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China's Path to 2035

China is undergoing significant and comprehensive changes, guided by the strategic resolutions of the 20th Congress and the Third Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee, aimed at deepening reforms to promote Chinese-style modernization. The country seeks to balance economic growth, social equity, and environmental sustainability, paving the way for both the well-being of its citizens and its role on the global stage. 1. The Importance of Comprehensive Reforms Historically, reforms in China have been a powerful force driving modernization. Significant milestones were achieved during the 11th and 18th Central Committee sessions, which laid the foundation for socialism with Chinese characteristics. These reforms ushered in a period of rapid economic development, transforming China into the world’s second-largest economy. Today, the world is more complex. Domestically, China must balance economic growth, social equity, and environmental sustainability. Internationally, it must navigate geopolitical competition and tensions. Against this backdrop, comprehensive reforms are essential to sustain progress and ensure the stability and predictability of China’s growth. Reform is the key to adapting China’s systems to meet modern demands. 2. Ideological Guidance: The Pillar of Reform At the core of China's approach are the guiding ideologies of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and the modern contributions of Xi Jinping Thought. Xi’s ideology on socialism in the new era emphasizes reform as a means to align China’s social, economic, and environmental systems with its developmental goals. The resolution underscores that China’s reforms must balance economic growth, social equity, and environmental sustainability. In this context, the reforms are not only about advancing China’s economic ambitions but also about ensuring the well-being of its people. This vision reflects a commitment to a balanced and inclusive approach. 3. Goals for 2035: A High-Level Socialist Market Economy By 2035, China aims to complete its transformation into a high-level socialist market economy. This includes: - Improving market mechanisms to reduce government interference and promote innovation. - Fostering technological advancements and industrial modernization to ensure China remains at the forefront of global innovation. - Enhancing social welfare and governance, with a particular focus on fairness and accessibility in public services, ensuring that all citizens benefit from the nation’s growth. Additionally, environmental sustainability will be a critical focus. The resolution emphasizes creating an ecological civilization based on low-carbon development and sustainable resource management. This shift ensures that China’s modernization aligns with global environmental goals. 4. Reforming Public and Private Sectors To further integrate the public and private sectors, reforms will aim to strengthen state-owned enterprises while creating more opportunities for private enterprises to thrive. This includes improving access to markets and capital for non-state enterprises and fostering a more competitive and unified national market that promotes fair competition and encourages innovation. 5. Party Leadership and Governance A crucial element of China’s modernization is the centralized leadership of the Communist Party. The Party’s role in steering reforms ensures that the modernization process remains aligned with China’s political and social objectives. This leadership will be reinforced by ongoing governance reforms that emphasize transparency, anti-corruption measures, and more efficient administration. The Central Committee’s resolution represents a forward-thinking approach to reform, one that seeks to bring China closer to its goals of national rejuvenation and global leadership. By 2035, China envisions a robust socialist market economy that balances economic growth, social justice, and environmental stewardship. Through the comprehensive reforms outlined, China is not only shaping its future but also setting an example for the world on how to achieve sustainable and inclusive modernization. Sources: Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, July 2024 https://bit.ly/4eSE44i Halo Hassan Saeed is a writer and journalist, a member of the International Union of Journalists, and the author of two books on the People's Republic of China.

Kurdistan oil smuggled to Turkey and Iran

Has Iraq violated the OPEC Plus agreement? Nabil Marsumi - Economist Iraq has reiterated its commitment to the OPEC Plus agreement and its production quota of 4.22 million barrels per day. Iraq's oil exports rose to 3.533 million barrels per day in October, the highest level this year, due to lower domestic consumption. However, a recent report showed that Iraq's oil production increased by 180,000 barrels per day, above the level set by OPEC Plus. Iraq's oil production rose to 4.4 million barrels per day in October, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. This increase is largely due to weak monitoring of oil investment in Kurdistan, which is partly used domestically and partly smuggled by tankers to Turkey and Iran.

Why the United States should stop supporting the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga

Diary Marif/ culturico The United States has planned to unify the Kurdish forces of Peshmerga, providing more financial aid and weaponizing them in order to defeat IS and other extremist groups. But the senior military men and politicians keep aside the weapons and aid for themselves and do not give them to the Peshmerga forces who are on the front lines fighting IS. Instead, they use weapons to repress the Kurdish protestors who ask for their basic rights and freedom of expression. In early August, the Kurdistan Region’s Minister of Peshmerga Affairs, Shoresh Ismail, met with U.S. officials in Washington DC and promised to follow through on reforms aimed at unifying the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Peshmerga militias are the main forces of the KRG in Iraq, but they are not controlled by the KRG. Rather, they are governed by political parties. This issue of divided loyalty affects the KRG’s national strategies to protect Kurdistan and defeat extremist groups. For example, a few days after Ismail’s promising visit with U.S. officials, Mohammed Haji Mahmoud, the leader of the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, illegally held a military parade for his militia without censure from the KRG. The militia may be under Ismail’s command, but the troops clearly listen to Mahmood, not the minister. Accentuating this general discord even further, Ismail returned from his visit with U.S. officials to brief not the KRG parliament, president, or prime minister, but rather the former President, Masoud Barzani, who has no official position or responsibilities in the current government. The KRG’s lack of control over the Peshmerga is proving a problem for U.S. partners. The U.S. has been in a partnership with KRG in Iraq to defeat the Islamic State (IS) and other terrorist groups. The separation of the forces, however, has negative consequences for U.S. plans. The U.S. also wants the Peshmerga to cooperate with the Iraqi army to set up robust security in the country. Mahmoud’s illegal parade and Ismail’s meeting with Barzani reveal an obvious, disappointing reality: the unification of the Peshmerga is just not happening, and any U.S. financial or political support for it instead goes into the pockets of the political parties’ militias, putting the lives of ordinary people at risk. Why is Unification Failing? The U.S. proposal of integrating and unifying the Peshmerga forces is not a new agenda. When the KRG formed in 1992, it bridged several political parties, including the two major ones: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by former Iraqi president Jalal Talabani. Right away, these parties undertook a plan to abolish their partisan militias and set up a single national force to protect the region and its people (1). Although straightforward in theory, the plan caused chaos on the ground, and a bloody, four-year civil war broke out in which thousands of the Peshmerga were tortured, wounded, and killed. One dire consequence of the civil war was that the Peshmerga forces of the parties were not able to trust each other (2). To this day, they are still traumatized by the civil war years. Therefore, unification has not worked. During the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. high officers proposed to Talabani and Barzani to unify their forces under one national commander. Although Talabani and Barzani accepted the proposal, they hesitated to follow it, as each party thought that losing its militia would have a negative impact on its political hegemony and that losing control of its forces would affect their interests. But in 2010, both parties tried again and consequently integrated fourteen brigades, though this integration was only of about 40,000 Peshmerga fighters and over 120,000 troops remain in unintegrated KDP and PUK units. The process of integration was then halted again for two main reasons. Firstly, U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 meant less attention from the U.S. on integration; secondly, both parties were in a contest to win the fame of their militia against IS. The desire to unify the Peshmerga became more concrete in 2014 when IS began assaulting Iraq. At the time, Barzani was President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). As commander-in-chief of all Peshmerga forces, he granted the Peshmerga minister, Mustafa Said Qadir, six months to carry out the necessary reforms in order to unify the forces against IS. Even though Barzani was the most powerful man in Kurdistan, his demand for reform has gone unanswered for the last eight years. Barzani’s demands have no power in the PUK-controlled zone, and his stubborn desire for the Peshmerga to stay under the control of his own party led to significant disruption and further division in the PUK zone and elsewhere. Although nominally united under one government, the bitter divisions between the KDP and PUK are just as deep-seated and intense now as they were when the PUK separated from the KDP in 1975. Having each established their own militias to protect their interests, the parties spent decades killing one another in the 1980s and during the civil war of the 1990s—a reality that cannot be easily undone. The wounds of past conflicts are still present in today’s parties, and any sign of friction nowadays is met with threats and the fear of another civil war. With such deeply-entrenched attitudes, Peshmerga forces simply do not listen to the Minister of Peshmerga Affairs and are instead loyal to political party leaders, protecting the interests of their party and competing against other parties. In return, the political parties incentivize the Peshmerga with monthly payslips and threaten them with firing or kidnapping if they refuse to act as protection to party leaders and their families. Even the fourteen brigades—consisting of around 40,000 Peshmerga fighters—that were nominally integrated in 2010 remained party-focused. In 2017, these brigades were once again separated as party tensions ran high during the Independence Referendum for the Kurdistan Region. The PUK troops withdrew from the disputed territories between Baghdad and Kurdistan and Iraqi forces replaced them. The KDP accused the PUK of collaborating with the Iraqi army and betraying the Kurdish cause, as the KDP knew the PUK and Iran had a secret agreement. The KDP claimed that Iran wanted Kurdistan not to be an independent country and forced the PUK not to support the referendum any longer. Although the 14 brigades remain officially integrated, they were called on and controlled by party leaders, not the ministry of Peshmerga. Since then, the process of Peshmerga reform stopped and the relationships between parties has continuously deteriorated. Making the situation worse, senior Peshmerga commanders and politicians of both parties know exactly what is at stake if unification were to occur. These authorities have been the sole beneficiaries of their own protection brigades, corrupt practices, and party dynamics, and they are not so willing to give up their power, especially to other parties. As a case in point, a senior PUK commander allegedly ordered an attack on the headquarters of the Gorran Movement in Sulaimaniyah in 2018 after the Gorran Party complained about vote violations and the results of the KRG elections. Clearly, any deviation from the divisive norm is a threat to party officials. Kurdish forces of Peshmerga. Photo @Levi Meir Clancy for Unsplash. Where Does the Aid Go U.S. support for the Peshmerga forces goes back to the 1970s, when the Peshmerga fought against the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein and the U.S. supported them in order to deter Saddam from falling into an alliance with the Soviet Union. In 1991, the U.S. and its allies played a major role in establishing and enforcing a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. They supported the Peshmerga to serve as a local fighting force to stabilize the area after Saddam’s regime was overthrown. In recent years, the U.S. and its allies have provided financial aid, arms, and training to the Peshmerga forces in the name of countering IS. But U.S. support has not actually gone to the low-level Peshmerga soldiers who fight IS forces on the frontlines. Instead, senior party officers and high-level Peshmergas—individuals who have never faced IS—receive the funds and guns. I talked to two Peshmerga soldiers for this project, one from the PUK and one from the KDP. Neither soldier has seen any U.S. ammunition or weapons on the frontline, and instead, they fight with their own guns and bullets. The Peshmergas do not get any money back for these expenditures, despite the fact that they cost an arm and leg. When asked, the Peshmergas revealed that most U.S. guns go to senior commanders and their personal guards, who have never fought IS. These guns are used to shoot and kill the civilian protesters who request basic rights in the KRG, or for the protection of tribes—not for eliminating the IS threat. In addition, a portion of guns also goes to the bodyguards of some political and military seniors who look after their farms and gardens in suburban areas. At the same time, a number of guns provided by the U.S. are sold on the market illegally, at times even going to IS forces that are able to pay. Several members of the KRG parliament and journalists have verified that senior Peshmergas have traded weapons with IS. Nevertheless, these officers have not been charged. The United States Needs to Take Action The U.S.-Kurdish military action against Saddam Hussein’s regime and IS is one example of successful cooperation in the Middle East. Each side needs the other; the U.S. needs to exist in the area to protect its interests and stop the incursion of Russia, China, and Iran into the KRG. At the same time, the Kurds need the U.S. to protect themselves from extremist groups and threats from neighbouring countries. Furthermore, over the past 20 years, the U.S. has not had smooth relations with Shiite groups as they support Iran, while the Sunni groups have consistently clashed with American troops during the post-Saddam era. The Kurdish Peshmerga, in contrast, has consistently supported connections with the U.S. But in the last decade, the Kurdish leadership has taken advantage of the Peshmerga and continues to misuse their relationship with the U.S. This situation does not facilitate the U.S.’s regional interests and may force them to rethink other new partnerships and even to stop supporting the Peshmerga forces. But the U.S. should not cut off this relationship. In doing so, the U.S. may lose an epicentre of power in the region and cost the Kurdish authorities their long-standing security from militia attacks from neighbouring countries. If this happens, it will be the end of the Kurdish region of power, similar to the collapse of power in Afghanistan after the U.S.’s abrupt departure. Mahmoud’s most recent display with his private militia is only one link in a long chain of corrupt practices, personal brigades, and divisive tensions within the Peshmerga. To this day, Peshmerga forces remain loyal to their singular parties or party leaders, ignoring their stated purpose of protecting the Kurdish people as a whole and co-opting aid for themselves. By continuing with existing aid practices, U.S. officials fail to serve Kurdistan and its people. To change this reality, there are several steps the U.S. needs to take. First, they should push for abolishing the non-integrated PUK’s 70 units and the KDP’s 80 units—forces that only work for their parties. Second, the U.S. can curtail the KDP’s Zerevani forces and the PUK’s emergency forces, as well as the parties’ militia academies in Zakho and Qalasholan. Finally, the U.S. should investigate where the weapons and financial aid go and how they are used. Ideally, the Peshmerga must employ professionals in high positions who have no party affiliations. Without these steps and several more beyond, the U.S. support only helps parties and their corrupt politicians and commanders, not Kurdistan’s citizens. Diary Marif References: Van Wilgenburg, W. and M. Fumerton, “Kurdistan’s political armies: The challenge of unifying the Peshmerga forces” Carnegie Middle East Center, 2015. Arif, B. H. and T. M. Mokhtar, “The Kurdish civil war (1994–1998) and its consequences for the governing system in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”, Asian Affairs, 2022. culturico https://culturico.com/2023/03/29/why-the-united-states-should-stop-supporting-the-iraqi-kurdish-peshmerga/

