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The future of the Kurdistan oil pipeline

Iraq’s Oil Ministry announced on Monday its intention to operate a pipeline that runs from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, which will rival the more than a year-old Kurdistan Jihan line, in a move that could anger Kurdish officials and companies operating there. “Baghdad is working to repair a pipeline that would allow it to pump 350,000 barrels per day of oil to Turkey by the end of this month,” Iraq’s deputy oil minister, Bassem Mohammed, told Reuters. The restart of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which has been closed for a decade, would provide a competitive route for a pipeline from the Kurdistan Region that has been suspended for a year amid stalled talks between Baghdad and the KRG over the resumption of exports. “The pipeline is likely to be ready to operate the flows by the end of this month, and the repair work is underway and a major crude pumping station with storage facilities has been completed,” Mohammed added. “Repairing the damaged parts inside Iraq and completing one basic pumping station will be the first phase of operations to return the pipeline to full capacity,” he stressed. For its part, three sources from the Baghdad-run North Oil Company said, “Crude oil test pumping began early last week to verify the pipeline parts operating inside Iraqi territory. The sources added, Reuters, that “the Iraqi technical crews, during the past period, have speeded up the repair of the affected parts that extend from Kirkuk through the provinces of Salah al-Din and Nineveh to the border area with Turkey.” According to the above, Reuters noted that the federal government in Baghdad will ask oil companies operating in the Kurdistan region to negotiate with it to sell their oil via the revived pipeline to Turkey, something that could anger the Kurds who are almost completely dependent on oil revenues. “Baghdad has rejected a Kurdia’s request that the federal government pay a transit fee of $6 a barrel for Russian oil company Rosneft, which partially owns the pipeline,” two Iraqi oil officials and a government energy adviser, speaking to Reuters, on condition of anonymity, said. “Iraqi Oil Ministry officials told the Kurdish negotiating team that they consider the agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Rosneft illegal and a violation of applicable Iraqi laws,” Reuters quoted energy adviser in the Kurdistan Region as saying.

