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هه‌واڵ / جیهان

Turkish influence in Syria changes the West's mood towards the Kurds

The German Foreign Ministry calls for the disarmament of armed Kurdish groups in Syria and their inclusion in the security forces of the new government in the country. New Western approaches towards the Kurds American and German statements indicate a change in Western approaches towards the Kurds, and this change is linked to the influence that Turkey has in Syria after its Islamist allies took control of Damascus. US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf told reporters on the sidelines of an official US delegation's visit to Damascus, "Turkey has great influence in Syria and has national security interests and many other interests," noting that the circumstances that prompted the Kurds in northeastern Syria to organize and defend themselves have changed significantly. Although the US official's statement was general and did not include any details regarding a change in Washington's position towards its Kurdish allies, it suggests a change aimed at appeasing Ankara, in light of Kurdish fears that Leaf's statements could pave the way for a change in US policy. Barbara Leaf: The conditions that prompted the Kurds in northeastern Syria to organize and defend themselves have changed dramatically It is not known whether Leaf’s words are related to the Joe Biden administration, which is preparing to leave its place in a few weeks to President-elect Donald Trump, or whether he expresses an official position, especially since Trump himself supports the complete US withdrawal from Syria. In a more explicit position, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said on Friday, after talks between her and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara, “The armed Kurdish groups in Syria must be disarmed and integrated into the security forces of the new government in the country.” Baerbock added at a press conference that “the security of the Kurds is essential for a free Syria, but Turkish security concerns must also be addressed to ensure stability.” Turkey says the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, which has been fighting alongside U.S. forces for years, is an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been fighting Turkey, and It’s considered a terrorist organization by Ankara, Washington and the European Union. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan predicted on Friday that foreign countries would withdraw their support for Kurdish fighters in Syria, saying "there is no longer any reason for foreign powers to support the YPG fighters." Source: Al Arab Newspaper

The Complex Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict: Qatar’s Strategy in Syria

Dr Rebwar Fatah Qatar's strategy in Syria is multifaceted, driven by its regional ambitions and ideological leanings. Here are the key components: Promoting Islamist Groups: Qatar has historically supported Islamist groups, including factions within the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), to promote a governance model aligned with its ideological preferences. This support includes financial aid, weapons, and other resources as part of its broader strategy to balance regional alliances and maintain its influence in the Middle East. The exact amount of financial support is not publicly disclosed, but it is well-documented that Qatar has been a significant supporter of various Islamist factions in Syria. Mediation and Diplomacy: Qatar has positioned itself as a mediator in the Syrian conflict, engaging with different Islamist factions and regional powers. This diplomatic role allows Qatar to influence the political landscape and promote its interests by: Building Alliances: Forging strategic alliances with influential groups and regional actors. Promoting Political Islam: Helping place Islamic factions in positions of power, aligning with its broader ideological goals. Enhancing Influence: Using mediation and diplomacy to bolster its influence and reputation as a key player in regional politics. This approach has allowed Qatar to exert considerable influence in the Syrian conflict and other regional issues, despite its relatively small size compared to other regional powers. Balancing Regional Influence: Qatar's involvement in Syria is also driven by its desire to counter the influence of other regional players, such as Iran and Russia, who support the Assad regime. By supporting opposition groups, Qatar aims to prevent these actors from consolidating power. Post-Assad Strategy: Qatar has been active in mediating conflicts and supporting transitions in various regions. The Foreign Ministry has called for the preservation of national institutions and unity in Syria, urging all parties to engage in dialogue. Qatar's foreign policy involves supporting various Islamist groups, particularly during the Arab Spring and in conflict zones like Syria and Libya. This support aligns with Qatar's broader strategy of promoting political Islam and increasing its influence. For example, Qatar has played a significant role in mediating conflicts and supporting peace processes, such as in Afghanistan with the Taliban. Qatar's Position on the Kurds and SDF: Qatar's strategy in Syria has primarily involved supporting various Islamist groups rather than the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or Kurdish people. This support has had significant implications for the SDF, which has been a key player in the fight against ISIS and in maintaining control over parts of northern and eastern Syria. Qatar's backing of Islamist factions aligns with its broader regional strategy and has contributed to the complex dynamics on the ground, impacting the balance of power and the ongoing conflict. Conclusion Qatar's strategy in Syria is complex, involving support for opposition groups, promotion of Islamist factions, and engagement in diplomatic efforts to shape the future political landscape. By balancing regional influences and promoting its ideological preferences, Qatar aims to maintain its influence and ensure a favorable outcome in the Syrian conflict.

The Complex Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict: Israel’s Strategic Goals in Syria

Dr Rebwar Fatah Israel's strategy in Syria is multifaceted, focusing on several key objectives to ensure its national security and regional stability. Here are the main components: Preventing the Transfer of Advanced Weapons Israel has conducted numerous airstrikes targeting Syrian military infrastructure, including airbases, weapons stockpiles, and naval assets. The goal is to prevent advanced weaponry, such as missiles and chemical weapons, from falling into the hands of hostile groups like Hezbollah, Turkey and Qatar-backed groups, and other extremist factions. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has conducted over 300 airstrikes on Syria. These strikes have targeted critical military infrastructure, including air defence systems, missile depots, and chemical weapons sites. The Israeli military estimates that it has destroyed around 70-80% of the former Assad regime's strategic military capabilities. Establishing a Buffer Zone Israel has moved to establish a "sterile defence zone" in southern Syria, particularly near the Golan Heights. This zone aims to prevent the establishment and organization of insurgent groups close to its borders. The buffer zone is intended to create a security barrier without a permanent Israeli presence, ensuring that threats are kept at a distance. Israel has recently seized control of a 155-square-mile (400-square-kilometer) demilitarized buffer zone in the Golan Heights, which was established by a 1974 ceasefire agreement with Syria. This move was described as temporary and aimed at securing its border amid the collapse of the Assad regime. Given Israel's historical expansion policies and recent actions, it seems unlikely that they will withdraw from the buffer zone anytime soon. Israel has been expanding settlements and increasing its control in the region, which suggests a long-term strategy rather than a temporary measure. Countering Iranian Influence Before the ousting of the Assad regime, Israel was very active in countering Iranian influence in Syria, conducting numerous airstrikes targeting Iranian military sites and proxies. This strategy aimed to limit Iran's operational capabilities and prevent it from establishing a permanent foothold near Israel's borders. However, the power vacuum left by the ousting of the Assad regime has led to increased instability. Fundamentalist groups, including remnants of ISIS, have been moving closer to the Israeli border, raising concerns about potential threats to Israel's security. Supporting Reliable Partners Israel's actions indirectly support groups like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are seen as more reliable and secular compared to Islamist factions supported by Turkey and Qatar. By weakening groups like the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Israel aims to bolster the SDF's position and ensure a more stable and secular governance structure in the region. This is not solely to support the Kurds, but to build a more reliable partner in future Syria. Israel's support for the Kurds has historically been driven by strategic interests rather than a genuine desire to establish a Kurdish-led state. Israel has maintained informal relations with the Kurdish people, recognizing their struggle for self-determination and using this relationship to counterbalance regional adversaries like Iran and Turkey. Maintaining Regional Stability Israel's overarching goal is to maintain regional stability and prevent the rise of extremist groups that could threaten its security. This involves a combination of military actions, diplomatic efforts, and strategic alliances to shape the future political landscape of Syria in a way that aligns with its security interests. Conclusion Israel's strategy in Syria is complex and involves balancing various regional dynamics to ensure its national security and promote stability in the region. By targeting advanced weaponry, establishing buffer zones, countering Iranian influence, supporting reliable partners, and maintaining regional stability, Israel aims to secure a safer and more stable future both for itself and the broader region.

