Draw Media
News / Kurdistan

Peshmerga reform hangs in the balance in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region

Winthrop Rodgers Efforts to reform the Iraqi Kurdish security forces known as the Peshmerga are at serious risk of failing. Tensions between the ruling parties of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region are not new, but the working relationship between the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has collapsed over the past year. As a result, officials within the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MOPA) are no longer capable of preventing the politics of partisan self-interest from consuming the reform project. The prospects for the depoliticization and unification of the Peshmerga have rarely seemed more remote. The first anniversary of the renewed memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the U.S. Department of Defense and the MOPA is coming up in September. According to multiple people familiar with the situation, the Peshmerga is not living up to the agreement. Therefore, with three years left in the deal, it is a good time to be clear-eyed about the state of reform. There is still an opportunity to salvage the program, but not in the likely event that current dynamics continue. There will be significant consequences if the Kurdistan Region’s political leaders fail to get serious about implementing Peshmerga reform. Reassurances and playing for time are insufficient. There is a pervading feeling of disappointment among Western military officials working on reform. They recognize that historic tensions between the KDP and the PUK are real, but worry that Kurdish leaders are allowing a golden opportunity to slip away after years of enthusiastic foreign support. The military dimension is just one part of the relationships between the Kurdistan Region and its foreign partners, but it is an important one. If the Kurdish political parties fail to live up to their responsibilities, it will have knock-on effects for political and economic links with longtime supporters. A splintered Kurdistan Region within an increasingly centralized Iraq holds much less geopolitical relevance for the international community than a united entity within a federal system. This piece reflects the open political dynamics in the Kurdistan Region and conversations with Peshmerga officials from both parties, as well as former and current military officials from the Kurdistan Region’s foreign partners, all of whom spoke on background. A golden opportunity The modern Peshmerga — which means “those who face death” in Kurdish — was born out of the various armed groups that fought for Kurdish rights in Iraq during the second half of the 20th century. Of these, the KDP and the PUK were the most powerful. The legacy of this initial division matters, but there have been three distinct opportunities to set aside partisan differences in the interests of Kurdish unity. The first two — when self-governing institutions were established following the 1991 Kurdish uprising and in the wake of the 2006 KDP-PUK strategic agreement — were not realized. Institutions remained divided. Within the Peshmerga, the KDP and the PUK each maintained partisan units, known respectively as the 80s Unit and the 70s Unit, while half-heartedly engaging with ostensibly joint institutions like the MOPA. The third opportunity came as a result of the war against Islamic State (ISIS), in which the Kurdistan Region played a frontline role starting in 2014. More than 1,300 Peshmerga were killed and thousands of others were wounded in operations against the militant group. Members of the International Coalition to Defeat ISIS provided support and training to the Peshmerga, but both Kurds and foreigners realized that its divided structure hampered its military effectiveness. Military needs could service political goals. With the full commitment and support of the international community, Kurdish political leaders had an opportunity to unify, with the Peshmerga as both the symbolic and practical vehicle. In 2017, the U.S., the U.K., and Germany formally launched the Peshmerga reform program; the Netherlands later joined the group in 2019. They reached a 35-point agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to create a “robust and professional” defense force. It included developing an official security strategy for the KRG, bringing partisan KDP and PUK units under the MOPA, eliminating so-called “ghost employees” (who exist only on paper but receive a salary), instituting new recruitment practices to eliminate patronage, and implementing new logistics and equipment procedures. At the time, officials predicted that it would take between five and 10 years to complete the process. Recognizing the Kurdistan Region’s dire financial straits, the U.S. began providing stipends to pay the salaries of MOPA-controlled Peshmerga around 2017; currently, Washington provides $20 million per month. Some progress has been made. The ministry has also started using a biometric payroll system to crack down on ghost employees. Twenty brigades are now organized under the MOPA, involving approximately 54,000 Peshmerga, according to the most recent lead inspector general report for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). KDP and PUK officials both insist that several other units stand ready to be integrated in the near future. Oftentimes, announcements of progress are premature and a way to deflect pressure to show results. For example, the MOPA announced on Aug. 15 that KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has authorized the formation of three more brigades under the ministry taken from the PUK, but the process of switching them over is not yet complete, according to a PUK source. Yet, many of the big-ticket items remain unaddressed. There is no agreed security strategy and required lists of available equipment have not been delivered. Approximately 50,000 KDP Peshmerga, which are organized under the 80s Unit, and 50,000 PUK Peshmerga, under the 70s Unit, remain outside MOPA control. These partisan units perform the majority of counter-ISIS operations, leaving ministry Peshmerga to conduct “control of area” operations in the Kurdistan Region. “Some of the most effective counter-ISIS capability, including aggressive patrolling, raids, and ambushes, still lies with the commando forces in the 70s and 80s Units,” the lead inspector general report found. On Sept. 21, 2022, the U.S. and the KRG signed a new, four-year MoU with strict timelines and deliverables for Kurdish officials to meet. In interviews, Kurdish officials conceded that they were behind schedule in meeting those deadlines. The OIR lead inspector general’s report, which was published on Aug. 3, found that the coalition is “still uncertain how and when [the KDP and the PUK] will transfer the remainder of their forces to the MOPA” and blamed “political tensions” between the parties for this uncertainty. Moreover, the joint brigades “showed no progress in developing key warfighting functions” and the MOPA “continues to lack a long-term plan,” including a defense strategy. Political dynamics in the Kurdistan Region Asked why Peshmerga reform is in trouble, most people interviewed for this piece blamed the refusal of the political leaderships of the KDP and the PUK to work together. While acknowledging that many Peshmerga, particularly in the older generations, maintain strong partisan loyalties, they felt that the majority of military officials were committed to the reform program and recognized its benefits. Militarily, Peshmerga reform will yield a unified command and control system, simplified logistics and equipping, and reduce patronage in recruiting. But given the history of the Kurdistan Region, taking guns out of the hands of individual political parties and making security affairs apolitical would be a huge boon for Kurdish democracy. Increasingly, however, these officials are unable to deflect the extreme partisan behavior of their political masters away from MOPA operations. Without even this imperfect symbol of shared commitment to unity, the Peshmerga reform process is surely doomed. Within the KDP, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has taken over the day-to-day running of the party from his father, Masoud Barzani, and largely sidelined his cousin, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani. Before entering frontline politics, Masrour was deeply involved in running the KDP’s intelligence agency, known as the Parastin. This background influences his approach to governance: opaque, partisan, and focused on internal security. Human rights violations against activists and journalists are common in KDP-controlled Erbil and Duhok governorates. He sees the KDP as the most powerful party in the Kurdistan Region and is therefore reluctant to compromise or cooperate with others. From his position, Masrour Barzani is able to wield significant state resources in furtherance of his political ambitions. The PUK has the opposite problem. Its leader, Bafel Talabani, is a political neophyte who never held an official position within the party before coming to power. His main qualification is that he is the eldest son of the PUK’s longtime leader, the late Jalal Talabani. Initially elected as the party’s co-leader, Talabani removed his cousin Lahur Sheikh Jangi from power in July 2021. Although Sheikh Jangi no longer poses a real challenge to the party’s leadership, the episode alienated many party members. Talabani lacks grassroots support within the factional party and therefore relies heavily on the security forces to project an image of strength. The KDP uses its control of KRG finances to restrict the transfer of money to the PUK’s homebase of Sulaymaniyah governorate. To compensate for these weaknesses, Bafel Talabani has turned to Baghdad and the Shia Coordination Framework for support. He clearly sees the future of his party and Sulaymaniyah as better served by focusing on federal Iraq, rather than the Kurdistan Region. The PUK also maintains close ties with Iran, which has an important mediating influence within the party. Moreover, the PUK is reliant on income collected from Sulaymaniyah’s border crossings with its neighbor to make up for what it loses as a result of tensions with the KDP. In interviews, Kurdish officials acknowledged that tensions between the KDP and the PUK have become worse over the past six years, often citing the withdrawal of the Peshmerga from Kirkuk on Oct. 16, 2017 as a significant event. The KDP accused members of the PUK of betraying the Kurdish people by allegedly making a deal with the government in Baghdad in the aftermath of the 2017 independence referendum to withdraw from the disputed city without bloodshed. But many also argued that the relationship has gotten worse since the new Barzani and Talabani generations came to power after 2019. The result is a profound lack of trust that has destroyed the working relationship between the parties. For example, the PUK decided to boycott KRG cabinet meetings for six months in response to specific security incidents and a sense that Sulaymaniyah is not getting its fair share of revenues relative to Erbil and Duhok. Although that boycott ended under heavy pressure from the U.S. State Department, the two parties are hardly reconciled. Their differences remain on full display across a range of issues, including over Iraq’s federal budget law and elections. Following a contentious meeting between the parties on July 9, a reporter asked Bafel Talabani if the parties’ relationship was back on track. “Does it look like we’re on good terms,” the PUK leader growled before storming off.   Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga officers take part in a graduation ceremony in Erbil, the capital of Iraq's northern autonomous Kurdish region, on June 21, 2021. Photo by SAFIN HAMED/AFP via Getty Images.   Tensions escalate within the MOPA The MOPA, which is the heart of the Peshmerga reform process, is increasingly influenced by these dynamics and is currently without permanent leadership. In October 2022, the PUK decided that it wanted to replace Minister of Peshmerga Affairs Shorsh Ismail, who is a member of that party. PUK and international sources explained that there were concerns within the PUK that Ismail had grown too close to the KDP and Masrour Barzani during his tenure. He was also the subject of corruption allegations. Asked about this, a senior KDP Peshmerga official praised Ismail’s performance and argued that all parts of the force benefitted from his work as minister. Under the KDP-PUK agreement, both parties must consent before switching out high-level officials. The KDP also wanted to change some of its own officials, including Kurdistan Parliament Deputy Speaker Hemin Hawrami, who had recently been given a new party position. However, not all of the necessary pieces fell into place and the parties were unable to implement the changes. As a result, Ismail has not been replaced, but is also no longer active in his position. Both PUK and KDP Peshmerga officials lamented the lack of leadership at the top of the MOPA, but disagreed whether Ismail should return to his position. Partisan tensions within the MOPA exploded in July when the deputy Peshmerga minister, who is from the KDP, issued an order redistributing official positions within the ministry. Traditionally, posts have been divided evenly between the parties — a principle known locally as 50-50 — but the new order changed this to 57-43 in favor of the KDP and replaced PUK officials from the leadership of four department positions. Moreover, promotions of PUK Peshmerga officers have allegedly been held up, adding a personal dimension to the ministerial tensions. In the weeks that followed, documents were leaked online in order to embarrass high-level KDP and PUK Peshmerga officials with corruption accusations. In an interview, a senior PUK Peshmerga official denounced the order establishing the 57-43 ratio as “illegal” and against the KDP-PUK strategic agreement. He questioned why it was made without apparent regard to the MoU with the U.S. Moreover, he accused KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani of directing Peshmerga officials to issue the order. A senior KDP Peshmerga official defended the deputy minister’s order in a separate interview, calling it a “correct decision” that reflected what he argued are the greater geographic responsibilities of the KDP-affiliated 80s Unit. KDP-controlled areas border northern Kirkuk, Makhmour, and Nineveh, while PUK forces are mostly responsible for areas in eastern Kirkuk and northern Diyala. Asked where the decision to change the ratio originated, he conceded that ministry officials cannot issue such a decision “without receiving an order,” implying a political source. “I hope my answer is clear,” he said. A crossroads Former and current Western military officials involved in the Peshmerga reform process expressed their disappointment at the lack of progress. In interviews, they said that Kurdish leaders have been given a valuable opportunity, but are failing to take advantage. In their eyes, bringing the Peshmerga together as a unified force is politically fraught, but achievable. Ultimately, however, this is a Kurdish process and Kurdish political leaders are responsible for whether it moves forward or not. In interviews, the Peshmerga officials stressed the importance of continued Western engagement, but gave starkly divergent assessments of whether Kurdish leaders and institutions would live up their responsibilities. The KDP Peshmerga official expressed confidence that the process would get back on track following recent meetings with the coalition and promised results in the autumn. In contrast, the PUK Peshmerga official said that things would only improve if there are significant — and, frankly, unrealistic — political changes in the Kurdistan Region in the near term. One Western military official said they still have enthusiasm for the Peshmerga reform project, but echoed a military adage: hoping that Kurdish political leaders suddenly change their demonstrated behavior is not a strategy. If the KDP and the PUK fail to change tack, current levels of support may be reconsidered. This may already be starting to happen. According to multiple sources, a stern message has been delivered to Kurdish officials that the U.S. is weighing whether to reduce its stipend payments for MOPA salaries from $20 million to $15 million this autumn in response to the lack of progress. Geopolitically, the Kurdistan Region will undoubtedly remain relevant, but foreign capitals will become increasingly hesitant to involve themselves with the Kurdish parties. Peshmerga reform stands at a junction that speaks to more general dynamics. Will the political leadership put aside their mutual mistrust and advance a unified vision in service of all people and institutions of the Kurdistan Region regardless of political affiliation or will they crawl deeper into partisan self-interest as their foreign partners gradually tune out? Opportunity remains, barely and not for long.   Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist and researcher based in Sulaymaniyah in Iraq's Kurdistan Region. He focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy. He is an editor for The Nesar Record and past work has appeared in Rest of World, the Columbia Journalism Review, Al-Monitor, and the Los Angeles Review of Books.

