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Kurdistan Oil Flows Not Expected to Resume Anytime Soon

Perhaps no subject in the complex world of global oil involves so many intricate moving parts as the extraordinary relationship between the Federal Government of Iraq (FGI), based in Baghdad, and the government of Iraq’s northern semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan (KRG), centred in Erbil. It is only when something such as the suspension of major flows of oil from Kurdistan to Turkey occurs, as began on 25 March 2023, that many analysts start trying to unravel what has caused it. And they find themselves entering an Alice In Wonderland world in which anything is possible, but nothing is as it seems. In this world, it is very easy to lose sight of the wood for the trees sometimes, and this appears to be what has happened in a letter sent by foreign oil firms in Kurdistan to the U.S. Congress asking for help in having the export oil embargo lifted. Ironically, in fact, it is only towards the very end of the letter from the Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) that the group, which largely comprises the oil interests of several foreign firms directly or indirectly, inadvertently hits on the precise reasons why a full, clear, and transparent lifting of the embargo is unlikely to happen soon, if ever. The letter highlights that the halt in exports that affects between 400,000-500,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil from Iraqi Kurdistan must be lifted because it puts at risk over US$10 billion of U.S. and international investments in Kurdistan and because it is severely impacting the region’s economy and stability at a time when regional tensions are already heightened. “By keeping the West out of energy deals in Iraq – and closer to the new Iran-Saudi axis - the end of Western hegemony in the Middle East will become the decisive chapter in the West’s final demise,” said a very high-ranking Kremlin official at a meeting with senior government figures from Iran, just after the 10 March 2023 signing of the Iran-Saudi Arabia relationship resumption deal, brokered by China. The comment was exclusively relayed to OilPrice.com, just before the 25 March oil export embargo from Iraqi Kurdistan by a senior source who works closely with the European Union’s energy security apparatus, and we passed it on to our esteemed readers. Nothing whatsoever has changed to modify the view of either the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, or the senior figures in Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing who are helping to implement the ‘One Iraq Plan’ as it is referred to behind closed doors. If anything, the rising uncertainty in the Middle East emanating from fears of a dramatic escalation in the Israel-Hamas War are serving to expedite key elements of the plan, with the U.S.’s focus on that War. In essence, the bare mechanics of the ‘One Iraq Plan’, as broadly delineated by the senior Kremlin figure, are to cut off all sources of external revenue from the government of Iraqi Kurdistan – most significantly from independent oil sales by foreign companies operating there – before absorbing it into the rest of the country, under the sole rule of Baghdad, as analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. If that is understood, then everything that has subsequently happened in Iraq since the 10 March relationship resumption deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia makes perfect sense. The basic reason for this is that Iraqi Kurdistan has long been regarded by Russia, China, and Iran, as a key U.S. ally in the Middle East, and this will no longer be tolerated, which gives rise to two further choices. China to Hike the Price of Gasoline and Diesel The first is to give Iraqi Kurdistan its independence and sever all links between it and the rest of Iraq. This, though, is not an option on the table for three key reasons. One is that the main northern overland export route into Europe for all of Iraq runs through the Kurdistan region and into Turkey. The original Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) – controlled by the FGI in Baghdad - consisted of two pipes (a 40-inch one started up in 1977, and a 46-inch one started up in 1987), from the Kirkuk oil fields (also nominally owned by the FGI) on the border of the Iraqi Kurdistan to Ceyhan, which had a combined nameplate capacity of 1.6 million bpd. The FGI-controlled pipeline’s export capacity reached between 250,000 and 400,000 bpd when running normally, although it was subject to regular sabotage by various militant groups. The Iraqi Kurdistan’s KRG, in response to the regular attacks on the FGI pipeline, completed its own single-side track Taq field-Khurmala-Kirkuk/Ceyhan pipeline in the border town of Fishkhabur. This was part of its drive to raise oil exports above 1 million bpd. Clearly, Baghdad will never give these vital oil export links away. The second reason is that giving Iraqi Kurdistan independence would set a dangerous precedent for all other large Kurdish groups in the region to ask for the same. Iran’s Kurdish population is around 9 percent, Syria’s 10 percent, and Turkey’s about 18 percent. It is highly apposite to note in this context that the U.S. had privately assured the Iraqi Kurds in 2014 that in exchange for their Peshmerga armed forces taking the principal combat role against a surging ISIS, they would eventually be given their own independent country, as also detailed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. On 25 September 2017, then, a vote did take place in Iraqi Kurdistan, in which the 92.73 percent voted for full independence. It was immediately followed by elements of Iran’s military rolling into Iraq Kurdistan, including the prime oil-rich areas. Additionally, very senior officers from Iran’s Quds branch of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, and from its Vezarat-e Ettela’at Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran intelligence service, made it clear to several of Iraq Kurdistan’s leading politicians that it would not be in their best interests to continue to push for independence from Iraq. At the same time, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a top military adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called for a blockade on Iraq Kurdistan’s land borders. Turkish President then as now, Recep Erdogan, also threatened to invade the Iraqi Kurdish area. He added that Turkey could also cut off the ITP export pipeline. The third reason is that having a fractious would-be breakaway region with ties to the U.S. makes the administration of Iraq’s massive oil and gas sector much more difficult for China and Russia. Moscow specifically took control of Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sector just after the abortive 2017 vote for independence to maintain a grip over the region with a view to reintegrating it back into the rest of Iraq, as also analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. In tandem with this, China has been building up its influence in southern Iraq, through multiple deals done in the oil and gas sector that have then been leveraged into bigger infrastructure deals across the south. The apotheosis of Beijing’s vision for China is all-encompassing ‘Iraq-China Framework Agreement’ of 2021. This, in turn, was an extension in scale and scope of the ‘Oil for Reconstruction and Investment’ agreement signed by Baghdad and Beijing in September 2019, which allowed Chinese firms to invest in infrastructure projects in Iraq in exchange for oil. Back in early April last year, OilPrice.com highlighted that oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan would only go ahead with the full blessing of Iran, Russia, and China. That has not been given, so there is no reason to expect it to end in any sustainable fashion any time soon. Conversely, however, the move to destroy any last vestiges of Iraqi Kurdistan independence remain in full swing. A clear statement on 3 August last year from Iraq Prime Minister, Mohammed Al-Sudani, highlighted that the new intended unified oil law – run, in every way that matters, out of Baghdad - will govern all oil and gas production and investments in both Iraq and its autonomous Kurdistan region and will constitute “a strong factor for Iraq’s unity”. As the senior E.U. source reiterated exclusively to OilPrice.com last week: “Baghdad has no interest at all in agreeing to any of Turkey’s terms or in Iraqi Kurdistan resuming its independent oil sales either.” He concluded: “As Baghdad does not see an independent Kurdistan in the future of Iraq, it sees the best solution as keeping the independent oil sales stopped and the Kurds financially paralyzed.” By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