U.S. Government invested $300 million for KRI's oil and gas sector

aught in the middle of a standoff between Baghdad, Erbil and Ankara, international oil companies operating in Iraq's semiautonomous Kurdistan region are warning they may no longer continue investing amid an "increasingly hostile business environment." Exports of the crude oil they produce have been blocked for more than a month, as Iraq and Turkey have yet to agree on terms to reopen a critical pipeline to the port of Ceyhan following an international arbitration ruling. Beyond that, lingering sovereignty disputes over oil revenues between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the federal Iraqi government are still casting a pall, while the expiry of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline agreement looms in 2025. The regulatory and political uncertainty threatens the approximately 450,000 b/d of Kurdish crude production, with five of the IOCs operating there forming a trade group to advocate for their interests. The Association of the Petroleum Industry in Kurdistan comprises DNO, Genel Energy, Gulf Keystone Petroleum, HKN Energy and Shamaran Petroleum. The group has largely kept its activities out of the spotlight since organizing in February due to the sensitivity of relations between the governments involved in getting Kurdish crude to market. But with no resolution in sight to the shutdown of exports from Ceyhan, some members say they need to become more active and visible. "The KRG is plateauing in [crude] production, and much of that is due to the political issues," said one representative of a company in APIKUR who asked not to be named. "It's too difficult to justify an increased investment. For the KRG and the IOCs, this is an existential imperative." Gulf Keystone said April 27 it was weighing legal action over the halt in exports that has forced it and other IOCs to shut in production. APIKUR met with KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani April 18 to lay out its concerns. The association has also urged the US and UK governments, where many members are listed or headquartered, to pressure Baghdad, Erbil and Ankara to resolve their disputes and closely monitor any agreements. In letters to American and British lawmakers, APIKUR has said its members "cannot continue to make significant new investments [in Kurdistan] given the increasingly hostile business environment," adding that without more upstream development, the region's largely mature oil fields will see major degradations in crude production, while mooted gas projects will not get off the ground. The US has also financed $300 million in energy projects in Kurdistan. At stake is the KRG's ability to remain solvent, with Western governments seeking Kurdistan as a bulwark against Iran's influence in the Middle East, as well as the Islamic State and other terror groups. "Kurdistan has historically been a strong ally to the West," said another APIKUR representative, who also spoke to S&P Global Commodity Insights on condition of anonymity. "The engagement has to step up very quickly, as an objective broker. There's a nexus of multiple issues: the political side, the financial side, protection of shareholder rights, but also protecting the Kurds and their way of life, which will be severely compromised." Sanctity of contracts Oil and gas revenues fund some 80% of the KRG's budget. But Kurdish crude production has fallen from a peak of nearly 600,000 b/d, in large part due to the sovereignty dispute that has constrained the KRG's finances. The federal Iraqi government in 2017 reclaimed some Kirkuk oil fields from the KRG, after the region's successful non-binding independence referendum escalated tensions between Baghdad and Erbil. Baghdad has at times withheld budget payments to the KRG as well, and federal oil marketer SOMO has threatened to sue buyers of Kurdish crude and block IOCs and service companies from operating there, citing an Iraqi Supreme Court decision from February 2022 that ruled the KRG's independent exports as unconstitutional. KRG officials have rejected the ruling. The cash-strapped KRG has racked up billions of dollars of debt to oil traders and the IOCs, which APIKUR says Baghdad needs to address if it is going to assume control of Kurdistan's oil sector. "What we really care about is contract sanctity and surety of payment," the first APIKUR representative said. The Iraqi oil ministry and the KRG did not respond to requests for comment, while a SOMO official who spoke on condition of anonymity said "technical" issues were still being ironed out. While the resumption of exports from Ceyhan is of immediate priority, APIKUR officials said the Iraqi budget, an oil and gas law, and the renewal of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline agreement are also of heightened importance. A preliminary deal reached in February that would see the KRG receive 12.67% of the federal budget and establish an account to handle revenues from Kurdish crude sales has yet to be ratified by the Iraqi parliament. Talks over comprehensive overhaul of the country's oil and gas law that could enshrine regulation of the Kurdish oil sector appear on the backburner. Meanwhile, a negotiating window to renew the Iraq-Turkey pipeline agreement is set to open later in 2023, two years before it expires. But that is likely to be complicated by the International Commercial Court's arbitration ruling March 23 that Baghdad says ordered Ankara to pay financial penalties for allowing the KRG to independently export its crude, in violation of the pipeline pact. Resolving those thorny matters would lift the regulatory cloud that hangs over the Kurdish oil sector, APIKUR says. "In good faith, the IOCs can commit to a capital deployment program if these issues are addressed -- fix the pipeline issue and the repayments," the second APIKUR official said. "The delay in payments puts pressure on us as IOCs to reestablish the confidence of the market in investing in Kurdistan. The more delays, the more reduction in the level of production, which then creates the shortfall in revenues. The situation is very severe."

Bafel Talabani: The Kurdistan Parliamentary elections will be held on time

After the meeting of the parties involved in the Iraqi government, the President of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan said: "There has been no proposal to postpone the elections". The parties involved in the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Sudani met in the presence of President of Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani on Saturday. After the meeting, Bafel Talabani, President of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, said that the meeting discussed many things. Regarding the postponement of the elections or holding it on time, Bafel Talabani said "The elections will be held on time in Kurdistan,". He said that there is no proposal to postpone the elections in the Kurdistan Region.

Baghdad Bank Joins KRG's 'MyAccount' Project

Baghdad Bank has been approved by the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) to participate in the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) "MyAccount" project, as reported on Sunday. The inclusion of Baghdad Bank in the project is poised to broaden the spectrum of banking services and products available to the people of the Kurdistan Region. This move is anticipated to streamline access to loans and facilitate private expenditures for the residents, according to the KRG's official website. With six branches already established in the Kurdistan Region, Baghdad Bank's participation is expected to strengthen the banking infrastructure and further enhance financial accessibility for the local population. Additionally, it is reported that more banks are slated to join the initiative later this month, as revealed by information obtained by BasNews. The KRG's concerted efforts in fostering partnerships with participating banks have resulted in the creation of over 200,000 bank accounts for public sector employees. The project is set to continue its momentum, with plans to register more than one million KRG employees by the year's end. Rebaz Hamlan, Assistant to Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, provided insights into the expansion of the "MyAccount" project, aimed at digitizing the payroll system for over one million public sector workers. Hamlan shared that following the Ramadan period, additional Iraqi banks, including the Commercial Bank of Iraq TBI, will join the initiative. Highlighting the collaborative efforts between the KRG and the federal government concerning the "MyAccount" project, Hamlan expressed optimism about visible progress post-holidays. He underscored the project's goal of transitioning towards a cashless society, which is expected to enhance financial security for beneficiaries and streamline financial transactions. Since September 2023, the KRG has been diligently pursuing its mission to transition the Kurdistan Region towards a cashless society, starting with the digitization of the payroll system for its extensive public sector workforce. This initiative aims to simplify salary collection, reinforce financial stability, and provide beneficiaries with access to a wide array of financial services, including savings accounts.