Kurdistan gas and diversification

On the journey from Dubai to Erbil by plane and Dohuk by road for the MEPS Forum, the energy, environmental, and economic challenges of Iraq and the Kurdistan region are written in the landscape. Gas flares around Basra, Kirkuk, and Dohuk mark the site of major oil fields. Harnessing that natural gas productively is the first step to a cleaner and more diversified national economy. The participants at the MEPS Forum discussion on energy included students from the American University of Kurdistan in Dohuk and elsewhere in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and from the rest of the country. They were keenly interested in the role of oil and gas in their national economy, the implications for the future of Iraq, and the “resource curse.” Without revisiting the extensive literature on the “resource curse,” its reality, and manifestations, it is undeniable that Iraq displays several of the classic signs associated with high dependence on petroleum exports. Oil makes up 99% of Iraq’s exports. The government sector is heavily overstaffed, often in patronage-based and unproductive roles; corruption, rent-seeking, and the ethno-sectarian and partisan allocation of political and civil service positions are endemic. A truly independent private sector barely exists. Non-oil activities, such as agriculture and industry, have been neglected. At the same time, sectors that in some petro-states are well-funded and effective, such as electricity, public education, and health care, are also in very poor shape. Kurdistan Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, interviewed at the MEPS Forum by Karen Young, senior research scholar at Columbia’s Center on Global Energy Policy, recognized these problems: “Iraq and Kurdistan Region shouldn't only rely on oil and gas.” He pointed to diversification in agriculture, tourism, and other sectors. The KRI already attracts a reasonable level of tourism from the rest of Iraq and from Iran. Iraq faces other problems that are not caused by its petroleum dependence, but which its ineffective government struggles to solve: a legacy of violent conflict and insurgency, the lack of a state monopoly over paramilitary groups, interference and intervention by its neighbors (mostly Iran, but also Turkey), water shortages, and land degradation. The KRI is in many ways better off than the rest of Iraq, with better infrastructure and greater safety and security. Nevertheless, it displays many of these symptoms in microcosm. It suffers from several other problems beyond those of Iraq as a whole. It does not have its own currency and cannot issue sovereign debt. As a landlocked entity, it is dependent on problematic neighbors — war-torn Syria, sanctioned Iran, federal Iraq, and Turkey — for imports and exports. The legality of its own hydrocarbon sector and exports have been a topic of debate and dispute ever since the ratification of the 2005 constitution. In February 2022, the federal Supreme Court, in a ruling widely seen as politicized, declared that the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) own oil and gas law of 2007 was unconstitutional. Apart from the KRG’s own oil sales — which are under episodic legal pressure from Baghdad — it relies on transfers from the federal budget, which are often late or entirely absent, unpredictable in size, and subject to political wrangling. It has 1.3 million public servants from a population of about 6.3 million. It has accumulated debts variously quoted at $17-31 billion, to public employees in unpaid salaries, oil traders and producers, electricity companies, Iraqi banks, and others. Mr. Barzani remarked that the KRG was assembling a team to go to Baghdad and “settle all outstanding issues” with the new federal government formed in October. He complained of “illegal actions” taken by the government, and said they should work together to write a new national hydrocarbon law, which has been a perennial sore point since a draft in May 2007, followed by two further drafts in 2011, none of which were ever approved. The KRI is also damaged by an increasingly deep and bitter division between the two leading parties — the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) based in Erbil in the north, to which Mr. Barzani belongs and which dominates the government and the oil sector, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Sulaymaniyah in the south of the KRI. Most of the KRI’s major gas fields are located in areas controlled by the PUK. Although the two parties have exercised a fairly constructive duopoly over the KRG since 2003, and worked together to promote Kurdish interests in the federal authorities in Baghdad, their relationship has deteriorated as the PUK has gradually declined in power and influence. Regional elections due in October 2022 have been delayed for a year, and activists and observers complain of a worsening situation for democracy and independent media. The issue of diversification is difficult but urgent, given increasingly tight global climate policies, the advances of non-fossil technologies, and the limited lifespan of the KRI’s oil resources. Iraq as a whole has a ratio of oil reserves to production of almost 100 years, and could make substantial new finds with additional exploration. It will be one of the world’s leading oil producers out to mid-century and beyond, when the world is supposed to be nearing net-zero greenhouse gas emissions to meet its climate goals. But within this, the KRI produces about 400,000-450,000 barrels per day of oil, that is, about a tenth of the national total. Its fields are smaller and more geologically challenging than those in southern Iraq and there have been almost no sizeable discoveries in recent years. It is therefore faced much more imminently with the challenge of diversifying its economy, exports, and government budget revenues. Using natural gas productively is an essential first step in that diversification. It might sound paradoxical, given that many hydrocarbon-dependent countries group the fossil fuels together, and seek to move into renewables, hydrogen, and other new energy systems. But Iraq is at the stage its Gulf neighbors were in the 1970s; it has to walk before it can run. Iraq produces about 3 billion cubic feet per day of associated gas — the gas dissolved in oil that bubbles out when the oil comes to surface. Only about half of this is captured and used productively, mostly for electricity generation. The rest is burnt off, damaging the health of neighboring communities with air pollution, and releasing the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide and methane. Yet at the same time, Iraq suffers from chronic power deficits and shortages of gas that oblige it to burn oil for power — cutting its export earnings — and to buy expensive and unreliable gas from neighboring Iran. Peak power demand in “federal” (non-KRI) Iraq is estimated at more than 34 gigawatts (GW), but the country struggles to generate more than 20 GW, and much of this disappears in an antiquated grid. Only the KRI produces significant quantities of non-associated gas — that is, gas extracted independently of oil. The Khor Mor field in the south of the region provides gas to power plants and is currently being expanded. Several other major fields have not been developed yet. The KRI does not suffer as badly from flaring as federal Iraq, but several oil fields are still not connected to processing facilities and pipelines. In January 2022, power equipment company Aggreko announced completion of a project to use flared gas from the Sarqala field in southern Kurdistan to generate 165 megawatts (MW) of electricity. The KRI’s priority is to ensure reliable power generation and then the supply of gas to industry. A pipeline is under construction from Erbil to Dohuk that would bring Khor Mor gas to the under-utilized power plant there, which relies on expensive diesel. However, a number of rocket attacks on Khor Mor, probably intended by Iran-linked groups to pressure the Kurds during the period of government formation in Baghdad, and the KDP-PUK dispute, have held up the project. The development of the region’s gas sector has also suffered from long delays in approving field developments, apparently arbitrary regulatory decisions from the Ministry of Natural Resources, lengthy waits for payment to international oil companies, the lack of infrastructure to gather associated gas, and legal disputes with companies such as the Pearl Petroleum consortium (which operates Khor Mor) and Genel Energy (which held the contracts for the large Miran and Bina Bawi gas fields). These fields contain “sour” gas, that is, gas with a high content of toxic, corrosive hydrogen sulfide. The KRG would need to secure a large, technically-skilled partner to play its intended role of processing and selling such gas resources. And at the moment, the region has no systematic gas market, from which companies can buy and sell with transparent prices and conditions. After satisfying domestic demand, the development of Khor Mor and other fields could give the KRI a gas surplus by the mid to late 2020s. This makes it one of the few regions adjacent to Europe that could supply significant additional quantities of gas by pipeline, helping to replace Russian supplies (Algeria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Azerbaijan are the others, but all face various constraints when it comes to politics or resource availability). Gas from the KRI could go to federal Iraq, helping ease its chronic gas and power deficit and reliance on Iran; it could fuel the region’s under-utilized power plants and so facilitate electricity sales to federal Iraq; or it could go to Turkey and, via Turkey’s pipeline network, to south-eastern Europe and Italy. Once the Khor Mor-Erbil-Dohuk connection is complete, it is only about another 70 kilometers to the Turkish border, and a short distance beyond to the Turkish gas grid. Exports of about 5 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year by 2030, and ultimately about 15 bcm annually, are feasible. This would be a helpful if not huge contribution compared to the 155 bcm supplied by Russia to Europe last year. At recent crude prices, the KRG earns about $10-12 billion per year from oil exports. It might bring in about $2-4 billion annually from large-scale gas exports, after the cost of pipeline tariffs to get to markets in Turkey and beyond — a useful complement to oil, but not transformational. The gas would be important beyond the immediate financial impact, though. It would create a long-lived revenue stream to help replace an eventual — and perhaps imminent — decline in oil output. The domestic use of gas would build the local economy, offering opportunities in areas such as oil refining, cement, ceramics, glass, food processing, and other local industries. More reliable and cleaner electricity would save government and private funds spent on diesel, and improve business and living conditions. Electricity provision is not just a question of gas: The KRI has potential to rehabilitate its hydroelectric dams, and to install more solar power. And becoming a significant gas supplier to Turkey and Europe would heighten the KRI’s geopolitical importance. Given the legal battles, and an ongoing arbitration case between Baghdad and Turkey over use of the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline, gas exports would almost certainly require both Erbil-Baghdad and Erbil-Sulaymaniyah accords. Those are very thorny political disputes. Outside mediation by the U.S. and EU is likely essential. Both these governments have internal policy barriers to funding fossil fuel projects, but they should recognize the unique circumstances and strategic importance of the Iraqi-Kurdish gas and power sector. Robin M. Mills is CEO of Qamar Energy, and author of The Myth of the Oil Crisis.

Will Iraq Finally Revive This Mothballed Megaproject?