United States in Iraq: Withdraw but Do Not Disengage

Draw media Sardar Aziz - EMAIRATES POLICY CENTER Key Takeaways Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has reiterated his country’s demand for a quick and orderly negotiated exit of United States-led military forces from Iraq. While Iran has to do something to justify its resistance narrative, it knows that pushing the relationship to the level of Iraq-US disengagement will harm its interests, too. Indirect Iranian presence has added regional issues to the US-Iraqi bilateral relationship. It further complicates the relationship and makes Iraq less capable of defending its interests. Iran is in dire need of using its low-level proxy involvement in Iraq to support its resistance narrative in the wake of the Israel-Hamas conflict. Speaking to Reuters on January 10, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani reiterated his country’s demand for a quick and orderly negotiated exit of United States-led military forces from Iraq. While describing the coalition forces as destabilizing, he did not set a timetable for the exit. This came after the end of an unofficial truce between the US army in Iraq and the Shia militias under the ruling coalition, the Coordination Framework. The truce commenced when the Sudani cabinet took charge and ended on October 7, 2023. The pressure on US forces this time is different as the region struggles to control a potential wider conflict due to the Israeli-Gaza War. Domestically, Iraq is run by pro-Iran forces. The Sadr Movement, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Sunnis are either outside the government or weakened. While Iran has to do something to justify its resistance narrative, it knows that pushing the relationship to the level of Iraq-US disengagement will harm its interests, too. There is too much fog around the US-Iraqi relationship, especially on how and when to end the US presence in Iraq. This is due to the involvement of too many actors: the US government, the Iraqi government, the Iraqi pro-Iranian militias, the Iranian government, and, to a lesser degree, other Iraqi components, Kurds and Sunnis. The current Iraqi government attempts to involve the broader public by sending a question to 20 million Iraqis on their mobiles, asking them whether they agree with the departure of the international coalition forces. It attempts to add a democratic flavor and makes the relationship murkier. Therefore, it is essential to demystify this fog and the different actors’ behaviors to understand the relationship’s current nature and potential future. The Nature of the Relationship On November 17, 2008, Ambassador Ryan Crocker finalized the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation with the Republic of Iraq. The US side calls the agreement Strategic Framework, while the Iraqis call it the Withdrawal Agreement, a linguistic but telling nuance. The agreement is based on several principles: Respect for sovereignty, defense cooperation, and rejection of violence to settle disputes. Moreover, the temporary presence of US forces in Iraq is at the request and invitation of its sovereign government and, with full respect for Iraq’s sovereignty, is part of the deal. This agreement was given another life when Iraq came under pressure from ISIS. The US was initially reluctant, but after the fall of Mosul in 2014, Iraq requested air power. However, the strategic agreement remained the basis of the US-Iraqi relationship and negotiations. Both sides attempted to focus on different aspects at different times based on the need and urgency and diversify the relationship beyond security and the military. For instance, before the October 7 attack, they focused on economic cooperation, according to Sarhang Hamasaeed, the Director of the Middle East Programs at the United States Institute of Peace. Initially, Iran was an external third party in the US-Iraq relationship. Iran’s presence turned the Iraq-US strategic relationship into a highly unpredictable and sometimes battleground, as Iran and the US collided on the nature of the relationship and the nature of the Iraqi state. Consequently, the third party has added geopolitical, sectarian, and emotional aspects to the relationship. The US drone strike killing Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and Popular Mobilization Forces Deputy Commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 2020 was a critical juncture. It put the Iraqi elites under pressure and led the Iraqi Council of Representatives to pass a resolution calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. As a former Iraqi MP revealed, the air was highly retaliatory, and the government had to do something. The resolution was driven by emotional motivation rather than long-term Iraqi interest. The US-Iraq relationship has changed significantly due to Iran’s involvement. It has heightened Iranian apprehensions and concerns, particularly over the drive for a US pullout, given that Iraq is not equipped, either economically or militarily. Secondly, the indirect Iranian presence has added regional issues to the US-Iraqi bilateral relationship. It further complicates the relationship and makes Iraq less capable of defending its interests. Thirdly, it has added the state of emergency aspect: When the Iran-US relationship escalates elsewhere, the Iranian proxies in Iraq respond. Fourthly, Iranian influence has made Iraqi society and politics increasingly polarized. The Iraqi View: Strategic Ambiguity In 2020, after the Council of Representatives voted to expel the US forces, Barbara A. Leaf and Bilal Wahab considered nationalist sentiment and Iranian pressure as the main drivers behind the expulsion. This time, Iraqi nationalism is conspicuously absent, particularly considering Sadr’s exclusion from the political process. As a result, the US-Iraqi relationship and its current course are more Iranian and less focused on Iraqi concerns, especially from the Iraqi side. In the case of US withdrawal, Iran is believed to continue to dominate further. Many might not be happy with the outcome, particularly in Sunni areas, where they would prefer a limited US military presence. This also holds for the Kurds. Falah Mustafa, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the President, said that the US representatives had reassured them of their decision not to withdraw. Despite Baghdad’s declaration, the Pentagon said it does not have plans to evacuate its approximately 2,500 personnel. These statements show the US and Iraq’s lack of enthusiasm for a withdrawal. Besides the security aspect, a quick withdrawal will risk the country already facing economic and diplomatic consequences. The country’s current dollar situation indicates this. Entangled between Iran and the US, Iraq has to compromise and take the burden. Iraq can now heighten its rhetorical opposition to the US presence, especially in the media. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, PM Sudani, not worried that the coalition’s departure would undermine Iraqi military capabilities, said: “There is no cause for concern, as we have capable security forces that can control all areas of Iraq.” This suggests Iraq is targeting military departures. According to US officials, adjustments to the international coalition, including about 900 troops from two dozen countries and 2,500 US troops, may be necessary to satisfy Iraqi rhetoric. The Iraqi PM intends to form an Iraq-US bilateral committee. From the Iraqi political doctrine perspective, the committee represents taking the longest route or not doing it at all. To placate two hostile powers in a precarious situation, the Iraqi government, the weakest link between the US and Iran, is forced to adopt strategic ambiguity, swinging between withdrawal and no withdrawal. The US View According to the former US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, David Schenker, the US neither wants to leave under threat nor believes the moment is right. Several factors directly and indirectly influence the present state of US-Iraq ties. The pre-Gaza assault on US policy toward Iran is in the background. The US had other priorities, such as Russia’s Ukraine invasion and China’s rise. Moreover, its internal politics considers the Afghanistan and Iraq wars as undeserving of US blood and wealth. Accordingly, the US tried to buy off through agreements that would commit the Iranians to step back from the brink of the nuclear program. They want Tehran to release some Americans and refrain from aggressive activities in the Gulf against tanker traffic and US interests, allies, and assets across the Middle East. Iran seeks to have influence essentially by provocation. Indirect support for the Framework and the weakening of others in Iraq set the premise for further centralization and weakened federalism. This reality is also behind the current Iraqi call for US withdrawal. Iran and its proxies in Iraq believe they have marginalized the others. The US tries to see the crisis as transitory and will soon defuse it, just like in 2019. At best, this might not be accurate. The US is now forced to revert to using hard power and the prospect of escalation, even though it hoped to move attention to the relationship’s economic, financial, and cultural parts. The US will suffer from this and lose influence within the country. The Iranian-Iraqi militias are working to demilitarize the Iraqi relationship with the US, among them by expelling the advisors, even though they may wish to retain diplomatic and commercial ties. In addition, the US partners in Iraq are losing faith, particularly now that these groups have weakened the Kurdish troops, whom the US has traditionally considered to be more allying. As Iran attempts to gauge the US’s patience, the latter is being compelled to take more unwanted actions. The Iranian View Iraq is the most strategic country for Iran. For many Iranians, a place like Karbala is not a foreign place as Iraq is a threat and also a strategic asset to Iran, which it runs through the IRGC. However, despite its strong and close relationship with Iraqi elites, Iran is deeply unpopular with the Iraqi population, among them the Iraqi Shia. Iran, therefore, views US involvement in Iraq as posing a cultural and political threat besides a military one. Iran is thus opposed to a democratic state that supports America, is located nearby, and may serve as a role model for Iran’s disgruntled youth. Iran’s traditions and values are being challenged, particularly by women and youth, as seen by the republic’s most recent Jin, Jiyan, and Azadi rallies. Attempts to create an Iraqi political culture opposing Western culture are part of the Iranian strategy in Iraq. The last two decades have shown that the US and Iran have an unwritten agreement to split the spoils in Iraq, as the Iraqi Kurdistan representative in Tehran believes. Others argue that “the Iran-Iraq bilateral relationship is crucial for both countries – it is deeply grounded in history and will continue despite the threat of boycotts, sanctions, and war.” The Iranian campaign to drive Americans out of Iraq is different. Iran wants to see the US troops leave Iraq entirely. However, it does not want to disengage. The former entails the complete withdrawal of advisers supplying the Iraqi military with training assistance, terminating military interaction beyond regular Chief-of-Mission operations. The US has no base in Iraq, and the Iraqi government owns all joint base areas used by the US military, including those located within the Kurdish Regional Government. While Iran does not want Iraq and the US to reach the disengagement level, i.e., withdrawing combat assistance and advisory units and relinquishing borrowed physical space on Iraqi military bases, the US withdrawal will impact the dollar flow to Iraq. That will harm the Iranian economy or might turn Iraq from an economic asset into a liability. Where is the Situation in Iraq Headed? The US-Iraq relationship is not isolated from the more significant global and regional developments. Geopolitical strategist Peter Zeihan says, “The period of US hyper-involvement in global affairs is ending.” This break in commitment will directly impact the world, particularly the Middle East. Aware of this prospect, neighboring countries are vying for influence and growth, and the US and Iraq are discussing their relationship in this context. The two countries’ delegates convened on January 25 to “start working group meetings of the US-Iraq Higher Military Commission (HMC)” following the delayed escalation. The HMC will enable the transition to an enduring bilateral security partnership between the US and Iraq, building on the successes of Iraq’s Defeat-ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The committees will consider the ISIS threat, operational and environmental requirements, and the Iraqi security forces’ capability levels. The US seeks to expand security cooperation to promote stability in Iraq and the surrounding area. Iraqi leaders and officials welcomed the negotiation, which was seen as an event to de-escalate. However, some doubt it. The Iraqis saw the meeting as a way to prepare for withdrawal. According to the Iraqi media, “withdrawal” was removed from the statement. All this happened prior to the January 28 attack on the T22 bases in northeastern Jordan, killing three US service members and injuring 25 others. The Tanaf attack is anticipated to alter the engagement terms. The attack will put Biden under immense pressure at home from Trump and many Republican congress members. The strike demonstrated the futility of Biden’s deterrence strategy, which Iran and its allies view as a vulnerability. Now, the Biden administration has to punish Iran and its proxies and convince its constituency at home and its allies in the Middle East. While there are calls for attacks on Iran, a direct US strike on Iranian land seems unlikely. Others have highlighted the possibility of covert action, which would not serve the present US government and the Biden administration, which aims to project US power and deter Iran from engaging in military aggression. The US is anticipated to move in several military, diplomatic, and economic capacities to target Iranian assets and militias in Iraq, which could lead to an escalation in Iraq. Conclusions The current push to expel Americans from Iraq is unlike any previous attempt, as the new drive is more Iranian. Iran is in dire need of using its low-level proxy involvement in Iraq to support its resistance narrative in the wake of the Israel-Hamas conflict. While officially, Iran might combine Iraq and Gaza, the real target is within Iraq, the only place where the Iranian proxy has the capacity and willingness to hit the Americans directly. Iran seeks to solidify its coalition control over Iraq, pressuring the US to leave but not to disengage, thereby making the Framework the only powerful entity in Iraq, marginalizing others. Iran may not succeed in its goal as the US will not begin talks as long as drone attacks continue and will not leave under pressure. Iran manages to degrade parties and groups that it has not yet entirely subjugated, like the KDP and Sadr, restrict the US diplomats, and put the military and administration on high alert. The US may strive to stay by changing the strategic agreement. However, it is rapidly losing its reputation and aura in Iraq, adversely impacting its soft power. The major actors might lose control, and the situation could worsen. Iraq is, therefore, a battlefield, but more significantly, it is a stage for performances and message-giving. It seems insufficient to attribute the US-Iraqi escalation in Iraq to the Israeli-Gaza War alone. More than anything else, Iran takes the US presence in Iraq seriously. This tit-for-tat will continue to pressure Americans and also shape the Iraqi political landscape.

