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United states CG met with several independent media outlets

United states Consul General Mark Stroh met with journalists from several independent media outlets including Draw Media to learn about their work, the media landscape, and challenges faced by independent media. The United states Consul General commended the journalists on their ongoing efforts to provide impartial coverage of the politics, economy and society of the region. We continue to be concerned about recent backsliding on press freedom, including arbitrary detention, warrantless device searches, and lack of implementation of the IKR Press Law and Access to Information act.

August production surges as KRG fields partially revive

Iraq Oil Report Fields in Kurdistan are raising production and selling into the local market, as output increases despite the ongoing northern pipeline closure. Iraq’s crude oil production rose sharply in August as fields controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) increased output, reaching just under half of their total combined capacity. Nationwide output averaged 4.71 million bpd, up from 4.56 million bpd in July, according to Iraq Oil Report calculations based on field-by-field data. The gains were achieved despite the continued shutdown of the northern export pipeline, which has prevented the KRG from exporting its crude to world markets since late March.

In letter to Biden, Barzani warns of Iraqi Kurdistan's collapse, urges mediation

al-monitor - Amberin Zaman KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani's letter to Biden is aimed at jolting the administration into action as tensions rise between Erbil and Baghdad. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has appealed to President Joe Biden to intervene in a deepening crisis with the central government in Baghdad, airing fears that the Kurdistan Region might even collapse as an entity if the crisis is left unchecked, Al-Monitor has learned. In a letter dated Sept. 3 that was addressed to Biden and delivered to the White House last Sunday, Barzani wrote, “I write to you now at another critical juncture in our history, one that I fear we may have difficulty overcoming. …[W]e are bleeding economically and hemorrhaging politically. For the first time in my tenure as prime minister, I hold grave concerns that this dishonorable campaign against us may cause the collapse of … the very model of a Federal Iraq that the United States sponsored in 2003 and purported to stand by since.” “We believe that your administration retains significant leverage with Baghdad,” Barzani said of Washington’s ability to diffuse the crisis. The cri de coeur comes amid escalating tensions between Erbil and Baghdad over budgetary allocations, oil sales and territories that both sides claim for their own. Barzani reiterated his calls for further US engagement to help resolve the disputes in a meeting on Monday in Erbil with US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski. With Washington’s attention focused on China and the conflict in Ukraine, Barzani’s letter is meant to jolt the administration into action before a descent into violence. That very specter loomed in the contested oil-rich province of Kirkuk last week when Kurds and Arabs allegedly bused in by Iran-backed Shiite militia groups clashed over a court decision preventing Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP) from reclaiming its headquarters in the regional capital. Four Kurds died in the protests that were eventually quelled by federal forces deployed to the city. “We are asking where the hell is the United States,” said a Kurdish official speaking not for attribution to Al-Monitor. The State Department declined to comment on the letter. A White House official speaking on background said, “We do not comment on private diplomatic engagements.” The White House had not responded to Barzani’s letter as of the time of publication of this article. Broken promises, broken trust Since US forces birthed the creation of a putatively democratic Iraq with the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the sides have tussled over what share of Iraq’s budget should go to the Kurds, with successive governments in Baghdad typically failing to hand over the amount of money agreed to at any given time. This, in turn, has left the KRG struggling to pay public sector employees who are due $625 million every month. In recent years, the refusal has stemmed from Baghdad’s view that the Iraqi Kurds have since 2014 been “illegally” selling Iraqi oil produced in the Kurdistan Region via Turkey without the central government’s consent. Iraq took the matter to an international court of arbitration, and Turkey was slapped with a $1.5 billion fine earlier this year when the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce ruled in Baghdad’s favor. In response, Turkey halted the flow of some 400,000 barrels per day of Kurdish crude and a further 75,000 barrels per day of Iraqi crude from the Kirkuk fields. Ankara is demanding that Baghdad waive the fine and drop another arbitration case pending against it in order to resume exports from the Turkish port of Ceyhan, leaving the Kurds deprived of at least $5 billion in revenue since exports ceased. The KRG has since agreed with Barzani’s words to make “extraordinary concessions in the negotiations with Baghdad in the hope of securing our future.” However, Barzani told Biden, “I regret to inform you that they have done the opposite. Our goodwill in agreeing to market our oil through the federal government in return for a just share of the federal budget has been blatantly forsaken.” The figure for oil revenues promised to the Kurdistan Region following talks in April between Barzani and Baghdad was $900 million per month. Yet the federal government has parted with far less, even as the Kurds have sent Baghdad the 85,000 barrels of crude every month pledged under that deal without receiving a penny for it, Kurdish officials say. On Sept. 2, federal authorities informed the KRG they would be willing to disburse $380 million per month in loans. Iraqi Kurdish officials have long aired frustration at what they say is the United States’ growing indifference to their plight, with letters going unanswered and senior US officials no longer engaging with the same frequency as they did under the previous administration when, for instance, the energy secretary would have monthly telephone calls with Barzani. “The American mantra is ‘we are not an occupying force anymore,’” the official briefing Al-Monitor said. “The basis of our engagement in the post-2003 order was entirely predicated on the agreement that the United States would act as the guarantor of the federal model. And up until [the full US withdrawal in] 2011, when that line was tested, the Americans would step in. The Americans were the guarantors, the honest brokers.” The official explained, “We are asking the United States to take a principled position on the agreement we had at the beginning [in 2005] on three key issues: oil, the budget and territory." “Shotgun wedding, amicable divorce” Ken Pollack, a former CIA intelligence analyst and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute who has written extensively on Iraq, agrees that the status quo is unsustainable and could lead to renewed civil conflict in Iraq. A weaker Iraq means a stronger Iran, which goes against US interests. But Washington’s interest in the country has taken a back seat to other pressing files. “Is Iraq a bigger priority for the United States than, say, Saudi-Israeli rapprochement? It’s hard to say that it is,” Pollack told Al-Monitor. Yet while the Kurds “get it intellectually,” Pollack contended, “emotionally they don’t.” They very much want to believe that the United States is still fully committed. Preserving that impression at the very least will cause Baghdad, Iran and the Kurds’ other large meddlesome neighbor, Turkey, to back off. Either way, Pollack concluded that the best solution for Iraq and the Kurds was an amicable divorce. “It was a shotgun wedding to begin with,” Pollack said. An administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity to Al-Monitor noted that the KDP and its chief rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), needed to settle their own disputes “before pointing fingers at us.” The two parties went to war in the early 1990s, and the distrust runs so deep that they have yet to unify their respective peshmerga forces under a single command. Rampant corruption — with much of Kurdistan’s wealth concentrated in the hands of the Barzanis and the Talabani family that runs the PUK — is feeding popular disaffection and dampening dreams of independence. At the same time, mounting repression of journalists has dented the Kurdistan Region’s claims that it is “the other” and hence better Iraq. An Iranian hand Many see Iran’s hand in the unfolding row between the KRG and Baghdad. With a large restive Kurdish minority of its own, Iran sees neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan and its pro-American leadership as a threat. Tehran’s attempts to weaken the KRG through its Iraqi Shiite allies have gained vigor since 2017 when the KRG held a referendum on independence that was fiercely opposed by Ankara, Baghdad and Washington. The ensuing volatility allowed federal troops to retake control of Kirkuk and other disputed territories the Kurds seized as Iraqi forces fled the Islamic State onslaught in 2014. The central government has since been doggedly seeking to tighten its grip. Iran is now threatening to attack the Kurdistan Region once again should it fail to disarm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in Kurdish territory by Sept. 19. The date coincides with the first anniversary of the mass protests that rocked Iran following the death in police custody of Iranian Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini. Iran blames the Iranian Kurdish opposition parties and their alleged Western backers — namely America and Israel — for the demonstrations, although the parties themselves admit they are weak and have little if any impact inside the Islamic Republic. James F. Jeffrey, a former US ambassador to Iraq who chairs the Wilson Center’s Middle East program, contended that Iran was clearly using an “all elements of power” strategy to assume effective control of Iraq, following “the Lebanon model” whereby it relies on Shiite militias and their political arms that are loyal to itself rather than Baghdad. The Trump administration, Jeffrey argued, “pushed back on this Iranian strategy by inventorying all the ways the United States and more generally the West and its institutions were important to Iraq and then threatened to start sending them down if the Iraqi government didn’t take specific steps we detailed to push back on specific Iranian or militia tentacles inside government structures.” The Biden administration, by contrast, “doesn’t seem to be doing anything in this regard,” likely because it doesn’t want to provoke Iran as it seeks to revive the nuclear deal. Amos Hochstein, special presidential coordinator for Global Infrastructure and Energy Security, for example, has not been to Iraqi Kurdistan since January, Jeffrey recalled. “This is the most current and most dramatic result of the US maintaining its hands-off approach.” “Behind all the specifics, it’s Iran dictating Iraqi government positions to ensure no deal will be realized that would get oil flowing again and that keeps the KRG afloat — exactly what Iran wants to ruin,” Jeffrey added. Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/09/letter-biden-barzani-warns-iraqi-kurdistans-collapse-urges-mediation#ixzz8D7uKKqRc