Read more

DNO restarts Iraq's Tawke field, sells crude locally

Norwegian independent DNO said it has restarted crude production from the Tawke oil field in northern Iraq, four months after the closure of a key export pipeline to Turkey forced the company and fellow operators in Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region to shut in output and rein in their investment plans. The field is producing around 40,000 b/d, DNO said today, which is only around 5,000 b/d short of last year's average. With the export pipeline to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan still closed, half of Tawke's output is being delivered to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the rest is being sold to local trading companies, with prices averaging around 50pc of pre-closure levels, DNO said. "While there is no light at the end of the export pipeline, we are seeing the headlights of more and more incoming tanker trucks loading up our Tawke cargoes on a cash-and-carry basis," said DNO's executive chairman Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani. DNO said it restarted Tawke last month to carry out well integrity tests. It decided to keep the taps on in response to strong demand for the crude but the nearby Peshkabir field in the same licence remains closed, the company said. It is not clear how many other operators in Iraqi Kurdistan plan to follow DNO's lead. Gulf Keystone, which operates northern Iraq's Shaikan field, floated the option of selling crude to local buyers back in June. Turkey ordered the pipeline closure in late March after an international arbitration ruling said it had breached a bilateral agreement with Iraq by allowing KRG crude to be exported without Baghdad's consent. The KRG said in May that it had reached a deal with Baghdad on measures to allow oil exports through Turkey to resume and that Iraq's federal oil marketer Somo had asked Turkish authorities to facilitate the restart, but no timeline to resume pipeline operations has been announced. Knock-on effects The closure has had a significant impact on the finances of foreign oil firms operating in the region. DNO and its partner at Tawke, Genel Energy, have said they will pare back investments in Iraq until the situation is resolved. DNO reported today that it swung to a loss of $18.5mn in the second quarter from a profit of $87.4mn in the previous three months and $72.3mn in April-June last year, with its revenues squeezed by a sharp drop in production. The firm said its net oil and gas output hit a 13-year low of around 14,400 b/d oil equivalent (boe/d) in April-June, compared with almost 92,000 boe/d a year earlier. Gross crude production from the company's operated licenses in Iraqi Kurdistan averaged just 65 b/d during the second quarter, down from over 107,000 b/d in the same period of 2022. The small volumes that were produced in the few weeks after the pipeline closure were placed in storage tanks. The pipeline closure has also had a marked effect on the wider crude market, notably in Europe. The removal of northern Iraqi crude from international export markets, combined with Opec+ production cuts and sanctions on Russian Urals, has pushed up the price of North Sea sour grades, prompting European refiners to switch to lighter and sweeter crudes, in particular more affordable US WTI. The shift in crude slates is having a knock-on effect on refinery runs, yields and margins in Europe.

