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No real alternative: The failure of opposition parties in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region
DrawMedia Winthrop Rodgers - Middle East Institute Politics in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region is centered on the ruling duopoly of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Both parties wield significant influence over the administration of state institutions, the economy, and the media. Tens of thousands of Peshmerga, security forces, and Asayish are at their disposal and hundreds of thousands of public servants are part of their patronage networks. Despite these advantages, they are deeply unpopular with wide swathes of the population, who view them as corrupt, incompetent, and oppressive. An Arab Barometer survey released in 2022 found that 63% of respondents in the Kurdistan Region had “no trust at all” in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Other political parties — broadly referred to as the opposition — offer themselves as alternatives to the KDP and the PUK, but are disorganized, divided, and largely unable to capitalize on public grievances about governance. At present, they do not constitute a viable alternative to the ruling parties. This weakness is due to constraints imposed by the Kurdistan Region’s political culture and system, as well as the uninspiring profiles of the current crop of opposition parties. As a result, voters who are disillusioned with the KDP and the PUK have little to gain — and much to lose — by supporting the opposition. Many people opt out of electoral politics altogether. Nevertheless, opposition groups represent a tantalizing part of the Kurdistan Region’s political landscape. Their dynamics and potential are critical to a comprehensive understanding of Iraqi Kurdish politics. This analysis will look at some of the main opposition groups and explain each group’s positioning and prospects in the upcoming regional elections, which were initially scheduled for October 2022 but repeatedly delayed. They are currently expected in the autumn. Collectively, the opposition faces three main challenges. First, patronage networks and partisan control of the security forces and the state more generally reinforce the power of the ruling parties and give them decisive advantages over the opposition. Second, the current opposition parties have failed to unite as a broad front and, as a result, compete with each other for supporters, which dilutes their influence. Third, the opposition’s failure to articulate a strategic vision does not inspire confidence. Moreover, voters have learned lessons from the failure of the Gorran Movement and are wary of its successors. A map of the opposition parties Overall, the opposition can be divided into five groups: 1) The Gorran Movement, 2) The New Generation Movement, 3) the Islamist parties, 4) newly founded, personality-driven parties, and 5) the voters and activists who have become turned off from electoral politics, but nevertheless stand in opposition to the ruling parties. The Gorran Movement The most consequential opposition party in the Kurdistan Region during the post-2003 era is the Change Movement, usually known by its Kurdish name Gorran. It was founded in 2009 by Nawshirwan Mustafa, who had been a major figure in the PUK for decades. The new party declared that its explicit goal was to dismantle the KDP-PUK duopoly and bring about constitutional changes that would establish the KRG as a parliamentary democracy, in contrast to the presidential system favored by the KDP. It also promised to combat corruption and unify and depoliticize the Peshmerga and the security forces. The new party sparked hope for many people that reform was possible. It quickly drew interest from across the population, with its support concentrated in Sulaymaniyah city. Several months after its establishment, it contested an election for the regional assembly in July 2009. While the KDP and the PUK — running on a joint list — won 30 and 29 seats respectively, out of the total of 111, Gorran managed a remarkable campaign and won 25 seats. This gave it a major platform to pursue its agenda, even if it could be overruled in the Kurdistan Parliament by the duopoly parties’ majority. Later, Gorran earned some criticism for not standing more closely with anti-corruption protesters during the months-long demonstrations in 2011, but maintained its upstart reputation ahead of the 2013 elections. In those polls, the movement became the second-largest party in parliament: The KDP won 38 seats, Gorran took 24, and the PUK was shunted into third with 18 seats. Somewhat paradoxically, this posed a major problem for Gorran and one that has haunted it ever since. It decided to abandon its opposition stance and go into government with the KDP and the PUK. It took over the speakership of the Kurdistan Parliament and supplied ministers to the eighth cabinet. In part, this decision was made in order to take the reins at the Peshmerga ministry and work on one of its major policy goals. Ultimately, Gorran proved ineffective at achieving anything substantive and crashed out of the cabinet amid a major dispute with the KDP in 2015 over the extension of Masoud Barzani’s term as president. At this point, the party began to lose steam, winning just 12 seats in the 2018 elections for the Kurdistan Parliament and re-entering government with the KDP and the PUK. Its supporters began to feel that it had been co-opted into the system it proposed to dismantle. The party was subsequently wiped out at the federal level in the 2021 elections for the Iraqi parliament. Currently, the party is wracked with internal disagreements and disputes over its leadership structure. Its elected officials have largely left the party and joined new opposition groups. Heading into the next elections, it looks like an utterly spent force. It is hard to overstate how disappointing this has been for opposition politics in the Kurdistan Region. Gorran’s trajectory dashed the hopes of many voters and produced deep wounds that have hurt not just the party itself, but all other opposition groups. If Gorran, with its unique leader and widespread support, could not achieve its goals, then it seems to most people that the other groups have little hope of succeeding where it failed. The New Generation Movement The New Generation Movement, known in Kurdish as Naway Nwe, was founded in early 2018 by Shaswar Abdulwahid, a real estate developer and owner of prominent Kurdish satellite TV channel NRT. (Full disclosure: The author worked as Senior English Editor at NRT between 2018 and 2021.) Abdulwahid was already well-known as a result of NRT’s outspoken coverage that frequently criticized the KDP and the PUK. During the 2017 independence referendum, he again played the role of foil by backing the “No For Now” campaign, which argued that Kurdish independence is the ultimate goal but the timing of the vote was ill-judged. While the campaign failed to make much headway — 92% of voters supported “yes” — the experience encouraged Abdulwahid to jump into electoral politics. New Generation participated in both the May 2018 federal elections and the September 2018 Kurdistan Parliament elections, winning four and eight seats respectively. However, disagreements between Abdulwahid and the party’s newly elected MPs in Baghdad and Erbil quickly arose. Eventually, none of the MPs elected to the federal Council of Representatives and just three of the MPs in the Kurdistan Parliament would remain a part of the party. In the October 2021 federal elections, the party rallied and won nine seats, mostly by taking advantage of the collapse in support for Gorran. Seven years after its establishment, it is unclear what New Generation has accomplished. Its policy program is vague at best and, historically, it has relied on petty stunts to attract media attention. For the most part, the party’s stance is reactive, following whatever story is angering the public at a given moment (public sector salaries, gasoline prices, migration, water shortages, etc.), rather than driving the conversation, which seems odd for an organization with a prominent TV station. Strategically, its leadership is cognizant that voters roundly punished Gorran for working with the KDP and the PUK. As a result, Abdulwahid almost obsessively turns down opportunities to engage pragmatically with other parties — both ruling or opposition — who then respond in kind by ignoring New Generation. Despite this poor track record, New Generation will likely end up as the largest opposition party in the next elections. The deficiencies of the other parties are enough to make it the most attractive option in an underwhelming field. Few of its supporters believe that it will make a substantial impact both because it has not articulated a coherent vision for the Kurdistan Region and its leadership is deeply mistrustful. There are decent, principled figures within the party, but it is evident to most voters and observers that New Generation is not the real deal. The Islamist parties The Kurdistan Region has always had a significant Islamist movement, which stands in contrast to the relative secularism of the KDP and the PUK. The movement largely operates at a social and grassroots level, but is also active in electoral politics. There have been several Islamist parties, which have splintered, merged, and reorganized themselves over time. At present, there are two main Islamist parties: the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and the Kurdistan Justice Group (KJG). The KIU, which is known in Kurdish as Yekgirtu, was founded in 1994 and is led by Salahaddin Bahaaddin. It is particularly strong in Duhok governorate. In the 2021 elections for the Iraqi parliament, Jamal Kocher, a KIU member running as an independent, won 56,702 votes. This was the most of any individual candidate across the whole country that cycle. The party currently has four seats in Baghdad and had five seats in the last Kurdistan Parliament. Some observers have linked the KIU with the Muslim Brotherhood. The KJG was formed in 2001 by Ali Bapir. It used to be known as the Kurdistan Islamic Group before a rebranding in 2021 and is referred to in Kurdish as Komal. It currently has one seat in Baghdad and had seven in the last Kurdistan Parliament. The KJG tends to be more socially conservative and outspoken than the KIU. On their own and collectively, the Islamist parties do not represent a significant threat to the ruling duopoly. Instead, their approach emphasizes building support within society for Islamist attitudes. For example, both parties have proposed and supported measures that attack the LGBTQ+ community. However, they seem largely uninterested in seeking higher-level positions within the government beyond a few seats in parliament. By doing so, they maintain a seat at the broad table of governance in the Kurdistan Region and the ability to influence the ruling parties, while avoiding the responsibilities of actual governing. This pragmatic approach starkly contrasts with New Generation. New personality-driven parties With election season approaching, two disaffected figures from established parties have sensed an opportunity and formed their own political vehicles. These new parties are largely defined by their leaders, rather than being driven by a specific ideology or set of policies. They are viewed by voters as bids for continued relevance, rather than the kind of broad-based movements that could pose a real challenge to the ruling parties, at least for now. The most authentically opposition of the two is Ali Hama Salih’s National Stance Movement. Hama Salih is a former Gorran MP with a reputation for exposing alleged instances of corruption on the part of KDP and PUK officials. As his former party crumbled, Salih was able to keep his political reputation intact by distancing himself from the Gorran leadership and resigning from parliament in February 2023. Out of office, he attempted to bring together other Gorran dissidents to form a new party that could recapture the old energy. This was largely unsuccessful because of the personal differences between the ex-Gorran factions, but he went ahead and established a new party anyway in March 2024. Hama Salih’s rhetoric often skews conservative. Recently, he has decried the “new, strange norms” being introduced into Kurdish society from outside. The other personality-driven party is led by former PUK co-leader Lahur Sheikh Jangi. He had been popular with the party’s grassroots, particularly for his strong criticism of the KDP and the Barzanis. In July 2021, however, he was ousted by his estranged cousin (and now uncontested PUK leader) Bafel Talabani. For several years afterwards, it was unclear whether Sheikh Jangi would form a new party or seek accommodation and reconciliation within the PUK. Eventually, he chose the former and announced the establishment of the People's Front in January 2024. Both of these parties are defined by their leaders. This is not unusual in the patriarchal, top-down party structures common in the Kurdistan Region, but it exposes a deep flaw in their strategies. Their success is dependent on the personal appeal of their leaders, which is necessarily limiting. In Hama Salih’s case, his inability to convince the other Gorran dissidents, who are his natural political allies, to join him suggests that he does not have the leadership skills to manage a party organization. Meanwhile, Sheikh Jangi carries the baggage of his split with the PUK and will have difficulty bringing his former comrades with him into the new party or attracting authentic opposition supporters. Moreover, he is perceived as having grown close with Masrour Barzani of the KDP as part of his struggle with Bafel Talabani. The mere appearance of working with such a hated figure undercuts his personal and political reputation, whatever the truth may actually be about their relationship. As a result, it seems unlikely that either new party will have much of an impact at the ballot box or in sparking policy change. Turning away from partisan politics The dominance of the ruling duopoly, the disillusionment with Gorran, and the perceived unsuitability of the other opposition parties mean that many voters are left without a party that they can enthusiastically support. As a result, they stay at home on election day. Turnout has been steadily dropping in each election for the Kurdistan Parliament since 1992, when 87% of eligible voters cast ballots. Turnout was 75% during both of the “Gorran elections” in 2009 and 2013, but dropped to 60% in 2018. This is comparatively better than the turnout in recent federal elections, but the trendline is not encouraging. Moreover, low-turnout elections tend to benefit the ruling parties. This says more about elections in the Kurdistan Region and their ability to create legitimacy than it does about overall levels of political activity within society. Across social and class groups, Iraqi Kurds have a high degree of political engagement and sophistication — in many ways, far greater than their counterparts in the West. Decreasing turnout and a lack of support for opposition groups reflects a fundamental disconnect in Kurdish politics between the electoral process and the prospects for actually creating change. Looking at the situation, it is hard to blame people for feeling that their vote does not matter. Many people are actively looking for alternatives to party politics. This is clearly seen in the experience of the Dissenting Teachers Council. Over the past year, it organized a strike in Sulaymaniyah governorate to pressure the KRG about unpaid public sector salaries that lasted for five months. What the public saw was a highly disciplined and effective political movement that drove the popular conversation about its signature issue. Members of the Council told The Middle East Institute in recent interviews that they have been repeatedly approached by both the ruling and opposition parties about running for parliament. They consistently refused such entreaties and have also resisted calls from supporters to form their own electoral list. This shows that opposition politics is still active, but that the ballot box currently holds little appeal. Conclusion Voters are deeply frustrated about the political direction of the Kurdistan Region and disillusioned about the prospect for creating change through elections. On the one hand, this reflects the significant challenges that any opposition group faces in competing with the ruling parties and their structural advantages. The KDP and the PUK control the security forces — and are not shy about using violence and intimidation to enforce their political will — and oversee pervasive patronage networks that shape political behavior in insidious ways. The ruling parties largely control the media, with notable exceptions like New Generation-owned NRT, and are deeply embedded in state institutions like the judiciary. Even when opposition groups like Gorran make a play for power, the prospects for success are low and the risk of co-option is high. The recent controversy over the timing of the upcoming elections to the Kurdistan Parliament is instructive. Elections are moments of maximum exposure and leverage for opposition groups, when the ruling parties actually have to face their constituents. There are real questions about how free and fair these elections are, but they offer opposition groups time and space to make appeals to voters. After an election, the ruling parties either co-opt opposition groups, as they did with Gorran, or ignore them, as they do with New Generation. Yet, the opposition has been a total non-factor in the dynamics around the repeatedly postponed elections, which were initially supposed to take place in October 2022. Other than issuing the occasional statement urging elections to go ahead as planned, the opposition was invisible. If there had been a groundswell of support for these parties, they may have been able to organize street protests or exert other kinds of pressure on Baghdad, the KDP, and the PUK to force them into action. However, this was not at all in evidence. As of writing, a new date has not been announced, but informed speculation suggests that the elections will be held by November at the latest. Depending on the results, the opposition parties may or may not be a factor in the government formation process, which is likely to be long, difficult, and divisive. The opposition’s failure to grasp this moment is due to its inability to present a united front or to articulate a compelling vision for what exactly they would do if given power. As a result, opposition support is naturally diluted. Fractured voting patterns pose little threat to the ruling parties and overt division between opposition groups turns off potential supporters, as does their inability to propose realistic plans for reform. To that end, opposition parties have a tough hill to climb because of the outsize power of the ruling parties, but ultimately blame must fall on opposition groups themselves for failing to address their own flaws. Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist and researcher who focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy. His past work has appeared in Foreign Policy, the Index on Censorship, Al-Monitor, and Rest of World.