Opinion of Iraqi Arab Citizens About the Kurdistan Region and its Government

Draw Media Organization Department of Draw Survey Report title: Opinion of Iraqi Arab Citizens About the Kurdistan Region and its Government Relations between Baghdad and Erbil on the issues of public budget, salaries, and oil have constantly seen ups and downs. What effects have these ongoing political conflicts and challenges had on the people from both regions? To gain insights into the perspectives of Iraqi Arab citizens concerning topics such as oil, corruption, independence, and interregional relations, Draw Media Organization's Survey Department conducted a comprehensive survey. A total of 910 Arab citizens from 15 different provinces in Iraq participated in this survey, which was overseen by Assistant Professor Dr Niaz Najmalddin, a faculty member at University of Sulaimani. The survey was conducted between August 24th and September 4th, 2023, using an electronic platform. Conclusion: Here are the key findings from the survey: • Almost 46% of respondents believe that it is the responsibility of the Iraqi government to provide salaries for employees of the Kurdistan Regional Government. • About 81% of participants hold the view that the Kurdistan Region does not possess the right to extract and sell oil. • The majority of participants, precisely 56%, hold the view that there is a significant degree of corruption within both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi government. This perspective suggests that, from the standpoint of Iraqi Arab citizens, both governments are perceived as being tainted by corruption. • A significant majority, amounting to 61%, believe that the Kurdistan Regional Government has been more successful in delivering services to its citizens compared to the Iraqi government. • Only a smaller proportion, 19%, consider the idea of the Kurdistan Region pursuing secession as normal. In contrast, almost 38% of respondents favor the dissolution of the Kurdistan Region. • Regarding the transfer of the Kurdistan Region's governance model to Iraq, which has been stress on by some officials several times, 45% are in favor, while 55% are opposed to it. • Additionally, a segment of the survey focused on the perspective of Arab respondents regarding tourism in the Kurdistan Region. Nearly 47% of those surveyed indicated a keen interest in visiting Sulaimani, while 33% expressed a desire to explore Erbil province. • Also, 44% of respondents express a desire to live in the Kurdistan Region. • Finally, a notable 57% of those who have visited the region express dissatisfaction with the checkpoints and security procedures in place. Opinion of Iraqi Arab Citizens About the Kurdistan Region and its Government

Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government seeks int'l support to secure budgetary rights from Baghdad

The Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) called on the international community Wednesday to support the region in “asserting its constitutional rights, ensuring progress in payment from the federal budget.” Civil servants in the region have not received their salaries for the past two months due to the federal government's failure to allocate the KRG's share of the budget, according to a statement released after a Cabinet meeting of the KRG. The statement underscored that the Erbil administration has diligently fulfilled all of its obligations toward the Baghdad administration. For the year 2023, the KRG's allocated budget stands at roughly 16.4 trillion Iraqi dinars ($12.5 billion). According to the budgetary arrangement, 1.37 trillion dinars ($1.04 billion) should have been disbursed monthly to the KRG. However, the Iraqi government on Sept. 3 decided to allocate only 500 billion dinars ($382 million) per month, while no funds were allocated for salaries in July and August. The KRG called on the Iraqi government to reconsider its decision and stressed the urgent need for 906 billion dinars ($692 million) to cover the salaries of civil servants. The KRG also strongly condemned the violence perpetrated against Kurdish citizens in Kirkuk and urged the Iraqi government to swiftly bring the perpetrators to justice. Protests erupted in Kirkuk on Monday following the deaths of four demonstrators and injuries to 15 others over the weekend. The protests initially began in late August, triggered by a government decision to transfer control of the Kirkuk Operations Command headquarters to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP argued that the building had previously been under their control and should be returned to the party. Peshmerga forces affiliated with the KRG had taken over bases abandoned by the Iraqi army in Kirkuk after the emergence of the Daesh/ISIS terrorist group in 2014. However, in 2017, Iraqi government forces reasserted control over Kirkuk, ending the Peshmerga presence in the city.

Iraq-Turkey oil flows not expected to resume before October

Reuters Iraqi oil flows to Turkey are not expected to resume before October, when Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan will likely visit Baghdad, sources said, after the trip originally scheduled for August was postponed. Turkey halted Iraqi northern oil export flows on March 25 after an arbitration ruling by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ordered Ankara to pay Baghdad damages of $1.5 billion for unauthorised exports by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) between 2014 and 2018. In April, Iraq petitioned a U.S. federal court to enforce the ICC arbitration award. A lack of progress on resolving this litigation was one of the reasons behind the postponement of Erdogan’s August visit, the sources said. Erdogan still intends to visit Baghdad and “wants an agreement to be signed”, but “so far the concrete steps expected by Iraq have not yet been taken”, resulting in slow progress, a senior Turkish official said. One of the steps Ankara is seeking is a halt to the U.S. litigation and as a result, Erdogan’s visit is scheduled for October, the source added. “Until now we have not received a definite timeline from Ankara on when the Turkish president is expected in Baghdad,” another source, an Iraqi foreign ministry official, said. “It could be the end of this month, or more likely in October, depending on the successful development of talks on energy issues which require a longer than expected time due to multiple thorny issues.” Energy officials in Baghdad and Ankara are “having complicated discussions”, with the resumption of flows “the most difficult question”, an Iraqi oil official with knowledge of the talks said, adding it was “not likely” flows would restart this month. Turkey has also sought a compromise to reduce the damages to be paid to Iraq under the ICC arbitration, two Iraqi oil officials close the talks said. Iraqi sources have previously said Turkey wants Iraq to drop a second arbitration case on exports covering the period from 2018 onwards. Turkey’s energy ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The KRG has lost roughly $4 billion since oil flows to Turkey’s Ceyhan Port through a pipeline were halted, two sources familiar with the matter said. (Reporting by Ahmed Rasheed in Baghdad; Additional reporting by Can Sezer and Jonathan Spicer in Istanbul; Writing by Yousef Saba in Dubai; Editing by Jan Harvey)

Iraqi Kurds protest unpaid salaries from Baghdad

Thousands of people carrying flags of Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrated on Tuesday in the autonomous region over unpaid civil service salaries which they blamed on Baghdad, an AFP correspondent reported. The protest occurred in a region where activists usually accuse local Kurdistan authorities of repressing any sign of dissent. It came in the context of simmering tensions after protests turned violent and led to the deaths of four people on Saturday in the multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk, whose control has historically been disputed between Iraqi Kurdistan and federal authorities in Baghdad. "Kurdistan will not back down in the face of the Iraqi authorities' hostile policies," one banner said at the demonstration in Dohuk, the third-biggest city in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. "Solidarity with our people in Kirkuk," said another placard. An administrator in a hospital, Massoud Mohamed, said he had not received a salary in two months. "We must get our rights," the 45-year-old said. "They want to weaken our region." Iraqi Kurdistan has long accused Baghdad of not sending the necessary funds to pay civil servants. Previously the region, thanks to its oil exports, had independent funding that partially covered salaries. Since the end of March it has been deprived of this resource because of a dispute with Baghdad and Turkey, through which oil was exported. In principle, Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad later agreed that sales of Kurdish oil would pass through the federal government. In exchange for this, 12.6 percent of the federal budget is allocated to Iraqi Kurdistan. On Sunday, Baghdad unblocked a package of 500 billion dinars (about $380 million) for the region's salaries, but practically double that would be needed each month, according to the government of Iraqi Kurdistan. The violence in Kirkuk has added to tensions. Arab and Turkmen demonstrators had staged a sit-in near the headquarters of the Iraqi security forces in Kirkuk province on August 28, after media reports that Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani had ordered the site to be handed over to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which used to occupy it. In response, Kurdish protesters tried to reach the headquarters on Saturday, and the situation degenerated. Four Kurds were killed.