American man found in Syria after being imprisoned for months

It was not widely known that the man, who identified himself as Travis Timmerman and went missing in Hungary in May, was in Syria. By Matt Bradley and Chantal Da Silva A Missouri man found in Syria told NBC News on Thursday he spent months in a Syrian prison after after crossing into the country on a "pilgrimage" to Damascus. It was not widely known that the man, who identified himself as Travis Timmerman and went missing in Hungary in May, was in Syria. His discovery came as a shock to locals and journalists as thousands of detainees emerged from jails after the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad over the weekend. Timmerman, who initially identified himself only as “Travis,” was first seen in a video that emerged overnight. Surrounded by reporters while leaning against walls with flaking paint, Timmerman, 29, said he was stopped by Syrian officials earlier this year after crossing into the country on foot. "I was on a pilgrimage to Damascus," he told NBC News in a building on the outskirts of the capital. Timmerman separately told CBS News that he'd been freed from a prison earlier in the week as Assad's regime was toppled. Travis Timmerman speaking to NBC News outside the Syrian capital Damascus on Thursday.Ted Turner / NBC News “My door was busted down, it woke me up,” Timmerman said. “I thought the guards were still there, so I thought the warfare could have been more active than it ended up being… Once we got out, there was no resistance, there was no real fighting.” The video that emerged after he was found sparked early speculation that the missing man could be American journalist Austin Tice, 43, who disappeared in 2012 just days after celebrating his 31st birthday in Syria. After being located by NBC News and other outlets in Dhiyabia, Timmerman said he had “been reading the scripture a lot” before deciding to cross the mountains from Lebanon into Syria. He appeared calm. When one man repeatedly offered to put him in touch with U.S. officials, he replied that he was "okay for right now." A U.S. official told NBC News that Washington was "aware of reports of an American found outside of Damascus and seeking to provide support. Out of respect for his privacy, we have no further information to provide at this time." Timmerman said he had been in Europe prior to embarking on his pilgrimage and eventually traveled from Lebanon into Syria in late May, but was spotted by a border guard and detained. Authorities in Missouri and Hungarian capital Budapest had earlier this year put out missing person reports for a man named Pete Timmerman, with Hungarian police identifying him as “Travis” Pete Timmerman. The Missouri State Highway Patrol said in a public awareness bulletin that Timmerman had gone missing from Budapest, Hungary, on May 28th, just under seven months ago. Timmerman had been identified by authorities in Budapest in a request for information as “Travis Pete Timmerman.” They said he was last seen at a church and had since “left for an unknown location, with no sign of life.” Matt Bradley reported from Damascus, and Chantal Da Silva from London.

AP: America’s closest ally in Syria is losing ground as a new order takes shape

The jihadi rebels who toppled Syrian President Bashar Assad say they want to build a unified, inclusive country. But after nearly 14 years of civil war, putting that ideal into practice will not be easy. For Syria’s Kurdish minority, America’s closest ally in the country, the struggle for a new order is entering a potentially even more challenging phase. Over the course of Syria’s civil war, Kurdish fighters have fended off an array of armed factions, partnered with the U.S. to rout the Islamic State group and carved out a largely autonomous region in the country’s oil-rich east. But the gains of the non-Arab Kurds are now at risk. The ascendance of the Sunni Arab rebels who overthrew Assad — with vital help from Turkey, a longtime foe of the Kurds — will make it hard for the Kurds to find a place in the new Syria and could prolong the conflict. FILE – Kurdish-led fighters backed by the U.S. escort suspected Islamic State militants in Hassakeh, Syria, on Jan. 26, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad, File) The jihadi rebels who rode into Damascus over the weekend have made peaceful overtures to the Kurds. But the rebels violently drove Kurdish fighters out of the eastern city of Deir al-Zour days after government forces abandoned it. To the north, a separate opposition faction backed by Turkey that has been battling the Kurds for years seized the town of Manbij. And Turkey carried out airstrikes on a Kurdish convoy it said was carrying heavy weapons looted from government arsenals. The Kurds have long counted on U.S. aid in the face of such challenges. Around 900 American troops are in eastern Syria, where they partner with Kurdish forces to prevent an Islamic State resurgence. But the future of that mission will be thrown into doubt under president-elect Donald Trump, who has long been skeptical about U.S. involvement in Syria. Here’s a closer look at the predicament the Kurds find themselves in. FILE – Kurdish-led fighters backed by the U.S. man a checkpoint in Hassakeh, Syria, on Jan. 24, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad, File) Who are the U.S.-allied Kurdish fighters in Syria? The Kurds are among the largest stateless ethnic groups in the world, with some 30 million concentrated in a territory straddling Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. They are a minority in each country and have often suffered persecution, which has fueled armed Kurdish uprisings. In Syria, they carved out an autonomous enclave early in the civil war, never fully siding with the Assad government or the rebels seeking to topple him. When the Islamic State group seized a third of the country in 2014, Kurdish fighters — who are secular and include women in their ranks — proved their mettle in early battles against the extremists, earning support from the U.S.-led coalition. They formed a group known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, which also includes Arab fighters, and drove the Islamic State group out of large areas of Syria with help from U.S.-led airstrikes and American special forces. In 2017, these Kurdish-led forces captured Raqqa, the capital of the extremists’ self-styled caliphate. Why is Turkey fighting the Kurds? Turkey has long viewed the SDF as an extension of the decades-old Kurdish insurgency within its own borders. It considers the main Kurdish faction a terrorist group on par with the Islamic State and has said it should have no presence in the new Syria. In recent years, Turkey has trained and funded fighters known as the Syrian National Army, helping them wrest control of territory from the Kurds in northern Syria along the border with Turkey. These Turkish-backed fighters have portrayed themselves as part of the opposition against Assad, but analysts say they are largely driven by opportunism and hatred of the Kurds. The Kurds have focused on battling the SNA in recent years. But the new leadership in Damascus, which also has longstanding ties to Turkey, could open another, much longer front. How do the Syrian rebels view the Kurds? The main rebel faction is led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani, a former al-Qaida militant who cut ties with the group eight years ago and says he wants to build a new Syria free of dictatorship that will serve all its religious and ethnic communities. Nawaf Khalil, head of the Germany-based Center for Kurdish Studies, said the early signs were positive. He said the rebels steered clear of two SDF-controlled enclaves of Aleppo when they stormed the city two weeks ago at the start of their rapid advance across the country. FILE – Kurdish-led fighters backed by the U.S. stand guard in Raqqa, Syria, on Feb. 7, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad, File) “It is also positive that they did not speak negatively about the Syrian Democratic Forces,” he said. It remains to be seen if those sentiments will endure. After sweeping into Deir al-Zour this week, a fighter from al-Sharaa’s group posted a video saying they would soon advance toward Raqqa and other areas of eastern Syria, raising the possibility of further clashes with the Kurds. The rebels could still seek some kind of agreement with the Kurds to incorporate them into the post-Assad political order, but that would likely require accepting a degree of Kurdish autonomy in the east. It would also risk angering Turkey, which now appears to be the chief power broker in Syria. Will the Trump administration support the Kurds? The top U.S. military commander for the Middle East, Army Gen. Erik Kurilla, met with SDF forces in Syria on Tuesday, in a sign of the Biden administration’s commitment to the alliance post-Assad. But things could change on Jan. 20. Trump has provided few details about his Middle East policy, aside from saying he wants to end the region’s wars and keep the United States out of them. In a social media post shortly before Assad was overthrown, Trump wrote that “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT.” During his previous term, in 2019, Trump abandoned the Kurds ahead of a Turkish incursion, casting it as the fulfillment of a campaign promise to end U.S. involvement in the region’s “endless wars.” The move prompted heavy criticism, including from prominent Republicans who accused him of betraying an ally. Trump backtracked weeks later, approving a wider mission to secure oil fields in the east. The troops remained where they were and the alliance endured.