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“High Commissioner” Leaves Iraq
Draw Media The "High Commissioner" or "al-Khatun," as the Shiites call her, will leave Iraq at the end of this month. She is a Dutch woman who lacked any background about the Iraqi society but fell deep into the country’s deep challenges and complicated relations between the United Nations and Iraq. She is now spending the last days of her life in Iraq and plans to visit Tehran a second time. She does not want to repeat Iraq's mistakes and wants to normalize relations with Iran before taking up her new post in Lebanon, understanding that she will achieve nothing in Lebanon without Iran. The al-Khatun is called Jeanine Plasschaert who once said to the Kurdish leaders "Do not take today's autonomy for granted. In order to sustain it, unity will prove essential.” Plasschaert is Finished Jeanine Plasschaert read out her latest report to the Security Council this evening and will leave Iraq later this month. Ms. Plasschaert is the seventh UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. She took office in August 2018, following the end of the war against ISIS and the Kurdistan Region's independence referendum, two events that complicated the security and political situation. Since her inauguration, Iraq has seen another major political event. In October 2019, a wave of demonstrations against poor services began in Iraq’s southern provinces; these demonstrations later grew wider and demanded the removal of the ruling class after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This led to the resignation of the then-premier Adil Abdulmahdi, and this was the first time a prime minister had been forced to resign under street pressure since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. Plasschaert was one of those who quickly joined the protests against the ruling class in Baghdad, went to Baghdad’s Tahrir Square and rode a Tuk Tuk, a symbol of protests, visited Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf wearing a veil and announced her support for the protesters and reforms in Iraq. It was a Shiite popular demonstration, later called Tishreen. Since then, Plasschaert’s role in Iraq has increased, and she started presenting roadmaps to the government and parliament to overcome the situation. Her maneuvers made some political parties worrisome. And they claimed that her movements were beyond the authority assigned to her by the UNAMI mandate in Iraq. Some Iraqis went further and compared Plasschaert’s power to Gertrude Bell (Oriental Secretary for High Commissioner of Iraq Sir Percy Cox in 1920s), a woman who had great powers in Iraq and whose reports and opinions were valued by the British and Iraqi political leaders, ministers, and officers. She was called al-Khatun" (a Lady of the Court) and all [Iraqi leaders] wished to meet her once because she had ‘absolute power’ and was able to do anything for them. Plasschaert is the second Dutch to be appointed as the UN SRSG to Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. From 2009-2011, Ad Melkert, who was also Dutch, served as the UN SRSG in Iraq. Eruption of Concern Against Plasschaert The Tishreen protests forced Iraqi political parties to hold early parliamentary elections in October 2021. From the beginning of electoral preparations, Plasschaert began to interfere. The Shiite parties close to Iran soon accused her of playing a role in amending the electoral law in a way that was to their detriment. On October 10, 2021, early elections were held. For the first time, independent candidates were eligible to run outside the traditional parties. The electoral outcome created a huge rift in the Shiite house in Iraq; Moqtada al-Sadr was the biggest winner, and Iran-affiliated parties close (Noursi al-Maliki, Hadi Amiri, Qais al-Khazaali, Falih al-Fayyad, and other Hashd al-Shaabi groups) suffered a historic defeat, and they were disgruntled with the results and took to the streets to protest. In late November 2021, the Fatah Alliance and the most prominent loser of the election, Hadi al-Amiri, poured his cup of anger on Plasschaert, saying that “Iraq has not and will not accept any High Commissioner and she must abide by her specific duties." The defeated Shiite parties said they had submitted hundreds of fraud evidence to Plasschaert, who promised to report the it to the UN Security Council, she said the election was clean when she spoke to the Council. From Enmity to Friendship with Iran According to information obtained by Draw from sources in Baghdad, Plasschaert plans to visit Tehran next week. This is her second visit to Tehran after her last visit on 30 July of last year. Plasschaert’s visit comes as her tenure as Iraq SRSG is in the very final days before 31 May. According to Draw investigations, Plasschaert is looking to take over the post of UN Secretary-General's special envoy to Lebanon after completing her mission in Iraq. To fully achiever her goal, she first needs to normalize relations with Iran considering that Iran has a strong hegemony in the Lebanon through Hezbollah. The SRSG’s upcoming visit to Tehran is believed to be an entirely private matter rather than a visit in her current capacity as an SRSG for Iraq. Kurds and Plasschaert After the resignation of Adil Abdulmahdi and the inauguration of Mustafa al-Kadhimi as prime minister, Plaschardt was back in motion, this time preparing a bigger project for Iraq, which was the “confederation” project. In July 2020, Plasschaert stepped up her political moves. Informed sources indicated at that time that said that the United Nations, in coordination with the Iraqi presidency and government, had prepared a "comprehensive" roadmap to resolve the outstanding issues between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region. Plasschaert was trying to turn Iraq from a federal country into a confederal one. Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) leader Massoud Barzani was one of those who supported the project, but the idea of confederation was soon rejected by the Iraqi parties and the attempt ended in failure. Some reports announced that SRSG Plasschaert had said in meetings that her project was being supported the world powers, especially the United States. This and other political moves led Iraqi Shiites to become more suspicious of Plasschaert, accusing her of not acting "impartially," especially when it came to relations between Baghdad and Erbil. Now that she is spending her last days in Iraq, Plasschaert has not yet given up the Kurdistan Region. These days, she is portrayed as a close friend of President Nechirvan Barzani. Draw has learned that al-Khatun advocates postponing the Kurdistan Region’s long-overdue elections as a solution to reconcile the two ruling parties of PUK and KDP. The PUK is concerned about her intentions and the party sees it as a direct support of KDP’s policies towards postponing the election. In addition, Plasschaert has reportedly sent letter to the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to allocate five seats to the minority components in the Kurdistan Region’s parliament. In 2021, she said in a speech to the leaders of the Kurdistan Region’s political parties that “a friend is the one who makes you cry…do not take today’s autonomy for granted. In order to sustain it, unity will prove essential.” It turned out that a year after Plasschaert’s speech, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court overturned the KRG's oil and gas law and obliged Erbil to hand over its oil and gas to Baghdad. The same Court later issued a series of decisions against the Kurdistan Region, including ruling that the extension to the term of the Kurdistan Parliament was “unconstitutional,” dissolving Kurdistan Region’s provincial Councils, and lastly hitting the region’s electoral law. The FSC’s wave of decisions culminated in the suspension of oil exports to Turkey on March 25, 2023, which cost the region nearly 80 percent of its revenues, redirecting Kurdistan Region’s dream of independence to standing in front of Baghdad door. Plasschaert Kills UNAMI UNAMI is a special political mission established in 2003 by UN Security Council as per Resolution 1500 at the request of the then Iraqi government after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, and its mission expanded since 2007, according to the Security Council’s resolution 1770. UNAMI's mission in Iraq is to provide advice, support and assistance to the Iraqi government and people to strengthen comprehensive political dialogue, assist in the electoral process and facilitate dialogue between Iraq and its neighbors, as well as strengthen the human rights situation and reform in Iraqi courts and the judicial system. The mission was also tasked with working with government partners and civil society in Iraq. UNAMI currently has about 648 staff in Iraq, of whom 251 are international staff and 397 are local staff The meetings are held for political affairs and peacebuilding. It administratively functions under the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Sudani sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General last month calling for the mandate of UNAMI to end by December 31, 2025. Furthermore, the Iraqi prime minister has determined in the letter how UNAMI will work until the end of next year and cuts the mission off from any political work, saying it should only complete its work in the areas of “economic reform, service delivery, sustainable development, climate change and other development sectors). UNAMI's work in Iraq is fundamentally a political task and it provides reports UN the Security Council. Shiites appear to be very upset at Plasschaert seeing that premier Sudani has not even listened to the substance of the report prepared by the Independent Strategic Review Team led by Volker Persis last year, in which the majority of Iraqi parties supported staying of UNAMI; Kurds and Sunnis, including some Shiite parties, clearly supported UNAMI’s continuance. Nevertheless, it seems that premier Sudani did not listen to the views of these parties when he wrote to the UN Secretary-General. Now that the issue is at a critical juncture given Security Council’s fast-approaching talks on UNAMI’s future, the Kurds and Sunnis have chosen silence, fearing deterioration of their relations with the Shiite ruling parties and existence of other domestic issues that need to be addressed. Some familiar with UNAMI affairs in Baghdad told Draw that Plasschaert wishes to end UNAMI’s existence after her departure from Iraq and may not care what happens to the mission following her leave. But the UN Secretary-General António Guterres thinks otherwise. He met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein in Manama, Bahrain, yesterday and urged the continuity of UNAMI. Minister Hussein thanked Guterres for his “candid request” and promised to convey his request to the Iraqi government. At any event, Plasschaert’s policies during his tenure in Iraq appear to have increased protests against UNAMI by political parties. Those familiar with the SRSG’s work say that Plasschaert had no UN experience when she took office in Iraq, and that she had only military, but not a diplomatic background with no knowledge about the Iraqi society. She often exceeded the limits of her duty, which sparked a wave of discontent against herself and the UNAMI. She also allegedly acted authoritarianly and did not consult UNAMI team; even her deputy, Claudio Cordon, who was left little role to play. In case UNAMI stays in Iraq, the United Nations may need to send someone to Iraq who can normalize the post-Plasschaert crises. For civil society organizations and those who support the upholding of human rights, UNAMI's withdrawal from Iraq will have a hugely adverse impact given that UNAMI regularly submits its reports on the human rights situation in Iraq to the Security Council.
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Partisan press: The dominance of party-backed media in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region
Draw Media Middle East Institute (MEI) - Winthrop Rodgers Attend any press conference in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region and the microphone bank on the podium is a swirl of reds, blues, yellows, blacks, and oranges representing different outlets. At first glance, this suggests a healthy press environment with a high degree of opportunity and competition, but in reality the media landscape is dominated by outlets affiliated with political parties. A kind of Kremlinology is necessary to parse the partisan affiliations represented. The ruling duopoly of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) oversees a galaxy of loyal platforms. Islamist and opposition parties are represented too. Party factions and individual politicians also fund specific outlets to boost their profiles, adding a further level of complexity. As a result, media coverage in the Kurdistan Region largely promotes the interests of politically motivated patrons, rather than performing a public service mission of providing impartial and high-quality information to all audiences. There are some independent outlets, but they have limited reach due to lack of funding and harassment by the authorities. Their work ends up drowned out by the party-funded enterprises. For both the Kurdish public and foreign observers, this skews the playing field and creates a biased perception of events and what issues are important. Moreover, the resulting system produces reporting that is centered on the daily activities of the political elite, rather than stories that tackle systemic problems like corruption, the economy, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses. When these issues are covered by partisan outlets, they are framed to highlight the most positive possible interpretation or used to score points against political opponents. This analysis is an attempt to explain how party-affiliated outlets came to dominate the media landscape in the Kurdistan Region and the impact that has on Kurdish citizens and foreign stakeholders. It is not a comprehensive guide to Kurdish media, but it will provide insight into the positioning of some major outlets. The development of party media The dominance of party-affiliated media is partially a legacy of the Kurdistan Region’s political development. Until 1991, Kurdish areas of Iraq were administrated by the central government in Baghdad, including during the Ba’athist dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Media in this environment was highly restricted and largely came from official state organs. Non-state media existed as well in the form of newspapers and radio stations run by the KDP and the PUK as part of their organized resistance to the Iraqi government. Therefore, connections between media, government, and political parties are hardly unusual. In fact, they are the norm historically. For a period in the 2000s, however, independent media flourished in the Kurdistan Region. Newspapers like Hawlati and Awene and Livin magazine published news and commentary that challenged the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the ruling parties. Editors and reporters took on big stories, including investigations into corruption. “People were eager to read them and waited for the new editions. They had a real impact,” Surkew Mohammed, editor-in-chief of web-based independent news outlet Peregraf, said in an interview. Independent media is different from party-affiliated outlets both in how they are funded and how they cover the news. The first aspect is obvious, though a lack of financial transparency in the Kurdistan Region means that there are few clear lines between outlets and their patrons. Shell companies and trusted associates stand in for politicians on official documentation, but the connections are evident. The second aspect is tested by whether an outlet is able to report news or opinion pieces that are critical of its patron. For an authentically independent outlet, all public figures and newsworthy events are fair game for both positive and negative stories. In the Kurdistan Region, this editorial approach is rarely seen in practice. Instead, party-affiliated outlets decide what and how to cover developments based on the political calculations of their benefactors. Of course, all of the outlets mentioned in this piece vocally proclaim their independence and many use it heavily in their marketing. “It’s just using the term, like ‘democracy.’ It is seen as a good thing. … They use the term to justify themselves and their activities,” Mohammed explained. In most cases, it is simply a parlor trick that frequently succeeds in duping outsiders who are unfamiliar with the context; in others, those who know better deliberately ignore outlets’ partisan characters. The relatively open period for independent media in the mid-2000s was overtaken by the end of the decade by technological changes and the emergence of satellite television stations as the primary medium of news dissemination. Far more expensive to produce than a newspaper, Kurdish-language television is dominated by the political parties and wealthy businesspeople. Kurdistan TV, Zagros TV, and Kurdsat were early efforts, but today channels like Rudaw, Nalia Radio and Television (NRT), and Kurdistan24 run constantly in offices and shops, during dinner, and throughout the evening as the background of everyday life in the Kurdistan Region. Television is a one-directional way of communicating. This fact serves the parties’ interests and allows them great latitude to shape the news. For the most part, they choose exactly what goes out over their airwaves. The political affiliation and editorial lines of each channel are well-known and many viewers will flip around the channels to see what each is saying about a given news item and correlate that with the views of specific parties or politicians. This shift away from independent newspapers towards party-affiliated outlets was closely followed by the exploding popularity of social media, particularly Facebook. Mobile devices enabled greater access to the internet and the parties rushed to exploit it. The old guard of newspapers were not agile enough and did not have the resources to adapt, but the TV stations established robust web-based news operations. As a result, they fully displaced most independent outlets as the primary source of news in the Kurdistan Region by the middle of the 2010s, co-opting journalists from the old newspapers along the way. This tracks with the political culture of the Kurdistan Region, where civil society and the state are relatively weak compared with the political parties. The KDP and the PUK in particular exert a high degree of influence over the institutions that make up civic life, including labor unions, universities, courts, and businesses. Media is no different in this regard, but plays a unique role as a purveyor and shaper of information. Before going further, it is important to note that the partisan affiliation of an outlet does not mean that individual journalists share that political commitment. Sometimes they do but, like viewers, they are largely subject to a system beyond their control. Working in Kurdish media is a politically fraught adventure. Reporters in the field are regularly targeted and attacked by members of the security forces based on their perceived political affiliation. Job security is tenuous, pay is low, and disloyalty is punished. Journalists respond to these dynamics in a variety of ways, but the focus in this analysis is the overall system rather than their individual actions. KRG Coordinator for International Advocacy Dindar Zebari stands behind microphones of Kurdish media outlets at a press conference in Sulaymaniyah on May 6, 2021. Photo: Winthrop Rodgers. Parsing the media landscape It takes a bit of time and experience to read a microphone bank in the Kurdistan Region and see what outlets and political interests are present to cover a given news event. Some analysts, including Hakeem Dawd Qaradaghi, have written helpful guides. However, they are quickly out of date amid the churn of new platforms starting up and old ones closing down, which includes the websites where these guides are published. Link death and deleted stories are a major problem for Kurdish media. A rundown of some of the major outlets may be helpful here. Of the two ruling parties, the KDP’s media operation is by far the most sophisticated. The party and its leaders fund a wide array of media outlets. The most prominent of these is Rudaw, which was established in 2013 and is backed by Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani. Though reliable statistics are hard to come by, it is likely the most-watched channel in the Kurdistan Region. Like many other outlets, Rudaw runs its television programming mainly in Sorani Kurdish. It also publishes news in other Kurdish dialects, Arabic, Turkish, and English on its website and social media platforms. This allows them to cater to different audiences and news coverage is tailored to appeal to each. The tone and content of the English services, for example, are often quite different from what is published or broadcast in Kurdish. For example, issues like human rights and press freedom receive sympathetic coverage from the English desk, while the segments in Kurdish will more closely follow the party line. Rudaw’s coverage is relatively comprehensive, which sets it apart from other partisan channels, but its reliance on party funding and reluctance to directly criticize Nechirvan Barzani’s leadership make its character clear. In recent years, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has risen to power within the KDP and challenged his cousin Nechirvan politically. Concurrently, he has also sought to displace Rudaw as the top Kurdish outlet and replace it with outlets he controls. The most significant effort in this regard is Kurdistan24, which launched in 2015. Despite enviable levels of funding, it lags behind its older rival and its coverage in Kurdish, English, and other languages is little more than a regurgitation of KRG press releases. Masrour Barzani’s faction has a number of other outlets, including BasNews, that reinforce its message. The PUK’s media operations are far less sophisticated and reflect the party’s complex factionalism. Well-established