DNO’s operations in Iraqi Kurdistan recovered after severe floods

Norwegian oil and gas operator DNO ASA announced on Thursday that production and field operations at the Tawke oil field in the Kurdistan region have rebounded following significant floods. The floods, caused by melting snow in Turkey and heavy rainfall in the region, resulted in the destruction of large sections of the Khabur River's banks, damaged roads, and disrupted the loading of tanker trucks for customer deliveries, as per a statement from DNO ASA. The flooding compelled DNO to temporarily halt operations at the Tawke oil field, while operations at the Peshkabir oil field, unaffected by the floods, continued. During a ten-day period, gross license production dropped from over 80,000 barrels per day to an average of 65,000 barrels. However, by March 30, 2024, DNO had managed to restore production levels to pre-flood levels, employing measures to mitigate flood risks, assess damage, and implement corrective measures, including the installation of additional truck loading facilities.

A year after Iraq-Turkey pipeline halt, no progress to resume flows

A year after the closure of the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline, the conduit that once handled about 0.5% of global oil supply is still stuck in limbo as legal and financial hurdles impede the resumption of flows, three sources told Reuters. About 450,000 barrels per day of crude once flowed through Iraq's northern oil export route via Turkey, and its closure has led to the loss of roughly $11 billion to $12 billion for Iraq, the Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) estimates. A restart is not being discussed at the moment, one of the sources with knowledge of the matter told Reuters. Ankara halted flows on March 25, 2023, after an arbitration ruling found it had violated provisions of a 1973 treaty by facilitating oil exports from the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan without the consent of the Iraqi federal government in Baghdad. The court ordered Ankara to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion in damages for unauthorised exports between 2014 and 2018. A second ongoing arbitration case covers the period from 2018 onwards. The countries remain embroiled in a protracted legal tussle, two sources familiar with litigation said. Meanwhile, Iraq owes Turkey minimum payments as long as the pipeline is technically operational - estimated by consultancy Wood Mackenzie at around $25 million per month - as part of the treaty, in theory providing an incentive to restart flows. But with Iraq deepening oil export cuts as part of OPEC+'s broader mission to support oil prices, a resumption of northern flows is not on the agenda, two sources told Reuters. Geopolitical factors are also a stumbling block. The Iraqi government's strained relations with the Kurds, a feature of Iraq's political landscape since Saddam Hussein was toppled in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, have recently soured further. The United States, which would benefit from the pipeline restart lowering oil prices, has also made a handful of attempts to help broker a deal, said Michael Knights, an Iraq expert at the Washington Institute think-tank. But with war raging in Ukraine and Gaza, the U.S. government is spread thin, he said. "They've tried to fix this problem about five or six times. And they're tired of it." The U.S. State Department did not respond to a request for comment. Also key to any restart deal are the international oil companies operating in the Kurdistan region, who were forced to halt exports as a result of the pipeline closure. Instead, they can only sell oil locally in Kurdistan at a significant discount. With more than $1 billion collectively owed in overdue payments for oil delivered between October 2022 and March 2023, according to APIKUR, the group continues to push for compensation in line with their contracts. The companies have also collectively lost more than $1.5 billion in direct revenue since the closure, the group said. Despite several meetings, neither APIKUR nor its members have received any formal proposals or agreements from Iraqi or Kurdish officials that would lead to a resumption of exports, an APIKUR spokesperson said. Reuters

Fourth Decree of Nechirvan Barzani on the verge of dissolution

Kurdistan Ministry of Justice published number (317) of the Waqai Kurdistan Newspaper. All laws, decisions and instructions published in this newspaper shall come into force immediately. In this issue of Waqa'i newspaper, Regional Decree No. (50) of 2024 has been published which was issued by Nechirvan Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region and he has set June 10 as the date for the sixth round of parliamentary elections. The publication of this Decree in the Waqai Kurdistan Newspaper comes at a time when the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) announced its withdrawal from the election, and the PUK insists that elections must be held on schedule. Nechirvan Barzani, as the president of the Kurdistan Region, so far issued four decrees to hold the sixth round of parliamentary elections, three of which were canceled and the elections were not held. If the elections are delayed this time, that will be the fourth time to dissolve Nechirvan Barzani's decree. Nechirvan Barzani's decrees for the sixth round of elections: • February 24, 2022 Decree, to hold elections on October 1, • March 26, 2023 Decree, to hold elections on November 18, • August 3, 2023 Decree, to hold elections on February 25, • March 3, 2024 Decree, to hold elections on June 10,