Syria: The Last Nail in the Coffin of Arab Nationalism

Dr Rebwar Fatah . The region is transitioning from ethnic nationalism—Persian, Turkish, and Arab—to Islamic nationalism. The initial ideology failed, and now failing states hope that an Islamic cover can sustain their nationalism, continuing to dissolve and deprive non-Arab, non-Persian, and non-Turkish ethno-religious groups of their cultural heritage. . During the early 1960s, the dream of a united Arab state was championed by leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Hafiz al-Assad of Syria, and Abdul-Karim Qasim of Iraq. These leaders, all with military backgrounds, were part of the Free Officers Movement, which sought to promote Arab unity and nationalism [1]. . However, this dream quickly faded. In Iraq and Syria, the Kurds became the primary victims of Arab nationalism. They were accused of establishing a "second Israel," implying that they were a threat to Arab land and identity, which gave pretext to oppressing Kurds. As a result, the Kurds faced severe hardships, including displacement, genocide, Arabization, and the destruction of their villages and towns. Their cultural identity was deeply shaken [2][3]. . The first wave of Arab nationalism aimed to build Arab unity by dissolving the rich cultures of non-Arab ethno-religious identities. The ideology of Arab unification died at the sunrise, but even at the sunset, the ideology of oppressing the Kurds stayed alive and kicking. After the failure of this ideology, states turned to Islamic nationalism, which sought to achieve the same goal but through religious means. This approach, similar to the previous one, only created failed states like Iraq. The last nail in the coffin of Arab nationalism was seen in Syria, where it transformed into an Arab Islamic identity. Islamic groups backed by Erdogan are now controlling Damascus, with the only exception being the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controlling the north and east of the country, representing the only hope to rescue Syria from falling into an Islamic nationalist state [4][5]. . This approach was not unique to the Arab world. In 1979, Iran became a Shia Islamic state, but at its core, it remained a Persian nationalist state, similar to that of the Shah regime. Turkey, under President Erdogan, also adopted an Islamic hijab, but its core remained an ultra-Turkish nationalist state, aiming to dissolve all non-Turkish identities, particularly the Kurds [6]. . Sources: Ismael, Tareq Y. "The Arab Left." Syracuse University Press, 1976. Human Rights Watch. "Iraq: Claims in Conflict – Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq." 2004. International Crisis Group. "Flight of Icarus? The PYD’s Precarious Rise in Syria." Middle East Report N°151, May 2014. Izady, Mehrdad R. "The Kurds: A Concise History and Fact Book." Mazda Publishers, 1992. Abrahamian, Ervand. "A History of Modern Iran." Cambridge University Press, 2008. Özkırımlı, Umut. "Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction." Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. . The flag of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a political union between Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1971, featured three horizontal bands of red, white, and black with two green stars in the white band

A documentary film produced by (Draw Media) was screened in The Hague

Today in The Hague, Netherlands, within the framework of the 29th Annual Conference of the States Parties (CSP), which oversees the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a documentary film produced by (Draw Media) was screened. The documentary film (Goptapa) talks about the chemical attack and Anfal of the village of (Goptapa) within the framework of the fourth phase of Anfal on May 3, 1988. Farhad Latif is the main character of this documentary film, whose 22 family members were martyred in this massacre. During the screening of the documentary, (OPCW) officials participated and called for more victims of chemical attacks in different parts of Kurdistan to be known to the world through films and documentaries.

How did Trump win and what is next for the Kurdistan Region?