satellite TV stations Kurdsat and Gali Kurdistan are associated with the party’s leadership, with Iraq’s First Lady Shanaz Ibrahim wielding influence over the former. PUK leader Bafel Talabani established Esta News in 2019 as he geared up to take power. Other party leaders like Qubad Talabani, Barham Salih, and Mala Bakhtiyar are believed to back smaller outlets to varying degrees. Both before and after he was ousted from the PUK, Lahur Sheikh Jangi sought influence through the media. His outlet, known as iPlus, was seized by the Talabanis as one of their first steps towards removing their rival cousin as party co-leader. “Both ruling parties established media organizations to tell the public the news in the way they want, not in the way the news happens,” Qaradaghi said in an interview. “The KDP is more successful mostly because it is a centralized and tribal party where only the Barzanis make decisions. This makes the job of the media crystal clear and [outlets] get direction from one source. On the PUK’s part, it is different … it is not a strong and centralized party.” The main opposition television channel is NRT, which launched just days before massive anti-corruption protests swept Sulaymaniyah Governorate in February 2011. Within a week, armed men stormed the channel’s office and set it on fire. This knocked NRT’s coverage of the protests off the air, but gave it a compelling origin story. Over the years, the authorities have continued to target its reporters and close down its offices to restrict coverage of protests. After its owner Shaswar Abdulwahid went into politics and founded the New Generation Movement in 2018, viewers increasingly see it as merely another party-funded operation. Nevertheless, NRT’s coverage remains highly critical of the Kurdistan Region’s ruling parties and it airs viewpoints that are passed over by KDP and PUK channels, which make it a widely viewed alternative. Other parties have their own outlets. The Change Movement (Gorran) runs Kurdish News Network (KNN), but the channel has never been as prominent as NRT or those backed by the KDP and the PUK. The Kurdistan Region’s two Islamist parties also have extensive media operations, which include both news and religious programming. The Kurdistan Islamist Union’s (KIU) main channel is Speda TV, while the Kurdistan Justice Group (KJG) runs Payam TV. While newspapers Hawlati and Awene have lost their influence, several web-based outlets have stepped in to take up the mantel of independent news coverage, including Peregraf, KirkukNow, and Draw Media. Some independent outlets are actively harassed by the authorities, but for the most part their main challenge is securing funding. Unlike their party-affiliated counterparts, they do not have access to deep-pocketed patrons. “At the beginning of Peregraf, I sold my own car to fund its start up. Following that, I received funding from the international community,” Mohammed said. Both Peregraf and Draw receive support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and KirkukNow is supported in part by the European Endowment for Democracy and Free Press Unlimited. Among some observers, this foreign funding is controversial because the funders are located in the US or Europe, but for its recipients it is key to their independence. There is some advertising revenue available, but businesses are subject to political influence, so it is not a reliable option. “[We] have only one way to work and this is through international funding and grants. Otherwise, we cannot survive,” Mohammed said. New ventures The KDP and the PUK are doubling down on their strategy and several new party-affiliated outlets have launched over the past several months. The bulk of these new ventures are associated with Masrour Barzani and his advisors, reflecting the prime minister’s growing power within the KDP. Established in February 2023, the Kurdistan Chronicle is a slickly produced, English-language magazine aimed at the international community with content that reads like an investment brochure for Barzani’s premiership. The prime minister’s signature initiatives like the export of produce to the Gulf dominate its coverage. Similarly, The New Region is oriented towards a global audience, but is newsier. Yet, the intent embodied in its name is unmistakable. Finally, Barzani’s operation has re-oriented Ava Media from entertainment broadcasting to a news platform that caters to Kurdish speakers. Barzani’s son and presumed heir, Areen Barzani, is regularly featured in its coverage. A screenshot of Kurdistan 24’s January 12, 2024 coverage of KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s trip to Davos. Photo: Screenshot/Kurdistan24. “The aim is to compete with Rudaw and mostly target the Kurdistan Region and other Kurdish areas,” said Qaradaghi, adding that Ava Media is allegedly “hiring Rudaw employees on massive wages.” They are also an attempt to blunt criticism of Barzani’s term as prime minister, which has seen significant political and economic upheaval, and improve the souring perception of his government in foreign capitals. However, Qaradaghi sees this as “conflating government, personal, and partisan roles.” Not to be outdone, PUK leader Bafel Talabani is also seeking to boost his profile. A political newcomer who has only held an official position within the PUK since December 2019, Talabani lacks the kind of connection that other Kurdish leaders, including his father Jalal Talabani, developed with the broader public beyond their core supporters. Therefore, his profile and apparent accomplishments must be constructed by friendly media. In January 2024, Channel 8 began airing after a long period of development. In addition to Talabani’s own political fortunes, the new outlet will likely seek to boost the PUK’s brand ahead of expected regional elections later this year. Who it harms The Kurdistan Region’s system of party-affiliated media skews coverage of news events and issues. This harms two distinct groups: Kurdish citizens, who are unable to access impartial information in their own language about their government and politics, and foreign observers, for whom information about the Kurdistan Region is largely viewed through partisan filters. While citizens have the option of choosing from a variety of party-supported outlets, which does mean some diversity of perspectives, there are many issues and viewpoints that the ruling parties are united in keeping off the airwaves. A good example of this is corruption, which is pervasive in the Kurdistan Region. Nevertheless, in-depth investigations into specific cases are rare. When it is mentioned, it mostly takes the form of hints and allegations rather than the kind of exploratory investigative journalism that occurs elsewhere. Lamentably, some of the most detailed stories about corruption have been published abroad by foreign journalists. That is not because of a lack of bravery, talent, or ambition on the part of Kurdish journalists — far from it — but rather because the system protects vested interests and punishes those who challenge it with unemployment or worse. Citizens are the biggest loser: They are denied the vital information that enables authentic democracy to function. Foreign observers are similarly offered a distorted view of economic and political dynamics in the Kurdistan Region focusing almost entirely on the activities and concerns of the elite, rather than the everyday experience of ordinary residents. Outlets like Rudaw, Kurdistan24, and the Kurdistan Chronicle publish accessibly in English and their platforms are optimized to appear in web searches. This is not trickery, but smart business practice that above all takes money to do well and consistently. The effect is that outside observers most frequently encounter the information these partisan outlets publish, while information that disrupts party-constructed narratives is not as easily available. It takes time, experience, and language skills to dig deeper. That is hard to do from behind a desk in Washington, Dubai, or Berlin. The Kurdistan Region would be much better served by independent, non-partisan media. However, such a shift would require major systemic changes that run counter to the region’s political development. A completely different funding model would also need to be put in place to support truly independent journalism. These are unlikely to happen in the near term, but recognizing this dual challenge is the first step to making sure that Kurdish citizens and foreign observers get the information they deserve. Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist and researcher who focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy. His past work has appeared in Foreign Policy, the Index on Censorship, Al-Monitor, and Rest of World. Full disclosure: Rodgers was NRT’s English Editor from 2018-2021 and contributes to Peregraf’s English coverage. Main photo by Winthrop Rodgers The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.
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Iraq’s Disputed Territories and the Potential Impact of the Upcoming Provincial Elections
Draw Nedia washingtoninstitute - Hiwa Abdullah Hussein These elections will directly affect the future of the disputed territories, and political parties must be careful to avoid deepening sectarian divides, both in this case and in future elections. Iraq’s highly anticipated provincial elections are scheduled for December 18. Despite initial pushback from political parties, the country’s Electoral Commission with the support of the federal government has emphasized that the elections will go forward. These elections, which will be held in all Iraqi provinces except in the Kurdistan region, have the potential to shift the balance of political power in the country. Per Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, Kirkuk and parts of other northern provinces are considered “disputed territories,” and a referendum will ultimately decide whether they become part of Iraqi Kurdistan or remain under the central government. These are not marginal territories; they span about 40,000 square kilometers and are inhabited by over 3 million people. Open image Source: The New Humanitarian In practice, the final status of these “disputed territories”—areas considered by both the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) as part of their territory, will be in the voters’ hands given the sectarian party options, with implications for their future status as areas primarily under either Baghdad’s or Erbil’s purview. Given the high stakes, the question of the legitimate electoral management of the disputed territories will likely become a flash point for conflict between the KRG and the federal government. However, if the will of the people is respected and competing political forces put aside their differences, the elections could open a new chapter of prosperity and cooperation in the disputed territories. Provincial Council Elections: The First In Ten Years It may seem odd that the results of local elections could reverberate through the larger Iraqi political system, but the provincial council elections are an important step toward increasing administrative decentralization and developing provinces. The Iraqi constitution grants provincial councils broad administrative and financial powers, in addition to the power to select the governor and provincial officials and to approve projects according to the budget allocated to the province. Although provincial elections are intended to be held regularly, they have been held only three times since 2003: in 2005, 2009, and 2013. They were scheduled to take place in 2018 alongside parliamentary elections but were postponed indefinitely. According to the Iraqi Provincial Councils Law, provincial councils consist of 285 seats nationwide, with 75 allocated to women. The Independent High Electoral Commission announced that in this year’s elections there are more than 6,000 candidates from 134 electoral lists, including 39 coalitions, 29 parties, and 66 individual candidates. According to the Electoral Commission, more than 23 million citizens are eligible to cast their votes in the elections, but only 60% have received the biometric cards that make them eligible to vote. This concerning figure indicates the potential for a drop in participation, likely due to the absence of the Sadrist movement, the recent withdrawal of independent parties, and a general disenchantment with the political process. As is typical in Iraqi elections, the political arena is cacophonous and confusing, with a staggering number of political actors participating. Currently, ten lists are vying for the largest number of seats for the provincial councils. The largest Shia political fronts competing for provincial seats are the State of Law Alliance, led by former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki; the We Build Alliance, led by Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri; the Powers of the State Alliance, which includes the National Wisdom Movement led by Ammar al-Hakim; and the Victory Alliance, led by Haider al-Abadi. The Shia forces are competing in all fifteen provinces and are expected to win the majority of seats in Baghdad and eight provinces in the southern and central regions. The Sunni groups will field four lists: the Progress Alliance, led by former Iraqi parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi; the Sovereignty Alliance, led by Khamis al-Khanjar; the Decision Alliance, led by Defense Minister Thabet al-Abbasi; and the Determination Alliance, led by the MP Muthanna al-Samarrai. Sunni parties are actively participating in elections in Baghdad, Anbar, Nineveh, Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Kirkuk provinces and are expected to win the majority of seats in all but Kirkuk. The Kurdish groups will field three lists: the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Masoud Barzani; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Bafel Talabani; and the New Generation Movement, led by Shaswar Abdulwahid. These Kurdish parties are participating in the provinces of Kirkuk (fifteen seats), Salah al-Din (fifteen seats), Diyala (fifteen seats), and Nineveh (twenty-nine seats). Kirkuk and its environs are of particular importance for KRG-Baghdad relations. All Kurdish parties consider the entire province of Kirkuk to be part of Kurdistan. Kurdish parties are expected to win the majority of seats in Kirkuk and to be the decisive power in local governance in Nineveh province, raising the likelihood of a takeover by the Peshmerga, military forces affiliated with each Kurdish party. The results of the upcoming election could sour the already-strained relationship between the KRG and Baghdad. Electoral Politics: Motivated by Sectarianism, not Policy The official status of the disputed regions—including Kirkuk, Tal Afar, al-Hamdaniya, Sinjar, Zammar, Makhmur, and Khanaqin near the Iraq-Iran border—is hotly contested. This is due to the variety of ethnic and religious groups residing in those regions: Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen, Shia, Sunni, and Christian. In the past, the run-up to elections has been an opportunity for political parties and coalitions in these areas to elevate sectarian rhetoric. The political campaigning of these regions is not governed by a coherent political program or party ideology, but rather reflects a collection of sectarian or ethnicity-based groups aiming to bring their voters to the ballot boxes. While the electoral process, and the large number of candidates, might appear to indicate a thriving civil society, most voters cast their ballots for candidates and lists based on national or sectarian orientation rather than qualifications or political platform. While political parties are eagerly preparing for the December elections, the main groups living in these areas—Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen—have not been enthusiastic during the initial voter registration phase. Although the elections are highly consequential, turnout could be quite low due to voter frustration with the political, security, and sectarian problems that have persisted for two decades. Another issue in the disputed regions is that local community representatives cannot work together for the benefit of their areas’ residents. Local governments suffer from a lack of cohesive policy, as each official is interested first and foremost in providing services to his or her sect or ethnic constituency. The patronage system in these locales has led to the deterioration of the security situation; the presence of more than one dominant security force, with different names, affiliations, and agendas, is a major roadblock to ensuring civilians’ safety. In October 2017, following the Kurdistan region’s failure to gain independence in the September referendum, the Peshmerga withdrew from Kirkuk and other areas and Iraq’s federal forces resumed control immediately after. Since then, there has been a security vacuum in these areas given the limited involvement of federal forces on the ground. Therefore, sectarian propaganda and political tensions threaten the security situation in these areas, especially since the Islamic State and other terror groups are still able to carry out attacks. Considerations and Approaches to the Elections Outcome These elections will directly affect the future of the disputed territories, and political parties must be careful to avoid deepening sectarian divides, both in this case and in future elections. As a first step, explicitly sectarian speeches, which are likely to increase tensions, should be outlawed. After the elections, the dispute over the identity of these areas will continue. Regardless of the electoral outcome, all of the components, sects, and ethnic minorities currently living in this province must be respected. Moreover, while the formation of local governments in the provinces will likely be delayed for several months because of political disagreements about positions and entitlements, it is important for the main groups in these provinces to start serious talks to reach an agreement on the details as soon as possible after the elections. This is especially true in Kirkuk province, where local parties and regional actors—namely, Iran and Turkey—will undoubtedly try to interfere in the province’s internal affairs. Intra-sectarian tensions must also be addressed; although there is significant infighting within Kurdish parties, they should move beyond internal conflict and present a united front in these elections and their aftermath. Reestablishing a united presence in the disputed areas would be a key point of strength and security for the Kurdistan region, and Kurdish parties should work together to protect the Kurdish voice and form alliances with other groups to serve the people of these areas. If the Kurds do not unite and do not make the necessary preparations, there is no guarantee that they will win the elections for governor of Kirkuk. Post-Election Challenges and Opportunities The elections themselves promise to be an arduous, tense process regardless of the outcome. Afterwards, however, the provincial councils will face a new set of challenges. Dealing with citizens based on their sectarian identity rather than viewing them all as Iraqi citizens creates many social and political problems in the disputed areas. The essence of the problems in these disputed areas, especially in Kirkuk, as stated by Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani, is “not security, but a political issue.” He also emphasized that this situation negatively affects the citizens. One of the clearest post-election risks is that local factions might be unable to reach agreement on distribution of gubernatorial positions and other unelected posts determined by the new municipal councils fairly quickly. If this happens, the delays will lead to increased tensions and jeopardize the security of the area’s residents. Additionally, there is a risk of external interventions in these disputed areas, especially by neighboring countries. Furthermore, there is no consensus within these regions on how to use the budget allocated for their administration. Past councils could have created more job opportunities and prosperity through development budgets, but administrative corruption and the unstable security situation have rendered this program ineffective to date, and difficulties continue. Despite the myriad challenges that will arise after the elections, there are important opportunities for greater cooperation and harmony in the disputed territories. Security coordination between the Kurdistan region and Baghdad in the disputed areas can be exploited for collaboration in other fields and for fostering competition in delivering services to the citizens of these areas. For this to work, it is imperative that Baghdad grant operational permission to the region’s service institutions and agree on both parties’ working together to offer the best services, particularly those related to road construction, bridges, and infrastructure. The disputed areas are renowned for their archaeological, historical, and cultural sites. If investment is done correctly, they can attract millions of tourists annually, providing an additional revenue stream for the country and aiding in sustainable development in the provinces. These areas can also be leveraged for agriculture, as they are the breadbasket of the country, and more than 40 percent of the country’s wheat is produced in them. If Iraq, with its different ethnic and religious groups, can have an open, fair, and nonviolent election cycle, this will significantly strengthen its international standing. This would allow it to host dozens of diverse cultural and religious events annually and enhance its position vis-a-vis neighboring countries. Iraq’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious character could be one of its greatest assets, positioning the country as a beacon of coexistence. In order to successfully project this image however, federal and local actors must ensure that the upcoming elections are inclusive and free of harmful sectarian rhetoric. Hiwa Abdullah Hussein Hiwa Abdullah Hussein is an Iraqi Kurdish journalist and a fellow of Iraq Leaders Fellowship Program (Political Track) at the Institute of International Regional Studies.