Read more

Tracking Iranian Soft Power Influence in the KRI

Nawras Jaff The Islamic Republic of Iran over several years has gained a significant foothold in Iraq, spreading its influence and agenda throughout Iraqi daily life. However, this foothold has adopted a particular character in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), where Iran has developed different mechanisms through which to expand that influence both inside and outside KRI territory. Tehran utilizes numerous methods of soft power to this end, including coercion in Iraq’s internal politics, proselytization, cultural expansion, and the shaping of educational opportunities.  Iranian Influence in the KRI’s Internal Politics As with much of Iraq, the Islamic Republic is notorious for its financial, military, and logistical support of Iraqi Kurdish political parties, especially the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Over the years, this has given Iran a key foothold in the Iraqi political scene. Starting at the beginning of the militant and revolutionary political movements of the parties in south Kurdistan in the 1960s until today, Iran's extensive role in supporting and insuring the financial, military, and logistical necessities of the parties has played a major role in internal Kurdish politics. Visits are one public aspect of this dynamic. An Iranian delegation visited Kurdish officials in April 2022 to discuss strengthening bilateral ties, during which the delegation met with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) president Masoud Barzani, KRI Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, and KRI President Nechirvan Barzani.  Iran’s Deputy Minister of Intelligence (Ettela’at/VAJA), Agha Lutfi, and another Iranian delegation likewise met with several other KRI politicians in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil in April 2023, including Muhammad Haji Mahmood, an Iraqi Kurdish politician affiliated with the KRI’s Social Democratic Party. During this visit, the Washington Kurdish Institute’s April 18 report noted claims that the Iranian delegation had pressured the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to “expel and disarm Iranian Kurdish parties in Iraqi Kurdistan in an attempt to follow up on a recent security agreement between Baghdad and Tehran,” an agreement focused on containing Iranian Kurdish dissidents in the KRI to protect Iran’s security. In a televised interview in April 2023, Haji Mahmood—secretary of a party splintered off from the KDP—seemingly acknowledged the deep entrenchment of Iranian forces in Kurdish politics, claiming that “in the 2014 elections, Qasem Soleimani, the former Iranian Quds Forces commander, gave one million U.S. dollars to the four Kurdish opposition parties.” Likewise, prior to his death, Soleimani would meet regularly with Iraqi Kurdish officials. In particular, he met with PUK figures in 2017, advising them and their Peshmerga forces not to attempt a firefight in the city of Kirkuk against the forces of then-Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, who were backed by Western and regional powers, including Iran. In exchange for a Peshmerga withdrawal from Kirkuk, Soleimani promised that Iran would “protect their interests.” His visit and advice were lauded by Kurdish lawmakers as both “wise” and helpful in preventing “a fatal mistake.” Religion as a Tool of Influence The KRI is primarily comprised of Sunni Muslims, especially those who follow the Shafi’i school of Sunni religious thought. For several years, Iran has organized the ‘Imam al-Shafi Congress’ for KRI Mullahs and other religious figures as a means of influencing religious leaders in the KRI. Some religious figures have in fact converted to Shia Islam. Sheikh Issa Barznji, for instance, pledged allegiance to Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of the prophet Mohammad, saying, "I am the follower of Imam Ali and Muhammad Prophet. Everyone should be the followers of Imam Ali" to Rudaw Media Network during Eid al-Ghadir, a significant holiday for Shia Muslims. He then went on to claim that the events of Saddam Hussein’s regime would not have occurred if Iraqis had been Shia.  Among the many ethnic groups inhabiting the KRI, Iran has tried to curry religious favor with several of them, including those that were targeted during the years when ISIS was most active—the Shabak, Kaka’i, and Bektashis in particular. In each case, Iran has attempted to push these minorities towards its brand of Shia Islam. As one source put it, “Iran tried to alter the opinions and beliefs of the Shabak and Kaka’is… [and attempted to] convince the Kaka’is that if they do not convert to Shia, Sunni extremists will attack them.” Demonstrating the partial success of Iran’s message, there are now Shia militias operating in the Mosul Governorate and in neighboring areas which consist of members of the Shabak and Kaka’i ethnic groups. Bartella, a previously Christian-dominant town in the heart of Christian Iraq, now hosts many Shia Iraqis.  Tariqqat There are multiple Tariqqat in the Kurdistan Region, almost all of which are affiliated with Sunni Islamic movements. Nevertheless, Iran’s influence is visible in one of the KRI’s largest Tariqa in terms of followers: Qadri-Kasnazani Tariqa, which is located in Sulaymaniyah. This Tariqa receives thousands of visitors monthly. Alongside Sunni visitors, Shia from southern and central Iraq and Iran visit and participate in its ceremonies and religious activities.  The history of this Tariqa is not extensive. It emerged from the burial place of Sheikh Muhammad Kasnazani after his death in July 2020. Since then, it has become a place of pilgrimage for his followers, including Iranians along with domestic and other foreign visitors. The imagery around this Tariqa is decidedly reminiscent of other Shia holy sites, including major Shia figures such as Ammar al-Hakim, the Hikmah Route Leader who is one of the known Shia leaders in Iraq and has great support from Iran. Iran has likewise devoted concerted efforts to trying to build a Hussainiya in the KRI city of Erbil. A Hussainiya (or Hosayniya) is a venue for Muharram ceremonies commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali, a primarily Shia practice. Though the building plan was eventually rejected by KRI authorities, Shias still perform their annual religious ceremonies and activities at the city’s Altoon Mosque.  Some indirect influence through Iranian visitors is also evident, and may have an impact on Kurdish receptiveness to these efforts. The KRI’s position along the route that some Iranians take in pilgrimage to the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in southern Iraq has left its mark on Iraqi Kurds’ familiarity with Iranian Shia Islam. Iranian nationals, along with Afghani nationals—despite Iraq’s lack of diplomatic relations with Afghanistan’s Taliban government—are allowed to enter Iraq without a visa as of 2021, including the KRI-controlled Bashmaq border crossing. In September 2022, especially during the annual anniversary of Ashura, more than 100,000 Shia followers from Iran used the KRI as a through point, arriving from the Haji Omaran border crossing. Pilgrims stayed a few nights in Erbil before and after the pilgrimage. Education Beyond religion, students hailing from the KRI are increasingly traveling to Iran to study in the Islamic Republic’s universities, a low-cost option compared to Iraqi universities for those pursuing bachelors, masters, and PhD degrees. Annually, an Iraqi student can expect to pay $5,000 in tuition at an Iraqi private university, while a master’s or doctoral degree will only cost a student $1,000 and $1,500, respectively, at the University of Tabriz in Iran. Making an Iranian education even more appealing, admission to an Iranian University has been greatly expanded to students with just “average scores.” Additionally, Iraq recognizes certificates from Iranian universities, further facilitating study there. The Islamic Republic has used the attendance of Iraqi Kurdish students in its universities to its advantage, introducing them to Shia culture and religion and the Iranian Shia agenda. This has resulted in a legacy of Iraqi Kurdish converts to Shia Islam, such as Umed Nanakali, an office manager for the renowned Shia cleric Ammar al-Hakim—who himself was exiled in Iran as a dissident of Saddam Hussein’s regime.  More recently, Iran has taken to bringing its own universities and educational opportunities inside the borders of its neighbor. Islamic Azad University, a multi-branch Iranian university with campuses in the Islamic Republic and Syria, has reached the approval phase to build five new campuses in the Middle East. Iraqis have noticed these Iranian moves and view this educational expansion as another attempt by the Islamic Republic to spread its influence across the region, including in the KRI. With Iran wielding such effective influence campaigns on both the political and cultural levels, all signs point to Iranian soft power continuing to grow in the KRI. Though the impact of these soft power efforts only tends to become evident over time, the current signs of Iranian influence in the KRI’s political, religious, and educational life suggest that this movement will remain effective in the future.