Iran-Iraq deal on Iranian Kurds puts Iraqi Kurds between rock and hard place

Amwaj.media Amid rising focus on Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan, Tehran says Baghdad has agreed to its demand that such factions be disarmed and relocated. But as the Islamic Republic’s Sept. 19 deadline for action against its exiled Kurdish opponents looms, there are major questions about the extent to which any agreement may be implemented. This comes as the authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan worry that the deal is aimed at further undermining their self-rule and standing in the regional geopolitical landscape. In March, then-secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani and his Iraqi counterpart Qasim Al-Araji signed an agreement in Baghdad to secure the border between the two countries. The accord was primarily aimed at curbing the activities of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Addressing reporters in Tehran on Aug. 28, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani said the Iraqi central government had committed to disarm “terrorist, secessionist groups” and close their “bases” by Sept. 19, adding that Iraqi Kurdish authorities have been informed of the “contents of the agreement.” Importantly, Kanani underscored that the deadline would not be extended. Iranian military officials have previously threatened attacks against opponents of the Islamic Republic based in Iraqi Kurdistan if no action is taken. On the same day as Kanani’s remarks, Iraqi government spokesperson Basim Al-Awadi stated that Baghdad had fulfilled its commitments under the security agreement with Iran. Without providing details, Awadi referred to prevention of the infiltration of militants, extradition of wanted persons as well as disarming and removing camps run by armed groups. Focus on disarmament Fariba Mohammedi, spokeswoman of the Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan (Komalay Zehmetkeshan), said there is pressure for the group’s armed forces based in mountainous areas to relocate to another area within the Kurdistan region. However, she also told Amwaj.media that there was no discussion about members of the group and their families who reside in camps in Iraqi Kurdistan. In any event, Mohammedi insisted, her group would not accept being disarmed. At least six Iranian Kurdish groups have varying degrees of presence in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. In addition to the Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan, these include the Society of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan—also referred to as the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan (Komalay Shorishger), led by Abdollah Mohtadi—the Komala Organization of the Iranian Communist Party, led by Seyed Ibrahim Alizadeh; the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) led by Mustafa Hijri; the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) headed by Hussein Yazdanpanah; and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), co-led by Siamand Moeini and Zilan Vejin. Many of these parties were driven into exile in Iraq following years of armed conflict with the Iranian government, which refuses to recognize Kurdish demands for autonomy within Iran. Iraqi Kurdish authorities have some leverage over Iranian Kurdish groups with the notable exception of PJAK, which is aligned with the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Against this backdrop, the threats and pressures from Tehran have put authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan in a pinch. A refusal to meet Iran’s demands could be costly as Tehran or its allies in Baghdad could resume attacks on Iranian Kurdish groups in the Kurdistan region. On the other hand, meeting Tehran’s conditions—particularly on disarming Kurdish opposition parties—poses a risk of confrontation between Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) forces and such groups. Adding further complexity to the situation, “The Kurdish identity element is important here,” said Lawk Ghafouri, a political analyst, explaining that it would be highly unpopular for Iraqi Kurdish authorities to try to disarm Iranian Kurdish parties. Displaying an understanding of the KRG’s dilemma, a senior military official from the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) told Amwaj.media that while his group would not agree to disarm under any circumstances, it would, however, consider moving its forces from certain “highland areas” of Iraqi Kurdistan to another—but not to the plains or urban areas Iran’s carrot-and-stick approach With the first anniversary of nationwide anti-establishment protests in Iran around the corner, there is a strong sense among Iranian Kurds that Tehran’s pressures are mainly rooted in anxieties of a possible resurgence of unrest. When protests engulfed Iran last September in the wake of the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini in the custody of morality police, state propaganda was heavily focused on portraying the demonstrations—which first erupted in Kurdish areas of Iran—as a plot by the exiled Kurdish opposition groups across the border. The Kurdish parties have firmly rejected such accusations. In this vein, the Iranian government deployed military forces to Kurdish areas and struck positions of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan on multiple occasions with drones and missiles. Ahead of Iran’s Sept. 19 deadline, Mohtadi of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan on Aug. 28 stated that his group’s forces were in Iraqi Kurdistan in a defensive capacity and had not engaged in attacks against Iranian government forces since a truce in the late 1980s. Since the protests sparked by Amini’s death, Iran has adopted a multi-pronged stick and carrot strategy to achieve its objectives in dealing with Iraqi Kurds, hoping to drive a wedge among them. While Tehran has not conducted drone and missile attacks this year, Iranian operatives are believed to have been behind several reported assassinations of Iranian Kurdish activists in the Kurdistan region. In parallel, Iran has since late last year sought to strengthen trade ties, which has been met with enthusiasm from the KRG. Iraqi Kurdish authorities have also strived to forge a more positive atmosphere in bilateral relations with Iran by facilitating the entry of tens of thousands of Iranians entering Iraq for the annual Arbaeen pilgrimage, which has earned Tehran’s praise. The KRG’s balancing act KRG spokesperson Peshawa Hawramani told Amwaj.media that Iraqi Kurdish authorities do not want to be a party to the “problems” between the Islamic Republic and its Kurdish opposition. “We do not want the Kurdistan region’s territory to be used for attacks against any of our neighbors,” said Hawramani, adding that Iraqi Kurdistan should not be targeted by neighboring governments either. Of note, in addition to the Iranian cross-border attacks, Turkey regularly hits alleged PKK targets. While Hawramani urged dialogue between the Iranian government and its Kurdish opponents, he called on the Iraqi government to assert its sovereignty in the face of threats from neighboring countries. The question of sovereignty, however, is a double-edged sword as far as Iraqi Kurds are concerned. Seemingly encouraged by Tehran, Baghdad is trying to seize the Iranian threats as an opportunity to impose its sovereignty on the Kurdistan region, undermining decades of Kurdish self-rule since the uprising against the regime of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) in 1991. Wary of Baghdad and Tehran’s plans, Hawramani said the task of securing borders should be entrusted to the KRG Peshmerga forces and Kurdish units of the Iraqi border guards “to prevent the coming into contact of [the Iranian] Kurdish parties and Iranian troops.” In other words, the KRG’s vision of Baghdad’s role in protecting Iraqi sovereignty in the Kurdistan region is to empower local forces and Kurdish units of the Iraqi armed forces to take on the task. Iraqi border guards have announced the recruitment of up to 3,000 locals to protect Iraqi Kurdistan’s borders with Iran, Syria, and Turkey. However, it is not clear if this is part of a possible agreement between the Iraqi federal government and the KRG to boost the latter’s border protection. The bigger game The broader geopolitical repercussions of the Iran-Iraq security agreement for Kurds are also critical to consider. The Iranian pressure on Iraqi Kurdish authorities comes amid a string of measures by the Iraqi state—particularly elements with close ties to Iran—to weaken the KRG and strip it of key levers of power, such as independent oil exports and management of finances. Hence, for Iraqi Kurds, Iran’s saber-rattling is interpreted through the lens of broader geopolitical rivalries. In this context, there are concerns that Tehran might use the exiled Iranian Kurdish groups as a pretext to lobby Baghdad to dispatch the Iraqi army or the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) into Iraqi Kurdistan, effectively ending any meaningful exercise of autonomy by the KRG. In this game of realpolitik, Iranian Kurdish groups—though presenting a certain degree of risk and vulnerability for Iraqi Kurdish authorities—simultaneously present an opportunity to increase the KRG’s weight in the regional geopolitical landscape. “For a long time, the presence of such [Iranian Kurdish] forces in [Iraqi] Kurdistan has contributed to establishing the region as an autonomous player on a regional scale. This presence has sent a message that Kurdistan holds strategic leverage to influence neighboring countries,” Kamaran Palani, a professor of international relations at Erbil’s Salahaddin University, said to Amwaj.media. “If Iran were to disarm these groups, it could substantially undermine Kurdistan's autonomy.” The disarming or expulsion of Iranian Kurdish groups in the Kurdistan region could also encourage neighboring Turkey to make a similar request of Baghdad and Erbil over the PKK. The latter would likely put the Iran-aligned Shiite factions which rule federal Iraq in a difficult spot. Some Shiite groups aim to harness their warm relationships with the PKK for a broader Iran-led geopolitical competition against Turkey. A failure to act on the PKK by Baghdad and Erbil would thus likely lead to an intensification of Turkish attacks in the Kurdistan region, plunging Iraqi Kurdistan into further conflict and instability. As adamant and forceful as Iran appears in its demands, there does not appear to be a willingness among Iraqi Kurdish authorities to meet the exact conditions—or at least on the scale and scope desired by Tehran. Political analyst Ghafouri, however, warned that the KRG should not underestimate the Iranian threats, especially given Tehran’s ability to undermine stability. “Ku

KDP and PUK move forces in Klawqasim

Draw Media The PUK and KDP have moved military forces in the mountain of Klawqasmi in Balisan Valley near Erbil province A military official told Draw Media that the KDP forces have started military movements in Klaw Qasim since yesterday, therefore, the PUK has put its forces on alert. However, it is still unknown what is the reasason of these military movement in the region. According to the source, an anti-terror force of the PUK headed to the area this morning. The source confirmed that the anti-terror forces left to support the PUK forces in Balisan and Klaw Qasim. At the same time a citizen in Dukan district told (Draw Media) that saw an armed PUK anti-terror force carrying weapons and military equipment on the road Dukan - Ranya this morning.