Winthrop Rodgers After a year of primary and general election campaigning, voters in the US picked Republican Donald Trump over Democrat Kamala Harris. Trump, who was running to retake the office that he held between 2017 and 2021, won with 312 electoral votes. Harris managed just 226. The former president is also expected to win the popular vote, which he failed to do in the 2016 election. The final results will be confirmed in the next few weeks. Trump’s victory came as a result of sweeping all seven major swing states: Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Georgia, Arizona, and Nevada. While he went beyond the narrow margins that had been anticipated, the election was still decided by just a fraction of the more than 146 million votes cast. Across those seven states, Trump won fewer than 800,000 more votes than Harris based on the preliminary numbers. He won just 255,000 more votes in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, a combination that would have gotten her to 270 electoral votes. Overall, there was a broad shift to the right across the US. While Democrats continued to win women, Blacks, and university-educated voters. More conservative demographics like men, Whites, and working class voters continued to cast ballots for Republican candidates and did so at higher rates than in the past. The rightward shift was most pronounced among young men, Whites, Latino men, and voters aged 45-64 years old. In particular, voters seemed to be reacting against the high cost of living in the US. While the administration of President Joe Biden has been successful at bringing down inflation, spurring economic growth, and reinvigorating the industrial sector, the effects were not felt by ordinary people who are still grappling with the economic fall-out of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many economists have questioned Trump’s proposed plans, but voters’ anger was real. Moreover, Trump used racist and sexist grievances and stoked a narrative that Biden had mishandled immigration as a way to motivate his base. While these trends prevailed at the presidential level, Democrats had a better, but still disappointing night, in races for the Senate, the House of Representatives, and state-level races. They lost control of the Senate after Republicans flipped seats in West Virginia, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. As of writing, control of the House remains unclear, but Republicans look likely to retain control. Voters in the US also make choices about policy questions at the ballot box. In a number of cases, they rejected Democratic candidates for office, but embraced Democratic-backed initiatives. For example, there were ballot measures in ten states to protect abortion and reproductive rights, including several places where harsh abortion restrictions were put in place after the Supreme Court invalidated Roe v. Wade. These were approved in seven states, but failed to pass in three. In Florida, the pro-choice measure achieved a majority, but was unable to reach the 60% of the vote needed to become law. As a result of the election, the US continues to be one of the only major Western countries never to select a woman as its top political leader. The so-called “highest glass-ceiling in the nation” remains cracked, but unbroken. How will the result affect the Kurds? Observers in from around the world watched the US election closely, including in the Kurdistan Region. This is understandable given the stakes: what the next president decides to do will have significant bearing on its future. Now that the result is known and Trump will be returning to the White House, Kurds are wondering what that means. Given that he was previously the president, there is a precedent for what he might do. Kurds will of course remember his administration’s opposition to the 2017 independence referendum in the Kurdistan Region and his personal actions to enable Turkey’s invasion of northeastern Syria during Operation Peace Spring. But that is no guarantee that he will do the same thing. Trump is famously transactional and prone to changing his mind based on emotion. The leaders of the Kurdistan Region’s main political parties—who have much work to do themselves in terms of forming a government following their own election—were quick to congratulate Trump on his victory. They emphasized the bond between the US and the Kurdistan Region and a desire to strengthen it. However, the relationship between the US and the Kurdistan Region is changing, particularly on the security front. By mid-way through Trump’s term in 2026, the International Coalition will withdraw its forces from bases in the Kurdistan Region, including Erbil and Harir. Moreover, the four-year memorandum of understanding regarding Peshmerga reform will expire that same year. These will have to be dealt with in due time and Baghdad will have a significant say in the matter, particularly in terms of the bases. Much of Trump’s Middle East policy will depend on who he selects for key positions at the State Department and the Pentagon. His first term was characterized by confrontation with Iran and many of the names being floated for those jobs have hawkish views about Tehran. While politically this may prove popular among some Kurds, many others understand that it is often the Kurdistan Region that is caught in the crossfire when the US and Iran clash. This is all the more relevant in the context of regional tensions regarding Israel, which Trump is expected to support even more than Biden. However, Trump also ran on a platform of keeping the US out of foreign conflicts. “'I’m not going to start wars, I’m going to stop wars,” he said in his post-election victory speech. Obviously, this is more easily said than done and Trump thrives on aggression. Only time will tell whether this was merely a talking point to get elected. But this is all at the geopolitical level. There is little chance that the next administration increases its attention on the Kurdistan Region; in fact, its focus will probably continue to shift away from the problems of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Practically, this means that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) will appeal to Washington when they feel that it is in their interest, but ignore it when they want. That will likely have a destabilizing effect inside the Kurdistan Region and enable further democratic backsliding and freedom of expression violations.

Linking the Eastern Mediterranean and Gulf Energy Hubs: The Expanding US Strategic Role