Number of security and military forces in the Kurdistan Region

🔻There are (433) thousand security and military forces in the region 🔻The monthly salary of the security forces is (455) billion dinars 🔸Number of security and military forces 🔹Peshmerga and Internal forces: 217 thousand 979 people 🔹 Police and security:: 104 thousand 699 people 🔹 Military pensioners: 110 thousand 729 people Total military force: 433 thousand 407 people 🔸Monthly salaries of security and military agencies: 🔹Ministry of Interior: 178 billion 489 million dinars 🔹Ministry of Peshmerga: 133 billion and 61 million dinars 🔹Security Council and agencies: 62 billion 997 million dinars 🔹Military pension: 75 billion 630 million dinars 🔹Total: (450 billion 177 million) dinars, which is 49% of the total salary of KRG

British Consul General visits Draw Media

The new British Consulate-General in the Kurdistan Region, James Goldman, and a delegation from the the British Consulate-General in Erbil visited Draw media headquarter in Sulaymaniyah today. In a meeting with Draw Media editorial staff, the British consulate team discussed the Media environment and the freedom of the press in the Kurdistan region. They also focused on problems of the KRG civil servant salaries, livelihoods of people, and the future of oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region. (Draw) explained the situation of journalism and livelihoods of people with its reports, books and publications with statistics and data.