Iran renews ultimatum for Iraq to disarm Kurdish opposition groups

Al-Monitor, Amberin Zaman Iran warned Monday that it would not extend a September deadline for Iraq to disarm and evacuate Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in camps within Iraqi territory, calling their presence a “dark stain” on otherwise friendly relations and raising fears of further Iranian attacks. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kaanani said a Sept. 19 deadline set for disarming the groups would “not be extended in any way.” In July, Iran threatened to use military force should Baghdad fail to comply with its demands as it did in September and November last year, striking Iranian Kurdish parties deep inside Iraqi Kurdistan with ballistic missiles and suicide drones and assassinating their leaders in urban centers. “Our operations against these groups will definitely reoccur more severely” unless Iraq did as it was told, said Iran’s Chief of General Staff Mohammad Hossein Bagheri. In March, Iran and Iraq signed a security agreement, the details of which were never formally disclosed. “Under the signed security deal, Iraq pledged it would not allow armed groups to use its territory in the Iraqi Kurdish region to launch any cross-border attacks on [neighboring] Iran,” said an Iraqi security official who attended the signing, Reuters reported. The accord is believed to have included provisions that Iranian Kurdish fighters would be prevented from entering Iranian territory and moved away from the borders where they levy “taxes” on smugglers carrying alcohol, cigarettes and electronic goods into Iran. Iraqi forces would be deployed along the border, and Kurdish fighters would be disarmed, with some handed over to Iranian authorities, according to Iranian press reports. Some Iraqi officers are believed to now be stationed alongside Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga forces at certain points along the border. Mohammed Nazif Qaderi, a senior member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the biggest of the Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan, told Al-Monitor, “It is true that we have weapons. But we have never used them against the Iranian regime.” Local authorities have not sought to disarm them so far. Another Iranian Kurdish politician speaking not for attribution said Iraqi Kurdish officials had already curtailed some of their activities, including moving their men away from their mountain outposts overlooking Iran. The politician maintained, however, that Iranian Kurdish forces would never surrender their weapons as they needed them to defend themselves and their families against Iranian aggression. “We promised KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] authorities that we would not send our fighters into Iran and in fact, we haven’t,” he told Al-Monitor. The ultimatum comes as Iranian authorities arrest scores of activists and pressure its citizens not to resume anti-government protests around the anniversary of the nationwide demonstrations that erupted a year ago over the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini, an Iranian Kurdish woman who allegedly breached the Islamic Republic’s dress code. At least 537 people were killed and 22,000 arrested as security forces crushed the unrest, according to international rights groups. Iranian authorities pointed the finger of blame at “Kurdish terrorists” acting purportedly at the behest of malign foreign powers. Iranian Kurdish leaders say they are being scapegoated as part of the regime’s bid to deflect attention from the real causes of the protests, namely the chronic lack of economic opportunity and freedom, which remain unresolved. That said, Iran — like its regional rival Turkey — has historically been at odds with its large Kurdish minority, with the KDPI and Komala, a left-wing Iranian Kurdish group, seizing control of large chunks of Iranian Kurdistan as the shah’s rule came crashing down in the late 1970s. Even before the mass protests, Iran periodically attacked its Kurdish foes inside Iraq, though unlike Turkey it does not have thousands of forces deployed inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Although both the KDPI and Komala say they have no desire to secede from Iran, Tehran believes otherwise. “They are viewed as secessionist groups and as such are a serious threat to Iran’s national security,” said Hassan Ahmadian, a professor at Tehran University. "The potential of those groups importing arms or their ability to weaponize some of the demonstrations inside Iran using their position in Iraqi Kurdistan is considered the most important factor in dealing with them. Stopping that potential is the main thing, and the Iranians have been pressurizing Iraq and the KRG to stop harboring them,” Ahmadian told Al-Monitor. Moreover, Iran is convinced that Israel is using the Kurdistan Region to destabilize its regime. In March 2022, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) struck the home of Iraqi Kurdish oil czar Sheikh Baz Karim Barznji. The IRGC said in a statement that a "strategic center for conspiracy and mischiefs of the Zionists was targeted by powerful precision missiles fired by the [IRGC]." Erbil’s governor denied the presence of Israeli agents. Enforcing the alleged provisions of the deal would necessarily fall principally on the KRG, as the central government in Baghdad likes to point out. The KDP — the prevailing force in the KRG — collaborated with the late Iranian shah against the KDPI in exchange for his support against Baghdad. In present times, the KDP is bitterly criticized by many Kurds for helping Turkey in its military campaign against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The group is fighting for Kurdish autonomy inside Turkey from its bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Free Life Kurdistan Party (PJAK) is its Iranian arm. Turning against Iran’s Kurds yet again would blow a further hole in the KDP’s credibility. The KDPI has at least three bases inside KDP-controlled territory, but it’s generally accepted that the former does not pose any meaningful threat to Iran. Nor does Komala, which has even fewer fighters and is based in areas controlled by the KDP’s coalition partner and biggest rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and where Iran enjoys greater influence. “These Iranian groups had no impact on the protests,” said Sardar Aziz, an Iraqi Kurdish researcher who follows security affairs. He believes that Iran’s allegations are a foil for helping Iraq’s central government exert greater control over the Kurdistan Region in the aftermath of the Iraqi Kurds’ referendum on independence in 2017. At the same time, while Iraqi Kurdish forces have the physical heft to disarm their Iranian brethren, “mounting public disenchantment with the ruling parties amid worsening economic conditions makes it that much more unlikely they would,” Aziz said.

APIKUR: Even If the Kurdistan region's oil exports resume, we will not produce oil

Draw Media Major oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region say: “Even If the Kurdistan region's oil exports resume, we will not produce oil" until they receive a guarantee that their financial rights are protected. The Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR), which includes six international investment companies (DNO, Genel Energy, Gulf Keystone Petroleum, HKN Energy and ShaMaran Petroleum), said in a statement that it is important to resume oil exports through the Turkey-Iraq pipeline, but they warn that if their contractual rights are not protected from receiving past financial entitlements, they will not resume oil exports even if Turkish oil exports resume. (APIKUR) encourages the recent talks between the Iraqi Federal Government and the Turkish government to resume oil exports through the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP). "Opening of the pipeline is an important step for the Kurdistan Region to restart its most important trade sector, which accounts for 80% of its economy. It will also benefit international oil companies (IOCs) and many Iraqis." "The damage caused by the closure of the pipeline in late March is estimated at about $4 billion," the statement said. “But even if the ITP pipeline is opened, APIKUR member companies will not produce oil until it is clear how the financial entitlements of international oil companies will be paid under their contractual rights for past and future oil exports,” the association said in a statement.

The Geopolitics of Natural Gas in Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Deadlock or Shifting to a New Perspective?