They registered a new party for the elections

A number of former parliamentarians and political figures registered a new party in Baghdad to participate in the Kurdistan parliamentary elections. So far, a number of political parties and two coalitions have registered for the Kurdistan parliamentary elections: • Kurdistan Democratic Party • Patriotic Union of Kurdistan • New Generation Movement • Gorran Movement • KUrdistan Islamic Union • Kurdistan Justice Society • Kurdistan Islamic Movement • National Coalition • People's Front Party • National Stand Party Two coalitions have been registered so far: Kurdistan Alliance Sardam Coalition A number of former Kurdistan parliamentarians have registered a new party in Baghdad today. The new party includes a number of parliamentarians and political figures, including: • Massoud Abdulkhaliq • Salim Koyi • Ali Hama Saleh • Dr. Ghalib Mohammed • Dr. Karwan Hamasaleh • Dr. Rebwar Karim • Badal Barwari

Christians and Turkmen Parties Decide to Boycott Kurdistan Elections After Iraqi Court Ruling

Kurdistan Region's Turkmen parties on Tuesday announced that they will be boycotting the Region's upcoming parliamentary elections in protest to Iraq's top court ruling that stripped them of the quota seats allocated to them in the parliament. At the same time, a coalition of Chaldean, Syrian, Assyrian, and Armenian Christian parties and associations on Monday announced their decision to boycott the upcoming parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region. The announcement was made during a press conference held in Erbil province where the coalition voiced their concerns over what they perceive as an attack on coexistence and a violation of constitutional principles and laws. The coalition criticized the Iraqi Federal Court's decision to annul final seats, attributing it to a historical error made by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to serve their immediate political interests. They highlighted the negative impact of this decision on communal harmony and democracy in the Kurdistan Region. "By passing this unjust and unjustified ruling which deprived the indigenous components of Kurdistan from exercising their democratic rights, the federal court and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have inflicted a heavy wound in the hearts of our nation," Turkmen parties said in a news conference in Erbil today. As Turkmen parties, we have decided to boycott the upcoming Kurdistan parliamentary elections unless the quota seats are reinstated." In late February of this year, Iraq's Supreme Federal Court ruled that the allocation of quota seats for ethnic and religious components in the Kurdistan parliament were "unconstitutional." The Kurdistan Region is set to hold parliamentary elections in June this year. Political parties will now be vying for 100 seats at the Region's parliament, which had previously allocated 11 seats for ethnic and religious components in the Region. Emphasizing the significance of the existing parliamentary system, established since 1992, the coalition argued that it provides a guaranteed framework for political representation of Christian and Turkmen minorities. They expressed reservations about the ability of minority groups to compete fairly in elections due to the dominance of Kurdish communities and the lack of balanced opportunities. The decision to boycott the elections reflects the rejection of what they perceive as historic mistakes by the Federal Court and the PUK-led coalition against Chaldean, Assyrian, Syrian, and Armenian communities. However, they clarified that their stance is subject to change if their constituents demand participation. Furthermore, the coalition called for early parliamentary elections to uphold democratic values and strengthen the constitutional framework of the Kurdistan Region. The declaration was jointly signed by prominent parties and associations representing Chaldean, Syrian, Assyrian, and Armenian communities, including the Chaldean Democratic Union Party, the World Chaldean Alliance, the Syrian Gathering Movement Party, and others. The Federal Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding the Kurdistan Parliamentary Elections were also discussed during the press conference, particularly the abolishment of quota seats and the increase in the total number of parliamentary seats from 111 to 100.