Read more

Fractious Iranian Kurdish dissidents pose challenge for KRG stability

A splintering of opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan is complicating efforts to meet Iranian demands for secure borders in order to avoid more drone and missile attacks. MOHAMMED HUSSEIN AND LIZZIE PORTER OF IRAQ OIL REPORT      Iranian Kurdish dissidents based in Iraqi Kurdistan are engaged in a destabilizing internal conflict that could lead to a more confrontational posture toward Iran, with the potential for provoking more cross-border attacks by Tehran's military forces. The Komala party, one of the main dissident groups, has generally maintained a policy against using Iraqi Kurdistan as a staging area for direct action against Iran. But now the party has split into three factions over a variety of disagreements, including whether to settle in refugee camps or maintain border bases, and how to structure alliances with other dissident groups. “I think the Iranian Islamic Regime is very happy about these intra-Kurdish conflicts,” said an official from the Komala Party of Kurdistan, one of the three factions. “Certainly, they would love to see us kill one another and weaken ourselves." The disarray comes as Tehran is threatening to take new military action if Iraq's federal government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) do not meet a mid-September deadline to disarm the dissident groups and move them to residential camps away from the border. “If the deadline passes and they remain armed or carry out any operation, our operations against those groups will definitely reoccur more severely,” said Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, according to a report by the state-backed Tasnim news agency.

Read more

Results of Draw survey on Kurdistan Parliamentary election

• 37% of the respondents have expressed their decision to boycott the elections. • A notable 68% of the respondents hold the belief that the elections will not lead to substantial changes. Draw Media The Kurdistan Region Presidency has announced that the sixth parliamentary elections will take place on February 25, 2024. In anticipation of this event, political parties have commenced their preparations to engage in the electoral process. To gauge the public sentiment regarding the Kurdistan parliamentary elections, the Survey section of Darw Media Organization conducted a comprehensive survey involving 5672 participants across the four provinces of the Kurdistan Region: Erbil, Sulaimaniyah, Duhok, and Halabja. The survey was supervised by Dr. Nyaz Najmaddin Noori, assistant professor of Economics at the University of Sulaimaniyah, and it was conducted through a dedicated electronic platform and was active during the period from 1-7 August 2023. Survey Findings:

Read more

Dana Gas: Oil Production Increased in Kurdistan

UAE's Dana Gas says oil production in the Kurdistan Region has increased by 6 percent, recently, Birl Petroleum, one of their partners, received $101 million from the Kurdistan Regional Government. Dana Gas Company announced: Profit fell 25 percent to $83 million in the first half of this year from $111 million in the first half of last year, as a result of falling oil prices and additional reductions in gas sales by selling condensate to NGOs while other oil companies operating in the region have stopped production. Revenue fell 22 percent to $222 million in the first six months of this year, compared with $284 million in the first half of last year, due to falling oil and gas prices in the world markets, as well as increased production in the region Consumption expenditure of 15% played a positive role in limiting the impact of the decline in oil prices. Added that Burl Petroleum has recently received $101 million from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) despite continuous internal challenges in Iraq, and negotiations have been held with the KRG to clear all outstanding entitlements as soon as possible It continued and all its products were used domestically.

Read more

Washington’s security strategy in Iraq was deep-frozen. This week might bring an overdue thaw