By Dr. Bahrooz Jaafar l MEDITERRANEAN INSTITUTE Executive summary Several problems surround the Kurdistan Region's natural reserves; internal political divisions and the lack of institutions, successive pressures from the central government in Baghdad, and regional efforts to keep the Kurds away from the energy issue. If the Iraqi Kurdish leaders develop a new energy security vision and build effective institutions, the region's natural gas could bring about geopolitical change. The Western mediations (US and Europe) are trying to promote the Kurdistan Region's position and its agendas at the regional status. Introduction The Iraqi Kurdistan Region still has its pipeline infrastructure، the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oil pipeline starts from the Taq Taq field, which is connected to the Khurmala Dome by 81 kilometers. Substantially, the Kurdistan's oil pipeline was completed in 2014, and it is a 281 kilometers pipeline that runs from the Khurmala field to Pesh Kabir (Fesh Khabur) on the border of Iraq- Turkey, where it is connected to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. The KRG's pipeline was initially designed to transport 700,000 barrels of oil daily. Then, in October 2017, Rosneft signed a deal with the KRG to enter an infrastructure project regarding the region's oil export pipeline, as Rosneft referenced an expected increase of the pipeline system's capacity from 700,000 bpd to 950,000 bpd. However, plans for the development have not yet been confirmed. According to the Ministry of Natural Resources of the KRG, the Kurdistan Region has 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (about 5.7 trillion cubic meters). However, the fact is that the Kurdistan Region leads 25 tcf of proven gas and 198 tcf of un-proven gas. Proven reserves are considering the oil and gas reserves that we know about (i.e., we have over 90% confidence in them), while unproven reserves are oil and gas reserves that we are less sure of but have some indication of their existence; these can be almost proved if advanced techniques are used. The most probable predictions confirmed that natural gas will become a more critical factor in energy markets in the future, especially in pursuing zero-carbon policies and environmental protection. In a significant step, the USA provided $250 million to the Khor Mor gas field in September 2021, aiming to enhance gas plants in the region (a project known as KH250). The expectation is for the field to produce 750 million cubic feet per day by the end of 2024 and 1 million cubic feet per day in the subsequent year. Since 2007, the two UAE energy corporations Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum have signed an agreement with the KRG, which is operating in the Khor Mor bloc, which is of the backbones of the Kurdistan Region's economy, producing 500 million standard cubic feet of natural gas per day. In addition, in the first half of 2023, oil production from the gas field increased by 6% to 1,900 barrels of condensate per day, The field now producing 20 000 bpd. The field will then meet most of the liquefied natural gas needs of households in the Kurdistan Region. In general, this bloc alone is the source of electricity for about (5) million Kurdistan Region and Iraq citizens. By using a realistic approach, this research shows the market reality of natural gas and oil in the Kurdistan Region and its possibility to be a part of the global energy market. Then it seeks to identify and highlight geopolitical prospects for Kurdistan's natural gas within the new regional order. Context While the continuing internal division and political conflicts in the Kurdistan Region have tarnished the landscape of natural resource management, which has disrupted the institutions of the Kurdistan Region, on the other hand, since 2003, due to the lack of strong political, economic, military and scientific institutions behind the energy sector, it presented the KRI's energy vision distorted. Thanks to "Critical Thinking", which helps us in this endeavor. Thinking is critical when involved with logic; here, an idea becomes part of the reform project because critical thinking is the product of the mind and neural. Thoughts emerge from neural processes, and neural processes come from everywhere. Therefore, in critical thinking, a vision or idea responds to another vision and gives an evaluation and value to other perspectives. When an agency or commentator claims an argument that shows the failing down of the KRI's energy sector, it is an idea, and another idea comes to prove that there is room to save Kurdistan from the threats and demonstrate opportunities, as well as evaluate and value the early perspective and its arguments. Turkey's role in the KRI's hydrocarbon sector is a significant issue. Indeed, Ankara's relationship with the KRG from 2003 to 2023 has shown that a closer partnership with the Iraqi Kurds can impact several ways. In Iraq, the KRG has established an oil pipeline through which Turkey could be able to shape policy in Baghdad. Geopolitically, Turkey has relied on the KRG to reduce the influence of Iran and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Syria. Therefore, in 2013, Baghdad filed a complaint with the International Court of Arbitration (ICC), which has a branch in Paris. The result in March 2023 was in favor of Baghdad and led to the halt of oil exports from the Kurdistan Region to Turkey's Ceyhan port. As in the previous year, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court decided on February 15, 2022, that the Kurdistan Regional Government's oil and gas law passed in 2007 by the Kurdistan Parliament was unconstitutional. The Federal court decision came hours after the Kurdistan Region's prime minister arrived in Doha with energy cooperation high on his visit's agenda; Iraq's federal court ruled the Kurdish oil and gas law to be unconstitutional, putting both the premier's plans and the KRI's industry in jeopardy, in a decision the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has deemed to be "unjust" and "unconstitutional". In parallel, Baghdad sent letters to multinational energy companies operating in the Kurdistan Region not to deal with the Region more. Several other rounds are underway against the Kurdistan Region. Political and economic deadlock in Iraq In July 2023, Iraq produced 20.8 MW of electricity, while it needed 34,000 - 35,000 MW to meet its domestic demands. For this purpose, about 40% of electricity is imported from Iran at more than the world market price. Iraq buys about $4 billion worth of electricity from Iran annually. While, there is an estimated gas reserve of 125.6 trillion cubic feet, contributing 1.8% to the total reserve. This reserve places Iraq in the eleventh position globally. However, according to the World Bank's annual report, the country wastes $290,000 of gas every hour, or about $2.5 billion a year, polluting the environment and putting toxic substances into the atmosphere. The Iraqi government needs 25 to 30 million cubic meters of gas daily in 2023 for its 15 central and southern provinces. According to experts, due to a lack of energy production, the Iraqi economy loses about (40) billion dollars annually, and these losses include the large amount of money that Iraqis spend to buy energy, damage to the industrial and agricultural sectors, as well power health problems caused by frequent power outages. As a part of the sanctions, the United States has banned dollars from reaching Iran and Russia and is trying to reduce oil and gas sales revenues. So $2.7 billion (about 11 trillion Iraqi dinars) of Iranian money was stuck in the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI). Occasionally, several Iraqi banks and figures have been black-listed by the US administration for transferring dollars to Iran and Russia. Iraq's current government, formed after two early elections and several demonstrations, does not represent the majority of its citizens. This political misrepresentation has been described as “the hijacking of democracy" by the Wilson Centre. A crisis ensued in July 2023 when temperatures soared to 50 degrees Celsius in some Iraqi provinces, and Iran cut off electricity. Washington has since committed to repaying the electricity loan to Iran within 120 days through non-Iraqi banks, but will it be enough to salvage Iraq? On July 14, 2023, Iraq and Iran signed an antique agreement; Iran supplies natural gas to Iraq, and Iraq will supply 250,000 oil to Iran. Why does Iran need Iraqi oil when it has 157 billion barrels of oil reserves and covers the fourth largest in the world? Iraq, Iran oil-gas swap deal to continue until the end of 2023, which it was signed between Ihsan Yassin al-Awadi, director of the Iraqi prime minister's office, and Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadeq, Iran's ambassador to Baghdad, after days of negotiations. One of the clauses of the agreement states that if Iran does not send gas to Iraq, Iraq must supply the specified amount of oil to Iran! Since 2021, Turkey and the KRI have taken steps in the same direction to strengthen their ties with Gulf countries; it is about when Turkey and the UAE began to normalize relations after a decade of tensions. The KRG's leadership has reportedly played a central role in facilitating direct talks between Turkey and the UAE, although this may be a secondary role. However, reporting on the KRG's participation in regional dialogue is evidence of the central role played by the KRG. In addition to these events, Iran and Shiite militia groups in Iraq have launched several missile and drone attacks on the Kurdistan Region's energy fields. From October 2022 to January 2023, the Khor Mor field was attacked with Katyusha and drones three times. On March 13, 2022, Iran fired 12 missiles at the residence of Sheikh Baz Barzanji, owner of the Kar Group Companies (40% of the Kurdistan Pipeline is owned by Kargroup and 60% by Rosneft). Iranian ballistic missiles hit the Iraqi Kurdistan capital, and Tehran took responsibility for missile strikes on the northern Iraq city, saying it had hit an Israeli "strategic centre". In response to Iran's policies, Turkey has intensified its attacks on southern and western Kurdistan under the pretext of attacking the PKK، this is probably Turkey's dance and show on Kurdistan's territory to find a market in the world for its new drones. Turkey- Kurdistan Region - Gulf Triangle The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) could be influential in mobilizing regional and global support for Erbil. They also inclined to emerge as the world's largest energy hub, as the West thirsts for finding alternative gas sources due to the consequences of the Russo- Ukraine war; In early February. 14, 2022, the KRI's President Nechirvan Barzani visited Ankara to discuss closer energy ties with Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A week later, the Kurdistan Region announced it would extend its gas pipeline network to the Turkish border through a 112-mile pipeline that promised to open up vast reserves of gas supply. This step encouraged Kurdish export capabilities and showed Turkey's significant gas supply hub position, especially for European markets. Two weeks after Nechirvan Barzani visited Ankara, KRG's Prime Minister Masrour Barzani discussed Kurdistan's gas potential during a visit to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The KRG's Prime Minister has visited the UAE twice in the two months, the first to attend the Government Summit on February 15, 2022, and the second to attend the Energy Summit on March 28-29, 2023; the primary purpose of his visit to the UAE is to discuss the energy sector and regional developments (Masrour Barzani said). The succession joshing visits between the UAE and KRG's official leaders are a triangular prospect that could significantly change regional geopolitics and the regional economic order by taking advantage of the recent progress of relations between Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Whatever Baghdad moves, it needs Iran. Even with Iran's consent, holding elections is easier. Simultaneously, the Kurdistan Region must consider Turkey's position for any economic and political shift. Erbil's involvement in closeness with the Gulf countries parallels Turkey's strategy. The UAE companies participate in oil production in the KRI and operate in the gas production of the Kurdistan Region and provide 70% of the population's electricity. However, the KRG and its gas reserves do not provide attractive news for the Gulf, but the KRG's planned 112-mile pipeline to Turkey and from there to Europe needs to be financed, lobbied and supported by Baghdad. Iran and its like-minded actors in Iraq have challenged Kurdistan's oil and gas exports in domestic and international courts, and restrictions on these actors require the support and struggles of the international community to sustain Kurdistan's energy infrastructure. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been an increasing desire among Gulf countries to become more active players in Iraq and to experience power relations more effectively. This is partly due to Qatar and the UAE's long-standing relations with Iraq's current Sunni leaders, such as Mohammed al-Halbousi and Khamis al-Khanjar, who are close allies of the KRI's leaders. Moreover, the UAE participates highly (thanks to Dana Gaz, Crescent Petroleum and TAQA) in developing Kurdistan's gas and oil capacity. As well as Saudi Arabia has also come in with a solid wave of investment in Anbar (the largest Sunni region). Saudi Aramco is developing a gas field in Anbar province that can produce more than 400 million cubic feet daily. Iraq and Saudi Arabia agreed on establishing an industrial zone for Saudi industries and establishing a new unit for investment in various sectors worth 3 Billion Dollars. Eastern Mediterranean Gas Project Apart from the GCC's energy geopolitics zone, there is the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Geographically, the countries and territories of the Eastern Mediterranean include Cyprus, Turkey, the Greek islands, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Israel, Jordan and Egypt are located in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. There is a strange item here; Almost all of these countries have owned natural reserves, and they are all members of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which was founded in 2017, except Turkey! As well as from Europe, each France, Italy, Greece and Spain are considering prominent active members of the Eastern Mediterranean gas project. Since 2010, natural gas has been discovered off the coast of Cyprus and Israel, turning both countries from energy importers to exporters! The 1,900-kilometer pipeline was built for 6.7$ Billion. The energy ministers of Greece, Israel, and Cyprus signed the final agreement for the pipeline project in January 2020. The West has made no secret of its reliance on the project as an alternative to Russian gas. However, they have not hidden their intention to turn the eastern Mediterranean into a larger energy production zone, security and stability. Interestingly, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has also become involved in the Eastern Mediterranean. Though geographically separate from the Mediterranean Sea, the UAE joined the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) as an observer in 2020, fostering diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi. By September 2021, the UAE's Mubadala Petroleum purchased a 22% stake in the Israeli Tamar gas field for about $1 billion. Compared to the UAE, the Kurdistan Region and West Kurdistan are geographically much closer to the eastern Mediterranean basin. The matter is also not easy without Turkey; Turkey is expected to be a part of the EMGF after its reconciliation with Israel and Egypt, the two main EMGF speakers. Iraqi Kurdistan; A call to be realistic One of the most influential approaches in international relations literature is "Realism". The theory is the idea of power and interpreting how to survive in the arena, understanding national interest and acquisition of power, experiencing competition, and knowing why international relations are anarchy. Here, power is crucial to promoting national identity, but where does power come from? Despite that, Realists view a balance of power as desirable. It creates an inability to be dominated by another state, providing security as states are less likely to engage in conflict or war they cannot win. As the father of classical Realism, Hans Morgenthau emphasized in his famous book "Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace", first published in 1949, presents a realistic view of politics and authority. Morgenthau assumed that the state is the most critical actor in international relations and the base of politics, and the political leaders' main task is to increase the strength of the national entity in various ways. Unlike liberals who assume that the private sector and companies should be given the primary role, in Realism, the final decision lies with the state; The United States and Britain will decide instead of Exxon Mobile and British Petroleum. These realistic concepts and assumptions played a significant role in US foreign policy, making it the embodiment of global power during the Cold War. According to Morgenthau، the politician must think pragmatically in terms of national interest in order to be counted as a unit among other powers. Therefore, realists insist that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states. The centre of thought and action should be "maintaining national security". The state or region must do this. On the other hand, the American scientist Kenneth Waltz became the father of the new realist theory (Structural Realism), influenced by the prospects of Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau. Waltz believes that all threats come from outside the internal system of the state or region, emphasizing the nature of the international system, which is "Chaos" because everyone is scrutinizing power and the origins of power. To this end, Waltz calls for a "strong global ruler" to stand up like the United States. Look at the circumstances in a region like South Kurdistan or West Kurdistan; If the United States does not stand up, Iran, Turkey and Iraqi militias will attack it within hours. The Kurdistan Region shares a 513-kilometre geographical border with the Islamic Republic of Iran. From 2014 to 2023, Kurdistan's oil exports to the Turkish Ceyhan port in the Mediterranean have been considered a cheaper alternative to Iranian oil. In 2021 and 2022, Iran will meet 16% of Turkey's natural gas demand, but the Kurdistan Region's natural gas can supply more than that amount to Turkey and is more stable and cheaper; Iran sees the Kurdistan Region as a competitor for natural gas. In addition, the Kurdistan Region has 57 oil blocks, and only 12 are in operation. In 2022, the total oil exported and consumed in the Kurdistan Region reached more than (158) million barrels of oil, which is produced daily from all fields 433 thousand 726 barrels of oil, in addition to several significant refineries such as Kalak, Lanaz, Bazian and Tawke, which according to information, have a capacity of 265,000 barrels of oil per day. The Kurdistan Region has also produced 4,200 to 4,300 megawatts of electricity, 75% of which comes from fuel in 2023. What happens when heating a piece of iron? The Kurdistan Region's position has been weak because of corruption and maladministration; political parties have lost significant public trust. The KRI is an autonomous region in Iraq comprising the four Kurdish-majority governorates of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok, and Halabja, bordering Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The Kurdistan Region encompasses most of Iraqi Kurdistan. However, it excludes the disputed territories of Northern Iraq, contested between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the central Iraqi government in Baghdad since 1992 when autonomy was realized. The Kurdistan Region has existed for 32 years, but they still do not have a constitution, and they do not have a unified military force; they also do not have scientific research institutions. The region is divided into two-party zones: the Sulaimani zone is still led by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and is close to Iran. In contrast, the Erbil and Badinan zones are led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which is close to Turkey. The Kurds have an occupied territory, and for a hundred years (1923-2023), there has been continuing war and conflict with successive Iraqi governments. Baghdad and Erbil have been ambushing each other since 2005 and do not trust each other. When the Kurdish position in Kirkuk was strong, Iraq held provincial council elections throughout the country except in Kirkuk. Eighteen years later, in December 2023, they will hold provincial council elections in Kirkuk. Iraq does not have an oil and gas law because the Kurds have played a substantial role in the past eighteen years. Now that the Kurds have shaped their oil and gas reserves into law, they are pushing the Kurdistan Region to pass an oil and gas law that would concentrate all oil and gas powers in the control of the federal government in Baghdad. The Kurds were like hard iron, thoroughly heated due to the lack of a comprehensive strategic vision due to regional pressures and constant threats from Baghdad. Of course, if a metal is constantly heated and then hammered, it will change its shape. Hence, will the KRI s leaders stand in the stadium like a goalkeeper, and will the balls come and go so quickly? Iraqi political economy circumstance is waiting for mercy. From 2004 to 2022, the country has received around $1 trillion; through these eighteen years, between 25% and 40% of the Iraqi budget has been wasted annually. $80 billion has been spent on electricity alone, but there is no electricity. In August 2022, Iraqi Finance Minister Ali Alawi resigned and pointed out that 6-7 billion dollars annually disappear from the customs of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region and cannot be held accountable. Alawi said corruption prevented money from returning to the state treasury, while only $1 billion of the $9 billion in customs revenue was returned. The Iraqi Parliament's Corruption Commission says 200 billion dinars are being corrupted monthly. In addition, during the cabinet of Mustafa Al Kadhimi, 2.5 $ billion were stolen from Iraqi banks in just two months [theft of the century]. In 2023 Iraq had about $111 billion in its central bank due to rising oil prices, not because of a substantial economic infrastructure. Furthermore, because passing the budget in the Iraqi parliament is complex and risks deepening political problems, Iraq has passed the 2023, 2024 and 2025 budgets in one package. This budget has a deficit of 63 trillion dinars, 25% of the budget deficit and inflation! The value of $100 is opposite 130,000 Iraqi dinars. However, the dollar is constantly higher than the Iraqi currency, and due to the suspension of oil exports from the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk to the Turkish Ceyhan port, selling 500,000 barrels less oil per day paralyzes the Iraqi budget bill. Despite that, according to the Emirates Policy Center, southern Iraq has repeatedly faced significant climate and environmental degradation threats while the country is experiencing severe climate change. Thus, Iraq has lost at least 50% of its annual water revenue from the Euphrates River and 40% from the Tigris River over the past 40 years (Due to Turkey cutting off the water flow to Iraq). In 2022, the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources warned that the country's water reserves had halved since the previous year. Later in the same year, severe heat waves, reduced rainfall, dust storms, severe dust and salinity caused the loss of 60,000 acres of agricultural land and 30,000 trees, displacing about 30,000 families in eight provinces. When the heat wave brings Iraq to the brink of destruction, does it expect Turkey to save it from drowning? Despite those mentioned above, the Iraqi leaders are still preoccupied with sectarian conflict, increased militia budgets and political divisions. Conclusion The Kurdistan Region must reevaluate its policies to ensure energy security. The foundation of a new vision involves addressing internal issues and not standing idle before accumulating challenges. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leaders must unify and articulate a clear picture that answers essential questions concerning their goals, problems, and inspirations for change. The eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Gulf energy basins present opportunities for the Kurdistan Region's geopolitical transformation. Recognizing the sources of power and national interest, addressing internal divisions, constant conflict with Baghdad, and threats from Iran are paramount at this pivotal moment. Increased Gulf influence in Iraq may weaken Iran's control, necessitating the Kurdistan Region to foster improved relations with Baghdad while maintaining a delicate balance with Iran. Every level of work and every place must contribute to the growth and development of the Kurdistan Region. An initiative involving the Kurdistan Region, Turkey, the UAE, the East-Med Basin, Europe, and the United States could reduce Iran's security and geopolitical threats in the KRG. As the world grapples with the Ukraine war's energy demands, the era of natural gas civilization might just be on the horizon, ushering in new opportunities and challenges for the region.