"We have called on the United States and the West to support the communities"

The Minister of Transportation and Communications in the Kurdistan Region Ano Jawhar stated on Thursday that "we have called on all our friends in the United States and Europe to support the constitutional components of the Region." Minister Jawhar considered the complaint of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) against the quota seats for components in the Kurdistan Electoral Law as "a historical mistake," adding, "the actions of the PUK and the decision of the Federal Court resemble the Revolutionary Court during the Baath regime era." He continued, "We condemn the decision of the Federal Court as a threat to the constitutional entity of the Kurdistan Region," adding, "We visited the United Nations two months ago, where we participated in the international conference on the right to freedom of religion and expression, and discussed the situation of Kurdistan’s Christians and components." He pointed out that "we have called on all our friends in the United States and Europe, through representatives of 137 countries who attended the conference, to support the components and entity of the Kurdistan Region." Notably, the Supreme Federal Court decided last February to cancel the quota seats in the legislative elections law for the Region, and to reduce the number of seats in the Kurdistan Parliament from 111 to only 100, which sparked widespread discontent among minorities, leading to a declaration of their boycott of the upcoming elections scheduled for next June. Turkmen parties in Kurdistan announced, on Tuesday, the boycott of the parliamentary elections in the Region, scheduled to be held on June 10, in protest against the Federal Court's decision to cancel the "quota" seats. Representative of the Turkmen parties Kerkhi Alti Barmak said that "the cancellation of the quota seats is unconstitutional and contravenes Article 49, which guarantees the rights of components," adding that "the court's decision will weaken the principles of democracy in the Region." The representatives of the Turkmen parties called on the United Nations, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Parliament to intervene to cancel this decision. He also called on the Regional President and Prime Minister to intervene to cancel the decision, confirming that "the Turkmen parties have decided to boycott the parliamentary elections until the quota system for components is reinstated."

"Kurdistan Regional Government does not allow us to visit its oil facilities"

"We have no information about the production and export of oil in the region and the companies are going to the International Court of Arbitration, which is the problem of the region," said the Iraqi oil minister says. Arian Tawgozi, a member of the New Generation Movement faction in the Iraqi parliament, met with Iraqi Oil Minister Hayyan Abdul Ghani today. "The Iraqi Oil Minister has said that we have no information about the production and export of oil from the Kurdistan Region and SOMO has not received a single barrel of oil from the Kurdistan Region," Tawgozi said. "Some of the oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region want to move towards the International Court of Arbitration, which is the problem of the region," he said. Also the Iraqi Deputy oil minister who attended the meeting said "The Kurdistan Region will not allow the teams of the Iraqi Oil Ministry to visit the oil facilities in the region,". The problems between the Kurdistan Region and the central government are about the cost of oil extraction. In Iraq, the price of oil is between 8,000 and 9,000 Iraqi dinars per barrel, while in the Kurdistan Region it is set at $20. In Iraq, the amount of $ 1.20 dedecated per barrel for transportation, but in the Kurdistan Region, the amount of $ 6 per barrel of oil will be spend for transportation, which is contrary to the general budget law and Iraq can not comply with them.

Reasons for divorce: infidelity, mobile and Internet

🔻 Based on the data and statistics of the Kurdistan Regional Judicial Council between the years (2014 - 2023), that is, during the past (10) years; 🔹 In 2023, the highest number of marriage registrations was in Sulaimani province and divorce was in Erbil province. 🔹 According to the data, the number of divorces compared to marriage registration contracts in the courts increased (18%) in (2014) to 27% in (2023). 🔹 During the years (2014 - 2023) in the courts of the Kurdistan Region (472 thousand 581) marriages were registered, of which (446 thousand 234) cases were registered directly in the courts (26 thousand 347) cases were external marrige and approved in the courts. That is, on average; Annually (47 thousand 258), and monthly (3 thousand 938) and daily (129) marriages have registered. 🔹 In the past 10 years, 96 thousand 44 families have been dissolved. An average of; 9 thousand annually, 800 monthly and more than 26 divorces haveregistered every day. 2023 has the highest divorce rate. 🔹Reasons for divorce in the Kurdistan Region are "marital infidelity, mobile and Internet, incompatibility, infertility, asking for separate houses"

(3 million 789 thousand) people are eligible to vote

Out of (3 million 789 thousand 405) people who are eligible to vote, (2 million 784 thousand 303) people have received their voting cards (73%). • More than (1 million 5 thousand 102) people have not received their voting cards, that is (27%). • That means from the beginning, 27% of citizens boycott the elections and do not participate. • Between the fifth and sixth sessions of the Kurdistan Parliament, 704,000 people will be eligible to vote. • The head of the Iraqi Independent High Election Commission (IHEC) said: • Number of eligible voters: (3 million 789 thousand 405) people • Those who have received their voting cards: (2 million 784 thousand 303) people, that is (73%) of the eligible voters. • Those who have not received their voting cards (They are not going to participating): (1 million 5 thousand 102) people. which is (27%) of the eligible voters. • In the past 15 days, 434 thousand people have received their voting cards. • Those who born in 2006 are eligible to vote: 150,000 people. • For the fifth round of elections in 2018: 3 million 85 thousand people were eligible to vote.