  In this new analysis, Jonathan Lord of the Center for a New American Security says this week should provide a starting point to reassess US military funding for Iraq.   Since 2014, the US has poured millions of dollars into Iraq under the mission of defeating ISIS. Even as the threat has shrunk, argues Jonathan Lord of the Center for a New American Security, the funding has continued with little to no change in approach. With a meeting of key officials in Washington this week, Lord says, it is time to reassess.  This week, the Pentagon will host Iraq’s Defense Minister Thabet Muhammad al-Abbasi and a delegation of Iraqi military leaders, selected by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, for a Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue (JSCD) in Washington. The two-day conference, led on the American side by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander, will seek to discern a vision for the future of the US-Iraqi security relationship. It’s a discussion that’s long overdue, and one that has to come with hard questions, not just about US-Iraq affairs but about how the Biden administration plans to manage the millions of dollars it still spends on Iraqi security each year. Since 2014, when the US military returned to Iraq under the auspices of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), its mission and legal authorities have focused squarely on defeating ISIS —  which at the time controlled one-third of the country, and was closing in on Baghdad and Erbil. The Iraqi security forces (ISF) and the Kurdish Peshmerga were in various stages of collapse and retreat, respectively. Dormant militias, with backing from Iran and harnessing a twisted interpretation of a fatwa from Iraq’s most senior Shia cleric, were re-establishing their ranks to fight-off the coming ISIS hordes. Iraq’s Counterterrorism Service, which had the longest, continuous relationship with its American counterparts of any Iraqi unit, remained one of the few relatively-capable forces, and found itself on the vanguard of virtually every significant and successful Iraqi operation to claw back territory from ISIS. Through the first three phases of the campaign, the Pentagon worked with Iraq’s military forces (all but the Popular Mobilization Forces, which it was precluded from supporting due to its proximity and linkages with Iran) to flood the zone with arms, equipment, and training. That included thousands of precision-guided munitions, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), courtesy of constant coverage from US Air Force UAVs. As early as 2017, after ISIS’ last major bastion of Mosul was liberated, Central Command planners began cogitating over what conditions needed to be met in order to reach “Phase IV” of the operation, and its ultimate conclusion. Nine years (to the day, August 8) since OIR began, it continues to languish in its final phase, which began in 2020, when a global pandemic reduced any in-person US-Iraqi mil-to-mil engagement to nil. Though ISIS has been reduced to an insurgent nuisance, OIR has persisted, as has the Congressional authority and funds to train and equip Iraqi forces that have long been saturated with equipment and training by their US counterparts. The Biden administration, the third US presidential administration to oversee OIR, has not moved with any particular urgency to advance beyond the defeat-ISIS mission. In July 2021, during a bilateral “strategic dialogue” with a delegation of Iraqi leaders, President Joe Biden announced the end of US combat operations in Iraq, and the withdrawal of any remaining combat forces by year’s end. The move was largely gestural, as US forces hadn’t suffered a single casualty in battle with ISIS since 2019. Today, the US military presence is largely confined to an advisory role in operational control rooms managed by Iraqi forces. Most of the resources it is appropriated and authorized by Congress in the “Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund” (CTEF) no longer pay for the rapid acquisition of vehicles, guns, and munitions. Instead, they are mostly used to pay the salaries of a teetering and largely symbolic force of Kurdish Peshmerga, the “Regional Guard Brigades” (RGBs), drawn together from the Kurdistan region’s two major political factions. The RGBs remain one of Iraq’s shakiest forces, perhaps even a “Potemkin Village” which the Kurdistan Regional Government props up to ensure the continued flow of tens of millions of dollars of support every month. Plainly put: Year in and year out, the Department of Defense has continued to request funding and the extension of authorities from Congress to train Iraqi forces to fight ISIS ($315 million this fiscal year alone), despite the fact that OIR’s training activities in Iraq have long since ceased and the fight is nearly non-existent. This week’s JSCD is the long-awaited kick-off to a bilateral discussion of what should come next. Why it has taken so long to reach this point is a question the Pentagon should have to answer. Lawmakers have been calling for such a dialogue — in law — as early as 2019, when in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress held back funding until the Defense Department took steps to properly staff the US Embassy-based “Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq,”, appoint a “Senior Defense Official-Defense Attache” (SDO-DATT), and host a “bilateral engagement with the Government of Iraq with the objective of establishing a joint mechanism for security assistance planning, including a five-year security assistance roadmap for developing sustainable military capacity and capabilities and enabling defense institution building and reform.” The Pentagon appointed an SDO-DATT a few years ago, though to this day, hasn’t provided permanent billets for OSC-I staff, despite Congress having mandated (and annually-restating the mandate for such) reform for years. The foot-dragging hasn’t come without cost or waste. The Pentagon continues to spend upwards of $20 million every month to prop-up an Iraqi Kurdish force that will likely disintegrate the day the money dries up. Having spent billions of dollars to arm Iraq for the ISIS fight, little effort has been made to reform Iraqi defense institutions, such that it can sustain its own equipment, plan and execute its own operations, operate without US-provided intelligence and ISR, or effectively command and maneuver combined forces on the field of battle. In essence, all of the ills that plagued the Iraqi military in 2014 still do, which makes sense, since virtually none of our military support was focused on fixing that problem. The focus was, rightly, on defeating ISIS. Frustration and concern has mounted in Congress. In posture hearings this year, when asked about the future of Iraq, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s answer was to assure members of Congress that the US military was staying-put. Wrong answer. Congress has sought to understand what steps the Pentagon was undertaking such that Iraq might no longer need to rely on an outsized US military presence, which itself has been the subject of constant political debate in Baghdad. While no US servicemembers have died at the hands of ISIS since 2019, some have been killed more recently than that, as the result of attacks by Iran-supported militias that violently object to a continued US military presence on Iraqi soil. Unwilling to wait any longer for the Pentagon to drive a future policy, the FY22 NDAA included line-item funding for Iraq under the less-permissive 10 USC 333 security cooperation authority, which would enable greater oversight of the US military’s security cooperation than the emergency ISIS authorities. Unlike the ISIS train and equip authority, “333” (“triple 3,” as it’s known) focuses more on building lasting military capacity, which is sorely needed if the ISF is to avoid repeating the history of collapse it suffered in 2014. In addition to brain-storming what funds and authorities it needs to assist Iraq’s military forces into the future, the Pentagon needs to coordinate its effort with the State Department, which through Title 22-based foreign military financing, continues to support major Iraqi military weapons programs that the Iraqi MoD will almost certainly never be able to sustain without help. Does Iraq need F-16s, which are expensive to fly and maintain, or might there be a more appropriate solution to provide Iraq’s ground forces with the air support they need? What about the C-130s or the M1 Abrams tanks? If these platforms are important enough to Iraq’s MoD, will it budget the necessary funds to pay for their upkeep, or is the US taxpayer going to foot the bill in perpetuity? The Pentagon and State Department need to come to a shared vision of future US military support, and it must do so collaboratively with Iraq’s military and political leaders, if they are to be effective. The Iraqis too have hard choices to make. It will require immense political will and courage to reform an Iraqi defense establishment that continues to perpetually hollow itself through corruption, indifference, and over-dependence on foreign assistance. It will require Prime Minister Sudani to ultimately confront and rein in para-military forces that exert too much political power, answer to too many commanders that aren’t him, and extract too many resources from Iraq’s government, for too-little security benefit for Iraqis. It will require Iraqi Kurdish leaders to commit to meaningful reform of the Peshmerga, such that it’s no longer the arm of political factions, but rather a tool of state security that’s answerable to elected leaders. It must operate to secure the safety and future of all Iraqi Kurds, in coordination with federal Iraq as a partner, and not be abused by individual Kurdish leaders for their own power and enrichment. With any hope, this JSCD is the first step in achieving a shared vision of a US-Iraqi security relationship that closes the book on the ISIS fight and develops an Iraqi military partner that can stand on its own two feet with fewer commitments in US blood and treasure. Though by any measure, it’s a hard step, it’s necessary, long overdue, and a more-than-welcome development. Jonathan Lord is a senior fellow and the director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, a former staff member for the US House Armed Services Committee, a former Iraq country director in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and a former political military analyst in the Department of Defense.    

Read more

Surge in harassment of journalists in Iraqi Kurdistan

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is alarmed by a surge in press freedom violations in Iraqi Kurdistan, an autonomous region in northern Iraq where several journalists have just been arrested arbitrarily and freelance journalist Sherwan Sherwani’s jail term has just been extended. Iraqi Kurdistan had until recently been relatively safe for media personnel but RSF has tallied around 20 arrests of journalists since the start of 2023. The events of the past few days are indicative of the escalation in violations. “Using the letter relative to Sherwan Sherwani’s conditional release as grounds for sentencing him to another four years in prison was a cruel and vindictive way to punish a journalist who refuses to keep quiet, even behind bars. At the same time, the arrest of his colleague Omed Baroshki, and all the arbitrary arrests of other journalists and the circumstances in which they were carried out also undermine press freedom and constitute a threat to those outside who still express themselves freely. Such acts of intimidation must stop and Sherwan Sherwani and all other detained journalists must be released. Jonathan Dagher Head of RSF’s Middle East desk The former editor of the monthly Bashur, Sherwan Sherwani was sentenced to an additional four years in prison by a court in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan’s capital, on 20 July for allegedly imitating the signature of fellow detained journalist Guhdar Zebari in a letter relative to their conditional release in August 2022 . Zebari nonetheless testified to the court that he had agreed to his name being added to the letter while he was in solitary confinement. RSF has learned that Zebari was himself the victim of a similar judicial ploy in March, when – just as he was about to be released – he was given an additional seven-month jail term for allegedly forging a vehicle brand three years ago. The decision to sentence Sherwani to four more years in prison was denounced on camera the same day by freelance journalist Omed Baroshki, who said it had been personally ordered by Kurdistan’s prime minister, Masrour Barzani. Members of Kurdistan’s security forces, the Asayish, immediately arrested Baroshki at his home in Duhok. He was released the next day without being charged. Sherwani was one of a total of four journalists – the others were Guhdar Zebari, Hariwan Issa, Ayaz Karam along with activist Shivan Saeed – who were arrested in 2020 and were referred to as the “Bahdinan prisoners” (after the name of a region in Iraqi Kurdistan). Arrested in October 2020, Sherwani was given a six-year sentence on a spying charge although his crime was investigating corruption within Iraqi Kurdistan’s ruling elite, including the Barzani family. He was to have been released in September after his sentence was reduced to three years by President Nechirvan Barzani, former President Massoud Barzani’s nephew. When several journalists and NGO representatives gathered outside the courthouse in Duhok on 26 July with the aim of protesting against Sherwani’s additional jail sentence, members of the security forces intervened and prevented them from addressing the reporters who were there to cover the event. Journalists with independent NRT TV, including Omed Chomani and Goran Abdul-Khaliq, were arrested the day before while covering a protest against water shortages by residents in one of Erbil’s districts. Murad Ahmed, another NRT TV reporter in Erbil, said his colleagues were taken away in a black car with no licence plate. They were transferred to downtown Erbil where they were questioned for several hours and then released.