Peshmerga reform hangs in the balance in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region

Winthrop Rodgers Efforts to reform the Iraqi Kurdish security forces known as the Peshmerga are at serious risk of failing. Tensions between the ruling parties of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region are not new, but the working relationship between the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has collapsed over the past year. As a result, officials within the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MOPA) are no longer capable of preventing the politics of partisan self-interest from consuming the reform project. The prospects for the depoliticization and unification of the Peshmerga have rarely seemed more remote. The first anniversary of the renewed memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the U.S. Department of Defense and the MOPA is coming up in September. According to multiple people familiar with the situation, the Peshmerga is not living up to the agreement. Therefore, with three years left in the deal, it is a good time to be clear-eyed about the state of reform. There is still an opportunity to salvage the program, but not in the likely event that current dynamics continue. There will be significant consequences if the Kurdistan Region’s political leaders fail to get serious about implementing Peshmerga reform. Reassurances and playing for time are insufficient. There is a pervading feeling of disappointment among Western military officials working on reform. They recognize that historic tensions between the KDP and the PUK are real, but worry that Kurdish leaders are allowing a golden opportunity to slip away after years of enthusiastic foreign support. The military dimension is just one part of the relationships between the Kurdistan Region and its foreign partners, but it is an important one. If the Kurdish political parties fail to live up to their responsibilities, it will have knock-on effects for political and economic links with longtime supporters. A splintered Kurdistan Region within an increasingly centralized Iraq holds much less geopolitical relevance for the international community than a united entity within a federal system. This piece reflects the open political dynamics in the Kurdistan Region and conversations with Peshmerga officials from both parties, as well as former and current military officials from the Kurdistan Region’s foreign partners, all of whom spoke on background. A golden opportunity The modern Peshmerga — which means “those who face death” in Kurdish — was born out of the various armed groups that fought for Kurdish rights in Iraq during the second half of the 20th century. Of these, the KDP and the PUK were the most powerful. The legacy of this initial division matters, but there have been three distinct opportunities to set aside partisan differences in the interests of Kurdish unity. The first two — when self-governing institutions were established following the 1991 Kurdish uprising and in the wake of the 2006 KDP-PUK strategic agreement — were not realized. Institutions remained divided. Within the Peshmerga, the KDP and the PUK each maintained partisan units, known respectively as the 80s Unit and the 70s Unit, while half-heartedly engaging with ostensibly joint institutions like the MOPA. The third opportunity came as a result of the war against Islamic State (ISIS), in which the Kurdistan Region played a frontline role starting in 2014. More than 1,300 Peshmerga were killed and thousands of others were wounded in operations against the militant group. Members of the International Coalition to Defeat ISIS provided support and training to the Peshmerga, but both Kurds and foreigners realized that its divided structure hampered its military effectiveness. Military needs could service political goals. With the full commitment and support of the international community, Kurdish political leaders had an opportunity to unify, with the Peshmerga as both the symbolic and practical vehicle. In 2017, the U.S., the U.K., and Germany formally launched the Peshmerga reform program; the Netherlands later joined the group in 2019. They reached a 35-point agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to create a “robust and professional” defense force. It included developing an official security strategy for the KRG, bringing partisan KDP and PUK units under the MOPA, eliminating so-called “ghost employees” (who exist only on paper but receive a salary), instituting new recruitment practices to eliminate patronage, and implementing new logistics and equipment procedures. At the time, officials predicted that it would take between five and 10 years to complete the process. Recognizing the Kurdistan Region’s dire financial straits, the U.S. began providing stipends to pay the salaries of MOPA-controlled Peshmerga around 2017; currently, Washington provides $20 million per month. Some progress has been made. The ministry has also started using a biometric payroll system to crack down on ghost employees. Twenty brigades are now organized under the MOPA, involving approximately 54,000 Peshmerga, according to the most recent lead inspector general report for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). KDP and PUK officials both insist that several other units stand ready to be integrated in the near future. Oftentimes, announcements of progress are premature and a way to deflect pressure to show results. For example, the MOPA announced on Aug. 15 that KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has authorized the formation of three more brigades under the ministry taken from the PUK, but the process of switching them over is not yet complete, according to a PUK source. Yet, many of the big-ticket items remain unaddressed. There is no agreed security strategy and required lists of available equipment have not been delivered. Approximately 50,000 KDP Peshmerga, which are organized under the 80s Unit, and 50,000 PUK Peshmerga, under the 70s Unit, remain outside MOPA control. These partisan units perform the majority of counter-ISIS operations, leaving ministry Peshmerga to conduct “control of area” operations in the Kurdistan Region. “Some of the most effective counter-ISIS capability, including aggressive patrolling, raids, and ambushes, still lies with the commando forces in the 70s and 80s Units,” the lead inspector general report found. On Sept. 21, 2022, the U.S. and the KRG signed a new, four-year MoU with strict timelines and deliverables for Kurdish officials to meet. In interviews, Kurdish officials conceded that they were behind schedule in meeting those deadlines. The OIR lead inspector general’s report, which was published on Aug. 3, found that the coalition is “still uncertain how and when [the KDP and the PUK] will transfer the remainder of their forces to the MOPA” and blamed “political tensions” between the parties for this uncertainty. Moreover, the joint brigades “showed no progress in developing key warfighting functions” and the MOPA “continues to lack a long-term plan,” including a defense strategy. Political dynamics in the Kurdistan Region Asked why Peshmerga reform is in trouble, most people interviewed for this piece blamed the refusal of the political leaderships of the KDP and the PUK to work together. While acknowledging that many Peshmerga, particularly in the older generations, maintain strong partisan loyalties, they felt that the majority of military officials were committed to the reform program and recognized its benefits. Militarily, Peshmerga reform will yield a unified command and control system, simplified logistics and equipping, and reduce patronage in recruiting. But given the history of the Kurdistan Region, taking guns out of the hands of individual political parties and making security affairs apolitical would be a huge boon for Kurdish democracy. Increasingly, however, these officials are unable to deflect the extreme partisan behavior of their political masters away from MOPA operations. Without even this imperfect symbol of shared commitment to unity, the Peshmerga reform process is surely doomed. Within the KDP, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has taken over the day-to-day running of the party from his father, Masoud Barzani, and largely sidelined his cousin, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani. Before entering frontline politics, Masrour was deeply involved in running the KDP’s intelligence agency, known as the Parastin. This background influences his approach to governance: opaque, partisan, and focused on internal security. Human rights violations against activists and journalists are common in KDP-controlled Erbil and Duhok governorates. He sees the KDP as the most powerful party in the Kurdistan Region and is therefore reluctant to compromise or cooperate with others. From his position, Masrour Barzani is able to wield significant state resources in furtherance of his political ambitions. The PUK has the opposite problem. Its leader, Bafel Talabani, is a political neophyte who never held an official position within the party before coming to power. His main qualification is that he is the eldest son of the PUK’s longtime leader, the late Jalal Talabani. Initially elected as the party’s co-leader, Talabani removed his cousin Lahur Sheikh Jangi from power in July 2021. Although Sheikh Jangi no longer poses a real challenge to the party’s leadership, the episode alienated many party members. Talabani lacks grassroots support within the factional party and therefore relies heavily on the security forces to project an image of strength. The KDP uses its control of KRG finances to restrict the transfer of money to the PUK’s homebase of Sulaymaniyah governorate. To compensate for these weaknesses, Bafel Talabani has turned to Baghdad and the Shia Coordination Framework for support. He clearly sees the future of his party and Sulaymaniyah as better served by focusing on federal Iraq, rather than the Kurdistan Region. The PUK also maintains close ties with Iran, which has an important mediating influence within the party. Moreover, the PUK is reliant on income collected from Sulaymaniyah’s border crossings with its neighbor to make up for what it loses as a result of tensions with the KDP. In interviews, Kurdish officials acknowledged that tensions between the KDP and the PUK have become worse over the past six years, often citing the withdrawal of the Peshmerga from Kirkuk on Oct. 16, 2017 as a significant event. The KDP accused members of the PUK of betraying the Kurdish people by allegedly making a deal with the government in Baghdad in the aftermath of the 2017 independence referendum to withdraw from the disputed city without bloodshed. But many also argued that the relationship has gotten worse since the new Barzani and Talabani generations came to power after 2019. The result is a profound lack of trust that has destroyed the working relationship between the parties. For example, the PUK decided to boycott KRG cabinet meetings for six months in response to specific security incidents and a sense that Sulaymaniyah is not getting its fair share of revenues relative to Erbil and Duhok. Although that boycott ended under heavy pressure from the U.S. State Department, the two parties are hardly reconciled. Their differences remain on full display across a range of issues, including over Iraq’s federal budget law and elections. Following a contentious meeting between the parties on July 9, a reporter asked Bafel Talabani if the parties’ relationship was back on track. “Does it look like we’re on good terms,” the PUK leader growled before storming off. Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga officers take part in a graduation ceremony in Erbil, the capital of Iraq's northern autonomous Kurdish region, on June 21, 2021. Photo by SAFIN HAMED/AFP via Getty Images. Tensions escalate within the MOPA The MOPA, which is the heart of the Peshmerga reform process, is increasingly influenced by these dynamics and is currently without permanent leadership. In October 2022, the PUK decided that it wanted to replace Minister of Peshmerga Affairs Shorsh Ismail, who is a member of that party. PUK and international sources explained that there were concerns within the PUK that Ismail had grown too close to the KDP and Masrour Barzani during his tenure. He was also the subject of corruption allegations. Asked about this, a senior KDP Peshmerga official praised Ismail’s performance and argued that all parts of the force benefitted from his work as minister. Under the KDP-PUK agreement, both parties must consent before switching out high-level officials. The KDP also wanted to change some of its own officials, including Kurdistan Parliament Deputy Speaker Hemin Hawrami, who had recently been given a new party position. However, not all of the necessary pieces fell into place and the parties were unable to implement the changes. As a result, Ismail has not been replaced, but is also no longer active in his position. Both PUK and KDP Peshmerga officials lamented the lack of leadership at the top of the MOPA, but disagreed whether Ismail should return to his position. Partisan tensions within the MOPA exploded in July when the deputy Peshmerga minister, who is from the KDP, issued an order redistributing official positions within the ministry. Traditionally, posts have been divided evenly between the parties — a principle known locally as 50-50 — but the new order changed this to 57-43 in favor of the KDP and replaced PUK officials from the leadership of four department positions. Moreover, promotions of PUK Peshmerga officers have allegedly been held up, adding a personal dimension to the ministerial tensions. In the weeks that followed, documents were leaked online in order to embarrass high-level KDP and PUK Peshmerga officials with corruption accusations. In an interview, a senior PUK Peshmerga official denounced the order establishing the 57-43 ratio as “illegal” and against the KDP-PUK strategic agreement. He questioned why it was made without apparent regard to the MoU with the U.S. Moreover, he accused KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani of directing Peshmerga officials to issue the order. A senior KDP Peshmerga official defended the deputy minister’s order in a separate interview, calling it a “correct decision” that reflected what he argued are the greater geographic responsibilities of the KDP-affiliated 80s Unit. KDP-controlled areas border northern Kirkuk, Makhmour, and Nineveh, while PUK forces are mostly responsible for areas in eastern Kirkuk and northern Diyala. Asked where the decision to change the ratio originated, he conceded that ministry officials cannot issue such a decision “without receiving an order,” implying a political source. “I hope my answer is clear,” he said. A crossroads Former and current Western military officials involved in the Peshmerga reform process expressed their disappointment at the lack of progress. In interviews, they said that Kurdish leaders have been given a valuable opportunity, but are failing to take advantage. In their eyes, bringing the Peshmerga together as a unified force is politically fraught, but achievable. Ultimately, however, this is a Kurdish process and Kurdish political leaders are responsible for whether it moves forward or not. In interviews, the Peshmerga officials stressed the importance of continued Western engagement, but gave starkly divergent assessments of whether Kurdish leaders and institutions would live up their responsibilities. The KDP Peshmerga official expressed confidence that the process would get back on track following recent meetings with the coalition and promised results in the autumn. In contrast, the PUK Peshmerga official said that things would only improve if there are significant — and, frankly, unrealistic — political changes in the Kurdistan Region in the near term. One Western military official said they still have enthusiasm for the Peshmerga reform project, but echoed a military adage: hoping that Kurdish political leaders suddenly change their demonstrated behavior is not a strategy. If the KDP and the PUK fail to change tack, current levels of support may be reconsidered. This may already be starting to happen. According to multiple sources, a stern message has been delivered to Kurdish officials that the U.S. is weighing whether to reduce its stipend payments for MOPA salaries from $20 million to $15 million this autumn in response to the lack of progress. Geopolitically, the Kurdistan Region will undoubtedly remain relevant, but foreign capitals will become increasingly hesitant to involve themselves with the Kurdish parties. Peshmerga reform stands at a junction that speaks to more general dynamics. Will the political leadership put aside their mutual mistrust and advance a unified vision in service of all people and institutions of the Kurdistan Region regardless of political affiliation or will they crawl deeper into partisan self-interest as their foreign partners gradually tune out? Opportunity remains, barely and not for long. Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist and researcher based in Sulaymaniyah in Iraq's Kurdistan Region. He focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy. He is an editor for The Nesar Record and past work has appeared in Rest of World, the Columbia Journalism Review, Al-Monitor, and the Los Angeles Review of Books.

