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هه‌واڵ / جیهان

Where Does PJAK Fit into the Peace Process?

Does Arming the PKK Extend to PJAK? Why Is Turkey Silent on PJAK? Analytical Report by Hemn Khoshnaw As discussions around the dissolution and disarmament of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) gain momentum, a critical question remains unanswered: What is the future of the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK)? Notably, Turkey has maintained a conspicuous silence on this issue. Despite being a significant actor in the Kurdish militant landscape, PJAK appears absent from the agendas of Turkish, Iranian, regional, and international stakeholders. This silence raises questions about whether the group is being deliberately overlooked or strategically sidelined. PJAK, widely regarded as the Iranian and East Kurdistan wing of the PKK, was officially founded on April 4, 2004. The organization maintains its own armed forces under the banner of the East Kurdistan Units (YRK). These units are active in various regions of East Kurdistan (Iranian Kurdistan) as well as in the mountainous stronghold of Kandil. Since its formation in 2004, PJAK has engaged in repeated armed confrontations with Iranian security forces, resulting in casualties on both sides. One of the most significant escalations occurred in the summer of 2011, when the Iranian military launched a large-scale offensive targeting the Kandil Mountains—an operation bolstered by artillery fire and military helicopters. The campaign led to the bombing and destruction of several villages and areas within the Kurdistan Region, drawing regional concern. The hostilities persisted until September 29, 2011, when both parties reached a negotiated agreement, culminating in the declaration of a ceasefire. While the truce has largely held, intermittent skirmishes have continued to flare between PJAK guerrillas and Iranian forces. These encounters have typically been limited in scope and characterized by sudden, small-scale clashes rather than sustained conflict. PJAK, currently under the leadership of co-chairs Amir Karimi and Payman Viyan, remains an active member of the Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma Civakên Kurdistanê, KCK). This umbrella organization encompasses several Kurdish political parties and affiliated groups operating across the region. Like other KCK constituents, PJAK considers Abdullah Öcalan—the imprisoned leader of the PKK—as its primary ideological and political reference, or marja'i. Following the collapse of Turkey’s Kurdish peace process on July 22, 2015, the Turkish military significantly curtailed the ability of Kurdish youth from Northern Kurdistan to join the ranks of the PKK. This shift contributed to a noticeable rise in the number of guerrilla fighters originating from Eastern Kurdistan within the PKK structure. Current estimates suggest that youth from the east now constitute approximately 35% of the overall military forces within the broader KCK framework. In this context, PJAK has evolved into a key component of the KCK’s military, political, economic, social, organizational, and diplomatic capital. Any stakeholder engaging with the Kurdish question must now take PJAK into serious consideration as an integral force within this complex landscape. The renewed dialogue process between İmralı and the Turkish government, initiated in October 2024, centers on the dissolution and disarmament of the PKK. Yet, the deliberate strategy of withholding information—particularly concerning PJAK—casts a shadow over the transparency of the talks. This lack of clarity compels observers to interpret PJAK’s potential future role through the lens of Abdullah Öcalan’s earlier statements, as no direct disclosures have been made regarding the group’s position within the evolving negotiations. In 2008, Abdullah Öcalan, through his legal representatives, issued a warning to the PKK leadership in Kandil concerning Iran’s apprehensions over the withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkey into the Kurdistan Region. He cautioned that Iran might attempt to undermine the process. Later, during the 2013 phase of his political engagement—often referred to as the Öcalan treatment process—he spoke more explicitly about Iran’s potential role, expressing concern that Tehran could initiate armed actions against Turkey and attribute them to the PKK, thereby sabotaging the peace efforts. To preempt such scenarios, Öcalan urged the leadership in Kandil to remain vigilant. “The only way to prevent Iran is for the PJAK to increase its forces to 40,000,” Öcalan stated. The significance of this remark lies more in its political implication than its logistical feasibility. Nevertheless, it offers a crucial lens for understanding the current, largely opaque dynamics surrounding PJAK’s role in the region. Another dimension that reveals how both the Turkish state and Abdullah Öcalan perceive PJAK lies in the broader international context. The ongoing war in Ukraine, developments in Syria and Lebanon, Israel’s involvement in regional affairs, India’s tensions with Pakistan, and the strategic maneuvers of the U.S. administration all influence the shaping of PJAK’s fate and future agenda. This complex geopolitical landscape presents Turkey with a chance to elevate its regional role. However, when assessed through a comparative lens, the balance tilts more toward “anti-opportunities” than actual advantages for Ankara. These counter-opportunities have increasingly positioned Turkey at odds with many of its NATO allies, intensifying geopolitical pressure on multiple fronts. Within the framework of ongoing dialogue between Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish state, there appears to be consensus regarding the strategic strength and influence the PKK has amassed within the broader Middle Eastern balance of power. Iran—Turkey’s long-standing regional and historical rival—represents a critical geopolitical arena where the PKK holds significant political, military, social, and diplomatic leverage. In recent years, Iranian and Turkish interests have visibly clashed in the South Caucasus, particularly in the context of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. The current regional and international conditions surrounding Iran offer Turkey a strategic opening to consolidate and expand its influence—potentially at Iran’s expense—amid shifting alliances and renewed regional rivalries. Against this backdrop, the agreement between Öcalan and Turkey carries an unmistakable Iranian dimension. This aspect, in turn, is among the driving factors pulling Turkey into renewed negotiations with both Öcalan and the PKK leadership. Between 2011 and 2025, amid a series of overlapping regional crises, key actors involved in the Syrian conflict sought to exploit the shifting dynamics in Libya to recalibrate their strategic agendas in Syria. Developments in Libya consistently reverberated across the Syrian landscape, influencing decision-making and battlefield outcomes. Today, it has become increasingly apparent that Turkey aims to draw on the lessons learned from over a decade of entanglement in Syria. Leveraging its accumulated experience, Ankara appears intent on avoiding the strategic missteps it encountered during the Syrian crisis as it navigates the unfolding challenges related to Iran. In recent years, amid the ongoing Syrian conflict, the Kurdish population has emerged as a pivotal force in shaping the country’s power dynamics. Turkey’s persistent interference in Syria’s internal affairs—coupled with its antagonistic stance toward the Kurds—has effectively kept Syrian Kurds beyond the scope of Ankara’s strategic influence. Previously, during the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, the Kurds secured a significant foothold that caught Turkey off guard and recalibrated regional power equations. Simultaneously, the unwavering push by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to drive change within Iran has compelled Turkey to formulate its own contingency strategies for potential developments across its eastern neighbor’s borders. These various factors have led Turkey to prioritize the urgent formulation of its agenda regarding Iran. This sense of urgency may explain the swift actions taken by Turkish leaders to convene the PKK congress, where they decided to initiate the process of dissolution and disarmament. It has become increasingly clear to Ankara that its strategic objectives in Iran cannot be realized without engaging in cooperation with PJAK. Why does Turkey need PJAK? In 2015, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and other Kurdish factions attempted to reclaim their influence in East Kurdistan through the Rasan campaign, aiming to curb PJAK’s military and popular expansion. The Keleshin highland pastures incident that year was part of a covert operation orchestrated by the Turkish state as part of the Rasan campaign. Media outlets linked to the KDPI, and to a lesser extent Komala ahmetkeshan, later confirmed Turkey’s involvement in the campaign. However, the failure of the campaign, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the eastern Kurdish parties, prompted Turkey to reconsider its strategy and turn to a more viable alternative—PJAK. Around this time, Israel also sent a subtle message to Iran's Kurdish factions, signaling that significant changes were imminent in Iran that summer. Israel implied that the Kurdish role in these changes would be both influential and decisive. What does Turkey want from PJAK? While the PKK has yet to convene a congress to dissolve and disarm, it is evident that the process has reached a standstill. The reasons behind this impasse remain unclear. However, it is apparent that Kandil remains resolute in its position: if Abdullah Öcalan is not permitted to preside over the congress, no steps will be taken toward disbandment or disarmament. In the event that a congress is held and a decision is made to renounce armed struggle, not all guerrilla fighters are expected to disarm—at least not until the peace process is fully realized. It remains difficult to compel all fighters to lay down arms and transition into legal political work. As such, there must be a mechanism or platform to absorb and accommodate them, and the most viable platform appears to be PJAK. However, such a transition will not occur automatically. The agreement between Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish state must be comprehensive. Any forces relocated under the PJAK umbrella must not function as anti-Turkish elements. Turkey is counting on PJAK. Moreover, positioning PJAK in this role would serve to block the Kurdish movement from falling into Israel's sphere of influence should a political transformation occur in Iran. Through this plan, Turkey aims to secure leverage over the Kurdish file in Iran—an objective that can only be realized if PJAK is incorporated into the framework of the Öcalan–Turkey agreement. It appears that Turkey has detected Israel’s subtle message to Kurdish factions in East Kurdistan and, in response, is determined not to repeat the Syrian scenario by allowing Kurds to emerge as an adversarial force in Iran. In a telephone interview with a Kurdish journalist in Turkey closely following the resolution process, I asked about the state’s vision for PJAK. “Turkey expects PJAK to play a role similar to that of the so-called Syrian National Army militias—but within Iran,” the journalist said. Iran Will Not Remain Passive Since 2008, Iranian authorities have viewed the peace process between Turkey and the PKK with increasing alarm, fearing its potential geopolitical repercussions for Iran. These concerns intensified in 2013, when PKK guerrilla forces began withdrawing from North Kurdistan toward the Iranian border areas—a shift Tehran perceived as a direct threat. That summer, Iran held a series of high-level meetings with senior figures from the PKK, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). During the meetings, Iranian officials voiced their apprehension over the growing concentration of guerrilla forces near their frontier and questioned the implications of a possible Öcalan-Turkey agreement. “If Öcalan strikes a deal with Turkey, is there anyone who can stop PJAK?” Iranian representatives asked pointedly. The discussions turned tense, with friction between Iranian officials and representatives from Kandil surfacing clearly. Iran’s perceived threat from PJAK is not a superficial one, but rather rooted in a longstanding geopolitical rivalry between Tehran and Ankara. In this strategic context, if a figure like Öcalan—known for his pragmatic maneuvering—were to wield control over PJAK, it could potentially smooth the path for a comprehensive agreement with Turkey. As a dominant regional power, Iran has clearly grasped Turkey's strategic intentions. The election of Massoud Pezeshkian's government appears to be a calculated response to anticipated regional and international maneuvers involving Kurdish dynamics. Shortly after the peace treatment process between Öcalan and Turkey resumed, Pezeshkian’s administration made a symbolic yet significant move: it called on parliament to implement Article 15 of the Iranian constitution, which allows for education in unofficial languages. Although the initial bill failed to secure enough parliamentary support, Pezeshkian and his allies remain committed. They are now working on revising the bill's language with the intention of resubmitting it for a new vote. On March 4, 2025, government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mahajerani announced that a draft law had been submitted to grant official recognition to non-Persian languages.This push reflects more than just a domestic policy shift. Pezeshkian’s efforts aim to prevent Iran from becoming isolated in the region as the only country clashing with its Kurdish population. Strategically, it is an attempt to neutralize the Kurdish card and prevent it from falling into the hands of regional rivals such as Turkey—or even outside powers like Israel. If the disarmament of the PKK moves forward alongside constitutional reforms in Turkey over the next three to four years, the role and strategic importance of the PJAK (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan) is poised to expand more than ever before. However, the current sluggish pace of the process raises serious doubts about the PKK fully severing its ties with Iran. With the resumption of the peace dialogue between Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish state, it is now almost inevitable that Iran and the PKK leadership in Qandil will engage in renewed talks. Such dialogue would serve a dual purpose: easing Iran’s security concerns and enabling the PKK to position itself pragmatically for the shifting political dynamics ahead. Turkey’s evolving strategy toward PJAK remains tightly bound to the position of the PKK leadership in Kandil. Any rupture in relations between Kandil and Tehran would effectively signal a strategic gamble by the PKK—placing all its leverage in Ankara’s hands, a move that appears untenable under current conditions. Without robust legal and political guarantees from Turkey, it is unlikely the PKK would risk activating PJAK in a way that compromises its Iranian front, potentially triggering new crises and undermining its broader regional standing.

US 'reciprocal tariff' is an old habit that dies hard

By Shao Xia | chinadaily.com.cn Once again, the US Administration imposed sweeping tariffs on the world — even targeting some poor penguins. Many around the world were stunned, with some US allies protesting, "This is no way to treat friends." Yet America's habit of imposing tariffs is nothing new. Over a century ago, the United States had its own "Tariff Man," who not only levied tariffs but also pursued policies that have parallels with those seen today. A tariff-obsessed president William McKinley, the 25th President of the United States, is a controversial figure in American history. During his presidency, the US experienced "The Gilded Age," an era marked by rapid industrial growth as well as significant social inequalities. He campaigned with the slogan "Prosperity at Home, Prestige Abroad" and declared himself "Tariff Man". As a congressman, he was a staunch advocate of tariff. The McKinley Tariff Act of 1890, named after him, raised average US tariffs from 38 percent to 49.5 percent. Later, as president, he signed the Dingley Tariff Act in 1897, pushing rates to 52 percent under the guise of "protecting American workers and products". Industrial capitalists adored him. Under tariffs, foreign goods became uncompetitive, allowing some US industrial giants to monopolize domestic markets. Protected by a 70 percent tariff, American tinplate production expanded rapidly, capturing over 60 percent of the domestic market by 1895. But workers and farmers despised him. Tariffs inflated living costs, pushing US consumer prices 35 percent higher than Europe's. Retaliatory tariffs crushed agricultural exports, slashing farmers' incomes. Between 1897 and 1904, the labor movement saw a stunning 17,000 strikes involving four million workers. The old playbook For quite a long time, McKinley was a forgotten president, until the current US administration began to hype up his presidency for its own purposes. Today's US administration openly shows admiration for McKinley. It restored the name "Mount McKinley" to "dutifully recognize his historic legacy of protecting America's interests and generating enormous wealth for all Americans." The administration's slogan — "The Golden Age of America" — reminds people of "The Gilded Age." After announcing "reciprocal tariffs," the administration even claimed high tariffs "could have prevented the Great Depression". The mimicry extends beyond tariffs. McKinley launched the Spanish-American War, seized colonies like Cuba and the Philippines, threatened Hawaii with tariffs, and pushed for a Latin American canal. The new administration, meanwhile, vows to "not rule out military force to take Greenland," threatens an annexation of Canada, and demands control of the Panama Canal. In McKinley's time, the US government was relatively small, with federal spending accounting for less than three percent of GDP. His administration relied on the alliance with industrial capitalists. Today's administration, through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), plans to slash US$2 trillion in federal spending while aiming to build alliances with tech capitalists, mirroring McKinley's approach. Learning the right lesson Clearly, the US is replaying its 19th-century playbook, hoping to solve modern crises with outdated strategies. But the world — and America itself — has changed. Repeating past errors won't secure the future. It only leads to more problems. If history is any guide, tariffs are never the foundation of prosperity, but threats to prosperity. What McKinley's 19th-century "boom" actually relied on was technology, capital, and labor growth — not tariffs. History also offers a stark lesson: the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 slapped tariffs on more than 2,000 products, raising average rates to 60 percent. The result? US trade plummeted 67 percent, and global trade collapsed by 66 percent in just four years. The damage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was so severe that 50 years later, Ronald Reagan provided a cautionary tale: "There are those in the Congress, just as there were back in the 1930s, who want to go for the quick political advantage, who risk America's prosperity for the sake of a short-term appeal to some special interest group". He succinctly pointed out the logic and impact of tariffs: They might seem appealing initially, but they ultimately lead to economic devastation. The new administration believes that tariffs that "nurtured" 19th-century industry can also bring about 21st-century manufacturing "reshoring." But we should remember one thing: tariffs in the 1890s were aimed at bolstering the rising industries and companies in the US, not attracting manufacturing from other countries or creating new industrial chains from zero. US today Today, US manufacturing is in a totally different position compared to 100 years ago. It is hollowed out: skilled workers are scarce, infrastructure is crumbling, and supply chains are broken. Decades of financialization have overvalued the dollar, making US production costs uncompetitive. Without cost advantages or reliable infrastructure, tariffs for "reshoring" would only yield two outcomes: slow,expensive production and no market — domestic or global. US Commerce Secretary Luttnick claimed "An army of millions will build iPhones in the US". If the US attempts to do so, it can surely be achieved. But if the costs of producing an iPhone were to double or rise even higher as a result, who would be willing to buy it? And while consumers might skip an iPhone, they can't skip expensive food or other daily essentials made in the US, as the tariffs choke off cheap imports. The world has moved on since McKinley's time. In the 19th century, America could thrive as an isolated industrial power. Today's global economy is interconnected. By dismantling the global trading system which was built by the Americans but deemed "unfair" by some Americans, the US risks global isolation, losing moral authority, and ultimately, dollar hegemony. As International Chamber of Commerce Secretary General John Denton noted, "only 13 percent of global trade issues from the US". The world would suffer without America, but America alone is not in a position to disrupt the global trade order and threaten the whole world. If the US truly seeks a "Golden Age," it must choose wisely: cling to the outdated history and repeat past failures, or confront its own flaws, solve real problems, and stop blaming others. The author is a commentator on international affairs. The views are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of their affiliation or China Daily. If you have a specific expertise, or would like to share your thought about our stories, then send us your writings at [email protected], and [email protected].

Kurdish Unity Conference kicks off in Rojava

The Rojava Kurdish Unity and Common Position Conference has begun in Qamishlo, Northern and Eastern Syria. More than 400 people from Rojava, Bakur and Bashur Kurdistan and different regions of Syria are attending the conference in Azadi Park. Kurdish political parties in Rojava, youth and women's organizations, intellectuals, writers, artists, religious figures, and respected members of society are among the participants. In addition, prominent Kurdish figures from Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Bab, and Azaz are also expected to attend. Representatives of political parties from both the northern and southern parts of Kurdistan will take part in the conference. Messages are also expected from Eastern Kurdistan and abroad. Around 200 journalists representing more than 60 media outlets will cover the conference. The opening speech will be delivered by the General Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi. After the reading of messages and the speeches by the guests, the conference will continue behind closed doors. In the closed session, the draft document on unity and a common stance, previously worked on by parties, organizations, and individuals, will be discussed, finalized, and presented for approval. At the end of the day, the outcomes of the conference are expected to be announced to the public through a final declaration.

Iran imprisons Kurdish teacher for allegedly threatening national security

Srveh Pourmohammadi, a Kurdish language instructor and active member of the NGO Nojin, has been taken into custody to begin serving a five-year prison sentence. She was transferred to the women’s ward of Sanandaj Central Prison—referred to by state institutions as a “Correction and Rehabilitation Center.” According to a report received by the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, on Saturday, April 19, 2025, 36-year-old Srveh Pourmohammadi was summoned to the Sentence Enforcement Office in Sanandaj and subsequently arrested. She was then transferred to the prison to serve her five-year sentence. Pourmohammadi had originally been sentenced to ten years in prison by Branch 1 of the Sanandaj Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Karami, in November 2023. She was convicted on charges of “forming a group with the intent to disrupt national security.” However, the Court of Appeals later reduced the sentence to five years of suspended imprisonment. The final verdict was officially issued to her on Tuesday, November 25, 2024. Srveh Pourmohammadi was initially detained on Sunday, January 29, 2023, after going to the Sanandaj courthouse to follow up on the cases of other detained members of the Nojin association. She was arrested by state forces at the courthouse. After two weeks in detention, she was released on bail on February 13, 2023, pending the conclusion of legal proceedings. Source: Hengaw

SDF announced the names of the members of the delegation for talks with Damascus

Syrian Democratic Forces Media Center announced the names of the members of the committee for the northern and eastern regions of Syria for talks with the Damascus government. SDF Media Center reported: Mazlum Abdi and East Afrin received Hussein Salama, head of the Damascus government's committee appointed to implement the March 10 agreement between Syrian President Ahmed Shara and Mazlum Abdi. It added: The meeting discussed the implementation of the provisions of the agreement and the need to continue to reduce violence and stop the fighting in Syria, including the protection of the Tishrin Dam from military attacks. They also discussed the formation of a committee to discuss the return of refugees from all parts of Syria. The statement said: The committee, which will represent northern and eastern Syria in talks with the Damascus government, includes Fawza Yousef, Abdul Hamid Mahbash, Ahmad Yousef, Sanhar Barsum, Suzdar Haji, Maryam Ibrahim and Yasser Suleiman.

Kurds to push for federal system in post-Assad Syria

Syrian Kurdish groups are preparing to push for a federal system that would grant them autonomy, despite opposition from interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa, a senior Kurdish official told Reuters. Kurdish sources said rival factions reached consensus last month on a unified political vision, including support for a federal governance model—though it has not been officially announced. Momentum for a federal system has grown amid rising concerns among Syria’s minorities, particularly after last month’s mass killings of Alawites. Kurdish groups accuse al-Sharaa and Islamist factions leading the interim government of consolidating power and steering Syria in the wrong direction. Kurdish-led groups currently control nearly a quarter of Syrian territory. In March, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reached an agreement with Damascus to integrate Kurdish governing bodies and security forces into central structures. “All Kurdish political forces in Syria have agreed on a common political vision regarding governance, the identity of the Syrian state, and Kurdish rights,” said Badran Jia Kurd, a senior official in the Kurdish self-administration. “They affirmed the need for a federal, parliamentary, pluralistic, and democratic system.” It marks the first time a senior Kurdish official has publicly confirmed support for federalism since the consensus was reached. Until now, Kurdish authorities had emphasized decentralization rather than explicitly calling for a federal system. They maintain that the goal is autonomy within Syria, not independence. Al-Sharaa has rejected federalism, telling The Economist in January that it lacks popular support and would harm Syria’s unity. “The reality of Syrian society and its geography shows the need to preserve each region’s administrative, political, and cultural identity,” Jia Kurd said. He added this would require regional legislative councils, executive bodies for local governance, and internal security forces, all anchored in the constitution. Neighboring Turkiye opposes the move. It considers the main Syrian Kurdish party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a security threat due to its ties to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has led a decades-long insurgency in Turkiye. The Kurdish National Council (KNC), backed by Iraq’s Barzani-led Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), also joined last month’s talks. KNC leader Suleiman Oso said the joint Kurdish vision will be presented formally at a conference later in April. He noted that developments since Bashar al-Assad’s ouster in December have strengthened support for federalism—particularly following reported violations against Alawites in Syria’s coastal regions and growing resistance among the Druze community in Suwayda. A recent constitutional declaration by the interim government gave sweeping powers to al-Sharaa, named Islamic law as the main legislative source, and established Arabic as the sole official language—without reference to Kurdish. “We believe federalism is the best solution to preserve Syria’s unity,” Oso said. “Syria is home to many ethnicities, religions, and sects. When we go to Damascus, we will clearly present our vision and demands to the interim government.”

Erdogan to Meet DEM Party Delegation Amid Ankara-PKK peace talks

A delegation from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), also known as the Imrali delegation, is set to meet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Thursday, April 10, to discuss reviving the Kurdish peace process and the potential disarmament of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The meeting comes in response to a request made by the delegation prior to the Newroz holiday to convey a message from jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and to discuss the next steps in the peace process. Erdogan reportedly agreed to the meeting on Tuesday but will not receive the full seven-member delegation. According to Turkish media, only two members—Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Pervin Buldan—will attend the meeting. Ahmet Türk, another prominent figure in the delegation, will not participate due to health concerns. Observers consider the meeting significant, as the DEM Party is seeking clarity on whether the PKK’s disarmament will be unconditional or if Erdogan intends to introduce related legislation in the Turkish Parliament. Erdogan’s stance is expected to be clarified during the talks. On Wednesday, Erdogan addressed the peace process during his Justice and Development Party (AKP) parliamentary group meeting, stating: “We have issues that hold great importance for the future of our country, including the goal of a ‘Terror-free Turkey.’ As the People’s Alliance, we will carry out the peace process, which we are managing with great care, in a way that will be beneficial for our country.” He confirmed that the DEM Party delegation would be received on Thursday, reaffirming his government’s commitment to achieving a “Terror-free Turkey.” He further emphasized inclusivity, saying, “We will continue reviving and rebuilding our country and our region. Together with our Kurdish, Arab, Alevi, and Sunni brothers, we will intensify our efforts to sow peace on our country’s soil.” On February 27, Ocalan, who is imprisoned on Imrali Island, issued a written message through the delegation calling on the PKK to convene a congress, dissolve itself, and lay down arms. The move followed a speech by Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli in parliament, urging that Ocalan be brought to the assembly to publicly call for the PKK’s disarmament. Ocalan’s message has since reignited debate on the Kurdish solution process, drawing significant attention in both Turkish and international media.

Groups urge US to protect press freedom and keep journalists safe after order to gut

Draw Media We, the undersigned, reaffirm our support for press freedom and a free media that is able to operate without coercion by, or interference from, government – and call on the United States to protect all reporters and media workers employed by the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), many of whom face significant personal risk in reporting on and from highly repressive regimes. For more than 80 years, USAGM entities, which include Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), have played a vital role in reaching audiences living under authoritarian governments, empowering free expression in some of the world’s most dangerous reporting environments. Eliminating these organizations is a significant blow to press freedom - and a gift to autocrats worldwide. Journalists for VOA, RFE/RL, and other affiliates are frequently targeted by authorities in highly censored or dangerous countries. A March 14 executive order issued by President Donald J. Trump called for USAGM to be “eliminated to the maximum extent consistent with applicable law” as part of ongoing efforts to reduce “the elements of the Federal bureaucracy that the President has determined are unnecessary.” USAGM is a U.S. federal agency whose mandate is drawn from several laws. It oversees broadcast entities including VOA, RFE/RL, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Radio Free Asia, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks. Under U.S. law, the editorial operations of USAGM entities are separate from the government to protect editorial independence. It is vital that Congress protect USAGM, ensure the safety of its affiliate journalists, and reaffirm the U.S. government’s commitment to a free and independent media at home and abroad. Signed by– • Committee to Protect Journalists • Association for International Broadcasting • Reporters Without Borders (RSF) • Public Media Alliance • The Press Freedom Center at the National Press Club • Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism • The Bureau of Investigative Journalism • International Press Institute • Forbidden Stories • Radio Television Digital News Association • PEN America • The European Federation of Journalists • Nieman Foundation for Journalism • Pulitzer Center • World Association of News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) • National Press Photographers Association • Society of Professional Journalists • Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press • Freedom of the Press Foundation • Association of Foreign Press Correspondents • Center for Democracy & Technology • Index on Censorship • Free Press • Global Investigative Journalism Network • Global Reporting Centre • International Women’s Media Foundation • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) • The Asian American Journalists Association

US calls on Iraq to resume northern oil exports through Turkey’s Ceyhan

In order to resume oil exports via the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline as soon as possible, the United States encouraged the Iraqi government to come to an agreement with the foreign oil corporations that operate in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The spokesperson of the US State Department, Tammy Bruce, told reporters during a press briefing on Wednesday that the US administration is urging the Iraqi government to reach an agreement with the international oil companies to resume oil exports through the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline as soon as possible. Bruce also urged the Iraqi government to honor the existing contracts with US companies as part of the issue. “Reopening the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline ensures Iraqi oil can reach global markets, especially European markets. Iraq benefits from the stability of resilient supply chains, as we all do,” Bruce added. Due to financial and legal concerns, crude oil shipments through the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline, which formerly handled around 0.5 percent of the world’s oil supply, have ceased since March 2023. After the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris ruled that Ankara had violated a 1973 treaty by permitting oil exports without the approval of the federal government in Baghdad, oil flows via the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline were stopped. The ruling obligated Turkey to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion in compensation for losses caused by the KRG’s illegal oil exports between 2014 and 2018. Earlier in March, negotiations held to restart Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil flows through the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline have failed for the second time in a week due to differences between oil firms and the Iraqi Oil Ministry, according to Reuters. In February, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Fuad Hussein, revealed that Baghdad is collaborating with the KRG to resolve technical issues and resume crude oil exports to Turkey, which had been suspended for almost two years and cost Iraq around $19 billion in lost revenue. The legislative structure is in place, but before oil flows can restart, oil firms, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the federal government need to resolve technical issues, Hussein told Bloomberg.

Airstrikes or Starvation Death: The Fate of Gaza Residents After October 7th

Draw Media "If people don't die from airstrikes, they will die from hunger." With these words, Hind Khudari, a worker with the World Food Programme (WFP) in Gaza, conveyed the immense suffering of the residents, as reported by the WFP. According to the global program, Hind has dedicated her life to sharing the stories of the people of Gaza, the city where she was born and raised, shedding light on the struggles of the besieged enclave and the daily battle for survival. For weeks, Hind has been narrating the harsh living conditions in Gaza, her personal experience of displacement, losing her home, enduring days without food, and wavering between despair and hope. She recounts how she and other residents were forced to flee their homes to areas in Gaza that were claimed to be safe. "The truth is, there is no safe place in Gaza. People are fleeing from one death to another." She adds, "One day, we were sharing a single bottle of juice that a friend had found. As we passed it among ourselves, a massive explosion suddenly erupted near where we were staying. We ran toward each other in fear of another blast. That was our last bottle of juice, and I didn’t even get a sip." During a temporary truce, Hind went to the Deir al-Balah market in search of food but found almost nothing. "All we could find were tomatoes, cucumbers, onions, eggplants, and oranges. We couldn't even find clothes or blankets for the winter." What Hind has endured is the reality for 1.8 million people—trapped between the rubble, facing the threat of death either by airstrikes or starvation. A Humanitarian Catastrophe: Egypt Intervenes Amid scenes of devastation, airstrikes, displacement, killings, and starvation in Gaza, Egypt has stepped up to alleviate the suffering of the enclave's residents, providing various forms of support and assistance since the events of October 7, 2023. Among its efforts, Cairo has intensified its diplomatic pressure on Israel to allow the entry of urgent humanitarian and food aid for displaced civilians. In January, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, Dr. Badr Abdel Aty, stated that Cairo aimed to facilitate the entry of 1,000 aid trucks daily into Gaza to meet the escalating needs of the population amid the dire conditions. He also noted that between 600 and 700 food aid trucks were ready to cross the Rafah border crossing to deliver relief to the Palestinian people in Gaza. In February, Egypt announced that the number of tents delivered to Gaza through Egyptian crossings since the start of the truce had surpassed 20,000 tents. Additionally, Egypt reported that 680 wounded and ill individuals, along with 1,850 accompanying relatives, had entered Egypt through the Rafah crossing since the beginning of the truce. Gaza residents relief Following the humanitarian catastrophe that struck Gaza after October 7, several Arab countries have taken the lead in relief efforts, supporting the Palestinian people and working toward ending the war. The United Arab Emirates has been at the forefront, launching various initiatives, including the "Birds of Goodness" campaign, which coordinated 104 airdrop missions delivering humanitarian aid to areas inaccessible by land. This initiative was carried out in collaboration with Egypt and Jordan, significantly aiding the besieged population, especially in northern Gaza. Additionally, the UAE launched Operation Gallant Knight, which provides food aid and medical care, including the deployment of a floating hospital to deliver urgent healthcare services. This initiative is aimed at assisting all affected groups in Gaza, with a particular focus on women and children. In January, 150 aid convoys entered Gaza through Egyptian border crossings as part of Operation Gallant Knight 3, carrying 2,319 trucks loaded with over 29,000 tons of food and humanitarian supplies. Arab nations continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza, with Iraq playing a crucial role in these efforts. Baghdad sent a fuel tanker to Egypt to help alleviate the severe fuel shortage in Gaza, which has significantly hindered relief efforts and exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. The Iraqi tanker, carrying 10 million liters of fuel, sailed through the Suez Canal as an aid shipment for the Palestinians in Gaza, while the Iraqi government affirmed its commitment to sending more humanitarian shipments in the future. Meanwhile, Egypt remains pivotal in facilitating aid entry through the Rafah border crossing, the lifeline for Gaza’s residents. The crossing has seen an increased flow of aid trucks and essential goods, reflecting Egypt’s ongoing commitment to organizing and securing transport operations to meet the Palestinian people's urgent needs. These Arab-led humanitarian efforts have had a profound impact, reinforcing the resilience of Palestinians alongside diplomatic efforts to end the war and destruction. Led by the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other nations, these initiatives stand in stark contrast to the rhetoric of death and destruction that has caused yet another catastrophe for the Palestinian people—one that now threatens their future and their cause more than ever before.

Ocalan's call: uncertainty surrounds next steps, different scenarios

Shafaq News/ Following the historic call by Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan for his group to lay down arms, ending a more than 40-year conflict with Turkiye, attention is now focused on how this call will be implemented. Multiple scenarios are being considered, ranging from full or partial implementation to a hybrid approach varying by region. Öcalan’s Historic Message & Reactions On February 27, 2025, Abdullah Öcalan issued his historic call from his prison on Imrali Island, urging the PKK to disarm and dissolve. The message was read in Istanbul by a delegation from the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP), which visited Öcalan earlier that day. In his message, Öcalan took "historical responsibility" for the call, stressing the need to transition the struggle from armed conflict to the political arena. The call has been welcomed internationally, with the White House calling it a "major development" that could promote peace in the troubled region. It also expressed hope that it would help ease tensions between Turkiye and its allies in the fight against ISIS in northeastern Syria. Internally, Turkiye’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) expects the PKK to comply with Öcalan’s call, believing it would help liberate Turkiye from the constraints of the conflict. In Iraq's Kurdistan Region, President Nechirvan Barzani welcomed the call, urging PKK members to adhere to it and stressing that it was time for a "peaceful and democratic struggle." Prime Minister Masrour Barzani also expressed support for Turkiye’s peace efforts, and Bafel Talabani, President of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), called on all parties to commit to Öcalan’s call, describing it as the start of a "significant phase" towards peace and brotherly coexistence between Kurds and Turks. On the other hand, SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said Öcalan’s announcement is unrelated to Syria and pertains solely to the PKK. Abdi described the announcement as a “positive step” since it advocates for ending the war and initiating a peaceful political process in Turkiye. He added, “If peace is achieved in Turkiye, there will be no justification for continued attacks on us in Syria.” Öcalan’s Call Sparks Optimism Hours after its leader’s call, the PKK agreed to declare a ceasefire. "These are clear signs pointing towards the resolution of a long-standing issue, which will undoubtedly improve relations between Iraq and Turkiye," says political analyst Yasin Aziz in an interview with Shafaq News. Aziz anticipates that the positive developments following Öcalan’s call could span political, diplomatic, security, and economic realms. He believes that if the PKK issue is resolved, it will end a period of security tensions and military escalation in several areas of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which have strained Baghdad-Ankara relations. Among the potential positive outcomes, Aziz points to the return of displaced villagers to their homes in Kurdistan, which were abandoned due to military operations and fighting between PKK fighters and Turkish forces, warning that "The PKK's presence has been used by Turkiye to justify establishing numerous military bases and breaching international borders for years.” The Positive Scenario Abdul Salam Broari, a former Kurdistan Parliament member, agrees with Aziz’s view of the “positive developments” that could arise from Öcalan’s call, calling it the “positive scenario” for the future. In an interview with Shafaq News, Broari describes Öcalan’s call as “positive in itself,” noting that it was received positively by Turkiye, the PKK leadership, and internationally. However, he stressed that the success of this scenario depends on turning Öcalan’s call into a practical reality. Broari explains that positive effects for Kurdistan would be seen if all PKK-affiliated groups complied with Öcalan’s directive to disarm and dissolve. He also called for Turkiye to take positive steps, such as a program to reintegrate PKK members and address detained leaders and cadres. He believes the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Kurdistan since their presence is based on the PKK's existence, would contribute to regional stability, facilitate reconstruction in areas the PKK has occupied since 1992, and “end threats from both Turkiye and Iran.” The Worst-Case Scenario However, Broari also warns of a potential opposite scenario. This would involve Turkiye and the PKK reaching an agreement in which the PKK dissolves within Turkiye and abandons armed struggle, but its armed groups remain outside, notably through the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria and other units in Sinjar and along the Iraq -Turkiye border. "These groups could argue that they are not the PKK, but have different names—such as the Yazidi Protection Units in Sinjar, or the Freedom Party in Al-Sulaymaniyah and Kalar," he explains. Broari also expresses concern that these groups' continued presence in Iraq could justify Turkiye’s ongoing presence and attacks in the region, preventing any change in the relationship between Turkiye and Iraq on this issue. He notes the role of Iran, given these groups’ good relations with Tehran or its sympathizers. “The worst-case scenario is more likely soon,” he concludes. Turkiye’s Warning and Mixed Reactions Despite the PKK’s declaration of a ceasefire, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has warned that Turkiye will resume operations against the PKK if disarmament is not fully implemented or promises are not kept. This warning came on the same day the PKK announced its ceasefire in response to Öcalan’s call, with the PKK's executive committee stating that "disarmament can only be achieved through the operational leadership of Leader Apo." Security expert Sarmad Al-Bayati echoes similar concerns, noting that Öcalan’s call is not the first, with previous calls—most recently in 2013—remaining unimplemented. Al-Bayati warns that if the PKK agrees to disarm, the issue of Turkish forces staying in Kurdistan will remain unresolved. "If the PKK refuses to surrender its weapons, this could lead to a large-scale Turkish military operation, and Ankara may request Baghdad's help," he added. Al-Bayati also points out that the SDF and some factions in Syria have dismissed Öcalan’s call, claiming “It does not concern them.” He suggested that the call could affect the relationship between Iraq and Turkiye, especially as these groups remain active in Iraq.

"UK expands campaign to stop migrant smugglers and their lies"

Digital advertising launched today in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) as part of the government’s international campaign to warn prospective migrants about people smugglers’ lies, expanding on the campaigns in Vietnam and Albania.  Quotes from real migrants who have attempted the journey are featured, to counter the myths and misinformation peddled by criminals to dupe people online, as the UK government secures its borders as part of the Plan for Change.  The campaign forms part of this government’s work to expand the UK’s international partnerships and boost cooperation, to dismantle the people smuggling gangs operating across borders and protect vulnerable people, delivered through the Border Security Command.  It comes as the UK is set to sign a joint communiqué today (4 March 2025) with the Vietnamese government at the third annual UK-Vietnam Migration Dialogue, hosted in Hanoi, agreeing to build on our joint work to prevent the exploitation of irregular migrants, disrupt criminal gang operations, strengthen intelligence sharing and return those with no right to be in the UK.  The communiqué includes commitments to enable swifter and more effective returns, and for the UK government to continue its communications campaign in Vietnam to tackle migrant smugglers’ lies. Minister for Border Security and Asylum, Dame Angela Eagle, said: Ruthless criminal gangs spread dangerous lies on social media to exploit people for money, and we are exposing them using the real stories of their victims. This campaign helps to break the business model of these criminals and protect people from falling victim, securing our borders as part of the government’s Plan for Change. No one should be in any doubt that putting your life in the hands of a smuggler is not worth the risk. Too many people have died in the English Channel at the hands of these criminals, and we will stop at nothing to bring them to justice. The UK’s Border Security Commander, Martin Hewitt, also visited Iraq and the KRI last week, to progress the world-first agreements reached between the Federal Government of Iraq and the UK Government in November and further progress our cooperation on strengthening mutual border security.  He met with senior officials in the Federal Government of Iraq and within the Kurdistan Regional Government and its agencies to discuss ongoing cooperation, including increased joint working to tackle organised immigration crime and strengthen our mutual border security co-operation.  Through the Border Security Command, the UK government is working on a whole system approach, preventing irregular migration through communications, increasing international collaboration to tackle this issue across borders, and arming law enforcement with the powers it needs.  Bold new counterterror-style powers in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill, which is back in Parliament today for committee stage, will help bolster law enforcement to intercept and smash the people smuggling gangs earlier and faster. This includes stronger powers to seize and search mobile phones to investigate organised immigration crime and new offences against gangs conspiring to plan crossings, selling or handling small boat parts for use in the Channel, or supplying forged identity documents for migrants attempting to come here illegally. Border Security Commander Martin Hewitt, said: International partnerships are an essential part of our work to stop criminal gangs operating across borders to exploit vulnerable people. By strengthening these relationships and working closely with law enforcement partners across the world, we will bring down these gangs, break their business models, and put a stop to the misery and harm they inflict. Communications are an important part of this work, and our international campaign is sending a clear message to prospective migrants that these criminals cannot be trusted. The Home Office has today published a short film explaining the Border Security Command’s mission, its work to date, and its future plans.   The video features the Border Security Commander, Martin Hewitt, and key staff setting out the challenge the UK faces from criminal gangs determined to abuse our borders and exploit people for profit, and how the Border Security Command will defeat them and bring them to justice.  The UK’s international communications campaign will also ramp up this year to inform prospective migrants at every stage of the journey about the risks and realities of entering the UK illegally, including informing diaspora communities in the UK about the dangers their friends and families overseas face from people smugglers. Source: GOV.UK

Kurds begin supplying oil to Damascus

Kurdish-led authorities in northeast Syria have begun providing oil from local fields they manage to the central government in Damascus, Syrian oil ministry spokesman Ahmed Suleiman told Reuters on Saturday. It was the first public acknowledgement of internal oil deliveries from Syria's oil-rich northeast to the Islamist-run government installed after former leader Bashar al-Assad was toppled by rebels in December. Suleiman said the oil was from fields in the provinces of Hasakeh and Deir el-Zor and that the deliveries took place based on an amended version of a previous arrangement between the Assad government and Kurdish authorities. He said Syria's new leaders had changed articles in that deal that had "served the interests of people linked to the Assad regime". A source from northeast Syria's semi-autonomous administration told Reuters that the deal involved sending 5,000 barrels a day of crude from the Rmeilan field in Hasakeh and other fields in Deir el-Zor province to a refinery in Homs. Syria exported 380,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) in 2010, a year before protests against Assad's rule spiralled into a nearly 14-year war that devastated the country's economy and infrastructure - including its oil. Oilfields changed hands multiple times, with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces ultimately capturing the key northeast fields, although U.S. and European sanctions made both legitimate exports and imports difficult. The United States issued a six-month sanctions exemption in January allowing some energy transactions and the European Union is set to suspend its sanctions related to energy, transport and reconstruction. Tal Shoham and Avera Mengistu were released first, in southern Gaza's Rafah. In the interim, Syria is seeking to import oil via local intermediaries after its first post-Assad import tenders garnered little interest from major traders due to sanctions and financial risks, several trade sources told Reuters. The internal oil trade is also a key part of talks between the northeast region and the new authorities in Damascus, which want to bring all regions in Syria under centralised control. Sources said the SDF would likely need to relinquish control of oil revenues as part of any settlement. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said last month that his force was open to handing over responsibility for oil resources to the new administration, provided the wealth was distributed fairly to all provinces.

US piles pressure on Iraq to resume Kurdish oil exports, sources say

By REUTERS U.S. President Donald Trump's administration is piling pressure on Iraq to allow Kurdish oil exports to restart or face sanctions alongside Iran, eight sources with direct knowledge of the matter told Reuters. A speedy resumption of exports from Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region would help to offset a potential fall in Iranian oil exports, which Washington has pledged to cut to zero as part of Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign against Tehran. The U.S. government has said it wants to isolate Iran from the global economy and eliminate its oil export revenues in order to slow Iran's development of a nuclear weapon. Iraq's oil minister made a surprise announcement on Monday that exports from Kurdistan would resume next week. That would mark the end of a near two-year dispute that has cut flows of more than 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Kurdish oil via Turkey to global markets. Reuters spoke to eight sources in Baghdad, Washington and Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, who said that mounting pressure from the new U.S. administration was a key driver behind Monday's announcement. All of the sources declined to be named due to the sensitivity of the issue. Iran views its neighbor and ally Iraq as vital for keeping its economy afloat amidst sanctions. But Baghdad, a partner to both the United States and Iran, is wary of being caught in the crosshairs of Trump's policy to squeeze Tehran, the sources said. Trump wants Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to sever economic and military ties with Iran. Last week, Reuters reported that Iraq's central bank blocked five more private banks from dollar access at the request of the U.S. Treasury. Iraq's announcement on export resumption was hurried and lacked detail on how it would address technical issues that need to be resolved before flows can restart, four of the eight sources also. Iran wields considerable military, political and economic influence in Iraq through its powerful Shi'ite militias and the political parties it backs in Baghdad. But the increased U.S. pressure comes at a time when Iran has been weakened by Israel's attacks on its regional proxies. CURB SMUGGLING With the pipeline taking Kurdish crude to the Turkish port of Ceyhan closed since 2023, the smuggling of Kurdish oil to Iran by truck has flourished. The U.S. is urging Baghdad to curb this flow, six of the eight sources said. Reuters reported in July that an estimated 200,000 barrels per day of cut-price crude was being smuggled from Kurdistan to Iran and, to a lesser extent, Turkey by truck. The sources said the exports remained at around that level. "Washington is pressuring Baghdad to ensure Kurdish crude is exported to global markets through Turkey rather than being sold cheaply to Iran," said an Iraqi oil official with knowledge of the crude trucking shipments crossing to Iran. While the closure of the Turkish pipeline has prompted an uptick in Kurdish oil smuggling via Iran, a larger network that some experts believe generates at least $1 billion a year for Iran and its proxies has flourished in Iraq since al-Sudani took office in 2022, Reuters reported last year. Two U.S. administration officials confirmed the U.S. had asked the Iraqi government to resume Kurdish exports. One of them said the move would help to dampen upward pressure on oil prices. Asked about the administration's pressuring of Iraq to open up Kurdish oil exports, a White House official said: "It's not only important for regional security that our Kurdish partners be allowed to export their own oil but also help keep the price of gas low." There has been close military cooperation between authorities in Kurdistan and the United States in the fight against Islamic State. Trump's restoration of the "maximum pressure" campaign on Iran was one of his first acts after returning to office in late January. In addition to efforts to drive Iran's oil exports to zero, Trump ordered the U.S. treasury secretary to ensure that Iran can't use Iraq's financial system. Trump also came into office promising to lower energy costs for Americans. A sharp drop in oil exports from Iran could drive up oil prices, and with it the gasoline price worldwide. The resumption of Kurdish exports would help offset some of the loss to global supply of lower Iranian exports, but would cover only a fraction of the more than 2 million bpd of crude and fuel that Iran ships. However, Iran has proven adept in the past at finding means to circumvent U.S. sanctions on its oil sales. Ole Hansen, head of commodity strategy at Saxo Bank, said the restart of exports from Kurdistan could help increase global oil supplies at a time when output was disrupted from other regions, such as Kazakhstan, where exports have dropped this week following a Ukrainian drone attack on a major pipeline pumping station in southern Russia. "At this point in time, I believe the market has adopted a relatively neutral but nervous stance on crude oil prices," he said. HURDLES TO RESTART The pipeline was halted by Turkey in March 2023 after the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ordered Ankara to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion in damages for unauthorized exports between 2014 and 2018. There are still unresolved issues around payment, pricing and maintenance, the sources told Reuters. Two days of talks in the Kurdish city of Erbil this week failed to reach agreement, sources said. The federal government wanted exports to restart without making commitments to the KRG on payments and without clarity on the payment mechanism, a source familiar with the matter said. "We can't do that. We need clear visibility on guarantees," the source said. Oil companies working in Kurdistan also have questions over payments. Executives from Norwegian firm DNO (DNO.OL), opens new tab told analysts on Feb. 6 that before agreeing to ship oil through the pipeline to Ceyhan they wanted to understand how the company would be paid for future deliveries and how it would recoup $300 million for the oil it had delivered before the pipeline was shut. Turkey has yet to receive any information from Iraq on the resumption of flows, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar told Reuters on Wednesday. A restart could also cause issues in OPEC+, or the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries plus Russia and other allies, where Iraq has been under pressure to comply with its pledge to reduce its output. Additional supply from the Kurdish region could put Iraq over its OPEC+ supply target. An Iraqi official said it was possible for Iraq to restart the pipeline and remain compliant with OPEC+ supply policy. Giovanni Staunovo, a commodity analyst at investment bank UBS, said the overall impact of the resumption could be muted. "From an oil market perspective, Iraq is bound to the OPEC+ production deal, so I wouldn't expect additional production from Iraq in case of a pipeline restart, but just a change in the way it is exported (currently, among others, using trucks)," he said.

Iraq is trying to Import Gas from Turkmenistan: What will be the Role of Iran?

Vali Kaleji On 10 July 2023, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani convened an emergency meeting with energy officials to explore alternatives to Iranian gas, including supplies from Qatar and Turkmenistan. The meeting was held in response to the abrupt suspension of Iran’s gas exports to Iraq, which resulted in the reduction or shutdown of power plant operations in Al-Mansuriyah, Baghdad, Sadr, and some other regions of the country. Iraq’s electricity ministry declared that Iran’s restrictions on gas exports to its neighbor had caused the country to lose approximately five thousand megawatts (MW) of power. In order to attain stability in electricity supply, Iraq urgently needs 40,000-MW of power, of which 26,000 MW of electricity is generated from imported gas, primarily from Iran. Because of this, Al-Sudani directed the Iraqi government to come up with quick fixes and alternatives as well as to continue its initial efforts to import gas from Turkmenistan and Qatar. In this regard, Iraqi Parliamentary Committee on Electricity and Energy met the Minister of Electricity, Ziyad Ali, and his accompanying delegation on 15 July to look for alternative options for obtaining and purchasing gas, including gas supplies from Turkmenistan and Qatar. Regarding this, Iraqi Oil Minister Azzat Sabir announced on 24 August that “an initial agreement has been reached with Turkmenistan regarding the import of gas for the operation of their power plants. The agreement between the two countries was reached after negotiations in Ashgabat. Details will be reflected in the relevant agreement. The agreement, which will be signed closer to the end of the year, will determine the volumes of gas that Turkmenistan will supply to Iraq.” During this process, on 6 October, Turkmenistan’s Minister of State and Chairman of the State Concern “Turkmengaz” Maksat Babayev visited Baghdad. On the same day, Turkmenistan and Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the supply of natural gas to meet the needs of production stations and the electrical system. “The preliminary agreement is to import approximately 25 million cubic meters (883 million cubic feet) of gas per day” from Turkmenistan. In the continuation of this process, on November 8, 2023, a meeting between representatives of the State Concern “Türkmengaz” and the delegation of the Republic of Iraq led by the Minister of Electricity Ziad Ali Fadel took place in Ashgabat. According to the protocol that was signed in this meeting, 9 billion cubic meters of Turkmen natural gas will be transported annually through Iran to Iraq under the SWAP scheme during 5 years. However, this agreement, if implemented, will not completely solve the problem of Iraq and it can only help reduce the current problems of gas and electricity shortages in this country. The truth is that Iraq suffers from persistent power shortages despite its large oil and gas reserves. This is particularly noticeable in the summer, when temperatures rise above 50 degrees Celsius (122°F) and power consumption peaks. Although the current production volume of gas in southern Iraq is about 900 million cubic feet and 300 million cubic feet in northern Iraq, these amounts are insufficient to meet the demand, Iraq’s minister of electricity, Ziad Ali Fadel stressed. Indeed, on the one hand, the limitation of water resources — particularly in light of Turkey’s control of water flows from the upstream areas of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in recent years — has posed challenges in the development of dams and hydroelectric power plants for electricity generation in Iraq. On the other hand, Iraq’s thermal power plants, which use gas fuel, are heavily dependent on imported gas input from Iran. Despite the close political relations between Iran and Iraq, unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran and payment problems for imported gas by Iraq have caused several disruptions in Iran’s gas exports to the country in recent years, and the halt of gas in early July 2023 was the latest example of this. Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Sudani, in the emergency meeting, noted that “the U.S. sanctions and non-compliance with the gas dues payment mechanism agreed upon in 2018 caused a 50 percent reduction in gas supplies from Iran which negatively affected electricity production in Iraq”. Although in June, Iraqi officials received U.S. permission to pay about $2.76 billion to Iran after receiving clearance from U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and the Iraqi Minister of Electricity also announced that all of Iran’s gas payments have been deposited into the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI), it appears that the problem of receiving payments for Iran’s gas exports to Iraq, especially blocking Iranian gas money in the TBI, has not been fully resolved yet. To overcome these challenges, the Iraqi government is pursuing two options simultaneously in the domestic and international arenas. In the domestic area, Iraq is planning to build combined cycle power plants totaling 4,000 MW in the next two years, which use both a gas and a steam turbine together to produce electricity. This will be only a small portion of the 26,000 MW of electricity generated from imported Iranian gas. However, in the international arena, as was previously mentioned, Baghdad is looking for new sources of gas imports to reduce the negative impact of Iran’s sanctions and banking issues on the sustainable supply of Iraq’s electricity network. In this regard, Turkmenistan and Qatar are the two main options for the Iraqi government. However, with respect to Turkmenistan’s role — the primary focus of this article — it has the fourth-largest proven gas reserves in the world, after Qatar, Iran, and Russia, with around 50 trillion cubic meters (tcm). Indeed, Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality policy in foreign policy also enables the country to cooperate with various parties, including China, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Europe, in the field of energy. However, given the geographical distance between the two countries, the question is how to supply a portion of Iraq’s imported gas. The first and most likely option is the transit or swap of Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq via Iran. In transit, although it can be done utilizing the existing Iran-Turkmenistan-Turkey gas pipeline to transfer gas to northern Iraq and through the Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline to transfer gas to the eastern and central parts of Iraq, this is very difficult in practice. In this regard, Gholam Hossein Hasantash, a faculty member of the Institute for International Energy Studies (IIES) Tehran, in an interview with the author, said it is currently not possible to transport gas from Turkmenistan to Iraq through Iran unless a separate pipeline is built with the financial support of both Iraq and Turkmenistan, as well as Iran’s approval. However, due to the high level of investment required for such a pipeline, which would be more than 1000 kilometers long and pass through mountainous areas, it seems very difficult to conclude such a tripartite agreement. Another option will be the swap of Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq via Iran. Recent agreements between Turkmenistan and Iraq show that both sides have chosen this option. Before this, Iran has taken steps in the field of gas swap with Turkmenistan. In this regard, a trilateral gas cooperation between Turkmenistan, Iran, and Iraq may be formed as a result of the resolution of long-standing gas disputes between Iran and Turkmenistan and the trilateral gas swap agreement signed on November 27, 2021, by Turkmenistan, Iran, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Indeed, Iran repaid $1.6 billion in gas debts to Turkmenistan using its deposits withheld in Iraqi banks. This can facilitate the transfer of Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq via Iran, which can help Iraq reduce its dependence on Iranian gas imports and ensure a more sustainable supply of gas for its electricity network. It is important to remember that most of Iran’s oil and gas fields, including the “South Pars Gas Field,” are located in the country’s south and southwest. Although Iran has a wide network of gas transmission lines, during the winter season, the country’s northeastern and northern provinces, including Razavi Khorasan, North Khorasan, Mazandaran, and Golestan, with their high gas consumption, cause a sharp drop in gas pressure in pipelines and distribution stations. To overcome this challenge, Iran has pursued a trilateral gas swap agreement with Turkmenistan and the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as a bilateral gas import agreement with Turkmenistan to import 10 million cubic meters of gas per day. Therefore, the formation of a trilateral gas swap agreement between Turkmenistan, Iran, and Iraq is possible and can lead to more stable and sustainable supply of gas for Iran’s domestic needs, especially during the winter months. Gholam Hossein Hasantash in the interview with the author said that “logistically, swapping is completely possible. If the potential of such a swap exists, transit has no economic logic at all.” The important point is that 83 percent of Iran’s power plants use gas sources and less than 20 percent of them use other sources, including water. Consequently, during the winter months, when gas consumption peaks and pressure drops, not only households face problems, but also power plants face a serious challenge. In fact, the problem that Iraq is facing in the summer, Iran will deal with in the winter. As a result, trilateral gas cooperation between Iran, Iraq, and Turkmenistan can help address the issue of supplying sufficient gas to Iran’s power plants during the winter and high gas consumption during that time, while also providing assistance to Iraq’s power plants during the summer. Additionally, from a financial and banking perspective, the Iraqi government will be a party to Turkmenistan, and the level of sanctions and banking restrictions imposed by the U.S. on Iraq will also be reduced. The second option for exporting Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq is Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), which can be transferred by tankers. The volume of gas transportation via tankers is much lower compared to pipelines, and LNG is usually twice as expensive as piped gas. Hasantash said that “at present, Turkmenistan is not among the countries that produce and export LNG and lacks liquefaction facilities. Moreover, because it does not have access to open waters, it cannot potentially be a major exporter of LNG. It does not have any LNG receiving terminals”. However, the main advantages of LNG will be Turkmenistan’s direct gas exports to power plants in different parts of Iraq and meeting some of the country’s gas needs, particularly during pressure drops in the Turkmenistan and Iranian gas transmission lines. Although Turkmenistan’s production and export capacity for LNG cannot be compared to a country like Qatar, Turkmenistan has taken steps in recent years to develop its LNG industry, and in May 2023, the country started exporting LNG to Pakistan through Afghanistan’s Kandahar for the first time, which included 50 gas tankers, each carrying 30 tons of gas. Overall, it seems that in both forms of gas exports or swaps from Turkmenistan to Iraq through pipelines or LNG exports, Iran will play the most important intermediary role between Ashgabat and Baghdad. While it appears that the Iraqi government is considering a mixed approach to importing gas from Turkmenistan through both pipelines and LNG exports, the reality is that the main form of gas imports from Turkmenistan to Iraq will be through pipelines, whereas LNG will be the main mode of gas imports from Qatar.