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Can Baghdad and Erbil Make a New Beginning?
Sardar Aziz Emirates Policy Center Key Takeaways Iraqi Kurdistan has been going through its most vulnerable period in its relationship with the central government in Baghdad for the last three decades. Iraq’s Constitution sacrifices clarity for consensus, as its authors addressed major disputes in ambiguous terms, hoping that future political processes would resolve them. In politics, institutionalization, free market, armed group unification, and wealth distribution, the region developed a model incompatible with societal development and expectations, especially among the youth. Despite the possibility that the present crisis may lead to a reorganization of the Baghdad-Erbil relationship, the reality of the situation suggests that this won’t happen anytime soon. The different views and expectations allow both sides to point to the Constitution as a touchstone for reconciliation; it has also contributed to the present conflict. In September 2023, the Kurdistan Region’s Prime Minister, Masrour Barzani, accompanied by a delegation, visited Baghdad. According to one of his close advisors, he had more than a dozen marathon meetings in a day), to resolve the dispute over the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) share of the federal budget. Masrour Barzani and his delegation celebrated their trip after guaranteeing a loan of 700 billion Iraqi dinars (IQD) to cover the salaries of the region’s civil servants for three months. Barzani also thanked the Kurdish political parties for their support. The visit, the delegation, the urgency, the meetings, the loan, and the marketing afterward are all signs of a new era between Erbil and Baghdad. This paper explores whether Baghdad and Erbil can make a new beginning and reach a sustainable deal. The State of the Relationship Like his father, Masrour Barzani was reluctant to visit Baghdad. The negotiation between the two sides continued at a low level among technocrats. The negotiation was wedged. According to insiders, there were calls that the finance ministries in Kurdistan and Baghdad had no power to make new decisions. Any further decision has to be made by the politicians (the elite who steer the government behind the existing structures). However, public pressure, especially from public employees, caused the urgency. There were no other options but for the Barzani to visit Baghdad. To show unity and strength, he had to overcome differences with his deputy, Qubad Talabani, from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and make up a unity delegation. Besides the prime minister, they met with dozens of politicians from different parties and groups in Baghdad. This is a clear sign of the diverse and polycentric nature of power in Baghdad and, above all, the limited capacity of the prime minister’s office. When the deal of providing Erbil with a loan was reached, the prime minister preponed his weekly meeting and verified the new agreement before embarking on his trip to the United Nations. According to a former Iraqi MP, a big part of the Baghdad elite sees Kurdistan, especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), as trying to connect to Baghdad only for financial reasons. This makes the Baghdad elites use the economic influence to gain Kurdish support for the current government. Limiting the Baghdad-Erbil relationship to financial support for government participation omits many other essential aspects. Considering these circumstances, the Bagdad-Erbil relationship seems to have reached its Thucydides moment when the strong [Baghdad] do what they can and the weak [Iraqi Kurdistan] suffer what they must. Iraqi Kurdistan has been going through its most vulnerable period in its relationship with Baghdad for the last three decades. The region is in a dire economic situation and cannot pay the salaries of more than a million public sector employees. The region stopped exporting its oil six months ago and has difficulty receiving its budget share from Baghdad. Besides, the Iraqi Supreme Federal Court ruled that the 2022 Kurdistan Parliament extension is unconstitutional. Consequently, the region has no functional Parliament and is governed by a caretaker government. Moreover, the two main political parties, PUK and KDP, are experiencing their worst relationship. A high-ranking PUK politician described it as “worse than the 1990s civil war era.” In contrast, Baghdad is at its most influential period. It deals with the KRG through legal, financial, security, and institutional tools. The KRG elites see their issue with Baghdad as political and constitutional. In response, Baghdad dismisses that and regards the matters as financial and administrative, as PM Sudani told experts in New York, among them Bilal Wahab, a Fellow at the Washington Institute. Bilal says Sudani’s categorization was an attempt to dismiss international intervention between Baghdad and Erbil, especially after the KRG PM’s letter to US President Joe Biden, calling him to intervene. The two sides have agreed to change the budget provisions for Kurdistan next year. Soran Omer, a Kurdish MP in Baghdad, says the circumstances closely associated with the Parliament’s passage of the oil and gas bill are difficult to anticipate. To avoid any pretext for oil decentralization, particularly for a governorate like Basra, where most of Iraq’s oil is located, the Iraqi government is establishing legislation ensuring that most authority will remain in its hands. They culminated in the interventions of the increasing regional powers, Iran and Turkey. The Background Kurds in Iraq have had a problematic relationship with the central government since the foundation of the Iraqi government a century ago. This relationship entered a new phase with the emergence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the 1990s. The latter is a post-Cold War entity that emerged after Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990. The birth and emergence were not without challenges, some of them trailing the KRG to these days. The post-Cold War unipolar world order, the spread of democratization, and the emergence of human rights contributed directly and indirectly to the KRG’s emergence. Despite generous US and Western support, the local elites could not overcome their parochial differences and build on them. Soon, the civil war started in 1994, an institutionalized war, and the region struggled to overcome it. It has been fully shaped in government, administration, and social and cultural areas. The war structured the region’s political administration in a 50/50 fashion, where the two main parties divided everything between them. This arrangement is now under threat. In 2003, the region attempted to legitimize and normalize its de facto status through the new Iraqi Constitution. The attempts were nominally realized, such as federalizing Iraq, recognizing the Peshmerga, and dealing with natural resources management. These areas are at the heart of the Erbil-Baghdad contention these days. The Kurdistan region was a de facto state when Bagdad struggled to emerge in post-Saddam Iraq. The region flourished economically, the society urbanized and educated, house ownership rose, and life quality compared to the past changed dramatically for the better. In politics, institutionalization, free market, armed group unification, and wealth distribution, the region developed a model incompatible with societal development and expectations, especially among the youth. While many areas revolutionized, many structures remained unchanged, with them the whole power relationship. Conservation of the old power modes in unaltered forms, such as personalization, family, and maintenance of divisions, limited the region’s development. The ruling elites attempt to contain that through public employment, especially in various security areas. Today, in the region, a transformed society in many ways – education, worldview, lifestyle, expectation, and access – faces fixed, fast-frozen power structures. The result is a double crisis: Neither society can change the power structure nor the ruling elites are able or willing to change the status quo. Primary Issues of Contention and Disagreement Before getting to the nature of the relationship, we need to lay out the main areas of contention between Baghdad and Erbil. First, after the change in the power balance between the two sides, KRG struggles to find a formula to frame the relationship. Their latest statements show that the KDP and PUK are pushing for federalism as the old/ new formula between the two sides. Nechirvan Barzani, KRG president, and Qubad Talabani, Deputy Prime Minister, recently stressed federalism to govern Iraq and the Baghdad-Erbil relationship. This is challenging while Baghdad sees Kurdistan exceeding federal rights, and the KRG argues otherwise. According to Article 1 of the Iraqi Constitution, Iraq is “a single federal” state, and the Constitution (the federal regime) guarantees its unity. Kurdistan is a recognized federal region within Iraq, according to Article 117. The second is financial and budgetary issues, both monetary and fiscal. The economic disputes between Baghdad and Erbil are politicized, i.e., depending on elite agreement, situation, and need. Kurds are required to form the government following every election, and every time this happens, they negotiate the budget shares and are guaranteed to obtain what they want. These political commitments face many difficulties after the establishment of the government and are, at best, only partially kept. Oil is the third issue. Before the ICC decision, KRG pushed for a federal right to oil. Iraq is sensitive regarding oil, and centralization is the only way currently foreseen by the Baghdad elites. There is a draft Hydrocarbon Law; according to the leaked version, the KRG will be treated as one of the oil-producing provinces, with one member in a committee of 12 and the right to offer suggestions. There have been other attempts to pass the law since 2007, and have yet to succeed. This becomes more sensitive as Basra pushes for more control over its natural resources. The disputed areas are the fourth issue. Kirkuk is also part of the package between Kurdistan, mainly the KDP, and Baghdad, along with budget and oil. The situation in the city and KDP’s reaction to it was part of the current governing coalition, including the return of the previous KDP party headquarters in the city, which caused the recent turmoil. The deal was not transparent, as the media could not cover all its provisions. The latest protests showed that the city is particular to Iraq and harbors immense complexity. The fifth issue is the Peshmerga and security sectors. Peshmerga, its size, function, sphere (area of duties), and duties are all subject to the Baghdad-Erbil dispute. Iraq would like to see a reduction in the number of Peshmerga and only be willing to pay a salary of less than 10 percent of the current number. Kurds are complaining that the Peshmerga are not treated the same way as the Iraqi army or even the Popular Mobilization Forces. The latter receives one of the biggest budgetary allocations in the 2023 budget, US$ 2,88 billion. On the other hand, despite continued pressure from the US and other coalition allies, the KRG cannot reform and unite its political party’s armed forces. Furthermore, the process of integrating Peshmerga into the Iraqi army and shared brigades is currently halted, a source close to the process reveals. To deal with these crises, both sides regularly refer to the Constitution and federal framework. However, this reference to the Constitution, rather than contributing to legalizing and institutionalizing the relationship, has complicated the conflict between the two sides. Iraq’s Constitution sacrifices clarity for consensus, as its authors addressed major disputes in ambiguous terms, hoping that future political processes would resolve them. The federal supporters won, at least on paper, in 2005. However, the system has proven stagnant, creating space for politics, political actors, and political situations to deal with the issues. This reliance on politics to solve the issues and on brute forces led some to categorize the Erbil-Baghdad relationship as a power balance relationship, including Dlawer Ala’Aldeen. President of the Middle East Research Institute in Erbil. Regarding vagueness, the power balance is not better than the articles of the Iraqi Constitution. From ancient Greece, we know that a system of multiple interacting states always causes some concern for balance among those states. It usually applies to international relations, where chaos is the main characteristic, rather than domestic federal relations. Based on power balance principles, Baghdad and Erbil see each other’s empowerment as a threat and use military, economic, and legal power to maintain balance. This view indicates a zero-sum relationship between the two sides. In the last two decades, many tools of international relations have been applied, such as economic pressure, salary and budget cuts, relying on the military and forces, international courts, federal courts, and media war. As there is no power without certain forms of knowledge and vice versa, to establish a sustainable Erbil-Baghdad relationship, the nature of thinking, understanding, and imagining each other plays a significant role. If the relationship is based on the balance of power, then there is a lack of trust, if not the absence of it. There is a la carte, cheery picking of constitutional articles, and politicization of courts. In these circumstances, stability emerges when one submits to the other and the nature of the relationship changes. However, history has proved that is not sustainable, especially for a country like Iraq, which is ridden with potential crises. Intervening Factors Baghdad and Erbil are not homogeneous entities. The division among the parties and groupings is worse than ever. These many parties and organizations have various opinions and strategies regarding the Baghdad-Erbil relationship. It is vital to map the key players on both sides of the conflict to grasp the circumstances better. Along with the smaller opposition organizations, the KRG is home to the KDP, the PUK, and a newly emerged actor, more than a million public employees. Each player advocates for a different relationship with Baghdad and has distinct interests inside the KRG polity. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) In its three-decade history, the KRG is currently experiencing its weakest phase. Following the termination of the KRG-Turkey Energy Framework Agreement by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the region lost its ability to export nearly 500,000 barrels of oil daily. The oil income was its primary source and the blood of the KRG-Turkey strategic relationship. This has made the region unable to pay the salaries of more than a million employees. The current KRG administration hoped for a “constructive and stable partnership with Baghdad.” It also marked “a new era for the Kurdistan region, especially in the relationship with the Federal Republic of Iraq.” According to Adel Bakawan, [4] Director of the French Research Center on Iraq, the current KRG government has been the most transparent cabinet with the federal government in Baghdad. Reflecting on the discourse of the KRG’s current administration, the regional government tries to build relationships with Baghdad as they are two equal governments within Iraq. This formula is not accepted in Baghdad. One of the primary outcomes of this misunderstanding is a feeling of frustration on both sides. While KRG hopes for “a clear understanding of both parties’ rights and duties,” Baghdad focuses on building a hierarchy of center-periphery relationships. The hawks in Baghdad claim the balance has changed, and today is not yesterday. Some called this the end of federalism in Iraq. Amanj Rahim, the longest-serving top bureaucrat in the KRG government and member of all KRG-Baghdad delegations, sees Baghdad as “stalling and procrastinating” rather than implementing the Constitution and laws. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Even though the KDP is the region’s largest and most powerful party, it is divided and factionalized more than ever. There are two significant factions, one led by the present prime minister and the other by Nechervan Barzani, the regional president. The former is more potent than the latter. The dominant faction is more nationalistic, especially in rhetoric and symbolism – a skin-deep nationalistic view that hardly goes beyond personal allegiance. This framework has impacted the KDP’s relationship with Baghdad and made it less pragmatic. Concerning relations with other parties within the KRG, the dominant faction within the KDP feels the PUK is no longer equal and has been fracturing over the past 10 years. As a result, the KDP sees itself as the Kurdistan Region’s most dominant party and seeks to permanently abolish 50-50 to enable the party to govern the region on its own, once and for all. The referendum and the tripartite alliance between the Brazani-Sadr and Sunni coalitions are the two political events that influenced Baghdad’s relationship with the KDP. The referendum is evident because it was perceived as an effort to partition Iraq, which led to the KDP being labeled a separatist group. The Barzani-Sadr-Sunni coalition was a KDP attempt to marginalize pro-Iranian groups, which also backfired on the party. Iran exerted significant pressure on the KDP, particularly Barzani. However, the arrangement turned out to be adverse for the KRG. The harm had already been done when Barzani recognized his error. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) On September 27, the PUK held its fifth congress in Sulaymaniyah. As expected, it ended the co-presidency model in the party and appointed the current president, Bafel Talabani, as the only leader. While the party will become more centralized and family-owned, more akin to the KDP, the PUK is weaker than ever. It only lives on its past glories and is proud of its over 20,000 martyrs. The powerful elites within the KDP see the PUK’s dwarfing as an opportunity to change the equal relationship with that party and treat it as a junior partner. PUK finds it hard to stomach this new status and tries to balance the KDP. Therefore, the PUK has further gravitated toward Baghdad. This is apparent through its discourse and more vividly through the party’s president, Bafel Talabani’s frequent visits to Baghdad. As some observers counted, he traveled to Iraq’s capital 35 times over a year, or more than once every two weeks on average. This is the polar opposite of the current KRG prime minister, who only visited Baghdad four times during that period. The pivot to Baghdad is not an attempt to balance against the KDP alone. It brings the regional powers, Iran and Turkey, into the situation. Whether the pivot to Bagdad is a strategy or a tactical attempt to balance against the KDP in the KRG is unclear. However, the PUK president feels more at home in Baghdad than Erbil. The PUK is sandwiched between Baghdad and Erbil as a junior partner. According to local journalist Kamal Rauf, this has made the PUK a spoiler in Kurdistan and a big dreamer in Baghdad, but with other natural options. [5] The Public Employees or Salary Receivers Becoming a salaryman or a public employee is a dream of the majority in Iraq and Kurdistan. Being an Iraqi “salaryman” means a lifetime of employment with little effort and a lifelong pension. The security and ease in the public sector contrast with the private sector. Iraqi public servants are off work for more than half of the year, a situation the Parliament tries to regulate through a law. The salarymen and women are the lucky insiders in a distributional regime that has reached a cul de sac in recent years. As the reality of Kurdistan and Iraq has shown, scholars have argued that this distributional regime has proven fiscally unsustainable, economically distortionary, and, most importantly, ineffective in reducing income inequalities as it has created insider-outsider dynamics and benefited the privileged insiders most of all. However, the main goal of the system in Kurdistan is to create a patronage that guarantees the survival of the party-government system. Recently, because of delays, cuts, and the government’s inability to pay, this segment of society has emerged as a cohesive group with a single issue, resembling single-issue parties elsewhere. In their push for regular payment, this broad segment of society has created an ad hoc affiliation that no political party can ignore. As financial issues are at the heart of the Baghdad-Erbil relationship, this segment is, directly and indirectly, becoming a party in this negotiation. This group struggles to come up with a coherent view. While their aim is regular payment of salaries, some wish they would be directly paid by the federal government, especially in the education and health sectors. Others cry for less corruption and more regular payments. Many are boycotting work and going on strike. Recently, the Teachers and Employees’ Rights Defense Commission organized a petition to collect signatures, and their representatives met with politicians like Qais al-Khazali. After collecting more than 60,000 signatures, many Iraqi MPs and some Kurdish political parties joined the campaign. These cleavages are in a tricky situation. Public sector employees are part of the KRG political system and the most beneficial segment of society now looking to Baghdad to maintain their income and lifestyle. While Iraqi elites, especially hawks within the Coordination Framework, are happy to see public employment pressure, they are unwilling to include them in the Iraqi public payroll for political, economic, and legal reasons. Baghdad’s Kafkaesque World In Baghdad, the authority figures are diverse, enigmatic, and have multiple responses. This applies to the prime minister’s office, the ministry of finance, the finance committee in the Parliament, various party and group leaders, the “independent” MPs, and above all, the high federal court. The Kurdish representatives are often subjected to endless forms, paperwork, demands, and tasks that prevent them from achieving their goals, creating a sense of frustration and hopelessness. This bureaucratic entrapment derails or frustrates the Kurds. If the Bagdad-Erbil relationship is a power balance form, then using power in every way, including revenge and humiliation, is permissible. The Supreme Federal Court (SFC) Iraq’s Supreme Federal Court (SFC) has emerged as an influential actor in the country’s political scene. The court has been actively issuing decisions regarding the unconstitutionality of KRG laws and institutions. On the one hand, the SFC’s decisions regarding Kurdistan show the crisis in the KRG’s courts and their inability to become an apolitical arbitrator within the region’s polity. On the other hand, the SFC is very centrist in its interpretations of the Constitution. Intriguingly, federalism is seen as a strategy to avoid the country’s division and a way or a threat to divide it. As Qubad Talabani put it in 2005, “We feel that the Kurds conceded to be part of Iraq.” The current Iraqi elites are unhappy with this view and want to end it. Hence, federalism is also under stress. The SFC plays a significant role in reshaping federalism to make it an entity governed from the center and eliminating differences between Kurdistan and Iraq, from the Personal Status Law to oil, institutions, budgets, and other areas; the latest of its decision is considering KRG Parliament extension is unconstitutional. These all jeopardized another pillar of Iraq’s political system: the Constitution. While the different views and expectations allow both sides to point to the Constitution as a touchstone for reconciliation, it has also contributed to the present conflict. Iraq’s Constitution sacrifices clarity for consensus, as its authors addressed major disputes in ambiguous terms, hoping that future political processes would resolve them. As these processes failed, parties seized on these ambiguities to legitimize their respective positions and, at times, further them through domestic and international legal processes. That takes us back to politics and the balance of power mechanisms. External Interventions: US, Turkey, and Iran Because of the election year, rising global issues, and domestic pressures, Washington is trying to keep Iraq and Iran away from the media. This has made the Kurds complain of the US inaction in Iraqi Kurdistan and sit idly by, letting the region fall into Tehran’s orbit. Others call for Washington to re-engage with the Kurdish and Iraqi governments, not as a passive advisor but as an active mediator and guarantor. Currently, the KDP is frustrated with the US’s inaction and is putting pressure on the KDP. “We are asking where the hell the United States is,” said a Kurdish official. This feeling dates back to the 2017 referendum, when the KDP expected the US to protect Kurdistan. The frustration is mutual, as the current administration feels it cannot work as it wishes with the KRG. The US frustration was expressed through concern over human rights and freedom of expression in the region. The US focus on this area is a way to message the current KRG elites on freedom of expression. The current US administration is experiencing its lame-duck election campaign year, and their priority in Iraq is to maintain the quietness that has prevailed recently. On the Iraqi side, especially in the Coordination Framework, there is a deliberate ambiguity regarding the US. The reality on the ground is a truce, if not peace, between the two sides, a reality that could change due to the eruption of war in Gaza. The two sides appear to have reached a win-win formula. The US seeks calmness; the Framework wants to safeguard its government and avoid pressure, especially with Sadr outside and a disenchanted street. The US wishes to maintain ties with Kurdistan and build good relations with Baghdad. When Secretary Blinken met with Iraqi Prime Minister al-Sudani, he urged the Iraqi government to continue cooperating with the KRG to foster its stability and resilience. This policy of low-profiling Iran and Iraq and treating them as dual cases has stressed the US-KRG relationship. Iran Iran is close to the current ruling elite in Baghdad. Iranian demands and interests are maintained through them, whether it is security or trade. Iran might not push for the KRG’s collapse, as Tehran neither favors a strong Iraq nor instability in Iraqi Kurdistan. Accordingly, Iran might favor a curtailed-power KRG under Baghdad’s control and be unable to act against Iranian interests. Turkey Iraq and Turkey are exchanging political and technical delegations, although oil exports have not yet resumed. The flurry of technical meetings between their officials led some observers to suggest that momentum has revived negotiations to reopen the Iraq-Turkey oil export pipeline. On the political side, during the last ADIPEC conference, Turkish Energy Minister Alpaslan Bayraktar said: “As of today, the pipeline is ready to operate; within this week, we will start the Turkey-Iraq pipeline.” Turkey claimed until recently that the pipelines were unprepared following the Februaryearthquake. While both parties try to keep the connection alive, there is no resolution. Iraq has not formally asked Turkey to resume the export because it is unwilling to pay the “high” extracting cost to the international oil companies. As they are aware that Iraq has not achieved a deal with the KRG and particularly the global oil companies, observers argue that the Turkish remark may be an effort to place the responsibility for the delay with Iraq, according to Muhammad Hussain [6] an energy observer from the Iraq Oil Report. Others argue that despite frequent exchanges between the two sides, neither Turkey nor Iraq is in a rush to start exporting oil again, each for different reasons. While the two nations had a long list of disagreements, as Basra MP Ali Al-Shaddad put it, Turkey’s demands included the following: Acceptance of Turkish forces’ presence in Iraqi territory, Withdrawal from further international arbitration brought by the Iraqi Oil Ministry against Turkey, A permanent price reduction for Turkey, Paying US$ 7 for each barrel exported, Various payments regarding the pipelines. It is unclear if Ankara has relented to its demands or not. According to Kurdish expert Burhan Yasin, [4] Ankara faces a decisive moment in its relations with Iraq and Kurdistan. Turkey has to either turn to Iraq and abandon the 50-year deal with the KRG or maintain it, which looks somewhat unattainable. Conclusion The Baghdad-Erbil relationship is at its lowest point right now. Despite the possibility that the present crisis may lead to a reorganization of the Baghdad-Erbil relationship, the reality of the situation suggests this won’t happen anytime soon. The new Iraq emerged due to a tactical alliance between Shia and Kurdish groups; the coalition no longer exists, and a new hierarchy is emerging between the two sides for the first time. Will the Kurds be allowed to negotiate their position, or will they be considered the defeated side and be required to comply with the terms of surrender? The Kurdish elites have yet to accept that they are the weaker party and that the current power dynamics will only last for a while. Even though financial and economic concerns dominate the Baghdad-Erbil relationship, it is more than that in the long run. The two sides’ issues demand reframing and a fresh perspective, which is not expected from the current Baghdad and Erbil elites, who prioritize their interests and use the situation to that end. Scenario 1: Continuation of the swinging between a short-term fix and tensions Baghdad needs more time to pass numerous laws, among them the Hydrocarbon Law, and establish itself further vis-à-vis Erbil in other areas. Since 2007, Baghdad and Erbil have disagreed on the law. Baghdad appears to favor a centralized regulation and now is the best time to pass it through the Parliament. Scenario 2: Accepting reality, the KRG changed its focus to Baghdad while Baghdad and the PUK are working together to restrict the KDP. Iran strongly supports this strategy both directly and indirectly. The actions have successfully limited the KDP’s options, especially given Turkey’s desire to grow closer ties with Baghdad. KDP hasn’t changed its mindset yet, in any case. Scenario 3: Wishing for a situation that, directly or indirectly, alters the power dynamics between the two parties. The KDP adheres to the belief that the country’s existing structure is susceptible to changes within and outside. Based on the region’s history, KDP elites believe such an event is imminent. Therefore, the KDP should be patient and wait in this regard. It may be argued that the current Israeli-Hamas conflict and its potential influence in the broader region is making Baghdad’s elites more cautious. This scenario hovers around the possibility of a KDP-PUK deal. Following the PUK conference and legitimizing the Talabani family’s control over the party, the two ruling families, Barzani and Talabani, will likely agree, particularly after the election at the beginning of next year, to safeguard their interests and deal with Baghdad appropriately.
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Opinion of Iraqi Arab Citizens About the Kurdistan Region and its Government
Draw Media Organization Department of Draw Survey Report title: Opinion of Iraqi Arab Citizens About the Kurdistan Region and its Government Relations between Baghdad and Erbil on the issues of public budget, salaries, and oil have constantly seen ups and downs. What effects have these ongoing political conflicts and challenges had on the people from both regions? To gain insights into the perspectives of Iraqi Arab citizens concerning topics such as oil, corruption, independence, and interregional relations, Draw Media Organization's Survey Department conducted a comprehensive survey. A total of 910 Arab citizens from 15 different provinces in Iraq participated in this survey, which was overseen by Assistant Professor Dr Niaz Najmalddin, a faculty member at University of Sulaimani. The survey was conducted between August 24th and September 4th, 2023, using an electronic platform. Conclusion: Here are the key findings from the survey: • Almost 46% of respondents believe that it is the responsibility of the Iraqi government to provide salaries for employees of the Kurdistan Regional Government. • About 81% of participants hold the view that the Kurdistan Region does not possess the right to extract and sell oil. • The majority of participants, precisely 56%, hold the view that there is a significant degree of corruption within both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi government. This perspective suggests that, from the standpoint of Iraqi Arab citizens, both governments are perceived as being tainted by corruption. • A significant majority, amounting to 61%, believe that the Kurdistan Regional Government has been more successful in delivering services to its citizens compared to the Iraqi government. • Only a smaller proportion, 19%, consider the idea of the Kurdistan Region pursuing secession as normal. In contrast, almost 38% of respondents favor the dissolution of the Kurdistan Region. • Regarding the transfer of the Kurdistan Region's governance model to Iraq, which has been stress on by some officials several times, 45% are in favor, while 55% are opposed to it. • Additionally, a segment of the survey focused on the perspective of Arab respondents regarding tourism in the Kurdistan Region. Nearly 47% of those surveyed indicated a keen interest in visiting Sulaimani, while 33% expressed a desire to explore Erbil province. • Also, 44% of respondents express a desire to live in the Kurdistan Region. • Finally, a notable 57% of those who have visited the region express dissatisfaction with the checkpoints and security procedures in place. Opinion of Iraqi Arab Citizens About the Kurdistan Region and its Government
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In Iraq, the Kurds Are Their Own Worst Enemy
Draw Media by Yerevan Saeed/washingtoninstitute Kurds were once referred to as kingmakers, a pillar of stability, and the most powerful force in the fight against ISIS. Now, the Kurdish Region of Iraq is crippled by ferocious partisanships, tribal politics, and internal splits. After months of horse trading and wrangling, the Iraqi Parliament approved a contentious three-year budget on June 12. The budget for 2023 secures a record-breaking 153 billion dollars to fund Iraq’s growing public sector, development projects, and infrastructure. Although Kurdish-Arab disagreements over the rights and obligations of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the budget stymied parliamentary sessions for a few days, internal Kurdish divisions eventually aided Shia and Sunni factions in weakening the Kurdistan Region's financial independence. This effectively brought the KRG under federal authority, ushering in a new era of Erbil-Baghdad relations. The Kurdish Role in Post-2003 Iraq Since 2003, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has gained a considerable degree of autonomy and political influence within the country. Indeed, the Kurds have been active participants in Iraq's new political landscape since the very beginning, getting heavily involved in the drafting of the new Constitution and ultimately shaping the political system in Iraq. They have held significant positions in the federal government and have been involved in the negotiations for and formations of various governments over the years. The ceremonial Iraqi presidency post has traditionally been reserved for Kurds. Militarily, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces were instrumental in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. As ISIS moved in in 2014, Peshmerga forces actually gained territory and economic resources by extending their control over the oil rich province of Kirkuk after federal Iraqi forces abandoned their posts. The Peshmerga effectively repelled the Islamic State from Kirkuk, and later took part in offensives to drive the extremist group back. They were lauded as the fighting force on behalf of the world. In addition to dealing with these political and military problems, the KRG has actively developed its economy over the last several years, luring international capital and forming business alliances. It significantly expanded its hydrocarbon industry and exported 450 thousand barrels of oil daily until March 2023. As a result, Kurdish-controlled areas were the most prosperous part of the country. Even despite the recent economic setbacks and the inability of the KRG to pay civil servant salaries—in addition to the wealth disparity underlying the region’s economic development—Kurdistan’s poverty rate remains the lowest across Iraq. Kurdish Divisions Under the Surface The KRG seems to possess all the characteristics of a sovereign state except for any official international recognition. It even made an attempt to obtain complete sovereignty in 2017 by holding a highly contentious independence referendum. However, this referendum resulted in significant geographical, political, and economic losses and exacerbated the internal rifts hiding under the surface of the KRG’s apparent successes. Politically, the historic power struggle between the two ruling parties—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—has only gotten worse in recent years. Efforts by Western diplomats, including Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara A. Leaf, to encourage the two parties to restore a functional relationship have only brought temporary relief. As soon as Western guidance is removed, every deal is followed by a significantly more serious dispute between the KDP and the PUK. This reality reveals a harsh truth: internal Kurdish peace is dependent on a determined and consistent foreign whip. The irony is that Kurds are adept at bringing rival foreign powers together, but awful at handling their own internal differences. Case in point, KRG President Nechirvan Barzani is credited with mediating the phone call between then UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which resulted in the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two nations. Though Barzani, to his credit, has summoned the Kurdish parties and gone the extra mile to try to bridge political gaps within Kurdistan, his initiatives have been impeded by the complete lack of trust introduced by deeply individualized politics. These tribal politics are so bad that each party is hell-bent on bringing the other down, regardless of the consequences for Kurdistan. As a result, the internal divisions have undermined Kurdistan’s autonomy against the federal government. These inter-party conflicts have weakened Kurdish collective bargaining power and have hampered the Kurds’ ability to present a unified front in negotiations with the federal government. Internal schisms have also resulted in a lack of cohesive decision-making, making it impossible for the autonomous region to effectively advocate for its autonomy and assert its budgetary needs. Shia parties in the Coordination Framework used such splits to gain more control and influence over the region's finances, especially in the newly-approved Iraqi budget law. The subservience of Kurdish power did not stop with the loss of Kurdistan's entire oil industry. Every dollar given to Erbil is now subject to rigorous federal audits, and the KRG Prime Minister's authority over how money is spent is now under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Federal Government and the Federal Board of Supreme Audits. As retaliation for being sidelined by the KDP financially, the PUK faction in Baghdad worked diligently to make the Iraqi Prime Minister the arbitrator in the event of a Kurdish internal fight over financing. It remains to be seen whether the Prime Minister will use his legal right to engage in internal Kurdish affairs. The Kurdish parties' failure to rise to the occasion has diverted focus and resources away from governance and development, jeopardizing the region's potential to construct strong institutions and efficiently govern itself. It has undermined the KRG’s credibility and standing on national, regional, and international levels. Even throughout the budget debate, which was crucial to the economic viability of the region, the Kurdish parties failed to devise a well-balanced policy. Their finest strategy was to bite their nose in order to spite their face. As a result, the Kurdistan Region is weaker than ever before, and its future is uncertain. The KRG institutions have lost their legitimacy not just in the eyes of the people but also from the legal perspective after the Iraqi supreme court ruled that the extension of the Kurdistan Region’s parliament tenure was unconstitutional. Now, the Kurdistan region needs to hold an election to restore public and legal legitimacy. In addition, such an election could reset all political tensions and conflicts between the Kurdish political parties. While a fresh election cannot guarantee national unity, it can provide an opportunity to foster trust, encourage dialogue, and increase citizen participation. The election can also help build a sense of unity and shared purpose provided it is fair and clean. For this to happen, the political field in Kurdistan must be leveled through a new political pact backed by the KRG's foreign patrons. This demands more American and European diplomatic engagement than ever before, despite their sense of diplomatic fatigue. In the event of a Western diplomatic vacuum, China and other western adversaries could seek to fill in the gap. Washington must not allow Beijing another diplomatic win in the Middle East.