DNO restarts Iraq's Tawke field, sells crude locally

Norwegian independent DNO said it has restarted crude production from the Tawke oil field in northern Iraq, four months after the closure of a key export pipeline to Turkey forced the company and fellow operators in Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region to shut in output and rein in their investment plans. The field is producing around 40,000 b/d, DNO said today, which is only around 5,000 b/d short of last year's average. With the export pipeline to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan still closed, half of Tawke's output is being delivered to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the rest is being sold to local trading companies, with prices averaging around 50pc of pre-closure levels, DNO said. "While there is no light at the end of the export pipeline, we are seeing the headlights of more and more incoming tanker trucks loading up our Tawke cargoes on a cash-and-carry basis," said DNO's executive chairman Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani. DNO said it restarted Tawke last month to carry out well integrity tests. It decided to keep the taps on in response to strong demand for the crude but the nearby Peshkabir field in the same licence remains closed, the company said. It is not clear how many other operators in Iraqi Kurdistan plan to follow DNO's lead. Gulf Keystone, which operates northern Iraq's Shaikan field, floated the option of selling crude to local buyers back in June. Turkey ordered the pipeline closure in late March after an international arbitration ruling said it had breached a bilateral agreement with Iraq by allowing KRG crude to be exported without Baghdad's consent. The KRG said in May that it had reached a deal with Baghdad on measures to allow oil exports through Turkey to resume and that Iraq's federal oil marketer Somo had asked Turkish authorities to facilitate the restart, but no timeline to resume pipeline operations has been announced. Knock-on effects The closure has had a significant impact on the finances of foreign oil firms operating in the region. DNO and its partner at Tawke, Genel Energy, have said they will pare back investments in Iraq until the situation is resolved. DNO reported today that it swung to a loss of $18.5mn in the second quarter from a profit of $87.4mn in the previous three months and $72.3mn in April-June last year, with its revenues squeezed by a sharp drop in production. The firm said its net oil and gas output hit a 13-year low of around 14,400 b/d oil equivalent (boe/d) in April-June, compared with almost 92,000 boe/d a year earlier. Gross crude production from the company's operated licenses in Iraqi Kurdistan averaged just 65 b/d during the second quarter, down from over 107,000 b/d in the same period of 2022. The small volumes that were produced in the few weeks after the pipeline closure were placed in storage tanks. The pipeline closure has also had a marked effect on the wider crude market, notably in Europe. The removal of northern Iraqi crude from international export markets, combined with Opec+ production cuts and sanctions on Russian Urals, has pushed up the price of North Sea sour grades, prompting European refiners to switch to lighter and sweeter crudes, in particular more affordable US WTI. The shift in crude slates is having a knock-on effect on refinery runs, yields and margins in Europe.

Tracking Iranian Soft Power Influence in the KRI

Nawras Jaff The Islamic Republic of Iran over several years has gained a significant foothold in Iraq, spreading its influence and agenda throughout Iraqi daily life. However, this foothold has adopted a particular character in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), where Iran has developed different mechanisms through which to expand that influence both inside and outside KRI territory. Tehran utilizes numerous methods of soft power to this end, including coercion in Iraq’s internal politics, proselytization, cultural expansion, and the shaping of educational opportunities. Iranian Influence in the KRI’s Internal Politics As with much of Iraq, the Islamic Republic is notorious for its financial, military, and logistical support of Iraqi Kurdish political parties, especially the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Over the years, this has given Iran a key foothold in the Iraqi political scene. Starting at the beginning of the militant and revolutionary political movements of the parties in south Kurdistan in the 1960s until today, Iran's extensive role in supporting and insuring the financial, military, and logistical necessities of the parties has played a major role in internal Kurdish politics. Visits are one public aspect of this dynamic. An Iranian delegation visited Kurdish officials in April 2022 to discuss strengthening bilateral ties, during which the delegation met with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) president Masoud Barzani, KRI Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, and KRI President Nechirvan Barzani. Iran’s Deputy Minister of Intelligence (Ettela’at/VAJA), Agha Lutfi, and another Iranian delegation likewise met with several other KRI politicians in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil in April 2023, including Muhammad Haji Mahmood, an Iraqi Kurdish politician affiliated with the KRI’s Social Democratic Party. During this visit, the Washington Kurdish Institute’s April 18 report noted claims that the Iranian delegation had pressured the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to “expel and disarm Iranian Kurdish parties in Iraqi Kurdistan in an attempt to follow up on a recent security agreement between Baghdad and Tehran,” an agreement focused on containing Iranian Kurdish dissidents in the KRI to protect Iran’s security. In a televised interview in April 2023, Haji Mahmood—secretary of a party splintered off from the KDP—seemingly acknowledged the deep entrenchment of Iranian forces in Kurdish politics, claiming that “in the 2014 elections, Qasem Soleimani, the former Iranian Quds Forces commander, gave one million U.S. dollars to the four Kurdish opposition parties.” Likewise, prior to his death, Soleimani would meet regularly with Iraqi Kurdish officials. In particular, he met with PUK figures in 2017, advising them and their Peshmerga forces not to attempt a firefight in the city of Kirkuk against the forces of then-Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, who were backed by Western and regional powers, including Iran. In exchange for a Peshmerga withdrawal from Kirkuk, Soleimani promised that Iran would “protect their interests.” His visit and advice were lauded by Kurdish lawmakers as both “wise” and helpful in preventing “a fatal mistake.” Religion as a Tool of Influence The KRI is primarily comprised of Sunni Muslims, especially those who follow the Shafi’i school of Sunni religious thought. For several years, Iran has organized the ‘Imam al-Shafi Congress’ for KRI Mullahs and other religious figures as a means of influencing religious leaders in the KRI. Some religious figures have in fact converted to Shia Islam. Sheikh Issa Barznji, for instance, pledged allegiance to Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of the prophet Mohammad, saying, "I am the follower of Imam Ali and Muhammad Prophet. Everyone should be the followers of Imam Ali" to Rudaw Media Network during Eid al-Ghadir, a significant holiday for Shia Muslims. He then went on to claim that the events of Saddam Hussein’s regime would not have occurred if Iraqis had been Shia. Among the many ethnic groups inhabiting the KRI, Iran has tried to curry religious favor with several of them, including those that were targeted during the years when ISIS was most active—the Shabak, Kaka’i, and Bektashis in particular. In each case, Iran has attempted to push these minorities towards its brand of Shia Islam. As one source put it, “Iran tried to alter the opinions and beliefs of the Shabak and Kaka’is… [and attempted to] convince the Kaka’is that if they do not convert to Shia, Sunni extremists will attack them.” Demonstrating the partial success of Iran’s message, there are now Shia militias operating in the Mosul Governorate and in neighboring areas which consist of members of the Shabak and Kaka’i ethnic groups. Bartella, a previously Christian-dominant town in the heart of Christian Iraq, now hosts many Shia Iraqis. Tariqqat There are multiple Tariqqat in the Kurdistan Region, almost all of which are affiliated with Sunni Islamic movements. Nevertheless, Iran’s influence is visible in one of the KRI’s largest Tariqa in terms of followers: Qadri-Kasnazani Tariqa, which is located in Sulaymaniyah. This Tariqa receives thousands of visitors monthly. Alongside Sunni visitors, Shia from southern and central Iraq and Iran visit and participate in its ceremonies and religious activities. The history of this Tariqa is not extensive. It emerged from the burial place of Sheikh Muhammad Kasnazani after his death in July 2020. Since then, it has become a place of pilgrimage for his followers, including Iranians along with domestic and other foreign visitors. The imagery around this Tariqa is decidedly reminiscent of other Shia holy sites, including major Shia figures such as Ammar al-Hakim, the Hikmah Route Leader who is one of the known Shia leaders in Iraq and has great support from Iran. Iran has likewise devoted concerted efforts to trying to build a Hussainiya in the KRI city of Erbil. A Hussainiya (or Hosayniya) is a venue for Muharram ceremonies commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali, a primarily Shia practice. Though the building plan was eventually rejected by KRI authorities, Shias still perform their annual religious ceremonies and activities at the city’s Altoon Mosque. Some indirect influence through Iranian visitors is also evident, and may have an impact on Kurdish receptiveness to these efforts. The KRI’s position along the route that some Iranians take in pilgrimage to the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in southern Iraq has left its mark on Iraqi Kurds’ familiarity with Iranian Shia Islam. Iranian nationals, along with Afghani nationals—despite Iraq’s lack of diplomatic relations with Afghanistan’s Taliban government—are allowed to enter Iraq without a visa as of 2021, including the KRI-controlled Bashmaq border crossing. In September 2022, especially during the annual anniversary of Ashura, more than 100,000 Shia followers from Iran used the KRI as a through point, arriving from the Haji Omaran border crossing. Pilgrims stayed a few nights in Erbil before and after the pilgrimage. Education Beyond religion, students hailing from the KRI are increasingly traveling to Iran to study in the Islamic Republic’s universities, a low-cost option compared to Iraqi universities for those pursuing bachelors, masters, and PhD degrees. Annually, an Iraqi student can expect to pay $5,000 in tuition at an Iraqi private university, while a master’s or doctoral degree will only cost a student $1,000 and $1,500, respectively, at the University of Tabriz in Iran. Making an Iranian education even more appealing, admission to an Iranian University has been greatly expanded to students with just “average scores.” Additionally, Iraq recognizes certificates from Iranian universities, further facilitating study there. The Islamic Republic has used the attendance of Iraqi Kurdish students in its universities to its advantage, introducing them to Shia culture and religion and the Iranian Shia agenda. This has resulted in a legacy of Iraqi Kurdish converts to Shia Islam, such as Umed Nanakali, an office manager for the renowned Shia cleric Ammar al-Hakim—who himself was exiled in Iran as a dissident of Saddam Hussein’s regime. More recently, Iran has taken to bringing its own universities and educational opportunities inside the borders of its neighbor. Islamic Azad University, a multi-branch Iranian university with campuses in the Islamic Republic and Syria, has reached the approval phase to build five new campuses in the Middle East. Iraqis have noticed these Iranian moves and view this educational expansion as another attempt by the Islamic Republic to spread its influence across the region, including in the KRI. With Iran wielding such effective influence campaigns on both the political and cultural levels, all signs point to Iranian soft power continuing to grow in the KRI. Though the impact of these soft power efforts only tends to become evident over time, the current signs of Iranian influence in the KRI’s political, religious, and educational life suggest that this movement will remain effective in the future.