Bahrooz Jaafar Exclusive Summary: The Eastern Mediterranean basin, encompassing Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey, has emerged since the late 2000s as a focal point of energy competition, ideological struggles, historical conflicts, and rising regional ambitions. This region forms part of a broader geopolitical landscape where the interests of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and China intersect. Increasingly, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf are merging into a single geopolitical sphere, becoming arenas for both regional competition and the influence of global powers, especially as the United States seeks to curtail the spread of Chinese dominance. Simultaneously, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have crucial consequences for the global and regional order. Security and Energy Dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean Since 2009, gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have sparked speculation about significant geopolitical shifts. These discoveries have transformed Israel from a gas importer to an exporter, elevated Cyprus as a regional energy player, and fostered a trilateral alliance between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus. To this effect, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) was formed in 2019, which includes seven countries bordering the Eastern Mediterranean, along with the European Union, the United States, and the UAE as observers. Despite Turkey's significant regional presence and location in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has been excluded from these regional gas activities, intensifying regional tensions. Notable gas fields such as Tamar (2009) and Leviathan (2010) in Israel's offshore borders, Aphrodite off the coast of Cyprus (2011), Zohr in Egypt (2015), and later discoveries like Calypso in Cyprus and Karish in Israel, raised hopes that these reserves would promote economic cooperation and ease political tensions. However, this optimism has not appropriately materialized. Geopolitical tensions persist due to overlapping maritime claims and border disputes, especially between Lebanon and Israel, the ongoing Israel- Palestine conflicts, as well as Turkey’s incursions into Greek waters, and the unsolved Cyprus problem. These issues, involving both sovereign rights and economic interests, continue to impede economic cooperation. Turkey’s refusal to recognize Cyprus’ sovereignty further exacerbates the geopolitical tensions. Since 2018, there have been plans to build a 1,900-kilometer underwater gas pipeline from the Cypriot and Israeli gas fields to the Greek island of Crete, with a projected completion date of 2025. However, this project has encountered a range of geopolitical, financial, and environmental challenges. The purpose of this pipeline is to reduce Europe's reliance on Russian gas by transporting 9-12 billion cubic meters annually, which would cover about 10% of Europe's energy needs. The Eastern Mediterranean is also expected to be a key region for Europe's security and energy strategy. It is essential to remember that the Mediterranean basin is not solely a hub for oil and gas extraction and export. Beyond its role in trade and economic activities, the region is intricately linked to Europe's security landscape. Millions of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe, contributing to a migration crisis that has fueled identity struggles across the continent. This issue has played a key role in the electoral success of right-wing and populist parties in several European countries. The Missing Link in the BRI: Connecting the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean The Gulf’s engagement in Eastern Mediterranean affairs has played a pivotal role in shaping recent developments, particularly through the participation of the Gulf's national oil companies. These companies have spearheaded the Gulf Arab states’ increasing presence in the region as part of their internationalization strategies. Among the three Gulf powers, the UAE has taken the lead in establishing a significant role in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its involvement in Libya and Egypt, alongside its deepening ties with Cyprus and Greece, highlights this strategic focus. The Abraham Accords, signed with Israel in 2020, further cemented the UAE's influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, blending both soft and hard power strategies during this period. The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and Mubadala Petroleum, both based in Abu Dhabi, have been at the forefront of the UAE's bid to secure a dominant position in the Eastern Mediterranean energy sector. In September 2021, Mubadala Petroleum acquired a 22% stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field for $1 billion. Additionally, Mubadala owns 10% of Egypt’s largest gas field, Zohr. In February 2023, ADNOC Distribution, the UAE’s largest fuel and service retailer, purchased a 50% stake in TotalEnergies Egypt, marking Abu Dhabi’s significant entry into Egypt as part of its broader regional expansion plans. Moreover, ADNOC is actively partnering with BP to develop new gas fields in the Mediterranean, and both companies have agreed to purchase New Med, the largest shareholder in Israel’s Leviathan gas field. Although the ongoing Gaza war complicates the deal, the UAE’s ambitions remain evident. Its policy starkly contrasts with that of Iran and its allied groups in the region, as well as with the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is a part. In February 2024, Egyptian officials signed a $35 billion agreement with the UAE to develop the Ras al-Hikma resort on Egypt's north coast. This deal provided a crucial boost to Egypt's struggling economy by injecting much-needed foreign currency, which led to a sharp decline in black-market activity amid Egypt’s currency and economic crisis. The project also promises to increase Gulf tourism and wealth flows to these coastal areas. In my latest book, Deciphering the Eastern Mediterranean's Hydrocarbon Dynamics: Unraveling Regional Shifts (published by Emerald Group Publishing in Europe and the United States), I explore these developments in detail. I argue that not all economic and security issues in the region are tied solely to oil and gas. Instead, these factors form part of a broader geopolitical shift in which both the Gulf states and Israel pursue their agendas. Natural gas has indeed become a central issue in international relations, especially in light of the Ukraine war. Although the majority of cars in Europe are battery-powered and the world as a whole has turned to clean energy, we are now in the energy transition phase, but oil and gas still dominate the global economic market. Before and after the Ukraine war, the European Union has clarified that it aims to replace Russian gas with Eastern Mediterranean gas (from the reserves of Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus) to reduce the West's dependence on Russian energy. As a result, the Eastern Mediterranean region needs to promote greater integration with the energy-rich Gulf states. While progress has been made, the ongoing Gaza war and the presence of Militia forces aligned with Iran in the region could complicate this effort. Moreover, as the war in Ukraine continues, Russia may increasingly align itself with Iran's interests in the region. Meanwhile, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known in China as One Belt, One Road, or the New Silk Road, is a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013. It aims to invest in more than 150 countries and international organizations. According to the 2024 report from the Center for Finance and Green Development, based on official Chinese media, by April 2023, a total of 149 countries (including China) had signed agreements to join China's Belt and Road Initiative. China has strengthened its strategic and economic relationships in the Gulf, with economic ties between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) increasing by 140 percent between 2015 and 2022. According to Commerce and Industry Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad Bin Qassim Al-Sani, who led a Qatari delegation to a conference in Xiamen, China, on May 23, 2024, titled "Embracing the Future: Promoting Industrial Cooperation and High-Quality Investment between China and the GCC," trade between China and the GCC reached approximately $23.7 billion in 2023, with an expected growth rate of 3.7% in 2024. China’s growing soft power in Asia, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf, poses a significant challenge to U.S. unipolar dominance. However, the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman remains a cornerstone of U.S. and British policy in the region. These nations still rely on the U.S. for security, particularly against threats from Iran and pro-Iranian groups in the surrounding region. Connecting the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean will be part of a broader U.S. strategy to curb the expansion of Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region, which is anchored by U.S. partnerships with India, Japan, and Australia. Additionally, the expressway from the Port of Duqm to Saudi Arabia is nearing completion, as is Saudi Arabia’s access to the Mediterranean coast with the support of Jordan. Conclusion Many of the world's most complex problems are concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean. These include the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Syrian crisis, the unresolved Cyprus dispute, which increases Turkey's involvement in the region, as well as issues like immigration, environmental degradation, the Lebanese conflict, and drug trafficking. In general, The war in Gaza is really matters for the Eastern- Mediterranean. Addressing these issues might require decisive action, though military solutions alone may not be sufficient. In the Middle East, Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are considered the major regional powers. Turkey's collapsing economy limits its ability to project power or engage in conflict, as its internal economic challenges take precedence. This doesn't allow Turkey to enter a war abroad because they will face collapse inside. Meanwhile, the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are focused on diversifying their economies and continue to view Iran as a significant threat. With strong support from the West, Israel is moving to keep the threats away posed by Hamas and Hezbollah, aiming to protect its key economic assets such as ports and gas fields. The Eastern Mediterranean holds immense strategic value for Western powers, and they seek a reliable and influential ally in the region -Israel fills this role. Therefore, ongoing conflict is inevitable, and it could be prolonged, given the resilience of groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. These groups have shown the ability to recover and renew their activities after being targeted, posing recurring threats to U.S. and Israeli interests. Bahrooz Jaafar holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Cyprus International University, Nicosia. He is the founder and head of the Mediterranean Institute for Regional Studies. His latest academic book, “Deciphering the Eastern Mediterranean's Hydrocarbon Dynamics: Unraveling Regional Shifts,” was published by Emerald Group Publishing. Dr. Jaafar is originally from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Email: [email protected]