New Oil Law Likely To Be The End Of Iraqi Kurdistan’s Independence Dream

By Simon Watkins The New Oil Law being worked on by the government of Iraq in Baghdad may drastically reduce the independence in energy matters for Iraqi Kurdistan. The FSC ruled that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must turn over “all oil and non-oil revenues” to Baghdad The New Oil Law may have drastic consequences for Western IOCs working in the area. A series of legal rulings by Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) on 21 February underlined that the planned New Oil Law being worked on by the government of Iraq in Baghdad will be the final agent of change that will end any semblance of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. And for Western oil companies working in the region, it looks like the future has been cancelled. To begin with, the FSC ruled that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must turn over “all oil and non-oil revenues” to Baghdad. This marks the end of any debate over whether the KRG can continue to conduct oil sales independent of the Federal Government Iraq’s (FGI) State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) – it cannot. And even it managed to arrange channels to do so, it would have to hand over all the money made from the oil sales to the FGI in Baghdad anyway. This effectively returns all financial control of Iraqi Kurdistan back to Iraq’s central government. The FSC added that the FGI, in turn, would be responsible for paying the salaries of public servants in the KRG, with the amount paid to be deduced at source in Baghdad from the KRG’s share. And the KRG must provide monthly, in-depth accounts of every salary that the FGI is paying. Effectively, this is a much tougher reset of the original ‘budget payments for oil revenues’ deal agreed between the KRG and the FGI back in November 2014, as analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. The deal was that the KRG exported up to 550,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil from its own fields and Kirkuk via SOMO. In return, Baghdad would send 17 percent of the federal budget after sovereign expenses (around US$500 million at that time) per month in budget payments to the Kurds. This arrangement never functioned properly, with the KRG frequently (and rightly) accusing the FGI of underpaying budget disbursements, and the FGI frequently (and rightly) accusing the KRG of under-delivering oil revenues. The deal was then superseded by an understanding reached between the KRG and the new Iraqi federal government formed in October 2018 and centred on the 2019 national budget bill. This required the FGI to transfer sufficient funds from the budget to pay the salaries of KRG employees along with other financial compensation in exchange for the KRG handing over the export of at least 250,000 bpd of crude oil to SOMO. Again, this arrangement never worked properly either. However, things became much worse in late 2017 for two reasons. The first reason was that 25 September 2017 saw a non-binding vote on full independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. Independence had been tacitly promised to Iraqi Kurdistan by the U.S. and its allies in exchange for Kurdistan’s fearsome Peshmerga army being the West’s principal boots on the ground in the fight against the then-rampant ISIS. Over 92 percent of voters in the 2017 referendum voted in favour of independence, but shortly after the results were announced, forces from Iraq and Iran (supported as well by Turkey) moved into the Kurdish region and quelled any further moves to make independence a reality. Neither Iraq nor Iraq nor Turkey (all with sizeable Kurdish populations) could tolerate the ramifications of a broader upsurge in the Kurdish independence movement across the region. The second reason was that soon after that, Russia gained control over Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sector through three key mechanisms also analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. India’s Refining Margins Slump as It Struggles to Secure Russian Oil Moscow’s aim was not just to secure the big oil and gas reserves of Iraqi Kurdistan but, more importantly in the long term, to sow the seeds for the destruction of Kurdish independence and its assimilation into one Iraq. It was Russia, then, that stoked mistrust and discontent between the KRG and FGI over the original 2014 ‘budget payments for oil revenues’ deal, which is largely why it never worked properly. The fault-line that Moscow used to create chaos between the two sides was handed to it by the lack of clarity over oil revenues in Iraq’s own Constitution. According to the KRG, it has authority under Articles 112 and 115 of the Constitution to manage oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region extracted from fields that were not in production in 2005 – the year that the Constitution was adopted by referendum. In addition, the KRG maintains that Article 115 states: “All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organised in a region.” As such, the KRG maintains that as relevant powers are not otherwise stipulated in the Constitution, it has the authority to sell and receive revenue from its oil and gas exports. The KRG also highlights that the Constitution provides that, should a dispute arise, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates. However, the FGI and SOMO argue that under Article 111 of the Constitution oil and gas are