Read more

KRG partially honouring crude supply deal with Baghdad

Argus By Bachar Halabi Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region is supplying refineries in the north of the country with 50,000 b/d of crude, a source told Argus, partially meeting its commitments even though the shut in of exports through Turkey's Ceyhan port is now in its fifth month. Under a deal with Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must supply at least 400,000 b/d to Iraq's storage facilities at Ceyhan, with Baghdad's state-owned Somo holding marketing rights. If oil cannot be exported through Ceyhan or other designated ports, it must be redirected for domestic refining, including refineries in the country's north. In return, the KRG has been allocated 12.6pc of the Iraqi budget, to be paid through monthly transfers. While the source said production could be a bit higher than the 50,000 b/d supplied to the KAR refineries, the KRG remains far from hitting the 400,000 b/d monthly target. It remains to be seen how the federal government will compensate Erbil over the current crude transfer levels. Turkey and Iraq remain in "deliberative talks" regarding the restart of around 470,000 b/d of northern Iraqi crude exports. The pipeline that transports crude from Iraq's Kurdistan region to Ceyhan for onward delivery to export markets was shut on 25 March. Turkey ordered the halt after an arbitration court at the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce ruled Ankara had breached a 1973 agreement with Iraq by allowing crude marketed by the KRG to be exported without Baghdad's consent. Turkey has held out on allowing a resumption while it seeks concessions from Iraq regarding the court ruling and another arbitration case. Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's office on 25 July said Turkish President Recep Tayyep Erdogan is scheduled to visit Baghdad, without giving a date. A source said this will not take place next week.

Read more

KRG begins implementing budget law with crude transfers to Baghdad

Iraq Oil Report Erbil and Baghdad are taking initial steps towards implementing an aspect of the 2023 budget law, in a sign of cooperation that could potentially lead to more stable financial flows for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its oil contractors. For the past month, the KRG has been handing over between 50,000 to 90,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude to the federal Oil Ministry, which is paying a private refinery in Erbil to produce fuel, according to multiple industry officials, KRG officials, and MPs briefed on Baghdad-Erbil negotiations. The oil transfers signal Erbil's willingness to comply with the terms of the 2023 budget law, passed in June, which compels the KRG to hand over 400,000 bpd of crude to Baghdad in order to qualify for a share of the federal budget. It remains to be seen whether the oil transfers will trigger a federal budget transfer to the KRG in July, and if so, how large it will be.

Read more

CPT Iraqi Kurdistan's Report on Sherwan Sherwani’s Trial

On July 20th, 2023, CPT-IK observed the court trial of Sherwan Sherwani. CPT-IK has attended the court trials of all 24 Badinan prisoners since early 2021. Sherwan Sherwani was one of a group of journalists and activists arrested by Duhok security forces in late 2020 in connection with protests against government corruption. In February 2021, he and four others were put on trial for "endangering the national security of the Kurdistan Region." They were found guilty and sentenced to six years in jail. Sherwani is a civil rights activist and independent journalist. His work has included exposing corruption, secret government prisons and advocating for human rights. Sherwani has been routinely targeted for his journalism and activism work. Before his imprisonment, Sherwani faced abductions and threats intended to silence his journalism. On July 20th, 2023, Sherwan Sherwani was tried and convicted in Erbil Criminal Court for falsifying and forging documents. The document in question surrounded a request made on August 28th, 2022, by Badinan Prisoners Sherwan Sherwani, Guhdar Zebari, Hariwan Issa, Eyaz Karam, and Shvan Saeed to retract a previously submitted document asking for conditional release. Sherwani was convicted of forging the signatures of fellow Badinan prisoners and the fingerprint of Guhdar Zebari, who was in solitary confinement at the time. Zebari and the others had all agreed to allow each other to sign on each other's behalf. Sherwani was convicted under Iraqi Penal Code Articles 295 and 298. Falsification under the aforementioned codes is "the alteration as to substance or meaning as stipulated by the Code with intent to deceive of a deed, certificate or other document thereby causing harm to the public welfare or to others."  Additionally, Article 295 is administered for the falsification of ordinary documents. "Any person who falsifies an ordinary document which establishes a debt or disposes of property or discharges a person from a debt or settles a debt or any ordinary document which can be used to establish rights of ownership is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years or by detention." Article 298 states that any person who makes use of a falsified document knowing it to be so is, according to the circumstances, punishable by the penalty prescribed for the offence of falsification.  Observations and Violations CPT-IK is concerned with the significant security presence inside the courtroom during the trial. CPT-IK estimated 12-15 heavily armed policemen were in active attendance, with Mr Sherwani inside a cage. Dozens of other armed guards were outside the courtroom as well. The militarized nature of the courtroom could be designed to intimidate the defendant (and other attendees) due to the high profile of Sherwan and the political nature of his imprisonment. This practice can infringe upon a defendant's legal representation and create an intimidating environment that works against the legal principles of impartiality. The right to a fair trial is a recognized human right. CPT-IK is concerned with the court's potentially unjust procedure of not providing the case's legal documents to the defence in advance, putting the defendants at a disadvantage as the court is skewed in favor of the prosecution. This practice could infringe upon impartiality and a fair trial. It is revealing that the judge asked Shvan Saeed, "You have been released now; do you have wisdom now?" Furthermore, there is no ability to cross-examine or question the validity and independence of the investigation department's evidence.   The judge questioned the prosecution and witnesses about the impact on the Erbil Adult Prison and the other Badinan prisoners Sherwan Sherwani signed for. The prosecution argued that there was a negative impact on the prisoners and the reputation of the Erbil Adult Prison. Guhdar Zebari, Hariwan Issa, and Shvan Saeed all testified in court that there was no negative impact, and stated that they all had given each other explicit permission to sign and fingerprint on behalf of each other. Saeed said when called as a witness, "One year ago, five of us made an agreement that they would all sign on behalf of one another, if it was ever needed. We had consent."  As stated in court, this agreement was created to make collective action easier. Sherwan and witnesses claim that the Erbil Adult Prison had created many obstacles for them to file complaints and requests formally. Also, the prisoners were sometimes placed in solitary confinement and therefore did not have access to participate in the submission of collective requests.  All witnesses testified that there was no negative impact on themselves as they permitted each other to sign. Since the submitted document was a memo and processed internally, no evidence would suggest possible harm to the prison's reputation, quoting Sherwani, "It is not an official document. It is not a security issue". There was no intent of misrepresentation presented in the court nor clear evidence of misrepresentation or any harm caused.  In the court, the representation of Erbil Adult Prison stated that collective requests could not be officially processed; only individual requests could. However, the prisoner's inadmissible document was used in court as evidence of a document that was officially processed.  Sherwan Sherwani stated that there were times they were asked by prison officials and guards to fingerprint blank pages - a commonly documented practice by Kurdish security forces on detainees for purposes of intimidation or attaining a signature or fingerprint to use on a 'false document'. It is important to note that Sherwani testified in court that he did not produce the fingerprint in the space for Guhdar Zebari.  The judge based the sentencing on a different law article because the document in question was not considered official. This raises more questions on the document's viability as evidence if no harm is caused. Ultimately, there was no evidence to suggest any damage to the prison's reputation or the individuals Sherwani had signed for. The result was the judge issuing a 2.5-year sentence for breaking Article 295 and a 1.5-year sentence for violating Article 298. Regarding this, CPT-IK is concerned with unjust sentencing.  CPT-IK is highly concerned that the court is being used to unjustly punish journalists and activists, as was the case for all Badinan Prisoners.  CPT-IK is highly concerned about allegations of torture during interrogations discussed during the trial by Sherwan about his initial trial with the same judge.       Analysis There is likely political interference by the KRG in the judicial system. CPT-IK is highly concerned that this political interference has the potential to significantly undermine the values of justice, fairness and independence in the Kurdish legal system. As evidenced by other Badinan prisoner cases, the judiciary is being used to overly punish activists and journalists who speak out on topics deemed sensitive to the KRG and Kurdish ruling political parties, such as corruption, nepotism, and human rights injustices.  On the evening of July 20th, the same day of the Sherwani's trial, journalist Omed Barushky was kidnapped from his home by the Asayish without any warrant or court order. Barushky had attended Sherwani's trial and was publically critical of the government during a press conference outside the courthouse. He was released upon orders of Masrour Barzani. This is a clear example of political involvement in the legal system.  Iraqi Kurdistan is increasingly an unsafe place for journalists and activists. At least nine journalists have left Iraqi Kurdistan in the past six months due to active threats on themselves and their families. Journalists and activists face constant fear for their lives for their work. Many journalists and activists have stated and shown physical evidence of gruesome torture committed on them while in prison or detention. Torture such as removing nails, hanging gas canisters on genitals, and verbal and physical assault have been used on prisoners. Torture is used to try to retract false confessions, sign documents without knowing what those documents are, and prevent the prisoners from speaking out about any ill-treatment.  After release, journalists and activists continue to face threats to themselves and family members if they speak on any issues related to their imprisonment or issues deemed sensitive by the government.   