Oil production from Sarsang and Atrush fields in the fourth quarter of 2023

Shamarani Petroleum announced the oil production data in the fourth quarter of 2023; 🔹 Sarsang oil field produced an average of (36 thousand 400) barrels of oil per day, each barrel sold at (42) dollars, which is (50%) lower than the price of Brent oil in the world markets. 🔹 The Atrush oil field produced an average of 9,006 barrels of oil per day, selling at $33 per barrel, which is 61% lower than the price of Brent oil in the world markets. Oil production from Sarsang and Atrush fields in the fourth quarter of 2023 The Sarsang operator was able to increase production and local sales during Q4 2023. The Atrush operator restarted production on November 7, 2023, and reached production and sales of approximately 20,000 bopd that month but was then curtailed to a maximum of 10,000 bopd for most of December 2023. The Atrush curtailment was primarily due to operational bottlenecks at local refineries receiving the crude through reversed-flow pipeline deliveries, and this situation continues in January 2024. As of December 31, 2023, ShaMaran had gross outstanding debt of $293 million and net debt of $193 million (including restricted and unrestricted cash and Company-owned bonds). The Company intends to use part of its owned bonds to satisfy the $22.5 million bond amortization amount due in January 2024. Pro forma for the amortization and interest payments at the end of January 2024, the Company forecasts gross debt of $271 million and net debt of $200 million (including restricted and unrestricted cash and Company-owned bonds). ShaMaran expects to publish its audited Q4 2023 operating and financial results on March 6, 2024. Except as otherwise indicated, all currency amounts indicated as “$” in this news release are expressed in United States dollars. About ShaMaran Petroleum Corp. ShaMaran is a Canadian independent oil and gas company focused on the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The Company indirectly holds an 18% working interest (22.5% paying interest) in the Sarsang Block, and, subject to closing the previously announced transaction, will increase its indirect 27.6% working interest in the Atrush Block to 50%. The Company is listed in Toronto on TSX Venture Exchange and in Stockholm on Nasdaq First North Growth Market (ticker “SNM”). ShaMaran is part of the Lundin Group of Companies.

UK confirms British businessman died in IRCG strike on Erbil site

A British citizen was killed during an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) strike on a site in northern Iraq, the UK government has confirmed. Five civilians, including two children, died in the missile strike in Erbil on Monday, according to Iraqi Kurdish officials. It targeted the family home of Kurdish businessman Peshraw Dizayee, who was killed alongside his 11-month-old daughter. Stephen Hitchen, the British ambassador to Iraq, confirmed the death of dual citizen Karam Mikhael in the attack. “I extend my deepest condolences to the families of all the victims of yesterday’s reckless attacks, and in particular to the family of British national Karam Mikhael. Our thoughts are with you during this difficult time," he said. Mr Mikhael's family, who held a wake for him on Wednesday, strongly rejected claims that he was involved in business with Israel, according to Kurdistan media site Rudaw. Mr Mikhael, the founder and Chief Executive of Manahil El Ryan, a consumer electronics distributor in Iraq and the country’s first online marketplace was attending a social gathering at the time of the strike, it said. The Erbil branch employs almost 150 people. The government said Foreign Secretary David Cameron raised his death during his meeting with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, in Davos on Wednesday. A representative said: “The Foreign Secretary condemned the attacks in Erbil in Iraq, which killed UK-Iraqi dual national Karam Mikhael. Attacks like this violate the sovereignty of other states.” Iran claimed Mr Dizayee’s house was a Mossad office, but his business empire has no apparent links to Israel, although his company's website says it is involved in oil services, a crowded sector in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The Prime Minister of Iraq's Kurdistan Region rejected the claim that the site was an Israeli spy base. The region previously exported oil to Israel, but has not done so since early last year, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy think tank said. The IRGC claimed the attacks in Iraq's Kurdish region, which consists of three provinces, were also aimed at “destroying anti-Iranian terrorist groups” in the area. The IRGC also hit targets in eastern Syria in a separate missile attack on the same night. In both instances, Iran claimed the attacks were in response to a January 3 bombing in Kerman, Iran, which killed nearly 100 people at an event commemorating Iranian general Qassem Suleimani’s death in a 2020 US air strike near Baghdad. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, had vowed a “harsh response” to the attack, which was claimed by ISIS, but which Tehran has blamed on Israel and the US. The IRGC has since struck the Baloch group Jaish ul Adl in Pakistan, which Iran has accused of taking part in an attack on a police station in the south of the country.