From Beijing to Erbil: China's 75th Anniversary: Insights for the Kurdistan

China’s progress over the last 75 years has been remarkable. From a largely agrarian economy in the mid-20th century, China has become the second-largest economy in the world, largely due to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has fostered international trade and infrastructure development. The Kurdistan Region, a rapidly growing area within Iraq, can learn from China’s economic model—particularly in diversifying its economy beyond oil, enhancing its industrial base, and attracting foreign investment.The BRI offers the Kurdistan Region a gateway to new infrastructure investments, trade partnerships, and technology transfers. By aligning itself with China’s global economic vision, Kurdistan can improve its connectivity with international markets and bolster its role as a commercial hub within Iraq and the wider Middle East. Chinese companies are already active in the region, contributing to sectors like energy and construction. Kurdistan can deepen its ties with China to accelerate development in critical sectors such as technology, telecommunications, and manufacturing.China’s vast investments in infrastructure, both domestically and abroad, demonstrate its commitment to modernization. From high-speed rail networks to smart cities and green energy projects, China has transformed the landscape of its cities and can serve as a model for Kurdistan,Connection to Kurdistan: The Kurdistan Region is focused on rebuilding and expanding its infrastructure, particularly in transportation, energy, and housing. China’s experience in developing megaprojects could be crucial for enhancing Kurdistan’s infrastructure, improving the quality of life for its citizens, and attracting foreign investment. Additionally, by partnering with China, the region can access cutting-edge innovations in renewable energy, telecommunications, and digital economy infrastructure, supporting its ambitions to become a technological leader in Iraq.Over 75 years, China has preserved its rich cultural heritage while embracing modernization. The promotion of Confucian values, the arts, and cultural diplomacy has made China a global cultural powerhouse. Similarly, the Kurdistan Region should strive to promote its identity while engaging in cultural exchange,China and Kurdistan have established cultural ties through events like the China-Kurdistan Cultural Weeks, language programs, and student exchanges. Expanding these exchanges will foster mutual understanding and promote tourism and education in both regions. The expansion of Mandarin language programs in Kurdish universities could allow more Kurdish students to study in China, bringing back valuable knowledge that could benefit various sectors of the Kurdish economy. Cultural diplomacy through arts, heritage preservation, and joint exhibitions could further strengthen the bonds between the two regions.China’s journey has focused on achieving sovereignty, national unity, and stability while emerging as a major global player. The Kurdistan Region, facing its own challenges related to autonomy, security, and regional stability, can find inspiration in China’s path to success.Just as China prioritized national unity and stability to enable its rise, the Kurdistan Region can work on consolidating its governance structures, ensuring peace and stability as a foundation for economic development and international cooperation. China has played a significant role in regional security, offering political support and engaging in diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts in the Middle East. Continued diplomatic engagement between China and Kurdistan can help address local security concerns, promote regional stability, and facilitate reconstruction efforts in Iraq.China’s global rise has been characterized by fostering diplomatic partnerships and participating in international forums that support global peace and development. Its strategic alignment with regions around the world, including the Middle East, has grown. The Kurdistan Region, through its cooperation with China, can leverage this partnership for both regional stability and economic growth. Halo Hassan Saeed -Halo Hassan Saeed is a writer and journalist, a member of the International Union of Journalists, and the author of two books on the People's Republic of China. His work focuses on fostering cultural understanding and promoting awareness of Chinese influence in the region.

The US election will come down to the “swing states,” but Harris has an advantage over Trump

Draw Media, Winthrop Rodgers US voters will go to the polls on November 5 to elect a new president. The Republican Party selected former President Donald Trump, who is seeking to recapture the post that he lost in 2020. The man who beat him, President Joe Biden, dramatically declined to continue his reelection campaign earlier this summer in response to concerns about his age. Instead, the Democratic Party nominated Vice President Kamala Harris. She will become the first woman to be US president if she wins. With just a few weeks to go, the race is close. Observers from Kurdistan, Iraq, and around the world are wondering what will happen. For many people, the process of the US election can be confusing, but it helps to keep a few key aspects in mind. The US has a federal system of government and it uses what is known as the “Electoral College” to determine who becomes president. Each state is given a number of electoral votes, which are roughly proportional to the size of its population. For example, California is the largest state and has the most electoral votes with 54, while smaller states like Wyoming and Vermont only have three. To win the presidency a candidate must get at least 270 electoral votes. The total number of votes that a candidate receives from across the entire country — known as the “popular vote” — is irrelevant. In fact, in two of the last six cycles — George W. Bush 2000 and Trump in 2016 — the winner got fewer votes overall, but was still elected because they got more electoral votes. Most states give all of their electoral votes to whoever wins the state, although there are two exceptions. The parties want to come first in as many states as they can, especially if they have large populations like New York or Texas. However, there are many states with clear political leanings and the outcome can be predicted ahead of time. For example, Democrats are almost certain to win in places like Massachusetts, while Republicans will definitely win Tennessee. Each cycle there are a few “swing states” that could go either way. With the US pretty evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats, how these states vote becomes extremely important. They are where the contest will be decided. In 2024, there are seven swing states where either candidate has a good chance of winning: Pennsylvania (which has 19 electoral votes), North Carolina (16), Georgia (16), Michigan (15), Arizona (11), Wisconsin (10), and Nevada (6). Harris and Trump will hold many rallies in these states and spend lots of money on TV advertisements to convince voters to support them. Whoever can win in enough of the right states in this group will become president. At the moment, Harris has a slight edge in polling averages, which change as new surveys are added. As of writing, she is currently leading in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. These three states alone have enough electoral votes to get her to 270 and secure the White House. She is also leading in Nevada. Trump has a slight edge in Arizona, North Carolina, and Georgia, but these will not be enough to win. However, he still has a decent shot at winning if Harris stumbles. The race remains extremely close. Pennsylvania is particularly important for both campaigns. It has a lot of electoral votes — more than any of the other swing states — and a history of voting for both Republican and Democratic candidates for president, congress, and at the state level. It has two major cities, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. These are vote-rich areas because of their large populations. Many young people, Blacks, and members of labor unions live there and they vote overwhelmingly for Democrats. In between these two cities, there are vast rural areas, where voters tend to be strongly Republican. Many people here are White and are more conservative than the voters in the cities. There are also suburbs and smaller cities that have a mix of voters. Harris will need to win by very large margins in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh and do well in their suburbs in order to off-set Trump’s strength in rural parts of the state. If she can do this, she will win Pennsylvania — and most likely the White House. On September 10, Trump and Harris debated each other in Philadelphia. They clashed on a variety of topics, including the economy, immigration, abortion, and foreign policy. Polling afterwards showed that more voters thought Harris did a better job because she appeared calm, empathetic, and prepared. In contrast, Trump focused heavily on fears about the impact of immigrants and spouted racist lies. He was widely criticized, including by members of his own party. The debate exposed a stark contrast between the two candidates among voters, many of whom are just now starting to pay attention to the election. It will merely reinforce the preexisting preferences of Democrats and Republicans, but Trump seems to have hurt himself among undecided voters with his poor performance. He has, in fact, refused to debate Harris again, likely to avoid getting embarrassed a second time. There is still a month and a half to go before the election on November 5. This is a long time in politics and many things can change in the meantime. Moreover, polling does not necessarily provide the full picture, as was the case when Trump was first elected in 2016. For now, however, it looks like Harris has a slight advantage based on polling in key swing states like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. She also has greater momentum than Trump coming out of the debate. But keep a close eye on the swing states over the next several weeks. That is where the race will be won or lost.