Read more

Imprisoned journalist Sherwan Sherwani given additional 4-year sentence in Iraqi Kurdistan

Iraqi Kurdish authorities should release journalist Sherwan Sherwani at once, drop all charges against him, and allow members of the press to work freely, the Committee to Protect Journalists said Thursday. On Thursday, July 20, the Erbil criminal court sentenced Sherwani to an additional four years in prison over a complaint by the Erbil Adult Correctional Directorate for allegedly fabricating documents, according to news reports as well as the journalist’s lawyer and brother, who both spoke to CPJ over the phone. Sherwani, who has been imprisoned since October 2020, was previously scheduled to be released on September 9, 2023, after his sentence was reduced by Kurdistan Regional President Nechirvan Barzani. “Iraqi Kurdish authorities must drop all charges against journalist Sherwan Sherwani and free him immediately,” said Sherif Mansour, CPJ’s Middle East and North Africa program coordinator, in Washington, D.C. “With the latest decision to extend his imprisonment by four years, Iraqi Kurdish authorities are showing their determination to tell the world how vicious they can be against journalists.” Sherwani’s lawyer, Ramazan Tartisi, told CPJ that the journalist was accused of falsely signing fellow imprisoned journalist Ghudar Zebari‘s name on a petition submitted by several prisoners in August 2022. Tartisi told CPJ that Zebari was in solitary confinement at the time but had given Sherwani permission to sign on his behalf.  At a hearing on Thursday, “Zebari confirmed his consent for Sherwani to sign on his behalf, but the judge disregarded that and still imposed punishment on Sherwani,” Tartisi said. The journalist received 2.5 years under Article 295 of the penal code, which pertains to falsifying documents involving debt or property, and 1.5 years under Article 298, which involves knowingly using a falsified document. Sherwani’s legal team plans to appeal the decision, according to Tartisi, who described the decision as “unjust and harsh.” Sherwani and Zebari were both sentenced on February 16, 2021, on charges of destabilizing the security and stability of the Kurdistan region. Barzan Sherwani, the journalist’s brother, described the ruling as “politicized,” adding, “our family will not be subject to such pressure.” CPJ emailed the Iraqi Kurdish Ministry of Justice for comment but did not immediately receive any response. CPJ also repeatedly called the director of Erbil Adult Correctional Directorate for comment but no one answered.

Read more

Deep Dive: Will Turkey agree to resume oil shipments from northern Iraq?