under the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates. Another turn for the worse for Iraqi Kurdistan came at the end of 2021 when the U.S. formerly ended its combat mission in Iraq, which effectively flung open the door for even greater economic, political, and military influence in Iraq by Iran, Russia, and China. It is in the interests of none of these three countries for the still broadly pro-U.S. Iraqi Kurdistan to exist. Moscow is happy enough to continue to work on fields in north and south Iraq, but under the administration of a centralised pro-Russian authority in Baghdad. In tandem with this, China has been building up its influence in southern Iraq, through multiple deals done in the oil and gas sector that have then been leveraged into bigger infrastructure deals across the south. The apotheosis of Beijing’s vision for China is all-encompassing ‘Iraq-China Framework Agreement’ of 2021. This in turn, was an extension in scale and scope of the ‘Oil for Reconstruction and Investment’ agreement signed by Baghdad and Beijing in September 2019, which allowed Chinese firms to invest in infrastructure projects in Iraq in exchange for oil, as also analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. Given all of this, it should not surprise anyone that on 3 August last year, the then-new Iraq Prime Minister, Mohammed Al-Sudani, clearly stated that the new unified oil law – run in every respect out of Baghdad - will govern all oil and gas production and investments in both Iraq and its semi-autonomous Kurdistan region and will constitute “a strong factor for Iraq’s unity”. Nor should it surprise anyone that a very high-ranking official from the Kremlin said recently at a meeting with senior government figures from Iran that: “By keeping the West out of energy deals in Iraq – and Baghdad closer to the new Iran-Saudi axis - the end of Western hegemony in the Middle East will become the decisive chapter in the West’s final demise,” a senior source who works closely with the European Union’s energy security apparatus exclusively told OilPrice.com. By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com New Oil Law Likely To Be The End Of Iraqi Kurdistan’s Independence Dream By Simon Watkins The New Oil Law being worked on by the government of Iraq in Baghdad may drastically reduce the independence in energy matters for Iraqi Kurdistan. The FSC ruled that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must turn over “all oil and non-oil revenues” to Baghdad. The New Oil Law may have drastic consequences for Western IOCs working in the area. Join Our Community A series of legal rulings by Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) on 21 February underlined that the planned New Oil Law being worked on by the government of Iraq in Baghdad will be the final agent of change that will end any semblance of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. And for Western oil companies working in the region, it looks like the future has been cancelled. To begin with, the FSC ruled that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must turn over “all oil and non-oil revenues” to Baghdad. This marks the end of any debate over whether the KRG can continue to conduct oil sales independent of the Federal Government Iraq’s (FGI) State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) – it cannot. And even it managed to arrange channels to do so, it would have to hand over all the money made from the oil sales to the FGI in Baghdad anyway. This effectively returns all financial control of Iraqi Kurdistan back to Iraq’s central government. The FSC added that the FGI, in turn, would be responsible for paying the salaries of public servants in the KRG, with the amount paid to be deduced at source in Baghdad from the KRG’s share. And the KRG must provide monthly, in-depth accounts of every salary that the FGI is paying. Effectively, this is a much tougher reset of the original ‘budget payments for oil revenues’ deal agreed between the KRG and the FGI back in November 2014, as analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. The deal was that the KRG exported up to 550,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil from its own fields and Kirkuk via SOMO. In return, Baghdad would send 17 percent of the federal budget after sovereign expenses (around US$500 million at that time) per month in budget payments to the Kurds. This arrangement never functioned properly, with the KRG frequently (and rightly) accusing the FGI of underpaying budget disbursements, and the FGI frequently (and rightly) accusing the KRG of under-delivering oil revenues. The deal was then superseded by an understanding reached between the KRG and the new Iraqi federal government formed in October 2018 and centred on the 2019 national budget bill. This required the FGI to transfer sufficient funds from the budget to pay the salaries of KRG employees along with other financial compensation in exchange for the KRG handing over the export of at least 250,000 bpd of crude oil to SOMO. Again, this arrangement never worked properly either. However, things became much worse in late 2017 for two reasons. The first reason was that 25 September 2017 saw a non-binding vote on full independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. Independence had been tacitly promised to Iraqi Kurdistan by the U.S. and its allies in exchange for Kurdistan’s fearsome Peshmerga army being the West’s principal boots on the ground in the fight