Violations against journalists decreased by (42%)

Compared to 2022, violations and arrests of journalists decreased by 42% in 2023. Violations decreased from 431 to 249 cases, arrests decreased from 64 to 37 cases. Metro Center for Journalists' Rights and Advocacy has released its annual report on the situation of journalists in the Kurdistan Region. According to the report, 249 violations were committed against 247 journalists in 2023, including: Prevention and discrimination: (134) cases Seizure of journalist's devices: (38) cases Arrest of journalists: (37) cases Attacks, Threats and Insults: (27) Arrest of journalists outside the Journalism Law (5) cases Cyber attack: (4) cases Breaking journalist's belongings (2) cases Raids on journalists' homes: (2) cases Violations against journalists 2022: (431) 2023: (249) Decreased: (182) (42%) Arrest of journalists 2022: (64) arrests 2023: (37) arrests Decreased: (27) cases Decreased by 42%

US State Department condemns IRGC missile attacks on Erbil

The US Department of State strongly condemned the missile attacks carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) against Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), on Tuesday, resulting in the death and injury of 10 civilians. The spokesperson for the Department, Mattew Miller, stated in a press release, "The United States strongly condemns the Iranian attacks in Erbil today and extends its condolences to the victims’ families." "We oppose Iran's reckless missile strikes, which undermine the stability of Iraq." He continued, "We support the efforts of the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to meet the aspirations of the Iraqi people." Furthermore, on Monday night, IRGC launched a fierce missile strike targeting civilian areas in Erbil, causing the death and injury of 10 civilians. It is noteworthy that IRGC had earlier claimed responsibility for the attacks that targeted Erbil and stated that they came "in response to the crimes of the Zionist regime against the Islamic Republic, the latest of which was the killing of several IRGC leaders by Zionist fire, targeting a main Mossad spy center in KRI and destroying it with ballistic missiles." The statement added that this Zionist center was the main one responsible for developing and launching espionage operations and planning terrorist activities in the region, especially against Iran. The Security Council of the Kurdistan Region condemned, early today, the missile bombardment conducted by IRGC, targeting various areas in Erbil, as a "blatant violation of the sovereignty" of the Region and Iraq. The Council stated that at 11:30 on the night of January 15 to January 16, 2024, IRGC bombarded several civilian areas in Erbil with ballistic missiles, resulting in the death of four civilians and the injury of six others, some of whom are in critical condition. The statement added that IRGC declared that the attack targeted several locations of groups opposed to Iran, pointing out that this excuse has no basis, and we reject it. They always use baseless excuses to attack Erbil. The statement emphasized that "Erbil, as a stable region, has never been a source of threat to any party." The statement continued that the strikes carried out by the IRGC on Erbil are a "flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the region and Iraq," and the federal government and the international community must not remain silent about this crime.

Since The Suspension of Oil Exports, The KRG Oil Sector Lost About $7.5 Billion

🔻 (1/4/2023 – 31/12/2023) After more than three seasons, oil exports have been suspended and there is no specific time to resume oil exports. 🔹 According to Deloitte data, before the suspension of oil exports, an average of more than (12 million) barrels of oil had been exported per month. 🔹 That is, within three seasons, the oil exports would have reached about (110 million) barrels of oil. 🔹 The average price of Brent oil during (1/4/2023 – 31/12/2023) was (82.9 dollars). 🔹 If the Kurdistan Region had sold its oil at a discount of $15, as happened in the second, third and fourth quarters of 2022; 🔹 The average price of oil sold in the Kurdistan Region would be (67.9 dollars). 🔹 The total value of oil exports would be (7 billion 455 million 479 thousand) dollars. Suspension of oil and financial losses Nine years after the Iraqi government filed a complaint against the Turkish government at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, "Turkey violated the 1973 oil pipeline transit agreement by allowing crude oil from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region to be exported through Turkey without Baghdad's consent." Finally, the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris issued a 277-page resolution on February 13, 2023 and on March 25, 2023 officially suspended oil exports from the Kurdistan Region. According to the decision of the International Arbitration Chamber in Paris, the Kurdistan Regional Government is a constitutional and legal government within Iraq, but cannot transport oil through pipelines, whether northern oil, or the region's oil, because the Kurdistan Region is not part of the IPT agreement which was signed between Turkey and Iraq in 1973 on oil pipelines. More than nine months have passed, but no concrete agreement has been reached to resume oil exports. Here we highlight the financial losses caused by the suspension of oil in the region during (1/4/2023 – 31/12/2023): • According to Deloitte's reports for the second, third and fourth quarters of 2022, which means the same the same period as in 2023; - The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exported an average of 12 million 192 thousand 494 barrels of oil monthly through the pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. - The Kurdistan Region sold oil at $15 less than Brent oil per barrel during the period. - According to Deloitte reports, 54% of oil revenues went to the expenditure of the process and 46% returned to the general treasury of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Therefore, based on the three reports of Deloitte during the second, third and fourth quarters of 2022, we explain the following assumptions; • From (1/4/2023 – 31/12/2023) that is (9) months have passed since the suspension of oil exports. • The region could have exported an average of 12 million 192 thousand 494 barrels of oil per month. • That is, within (9) months, the oil exports would have reached (109 million 732 thousand 446) barrels of oil. • The average price of Brent oil was $82.90 during the period. • If the region had sold its oil at a discount of $15, as happened in the second, third and fourth quarters of then; • The average price of oil sold in the Kurdistan Region would be $67.90 per barrel. • The total value of oil exports would be (7 billion 455 million 479 thousand 397) dollars. • If the amount of revenue (54%) would go to the expenditure of the oil process, it would be equivalent to (4 billion 25 million 958 thousand 874) dollars. • Accordingly, the amount of (3 billion 429 million 520 thousand 532) dollars at a rate of (46%) would be returned to the general treasury of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The following table explains the process.

Barzani has secretly met with Kirkuk Arabs

Massoud Barzani, leader of the KDP met with Arab representatives in Kirkuk and apologized for "past mistakes toward the Arabs." Mohammed Hamadan, a member of the Iraqi parliament, who is one of the leaders of the Kirkuk Arab Project, said they had a meeting in Erbil today. According to the investigations of (Draw), an Arab delegation led by Rakan Jabbari, acting governor of Kirkuk, met with Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Pirmam. Mohaimen Hamadani said about the meeting: "It was a historic and honest meeting for the Kurdish-Arab relationship, that the mistakes of the past years to be identified for the first time and acknowledged and apologize to all Arabs for all the suffering they have experienced."

Rare attack near heart of Iraqi Kurdish power holds multiple messages

Amwaj.media The story: Kurdish security forces have been targeted in a rare drone strike in northern Iraq. A Peshmerga base in an area that is home to the headquarters of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was hit. While no one has claimed responsibility, the attack follows months of operations against US forces in Iraq and Syria by a new entity known as the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq.” The incident also notably comes amid increased political tensions between Erbil and Baghdad—sparking sharp reactions. The coverage: Two attack drones hit a Peshmerga base in Pirmam on the night of Dec. 30, 2023, according to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The district is located approximately 28 km (17.4 miles) northeast of the city of Erbil. No casualties have been reported, although the strike is said to have caused material damage. Pirmam is notably home to the headquarters of senior KDP leaders, including party president Masoud Barzani and his son Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani. The area is thus highly sensitive both from a security perspective and in terms of political symbolism. KDP and KRG officials have reacted furiously to the incident, describing it as a “terrorist attack.” Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani said in a statement that “the assault on the Peshmerga, which is an official force and an integral component of Iraq’s federal defense system, is a dangerous and unacceptable escalation.” Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Barzani condemned the “outlaws and their collaborators.” In a thinly veiled reference to Shiite armed groups, Barzani thundered, “They use state money and weapons to attack the Kurdistan Region, destabilize the whole of the country, and risk renewed conflict in a nation that has seen enough bloodshed.” To help manage the rising tensions, top Iraqi Kurdish figures have engaged with senior members of the security establishment in Baghdad. On Jan. 4, KDP leader Masoud Barzani met with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim Al-Araji. Notably, the Kurdish party president also held talks with the chairman of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), Falih Al-Fayyadh. The context/analysis: While no one has claimed responsibility for the Pirmam incident, it notably comes amid ongoing attacks on facilities hosting US troops in Iraq and Syria. The “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” began targeting American forces in Oct. 2023 with the apparent aim to press the Joe Biden administration to halt the Gaza war. US facilities in Iraqi Kurdistan have been repeatedly hit, including at the Erbil Air Base. Incidents have additionally taken place at the Harir Air Base, located some 70 km (44 miles) outside Erbil. Pirmam is situated between Erbil and Harir. Out of an estimated 150 attacks in Iraq and Syria since Oct. 2023, some 30 targeted the Erbil and Harir bases, according to the Institute for the Study of War. Of note, only days after the Pirmam incident—on Jan. 5—Harir was hit by another attack drone. Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani has said that his government will launch a “comprehensive investigation” into the attack on the Peshmerga base. In contrast with past strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan, there has been little foreign condemnation, with France among few to issue an official statement. Faced with the political aftermath of deadly US attacks on Shiite armed groups accused of involvement in the targeting of American forces, Sudani has sought to calm tension. The renewed push for US forces to leave the country has grown stronger following a Jan. 4 US airstrike that killed Mushtaq Jawad Kazim Al-Jawari. Abu Taqwa, as Jawari was better known, was a senior commander of Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba. Notably, KDP-affiliated media outlets heavily covered the US airstrike. The day after the killing of Jawari, Sudani announced the formation of a committee to end the presence of Coalition and US troops in Iraq. The KDP—and Iraqi Kurdish parties more generally—are strongly in favor of maintaining the presence of Coalition and US troops. In this context, the attack on Pirmam is possibly an attempt to pressure the KDP on the issue specifically. The KRG and Iraq’s federal government are also in the midst of a multi-pronged dispute, which covers the budget, elections, oil, security, and other issues. The KDP—and Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Barzani specifically—have a testy relationship with the Iran-backed Shiite Coordination Framework. While not outright antagonistic, relations between the KDP and the ruling Shiite Arab parties are often tense. In contrast, the other main Kurdish ruling party—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—is closely aligned with the Shiite Coordination Framework. The Dec. 30 incident—showcasing the ability to attack symbolically important Pirmam—is potentially another way to keep the KDP under pressure amid Baghdad-Erbil tensions. The future: The Pirmam incident could hold both local and broader geopolitical messages for the KDP. Therefore, it is important to track coming developments along both axes. Ultimately, the potential for the withdrawal of Coalition and US troops is a matter between Baghdad and foreign capitals, with Erbil able to wield only limited influence. However, the KDP’s reaction to such a development will be politically significant. The Kurdish regional administration has progressively lost power to the federal government over the past two years. As the lead party in the KRG cabinet, this hurts the KDP the most. As the Shiite Coordination Framework continues to press this advantage, it remains to be seen whether the KDP can reverse the current dynamic. If the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” is involved in the attack in Pirmam, it could indicate that Shiite armed groups are able and ready to also target domestic political competitors. Attacks on the Peshmerga by forces based outside Iraqi Kurdistan have been rare since 2017, and when they have taken place usually limited in scale. If the tempo and intensity of strikes on Peshmerga positions grow, that would be a negative indicator for Baghdad-Erbil relations. Politically, the latter could in turn affect the prospect of the two sides forging a lasting consensus on issues like the budget or oil policy.

Legal Opinion Validates KRG's Constitutional Authority in Oil Sector

Draw Media Judge Stephen M. Schwebel In a landmark legal analysis, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel provides a resounding endorsement of the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) constitutional rights in oil and gas production and management. This opinion, rooted in a deep understanding of international and Iraqi constitutional law, underscores the KRG's legitimate, legal, and constitutional claim to manage its oil and gas resources. Schwebel's analysis meticulously dissects the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, affirming that the distribution of power heavily favours regional governments, like the KRG, over the Federal Government in matters of natural resource management. Central to his argument is the interpretation of Articles 110, 114, 115, and 121, which collectively do not grant the Federal Government exclusive authority over oil and gas resources. Instead, these articles empower regions to manage the production of oil and gas within their territories. Judge Schweble offers an extensive review of the 2022 ruling by the so called Federal Supreme Court, which deemed the KRG Oil and Gas Law of 2007 unconstitutional. His perspective significantly contests the court’s verdict and outlines the KRG's authority to create legislation and engage in agreements for oil and gas advancement within the boundaries of the constitution. Furthermore, Schwebel's opinion aligns with the late Professor James Crawford's analysis, emphasising that the KRG's authority extends to decisions on new oil exploration and exploitation, thereby reinforcing the region's autonomy. In conclusion, Judge Schwebel's legal opinion serves as a pivotal affirmation of the KRG's constitutional rights, paving the way for a more empowered and autonomous regional governance in managing its vital oil and gas resources. Stephen M. Schwebel is an American jurist and international judge, counsel and arbitrator. He previously served as judge of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal (2010–2017), as a member of the U.S. National Group at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, as president of the International Monetary Fund Administrative Tribunal (1993–2010), as president of the International Court of Justice (1997–2000), as vice president of the International Court of Justice (1994–1997), and as Judge of the International Court of Justice (1981–2000). Prior to his tenure on the ICJ, Schwebel served as deputy legal adviser to the U.S. Department of State (1974–1981) and as assistant legal adviser to the U.S. Department of State (1961–1967). He also served as a professor of law at Harvard Law School (1959–1961) and Johns Hopkins University (1967–1981). Here is the full text of Judge Schwebel’s analysis, titled “The Authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government Over Oil and Gas Under the Constitution of Iraq" Kurdistan Opinion Signed

Youth migration from Iraqi Kurdistan declined sharply in 2023

The head of the Civil Organizations' network in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, Sirwan Kurdi, on Tuesday said that the rate of youth migration from the Kurdistan region to Europe and other countries in the world has declined sharply in 2023. Kurdi said in a press conference in Erbil that during the past three years, about 36,000 to 38,000 young people from the Kurdistan region migrated to Europe. In 2023, the rate of migration declined to a low level of only 1,030 people. Kurdi attributed this decline to the outbreak of the war between Ukraine and Russia, the deterioration of the economic situation in Europe, and the tightening of Turkish authorities on illegal immigration operations.

Iraq Oil revenues decline in 2023 despite increase in exports

New statistics from the Iraqi Ministry of Oil revealed a decline in oil revenues in 2023, despite the rise in exports to more than 1.23 billion barrels of oil during the year when 67 new oil wells were drilled in the northern and southern regions of the country. Iraq relies on oil to provide around 96 per cent of its financial revenues, which bridges the financial deficit and reduces domestic and foreign debts. According to local media, the overall activities of oil export operations showed that the total oil exports in 2023 amounted to approximately 1.23 billion barrels. The statistics confirmed that the monthly oil export rate reached 102.6 million barrels, at a daily rate of 3.4 million barrels; a 5.36 per cent increase from the 2022 exports. The ministry’s figures indicated that the financial revenues from oil sales amounted to approximately $87.6 billion, averaging around $7.3 billion per month. This marks a 31.79 per cent decrease from the previous year’s revenues of $115.46 billion. According to the ministry’s figures, India and China were the main consumers of Iraqi oil, followed by US companies.

Drone shot down near US military base in northern Iraq

The Counter-Terrorism Service in the Kurdistan region of Iraq announced in a statement that defense systems shot down an armed drone on Sunday near Erbil International Airport in northern Iraq, where US and international forces are stationed. A group called the Islamic Resistance in Iraq said it launched a drone attack to target what it called an ‘occupation base.’ According to security officials, there were no injuries or infrastructural damage. US and international forces stationed in Iraq and across the border in Syria are on high alert amid dozens of attacks on their bases since the outbreak of the war between Israel and Hamas. The attack took place less than 24 hours after two drones were shot down on Saturday evening near a military base in northern Iraq used by the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Al-Harir Air Base, which also hosts US forces, according to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, ordered on Sunday an investigation in coordination with security forces in Iraqi Kurdistan and pledged to pursue those responsible for Saturday’s attack.