Draw Media amwaj.media The transfer of crude oil from Iraq to Turkey remains suspended, almost four months after an arbitration ruling found that Ankara owes Baghdad compensation for enabling unauthorized exports from Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite unconfirmed reports of an impending visit to Iraq by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, there are few indications of a deal on the horizon.   Origins of the dispute Ankara and Baghdad have clashed over independent Kurdish oil export for almost a decade. Under a 2014 Ankara-Erbil agreement, oil pumped in landlocked Iraqi Kurdistan was independently sold via Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Of note, most of federal Iraq’s oil exports are shipped through the southern Gulf coast. In reaction to the launch of independent Kurdish exports, Iraq filed an arbitration case with the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Baghdad argued that Turkey had broken a 1973 pipeline agreement by allowing oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan without its permission. The ICC's March decision rested on a stipulation in the 1973 agreement's annex that Turkey would only purchase oil via Iraq’s State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO). In March, the ICC ruled that Turkey must pay Baghdad some 1.47B USD in compensation for having facilitated Iraqi Kurdish oil exports between 2014 and 2018 without the Iraqi federal government’s permission. The Iraqi Ministry of Oil was prompt in welcoming the ICC ruling. As for Turkey, it accepted the outcome, particularly as the penalty was far lower than had been expected. Several Turkish officials Amwaj.media spoke to had expressed concern that the amount could have reached 20B USD. Iraq’s then-oil minister Ihsan Abdul Jabbar Ismail in Sep. 2022 said Baghdad expected compensation of 30B USD if it outright won the case. At the same time, Turkey on Mar. 25 moved to halt the export of over 450,000 barrels of oil per day from northern Iraq. Crude deliveries have been at a standstill ever since. Since the announcement of the ruling, Ankara has largely remained silent about paying the compensation. The case also fell off the Turkish government’s agenda amid an array of domestic challenges. These include the aftermath of the devastating February earthquakes that killed over 50,000 people in Turkey.   Back on the agenda? Beyond other domestic challenges, Ankara also essentially ignored the court ruling during the campaigning for Turkey’s May presidential elections. This was partly to prevent the Turkish opposition from using it as a propaganda tool in the polls. President Erdogan’s re-election has meant the case has once again gained visibility. Last month, a technical delegation from Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources met with an Iraqi team in Baghdad headed by Deputy Oil Minister Bassem Khdeir. They were joined by representatives from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Discussions were focused on restarting oil exports through northern Iraq. Ankara appears to seek to negotiate over the compensation that has been awarded to Iraq. Turkey also seeks clarification on another arbitration case that is still open. Speaking to Amwaj.media on condition of anonymity, an informed Turkish source alleged that Ankara has demanded to pay the compensation in instalments. The source further claimed that Turkey conveyed to the Iraqi side that it expects to take a more active role in future KRG oil operations. Another Turkish demand, the source alleged, was that it ought to receive discounts going forward as well. Of note, Ankara bought oil exported by the KRG at below market value before the arbitration ruling. The source additionally echoed reports that another Turkish precondition to restart the flow of oil is for Iraq to withdraw a second lawsuit. The latter ICC case relates to KRG oil exports from 2018 until Apr. 2023. Sources with knowledge of the process told Amwaj.media that the potential compensation in the second suit could exceed the 1.47B USD awarded to Baghdad in the first case. The Turkish delegation’s other demands reportedly include Iraqi payment for maintenance costs for the roughly 350 km-long (217 miles) pipeline. But Iraq has refused on the grounds that Turkey stopped the oil exports. Baghdad would also like crude transfers to resume before full negotiations over compensation begin, as a sign of goodwill.   Technical or political impediments? Despite months of efforts, there are no clear signs of any resumption of crude exports from northern Iraq. Before the suspension, the pipeline had been carrying around 400,000 barrels per day of KRG crude and around 75,000 barrels per day of oil pumped from fields controlled by the federal government. The export cessation is estimated to have cost Erbil in excess of 2B USD. The financial loss for the Baghdad government may also be significant, although far less impactful. Yet, there are some indications that a resumption of oil transfers could be on the table. The Iraqi government and the KRG on Apr. 4 signed a temporary deal in the hope of resuming crude exports through Turkey. Under the deal, SOMO will have the authority to market and export oil pumped in the Kurdistan region. The revenues will be deposited in an account at the Iraqi Central Bank under Erbil’s control. But despite the progress on the Iraqi side, Turkish blockages continue. Both the KRG and Iraqi federal government in May requested the reopening of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Later, Iraq’s Oil Minister Hayan Abdul-Ghani charged that there had been no response from Turkish state energy company BOTAS. This is while officials in Turkey reportedly blamed unspecified “technical reasons” for the delay. Baghdad’s frustration is evident; in May, Turkish media quoted an Iraqi official as saying that “the issue is political rather than technical.” Turkey appears to be exploiting the situation to pressure Iraq into compromising on the compensation it has been awarded. Shortly after the Apr. 2023 deal between Baghdad and Erbil, Turkey reportedly wanted to negotiate a settlement before permitting a resumption of Iraqi exports. Such an arrangement would be along the lines suggested to Amwaj.media by the informed Turkish source. However, Ankara could also be pushing for a reduction in the overall amount of compensation. Likely as part of its negotiating strategy, Turkey is intentionally drawing out the process. In the June 19 meeting held in Baghdad, the delegations drew attention to the political dimensions of the issue. They also called for further talks. The following day, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani met with President Erdogan in Ankara as the deadlock continued. The ICC ruling and the resumption of oil exports were discussed. But no concrete progress appears to have been made.   Different stances hinder resumption of exports Turkey is pursuing a maximalist position even as it is also suffering economically from the halt in oil deliveries. On the other hand, Iraq—as the winner in the arbitration ruling—does not wish to undermine the ICC’s decision. Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani is solution oriented. In principle, this should make a deal more likely. But as some reports indicate, Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq are believed to also be blocking progress. These factions are alleged to have been unwilling to let the Sudani government acquiesce to Turkey’s demand to drop the second lawsuit filed with the ICC. Of note, the same groups also blocked former Iraqi prime minister Adil Abdul Mahdi (2018-19) from attempting to freeze the case during his tenure. The situation is partly a reflection of the regional rivalry between Ankara and Tehran. Iran-backed factions in Iraq regularly make anti-Turkish statements and attack Turkish military bases in the north of the country. Essential to Ankara’s fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—an organization blacklisted by Britain, Turkey, and the US—the military installations have drawn the ire of many Iraqi actors. On the other hand, Washington is said to be lobbying behind the scenes in Ankara and Baghdad for a resumption of Iraqi exports through the northern route. So far, it has been unable to reconcile the parties. Bilateral trade between Iraq and Turkey reportedly exceeded 24B USD last year. There are strong shared business interests, and Ankara and Baghdad alike seek to protect their strong economic relationship from tensions. If anything, the dispute over the resumption of oil exports via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline show the need for high-level political negotiations. Without mutual concessions, the impasse is likely to continue.    

Read more

Fighting for Kurdistan?

Draw Media Netherlands Institute of International Relations-Feike Fliervoet     The Peshmerga forces of Iraqi Kurdistan are a complex and multi-faceted security organisation, their loyalty divided between the Iraqi state, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), different political parties and powerful individuals. At different times – and sometimes simultaneously – they can be characterised as national, regional, party and personal forces. This report explores the dynamics and consequences of these various roles in the broader political context of the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad. For relations within the KRG, as well as between the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) and Baghdad, to develop as constructively and as peacefully as possible, it is important that international partners currently supporting the Peshmerga and/or the Iraqi Security Forces take three recommendations to heart: 1. Develop an integrated security sector reform (SSR) strategy that considers support for the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces in relation to each other. 2. Ensure that such an integrated SSR strategy is embedded in a broader political strategy for re-including Iraq’s Kurds in the Iraqi polity on favourable, inclusive and reconciliatory terms. 3. Consider the need for reform and reconciliation within the Kurdistan region to prevent further intra-Kurdish conflict.         PDF

Read more

Deductions and non-payment of salaries in the ninth cabinet

Draw Media The total amount of salaries not paid and deducted in the ninth cabinet is; # (6 trillion 300 billion) dinars "7 full salaries" # (1 trillion 701 billion) dinars "9 salaries with 21% deduction" # (162 billion) dinars "1 salary with 18% deduction" # (900 billion) dinars "salary (6) of 2023" delayed # So the total amount of salaries not paid in the ninth cabinet (9 trillion 63 billion) dinars. Arrears and salary deductions as financial entitlements of the region's employees: In the election campaign in Septrmber 2018 political parties campaigned for the return of salary arrears and opening accounts for salaried employees. With the inauguration of the ninth cabinet salaried employees were waiting for the return of their salary arrears, but this cabinet invented a new innovation called (salary deduction). This is despite the fact that in 2020, a record number of non-payment of salaries was recorded. Regarding the financial entitlements of the salaried employees that are the responsibility of the Kurdistan Regional Government, only in the ninth cabinet is more than (9 trillion) dinars. The period of salary arrears was held during the eighth cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) headed by Nechirvan Barzani. However, in the ninth cabinet, the issue of salaries entered a new stage, which was the invention of salary deductions instead of savings. In this cabinet, the salaries of the months (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 of 2020) were not paid, (9) salaries with a deduction of (21%) and a salary with a deduction of (18%) has been paid to the employees in the years (2021 - 2022). Therefore, if we estimate the total salary expenditure at (900 billion) dinars monthly, then the total financial entitlements of salaried employees in the ninth cabinet has not been paid to them is; • (7) months of salary cuts X (900 billion) dinars = (6 trillion 300 billion) dinars • (9) months with deduction of (21%) X (189 billion) dinars = (1 trillion 701 billion) dinars • (1) month with deduction of (18%) X (162 billion) dinars = (162 billion) dinars • Currently, the month of June (2023) has passed, but the salaries have not been distributed, which is more than (900 billion dinars). Therefore, the total amount of unpaid salaries in the ninth cabinet is; (6 trillion 300 billion) dinars "7 full salaries" + (1 trillion 701 billion) dinars "9 salaries with 21% deduction" + (162 billion) dinars "1 salary with 18% deduction" + (900 billion) dinars salaries  of June 2023 = (9 trillion 63 billion) dinars.

Read more

All Contents are reserved by Draw media.
Developed by Smarthand