against the then-rampant ISIS. Over 92 percent of voters in the 2017 referendum voted in favour of independence, but shortly after the results were announced, forces from Iraq and Iran (supported as well by Turkey) moved into the Kurdish region and quelled any further moves to make independence a reality. Neither Iraq nor Iraq nor Turkey (all with sizeable Kurdish populations) could tolerate the ramifications of a broader upsurge in the Kurdish independence movement across the region. The second reason was that soon after that, Russia gained control over Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sector through three key mechanisms also analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. India’s Refining Margins Slump as It Struggles to Secure Russian Oil Moscow’s aim was not just to secure the big oil and gas reserves of Iraqi Kurdistan but, more importantly in the long term, to sow the seeds for the destruction of Kurdish independence and its assimilation into one Iraq. It was Russia, then, that stoked mistrust and discontent between the KRG and FGI over the original 2014 ‘budget payments for oil revenues’ deal, which is largely why it never worked properly. The fault-line that Moscow used to create chaos between the two sides was handed to it by the lack of clarity over oil revenues in Iraq’s own Constitution. According to the KRG, it has authority under Articles 112 and 115 of the Constitution to manage oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region extracted from fields that were not in production in 2005 – the year that the Constitution was adopted by referendum. In addition, the KRG maintains that Article 115 states: “All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organised in a region.” As such, the KRG maintains that as relevant powers are not otherwise stipulated in the Constitution, it has the authority to sell and receive revenue from its oil and gas exports. The KRG also highlights that the Constitution provides that, should a dispute arise, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates. However, the FGI and SOMO argue that under Article 111 of the Constitution oil and gas are under the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates. Another turn for the worse for Iraqi Kurdistan came at the end of 2021 when the U.S. formerly ended its combat mission in Iraq, which effectively flung open the door for even greater economic, political, and military influence in Iraq by Iran, Russia, and China. It is in the interests of none of these three countries for the still broadly pro-U.S. Iraqi Kurdistan to exist. Moscow is happy enough to continue to work on fields in north and south Iraq, but under the administration of a centralised pro-Russian authority in Baghdad. In tandem with this, China has been building up its influence in southern Iraq, through multiple deals done in the oil and gas sector that have then been leveraged into bigger infrastructure deals across the south. The apotheosis of Beijing’s vision for China is all-encompassing ‘Iraq-China Framework Agreement’ of 2021. This in turn, was an extension in scale and scope of the ‘Oil for Reconstruction and Investment’ agreement signed by Baghdad and Beijing in September 2019, which allowed Chinese firms to invest in infrastructure projects in Iraq in exchange for oil, as also analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. Given all of this, it should not surprise anyone that on 3 August last year, the then-new Iraq Prime Minister, Mohammed Al-Sudani, clearly stated that the new unified oil law – run in every respect out of Baghdad - will govern all oil and gas production and investments in both Iraq and its semi-autonomous Kurdistan region and will constitute “a strong factor for Iraq’s unity”. Nor should it surprise anyone that a very high-ranking official from the Kremlin said recently at a meeting with senior government figures from Iran that: “By keeping the West out of energy deals in Iraq – and Baghdad closer to the new Iran-Saudi axis - the end of Western hegemony in the Middle East will become the decisive chapter in the West’s final demise,” a senior source who works closely with the European Union’s energy security apparatus exclusively told OilPrice.com. By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

The election campaign will last a month

The Kurdistan Region will be divided into four constituencies (Sulaimani 38 seats, Erbil 34 seats, Duhok 25 seats, Halabja 3 seats) 🔹Heman Tahsin, Director of the Office of Political Organizations and Parties, in the Iraqi Independent High Election Commission said: from March 12, the registration of candidates will begin for the Kurdistan parliamentary elections, and the election campaign will last a month. 🔹 According to the official of the commission, who spoke to Kurdsat News, they have begun preparations for the parliamentary elections, the elections will be according to the Iraqi voter registration. 🔹The Kurdistan Region will be divided into four constituencies, the constituencies will be determined according to the population of the provinces, the separation of votes will be similar to Iraq as follows: • Erbil: 34 seats • Sulaimani: 38 seats • Duhok: 25 seats • Halabja: 3 seats 🔹 (600) thousand voting cards have been sent to polling stations in the cities of the Kurdistan Region. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has set June 10 as the date for the sixth session of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections.