Groups urge US to protect press freedom and keep journalists safe after order to gut
Draw Media We, the undersigned, reaffirm our support for press freedom and a free media that is able to operate without coercion by, or interference from, government – and call on the United States to protect all reporters and media workers employed by the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), many of whom face significant personal risk in reporting on and from highly repressive regimes. For more than 80 years, USAGM entities, which include Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), have played a vital role in reaching audiences living under authoritarian governments, empowering free expression in some of the world’s most dangerous reporting environments. Eliminating these organizations is a significant blow to press freedom - and a gift to autocrats worldwide. Journalists for VOA, RFE/RL, and other affiliates are frequently targeted by authorities in highly censored or dangerous countries. A March 14 executive order issued by President Donald J. Trump called for USAGM to be “eliminated to the maximum extent consistent with applicable law” as part of ongoing efforts to reduce “the elements of the Federal bureaucracy that the President has determined are unnecessary.” USAGM is a U.S. federal agency whose mandate is drawn from several laws. It oversees broadcast entities including VOA, RFE/RL, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Radio Free Asia, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks. Under U.S. law, the editorial operations of USAGM entities are separate from the government to protect editorial independence. It is vital that Congress protect USAGM, ensure the safety of its affiliate journalists, and reaffirm the U.S. government’s commitment to a free and independent media at home and abroad. Signed by– • Committee to Protect Journalists • Association for International Broadcasting • Reporters Without Borders (RSF) • Public Media Alliance • The Press Freedom Center at the National Press Club • Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism • The Bureau of Investigative Journalism • International Press Institute • Forbidden Stories • Radio Television Digital News Association • PEN America • The European Federation of Journalists • Nieman Foundation for Journalism • Pulitzer Center • World Association of News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) • National Press Photographers Association • Society of Professional Journalists • Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press • Freedom of the Press Foundation • Association of Foreign Press Correspondents • Center for Democracy & Technology • Index on Censorship • Free Press • Global Investigative Journalism Network • Global Reporting Centre • International Women’s Media Foundation • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) • The Asian American Journalists Association
Read moreUS calls on Iraq to resume northern oil exports through Turkey’s Ceyhan
In order to resume oil exports via the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline as soon as possible, the United States encouraged the Iraqi government to come to an agreement with the foreign oil corporations that operate in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The spokesperson of the US State Department, Tammy Bruce, told reporters during a press briefing on Wednesday that the US administration is urging the Iraqi government to reach an agreement with the international oil companies to resume oil exports through the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline as soon as possible. Bruce also urged the Iraqi government to honor the existing contracts with US companies as part of the issue. “Reopening the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline ensures Iraqi oil can reach global markets, especially European markets. Iraq benefits from the stability of resilient supply chains, as we all do,” Bruce added. Due to financial and legal concerns, crude oil shipments through the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline, which formerly handled around 0.5 percent of the world’s oil supply, have ceased since March 2023. After the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris ruled that Ankara had violated a 1973 treaty by permitting oil exports without the approval of the federal government in Baghdad, oil flows via the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline were stopped. The ruling obligated Turkey to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion in compensation for losses caused by the KRG’s illegal oil exports between 2014 and 2018. Earlier in March, negotiations held to restart Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil flows through the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline have failed for the second time in a week due to differences between oil firms and the Iraqi Oil Ministry, according to Reuters. In February, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Fuad Hussein, revealed that Baghdad is collaborating with the KRG to resolve technical issues and resume crude oil exports to Turkey, which had been suspended for almost two years and cost Iraq around $19 billion in lost revenue. The legislative structure is in place, but before oil flows can restart, oil firms, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the federal government need to resolve technical issues, Hussein told Bloomberg.
Read moreAirstrikes or Starvation Death: The Fate of Gaza Residents After October 7th
Draw Media "If people don't die from airstrikes, they will die from hunger." With these words, Hind Khudari, a worker with the World Food Programme (WFP) in Gaza, conveyed the immense suffering of the residents, as reported by the WFP. According to the global program, Hind has dedicated her life to sharing the stories of the people of Gaza, the city where she was born and raised, shedding light on the struggles of the besieged enclave and the daily battle for survival. For weeks, Hind has been narrating the harsh living conditions in Gaza, her personal experience of displacement, losing her home, enduring days without food, and wavering between despair and hope. She recounts how she and other residents were forced to flee their homes to areas in Gaza that were claimed to be safe. "The truth is, there is no safe place in Gaza. People are fleeing from one death to another." She adds, "One day, we were sharing a single bottle of juice that a friend had found. As we passed it among ourselves, a massive explosion suddenly erupted near where we were staying. We ran toward each other in fear of another blast. That was our last bottle of juice, and I didn’t even get a sip." During a temporary truce, Hind went to the Deir al-Balah market in search of food but found almost nothing. "All we could find were tomatoes, cucumbers, onions, eggplants, and oranges. We couldn't even find clothes or blankets for the winter." What Hind has endured is the reality for 1.8 million people—trapped between the rubble, facing the threat of death either by airstrikes or starvation. A Humanitarian Catastrophe: Egypt Intervenes Amid scenes of devastation, airstrikes, displacement, killings, and starvation in Gaza, Egypt has stepped up to alleviate the suffering of the enclave's residents, providing various forms of support and assistance since the events of October 7, 2023. Among its efforts, Cairo has intensified its diplomatic pressure on Israel to allow the entry of urgent humanitarian and food aid for displaced civilians. In January, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, Dr. Badr Abdel Aty, stated that Cairo aimed to facilitate the entry of 1,000 aid trucks daily into Gaza to meet the escalating needs of the population amid the dire conditions. He also noted that between 600 and 700 food aid trucks were ready to cross the Rafah border crossing to deliver relief to the Palestinian people in Gaza. In February, Egypt announced that the number of tents delivered to Gaza through Egyptian crossings since the start of the truce had surpassed 20,000 tents. Additionally, Egypt reported that 680 wounded and ill individuals, along with 1,850 accompanying relatives, had entered Egypt through the Rafah crossing since the beginning of the truce. Gaza residents relief Following the humanitarian catastrophe that struck Gaza after October 7, several Arab countries have taken the lead in relief efforts, supporting the Palestinian people and working toward ending the war. The United Arab Emirates has been at the forefront, launching various initiatives, including the "Birds of Goodness" campaign, which coordinated 104 airdrop missions delivering humanitarian aid to areas inaccessible by land. This initiative was carried out in collaboration with Egypt and Jordan, significantly aiding the besieged population, especially in northern Gaza. Additionally, the UAE launched Operation Gallant Knight, which provides food aid and medical care, including the deployment of a floating hospital to deliver urgent healthcare services. This initiative is aimed at assisting all affected groups in Gaza, with a particular focus on women and children. In January, 150 aid convoys entered Gaza through Egyptian border crossings as part of Operation Gallant Knight 3, carrying 2,319 trucks loaded with over 29,000 tons of food and humanitarian supplies. Arab nations continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza, with Iraq playing a crucial role in these efforts. Baghdad sent a fuel tanker to Egypt to help alleviate the severe fuel shortage in Gaza, which has significantly hindered relief efforts and exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. The Iraqi tanker, carrying 10 million liters of fuel, sailed through the Suez Canal as an aid shipment for the Palestinians in Gaza, while the Iraqi government affirmed its commitment to sending more humanitarian shipments in the future. Meanwhile, Egypt remains pivotal in facilitating aid entry through the Rafah border crossing, the lifeline for Gaza’s residents. The crossing has seen an increased flow of aid trucks and essential goods, reflecting Egypt’s ongoing commitment to organizing and securing transport operations to meet the Palestinian people's urgent needs. These Arab-led humanitarian efforts have had a profound impact, reinforcing the resilience of Palestinians alongside diplomatic efforts to end the war and destruction. Led by the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other nations, these initiatives stand in stark contrast to the rhetoric of death and destruction that has caused yet another catastrophe for the Palestinian people—one that now threatens their future and their cause more than ever before.
Read moreOcalan's call: uncertainty surrounds next steps, different scenarios
Shafaq News/ Following the historic call by Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan for his group to lay down arms, ending a more than 40-year conflict with Turkiye, attention is now focused on how this call will be implemented. Multiple scenarios are being considered, ranging from full or partial implementation to a hybrid approach varying by region. Öcalan’s Historic Message & Reactions On February 27, 2025, Abdullah Öcalan issued his historic call from his prison on Imrali Island, urging the PKK to disarm and dissolve. The message was read in Istanbul by a delegation from the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP), which visited Öcalan earlier that day. In his message, Öcalan took "historical responsibility" for the call, stressing the need to transition the struggle from armed conflict to the political arena. The call has been welcomed internationally, with the White House calling it a "major development" that could promote peace in the troubled region. It also expressed hope that it would help ease tensions between Turkiye and its allies in the fight against ISIS in northeastern Syria. Internally, Turkiye’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) expects the PKK to comply with Öcalan’s call, believing it would help liberate Turkiye from the constraints of the conflict. In Iraq's Kurdistan Region, President Nechirvan Barzani welcomed the call, urging PKK members to adhere to it and stressing that it was time for a "peaceful and democratic struggle." Prime Minister Masrour Barzani also expressed support for Turkiye’s peace efforts, and Bafel Talabani, President of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), called on all parties to commit to Öcalan’s call, describing it as the start of a "significant phase" towards peace and brotherly coexistence between Kurds and Turks. On the other hand, SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said Öcalan’s announcement is unrelated to Syria and pertains solely to the PKK. Abdi described the announcement as a “positive step” since it advocates for ending the war and initiating a peaceful political process in Turkiye. He added, “If peace is achieved in Turkiye, there will be no justification for continued attacks on us in Syria.” Öcalan’s Call Sparks Optimism Hours after its leader’s call, the PKK agreed to declare a ceasefire. "These are clear signs pointing towards the resolution of a long-standing issue, which will undoubtedly improve relations between Iraq and Turkiye," says political analyst Yasin Aziz in an interview with Shafaq News. Aziz anticipates that the positive developments following Öcalan’s call could span political, diplomatic, security, and economic realms. He believes that if the PKK issue is resolved, it will end a period of security tensions and military escalation in several areas of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which have strained Baghdad-Ankara relations. Among the potential positive outcomes, Aziz points to the return of displaced villagers to their homes in Kurdistan, which were abandoned due to military operations and fighting between PKK fighters and Turkish forces, warning that "The PKK's presence has been used by Turkiye to justify establishing numerous military bases and breaching international borders for years.” The Positive Scenario Abdul Salam Broari, a former Kurdistan Parliament member, agrees with Aziz’s view of the “positive developments” that could arise from Öcalan’s call, calling it the “positive scenario” for the future. In an interview with Shafaq News, Broari describes Öcalan’s call as “positive in itself,” noting that it was received positively by Turkiye, the PKK leadership, and internationally. However, he stressed that the success of this scenario depends on turning Öcalan’s call into a practical reality. Broari explains that positive effects for Kurdistan would be seen if all PKK-affiliated groups complied with Öcalan’s directive to disarm and dissolve. He also called for Turkiye to take positive steps, such as a program to reintegrate PKK members and address detained leaders and cadres. He believes the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Kurdistan since their presence is based on the PKK's existence, would contribute to regional stability, facilitate reconstruction in areas the PKK has occupied since 1992, and “end threats from both Turkiye and Iran.” The Worst-Case Scenario However, Broari also warns of a potential opposite scenario. This would involve Turkiye and the PKK reaching an agreement in which the PKK dissolves within Turkiye and abandons armed struggle, but its armed groups remain outside, notably through the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria and other units in Sinjar and along the Iraq -Turkiye border. "These groups could argue that they are not the PKK, but have different names—such as the Yazidi Protection Units in Sinjar, or the Freedom Party in Al-Sulaymaniyah and Kalar," he explains. Broari also expresses concern that these groups' continued presence in Iraq could justify Turkiye’s ongoing presence and attacks in the region, preventing any change in the relationship between Turkiye and Iraq on this issue. He notes the role of Iran, given these groups’ good relations with Tehran or its sympathizers. “The worst-case scenario is more likely soon,” he concludes. Turkiye’s Warning and Mixed Reactions Despite the PKK’s declaration of a ceasefire, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has warned that Turkiye will resume operations against the PKK if disarmament is not fully implemented or promises are not kept. This warning came on the same day the PKK announced its ceasefire in response to Öcalan’s call, with the PKK's executive committee stating that "disarmament can only be achieved through the operational leadership of Leader Apo." Security expert Sarmad Al-Bayati echoes similar concerns, noting that Öcalan’s call is not the first, with previous calls—most recently in 2013—remaining unimplemented. Al-Bayati warns that if the PKK agrees to disarm, the issue of Turkish forces staying in Kurdistan will remain unresolved. "If the PKK refuses to surrender its weapons, this could lead to a large-scale Turkish military operation, and Ankara may request Baghdad's help," he added. Al-Bayati also points out that the SDF and some factions in Syria have dismissed Öcalan’s call, claiming “It does not concern them.” He suggested that the call could affect the relationship between Iraq and Turkiye, especially as these groups remain active in Iraq.
Read more"UK expands campaign to stop migrant smugglers and their lies"
Digital advertising launched today in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) as part of the government’s international campaign to warn prospective migrants about people smugglers’ lies, expanding on the campaigns in Vietnam and Albania. Quotes from real migrants who have attempted the journey are featured, to counter the myths and misinformation peddled by criminals to dupe people online, as the UK government secures its borders as part of the Plan for Change. The campaign forms part of this government’s work to expand the UK’s international partnerships and boost cooperation, to dismantle the people smuggling gangs operating across borders and protect vulnerable people, delivered through the Border Security Command. It comes as the UK is set to sign a joint communiqué today (4 March 2025) with the Vietnamese government at the third annual UK-Vietnam Migration Dialogue, hosted in Hanoi, agreeing to build on our joint work to prevent the exploitation of irregular migrants, disrupt criminal gang operations, strengthen intelligence sharing and return those with no right to be in the UK. The communiqué includes commitments to enable swifter and more effective returns, and for the UK government to continue its communications campaign in Vietnam to tackle migrant smugglers’ lies. Minister for Border Security and Asylum, Dame Angela Eagle, said: Ruthless criminal gangs spread dangerous lies on social media to exploit people for money, and we are exposing them using the real stories of their victims. This campaign helps to break the business model of these criminals and protect people from falling victim, securing our borders as part of the government’s Plan for Change. No one should be in any doubt that putting your life in the hands of a smuggler is not worth the risk. Too many people have died in the English Channel at the hands of these criminals, and we will stop at nothing to bring them to justice. The UK’s Border Security Commander, Martin Hewitt, also visited Iraq and the KRI last week, to progress the world-first agreements reached between the Federal Government of Iraq and the UK Government in November and further progress our cooperation on strengthening mutual border security. He met with senior officials in the Federal Government of Iraq and within the Kurdistan Regional Government and its agencies to discuss ongoing cooperation, including increased joint working to tackle organised immigration crime and strengthen our mutual border security co-operation. Through the Border Security Command, the UK government is working on a whole system approach, preventing irregular migration through communications, increasing international collaboration to tackle this issue across borders, and arming law enforcement with the powers it needs. Bold new counterterror-style powers in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill, which is back in Parliament today for committee stage, will help bolster law enforcement to intercept and smash the people smuggling gangs earlier and faster. This includes stronger powers to seize and search mobile phones to investigate organised immigration crime and new offences against gangs conspiring to plan crossings, selling or handling small boat parts for use in the Channel, or supplying forged identity documents for migrants attempting to come here illegally. Border Security Commander Martin Hewitt, said: International partnerships are an essential part of our work to stop criminal gangs operating across borders to exploit vulnerable people. By strengthening these relationships and working closely with law enforcement partners across the world, we will bring down these gangs, break their business models, and put a stop to the misery and harm they inflict. Communications are an important part of this work, and our international campaign is sending a clear message to prospective migrants that these criminals cannot be trusted. The Home Office has today published a short film explaining the Border Security Command’s mission, its work to date, and its future plans. The video features the Border Security Commander, Martin Hewitt, and key staff setting out the challenge the UK faces from criminal gangs determined to abuse our borders and exploit people for profit, and how the Border Security Command will defeat them and bring them to justice. The UK’s international communications campaign will also ramp up this year to inform prospective migrants at every stage of the journey about the risks and realities of entering the UK illegally, including informing diaspora communities in the UK about the dangers their friends and families overseas face from people smugglers. Source: GOV.UK
Read moreKurds begin supplying oil to Damascus
Kurdish-led authorities in northeast Syria have begun providing oil from local fields they manage to the central government in Damascus, Syrian oil ministry spokesman Ahmed Suleiman told Reuters on Saturday. It was the first public acknowledgement of internal oil deliveries from Syria's oil-rich northeast to the Islamist-run government installed after former leader Bashar al-Assad was toppled by rebels in December. Suleiman said the oil was from fields in the provinces of Hasakeh and Deir el-Zor and that the deliveries took place based on an amended version of a previous arrangement between the Assad government and Kurdish authorities. He said Syria's new leaders had changed articles in that deal that had "served the interests of people linked to the Assad regime". A source from northeast Syria's semi-autonomous administration told Reuters that the deal involved sending 5,000 barrels a day of crude from the Rmeilan field in Hasakeh and other fields in Deir el-Zor province to a refinery in Homs. Syria exported 380,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) in 2010, a year before protests against Assad's rule spiralled into a nearly 14-year war that devastated the country's economy and infrastructure - including its oil. Oilfields changed hands multiple times, with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces ultimately capturing the key northeast fields, although U.S. and European sanctions made both legitimate exports and imports difficult. The United States issued a six-month sanctions exemption in January allowing some energy transactions and the European Union is set to suspend its sanctions related to energy, transport and reconstruction. Tal Shoham and Avera Mengistu were released first, in southern Gaza's Rafah. In the interim, Syria is seeking to import oil via local intermediaries after its first post-Assad import tenders garnered little interest from major traders due to sanctions and financial risks, several trade sources told Reuters. The internal oil trade is also a key part of talks between the northeast region and the new authorities in Damascus, which want to bring all regions in Syria under centralised control. Sources said the SDF would likely need to relinquish control of oil revenues as part of any settlement. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said last month that his force was open to handing over responsibility for oil resources to the new administration, provided the wealth was distributed fairly to all provinces.
Read moreUS piles pressure on Iraq to resume Kurdish oil exports, sources say
By REUTERS U.S. President Donald Trump's administration is piling pressure on Iraq to allow Kurdish oil exports to restart or face sanctions alongside Iran, eight sources with direct knowledge of the matter told Reuters. A speedy resumption of exports from Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region would help to offset a potential fall in Iranian oil exports, which Washington has pledged to cut to zero as part of Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign against Tehran. The U.S. government has said it wants to isolate Iran from the global economy and eliminate its oil export revenues in order to slow Iran's development of a nuclear weapon. Iraq's oil minister made a surprise announcement on Monday that exports from Kurdistan would resume next week. That would mark the end of a near two-year dispute that has cut flows of more than 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Kurdish oil via Turkey to global markets. Reuters spoke to eight sources in Baghdad, Washington and Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, who said that mounting pressure from the new U.S. administration was a key driver behind Monday's announcement. All of the sources declined to be named due to the sensitivity of the issue. Iran views its neighbor and ally Iraq as vital for keeping its economy afloat amidst sanctions. But Baghdad, a partner to both the United States and Iran, is wary of being caught in the crosshairs of Trump's policy to squeeze Tehran, the sources said. Trump wants Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to sever economic and military ties with Iran. Last week, Reuters reported that Iraq's central bank blocked five more private banks from dollar access at the request of the U.S. Treasury. Iraq's announcement on export resumption was hurried and lacked detail on how it would address technical issues that need to be resolved before flows can restart, four of the eight sources also. Iran wields considerable military, political and economic influence in Iraq through its powerful Shi'ite militias and the political parties it backs in Baghdad. But the increased U.S. pressure comes at a time when Iran has been weakened by Israel's attacks on its regional proxies. CURB SMUGGLING With the pipeline taking Kurdish crude to the Turkish port of Ceyhan closed since 2023, the smuggling of Kurdish oil to Iran by truck has flourished. The U.S. is urging Baghdad to curb this flow, six of the eight sources said. Reuters reported in July that an estimated 200,000 barrels per day of cut-price crude was being smuggled from Kurdistan to Iran and, to a lesser extent, Turkey by truck. The sources said the exports remained at around that level. "Washington is pressuring Baghdad to ensure Kurdish crude is exported to global markets through Turkey rather than being sold cheaply to Iran," said an Iraqi oil official with knowledge of the crude trucking shipments crossing to Iran. While the closure of the Turkish pipeline has prompted an uptick in Kurdish oil smuggling via Iran, a larger network that some experts believe generates at least $1 billion a year for Iran and its proxies has flourished in Iraq since al-Sudani took office in 2022, Reuters reported last year. Two U.S. administration officials confirmed the U.S. had asked the Iraqi government to resume Kurdish exports. One of them said the move would help to dampen upward pressure on oil prices. Asked about the administration's pressuring of Iraq to open up Kurdish oil exports, a White House official said: "It's not only important for regional security that our Kurdish partners be allowed to export their own oil but also help keep the price of gas low." There has been close military cooperation between authorities in Kurdistan and the United States in the fight against Islamic State. Trump's restoration of the "maximum pressure" campaign on Iran was one of his first acts after returning to office in late January. In addition to efforts to drive Iran's oil exports to zero, Trump ordered the U.S. treasury secretary to ensure that Iran can't use Iraq's financial system. Trump also came into office promising to lower energy costs for Americans. A sharp drop in oil exports from Iran could drive up oil prices, and with it the gasoline price worldwide. The resumption of Kurdish exports would help offset some of the loss to global supply of lower Iranian exports, but would cover only a fraction of the more than 2 million bpd of crude and fuel that Iran ships. However, Iran has proven adept in the past at finding means to circumvent U.S. sanctions on its oil sales. Ole Hansen, head of commodity strategy at Saxo Bank, said the restart of exports from Kurdistan could help increase global oil supplies at a time when output was disrupted from other regions, such as Kazakhstan, where exports have dropped this week following a Ukrainian drone attack on a major pipeline pumping station in southern Russia. "At this point in time, I believe the market has adopted a relatively neutral but nervous stance on crude oil prices," he said. HURDLES TO RESTART The pipeline was halted by Turkey in March 2023 after the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ordered Ankara to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion in damages for unauthorized exports between 2014 and 2018. There are still unresolved issues around payment, pricing and maintenance, the sources told Reuters. Two days of talks in the Kurdish city of Erbil this week failed to reach agreement, sources said. The federal government wanted exports to restart without making commitments to the KRG on payments and without clarity on the payment mechanism, a source familiar with the matter said. "We can't do that. We need clear visibility on guarantees," the source said. Oil companies working in Kurdistan also have questions over payments. Executives from Norwegian firm DNO (DNO.OL), opens new tab told analysts on Feb. 6 that before agreeing to ship oil through the pipeline to Ceyhan they wanted to understand how the company would be paid for future deliveries and how it would recoup $300 million for the oil it had delivered before the pipeline was shut. Turkey has yet to receive any information from Iraq on the resumption of flows, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar told Reuters on Wednesday. A restart could also cause issues in OPEC+, or the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries plus Russia and other allies, where Iraq has been under pressure to comply with its pledge to reduce its output. Additional supply from the Kurdish region could put Iraq over its OPEC+ supply target. An Iraqi official said it was possible for Iraq to restart the pipeline and remain compliant with OPEC+ supply policy. Giovanni Staunovo, a commodity analyst at investment bank UBS, said the overall impact of the resumption could be muted. "From an oil market perspective, Iraq is bound to the OPEC+ production deal, so I wouldn't expect additional production from Iraq in case of a pipeline restart, but just a change in the way it is exported (currently, among others, using trucks)," he said.
Read moreIraq is trying to Import Gas from Turkmenistan: What will be the Role of Iran?
Vali Kaleji On 10 July 2023, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani convened an emergency meeting with energy officials to explore alternatives to Iranian gas, including supplies from Qatar and Turkmenistan. The meeting was held in response to the abrupt suspension of Iran’s gas exports to Iraq, which resulted in the reduction or shutdown of power plant operations in Al-Mansuriyah, Baghdad, Sadr, and some other regions of the country. Iraq’s electricity ministry declared that Iran’s restrictions on gas exports to its neighbor had caused the country to lose approximately five thousand megawatts (MW) of power. In order to attain stability in electricity supply, Iraq urgently needs 40,000-MW of power, of which 26,000 MW of electricity is generated from imported gas, primarily from Iran. Because of this, Al-Sudani directed the Iraqi government to come up with quick fixes and alternatives as well as to continue its initial efforts to import gas from Turkmenistan and Qatar. In this regard, Iraqi Parliamentary Committee on Electricity and Energy met the Minister of Electricity, Ziyad Ali, and his accompanying delegation on 15 July to look for alternative options for obtaining and purchasing gas, including gas supplies from Turkmenistan and Qatar. Regarding this, Iraqi Oil Minister Azzat Sabir announced on 24 August that “an initial agreement has been reached with Turkmenistan regarding the import of gas for the operation of their power plants. The agreement between the two countries was reached after negotiations in Ashgabat. Details will be reflected in the relevant agreement. The agreement, which will be signed closer to the end of the year, will determine the volumes of gas that Turkmenistan will supply to Iraq.” During this process, on 6 October, Turkmenistan’s Minister of State and Chairman of the State Concern “Turkmengaz” Maksat Babayev visited Baghdad. On the same day, Turkmenistan and Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the supply of natural gas to meet the needs of production stations and the electrical system. “The preliminary agreement is to import approximately 25 million cubic meters (883 million cubic feet) of gas per day” from Turkmenistan. In the continuation of this process, on November 8, 2023, a meeting between representatives of the State Concern “Türkmengaz” and the delegation of the Republic of Iraq led by the Minister of Electricity Ziad Ali Fadel took place in Ashgabat. According to the protocol that was signed in this meeting, 9 billion cubic meters of Turkmen natural gas will be transported annually through Iran to Iraq under the SWAP scheme during 5 years. However, this agreement, if implemented, will not completely solve the problem of Iraq and it can only help reduce the current problems of gas and electricity shortages in this country. The truth is that Iraq suffers from persistent power shortages despite its large oil and gas reserves. This is particularly noticeable in the summer, when temperatures rise above 50 degrees Celsius (122°F) and power consumption peaks. Although the current production volume of gas in southern Iraq is about 900 million cubic feet and 300 million cubic feet in northern Iraq, these amounts are insufficient to meet the demand, Iraq’s minister of electricity, Ziad Ali Fadel stressed. Indeed, on the one hand, the limitation of water resources — particularly in light of Turkey’s control of water flows from the upstream areas of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in recent years — has posed challenges in the development of dams and hydroelectric power plants for electricity generation in Iraq. On the other hand, Iraq’s thermal power plants, which use gas fuel, are heavily dependent on imported gas input from Iran. Despite the close political relations between Iran and Iraq, unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran and payment problems for imported gas by Iraq have caused several disruptions in Iran’s gas exports to the country in recent years, and the halt of gas in early July 2023 was the latest example of this. Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Sudani, in the emergency meeting, noted that “the U.S. sanctions and non-compliance with the gas dues payment mechanism agreed upon in 2018 caused a 50 percent reduction in gas supplies from Iran which negatively affected electricity production in Iraq”. Although in June, Iraqi officials received U.S. permission to pay about $2.76 billion to Iran after receiving clearance from U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and the Iraqi Minister of Electricity also announced that all of Iran’s gas payments have been deposited into the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI), it appears that the problem of receiving payments for Iran’s gas exports to Iraq, especially blocking Iranian gas money in the TBI, has not been fully resolved yet. To overcome these challenges, the Iraqi government is pursuing two options simultaneously in the domestic and international arenas. In the domestic area, Iraq is planning to build combined cycle power plants totaling 4,000 MW in the next two years, which use both a gas and a steam turbine together to produce electricity. This will be only a small portion of the 26,000 MW of electricity generated from imported Iranian gas. However, in the international arena, as was previously mentioned, Baghdad is looking for new sources of gas imports to reduce the negative impact of Iran’s sanctions and banking issues on the sustainable supply of Iraq’s electricity network. In this regard, Turkmenistan and Qatar are the two main options for the Iraqi government. However, with respect to Turkmenistan’s role — the primary focus of this article — it has the fourth-largest proven gas reserves in the world, after Qatar, Iran, and Russia, with around 50 trillion cubic meters (tcm). Indeed, Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality policy in foreign policy also enables the country to cooperate with various parties, including China, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Europe, in the field of energy. However, given the geographical distance between the two countries, the question is how to supply a portion of Iraq’s imported gas. The first and most likely option is the transit or swap of Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq via Iran. In transit, although it can be done utilizing the existing Iran-Turkmenistan-Turkey gas pipeline to transfer gas to northern Iraq and through the Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline to transfer gas to the eastern and central parts of Iraq, this is very difficult in practice. In this regard, Gholam Hossein Hasantash, a faculty member of the Institute for International Energy Studies (IIES) Tehran, in an interview with the author, said it is currently not possible to transport gas from Turkmenistan to Iraq through Iran unless a separate pipeline is built with the financial support of both Iraq and Turkmenistan, as well as Iran’s approval. However, due to the high level of investment required for such a pipeline, which would be more than 1000 kilometers long and pass through mountainous areas, it seems very difficult to conclude such a tripartite agreement. Another option will be the swap of Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq via Iran. Recent agreements between Turkmenistan and Iraq show that both sides have chosen this option. Before this, Iran has taken steps in the field of gas swap with Turkmenistan. In this regard, a trilateral gas cooperation between Turkmenistan, Iran, and Iraq may be formed as a result of the resolution of long-standing gas disputes between Iran and Turkmenistan and the trilateral gas swap agreement signed on November 27, 2021, by Turkmenistan, Iran, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Indeed, Iran repaid $1.6 billion in gas debts to Turkmenistan using its deposits withheld in Iraqi banks. This can facilitate the transfer of Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq via Iran, which can help Iraq reduce its dependence on Iranian gas imports and ensure a more sustainable supply of gas for its electricity network. It is important to remember that most of Iran’s oil and gas fields, including the “South Pars Gas Field,” are located in the country’s south and southwest. Although Iran has a wide network of gas transmission lines, during the winter season, the country’s northeastern and northern provinces, including Razavi Khorasan, North Khorasan, Mazandaran, and Golestan, with their high gas consumption, cause a sharp drop in gas pressure in pipelines and distribution stations. To overcome this challenge, Iran has pursued a trilateral gas swap agreement with Turkmenistan and the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as a bilateral gas import agreement with Turkmenistan to import 10 million cubic meters of gas per day. Therefore, the formation of a trilateral gas swap agreement between Turkmenistan, Iran, and Iraq is possible and can lead to more stable and sustainable supply of gas for Iran’s domestic needs, especially during the winter months. Gholam Hossein Hasantash in the interview with the author said that “logistically, swapping is completely possible. If the potential of such a swap exists, transit has no economic logic at all.” The important point is that 83 percent of Iran’s power plants use gas sources and less than 20 percent of them use other sources, including water. Consequently, during the winter months, when gas consumption peaks and pressure drops, not only households face problems, but also power plants face a serious challenge. In fact, the problem that Iraq is facing in the summer, Iran will deal with in the winter. As a result, trilateral gas cooperation between Iran, Iraq, and Turkmenistan can help address the issue of supplying sufficient gas to Iran’s power plants during the winter and high gas consumption during that time, while also providing assistance to Iraq’s power plants during the summer. Additionally, from a financial and banking perspective, the Iraqi government will be a party to Turkmenistan, and the level of sanctions and banking restrictions imposed by the U.S. on Iraq will also be reduced. The second option for exporting Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq is Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), which can be transferred by tankers. The volume of gas transportation via tankers is much lower compared to pipelines, and LNG is usually twice as expensive as piped gas. Hasantash said that “at present, Turkmenistan is not among the countries that produce and export LNG and lacks liquefaction facilities. Moreover, because it does not have access to open waters, it cannot potentially be a major exporter of LNG. It does not have any LNG receiving terminals”. However, the main advantages of LNG will be Turkmenistan’s direct gas exports to power plants in different parts of Iraq and meeting some of the country’s gas needs, particularly during pressure drops in the Turkmenistan and Iranian gas transmission lines. Although Turkmenistan’s production and export capacity for LNG cannot be compared to a country like Qatar, Turkmenistan has taken steps in recent years to develop its LNG industry, and in May 2023, the country started exporting LNG to Pakistan through Afghanistan’s Kandahar for the first time, which included 50 gas tankers, each carrying 30 tons of gas. Overall, it seems that in both forms of gas exports or swaps from Turkmenistan to Iraq through pipelines or LNG exports, Iran will play the most important intermediary role between Ashgabat and Baghdad. While it appears that the Iraqi government is considering a mixed approach to importing gas from Turkmenistan through both pipelines and LNG exports, the reality is that the main form of gas imports from Turkmenistan to Iraq will be through pipelines, whereas LNG will be the main mode of gas imports from Qatar.
Read moreFuture Center: Iran’s Struggles Amid Regional Shifts
The collapse of the Assad regime marks a significant shift in Middle Eastern dynamics, hitting Iran where it matters most. For years, Syria served as Iran’s gateway to Lebanon, allowing it to bolster Hezbollah, challenge Israel, and expand its regional influence. With Assad gone, these critical links are severed, forcing Tehran to reassess its strategy. Iran now finds itself increasingly vulnerable, as other regional actors such as Turkey, Israel, and Gulf states are poised to exploit the Syrian vacuum. Potential Revival of the Maximum Pressure Campaign Meanwhile, Washington may see this moment as an opportunity to revive the Maximum Pressure Campaign—a strategy aimed at paralyzing Iran’s economy and undermining its ability to operate in the region.[1] The return of such a campaign would be devastating for Tehran, further isolating it economically and diplomatically at a time when its resources are overburdened. However, it can also threaten regional stability more than ever before. If sanctions are reimposed with full force, Iran’s economic troubles, already deepened by years of stagnation, would worsen dramatically. Inflation would surge, the currency would continue to collapse, and frustrations among the Iranian population could boil over. These pressures would likely empower hardliners, who would blame external aggression to justify more confrontational policies, including accelerating nuclear development. Iran’s response would likely play out on multiple fronts: doubling down on its influence in Iraq and Lebanon to compensate for the loss of Syria, and escalating proxy conflicts as a show of resilience. For the U.S. and its allies, while the Maximum Pressure Campaign might weaken Iran, it also risks significant blowback, including heightened instability across the region, more aggressive proxy actions, and closer cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China. In this post-Assad reality, both Iran and the U.S. face difficult choices that will shape the Middle East’s future trajectory. Potential Consequences of Renewed Sanctions Economic impact The economic consequences for Iran under renewed maximum pressure will be massive. Iran’s oil exports, essential for its economy, would face even harsher restrictions. During the first Trump administration’s initial pressure campaign, oil sales dropped from over 2.5 million barrels per day to as low as 200,000. If a similar pattern were to unfold again, Iran’s fiscal deficit would expand, exacerbating already dire economic conditions. Beyond depressing oil sales, international financial sanctions would further isolate Iran from the global banking system, cutting off access to funds needed for both domestic priorities and foreign operations. In such a scenario, the government’s ability to finance subsidies, pensions, and public services would further erode, widening the gap between the state and its increasingly frustrated population. Iran’s economic fragility has long been a point of contention within its borders.[2] Previous waves of sanctions have demonstrated their capacity to stir unrest, as seen during the protests of 2017-2018 and 2019, when rising fuel prices and inflation triggered demonstrations across the country. The return of maximum pressure could accelerate these conditions, putting the load on ordinary citizens’ shoulders. Inflation, already a persistent issue in Iran, would surge even higher as the rial depreciates under pressure. The currency’s collapse would erode the purchasing power of middle- and lower-income households, forcing many more Iranians into poverty. Social discontent, driven by economic desperation, could manifest in widespread protests, strikes, and labor unrest. The Iranian regime, accustomed to suppressing such movements, would likely respond with harsh crackdowns that further alienate segments of the population. Political ramifications The return of economic hardship would not occur in isolation. Tehran’s hardliners, who already dominate Iran’s political establishment, would see sanctions as both a threat and an opportunity.[3] Historically, external pressure has been framed as evidence of Western hostility, fueling nationalist sentiment that consolidates domestic support for more radical policies. Hardliners would likely champion economic self-sufficiency and resistance against perceived U.S. aggression. Such rhetoric, while aimed at boosting national morale, often coincides with more aggressive foreign and national security policies, which could include further advancements in Iran’s nuclear program, both as leverage in future negotiations and as a deterrent against military threats. Regional response At the regional level, Iran’s strategy would shift toward damage control and recalibration. Syria’s importance to Iran cannot be overstated; it has served as a critical land bridge for arms transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon and a forward operating base for Iranian proxies to pressure Israel. The collapse of the Assad regime disrupts these routes, forcing Tehran to look elsewhere to maintain its influence. Iraq, already a significant arena for Iranian activity, would become an even greater focus. While Iraq would seek to avoid being drawn into the crossfire between the U.S. and Iran,[4] its reliance on Iranian-backed militias for internal security might limit its ability to distance itself from Tehran. Deep economic linkage, Iran’s political and militia influence, and shared Shia identity constrain Iraq’s ability to fully sever ties with Tehran eveb as Iraq tries to strengthen its relations with Arab states to diversify its alliances. With the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen potentially avoiding broader confrontation with Israel and the United States, Iran might escalate proxy conflicts elsewhere. Tehran may encourage limited Houthi actions against Saudi Arabia or the UAE if desperate.[5] While avoiding direct confrontation with Israel, Iran could resort to cyberattacks or covert operations to disrupt Israeli security and maintain its deterrence. Simultaneously, Tehran would also likely expand alliances with Russia and China to counterbalance regional losses. The fall of Assad also opens new fault lines between Iran and other regional powers, most notably Turkey. Ankara, having played a significant role in Syria’s conflict, will seek to expand its influence in the post-Assad environment. This puts it on a potential collision course with Tehran. Turkey’s ambitions could undercut Iran’s efforts to retain any semblance of influence in Syria, further complicating Tehran’s regional strategy.[6] At the same time, Iran’s relationship with Russia, a former key ally in Syria, may be tested. While Moscow and Tehran have cooperated in supporting Assad, their long-term interests diverge, particularly in a post-conflict scenario where Russia seeks broader geopolitical influence at Iran’s expense. Challenges for the U.S. and Its Allies For Washington, reviving the Maximum Pressure Campaign presents a double-edged sword. Iran's weakened position post-Assad offers an opportunity to apply significant pressure, potentially forcing Tehran into concessions. By tightening sanctions and isolating Iran economically, the U.S. could aim to limit Iran's ability to fund proxies and expand its nuclear program. However, the geopolitical landscape has shifted since the original implementation of maximum pressure. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties with both China and Russia, who could offer Tehran critical lifelines to bypass sanctions. Beijing, in particular, remains a major buyer of Iranian oil, providing Tehran with vital revenue despite U.S. restrictions. Reviving maximum pressure would likely drive Iran closer to these powers, undermining Washington's efforts to isolate Tehran. Moreover, a unilateral approach to sanctions risks alienating European allies, who are wary of the destabilizing consequences of economic warfare. The domestic fallout in Iran could also carry unintended consequences for U.S. interests. While sanctions are designed to pressure governments, ordinary citizens often bear the brunt of economic hardship. Past instances have shown that this can fuel anti-American sentiment rather than opposition to the regime. Additionally, hardline factions within the Iranian government are adept at using external pressure to delegitimize reformist voices, consolidating their hold on power. In such a scenario, the likelihood of meaningful negotiations diminishes as Tehran adopts a more defiant posture both domestically and abroad. A Critical Juncture Ultimately, the collapse of the Assad regime and the potential return of the Maximum Pressure Campaign place Iran at a critical juncture. The loss of Syria represents not just a strategic setback but a broader challenge to Tehran’s regional ambitions. Faced with mounting economic pressures and an increasingly hostile regional environment, Iran will have limited options for recourse. Its response will likely involve a mix of economic adaptation, domestic repression, and proxy escalation, all of which carry significant risks for the region. For the U.S. and its allies, the decision to revive maximum pressure must account for these complexities, balancing the need to contain Iran with the broader goal of regional stability. In this evolving post-Assad reality, the stakes are higher than ever, and missteps could have far-reaching consequences for the future of the Middle East. [1] Financial Times, “Trump Team Aims to Bankrupt Iran with New 'Maximum Pressure’” [2] New York Post, “Energy crisis has Iran on the brink — and hands Trump a historic opportunity” [3] Modern Diplomacy, “Trump 2.0: A Return to “Maximum Pressure” against Iran?” [4] L’Orient Today, “In Iraq, Assad regime’s fall could limit Iranian militias' influence” [5] Associated Press, “Collapse of Syria’s Assad is a blow to Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’” [6] Reuters, “Turkey aiming for maritime agreement with Syria, transport minister says”
Read moreAssad’s fall spurs calls to revive Iraq-Syria oil pipeline
The overthrow of the former Syrian president, Bashar Al-Assad, has brought calls for the revival of the now-defunct pipeline that once carried crude oil from Iraq to a Syrian port on the Mediterranean. Several Iraqi experts have urged their government to consider rebuilding the facility as an outlet for the Opec member’s oil exports to Europe. An adviser to Iraq’s prime minister, Mohammed Al-Sudani, said there was a need for negotiations between the two Arab neighbours to set the groundwork for the pipeline’s resurrection. But other analysts disagreed with these calls, on the grounds that the situation in Syria is uncertain and Iraq’s oil exports to Europe have been falling in favour of Asian markets. In October 2023, Iraqi officials said rebuilding of the 850 km pipeline was discussed at two-day talks between the state-owned North Oil Company in Kirkuk and several local oil companies. The official news agency later quoted government spokesman Bassim Al-Awadi as saying Baghdad was thinking of reviving the pipeline to expand export outlets. Mudhar Saleh, a spokesperson for the Iraqi prime minister, said: “The Iraq-Syria pipeline is one of the vital projects that had shaped the oil industry in Iraq and the entire region. “Iraq remains in need to revive plans to expand its oil export outlets through the Mediterranean for its European clients... but this issue requires negotiations between the two countries because the pipeline’s part in Syria had been aggressively nationalised by Damascus,” Saleh told the official Iraqi news agency last week. The pipeline, dating back to the early 1950s, linked Iraq’s oil-rich Northern Kirkuk governorate with the western Syrian port of Baniyas on the Mediterranean. Iraq shut the pipeline between 1982 and 2000 because of political rifts with Syria, and it sustained heavy damage during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Abdul Hussein Al-Hanin, a member of Iraq’s Economists’ Association, says: “I believe it is time for Iraq to discuss with Syria the reconstruction of the pipeline after the recent changes in that country and the US willingness to ease its economic siege of Syria.” Al-Hanin says the US rejected Iraqi plans to revive the pipeline in 2003, and this prompted Baghdad to consider constructing a pipeline to Aqaba in South Jordan. Another Association member says he believes a revived pipeline to Syria could be an alternative to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which connects Iraq and Turkey. “I think there is a tendency now by Iraq to search for new oil export outlets to reduce reliance on the Ceyhan pipeline, which repeatedly faces political and security risks. I see the Syria pipeline as the best alternative in this respect.” Walid Khaddouri, another Iraqi energy analyst, rebuffs this view, saying the pipeline to Turkey is economically more feasible. Khaddouri, former information chief at the Kuwait-based Arab Energy Organisation, says: “The pipeline to Syria has not been maintained for decades. Iraq also considers that this pipeline is less economically feasible than the Kirkuk-Ceyhen pipeline when it comes to transporting crude to Europe. “Furthermore, the European markets have been declining due to a gradual fall in demand. Iraq and other Gulf oil producers are now more interested in Asian markets, to which nearly 65 to 70 percent of their crude is exported.” Nabil Al-Marsoumi, an economics professor at Basra University, has a similar view. He says, "I don’t believe it is a good idea to think now of reviving the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline, because the situation in Syria now is uncertain and unstable.” Source: AGBI
Read moreTurkish influence in Syria changes the West's mood towards the Kurds
The German Foreign Ministry calls for the disarmament of armed Kurdish groups in Syria and their inclusion in the security forces of the new government in the country. New Western approaches towards the Kurds American and German statements indicate a change in Western approaches towards the Kurds, and this change is linked to the influence that Turkey has in Syria after its Islamist allies took control of Damascus. US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf told reporters on the sidelines of an official US delegation's visit to Damascus, "Turkey has great influence in Syria and has national security interests and many other interests," noting that the circumstances that prompted the Kurds in northeastern Syria to organize and defend themselves have changed significantly. Although the US official's statement was general and did not include any details regarding a change in Washington's position towards its Kurdish allies, it suggests a change aimed at appeasing Ankara, in light of Kurdish fears that Leaf's statements could pave the way for a change in US policy. Barbara Leaf: The conditions that prompted the Kurds in northeastern Syria to organize and defend themselves have changed dramatically It is not known whether Leaf’s words are related to the Joe Biden administration, which is preparing to leave its place in a few weeks to President-elect Donald Trump, or whether he expresses an official position, especially since Trump himself supports the complete US withdrawal from Syria. In a more explicit position, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said on Friday, after talks between her and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara, “The armed Kurdish groups in Syria must be disarmed and integrated into the security forces of the new government in the country.” Baerbock added at a press conference that “the security of the Kurds is essential for a free Syria, but Turkish security concerns must also be addressed to ensure stability.” Turkey says the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, which has been fighting alongside U.S. forces for years, is an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been fighting Turkey, and It’s considered a terrorist organization by Ankara, Washington and the European Union. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan predicted on Friday that foreign countries would withdraw their support for Kurdish fighters in Syria, saying "there is no longer any reason for foreign powers to support the YPG fighters." Source: Al Arab Newspaper
Read moreThe Complex Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict: Qatar’s Strategy in Syria
Dr Rebwar Fatah Qatar's strategy in Syria is multifaceted, driven by its regional ambitions and ideological leanings. Here are the key components: Promoting Islamist Groups: Qatar has historically supported Islamist groups, including factions within the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), to promote a governance model aligned with its ideological preferences. This support includes financial aid, weapons, and other resources as part of its broader strategy to balance regional alliances and maintain its influence in the Middle East. The exact amount of financial support is not publicly disclosed, but it is well-documented that Qatar has been a significant supporter of various Islamist factions in Syria. Mediation and Diplomacy: Qatar has positioned itself as a mediator in the Syrian conflict, engaging with different Islamist factions and regional powers. This diplomatic role allows Qatar to influence the political landscape and promote its interests by: Building Alliances: Forging strategic alliances with influential groups and regional actors. Promoting Political Islam: Helping place Islamic factions in positions of power, aligning with its broader ideological goals. Enhancing Influence: Using mediation and diplomacy to bolster its influence and reputation as a key player in regional politics. This approach has allowed Qatar to exert considerable influence in the Syrian conflict and other regional issues, despite its relatively small size compared to other regional powers. Balancing Regional Influence: Qatar's involvement in Syria is also driven by its desire to counter the influence of other regional players, such as Iran and Russia, who support the Assad regime. By supporting opposition groups, Qatar aims to prevent these actors from consolidating power. Post-Assad Strategy: Qatar has been active in mediating conflicts and supporting transitions in various regions. The Foreign Ministry has called for the preservation of national institutions and unity in Syria, urging all parties to engage in dialogue. Qatar's foreign policy involves supporting various Islamist groups, particularly during the Arab Spring and in conflict zones like Syria and Libya. This support aligns with Qatar's broader strategy of promoting political Islam and increasing its influence. For example, Qatar has played a significant role in mediating conflicts and supporting peace processes, such as in Afghanistan with the Taliban. Qatar's Position on the Kurds and SDF: Qatar's strategy in Syria has primarily involved supporting various Islamist groups rather than the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or Kurdish people. This support has had significant implications for the SDF, which has been a key player in the fight against ISIS and in maintaining control over parts of northern and eastern Syria. Qatar's backing of Islamist factions aligns with its broader regional strategy and has contributed to the complex dynamics on the ground, impacting the balance of power and the ongoing conflict. Conclusion Qatar's strategy in Syria is complex, involving support for opposition groups, promotion of Islamist factions, and engagement in diplomatic efforts to shape the future political landscape. By balancing regional influences and promoting its ideological preferences, Qatar aims to maintain its influence and ensure a favorable outcome in the Syrian conflict.
Read moreThe Complex Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict: Israel’s Strategic Goals in Syria
Dr Rebwar Fatah Israel's strategy in Syria is multifaceted, focusing on several key objectives to ensure its national security and regional stability. Here are the main components: Preventing the Transfer of Advanced Weapons Israel has conducted numerous airstrikes targeting Syrian military infrastructure, including airbases, weapons stockpiles, and naval assets. The goal is to prevent advanced weaponry, such as missiles and chemical weapons, from falling into the hands of hostile groups like Hezbollah, Turkey and Qatar-backed groups, and other extremist factions. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has conducted over 300 airstrikes on Syria. These strikes have targeted critical military infrastructure, including air defence systems, missile depots, and chemical weapons sites. The Israeli military estimates that it has destroyed around 70-80% of the former Assad regime's strategic military capabilities. Establishing a Buffer Zone Israel has moved to establish a "sterile defence zone" in southern Syria, particularly near the Golan Heights. This zone aims to prevent the establishment and organization of insurgent groups close to its borders. The buffer zone is intended to create a security barrier without a permanent Israeli presence, ensuring that threats are kept at a distance. Israel has recently seized control of a 155-square-mile (400-square-kilometer) demilitarized buffer zone in the Golan Heights, which was established by a 1974 ceasefire agreement with Syria. This move was described as temporary and aimed at securing its border amid the collapse of the Assad regime. Given Israel's historical expansion policies and recent actions, it seems unlikely that they will withdraw from the buffer zone anytime soon. Israel has been expanding settlements and increasing its control in the region, which suggests a long-term strategy rather than a temporary measure. Countering Iranian Influence Before the ousting of the Assad regime, Israel was very active in countering Iranian influence in Syria, conducting numerous airstrikes targeting Iranian military sites and proxies. This strategy aimed to limit Iran's operational capabilities and prevent it from establishing a permanent foothold near Israel's borders. However, the power vacuum left by the ousting of the Assad regime has led to increased instability. Fundamentalist groups, including remnants of ISIS, have been moving closer to the Israeli border, raising concerns about potential threats to Israel's security. Supporting Reliable Partners Israel's actions indirectly support groups like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are seen as more reliable and secular compared to Islamist factions supported by Turkey and Qatar. By weakening groups like the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Israel aims to bolster the SDF's position and ensure a more stable and secular governance structure in the region. This is not solely to support the Kurds, but to build a more reliable partner in future Syria. Israel's support for the Kurds has historically been driven by strategic interests rather than a genuine desire to establish a Kurdish-led state. Israel has maintained informal relations with the Kurdish people, recognizing their struggle for self-determination and using this relationship to counterbalance regional adversaries like Iran and Turkey. Maintaining Regional Stability Israel's overarching goal is to maintain regional stability and prevent the rise of extremist groups that could threaten its security. This involves a combination of military actions, diplomatic efforts, and strategic alliances to shape the future political landscape of Syria in a way that aligns with its security interests. Conclusion Israel's strategy in Syria is complex and involves balancing various regional dynamics to ensure its national security and promote stability in the region. By targeting advanced weaponry, establishing buffer zones, countering Iranian influence, supporting reliable partners, and maintaining regional stability, Israel aims to secure a safer and more stable future both for itself and the broader region.
Read moreAmerican man found in Syria after being imprisoned for months
It was not widely known that the man, who identified himself as Travis Timmerman and went missing in Hungary in May, was in Syria. By Matt Bradley and Chantal Da Silva A Missouri man found in Syria told NBC News on Thursday he spent months in a Syrian prison after after crossing into the country on a "pilgrimage" to Damascus. It was not widely known that the man, who identified himself as Travis Timmerman and went missing in Hungary in May, was in Syria. His discovery came as a shock to locals and journalists as thousands of detainees emerged from jails after the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad over the weekend. Timmerman, who initially identified himself only as “Travis,” was first seen in a video that emerged overnight. Surrounded by reporters while leaning against walls with flaking paint, Timmerman, 29, said he was stopped by Syrian officials earlier this year after crossing into the country on foot. "I was on a pilgrimage to Damascus," he told NBC News in a building on the outskirts of the capital. Timmerman separately told CBS News that he'd been freed from a prison earlier in the week as Assad's regime was toppled. Travis Timmerman speaking to NBC News outside the Syrian capital Damascus on Thursday.Ted Turner / NBC News “My door was busted down, it woke me up,” Timmerman said. “I thought the guards were still there, so I thought the warfare could have been more active than it ended up being… Once we got out, there was no resistance, there was no real fighting.” The video that emerged after he was found sparked early speculation that the missing man could be American journalist Austin Tice, 43, who disappeared in 2012 just days after celebrating his 31st birthday in Syria. After being located by NBC News and other outlets in Dhiyabia, Timmerman said he had “been reading the scripture a lot” before deciding to cross the mountains from Lebanon into Syria. He appeared calm. When one man repeatedly offered to put him in touch with U.S. officials, he replied that he was "okay for right now." A U.S. official told NBC News that Washington was "aware of reports of an American found outside of Damascus and seeking to provide support. Out of respect for his privacy, we have no further information to provide at this time." Timmerman said he had been in Europe prior to embarking on his pilgrimage and eventually traveled from Lebanon into Syria in late May, but was spotted by a border guard and detained. Authorities in Missouri and Hungarian capital Budapest had earlier this year put out missing person reports for a man named Pete Timmerman, with Hungarian police identifying him as “Travis” Pete Timmerman. The Missouri State Highway Patrol said in a public awareness bulletin that Timmerman had gone missing from Budapest, Hungary, on May 28th, just under seven months ago. Timmerman had been identified by authorities in Budapest in a request for information as “Travis Pete Timmerman.” They said he was last seen at a church and had since “left for an unknown location, with no sign of life.” Matt Bradley reported from Damascus, and Chantal Da Silva from London.
Read moreAP: America’s closest ally in Syria is losing ground as a new order takes shape
The jihadi rebels who toppled Syrian President Bashar Assad say they want to build a unified, inclusive country. But after nearly 14 years of civil war, putting that ideal into practice will not be easy. For Syria’s Kurdish minority, America’s closest ally in the country, the struggle for a new order is entering a potentially even more challenging phase. Over the course of Syria’s civil war, Kurdish fighters have fended off an array of armed factions, partnered with the U.S. to rout the Islamic State group and carved out a largely autonomous region in the country’s oil-rich east. But the gains of the non-Arab Kurds are now at risk. The ascendance of the Sunni Arab rebels who overthrew Assad — with vital help from Turkey, a longtime foe of the Kurds — will make it hard for the Kurds to find a place in the new Syria and could prolong the conflict. FILE – Kurdish-led fighters backed by the U.S. escort suspected Islamic State militants in Hassakeh, Syria, on Jan. 26, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad, File) The jihadi rebels who rode into Damascus over the weekend have made peaceful overtures to the Kurds. But the rebels violently drove Kurdish fighters out of the eastern city of Deir al-Zour days after government forces abandoned it. To the north, a separate opposition faction backed by Turkey that has been battling the Kurds for years seized the town of Manbij. And Turkey carried out airstrikes on a Kurdish convoy it said was carrying heavy weapons looted from government arsenals. The Kurds have long counted on U.S. aid in the face of such challenges. Around 900 American troops are in eastern Syria, where they partner with Kurdish forces to prevent an Islamic State resurgence. But the future of that mission will be thrown into doubt under president-elect Donald Trump, who has long been skeptical about U.S. involvement in Syria. Here’s a closer look at the predicament the Kurds find themselves in. FILE – Kurdish-led fighters backed by the U.S. man a checkpoint in Hassakeh, Syria, on Jan. 24, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad, File) Who are the U.S.-allied Kurdish fighters in Syria? The Kurds are among the largest stateless ethnic groups in the world, with some 30 million concentrated in a territory straddling Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. They are a minority in each country and have often suffered persecution, which has fueled armed Kurdish uprisings. In Syria, they carved out an autonomous enclave early in the civil war, never fully siding with the Assad government or the rebels seeking to topple him. When the Islamic State group seized a third of the country in 2014, Kurdish fighters — who are secular and include women in their ranks — proved their mettle in early battles against the extremists, earning support from the U.S.-led coalition. They formed a group known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, which also includes Arab fighters, and drove the Islamic State group out of large areas of Syria with help from U.S.-led airstrikes and American special forces. In 2017, these Kurdish-led forces captured Raqqa, the capital of the extremists’ self-styled caliphate. Why is Turkey fighting the Kurds? Turkey has long viewed the SDF as an extension of the decades-old Kurdish insurgency within its own borders. It considers the main Kurdish faction a terrorist group on par with the Islamic State and has said it should have no presence in the new Syria. In recent years, Turkey has trained and funded fighters known as the Syrian National Army, helping them wrest control of territory from the Kurds in northern Syria along the border with Turkey. These Turkish-backed fighters have portrayed themselves as part of the opposition against Assad, but analysts say they are largely driven by opportunism and hatred of the Kurds. The Kurds have focused on battling the SNA in recent years. But the new leadership in Damascus, which also has longstanding ties to Turkey, could open another, much longer front. How do the Syrian rebels view the Kurds? The main rebel faction is led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani, a former al-Qaida militant who cut ties with the group eight years ago and says he wants to build a new Syria free of dictatorship that will serve all its religious and ethnic communities. Nawaf Khalil, head of the Germany-based Center for Kurdish Studies, said the early signs were positive. He said the rebels steered clear of two SDF-controlled enclaves of Aleppo when they stormed the city two weeks ago at the start of their rapid advance across the country. FILE – Kurdish-led fighters backed by the U.S. stand guard in Raqqa, Syria, on Feb. 7, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad, File) “It is also positive that they did not speak negatively about the Syrian Democratic Forces,” he said. It remains to be seen if those sentiments will endure. After sweeping into Deir al-Zour this week, a fighter from al-Sharaa’s group posted a video saying they would soon advance toward Raqqa and other areas of eastern Syria, raising the possibility of further clashes with the Kurds. The rebels could still seek some kind of agreement with the Kurds to incorporate them into the post-Assad political order, but that would likely require accepting a degree of Kurdish autonomy in the east. It would also risk angering Turkey, which now appears to be the chief power broker in Syria. Will the Trump administration support the Kurds? The top U.S. military commander for the Middle East, Army Gen. Erik Kurilla, met with SDF forces in Syria on Tuesday, in a sign of the Biden administration’s commitment to the alliance post-Assad. But things could change on Jan. 20. Trump has provided few details about his Middle East policy, aside from saying he wants to end the region’s wars and keep the United States out of them. In a social media post shortly before Assad was overthrown, Trump wrote that “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT.” During his previous term, in 2019, Trump abandoned the Kurds ahead of a Turkish incursion, casting it as the fulfillment of a campaign promise to end U.S. involvement in the region’s “endless wars.” The move prompted heavy criticism, including from prominent Republicans who accused him of betraying an ally. Trump backtracked weeks later, approving a wider mission to secure oil fields in the east. The troops remained where they were and the alliance endured.
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