Major oil companies' profits in the second quarter of 2024

🔹 In the second quarter of (2024) seven major oil and gas companies such as; (Exxon Mobil, Chevron, TotalEnergies, Shell, BP, Equinor and Eni) posted a profit of $26.325 billion, up 2 percent from $25.848 billion in the second quarter of 2023. 🔹 In the second quarter of this year, Exxon Mobil alone had revenue of more than (9 billion) dollars, while the company's profit in the second quarter of last year was (7 billion 880 million) dollars. 🔹 In the second quarter of this year, Chevron's profit decreased by (26%), compared to the same period last year, while the Italian company "Eni" profit increased by (125%), compared to the second quarter of (2023).

The Kurdish smuggler that is wanted by European countries

I am sitting in a shopping mall in Iraq, face-to-face with one of Europe’s most notorious people-smugglers. His name is Barzan Majeed, and he is wanted by police forces in several countries, including the UK. Over the course of our conversation - both here and the next day at his office - he says he does not know how many migrants he has transported across the English Channel. “Maybe a thousand, maybe 10,000. I don’t know, I didn’t count.” The meeting is the culmination of what had seemed like an impossible task a few months earlier. Together with Rob Lawrie, a former soldier who works with refugees, I had set out to find and question the man known as Scorpion. For several years, he and his gang controlled much of the people-smuggling trade - in boats and lorries - across the English Channel. More than 70 migrants have died making the crossing by boat since 2018 - last month, five people were killed off the French coast, including a seven-year-old girl. It is a dangerous journey, but for the smugglers it can be very lucrative. They can charge £6,000 per person for a boat crossing - and with nearly 30,000 people attempting it in 2023, the potential for profit is obvious. Our interest in Scorpion had begun with a little girl we met in one of the migrant camps near Calais, in northern France. She had almost died trying to cross the English Channel in an inflatable dinghy. The dinghy was not seaworthy - it was cheap, bought second-hand in Belgium - and the 19 people on board had no lifejackets. Who would send people out to sea like this? When police in the UK pick up illegal migrants, they take and inspect their mobile phones. From 2016 onwards, the same number kept cropping up. Often it would be stored under the name “Scorpion”. Sometimes it would be stored as a picture of a scorpion. Martin Clarke, a senior investigating officer at the UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) told us that officers started to realise “Scorpion” referred to a Kurdish Iraqi man called Barzan Majeed. As a 20-year-old in 2006, Majeed had himself been smuggled into England in the back of a lorry. Despite being refused leave to remain a year later, he stayed several more years in the UK - some of it in prison for gun and drug offences. He was finally deported to Iraq in 2015. Shortly after this, it is believed that Majeed “inherited” a people-smuggling business from his elder brother, who was serving a jail sentence in Belgium. Majeed became known as Scorpion. Between 2016 and 2021, Scorpion's gang is believed to have controlled much of the people-smuggling trade between Europe and the UK. A two-year international police operation resulted in convictions for 26 members of the gang at courts in the UK, France and Belgium. But Scorpion himself evaded arrest and went on the run. In his absence, he was tried in a Belgian court and convicted of 121 counts of people-smuggling. In October 2022, he was sentenced to 10 years in jail and fined €968,000 (£834,000). Since then, Scorpion’s whereabouts were unknown. This was the mystery we wanted to crack. A contact of Rob introduced us to an Iranian man who said he dealt with Scorpion when he had been trying to get across the Channel. Scorpion had told the Iranian he was based in Turkey, from where he was co-ordinating his business remotely. In Belgium, we tracked down Majeed’s elder brother - now out of jail. He also said Scorpion was likely to be in Turkey. For most migrants heading to the UK, Turkey is an important staging post. Because of its immigration laws, it is relatively easy to get a visa to enter the country from Africa, Asia and the Middle East. A tip-off led us to a cafe in Istanbul frequented by people-smugglers. Barzan Majeed had recently been seen there. Our initial enquiries did not go well. We asked the manager if he could tell us about the trade - the cafe went quiet. Soon after, a man passed our table and unzipped his jacket to show us he was carrying a gun. It was a reminder that we were dealing with dangerous people. Our next stop yielded more promising results. We were told that Majeed had recently deposited €200,000 (£172,000) at a money exchange a few streets away. We left our number there, and in the middle of the following night, Rob's phone rang. The caller ID said “Number withheld” - on the end of the line was someone claiming to be Barzan Majeed. It was so late, and so unexpected, there was no time to record the beginning of the call. Rob recalled the voice on the line: “He goes, ‘I hear you’re looking for me.’ And I go, ‘Who are you? Scorpion?’ He goes, ‘Ha, you want to call me that? That’s fine.’” There was no way of telling whether this was the real Barzan Majeed, but the details he gave tallied with what we knew. He said he had been living in Nottingham until 2015 when he was deported. But he denied being involved in the trafficking business. “This is not true!” he protested. “It’s just the media.” The line kept cutting out, and despite our gentle probing, he gave no clue as to his location. We had no idea when, or if, he would call again. Meanwhile, a local contact of Rob told us that Scorpion was now involved in smuggling migrants from Turkey to Greece and Italy. What we heard was disturbing. Up to 100 men, women and children were being crowded on to yachts that were licensed to carry about 12 people. The yachts would be often piloted by smugglers with no experience of sailing, and would take a dangerous route between clusters of small islands to avoid coastguard patrols. There was big money to be made. Passengers were said to be paying about €10,000 each for a place on one of these boats. Over the past 10 years, more than 720,000 people are thought to have attempted to cross the eastern Mediterranean into Europe - of those, nearly 2,500 died, most by drowning. Julia Schafermeyer, from the charity SOS Mediterranean, says the traffickers put people's lives in great danger: “I don't think it makes any difference to them whether these people live or die.” About this time, we had the chance to put this question to Scorpion directly. Out of the blue, he called us again. Once again, he denied being a smuggler. However, his definition of the word seemed to be someone who physically carried out the task, rather than someone pulling the strings. “You have to be there,” he told us, adding: “Even now, I’m not there.” He was just the “money man”, he said. Majeed also seemed to show little sympathy for drowned migrants. “God [writes it down] when you’re going to pass away, but this is sometimes your fault,” he said. “God doesn’t never say ‘Go inside the boat’.” Our next stop was the resort of Marmaris, where Turkish police said they believed Scorpion owned a villa. We asked around and received a call from someone who said they had been friendly with him. She knew Majeed was involved in people-smuggling, and said that although this caused him stress, his worry was about the money, not the fate of the migrants. “He didn’t care about them - that's really sad, isn’t it?” she said. “It’s something I think back on and feel some shame because I... heard things and I knew they weren’t good.” She added that she had not seen him at his villa in Marmaris recently, although someone had told her he could be in Iraq. This was borne out by another contact, who said they had actually seen Scorpion at a money exchange in Sulaymaniyah, a city in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. We set off. If we could not find Scorpion there, we decided we would have to give up. But Rob’s contact managed to get in touch with him. At first, he was very suspicious, worried we somehow planned to snatch him and take him back to Europe. A flurry of text messages followed, first through Rob’s contact and then with Rob himself. Scorpion said he might meet us, but only if he was allowed to choose the venue. We ruled that out, worried he might be setting us up. And then a text message arrived, asking simply: “Where are you?” We said we were on our way to a nearby mall. Scorpion told us to meet him there in a coffee shop on the ground floor. Finally, we saw him. Barzan Majeed looked like an affluent golfer. He was smartly dressed, in new jeans, a light-blue shirt and a black gilet. When he put his hands on the table, I saw his fingernails were manicured. Meanwhile, three men took a seat at a nearby table. His security team, we guessed. Once more, he denied being a big player at the top of a criminal organisation. He said other gang members had tried to implicate him. “A couple of people, when they get arrested, they say, ‘We’re working for him’. They want to get less sentence.” He also seemed bitter that other smugglers had been given British passports and carried on their trade. “In three days, one guy sent 170 or 180 people from Turkey to Italy, still holding a British passport!” he says. “I want to go to some other country to do business. I can’t.” When we pressed him about his responsibility for migrant deaths, he repeated what he had said on the phone - that he just took the money and booked places. For him, a smuggler was someone who loaded the people onto boats and lorries and transported them: “I never put anybody in a boat and I never kill anybody.” The conversation ended, but Scorpion invited Rob to see the money exchange he worked from in Sulaymaniyah. It was a small office - there was some writing in Arabic on the window and a couple of mobile phone numbers. People came here to pay for passage. Rob said that while he was there he saw a man carrying a box full of cash. On this occasion, Scorpion talked about how he got into the business in 2016, when many thousands of people were heading into Europe. “Nobody forced them. They wanted to,” he said. “They were begging the smugglers, ‘Please, please do this for us.’ Sometimes the smugglers say, ‘Just because of the sake of God, I will help them’. And then they complain, they say, ‘Oh this, that...’ No, this is not true.” Between 2016 and 2019, Scorpion said he had been one of two main people heading operations in Belgium and France, and admitted he had handled millions of dollars at that time. “I done them kind of things. Money, location, passengers, smugglers... I was between all of them.” He denied that he was still involved in people-smuggling, but his actions seemed to contradict this. Scorpion did not realise it, but as he scrolled through his mobile phone, Rob caught a reflection of the screen in a polished picture frame on the wall behind. What Rob could see was lists of passport numbers. We later learned that smugglers would send these to Iraqi officials. They would then be bribed to issue false visas so migrants could travel to Turkey. That was the last we saw of Scorpion. At every stage, we shared our discoveries with the authorities in the UK and Europe. Ann Lukowiak, a public prosecutor in Belgium who was involved in convicting Scorpion, still hopes that one day he will be extradited from Iraq. “It’s important to us to have sent the signal that you can't do what you want,” she says. “We will eventually take him down.”

Türkiye’s Strikes Wreak Havoc on Northeast Syria

Critical Infrastructure Damaged, Millions Without Access to Essential Services Hiba Zayadin As the world's attention remains fixed on the devastating conflict unfolding in Gaza, another crisis is intensifying under the radar in northeast Syria. There, Türkiye’s airstrikes and drone attacks on critical civilian infrastructure are putting livelihoods at risk and severing communities from electricity, medical care, and other essential services. In late October 2023, Human Rights Watch reported that Turkish strikes on Kurdish-held areas of northeast Syria had resulted in water and electricity disruptions for millions of people. Back then, Turkish forces struck water and electrical power stations, oil installations, and the only operational gas plant for domestic use in all of northeast Syria. In December and January, Türkiye intensified its strikes to include medical facilities and crucial access roads used by humanitarian responders, according to the Northeast Syria (NES) NGO Forum, a coalition of international organizations operating in the area. Attacks which cause disproportionate damage to civilians and civilian objects are prohibited under international humanitarian law, and deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure is a war crime. The repeated strikes on civilian infrastructure have left many essential facilities in ruins, rendering hospitals, bakeries, and water facilities inoperable. Fuel, needed for cooking, heating, and farming, is running out. On January 29, the NES NGO forum said that 1 million people in cities and villages had been cut off from electricity, and over 2 million people had limited access to safe water. Damage to medical facilities targeted in December has disrupted the oxygen supply to more than a dozen private and public hospitals, and strikes on 28 health facilities have disrupted their services, increasing the risk of water-borne diseases. The forum warned that the “scale of damage far supersedes the humanitarian community’s capacity to sustain emergency life-saving service provision.” Türkiye has, for years, carried out military operations and airstrikes in northern Syria with the stated aim of targeting the Syrian Kurdish armed group, the People’s Protections Unit (YPG). Türkiye views the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an armed group based in Türkiye and Iraq, which it considers a terrorist organization. As the crisis in Northeast Syria escalates, action is needed to mitigate the humanitarian impacts on the civilian population. Türkiye should immediately stop targeting critical civilian infrastructure, respect international humanitarian law and hold to account those responsible for serious violations. All countries need to address the plight of the region's populace even if other conflicts are dominating the headlines.

2023 prison census: Jailed journalist numbers near record high

Israel emerged as one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists following the October 7 start of the Israel-Gaza war, the Committee to Protect Journalists’ 2023 prison census has found. Israel ranked sixth – tied with Iran – behind China, Myanmar, Belarus, Russia, and Vietnam, respectively. Middle East and North Africa Egypt, routinely among the world’s worst jailers, tied with Turkey for the eighth-highest number of jailed journalists globally – 13 – in the 2023 census. Saudi Arabia was ninth, with 10 journalists behind bars. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Iraqi Kurdistan have all expanded the use of false news, terrorism, and anti-state charges against journalists in recent years. Egyptian authorities regularly work around legislation limiting prisoners’ pretrial detention to two years by filing additional charges to extend that period. Cases in point: freelancer Mohamed Said Fahmy, has spent more than four and a half years in pretrial detention after being arrested on false news and terrorism charges in 2018. He was scheduled for release in 2020 and 2021, but his detention was extended after prosecutors added further charges. Mostafa Mohamed Saad, a senior cameraman for Qatari broadcasting network Al-Jazeera, has been held in pretrial detention in Cairo on terrorism and false news charges since 2019. No new jailings were reported from Bahrain and Syria, which still held five journalists each in 2023, or from Morocco and Algeria, which each held three. Iraq’s four jailed journalists included one new prisoner in Iraqi Kurdistan. In Tunisia, Khalifa Guesmi was taken into custody in September to serve a five-year prison sentence on charges of disclosing national security information. Earlier in the year, an appeals court had increased his sentence from one to five years... Continue.