• The Iraqi government stated last week that the long-delayed Nebras Petrochemical Project is set to be revived. • The government set the price of the gas that will be used to operate the project at US$1.5 per million British thermal units. • The original memorandum of understanding for the deal to go ahead was agreed in 2012. For several years now, Iraq has been able to access all the technology required to turn part of its abundant crude oil and/or gas resources into the metaphorical gold at the end of the hydrocarbons production rainbow – petrochemicals. Last week, according to local news intelligence, the Iraqi government stated that the long-delayed flagship project in this regard – the Nebras Petrochemical Project (NPP) - is set to be revived. It also set the price of the gas that will be used to operate the project at US$1.5 per million British thermal units (BTUs). The Ministry of Finance is being tasked with bearing the difference in the price sold by the Basra Gas Company (BGC). The General Company for Iraqi Ports also transferred ownership of land to the General Company for Petrochemical Industries for the purpose of allocating it to the NPP. Iraq’s Ministry of Industry is also now working with an international consulting company to move to the next step. It is at this point that progress has tended to slow on the NPP in the past for the same reason that has stymied Iraq’s progress on all the other major projects that are crucial to its long-term economic well-being; most notably, the Common Seawater Supply Project (CSSP). The reason is the endemic corruption in Iraq, which finds a focus naturally enough in its most lucrative business sector, as has been covered in many of my previous articles. This has also been repeatedly attested to by the independent Transparency International (TI) in its ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ publications, in which Iraq perennially features in the worst 10 out of 180 countries for its scale and scope of corruption. “Massive embezzlement, procurement scams, money laundering, oil smuggling and widespread bureaucratic bribery that have led the country to the bottom of international corruption rankings, fuelled political violence and hampered effective state-building and service delivery,” TI states. “Political interference in anti-corruption bodies and politicization of corruption issues, weak civil society, insecurity, lack of resources and incomplete legal provisions severely limit the government’s capacity to efficiently curb soaring corruption,” it concludes. An unwillingness to expose itself to reputational damage by agreeing to questionable clauses in the NPP contracts was likely to have been key in British energy powerhouse Shell’s decision not to fully commit to the Project, a senior source who works closely with Iraq’s Oil Ministry exclusively told OilPrice.com at the time. The original memorandum of understanding for the deal to go ahead was agreed in 2012, with the initial deal - subject to further ratification - signed between Shell and Iraq’s Oil Ministry in 2015. “Commissions for those who broker deals and for those involved in implementing deals are standard practice across much of the Middle East and elsewhere, but for Western companies they are not easy to explain in the annual audited accounts, particularly when they are on the scale of these projects [the NPP, and the CSSP],” said the source. “The developer of [the] Nebras [Petrochemical Project] would be looking at paying out commissions of around 30 percent of the total cost for the [Nebras Petrochemical] Project – so over US$3 billion in what might be construed in the West as bribes - on top of the US$11 billion headline figure, and this would be difficult to explain to auditors, regulators, and government departments,” he added. The Day Ahead: More Earnings and New Samsung Products Hit Stores Having said this, one positive development in this regard in recent months was the screeching halt in plans to resuscitate the omni-toxic Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) as the all-powerful overseer of Iraq’s oil industry - an idea akin to putting a fox in charge of a chicken coup. As highlighted back in 2018 by former senior economist with Iraq’s Oil Ministry, and now head of the Oslo-based Development Consultancy & Research, Ahmed Mousa Jiyad, Article 12 of the law relating to the establishment of INOC contained: “The most ridiculous, disintegrative, destructive and unconstitutional aspects of this law […providing] the legal cover for formalised corruption and kleptocracy by assigning the three funds [‘Citizens Fund’, ‘Generations Fund’, ‘Reconstruction Fund’] at least 10 per cent of the revenues of the oil exports at the discretion of the INOC’s board of directors.” The power of the INOC board of directors, though, could be extended further, he added at the time, as under the 2018 version of the law (and the most recent version relating to INOC), revenues generated from the export and sale of oil and gas would be considered as financial revenues for INOC. “This is a flagrant violation of the Constitution, which states that oil and gas belong to the Iraqi people and not a financial return to one public company,” said Jiyad. Back before its withdrawal from both oil fields, for Shell the Nebras Project offered the opportunity to build out its existing upstream operations in Majnoon and West Qurna 1 into a landmark downstream capability. The fields offered oil and associated gas stocks to add to the potential feedstock that came from Shell’s 44 percent stake in the US$17 billion 25-year Basra Gas Company (BGC) project. The BGC was designed to aggregate gas from fields in the south, including West Qurna 1, Zubair, and Rumaila. The design plans for Nebras were for a project that could produce at least 1.8 million metric tonnes per year (mtpa) of various petrochemicals, making it Iraq’s first major petrochemicals project since the early 1990s and one of only four major petchems complexes across the entire country. The others - Khor al-Zubair in the south, Musayeb near Baghdad, and the Baiji refinery complex in the north – are all basically operated by Iraq’s State Company for Petrochemical Industries. Chinese companies have now effectively taken over the Majnoon and West Qurna 1 sites. Whichever nationality of company takes over the Nebras Petrochemical Project, there remains enormous potential in it, both for the developer and for Iraq itself, if any of the money reaches the central government coffers. As highlighted exclusively to OilPrice.com back in 2018 by a senior figure in one of the Russian companies that was looking to take over the Nebras Project: “Shell has done a really good job so far with the BGC, but the country needs to put into action its plans to develop a second gas hub away from Basra.” He added: “That would get the gas volumes up to an average of one billion standard cubic feet per day so that the ethane can be extracted on a sustainable and reliable basis and that would give sufficient volume for a major petrochemicals plant to be viable.” By 2019/2020, the BGC had reached a peak production rate of over this required level (1.035 billion standard cubic feet per day to be exact), the highest in Iraq’s history. Ethane should be the initial feedstock for Iraq’s new petrochemicals plants, including Nebras, the Russian source added at the time - not naphtha, as Iraq’s Oil Ministry is currently suggesting. “Ethane should be used, as it was in the development of Saudi Arabia’s master gas system that captured associated gas, which was then fractionated and supplied as primary feedstock to the flagship Jubail Industrial City,” he underlined. “The highest concentration of ethane [up to 10 percent and slightly over] is usually found in associated gas streams, which Iraq has a lot of, and processing ethane produces ethylene with few by-products [mainly fuel gas] to process and manage,” he told OilPrice.com. “This reduces the capital required for construction and minimises the complexity of the logistics and distribution requirements, which will be important factors in Iraq’s early-stage build-out of a viable petrochemicals industry,” he underlined. “Later, as the industry and corresponding infrastructure grows, heavier feed streams can be utilised, as happened with the use of propane, butane and naphtha in Jubail,” he said. A world-scale facility for ethylene – one of the most in-demand petrochemicals products in the world, especially from China - is in the range of 1.0 to 1.5 million tons of ethylene production, the source added, and a 1.0 million ton per year ethylene facility would require a supply of roughly 1.3 million tons per year of ethane. “This would need to be a sustainable and reliable supply for at least 20 to 25 years and, overall, to build out all of the necessary parts for a functioning world-class petrochemicals sector in Iraq would require around US$40-50 billion,” he concluded.

Stop giving Iraqi Kurds a free pass on religious freedom

Masrour Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, describes himself as protector of religious minorities. Under his watch, the Kurdish government’s official website states, "some of the most vulnerable communities in the Middle East have been sheltered and protected. Erbil, the seat of the Kurdistan Region Parliament is now home to a thriving community of Middle East Christians who have been granted long term refuge from persecution." That myth is not the reality Yezidis, Christians and other minorities experience in Iraqi Kurdistan. Take the Yezidis: It was the duplicity of both Masrour and father Masoud that allowed the Yezidi genocide to occur. Masoud sold arms to the Islamic State to weaken Baghdad rivals. He never expected blowback on Kurdistan. The Islamic State’s rise may have surprised the West, but not Yezidis. Masrour refused Yezidi requests to reinforce their villages or provide Yezidis weapons to defend themselves. When the Islamic State overran Yezidi villages, Masrour’s forces not only fled but also then diverted much of the weaponry donated to fight the Islamic State. Had it not been for Barzani cowardice, there would have been no Yezidi genocide. To this day, Masrour refuses to release airport manifests to protect the reputation of family and friends who tried to flee. The Barzanis collect cash to rebuild Yezidi villages in Sinjar and Christian communities, but impede free movement to prevent the return of any who do not subordinate themselves to Barzani political domination. NGOs cannot operate independently. Yezidis say that even Nadia Murad, who won the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize because of her advocacy on behalf of the Yezidis, cannot speak openly for fear of reprisals by Masrour and his violent younger brother, Waysi, against the community. While land-grabbing by Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias impede the return of Christians to ancestral villages, Barzani’s political party and peshmerga do the same as they enrich themselves with land speculation. This fits a long pattern. When Pope Francis flew into Erbil, he appeared unaware that Barzani’s government seized much of the lands surrounding the airport from Christians with neither warning nor reimbursement. Barzani cronies built many of the malls and housing projects on confiscated Christian property. To complain is to face arrest. Many Christians still hold deeds to land subsequently confiscated in and around the Barzani stronghold of Duhok and Zakho. Barzani’s militias harass to compel eviction. For example, they moved a checkpoint to force Christians around Alqosh to drive two hours in order to access their own farmland five minutes away. Other discrimination is evident. Christian villages often have bad roads and no streetlights, while neighboring Kurdish communities have paved roads and ample electricity. The Barzanis refuse to grant permits for Christians to build or expand houses and businesses unless they first contract Barzani-loyalists and Muslim partners, and often overrule local governments on the construction of new water systems. Masrour’s administration forces Assyrian children to go to Kurdish and Muslim schools by refusing to fund schools in Christian villages. He refuses to allow the Akitu and Nassiban Assyrian schools in Dohuk to expand on their own land. Most recently, Assyrian activists say Masrour’s government now bans the word "Assyrian" in the name of new businesses. What the Barzanis describe as religious freedom is really the manifestation of a deeply inculcated sense of supremacy. They approach Yezidis and Christians as dhimmi, second class citizens whose freedom of religion depends upon a willingness to subordinate themselves to the de facto sultan’s rule. Those who oppose the Barzanis politically, enjoy greatly diminished religious rights. The fact that Congress gives the Kurdistan Regional Government a free pass on religious freedom violations only encourages Masrour to double down on discrimination. Enough is enough. It is time Secretary of State Antony Blinken place Iraqi Kurdistan on the State Department’s religious freedom watch list. Michael Rubin is a contributor to the Washington Examiner's Beltway Confidential. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Iraqi Kurdistan Gas Resources: The Icarus Adventure

Sardar Aziz In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), gas is a relatively new industry rapidly growing in importance. The region has a massive amount of gas, accounting for an estimated 3 percent of global reserves. Domestic, regional, and international demand for gas is increasing for several reasons. Despite this potential, the sector faces many local, national, regional, and international challenges. Some of the region’s influential players are irritated that the gas could empower the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This article investigates the significance of this emerging industry and its various challenges. Introduction The gas sector in Iraqi Kurdistan is receiving much attention these days, perhaps too much. The entire industry is still in its early stages and has yet to meet local demands. The three attacks on the Khor Mor[1] natural gas field in Sulaymaniyah Governorate in June and July 2022 were one of these puzzling events that affected the industry’s prospects. On July 26, the attacks occurred again,[2] albeit under different circumstances. So far, no one has claimed responsibility, and neither the KRG authorities nor the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) as a local power holder, nor the Iraqi Government nor US governments is willing to blame anyone directly. Several new issues in the region and beyond have complicated the mystery. The attack highlights the potential and challenges of Kurdistan’s gas development. This policy analysis attempts to evaluate this sector from political, economic, and geopolitical standpoints. Recently, the KRG gas sector has piqued the interest of regional powers like Iran, Turkey, and Gulf countries[3] and superpowers like the United States[4] and Russia.[5] While the Chinese are active in the region, they have not yet invested in its gas sector. According to the KRG Natural Resources Ministry,[6] the KRI region has 200 trillion cubic feet (5.67 trillion cubic meters) of natural gas reserves, accounting for approximately 3 percent of the world’s total reserves. While Kurdistan can “produce approximately 40 billion cubic meters (BCM) per year of marketable (sales) natural gas by the mid-2030s,” according to a US Department of Energy Report,[7] the KRI’s current marketed natural gas production is limited to one non-associated (Khor Mor/Sulaymaniyah) and one associated (Khurmala/Erbil) gas field. According to the report,[8] “fractured carbonate reservoirs with hard-to-predict performance; the need for expensive sour gas processing; and mountainous terrain, commercial and economic challenges, and unclear or contradictory corporate and government objectives” are among the reasons for the lack of production in the other fields. Unlike oil, gas has no history and is not regarded as a mythical substance by the elites or the general public. However, it has emerged in a meteoric fashion, and its significance has grown alongside national, regional, and international developments. Furthermore, as public awareness of climate change and air quality grows, gas becomes a viable alternative to petrol, diesel, and kerosene. This is in addition to other factors such as rapid urbanization, car culture, and energy waste due to outdated infrastructure. While Iraq relies primarily on gas to generate electricity due to climate change (hot summers, reduced rainfall, and draughts) and social changes (lifestyle and expectations), society demands more and more electricity, not to mention the waste of electricity due to old infrastructure. Furthermore, the rise of a modern lifestyle (car culture) and economy consume a growing amount of energy, including gas. Other factors influencing energy consumption in Kurdistan include internally-displaced people[9] (IDP) and migration. The KRI controls the majority of Iraq’s non-associated gas fields. As a result, it will be a close and feasible gas source for Iraq. Gas Politics and Administration Following the Khor Mor attacks, it became clear that the primary targets were the field’s planned expansion,[10] financially supported by the US government. While denying any anti-Iran motivations for backing the field, the latter hopes the KRI will export gas to the rest of Iraq and possibly Turkey.[11] However, Iran and its proxies do not view this goal favorably. The attacks created security, political, energy, and market environment that combined KRI, Bagdad, and Iran. As a result, any action these parties take in these areas impacts others directly and indirectly. For these reasons, oil and gas are considered game changers in Kurdistan. It has been argued[12] that energy has the potential to change the nature of the Kurdish question because it is no longer used as a tool for political stability or a proxy force. With the emergence of oil and gas, KRI gained energy security and economic and political values, particularly following the signing of an agreement between Ankara and Erbil in November 2013, as Gareth Stansfield[13] put it in 2014. Behind all these developments, there is a man called Ashti Hawrami. He was appointed Natural Resources Minister in May 2006 and was instrumental in developing the KRG energy vision. He was a former Iraqi National Oil Company engineer who worked for the British National Oil Company in the North Sea. This contrasts sharply with most of his colleagues in Baghdad’s Ministry of Oil, who had no private-sector experience and had never worked outside Iraq. Hawrami was invited by the PUK, which later allied with the KDP and advocated for investor-friendly[14] policies, production-sharing contracts (PSC), and block allocation. His direction has hastened the development of the Kurdish energy sector. His confrontational approach toward Baghdad hampered the resolution of the various oil-related disputes. Unless someone like Hawrami is understood, any attempt to comprehend the KRG’s oil and gas projects would be futile. Hawrami was an oil expert. It has been claimed that Dana Gas’s problems were caused by his lack of experience in the gas industry. Bilal Wahab,[15] a Washington Institute fellow and Kurdistan energy sector expert, said Hawrami’s strategy was to sign as many contracts as possible with wildcatters and small companies in a short time. He hoped to pave the way for medium and large international oil companies (IOC) to follow. In a relatively short time, he could place Kurdistan on the global energy map (a phrase that became a sort of slogan in the KRG for a while) and attract oil and gas companies of various sizes and from various countries, including Exxon, Chevron, Total, Gazprom, and Shell.[16] Ashty Hawrami was portrayed as a man carrying his ministry in a bag, a common manifestation of personal importance and a lack of institutional support. While there was an Oil and Gas Council, “he became the Council’s de facto sole decisionmaker because he was the only person with extensive background and expertise in the oil and gas industry.”[17] As a result, ministries dominated the emerging petroleum governance model. This, combined with a lack of adequate institutional building, expertise, history, and a polarized political environment, fit Hawrami’s vision of a one-man ministry. The opposition’s relationship with him was complicated. “At first, he tried to accommodate and manage us,” said Ali Hama-Salih,[18] an independent MP from Kurdistan’s parliament, “but when we criticized him for personal gain through various contracts, he ended the relationship.” He was close to a faction within the KDP, and when that faction left the government’s executive branch, he was marginalized and disappeared. KRG Gas Contract Models and Companies Except for Khor Mor, a profit-sharing contract, the rest of the KRG’s contracts are production-sharing contracts (PSC). The KRG was forced to use the production share contract model to attract international gas companies due to a lack of capital, infrastructure, and expertise. This model differs from Baghdad’s central government’s risk service contract regime. Many people would prefer PSC in Baghdad, but the close relationship between oil and nationalism would prevent that. Notably, in contrast to the KRG fields, the risk in major Iraqi fields is low. “Under the PSC model, KRG, as the owner of the petroleum, engages international oil companies (IOCs) as contractors to provide technical and financial services for exploration and development operations.”[19] This applies to gas too. Gas is more capital intensive, time-consuming, and thus riskier than oil. When the PSC places the entire exploration risk on the IOCs, the KRG is saved from an adventure it cannot afford. If PSC criticism is justified in the case of oil, it is less so for gas. Without PSC, it is difficult to entice companies to risk their capital in an area fraught with legal, geological, and security risks. Unlike the oil sector, the KRG gas sector has not attracted major international companies, except Rosneft, which is not directly involved in exploration. It is focused on exports and pipelines, with little or no progress. Crescent Petroleum and its affiliates, Dana Gas in Khor Mor, Genel Energy in Bina Bawi, and Miran, are leading gas companies. Following a lengthy and costly arbitration between KRG and Dana Gas, the development of the Khor Mor gas sector was halted. In October 2013, Dana Gas and KRG began the arbitration process. The former accused the KRG of paying too little for gas liquid production. The KRG was forced to pay Dana Gas US$ 1 billion before the 2017 referendum. Dana Gas received additional benefits in addition to the financial award, such as an extension to the Khor Mor block boundaries, investment opportunities in new blocks, and the length of the licenses being extended by 12 years, with the licenses now expiring in 2049.[20] Furthermore, following the arbitration, the initial contract between the two parties was changed into a profit-sharing arrangement to bring it “in line with that received by other international oil companies operating in the region,” according to the company. KRG Cabinet Secretary and Chief Legal Advisor Amanj Raheem said, “the contract is now more akin to a service contract that the central government follows.”[21] Dana Gas was not the only company that the KRG had issues with. On December 12, 2021, the KRG stated that it would “vigorously defend any [compensation] claim”[22] made by Anglo-Turkish Genel Energy in connection with the termination of the PSCs for the Bina Bawi and Miran fields. Genel believes the KRG’s notice of intent to terminate is invalid. The company seeks compensation from an international arbitration court in London for the KRG’s termination of the production sharing contracts at the two fields.”[23] Erbil-Baghdad Gas Relationships Unlike oil, gas was once considered the glue that held Erbil and Baghdad together. KRG gas was viewed as “the major contributor and can almost entirely replace Iranian imports, except during the summer months, when peak demand will necessitate a small volume of Iranian natural gas,”[24] supplier and replacer at a lower price. KRG gas is more appealing than Iranian gas, let alone the complex geopolitical aspect of it. This may become less realistic after the Iraqi oil ministry added Russia’s Gazprom and the UAE’s Dana Gas to its list of legal targets in a campaign to invalidate the KRG’s contracts with international oil companies on August 9, 2022.[25] In terms of natural resources, there is a de-facto KRG energy sector, but achieving a de-jure situation has been difficult thus far. This formula is the foundation of the Erbil-Baghdad relationship. The KRG requested negotiations and a deal with Baghdad, the latter for political reasons, especially given the current complicated situation, pushing for control or using it to change political behavior. Baghdad has recently gone to extremes, endangering the entire process. Some see it as a zero-sum game, while others see it as a win-win situation.[26] This is significant on constitutional, legal, political, and regional levels. The constitution serves as the primary framework for guiding the relationship. According to Article 112 of the Iraqi Constitution, the oil and gas sector must be regulated by law. However, no such legislation has been enacted to date. The Council of Ministers approved an initial draft[27] of oil and gas law in February 2007, which was later revised in April 2007. The 2007 draft law was never enacted due to disagreements over its terms. In 2011, a revised draft of the law was presented to the Council of Ministers[28] but it has yet to be enacted. Currently, the country is in a political impasse,[29] which gives little hope of passing any laws. The passage of the oil and gas law by the Federal Parliament is seen as one way out of the current crisis between Baghdad and Erbil. However, since the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court’s decision on February 15, 2022, to declare the entire KRG oil and gas sector illegal, the relationship has grown more distrustful and punitive. The court decision, among other things, purports to (i) repeal the Kurdistan Region Oil and Gas Law (No. 22 of 2007), based on which the KRG has entered into production sharing contracts (PSCs) with international oil companies, (ii) rule that the federal ministry of oil is entitled to pursue the nullification of any contracts entered into by the KRG with third parties regarding oil exploration, extraction, export, and sale, (iii) rule that the Ministry of Oil and the Federal Board of Supreme Audit is entitled to review and revise any oil contracts entered into by the KRG; and (iv) order the KRG to hand over to the federal government all oil production it has extracted from oilfields.[30] The ruling ends oil federalism[31] and signals a dangerous return to centralization, leading to authoritarianism. If Baghdad attempts to limit or control the KRG gas sector, the regional countries and international powers have different priorities. The KRG has recently progressed from de facto to de jure status. This has resulted in a mindset and a role model for the Kurdish political elite; in other words, if they can establish a de facto reality, they will be able to negotiate and obtain legal recognition. This is how the KRG came to be: de facto status from 1992 to 2005 and constitutional recognition from 2005 to the present. This framework applies to the gas industry also. KDP and PUK Gas Relationship Natural resources, including gas, are governed by the Ministry of Natural Resources in the KRG. The ministry has yet to establish a Gas Directorate in charge of policy, strategy, regulation, enforcement, supply security, and external affairs. Furthermore, gas is emerging when the KRI as a region and polity is experiencing severe polarization. In general, the KRG follows legal and governing principles similar to the federal constitution, such as government ownership of natural resources. The KRG, on the other hand, struggles to be a unified government. It is officially divided into two zones of influence: the KDP zone (Yellow Zone) and the PUK zone (Green Zone), a relic of the 1990s Kurdish civil war.[32] The two zones have unequal gas and oil distribution. The PUK zone contains most of the gas fields, including Khor Mor. The shift in focus to the gas sector, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has widened the schism between the two major political parties. Recently, gas has emerged as the primary issue between the two parties. While the KDP advocates exporting gas not only to Turkey but also to Europe,[33] the PUK opposes this. Bafel Jalal Talabani, the new PUK leader, has been outspoken about it. He recently said that “only through my dead body can it [gas] be exported, and this is a demand of the Kurdish masses.”[34] While the PUK may have the land (territory) and armed groups to provide or threaten security in Khor Mor and other fields, the KDP has institutional, legal, and de facto ruling authority over contract signing and sector governance, according to Bilal Wahab. This political, governing, and economic division is expanding as both parties establish large corporations such as Kar[35] (KDP) and Qaiwan (PUK).[36] The KAR Group is also involved in oil and gas transportation, refineries, and pipeline construction. It was founded in 1999 in Erbil,[37] where its headquarters is located. It owns the Khurmala Oil Field and the Erbil Refinery. The KAR has a 40 percent stake in a pipeline infrastructure project in the KRG, being implemented in collaboration with the Russian company Rosneft. [38] Qaiwan was founded in 1993 in Sulaymaniyah as a multi-sector holding active in the energy sector. The two large corporations represent a new era of party-affiliated businesses. High-level party officials have confirmed this.[39] The two major parties are struggling to overcome the legacy of the civil war. This has several negative consequences for the gas industry. “Resource dependence tends to make countries more vulnerable to civil war,”[40] according to the literature. Before the discovery of natural resources, Kurdistan experienced civil war, which hampered the development of inclusive [41] institutions required for natural resource governance and, eventually, growth. The disparity between nominal people’s ownership and actual government or elite benefits has led to public disillusionment. People expect petrol and gas to be cheap, necessitating government subsidies, which the World Bank[42] and other institutions are hesitant to recommend. As a result of this disparity, there are public outrages, a rise in gasoline prices and price volatility, exporting from abroad,[43] and demonstrations. These confirm the region’s failure to prepare for such a seismic shift: the region’s economy is not free, the car culture is an old habit that dies hard, a lack of awareness of environmental consequences, a sense of entitlement, and, most importantly, poor public transportation. Meanwhile, there are indications that the high price of gasoline has influenced consumer behavior, with people opting for small cars and hybrids, as Aram Kokoy,[44]Assistant Lecturer at Komar University of Science and Technology and economic observer, informed me. Economic Aspects of KRG Gas KRG Gas appears to be promising but faces numerous obstacles. The region could hold up to 200 trillion cubic feet (5.67 trillion cubic meters) of natural gas reserves, accounting for roughly 3 percent of global reserves.[45] According to the KRG ministry of natural resources, this places Kurdistan in a prominent position in regional and global gas markets. If this sector grows smoothly, it “could result in gross external revenues to the KRG of around US$ 4 billion annually by 2032, and net revenues (after costs and financing) of around US$ 1.2 billion annually.”[46] Aside from domestic demand, Turkey and Iraq are potential markets. In 2013, the KRG and Turkey signed what is known locally as the 50-year agreement. So far, the actual content is largely unknown. However, according to sources, it “solidifies Kurdistan’s role as Turkey’s major strategic energy partner. Under the gas sales agreement (GSA), the KRG will ultimately sell 20 billion cubic meters annually (bcma) of natural gas to Turkey – nearly half of the country’s current consumption – at a price that significantly undercuts Turkey’s other major suppliers.”[47] The region is having difficulty locating the necessary capital and markets. While the current gas market and Kurdistan’s geographic proximity to Turkey and potentially Europe could have enticed multinationals, legal impediments and security have created sufficient barriers to prevent that from happening. Exporting to Turkey before satisfying domestic demand is problematic from a public demand standpoint. As a result, Iraq is the most viable domestic market. By 2030, Iraq’s natural gas demand is expected to reach 60 BCM/y, primarily for power generation but with an increasing share for industrial use. KRG gas could compete with Iranian gas in terms of price and viability: KRG gas may be less expensive and more reliable than Iranian gas. Gas-to-power is one area that is already taking shape. Kirkuk already has limited access to the Kurdistan electricity grid. There are also three new/expanded connections to Mosul. Iraq’s demographic boom, climate situation, and urbanization make it a desirable destination. KRG Gas: The Geopolitical Factors Regional powers see the development of the gas sector as part of the KRG’s empowerment. Gas has a higher geopolitical value than oil. The oil relationship could be terminated or transferred in more than one way at any time. Gas, on the other hand, is expensive to transport and export. Gas contracts are long-term, and the receiving country has difficulty quickly switching to other sources or diversifying. Iran is most likely concerned about the KRG’s gas development. Energy consultant Harry Istepanian [48] contends that “Kurdistan has close to 40 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves from 14 oil and gas fields, while Iran has 1,200 trillion cubic feet of proven reserves, ranking second in the world and accounting for approximately 17 percent of the world’s total natural gas reserves of 6,923 Tcf. I do not see how Kurdistan gas could endanger Iranian gas.” Notably, Iran is concerned about something other than obvious traditional market competition. It is concerned about the KRG’s empowerment, particularly the possibility of the latter becoming the source of gas supply to the rest of Iraq, thereby ending Iraq’s reliance on imported gas from Iran. Furthermore, Iran is concerned about the KRG PM’s statements about KRG gas exports to Turkey and Europe, as Turkey is one of Iran’s leading clients. During the Khor Mor attacks, this became clear. The main goal of the attacks was to halt the US$ 640 million expansion, partially funded by a US$ 250 million loan from the US International Development Finance Corporation.[49] Iran has long attempted to harm the developing KRI gas sector by linking it to Israel.[50] “Israeli-Kurdish cooperation provides Iran with a useful narrative,” writes Amatzia Baram.[51] Many people who would otherwise ignore the gas industry are drawn in by such a story. If Iran opposes the sector’s development, Turkey will consider importing gas from KRG. Turkey has pursued a policy of becoming a gas hub [52] for Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries over the last decade. Ankara’s relationship with the KRG is hazy at best. The two parties signed a 50-year agreement in 2013: while everyone is aware of it, very few are aware of its actual content. Over the last decade, both parties have expressed a desire to trade oil and gas. So far, the gas portion is merely a wish. One distinguishing feature of KRG geopolitics is the KRG’s difficulty in maintaining equal relationships with more than one neighboring country simultaneously; for instance, the KRI relationship with Turkey is one of the core issues in the Erbil-Baghdad relationship. This is especially difficult when neighboring countries have a geopolitical rivalry, as Iran and Turkey do. Furthermore, the PUK and other KDP opponents [PKK] oppose Turkey-KRG relations. On a global scale, the US is assisting in developing KRI’s gas sector in several ways. During the Trump administration, the US Department of Energy conducted one of the most comprehensive assessments of the KRG gas sector. The report[53] is extensive and somewhat technical. Nonetheless, it is a show of administration support. More importantly, the United States is contributing financially to the expansion of the Khor Mor gas field, the largest in the region. While US diplomats try to separate KRI’s gas development from US policy toward Iran,[54] the latter remains skeptical. The fact that KRI can supply gas to the rest of Iraq and Turkey is enough to anger Iran. While Iranian involvement is multifaceted, Russian engagement with KRI’s gas sector is limited, primarily geopolitical. The involvement in the KRG’s energy sector has resulted in several contracts for oil and gas pipelines. It aims to “transform Erbil, a long-standing US ally, into an important partner for Moscow as Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to expand his influence in the Middle East.”[55] Furthermore, the gas pipeline contract is designed to maintain Russia’s monopoly on EU gas imports [prior to the Russia-Ukraine war] while limiting the EU’s diversification capacity. While the EU talked about diversification,[56] it did little on the ground. For infrastructure, quantity, Iranian and Russian involvement, and their impact on the sector, not to mention Iraq’s legal and political challenges, talking about exporting KRG gas to Europe is, at best, a pipe dream now. According to Clarisse Pásztory, former head of the EU liaison office in Erbil, “the EU could have made a strategic investment in KRI/broader Iraq years ago, securing alternative gas supply routes and leveraging political influence at the same time, alas... instead we spent ‘humanitarian’ billions that only prolong their crises and don’t solve ours.”[57] Conclusions As illustrated above, the KRG gas sector is emerging, albeit with many challenges ahead. One of the major challenges is the bad blood between Baghdad and Erbil. The KRI and the central government are becoming increasingly interdependent. One way to reduce tensions between the two sides is to depoliticize the gas sector and treat it as a commercial commodity rather than a source of national pride or any other nationalist attachment. This is difficult to imagine now as energy facilities as strategic assets are increasingly becoming the primary target of those attempting to put pressure on the KRI. Furthermore, local and regional tensions, rapid urbanization, and a deteriorating climate will increase gas demand and consumption in Iraq and Kurdistan. Putting political differences aside to improve energy relations is a win-win situation. Following the KRG PM’s visit to Baghdad, there are hints in this direction, but it remains to be seen. More than ever, Iraq needs to pass an oil and gas law. Aside from the complex relationship with Baghdad, Kurdistan’s local and domestic relationships also challenge the gas sector’s development. This division has invited tribal groups to request a payoff, putting a strain on the sector’s revenue while on the national and regional level, resulting in further obstacles to developing the sector. When it comes to gas, the two Kurdish factions have opposing goals. These objectives are not incompatible, but tensions are high for reasons other than gas management. The direct influence of regional players – Iran in the case of PUK and Turkey in the case of KDP – plays a significant role in stimulating and challenging the sector. Iran does not want KRI gas to be perceived as another diverse source for the Turkish market, despite Iran being a supplier. Russia and Iran share this goal. Meanwhile, domestic gas demand will skyrocket in Kurdistan and Iraq as climate change, draughts, heat, and urbanization contribute to increased gas consumption. The current consumption pattern and energy-intensive lifestyle will be unsustainable. KRI must fly cautiously and avoid getting too close to potential hazards, as the title alludes to the Greek myth of Icarus. KRI must establish more institutions to manage the gas sector to avoid repeating the oil experience. Society’s support is critical for the industry’s legitimacy. [1] Douglas A. Ollivant, Barzani Goes to Baghdad: Trouble in the Kurdish Oil and Gas Sector, Warontherocks.com, July 18, 2022: https://cutt.ly/6XKmL7j [2] Oil Ministry puts Gazprom, Dana Gas in legal crosshairs, Iraq Oil Report, August 9, 2022: https://www.iraqoilreport.com/?p=45054 [3] PM Masrour Barzani meets with Emirati counterpart, GOV.KRD, March 23, 2022: https://cutt.ly/QXKQIOU [4] UAE’s Dana Gas secures US agency funding for Iraqi Kurdistan project, Reuters, September 8, 2021: https://cutt.ly/SXKQZkN [5] https://cutt.ly/fXKQ7Gw [6] Ministry of Natural Resources, GOV.KRD: https://cutt.ly/YXKWpEa [7] Opportunities to Strengthen the Natural Gas Sector in the Iraq Kurdistan Region: Qamar Energy, September 8, 2021: https://cutt.ly/PXKWR1u [8] Ibid. [9] DTM: Urban Displacement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Relief Web, February 25, 2021: https://cutt.ly/LXLdPgE [10] https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/khor-mor-expansion-suspended-after-rocket-attacks-44943/ [11] Maha El Dahan and Riham Alkousaa, Iraqi Kurdistan has energy capacity to help Europe, says Iraqi Kurdish PM, Reuters, March 28, 2022: https://cutt.ly/NXLdXCW [12] Gareth Stansfield, The Transformational Effects of the Oil and Gas Strategy Of The Kurdistan Regional Government Of Iraq, Center for International Studies, April 2014: https://cutt.ly/xXLfKYB [13] Ibid. [14] Robin Mills, 2016, Kurdish Oil and Regional Politics: A Brief History of Oil and Gas in the Kurdish Region of Iraq Under the Mountains: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. [15] Phone interview with Bilal Wahab, July 4. [16] Minister Hawrami speaks at the launch of the Kurdistan Oil and Gas Yearbook 2014, Ministry of Natural Resources, Yearbook 2014: https://cutt.ly/KXLjvPn [17] Khazal Abdullah Auzer, 2017, Institutional Design and Capacity to Enhance Effective Governance of Oil and Gas Wealth: The Case of Kurdistan Region, Springer. [18] Phone interview with Ali Hama Salih, independent MP [former Gorran (Change) movement MP]. 2 July, 2022 [19] Khazal Abdullah Auzer: 2017. Institutional Design and Capacity to Enhance Effective Governance of Oil and Gas Wealth: The Case of Kurdistan Region, Springer. [20] Operations KRI, Dana Gas, https://cutt.ly/rXLlG2H [21] Interview with Amanj Rahim, July 6, 2022. [22] KRG vows to fight any legal action by Genel Energy, Insight Iraq, December 12, 2021: https://cutt.ly/JXLz9Gt [23] Genel Energy ‘comfortable’ with the risk profile of operating in Iraqi Kurdistan, S&P Global Commodity Insights, March 15, 2022: https://cutt.ly/6XLxp4W [24] Opportunities to Strengthen the Natural Gas Sector in the Iraq Kurdistan Region: Qamar Energy, September 8, 2021: https://cutt.ly/PXKWR1u [25] Oil Ministry puts Gazprom, Dana Gas in legal crosshairs, Iraq Oil Report, August 9, 2022: https://cutt.ly/nXLx1Qx [26] Michael Knights, The Necessary US Role in Fixing the Baghdad-Kurdistan Energy Dispute, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 27, 2022: https://cutt.ly/kXLcSIm [27] https://www.aljazeera.net/2007/10/19/نص-قانون-النفط-والغاز-العراقي-لعام-2007 [28] Christopher B. Strong, The Oil and Gas Law Review: Iraq, The Law Reviews, November 3, 2021: https://cutt.ly/aXLc8ao [29] The Simmering Standoff Between Shia Parties in Iraq, The Emirates Policy Center, May 23, 2022: https://epcenter.ae/3ySUBmA [30] Gibson Dunn, Recent Iraqi Supreme Court Decision Likely to Trigger Investment Arbitration Claims, June 17, 2022: https://cutt.ly/cXLbr3c [31] Bilal Wahab, The Death of Oil Federalism? Implications of a New Iraqi Court Ruling, The Washington Institute of Near East Policy, February 18, 2022: https://cutt.ly/yXLbzwg [32] Michael M. Gunter, The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq, Middle East Journal, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328927 [33] Maha El Dahan and Riham Alkousaa, Iraqi Kurdistan has energy capacity to help Europe, says Iraqi Kurdish PM, Reuters, March 28, 2022: https://cutt.ly/VXLnniP [34] Bafel Jalal Talabani: We will not stand idly in the face of injustice, PUKNOW, April 29, 2022: https://cutt.ly/WXLnStL [35] https://www.kar-group.com [36] https://www.qaiwangroup.com [37] https://www.rwangaforas.com/Kurdish/details.aspx?ExibitorId=105 [38] Rosneft to Build New Kurdistan Oil Pipeline, Iraq Business News, October 20, 2017: https://cutt.ly/HXLmAUj [39] Bafel Jalal Talabani: We will not stand idly in the face of injustice, PUKNOW, April 29, 2022: https://cutt.ly/WXLnStL [40] Prof. Michael Ross, Natural Resources and Civil War: An Overview, World Bank Research Observer, August 15, 2003: https://cutt.ly/3XLQrAp [41] Daron Acemoglu, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, https://cutt.ly/wXLQda5 [42] Energy Subsidy Reform Facility: The World Bank, NOVEMBER 12, 2020: https://cutt.ly/9XLQvNW [43]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHQboodUPYw [44] Phone interview with Aram Kokoy, August 14, 2022. [45] https://gov.krd/mnr-en/publications/gas/ [46] Robin Mills, 2016, Kurdish Oil and Regional Politics: A Brief History of Oil and Gas in the Kurdish Region of Iraq Under the Mountains: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. [47] Ben Van Heuvelen, Turkey, Kurdistan cement massive energy deal, Iraq Oil Report, November 29, 2013: https://cutt.ly/5XLW2lE [48] Exchange with Harry Istepanian via Twitter messenger July 1, 2022. [49] Mohammed Hussein and Lizzie Porter of Iraq Oil Report, June 25, 2022: https://cutt.ly/BXLU1CX [50] Ahmed Rasheed and Orhan Coskun, Iran struck Iraq target over gas talks involving Israel – officials, Reuters, March 28, 2022: https://cutt.ly/IXLIdC9 [51] Amatzia Baram, Iraq at a crossroads: Kurdish energy competition with Iran, GIS Report Online, JUNE 14, 2022: https://cutt.ly/FXLIUGD [52] Turkey’s Gas Hub Plans, European Gas Hub, https://cutt.ly/qXLIVVh [53] Opportunities to Strengthen the Natural Gas Sector in the Iraq Kurdistan Region: Qamar Energy, September 8, 2021: https://cutt.ly/PXKWR1u [54] Matthew Zais, Barozh Aziz, Rob Waller, Gas in Iraqi Kurdistan: Market Realities, Geopolitical Opportunities, The Washington Institute for Near East Studies, Jan 21, 2021: https://cutt.ly/lXLO0zV [55] Dmitry Zhdannikov, Rosneft boosts clout in Iraqi Kurdistan with gas pipeline deal, Reuters, May 25, 2018: https://cutt.ly/3XLPaeq [56] Diversification of gas supply sources and routes, European Commission: https://cutt.ly/SXLPxkJ [57] http//twitter.com/clarissimata/status/1476111437294624768?s=21&t=DTSudJLfC4iDWCreYs088A

Kurdish diaspora asks Canada to help prevent another genocide

by Diary Marif - newcanadianmedia Given Canada's and the international community's refusal to deem Anfal a genocide, 34 years later the Kurdish diaspora is still worried of a repeat attack. Hardi Darwesh was just five years old when, by a stroke of fortune, his family managed to flee the Kurdish area in northern Iraq where Iraqi intelligence officers would kill thousands of men while taking the women and girls. “In the evening, I was playing with my friends when a vehicle brought back some dead bodies. Everyone screamed and immediately left and escaped all night,” he told New Canadian Media. Darwesh is one of the few who escaped the Anfal campaign — also known as the Anfal genocide — that Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s former president, ordered on the north of the country 34 years ago. The attacks lasted from Feb. 23 until Sept. 6, 1988, with up to 182,000 civilians killed or disappeared, and 90 per cent of the villages looted and ravaged in the Garmian Region in northern Iraq. Today, Darwesh is a Canadian citizen living in Vancouver, British Columbia, thousands of miles away from the country in which he was born. But the memories of the events still traumatize and haunt him, giving him nightmares for years, he says, as ongoing wars robbed him of his childhood forever. “I think we all need psychological treatment to alleviate our pain and trauma,” he says, adding that he can still hear the screams of women and girls, and the sounds of warplanes and military vehicles still echo in his mind. According to Britannica, genocide is defined as: “The deliberate and systematic destruction of a group of people because of their ethnicity, nationality, religion, or race.” By 2007, the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal decided the definition fit and ruled Anfal to have been a genocide against the Kurds. According to the 2016 census, there are 16,315 Kurds living in Canada who’ve immigrated from Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. But the Canadian government has refused to recognize Anfal as a genocide, despite calls from the diaspora to do so. That’s partly why 34 years later, Kurds in Canada continue expressing worry about another such attack. And as the situation deteriorates in Iraq, with civilian anger increasing over unpaid salaries, unemployment and a lack of basic services, with neither the Iraqi nor the Iraqi-Kurdish governments providing support, many feel they are being left to fend for themselves. With recently reported threats against Kurdistan from neighbouring countries like Turkey and Iran, Darwesh says he fears history might be repeating itself. Not so much fear but anger In 2010, three years after the official recognition of Anfal as a genocide, the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal issued arrest warrants for 258 accused Kurdish Mustashars (collaborators) for their involvement during the Anfal campaign and sent the warrants to the relevant authorities in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). To date, neither the Iraqi government nor the KRG have taken any action. Khaled Sulaiman, a Montreal-based environmental journalist, came to Canada several years ago with his family from the town of Kalar, in the west of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, at the epicentre of the Anfal genocide. For him, the possibility of another Anfal evokes not so much fear but anger towards the local Kurdish authorities for what he sees as their inaction. “Partisan, regional and individual interests have dominated the interest of the Kurdish people. The rulers in Kurdistan have become billionaires as a result of corruption and misuse of power, while the families of the Anfal victims live in poverty and destitution,” he says. Another reason why people are furious with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is that the two main parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have opted to protect former collaborators and advisors who aided the Ba‘ath regime during the genocide. International community’s duplicity Like Canada, the international community has also not recognized the genocide, as it has with other genocides such as the Holocaust. This, says Sulaiman, also put Kurds at further risk by silencing the killings of tens of thousands of Kurdish women, children and men at the hands of Hussein’s regime. “In view of their interests with the countries occupying Kurdistan, the international actors consider the Kurdish issue only as a card that can be used at the appropriate time,” he says. “Today, we see how Turkey practises a similar policy against the Kurds … and no one says ‘no’ to (President Recep Tayyip) Erdogan’s politics against the Kurds … It is absolute hypocrisy and duplicity.” Darwesh says if the Canadian government recognized the genocide, it would be a big step towards compelling the international community to act to expand the protection of local human rights. Misusing the term The term Al-Anfal is the name of the eighth Sura (chapter) of the Quran, meaning “The Spoils of War,” and it’s used in the Quran to refer to the clash between the Meccan disbelievers and Muslims in the battle of Badr in 624 AD. According to the Quran, the Muslims won that war and God told the Muslim prophet Muhammad, “The booty is in fact a bounty from God thus they should be mindful of Him and obey Him.” However, Ba’ath authorities, who have traditionally held socialist leanings, have misused the term to claim they were quelling a rebellion ignited by Kurds who sided with the enemy during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war from 1980-88. But the Kurd’s crime was simply being Kurds in Iraq. According to a 2004 Human Rights Watch report, since 1975 the former Iraqi government engaged in a policy known as “Arabization” which saw “hundreds of thousands of Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians (displaced) from their homes” and replaced with “Arab settlers.” “Although the aims of the Anfal campaign was not Arabization — the aim was genocide — in its aftermath Kurds were not allowed to return to their destroyed villages,” the report elaborates. “Their property rights, too, were invalidated, and Arabs were brought to settle and farm some of their lands.” Never forgetting Three years after the Anfal genocide, the Kurds overthrew Hussein’s regime in Kurdistan and elected their own, independent government, enabling the people, full of hope and expectation, to return to their ravaged villages and towns. Their dreams and hopes came to fruition when the Kurdish authorities declared an amnesty for all who collaborated on the overthrow. But they failed to give the families of the victims a pension for what they’d endured or to help them rebuild their houses and lives. Sulaiman, who lost some of his relatives during Anfal, says though the memories are painful, he carries them with him everywhere, to never forget the attempted genocide of his people. “I miss my family members more — my uncles, their wives and children, and childhood friends,” he says. “Whenever I remember Anfal, I invoke the souls of my loved ones. Their pictures accompany me wherever I am, in Montreal or in Kurdistan.” Diary Marif is an Iraqi Kurdish journalist based in Vancouver, Canada. His writing has appeared in the Awene weekly, Livin, and on KNNC TV as a documentary researcher by the name Diary Khalid. Diary earned a master's degree in History from Pune University, in India, in 2013. He moved to Vancouver in 2017, where he has been focusing on nonfiction writing. He can be found on Twitter: @diary_khalid.

Ukraine war as a gateway to hell for Rojeva Kurdistan!

Honar Jasim Saleh First of all, we must start with the danger that after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the political boundaries and borders of regions and states will no longer be protected, especially those with historical, geographical and political problems. That the influential states are trying to swallow their neighbors!. For example, Turkey dreams of crossing the border. Especially for Rojeva Kurdistan!. After Russia invaded Ukraine, on February the geostrategic map of the world in general and Europe in particular has changed. Especially the sovereignty of the country, because after the invasion of Ukraine, it became a reality that political springs are no longer easily protected and multipolar geopolitics, more dominant. Therefore, the question is what does the war in Ukraine have to do with the Kurds in general? Especially in Rojeva Kurdistan? The Turkish government has used all kinds of direct and indirect pressure on NATO countries, especially the United States, that Turkey has the right to reduce its threats, and the Turkish army must be open to crossing its borders. Turkey's demand has increased after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. To cross the political barriers, this is considered the gate of hell for the Kurds of Rojeva Kurdistan! ...................... Honar Jasim Saleh, political researcher and analyst on geopolitical changes in the Middle East. PhD student, honar lived in Germany

Youth-Led Movements Are the Ones to Watch in Lebanon and Iraq

Shayan Talabany Tony Blair Institute for Global Change The Lebanese parliamentary elections on 15 May were held three years into a debilitating financial and political crisis that has pushed many to emigrate and much of the remaining population into poverty. Despite the predictions of little change, the results surprised many. Several independent candidates won seats, revealing a vision for positive change in Lebanon, primarily led by the country’s dynamic youth. In many ways, this mirrors Iraq’s results in October 2021 when the election of a significant number of independent candidates exceeded expectations. Both countries, which share much in common, have lots to learn from each other, and both have a long way to go to address mounting popular agitation. In both countries, youth-led movements are now the ones to watch closely. In Lebanon, in spite of low voter turnout estimated at 41 per cent (almost identical to Iraq’s numbers), 13 independent opposition candidates, affiliated to Lebanon’s recent large-scale protest movement, managed to secure parliamentary seats. At least two of these were won in the south of the country, a challenging feat given the overwhelming presence and influence of Hizbullah, the Iran-linked Shia Islamist political and military organisation. There was also a remarkable number of female candidates although this did not translate into votes. The results are a culmination of years of dissatisfaction. In 2019, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese of all sects and backgrounds took to the streets in a series of protests known as the “Thawra” (revolution), calling for an end to the country’s confessional system that divides power between religious sects under a quota system. At the same time, 600 miles away, the “Tishreen” (“October”), Iraq’s largest protest movement since 2003, began. Like Lebanon, Iraq’s long list of grievances was heavily linked to the country’s inherently sectarian structure of governance that has protected the inept political elite overseeing the country for so long. For both Lebanon and Iraq, October 2019 represented the climax of years of progressive activism. Both the Lebanese and Iraqi movements hoped to usher in a new political class that would enact reforms to counter corruption and years of systemic political and economic negligence. In Lebanon, the protests forced the then-Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign and generated huge international support for political and economic reforms in the country. In Iraq, Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi was pushed to resign and a new government announced parliamentary elections that eventually took place in October 2021. Both countries’ elections exceeded expectations, with larger than expected wins for independents, despite less than half the eligible voters turning up to vote. Progressive movements in both countries can therefore learn from each other. Lebanon’s economy has eroded to the verge of collapse and successive leaders have failed to resolve the country’s numerous crises. Independent candidates and their support base posed a genuine threat to (and won seats from) candidates affiliated to the dominant parties and their foreign backers such as Iran. In some cases, they pushed out families and names that have been near constants in Lebanon’s political scene, including the Druze sect’s politician Talal Arslan who had held a seat for three decades, and Faisal Karami, son of former Prime Minister Omar Karami. The key for these independent MPs is to build a genuine opposition. Lack of a coherent political programme means they may struggle to coalesce but given that Sunday’s elections showed no clear majority for any group, an opposition alliance could play a substantial role in determining the country’s immediate future. There is also the question of Lebanon’s more traditional opposition figures and which way they will lean. Iraq’s newly elected independent MPs and more traditional opposition figures face similar questions and challenges, though they are further down the line from elections last October. The key challenge in both Iraq and Lebanon is maintaining momentum in the face of widespread disillusionment ahead of the next opportunity or election – which is easier said than done. While a lot has happened, not much has changed in the country since Iraq’s 2021 elections: there has been an attempted assassination of Iraq’s Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi; regressive forces continue to utilise formal and informal mechanisms to influence the formation of a government; and the once-flourishing Kurdistan region faces its own internal struggles. Overall, political negotiations remain in a harmful deadlock, with a government failing to form. Similarly, Lebanon’s new parliament will have to form a government, select a speaker, prime minister and eventually a president. Rumoured presidential candidates such as Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese forces, a former militia turned right-wing Christian party, are unlikely to bring about the changes necessary in the short term to alleviate Lebanon’s multitude of crises. This is a pivotal moment for both countries, with both progressive and regressive forces vying for influence amid an ever-growing list of short-term grievances that must be addressed while equally trying to forge a long-term trajectory for governance. Regressive forces operating in Iraq and Lebanon are not limited to the dominant Iran-linked Shia Islamist ruling parties. An urgent need for change has allowed controversial populist figures to play central roles in government-formation processes in recent years. They have positioned themselves as viable opposition to the status quo, criticising governance and elitism despite belonging in varying degrees to the same elite club. In Iraq, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the former leader of the Mahdi Army militia, won the most seats in the last election while the controversial figure Shaswar Abdulwahid of the Kurdish New Generation Movement now leads the largest Kurdish opposition party in Iraq. In Lebanon, Samir Geagea, rumoured presidential contender, described by many as a warlord, managed to increase his proportion of seats. Their electoral advances highlight the pull of populism in the Middle East. Sadr, Abdulwahid and Geagea have little in common ideologically, but they understand the escalating divides in their countries, not least those between young progressive modernisers in Iraq and Lebanon and their respective governments. The Tishreen uprising and the Thawra in Lebanon both evolved as leaderless, youth-driven, grassroots movements, at times joined by and, at others, opposed by populist forces. We should all watch the progress of this emerging generation, whose small yet effective wins could take them far, and nurture . their visions before ideological and governance vacuums are filled with more malign powers. Shayan Talabany Profile Shayan Talabany is an Analyst at the Tony Blair Institute (TBI) where she focuses on the international relations and politics of the Middle East, more specifically on Iraq and the Gulf. Prior to joining TBI, Shayan worked as a parliamentary researcher for a Conservative MP and as Head of Programmes for the Conservative Middle East Council (CMEC). Shayan lived in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq for almost a decade.

Ukraine wins the West's boundless sympathy, but did they forget Iraq?

The Russian invasion has laid bare the West's hypocrisy, piercing its tattered cloak of righteousness and morality On a sunny day in Chicago, former US presidents Bill Clinton and George W Bush make their way up a set of steps to the Saint Volodymyr and Olha Ukrainian church. They appear unfettered, dressed in fine sports jackets, not the striped prison pajamas befitting of their past actions. Gently, they place bouquets of sunflowers outside the church and stand in silence to honor the civilians being erased from existence by Russia’s war machine. What the audacious, short clip fails to show are the corpses of the forgotten Iraqis torn to shreds by the American war machine. Unlike Russian President Vladimir Putin’s crimes, those of Clinton and Bush came with global impunity. In a statement last month, Bush condemned the “unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine”, while Clinton’s former secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, wrote just weeks before her death that Putin was making a “historic mistake”. Unlike Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Iraq War was met with no sanctions or diatribes, receiving hardly a fraction of the condemnation we hear today. In 2003, generations of Iraqis came out limping from a decade of sanctions and into the arms of another war, sugarcoated in ostensibly benign intentions by the US and UK. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis had their lives ended early and quietly by UN sanctions, and those who survived were irreparably damaged by repeated air raids. Today, each bomb launched by Russian soldiers lays bare the West’s hypocrisy, piercing its tattered cloak of righteousness and morality. Denying our pain One might think that the European officials who deliver vicious tirades against the “barbarians” drowning and freezing to death at the gates of Europe are rotten apples. But in fact, western newsrooms reek with the stench of dormant racism. Even after the forays of New York Times reporter Judith Miller, columnist William Safire and their ilk in the sewers of shame, Times reporter Dave Philipps wrote of the US veterans joining the fight in Ukraine, who had previously been “trying to spread democracy in places that had only a tepid interest in it”. It seems that the Iraqi babies born with encephalocele, cleft lips, and spina bifida are not enough of a reminder that it was not democracy, but depleted uranium and white phosphorous that the US was spreading in places that had no interest in them. Even some of the livid, anti-Iraq-War Americans who lament this stain on their exceptionalism refer to it as a “mistake” or “blunder”, as Iraqi poet Sinan Antoon reminds us. This implies naivete at the decision-making level - miscalculations that could be understood and, perhaps, forgiven. In reality, the acts were predatory. The knowledge that enabled and encouraged them was not insufficient, but deliberate and lethal. In the face of this forgetfulness and denial of our pain and our dead, I feel violated. There is no escape from the beasts of trauma when acknowledgment, let alone accountability, is absent. Tonight, as I try not to think of the anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, bombs ring in my temples. I try to act normal. I try to ignore the sirens that drown out the wailing of Iraq’s grieving mothers, echoing deep in a bottomless abyss, whose edge I traverse in my nocturnal solitude away from Iraq. 'Roaming the ruins' It is painful to be Iraqi. Even the sweetest memories are now buried deep under the rubble of nightmares that haunt us. I seek refuge in the words of Antoon, but he, too, yearns for Iraq’s rivers from his exile: “This umbilical cord extends from my heart to the banks of the Euphrates / I sever it every morning but, at night, nostalgia mends it.” I turn to the late, great Saadi Youssef, but I find him walking hurriedly to the last car of a train taking him from one exile to the next, while chased by his enemy, nostalgia: “How did you find me? Jump at me like a hawk?” I decide to ask poet Sargon Boulus, but even in death, he is still there: “Roaming the ruins / mourning the sons of his city, dreaming at times / of soaring like an eagle, over the heads of the murderers and the murdered.” Like Boulus, I find myself descending into the dangerous territories of memory, rummaging through the wreckage of time to salvage happy shards from a smoldering past. I tiptoe my way towards Baghdad, past barbed wire fences under plumes of smoke. Quietly, so as not to trouble the mothers lining these streets, beating on their chests as the bodies of their babies pass by in endless funeral convoys, I approach afternoons washed in the heavenly fragrance of narenj flowers in blossom. Alongside my family and friends, I pick up mulberries and Khastawi dates that have fallen on the lawn, before rolling up my tracksuit to chase a nylon football in bare feet. My mother rolls chard leaves in the kitchen for a delicious dolma lunch in the garden. I wipe a tear from my cheek as I visit distant nights, sharing stories with my father on our rooftop, dazzled by a million stars twinkling in the skies of Iraq. That was before the “shock therapy” that Times columnist Thomas Friedman prescribed, scarcely mentioned in the US media today. Messengers of death In Baghdad, the American war machine unleashed an orgy of death, which unfolded to hysterical ululations from American newsrooms. “Give freedom a chance,” Safire wrote in 2003. An inferno ensued. The Iraq Body Count database documented 315 daily civilian deaths during the US invasion of Iraq, from 20 March to 9 April 2003. More than 22,000 others were wounded during the invasion phase alone. Now, our dead are countless. Cluster bomblets landed in my family’s garden. We rarely slept on the roof thereafter, fearing not only stray bullets and shrapnel, but also that invading troops would pick us off like pigeons, as they often did to those inferior beings they had come to “liberate”, but whose sons and daughters they massacred and raped. We would run upstairs to watch the columns of smoke rising from the day’s bombing sites. Outside, shrapnel and scorched, shredded human flesh was scattered under our feet in the sun. Routine clashes meant that no early birds sang in the mornings, which were soaked in the stench of rotten corpses laid out on the sidewalks. I walked past these swollen corpses en route to school. I still do in my sleep. Tonight, I see my mother’s face, horrified as she opens an envelope on our doorstep with a bullet and a death threat inside. Like everything else in the country, the mail system stopped working in 2003, but the messengers of death know how to deliver his letters. I see my mother the moment she learns of my father’s abduction, and I hear her voice when our western Baghdad neighborhood turns into a battlefield: “I cannot stay here anymore. I will lose my mind.” 'I need some air' Alas, nowadays, my mother sleeps alone in a cemetery in Baghdad. After 30 years spent educating generations of students, she passed away last summer in a state hospital where no one recovers; where nurses are bribed by patients’ caretakers to provide the medication they need on time. I remember how, when I tried to bring a fire extinguisher into the isolation ward where she slept - shocked they didn’t already have one after infernos had incinerated dozens of patients in Baghdad and Nasiriyah - hospital administrators reluctantly allowed me inside because “it would make people speak”, meaning that a scandal might ensue. And I remember how, during a merciless summer afternoon, the power went out and the air conditioning stopped working for hours, only to be restored after I begged a senior health ministry official for help. I wondered how long it would otherwise have taken them to fix it. The words of my mother as she spoke from behind her CPAP mask still haunt me: “It is hot. I need some air.” With her passing, I was orphaned for a second time. Like many Iraqis, I was first orphaned by the theft of Iraq. Today, Iraq is in the hands of some of the same crooks who have pillaged its coffers for the past two decades. Many won parliamentary seats in the October elections. But this is all normal in Iraq. Enduring barriers The Pope visited our country last year, and a foreign journalist loved the mural with his image painted on the concrete barriers still erected outside the Sayidat al-Nejat Cathedral in Baghdad. The presence of these concrete giants testifies to the insecurity that necessitates them, but the United Nations was also fascinated with them, posting photos of other areas where murals encouraged Iraqis to vote: “Stop and post a selfie,” noted one tweet from a UN account. Lost in all of this was the fact that these barriers represent enforced communal divisions, the encroachment of the state and its coercive apparatus on the public domain, and the securitization of the latter. For years, these barriers were plastered with funeral banners that Iraqis hung for loved ones who perished in the lethal security failure enabled or orchestrated by many of the same crooks who ran in the recent elections. They are an ugly sight, a sign of persistent trauma. But, to outsiders, they are a natural feature of the landscape. This is how an abnormal situation is normalized. The desperate protesters mowed down by the hundreds after demonstrations erupted in October 2019 have “ruined everything”, as a former minister once told me. Perhaps they should have known not to disturb the march to progress, and instead joined their peers who commit suicide by the hundreds every year - to leap from a bridge, set their hungry bodies ablaze, or hang themselves from a ceiling fan in the depths of night.

Why Halabja should be recognized as genocide

At the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the Kurdish city of Halabja was chemically bombarded by the Iraqi army. It left thousands of children, women and men suffocated to death. After 34 years, the incident has been largely forgotten, and it is still not recognized as genocide. On March 16, 1988, 32 Iraqi fighter jets began bombarding the city of Halabja for six consecutive days. “We hid in a cave on the border of Iran for days as the fighter jets continued to bombard,” said Nawshirwan Pasha. He is now 45 and lives in Europe. Surprisingly, he is still labeled as a martyr of the chemical bombardment by the government, he added. The fighter jets deployed internationally banned weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as mustard gas, cyanide and nerve agents. It left between 2,000 to 3,500, not 5,000 people, as it is publicly claimed, dead and more than 10,000 refugees. The scene left in the unpaved streets of Halabja resembled the atrocities of the Holocaust. Halabja is home to religious minorities such as Kakis, a distinct religion found in Halabja. Kakai’s holiest site is also located in Halabja. The town hosted a substantial Jewish population at the time. All these religious minorities were ethnically Kurdish, but the Ba’athist party in control of Iraq denied their existence – making it a textbook example of genocide. If genocide is the intentional extermination of an ethnic, national, racial or religious group, then Halabja suits all the categories. Halabja is a city that lies only 15 km. from the Iranian border. During the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, the city was constantly shelled. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) could not capture the city, as Saddam Hussein had positioned one of Iraq’s nine divisions in the governorate of Sulaymaniyah which includes the district of Halabja. Hussein had positioned a brigade in Halabja. The Iraqi Army had shifted its military center to the area, after years of stalemate in the south. Each division included more than 30,000 troops assisted by various paramilitary forces, usually made up of the local Kurdish population. The formidable Iraqi army, backed by the West, was difficult for the IRGC to defeat on its terms. Tehran was able to penetrate the rank-and-file of the Ba’athist army in Halabja using methods such as Shi’ite ideology and escape from Saddam’s execution. It was common for commanders to be executed after failing to secure an objective. IN 1988 an Iraqi brigadier general in charge of the Ba’athist army in Halabja, Ali Najafi, had secretly pledged allegiance to Tehran. In mid-March 1988, Tehran commenced “Operation Zafar 7” to capture the governorate of Sulaymaniyah. The objective of capturing Sulaymaniyah was to give Tehran a better bargaining position in the ongoing ceasefire talks. As Halabja was under constant attack, on March 15, Hussein came to Sulaymaniyah, a city that lies 45 km. north of Halabja. According to a former Ba’athist adviser, who didn’t want to be named, and various Kurdish military commanders and figures, from Sulaymaniyah Saddam Hussein directly radioed Ali Najafi and told him if he needed further assistance. The commander replied, “let the assistance go to your dad’s grave,” a severe rebuke in Iraqi culture. Later that day, Najafi surrendered to Iran. IRGC alongside their Kurdish Peshmerga allies entered the city. The angered dictator gave the order. A decision was made to erase the city, to deny Iran any territorial claims, and save its army from disintegration and coups in Baghdad. After eight years of trench warfare, Hussein was convinced that to save his country, he had to stop the war. A guilty conscience for Halabja did not convince Saddam to stop the war. But the collapse of its military in Halabja did convince the brutal, obstinate dictator to give in. Although the decision to chemically bombard Halabja was not planned before, the Ba’athist regime had perpetrated similar crimes. On April 14, 1988, the Iraqi army commenced the Anfal campaign. More than 182,000 Kurds of all ages and genders, from newly born infants to septuagenarians, were buried alive and treated in the worst possible ways in Saddam’s gulags in the deserts of Iraq. Not to mention that its random targeting of Iranian cities during the war claimed thousands of lives. Serving as one of the main factors of concluding the longest war of the 20th century, Halabja has been denied its proper recognition. Hussein felt the graveness of his crime. Months after the chemical bombardment Hussein built a brand-new Halabja city about 30 km. from the original Halabja. The city was populated in six months, mostly by internally displaced Kurds who had run from Halabja. My family was one of those families who moved to the city. In 1989, the dictator promoted the city to a municipality and named it “Saddamist Halabja.” In colloquial language, it is called “The New Halabja.” Now the city is officially known as Sharazoor. The Ba’athist regime built the city to prove to the international community that it had not destroyed Halabja using WMD. The new city served as a façade for Saddam Hussein to hide its textbook example of genocide. TEHRAN WAS quick to bring international journalists to cover what had really happened. Hundreds of journalists took photos of the people of Halabja who had suffocated to death and their corpses scattered across the streets. Hundreds of infants and young children went missing. Many of the missing have assimilated into the places they were raised in; they don’t know their real origins because they were infants or only one or two years old at the time. “It was appalling to see infants suffocated in their mothers’ arms,” said Ahmad Natqi, a veteran Iranian journalist who covered the incident as the jets were flying over. The documents gathered in Halabja helped in toppling its perpetrators years later. Halabja was a great factor in justifying the US invasion of Iraq. After months of looking for weapons of mass destruction, the coalition against Hussein did not find any evidence. Halabja became the center of attention but only to be forgotten hours later. Former US secretary of state Colin Powell; and provisional coalition administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, visited the newly repopulated Halabja. The visit brought international media attention to prove that Hussein did possess weapons of mass destruction. The West had supplied Hussein with its arsenal for the war’s entirety. The Ba’athists did use chemical weapons on Iranian targets as well. Yet they did not possess the technology to make them. Though officially no evidence of WMD was found in Iraq, Halabja proved that Baghdad did possess WMD. The incident demonstrates how the states that supplied Hussein can escape impunity. Producing WMD should be illegal. Even if the producer doesn’t deploy it, these weapons would provide a rogue regime a reason to deploy them for economic and scientific purposes. HALABJA IS currently ruled by the Kurdish people, yet the city lags behind. It has not been entirely rebuilt, and its appearance is worse than before it was bombed. There are still tens of wounded from chemical weapons who need immediate attention. Every year several people lose their lives to their wounds. More than 95 percent of its officials, including its governor, mayor and head of municipality live outside the city. Most of them only visit the city three or four times a week and stay there for a short period. In comparison, the Ba’athists who ruled the city did stay in the city until their duties were over. The genocidal aspect of the atrocity aside, the incident tells us how war sacrifices everything for meaningless military victories. The war in Ukraine is far more dangerous, with far more lives in danger. Halabja reminds us that genocide is usually a side effect of war. Most appalling genocides, including the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, happened during war. Halabja deserves to be recognized as genocide internationally. It helped the world realize Hussein’s threats to world peace and security. The writer is a researcher and journalist covering the Middle East and international affairs. His work has been published in The Jerusalem Post, The National Interest and various Kurdish magazines. He is a former editor-in-chief of Birst newspaper. Currently, he is a researcher at the Kurdistan Conflict and Crisis Research Center (KCCRC) focusing on international relations.

Iraq’s crisis is an opportunity for change

Reber Ahmed* The constitutional dues in Iraq have reached the point of electing a new president of the republic, after the political and social actors have embarked on a reform path that was not easy, since the start of the largest protest movement in the country, holding the early elections, and the meeting of the House of Representatives. We are in a new Iraqi era. We heard the voice of our people who want a regime on the level of Iraq, the historical majesty of their peoples and cultures, and their role in the region and the world, in a moment of great testing for leaders who love their land, urging them to do more to establish sovereignty and strengthen independence in front of allies and opponents. The station we are heading to is part of a moment of change that calls for a national response to roles in politics and administration, that rise to the requirements of change, that require loyalty to the state and guarantee its higher interests, and engage in an unprecedented reform process, whose impact will not be limited to national affairs; Rather, the region and the international crises surrounding it. Since the President of the Republic is the protector of the Constitution, and it is his responsibility to preserve Iraq’s independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, the reform path that is now imposing itself on everyone, calls for this position to take the real role that the Constitution assigned to it, to protect the state and its institutions from any threat. The modern Iraq crisis itself is an unconventional opportunity for success. It's a coincidence that only a country like Iraq has as many resources and diversity as its tough challenges. Here comes the importance of the President's pioneering role in exploiting this opportunity, so that it will ultimately return to the interest of Iraq and the Iraqis. It is necessary to emphasize solidarity and cooperation between Baghdad and Erbil, to complement each other in addressing all challenges, and to reach fruitful results in the interest of the country. According to our experience, and despite the outstanding crises between the Kurdistan Region and the federal government, the Iraqis witnessed great results when the two parties worked together, as in cases of solidarity in major security issues, defeating ISIS, liberating Iraq from the clutches of terrorism, the issue of displacement, effective diplomatic efforts, and reviving Ambitious strategic projects in industry and agriculture, from the mountains of Erbil to the coast of Basra. Since the founding of their modern state nearly a hundred years ago, Iraqis have fought ideological, ethnic and sectarian struggles, in the midst of which political movements and trends emerged, the activity and impact of which resulted in conflicting projects that delayed access to a contemporary political model that protects the status of the country. Here emerges the importance of a strong and vibrant civil society, which remains an important asset for a viable and developing state. The course of events around us tells us a new historical lesson. The tension and conflict in a region we assume is isolated, will have a wide impact on all the globe, and Iraq cannot retreat from its civilized role by remaining turbulent, unable to engage in accelerating transformations and to be a global station for formulating interests, solutions and opportunities. At this promising moment, the position of the President of the Republic can only be viewed as an effective tool in integrating roles, which requires wise power and treatment for many of the restrictions and problems that have entangled the position for a long time. In 2007, as I was completing my studies in Baghdad, at the height of the violence in the country, I had the honor to speak on behalf of my fellow graduate students of strategic planning at the National Defense College there, of the dream of developing a concept of politics; Where the human being and his advancement are the main focus of the efforts of leaders. Dreams stumble and are reborn in the great moments of people, and when there is sufficient inspiration, they can awaken the elements of good in individuals and groups. The path of national reform has one of these moments. *Reber Ahmed, Kurdistan Region Minister of Interior since 2019, and a candidate of the Iraqi presidency, nominated by the “Saving the Homeland Alliance,” the largest bloc in the Iraqi parliament, consisting of the Sadrist Movement, Al-Siyada Alliance, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

Gen. Mark Milley: Why no-fly in Ukraine is a no-go

By David Ignatius Columnist Rebuffing Ukrainian pleas for Western protection of its airspace, the United States’ top military commander said NATO has “no plans that I’m aware of to establish a no-fly zone” over the country. The comments Saturday from Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff came as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for such an air embargo and Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that he would treat imposition of a no-fly zone as “participation in the armed conflict.” “If a no-fly zone was declared, someone would have to enforce it, and that would mean someone would have to then go and fight against Russian air forces,” Milley explained. “That is not something that NATO Secretary [Jens] Stoltenberg, or member states’ political leadership, has indicated they want to do.” Milley made his remarks in an interview Saturday with Latvian journalists at a military base here, as part of a visit to Europe to assess the Ukraine conflict. His rejection of the no-fly zone echoes comments by other Biden administration officials, who have argued for weeks that although the United States wants to help Ukraine resist Russian aggression, it won’t make any moves that might place U.S. military forces, including Air Force planes, in direct conflict with Russia. Milley made another comment to journalists here that was perhaps meant to check rising tensions about Russian escalation, spawned by Putin’s announcement last Sunday that he was putting Russian nuclear forces on “special combat readiness” because of “aggressive comments” from the West. Despite Putin’s threatening language about nuclear weapons, Milley said, “we are not now seeing anything out there in the alert postures of the actual nuclear forces of Russia that would indicate any increased set of alerts.” He said the United States was monitoring the situation closely. The remarks here by America’s top military leader illustrate once again the delicate balance the United States and its NATO allies are trying to strike between supporting Ukraine with lethal weapons and other aid — but avoiding direct confrontation with Russian forces that could lead to a wider conflict and increase the cataclysmic risk of nuclear war. Putin has appeared to want to keep these escalatory tensions high, as part of his psychological pressure campaign against the West to gain dominance in Ukraine. Milley and other U.S. officials, in contrast, want to check these anxieties. But that’s becoming increasingly difficult as Russia broadens its assault on a defiant Ukraine, whose people and the president have become heroes around the world. Opinion by David Ignatius David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column for The Washington Post. His latest novel is “The Paladin.”

Iraq’s New Sultans

by Raad Alkadiri* Disputed results, rival claims, missed constitutional deadlines, drawn-out political negotiations. There is a sense of déjà vu all over again to Iraq’s latest elections. The almost four months since the 10 October 2021 national vote have been characterised by growing political discord as rival factions have disputed the outcome of the poll and argued over which of them has the legitimate mandate to select the country’s new slate of political leaders. But what is going on in Iraq is not just post-elections business as usual, a divvying up of the spoils among the country’s political oligarchs. Fundamental changes in the country’s power-sharing formula are being proposed that would would sweep away the big-tent consensus arrangement that has governed Iraqi politics since regime change in 2003 and replace it with a majority government where power was consolidated among a much smaller number of factions. Ethno-sectarian formulas would be preserved, but, for the first time, many of Iraq’s mainstream parties would be forced into opposition, left looking in from the outside and scurrying to protect their interests. Given the gross maladministration and corruption that has has been the hallmark of successive Iraqi governments, including the outgoing, many would argue that a shift is no bad thing. There is little doubt that the country would benefit from wholesale economic and political reform. But the current machinations are not about systemic change to improve Iraqi governance; they are a power play, largely driven by two men both of whom sees themselves as heirs to their own decades-long political mission that could finally be brought to fruition: Muqtada al-Sadr and Masoud Barzani. Sadr, the former enfant terrible of Iraqi politics, has been waiting for this moment since 2003. Excluded from the group of leaders that the United States chose to lead Iraq after Saddam’s fall, and subsequently brought to heal — temporarily at least — by Nouri al-Maliki’s government in 2008, Sadr has regrouped and reinvented himself as the voice of popular opposition in Iraq, advocating a nationally oriented, issue-based politics that seeks — rhetorically at least — to hold Iraq’s kleptocratic and self-interested political oligarchy to account. From camping outside of the gates of the Green Zone in protest in 2016 to claiming leadership of the mass protest movement after October 2019, Sadr has burnished his image as a maverick voice for change. But Sadr’s goal has never been reform; it has been power. He wants to push aside rival oligarchs to become the ultimate Shia power in Iraq, and, by extension, the unchallenged arbiter of Iraqi politics, which he believes is his rightful position as inheritor of his murdered-father’s legacy. Working in part through a weak and pliant prime minister who has been only too happy to accept his diktats over the past 18 months, Sadr has already been able to capture large swathes of the Iraqi civilian ‘deep-state’ at his rivals’ expense. With those building blocks in place, Sadr is now looking to take advantage of his party’s position as the largest single faction in parliament to complete his takeover, extending it to the security sector, and placing himself — undisputed — at the pinnacle of Iraqi politics. But the Sadrists’ 73 seats are not enough to act independently in the 329-member parliament. Enter Barzani, who has recently appeared to see the mercurial Shia cleric as precisely the powerful ally he needs to achieve his own ambitions in Kurdistan. There are those who suspect that Barzani has never given up on fulfilling the dream of Kurdish independence and of restoring once and for all his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)’s undisputed power and authority in Kurdistan. He may see now as the opportunity to take decisive steps in both directions. In the early years after 2003, Barzani and other Kurdish leaders saw the dominant Shia parties in Baghdad as their route to eventual secession, as they jointly pushed a confederal ‘league of friendship’ constitutional vision that would have left Arab and Kurdish parts of Iraq to coexist as independent sovereign equals. But shifts in the locus of political power within the ‘Shia house’ to advocates of a strong federal government dashed early Kurdish hopes. After the ignominy of Baghdad’s refusal to recognise the 2017 Kurdistan independence referendum, and the federal government’s insistence on conditionalising budget disbursements to Erbil, Barzani now appears to see promoting one, all-powerful Shia ‘sultan,’ and dividing the Shia political factions, as the way to achieve his cherished ambitions (beginning with securing revenue sharing on Kurdish terms). And, for the moment, a deal with Sadr fits that bill. Meanwhile, reinforcing KDP power in Kurdistan means defanging the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) once and for all, first by sidelining it in national politics, and then by attempting to mop up its power base at home. Hence the KDP challenge for the presidency. Government-formation negotiations in Baghdad over the next few days and weeks will illustrate just how far each man is willing to go to fulfil his ambitions. Neither has shown much appetite for (or need to) compromise so far, especially active support from a newly energised and united Sunni political leadership, which sees an opportunity to restore its own power in national politics after almost 20 years of being sidelined, has given them significantly more room for manoeuvre. Sadr has thus far eschewed his Shia rivals’ call for a traditional post-2003, all-inclusive government, insisting instead on a majority administration that would exclude parties that do not bend the knee to his authority and agenda. The KDP has tacked close to Sadr, backing the majority government idea, and voting with Sadrists and the biggest Sunni factions to elect Parliamentary Speaker Mohammed Halbousi, leader of the Sunni Sovereignty Alliance. The KDP is also running its own candidate for Iraqi President, a post that the PUK has traditionally claimed. That presidency vote, which is scheduled for 7 February 2022, will be the next big indicator of what direction Iraqi politics is going in. Supporters of consensus government are likely to work hard to deny parliament the quorum needed to hold the election if they cannot guarantee the defeat of the KDP candidate, Hoshiyar Zibari. Stalemate, or a victory for the PUK presidential candidate, the incumbent Barham Salih, could force Sadr and Barzani to reconsider their options, and change tack. But if the KDP does win the presidency without offering any compromises, then neither Sadr nor Barzani will have much incentive to make real concessions when it comes to selecting a prime minister and cabinet formation. The impotence of their political opponents will have been further exposed, and these groups may be left with a simple choice: come on board under the tutelage of and terms set by the Sadrists and the KDP (if they are willing to invite you, at that point), or wallow in opposition until new elections take place. Neither option will hold much appeal, but which one Sadr’s Shia rivals, in particular, choose will be important for stability in Iraq as long as the new government survives. The Coordination Framework of Shia parties that are Sadr’s adversaries have thus far held firm, insisting that they will only join the government if all factions are offered positions. Faced with the inevitability of a majority government, this unity may break if some factions — including ones close to militias — choose participation over risking their local economic and political power bases. But they also know that their power still would be dangerously circumscribed, and that their interests and patronage networks, including vital ones in the security services, would be dangerously exposed. Total exclusion would potentially pose an even bigger — and potentially existential threat — to these parties’ interest. Faced with this challenges, they are likely to take more extreme measures to protect themselves. Resorting to violence would be one option, raising the spectre of a Shia civil war that, once begun, would likely be hard to quell in the absence of external intervention given Sadr’s lack of overwhelming personal forces and the possible fracturing of the Iraqi security services. Alternatively, the excluded factions could seek to form a political opposition in parliament or boycott the political process altogether. The impact on Iraqi stability would be more benign, but in either case it would amount to political capitulation, with all that that entails, as there would be little to curtail the actions of a determined executive that controls most of the levers of state. However government formation does play out, one thing appears certain. There is little prospect for any sort of meaningful political or economic reform; both are antithetical to Sadr’s and Barzani’s underlying agendas. The post-election battle that is taking place is not over ideology; it is a naked drive for absolute economic and political power, and the promotion of personal and party ambitions. In fact, there is a real risk that a majority government will be even less effective than previous consensus ones, irrespective of who becomes prime minister and who fills the major cabinet posts. Supporters and allies of the incumbent premier, Mustafa Kadhimi, love to promote their man as an effective agent of change, capable of transforming Iraq’s domestic and foreign affairs. But that view smacks of wilful ignorance, especially given his record so far. If Kadhimi is reappointed premier in a Sadr/Barzani-dominated majority government, it will be because both men trust him to do their loyal bidding, and not get in the way. The next prime minister will be far more of an executive assistant rather than a manager — never mind a leader — of a majority government, dependent entirely on the instruction of Iraq’s new sultans and on how much room for manoeuvre they give him and his cabinet. That assumes that the government can survive for any length of time. Sadr and Barzani may see each other as a useful means to an end, but they will struggle to agree on a common government programme. Both men might be willing to live with a ‘you run your fiefdom; I’ll run mine’ arrangement, but they have long been at odds when it comes to decentralising power in Iraq. Neither Sadr nor his political faction have supported the types of revenue-sharing mechanisms and sovereignty ideas that Barzani espouses, and Sadr will be sensitive to any criticism that he is making concessions to the Kurds at the expense of his core constituency or of Iraqi nationalism. These divergences are likely to add up paralysing policy disagreements inside a new government. Improved governance certainly does not appear to be on the cards. Instead, the big question is whether a majority government would be able to see out its term. Sadr is notorious for changing his political course when circumstances are not to his liking; and, this time, he faces the additional disadvantage that the government is one of his own making. As such, any policy disputes inside government are likely to be magnified, and there is a real risk that Iraq will be back to the government-formation drawing board well before the current parliament’s four-year term is up. *Raad Alkadiri was Assistant Private Secretary to the UK Special Representative to Iraq from 2003–4. He tweets at @raadie66