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How a Kurdish dream went up in smoke
Draw Media reportersonline/ by Judit Neurink Iraqi Kurds have had to give up the dream that oil would help them achieve independence. Citizens blame their leaders, who do not stop quarreling and enriching themselves. If a new political party were to emerge now in the Kurdish Region of Iraq, it would get more seats in parliament than either of the two current largest parties, while a quarter of voters would not vote at all. This result of a recent opinion poll is not surprising, considering the crumbling trust in the oldest Kurdish parties KDP and PUK. In the past, however, the rise of new parties has shown that they do not do what is expected of them either, namely, taking care of the citizens. Those interviewed for the pollsters must, therefore, be pretty desperate. The biggest problem for most parties can be found in their foundation: a family or person, and in the loyalty to them. But they are never based on a party program that focuses on the points citizens find important. Even new parties don’t have those – and in fact, there aren’t really any new parties at the moment. Those that once were, are usually counter-parties: opposition for opposition’s sake, without providing workable alternatives. What predominates in Kurdish politics is the use of fear for an enemy. Internally, the contrasts that have always existed are magnified, resulting in the KDP and PUK barely governing together anymore. But also externally, towards Baghdad, which is said to always want to cut the Kurds down to size. This is a popular instrument to get Kurds to rally behind their leader. Lack However, what the poll most of all shows is how fed-up the Kurds are with their leaders and politicians. This is mainly due to the lack of progress resulting from their policies. While taxes are rising (the Kurdish government needs money, it can barely pay its civil servants), just like the prices (under the pressure from the global market and the war in Ukraine), the government is providing fewer services. The hours when an (expensive) neighbourhood generator is needed to supplement government supplied electricity are increasing. While a water tanker is needed more often because there is no water coming from the tap for days on end. Protests are therefore increasing, with supporters of KDP and PUK also participating. Although new roads are being built (ring roads for Erbil, and a highway from Duhok to Erbil), many other roads go without maintenance. It makes the potholed road surface a danger to traffic. Villages are not being connected, no matter how often the dirt road turns into an impassable mud pool in winter. And no matter how often villagers plead for asphalt. Iraqi Kurds were promised that all problems would be solved once they started extracting and selling their own oil and gas. They would no longer depend on Baghdad. This has now been proven demonstrably wrong. The reasons are clear, although the politicians blame others. It is due to the power games of the KDP, and the resistance to it from a divided PUK. To self-enrichment and corruption. But above all, because of the unwillingness to cooperate with each other. Wrong Things went terribly wrong when the 2017 referendum on Kurdish independence upset both Baghdad and foreign allies and sponsors. Not only did Erbil lose its influence in the so-called Kurdistani areas (claimed by both Erbil and Baghdad). It also lost control over the oil city of Kirkuk. And that was just the beginning. Because in this way, Baghdad managed to increase its influence over the Kurdistan Region. And next, the Federal Supreme Court, the highest Iraqi court, got involved. And it ruled that the postponement of the Kurdish parliamentary elections at the end of last year had been illegal. A number of decisions taken since then is declared to be void, and the Kurdistan government has been given a caretaker status until a new parliament is elected. That delay last year was agreed upon only because KDP and PUK could not agree on adjustments to the electoral law. This even led to Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani boycotting cabinet meetings for months. Only under American pressure and threats to withdraw their support for the Peshmerga forces of both parties, was this resolved. Turkey These conflicts also cloud the Kurdish relationship with Turkey – which is pursuing and bombing the Turkish-Kurdish PKK on the territory of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The PUK allows the PKK to operate in areas under its control, while the KDP does not obstruct Turkey’s attacks in the slightest. Baghdad plays its own role; it views the PKK as a foreign militia operating on Iraqi territory and wants to establish a military cordon around its main camp, Makhmour, only kilometers away from Erbil. Kurdish citizens despairingly shake their heads over all this, increasingly losing their faith in the problem-solving abilities of their administrators. Another interesting survey indicates that as many as eighty percent of Kurds believe it is to their advantage that the Kurdistan Region has lost its independent oil extraction to Baghdad. Only seventeen percent think otherwise. Because that is the latest big blow that the Kurds have had to absorb, which is again the result of all that internal strife. For years, they had insisted that according to the Iraqi constitution of 2005, the oil belongs to all Iraqis. That would give the Kurdistan government the right to sign contracts with oil companies and export oil without involving Baghdad. In February, the Federal Supreme Court once again ruled that this Kurdish policy was against the constitution. A month later Baghdad won an arbitration case against Turkey, thus preventing it from exporting Kurdish oil without Baghdad’s intervention. Halt All oil exports came to a halt – and remain so, which means a loss of billions of dollars in revenue. This forced Erbil and Baghdad to reach an agreement, where the Kurds had to give up their independence on this issue as well. The 400,000 barrels that Kurdistan produces daily are transferred to the Iraqi state company SOMO, which deposits its revenues in a separate account that is under the control of Erbil but supervised by Baghdad. The agreement was passed in the Iraqi parliament as part of the Iraqi government budget. But not without a fierce quarrel between KDP and PUK. The latter accuses the former of monopolizing oil revenues, thereby leaving insufficient money for the PUK province of Sulaymaniya. The PUK managed to push through an article that allows provinces in a region to ask Baghdad for a separate budget if they do not receive a fair share of the total regional budget. The KDP was furious and announced that it would appeal the decision. Prime Minister Masrour Barzani even called the Kurdish parties who voted for it traitors. “History will not forget the Kurdish traitors,” he threatened. Fact is, that the controversial article once again gives more power to the federal government in Baghdad. Schadenfreude During the budget voting in the Iraqi parliament, Kurdish discord was the subject of jokes and schadenfreude. For the PUK did something that the Kurds have been guilty of more often: collaborating with the enemy. Under the old adage: the enemy of my enemy is my friend, they have formed imprudent coalitions before. The most notorious being the KDP’s alliance with Saddam Hussein in 1996, during the Kurdish civil war, to drive the PUK out of Erbil. The PUK has never forgiven the Barzanis for this. The Kurds in Iraq are weaker than ever before. The dream of independence has disappeared beyond the horizon. Baghdad, Iran, and Turkey have more power than ever. And the Kurdish citizens blame their leaders for this. Ultimately, it is their unwillingness to cooperate that has burst the dream of an independent state for all Kurds like it was merely a soap bubble.
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Syria’s Kurds turn to UAE to ease tensions with Assad
Draw Media al-monitor - Amberin Zaman An alleged trip to the UAE capital by Syrian Democratic Forces chief Mazloum Kobane, which Emirati officials deny, came just before he was targeted by a Turkish drone last month. The Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria is seeking the United Arab Emirates’ help to broker a deal with the Syrian regime amid fading confidence in the United States and Arab outreach to Damascus, Al-Monitor has learned. Mazlum Kobane, commander in chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the United States’ premier ally in the fight against the Islamic State (IS), recently traveled to the UAE, four well-informed sources and officials in the region speaking on condition of strict anonymity told Al-Monitor. Kobane met with UAE officials, two of the sources said, in order to seek Abu Dhabi’s help to press the Syrian Kurds’ case with the Assad regime. One of the regional sources said that Kobane met with the UAE’s national security adviser Tahnoun bin Zayed al Nahyan, who was named deputy ruler of Abu Dhabi on March 29. The UAE denied that any such meeting had occurred. Start your PRO membership today. Join the Middle East's top business and policy professionals to access exclusive PRO insights today. Join Al-Monitor PROStart with 1-week free trial "The claims referenced in your email are false and unfounded,” a UAE official said in an emailed response to Al-Monitor’s request for comment on the UAE's alleged mediation effort between the SDF and the regime. The officials briefing Al-Monitor insisted that Kobane had indeed gone to the UAE between late March and early April. None provided specific dates. “It is one hundred percent true,” one of the officials said. Two of the officials briefing Al-Monitor said that Bafel Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the second largest party in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq that shares power in the Kurdistan Regional Government, had traveled with him. Talabani’s office did not respond to Al-Monitor’s request for comment. Badran Ciya Kurd, the de facto foreign minister of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria, confirmed that the UAE had expressed interest in helping the Syrian Kurds strike an agreement with the Assad regime. “They said they are ready to help, but so far we do not have a program (roadmap) for this,” Kurd told Al-Monitor in an April 28 interview in Qamishli. "We want them to play a role in the talks with Damascus, Kurd added. He declined to comment on whether Kobane had recently traveled to the UAE. Ankara strikes Kobane’s alleged trip to the UAE capital came before he was targeted by a Turkish drone as he was traveling in a convoy from the PUK’s intelligence headquarters known as the Counter Terrorism Group, or CTG, in Sulaimaniyah on April 7. The officials briefing Al-Monitor said the drone strike took place following Kobane’s return from the UAE. The convoy was headed toward Sulaimaniyah International Airport. Kobane was to fly back to northeast Syria on a plane operated by the US-led coalition against IS. The CTG chief, Wahab Halabji, and three US military personnel were in the motorcade, as was Ilham Ahmed, a top Syrian Kurdish official. The Turkish drone is widely believed to have deliberately missed the target, and Kobane made it home. The goal was to telegraph Ankara’s fury over the shuttling of Kobane by the PUK leader to the UAE, one of the officials briefing Al-Monitor speculated. On April 5, Turkey announced that it had sealed its airspace to planes taking off from and landing at the Sulaimaniyah airport, ostensibly after hearing of Kobane's assignation in Abu Dhabi, the sources said. The Turkish Foreign Ministry said the measure stemmed from an alleged “intensification of the PKK terrorist organization’s activities in Sulaimaniyah [and] infiltration by the terrorist organization into the airport.” The PKK is the acronym for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the outlawed militant group that has been waging an armed campaign for Kurdish autonomy against the Turkish state since 1984. Ankara insists that the SDF and Kobane, who also goes by the surname “Abdi,” are all PKK “terrorists” because of his previous role in the PKK. Turkey said it would reassess its decision on the airport on July 3 based on measures the PUK takes to curb the PKK’s activities in Sulaimaniyah. Turkey is the Kurdistan Region’s main gateway to Europe. The PKK was instrumental in the early days of the US-led coalition’s battle against IS, wresting thousands of Yazidis from the jihadis’ jaws in Iraq’s Sinjar region and training fighters for the SDF. However, it was listed as a terrorist entity by the State Department in 1997, hence Ankara’s ire over Washington’s effective collaboration with the group. Washington insists that the SDF and the PKK are different and says some 900 US special forces stationed in northeast Syria as part of the anti-IS campaign will not be withdrawn. However, confidence in the United States is waning. The first big shock came in 2019 when the Trump administration greenlighted a Turkish invasion of large swathes of Kurdish-controlled territory, including the key towns of Tell Abyad and Rais al-Ain, also known as Serekaniye. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan was another wake-up call, said Fawza al-Yusuf, a leading official in northeast Syria. “Our relations with the United States have been in decline since 2019. Serekaniye and Afghanistan provided lessons,” she told Al-Monitor in an April 27 interview in Hasakah. Yusuf acknowledged that while the United States' presence gave the Syrian Kurds leverage in their relations with Damascus, there was also a flip side. The Syrian regime insists that the Kurds sever ties with Washington and tell the Americans to leave as a prerequisite to any deal. “Thus, the presence of the US forces provides the regime with an excuse to not engage with us,” Yusuf explained. She added that trust in the Russians, the regime’s main ally alongside Iran, was diminishing in parallel with the Kremlin’s deepening ties with Ankara. The Kurds needed to take matters into their own hands and not be reduced to “objects” in regional power games. Diversifying their partners is part of that strategy. Bridge building The UAE has taken a lead role in building bridges between the Assad regime and fellow Arab states in recent years after reopening its own embassy in Damascus in December 2018, part of a race for regional influence aimed in part at thinning Turkey's and Iran’s grips over Syria. Engagement with the Syrian Kurds is part of that calculus. “The anti-Iran and the anti-Islamist agenda have been the driving force for Emirati normalization with Assad,” said Dareen Khalifa, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group who follows Syria. The UAE justifies the outreach on the grounds that “Assad isn’t going anywhere and we are going to have to deal with him in one way or another if we want to preserve our interests in Syria,” Khalifa told Al-Monitor. Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and director of its Syria program, contended that the UAE is "trying to be ‘friends’ with everyone, playing mediator everywhere possible and getting into the door of troubling places before anyone else to secure the competitive advantage." “Ultimately, the UAE’s forward-leaning role in normalizing Assad was initially promoted by a desire to counter Turkish influence, but it’s now principally about securing a competitive advantage — being the Sunni Arab actor with Assad's regime in its pocket and, it no doubt hopes, the first to win large-scale economic contracts if and when Western sanctions are dropped or fail to have their deterrent effect,” Lister told Al-Monitor. While the UAE may justify its rapprochement with Damascus on the grounds that this will help counter Iranian influence in Syria, the two are top trading partners and Abu Dhabi has hosted top Iranian officials, including Iranian National Security Advisor Ali Shamkani in March. It remains unclear whether the UAE's efforts to secure approval for Syria’s return to the Arab League during a May 19 summit in Riyadh will succeed. But the UAE is unlikely to give up the push to legitimize Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, it is also believed to be involved in back-channel diplomacy between Ankara and Damascus. UAE meddling apparently angered Tehran, which reportedly leaned on Russia and Turkey to drop the Emiratis from an April 4 meeting with Syrian officials that was held in Moscow. The Iranians took part instead. In 2018, around the same time the Emiratis reopened its embassy in Damascus, the Syrian Kurds began seeking engagement with the Assad regime. The Russian-induced effort has proved fruitless so far. The regime has rebuffed all of the Kurds' demands for linguistic and political rights. The most the regime offered according to sources familiar with the talks was two hours of Kurdish-language instruction per week. A fresh sense of urgency appears to have set in as Arab governments, including heavyweight Saudi Arabia, weigh normalization with the Assad regime. Worse, Assad’s longtime nemesis Turkey is also courting Damascus in the hope of reviving a security alliance targeting the Kurds. On April 18, the Kurdish-led self-administration issued a nine-point declaration reiterating its intention to reach an agreement with the regime. This included an offer to host millions of Syrian refugees currently residing in neighboring Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. “We need to reach out to the Syrian people wherever they are to erase negative feelings about our administration. This includes members of the Syrian opposition. We can build a new democratic Syria only if we are united,” a senior figure in the Kurdish movement told Al-Monitor on condition that he not be identified by name. Kurd, the de facto foreign minister, said the Syrian Kurds would not compromise on two things. One was the administrative model that they had set up. “The regime has to recognize the self-administration,” he said. The second is the status of the SDF. While the Kurds are willing to fall under the overall command of the Syrian army, they insist on keeping their forces in their own region. Seeds of an alliance The UAE is part of the 85-member Global Coalition against IS. The sources briefing Al-Monitor said that formal contacts between the Kurdish-led self-administration and the UAE started in 2018 when Emirati officials traveled to northeast Syria to interrogate imprisoned UAE nationals who had joined IS. The ties were brokered in part by former PUK intelligence supremo Lahur Talabani, who was ousted in 2021 by his cousin, PUK leader Bafel, in a bloodless coup. Talabani lobbied the Emiratis to invest in Syria’s battered oil infrastructure that lies mainly in the Kurdish-controlled northeast, where most of the country’s oil is located. The top ask was an oil refinery. Talabani traveled to Abu Dhabi with Kobane a number of times to push his cause, sources familiar with the outreach said. But the Emiratis were wary of upsetting Assad, the sources said. They would have been even more concerned about violating US sanctions on Syria. The moves coincided with spiraling tensions between Turkey and the UAE over the conflict in Libya where they backed opposing sides. These have since subsided, and it remains unclear whether the Emiratis would be willing to support the Syrian Kurds at the expense of their newly repaired ties with Ankara. The stiff Emirati rebuttal over Kobane’s trip suggests they are not. Syrian Kurdish officials, however, remain upbeat about the relationship. Yusuf praised the UAE for its “constructive and positive approach." “We have good cooperation with them in intelligence sharing, in combating drug trafficking,” she said. She noted that the UAE was the Arab country with the fewest nationals to have joined IS. “There were only 15 of them, and the Emiratis were very helpful in the fight against DAESH,” she said, using the Arabic language acronym for the jihadis. Yusuf added that the UAE’s own system of seven separate monarchies united under the same flag bore some resemblance to the decentralized model the Kurds are seeking for Syria. “We have some common traits,” she said. Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/05/syrias-kurds-turn-uae-ease-tensions-assad#ixzz80j2WZhZS
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Understanding the Roots of the Younger Generations’ Despair in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Draw Media Shivan Fazil-Arab Reform Initiative People take to the streets for celebration after the controversial unconstitutional referendum for an independent state of Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (IKRG) on 25 September 2017 in Erbil, Iraq. The non-binding unconstitutional referendum were took place in areas under the control of the Kurdish Regional Government (IKRG) in northern Iraq. © Hamit Hüseyin - Anadolu Agency Following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) was for many years hailed in the west as “the other Iraq” for its relative peace and prosperity. Two decades on, however, the KRI has started to share the same governance challenges that grip the rest of the country; dashing the hopes of an entire generation that grew up and came of age under the Kurdish self-rule with little to no memory of life under the previous regime. Young people’s needs and demands for quality education and employment are repeatedly not met, and as a result, youth disenchantment is mounting. This unprecedented moment of pressure on the region’s youth is rooted in an economic slump that is frustrating the aspirations of youth, who are forced to bear the brunt of decisions they have no part in making. In addition to economic factors, youth political participation (or lack thereof) is also playing an important role. Policy-making processes are not inclusive and participatory due to the waning interest in politics and insufficient participation and inclusion of youth. Hence, socio-economic policies and plans are not in line or responsive to the needs and aspirations of a young and steadily growing population. Consequently, dissent and despair have been on the rise since the fraught 2017 independence referendum despite the authorities' efforts to constrain protests. In 2022, for the second year in a row, university students across the governorates of Sulaymaniyah and Halabja staged week-long demonstrations and boycotts demanding the government reinstate a small monthly stipend, improve housing conditions, and reduce tuition fees. In 2021, university students took to the streets demanding the restoration of monthly allowances that were cut in 2015 as part of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) austerity measures. The year before that another largely youth-led protest wave had erupted in Sulaymaniyah before it soon spread to the far-flung midsized towns where the impact of economic crises is particularly severe. The rhetoric compared to pre-referendum protests was maximalist with demonstrators calling for an end to the two-party rule political system. The demands of the 2022 and 2021 protests nevertheless brought tens of thousands of students to the streets. The fallout from the referendum which included, amongst other things, the setback in the disputed territories and diminished leverage vis-à-vis Baghdad was seen as the failure of the political elite to advance the Kurdish national ambitions. It also gave impetus for the more maximalist narrative in recent demonstrations and calls for the overhaul of the two-party rule in the KRI. The rage and rhetoric of the demonstrations, however, were also used as a pretext by the government to dismiss youth protests as illegitimate, further widening the gap between the youth and the authorities. Young people are not only expressing their frustration through street protests: steady streams are also risking their lives in the pursuit of a better life abroad. In November 2021, images of Kurdish migrants from Iraq, primarily the youth, stranded at the Belarus-Poland border grabbed the international headlines. They had taken the perilous journey due to persistent and increasing unemployment and loss of hope, despite the region’s oil riches. Therefore, the socio-economic situation that shapes the demands and aspirations of the youth is key to understanding growing disillusionment and dissent in the KRI. ‘A golden decade’ The future looked bright for the Kurds in Iraq after the turn of the millennium. They had endured genocide and the effects of crippling economic sanctions over the previous two decades. However, while the rest of Iraq drifted into chaos after a 2003 US-led invasion toppled longtime ruler Saddam Hussein, the KRI remained quiescent. It enjoyed relative peace and stability and embarked on a decade of economic boom. The Kurds who were the big winners from the regime change began to hope. The Kurdish population was promised by the ruling parties that their share of the federal budget and oil revenues from the newly developed oil wells in the region, could replace the impoverishment of the preceding decade. In 2009, the start of Kurdistan Region oil exports was declared by then President Massoud Barzani as “a historic date” and “a giant step” and promised that “this achievement will serve the interests of all Iraqis, especially the Kurds.” The new access to oil wealth, which had previously been inhibited by international sanctions and locked up under the control of the Ba’ath regime, began to fund sprawling gated communities, shopping malls, and private schools in the region’s largest cities, widening the income gaps between the different social classes. The political leadership’s aspirations to turn the regional capital, Erbil, into the “next Dubai” seemed to be fast becoming a reality. People, young and old, believed the promise. However, the adopted economic model was at the expense of the policy considerations and development priorities of the future generations. The KRG provided free education and healthcare, subsidies for fuel, and jobs in the public sector – offering employment in exchange for loyalty and acquiescence. It extended loans to support private enterprises and housing mortgages to its citizens. The public sector became the single largest employer to absorb the tens of thousands of young graduates entering the job market annually. New jobs were increasingly created in the public sector rather than the private which was still quite small. Living conditions improved at a rapid pace. The economy grew considerably thanks to oil rents and public investment. The government’s annual budget increased from $2.5 billion in 2005 to $13 billion in 2013. The outcomes of this economic model, in the short run, were low and declining inequality, low poverty, and to some extent, shared prosperity. In the long run, however, funding the salaries of this bloated and inefficient public sector has become a real burden and a challenge given oil price fluctuations. These developments ushered in and greatly shaped the current social contract between the rulers and the ruled, where the political elite defined politics based on Kurdish identity and nationalism, or Kurdayeti. It was in this context that a frail and fragmented social contract was put in place, shortsightedly focusing on the provision of universal education and health as well as visible welfare interventions and employment without ensuring the sustainability of this model. A fundamentally broken social contract Several aspects of this social contract have begun to fray since 2015. First, because of economic recession, owing to the war with the so-called Islamic State, plummeting oil prices (between 2014-2016 and again in 2020), and to protracted revenue-sharing disputes with the federal government of Iraq. The public sector could no longer absorb the thousands of young people entering the job market each year. The KRG since 2013, which last had a budget law, slashed public spending which included salary cuts and a hiring freeze, and, in doing so, delivered a major blow to an entire generation that expects employment and benefits. They believed that if they obtained a university education that they would find a job; instead, they were suddenly faced with the prospect of competing for elusive opportunities of employment. The long-standing skill mismatch has not prepared them with the skills suited for the job market. Youth unemployment and idleness have soared – the total rate of people aged 15-24 who are not involved in education, employment, or training is 30% (20% for males and 40% for females). The overwhelming sense is that most employment opportunities are based on one’s political and social connections rather than merit. Second, the lagging growth in the private sector is also connected to the nature of the region’s political economy. The rapid development of some sectors such as the natural resources and real estate sectors at the expense of the more productive and labor-intensive sectors, a phenomenon that is known as the Dutch disease, has weakened the region’s economy and inhibited the growth of others such as manufacturing and agriculture. Relatedly, politically connected conglomerates benefit from generous rents and deals that undermine competition, entrepreneurship, and job creation. The most lucrative sectors, such as the real estate, telecommunications, and oil and gas tend to be dominated by companies that are owned by or connected to the ruling parties. The private sector growth has remained insufficient to absorb the surplus labor. In addition to the aversion to work in the highly unregulated private sector where the pay remains low despite the long hours. Worse still, like the rest of Iraq, the KRI has not escaped what is called the “resource curse”: it has ended up with less economic growth, less democracy, and less social equality, not despite the abundance of natural resources but because of them. Third, nearly a decade of austerity has precipitated the rapid decline in the provision of basic services – especially healthcare and education. These sectors are not only vital in people’s daily lives but are also, along with the security services, the most important public sector employers, especially for women’s labor force participation. The government still provides basic education and healthcare, but the quality of these services has declined. Protests and strikes against unpaid salaries, along with the lack of teaching and medical staff, have further deteriorated public service provision. The COVID-19 pandemic, which compelled hospitalization and homeschooling, barred many from a meaningful learning experience and exposed the substandard condition of the vital health and education sectors. People are forced to resort to private hospitals/clinics and schools for better healthcare and a more meaningful learning experience. Moreover, poor public service provision has created a lucrative market for private education and healthcare. This has forced people to pay for the same services to which they are already entitled in order to get them in better quality. For instance, the aspiring middle class is driven to send their kids to private schools and universities to learn skills in the hope of increasing their competitive advantages in an increasingly tight job market. The outcome has been a growing sense of social inequality and injustice, which is acutely felt by young people who bear the brunt of its consequences. All of these factors have contributed to rising dissatisfaction with the government to the point that street protests are a regular occurrence, albeit limited to the eastern part of the region. Recent protests have also become increasingly violent because of the authorities’ securitization of public space and growing intolerance of dissent. The unspoken deal at the heart of Kurdish politics in Iraq has been that the ruling parties control the political space but, in return, they deliver a better life. However, the austerity policies pursued since 2015 have reversed the improvements in living standards. Moreover, the region’s economic development model adopted in the preceding decade has made many people feel left out and with elusive prospects of social upward mobility. It has also contributed to rising public dissatisfaction and disenchantment with politics, while the region’s population is ever more disaffected and struggling to make ends meet amid soaring inflation and a cost-of-living crisis. The way forward The highlighted trajectory points to a clear indication that the current situation is unsustainable and requires a course correction. Renegotiating or redrawing the social contract has become a necessity to realign the relationship between the government and society and the obligations each has to the other. The public sector should be reformed to ensure the provision of the basic services that the government is expected to deliver. This is central to meeting citizens’ expectations of the government and enabling the emergence of a more balanced and durable social pact. The reimagined social contract must protect the most vulnerable such as the low-income earners and stimulate human capital development. A major challenge is to overcome inter-party squabbles that compound the region’s governance issues and to address patronage and nepotism. There are some promising developments as socio-economic concerns have become catalysts triggering the surge in entrepreneurship and activism, which indicates that the new generation is willing to break away from the patronage system. It is also embracing a citizenship model that is more inclusive and allows greater rights and responsibilities for citizens. They have formed new platforms, ideas, and dreams to push for a more just and prosperous future. These positive signs, however, are highly constrained by the system in which they operate and represent glimmers of hope rather than broad rays of progress. Across the board, talents can be found waiting to be tapped, entrepreneurial flair ready to be unleashed, and young people impatient to be given their chance. They are being held back by the region’s broken economy and broken politics. They also lack opportunities to engage with the political process and thus often turn to other non-political means to articulate their demands and express their dissatisfaction. There is also a growing fatigue with the region’s two ruling parties in charge since the inception of the region in 1991. The record low turnout in recent elections is an indication that they have lost faith in bringing about change in the status quo through conventional means. Abstaining is also a political decision. It is, therefore, imperative to address the waning interest in politics and facilitate youth engagement and participation in the political process. To be sure, while the KRI’s ruling parties hold the federal government in Baghdad responsible for the economic slump, the younger generations anticipate jobs, services, and opportunities, not from the Government of Iraq, but from their own rulers in the semi-autonomous region, who presided over its rise and prosperity, but have signally failed to ensure its fair and equitable distribution. Indifference and failure to heed the demands and frustrations of the young population will likely lead to more resentment that could bring the kind of unrest that other parts of Iraq have faced in recent years.
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The Rise and Fall of Kurdish Power in Iraq
washingtoninstitute- by Bilal Wahab Despite thirty years of landmark achievements, the KRG’s endless quest for economic independence has only entrenched its internal divisions and kleptocracy while shifting its dependency—from Iraq to Turkey, and from foreign aid to oil revenues. If the 1991 Gulf War led to the birth of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the US invasion in 2003 propelled it into the future. At the start of the invasion, Iraqi Kurdistan served as the northern front of the war, elevating the status of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The destruction of President Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime buttressed Kurdish rights and enabled their political and economic power to grow. Compared to the violence and sectarian strife that befell the rest of the country under the US-led occupation, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was held up by the US pundit class as a “safe haven” and “island of decency”—a narrative the KRG encouraged with a public relations campaign describing Kurdistan as “the Other Iraq.” 2003 brought with it a unity of purpose among Iraq’s Kurdish parties. They capitalized on their longstanding relationship with the United States and Britain, the primary enforcers of the no-fly zone following the first Gulf War and the two major proponents of regime change in 2003. Although differences persisted, Kurdish parties spoke in unison in Baghdad, particularly in the early years following the invasion. They worked to enshrine their new powers and rights into Iraq’s 2005 constitution, which recognized Kurdistan as an official region and granted the KRG power to govern largely independently of Baghdad. Kurdish parties also fully supported the 2005 parliamentary elections. As a result of these efforts, they gained a significant influence within the Iraqi state. Kurdish members of parliament form a significant block that often makes or breaks governments and legislation. In the muhassasa system—the informal but persistent practice of ethno-sectarian division of top jobs—Iraq has only had Kurdish presidents since 2006. Ethnic Kurds have on occasion served as deputy parliament speakers and led key ministries such as finance and foreign affairs. But working within the state apparatus has confused the Kurdish role in Baghdad. On the one hand, the KRG has sought the greatest possible share of the state’s powers and revenues. On the other, given historical Kurdish fears of a strong central government, they have also invested in their ability to secede, exemplified by the referendum for independence in 2017. Today, Iraqi Kurdistan faces external challenges, most notably a legal and financial squeeze by Baghdad’s federal government and threats of Iranian and Turkish attacks. The real threat to the KRG is not external, however. Thirty years after its founding and 20 years on from the US invasion, the KRG—as if going through a mid-life crisis—lacks a clear vision for its future. Amid the threat of losing relevance, it stares at implosion due to economic uncertainties, chronic internal divisions and weak institutions. Finding Wealth Kurds in Iraq have long based their struggle for self-rule on their grievances as a persecuted ethnic minority. Kurdish rulers gained legitimacy by standing up for Kurdish rights. Following the first Gulf War and the 1992 elections, however, such revolutionary credit gave way to democratic legitimacy. The elections gave birth to the KRG and brought two parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to formal political power. Since then, each of the two major Kurdish parties has remained inextricably associated with a family—the Talabani family lead the PUK, and the Barzani family the KDP (their second and third generations, respectively, are currently at the helm of power). The civil war in Iraqi Kurdistan between 1994 and 1998 discredited both parties, dividing the region into two single-party fiefdoms that persist until today. Meanwhile, over the course of the past two decades, as a new generation of each ruling family took on the mantle of leadership, their legitimacy has lacked both revolutionary and democratic standing. Economic development emerged as an alternative. Indeed, between 2004 and 2014, the KRG translated post-invasion opportunities into an economic boom. A construction frenzy in this period caused the capital city of Erbil to more than double in size. The KRG says it has rebuilt 65 percent of rural Kurdistan that was destroyed during the Anfal campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1988. Two of Iraq’s three national cell phone companies are headquartered in Kurdistan, and the region is also home to a slew of hotels, gated communities and private schools, including two American-style universities. By 2005, the KRG had built two international airports, in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, unshackling the landlocked region. Foreign visitors could obtain visas upon arrival, a policy that the Iraqi government did not adopt until 2021. Mass public hiring decreased unemployment, although foreign laborers filled much of the skills gap. Furthermore, a 2006 investment law, which offered investors perks such as land ownership, tax holidays and profit repatriation, helped the KRG attract significant local and foreign capital. Today, there are over 3,000 foreign companies registered in the region. On the diplomatic front, the KRG hosts 42 consulates and maintains 14 representation offices around the world. Making the most of its geographic location and security, Iraqi Kurdistan has become an important regional trade route and destination. Turkey, whose only land border with Iraq goes through the Kurdistan region, is the KRG’s largest trading partner. In 2017, the volume of trade between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan was $2.5 billion, representing nearly one third of Ankara’s overall trade with Iraq. Similarly, one third of Iraq’s imports from Iran—an estimated $2.4 billion a year—are to Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, 50 percent of Iran’s exports to Iraq pass through border crossings controlled by the KRG. From Foreign Aid to Oil Federalism The federal system proposed in the 2005 constitution granted the KRG a significant role in managing the oil and gas resources of the region. These provisions served as a safeguard: Should the new Iraq fail, it would be possible for an economically independent Kurdistan to take the next step toward statehood, the penultimate nationalist dream. The constitution envisioned a system of petro-federalism, in which the federal Iraqi government and the KRG would share responsibility over oil policy and revenue. But in the years since its ratification, the Iraqi parliament has consistently failed to pass a national hydrocarbon law that would regulate the energy sector and define these joint roles. Acting proactively, the Kurdish parliament passed its own natural resources law in 2007 and started inking some 55 contracts with international oil companies. While the federal government maintained that this law was unconstitutional and the oil contracts illegal, the KRG pushed ahead. It adopted production-sharing contracts, an industry favorite, which allowed international oil companies a stake in the region’s petroleum assets. This “smaller, faster, lighter” approach, as Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani put it in a 2012 interview with the author interview, helped jumpstart the Kurdish energy industry. Small firms, or wildcatters, came first, but Big Oil soon followed. In 2011 and 2012 ExxonMobil and Chevron each signed exploration contracts with the KRG, materially boosting the legal standing of its energy industry. The KRG asked for neither permission nor forgiveness from Baghdad, an approach that in many ways paid off. By mid-2022, the KRG was producing nearly 450,000 barrels of oil per day, most of it exported via the region’s independent pipeline through Turkey. In the second quarter of 2022 alone, Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sales earned $3.77 billion in gross revenues. While only 41 percent of these revenues made it into KRG coffers (the rest was dedicated to paying the oil sector’s costs as well as servicing its debts) the KRG still reaped $1.57 billion. As for natural gas, the KRG’s marketed natural gas production stood at about 5.3 billion cubic meters per year in 2021. The payoffs, however, have come with a cost. The federal government’s claim on Kurdish oil has forced the KRG to sell at a political risk discount. Furthermore, disputes between Erbil and Baghdad over oil and customs revenues boiled over in 2014, leading Baghdad to cut off the KRG’s share of the national budget. In 2022, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court formally ruled that the KRG’s natural resource law was unconstitutional and its oil contracts and exports illegal. The Iraqi government had also sued Turkey in international arbitration courts over allowing the KRG to use the Iraq-Turkey pipeline without Baghdad’s approval. At the time of writing, the court favored Iraq’s position, compelling Turkey to halt the KRG’s oil exports. The future of the KRG’s independent energy industry remains uncertain. Intent on more independence from Baghdad, the KRG has grown dependent on other entities and factors beyond its control, including global oil prices, the dollar-dinar exchange rate and Turkey, through which its pipeline passes. The vulnerabilities of this system started to show in 2014, when the expansion of ISIS caused international oil companies to either withdraw or suspend planned developments. The KRG made up for the losses by taking over Kirkuk’s oil fields following the Iraqi army’s retreat, which doubled the KRG’s crude exports to 550,000 barrels per day. But these gains were hampered by falling oil prices. Per barrel, oil prices fell from a peak of $115 in June 2014 to $70 in December and to $35 by February 2016. Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani described the KRG’s dire financial situation at the time as an “economic tsunami.” A telling manifestation of lost confidence in the KRG has been a renewed wave of migration to Europe. As a result of these factors, among others, by 2021 the KRG faced a debt of $31.6 billion. Internal Divisions and Institutional Weakness In recent years, fissures have cropped up among Iraqi Kurdistan’s ruling families, who have grown in prominence as the region’s political parties have weakened. After PUK founder Jalal Talabani passed away in 2017 his eldest son and nephew together took the reins of the party as co-presidents. In 2021, a feud broke out between the cousins, Bafel and Lahur Talabani, and the former ousted the latter. Meanwhile, on the Barzani side a power struggle is brewing between two Barzani cousins, which has the potential to disrupt not only the cohesion of the KDP but the entire regional government. These internecine struggles reflect broader institutional weaknesses and democratic regression in the Kurdistan region. As an example, KRG institutions were brittle and completely unprepared to weather the “economic tsunami” that began in 2014. The last time the KRG parliament had passed a budget was in 2012. The public sector had swelled uncontrollably, crowding out private sector jobs. By 2017, the KRG was the largest employer in Kurdistan, employing half of the labor force, roughly 1.4 million people, to the tune of $750 million a month. Corruption and inefficiency have marred public sector employment, with thousands of ghost employees, double dippers and undeserved pensioners, while the budding private sector owes its existence to holding companies owned or controlled by members of Kurdistan’s ruling families. To avoid showing its hand to Baghdad, the KRG energy industry has become increasingly opaque and unaccountable. The Peshmerga enjoy influence and prestige and have continued to garner significant public and political support, especially during their partnership with the US-led anti-ISIS coalition, but the cavernous political rift between the PUK and KDP has decreased the Kurdistan region’s value to the United States as a partner and diminished Kurdish leverage in Baghdad. There is no accurate accounting available, but the number of Peshmerga fighters is estimated to range between 160,000 to double that number. Prime Minister Masrour Barzani admitted that the Peshmerga forces have more generals among their ranks than either the US or Chinese military. Ever since the war against ISIS, the United States has provided stipends and training to Peshmerga units in exchange for the promise that the Peshmerga will be unified under the command of the KRG rather than its ruling parties. But the KDP and PUK refuse to surrender control of their respective units—a stance that Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces have cited in their own snubbing of national authority. Overall, the KRG’s reputation for valuing democracy and human rights has eroded in the years since 2003. Due to civil war and internal divisions in the 1990s, the region’s second parliamentary elections were not held until 2005, 13 years after the first election. Subsequent elections have taken place only following significant delays. Electoral victory and power are increasingly out of sync in the region. When the unarmed opposition party, Gorran, came in second in the 2009 elections, ahead of the PUK, the two ruling parties did not allow Gorran to share in power. Although President Masoud Barzani’s term ended in 2015, he only left office in 2017, effectively shutting down the Kurdish parliament for two years in order to extend his tenure. No wonder turnout has been steadily declining at Kurdish elections. The KRG’s Future Despite a persistent narrative of grievances and victimhood, Iraqi Kurds have exercised significant power and agency during the past three decades. KRG leaders continue to seek more power and autonomy, but to what end? Although they rebounded after decades of war, genocide and neglect, post-invasion Kurdish politics has not managed to shake off chronic internal divisions. The region’s most advanced institutions that could potentially support an independent Kurdistan remain its economy and Peshmerga forces. While the KRG has wielded economic policy to shift toward political independence, they have yet to produce a viable economic model. Indeed, despite 30 years of successfully managing a regional economy, the endless quest for economic independence has only ended up shifting dependency from Iraq to Turkey or from foreign aid to oil revenues. The ad hoc economic policy that has slowly emerged, like a Polaroid photo, over the past two decades displays traits of socialism, free markets and kleptocracy. Access to power and wealth, meanwhile, remains anchored to politics, not to economic activity. The 2017 independence referendum, called for by then-President Barzani, tested the Kurdistan region’s military and economic assets. Neither the international community nor the KRG’s neighbors could stomach redrawing the borders of the Middle East, and the KRG was not ready to withstand the economic and political costs of its push to secede from Iraq. The referendum and its aftermath cost the KRG the gains it had made following the ISIS invasion of 2014, including Kirkuk and its oilfields, which were reclaimed by Iraqi military and Popular Mobilization Forces after an armed encounter with the Peshmerga. Most damaging, however, was the clarity it bestowed on a hitherto ambiguous question: Can the KRG become an independent state? As Kurdish divisions deepen and security in the rest of Iraq improves, the balance of power that once favored the KRG is shifting in Baghdad’s favor. Since the referendum, KRG leaders disagree on visions for their position within Iraq and on plans to save their embattled energy sector. Should the Kurdish economy remain hinged on foreign aid, oil and budget transfers from Baghdad, or can it build a robust economy through reform and diversification? These are among the questions raised over the past 20 years. Whether and how they are answered will determine the Kurdistan Region’s future. Bilal Wahab is the Wagner Fellow at The Washington Institute. This article was originally published on the MERIP website.
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Why the United States should stop supporting the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga
Diary Marif/ culturico The United States has planned to unify the Kurdish forces of Peshmerga, providing more financial aid and weaponizing them in order to defeat IS and other extremist groups. But the senior military men and politicians keep aside the weapons and aid for themselves and do not give them to the Peshmerga forces who are on the front lines fighting IS. Instead, they use weapons to repress the Kurdish protestors who ask for their basic rights and freedom of expression. In early August, the Kurdistan Region’s Minister of Peshmerga Affairs, Shoresh Ismail, met with U.S. officials in Washington DC and promised to follow through on reforms aimed at unifying the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Peshmerga militias are the main forces of the KRG in Iraq, but they are not controlled by the KRG. Rather, they are governed by political parties. This issue of divided loyalty affects the KRG’s national strategies to protect Kurdistan and defeat extremist groups. For example, a few days after Ismail’s promising visit with U.S. officials, Mohammed Haji Mahmoud, the leader of the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, illegally held a military parade for his militia without censure from the KRG. The militia may be under Ismail’s command, but the troops clearly listen to Mahmood, not the minister. Accentuating this general discord even further, Ismail returned from his visit with U.S. officials to brief not the KRG parliament, president, or prime minister, but rather the former President, Masoud Barzani, who has no official position or responsibilities in the current government. The KRG’s lack of control over the Peshmerga is proving a problem for U.S. partners. The U.S. has been in a partnership with KRG in Iraq to defeat the Islamic State (IS) and other terrorist groups. The separation of the forces, however, has negative consequences for U.S. plans. The U.S. also wants the Peshmerga to cooperate with the Iraqi army to set up robust security in the country. Mahmoud’s illegal parade and Ismail’s meeting with Barzani reveal an obvious, disappointing reality: the unification of the Peshmerga is just not happening, and any U.S. financial or political support for it instead goes into the pockets of the political parties’ militias, putting the lives of ordinary people at risk. Why is Unification Failing? The U.S. proposal of integrating and unifying the Peshmerga forces is not a new agenda. When the KRG formed in 1992, it bridged several political parties, including the two major ones: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by former Iraqi president Jalal Talabani. Right away, these parties undertook a plan to abolish their partisan militias and set up a single national force to protect the region and its people (1). Although straightforward in theory, the plan caused chaos on the ground, and a bloody, four-year civil war broke out in which thousands of the Peshmerga were tortured, wounded, and killed. One dire consequence of the civil war was that the Peshmerga forces of the parties were not able to trust each other (2). To this day, they are still traumatized by the civil war years. Therefore, unification has not worked. During the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. high officers proposed to Talabani and Barzani to unify their forces under one national commander. Although Talabani and Barzani accepted the proposal, they hesitated to follow it, as each party thought that losing its militia would have a negative impact on its political hegemony and that losing control of its forces would affect their interests. But in 2010, both parties tried again and consequently integrated fourteen brigades, though this integration was only of about 40,000 Peshmerga fighters and over 120,000 troops remain in unintegrated KDP and PUK units. The process of integration was then halted again for two main reasons. Firstly, U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 meant less attention from the U.S. on integration; secondly, both parties were in a contest to win the fame of their militia against IS. The desire to unify the Peshmerga became more concrete in 2014 when IS began assaulting Iraq. At the time, Barzani was President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). As commander-in-chief of all Peshmerga forces, he granted the Peshmerga minister, Mustafa Said Qadir, six months to carry out the necessary reforms in order to unify the forces against IS. Even though Barzani was the most powerful man in Kurdistan, his demand for reform has gone unanswered for the last eight years. Barzani’s demands have no power in the PUK-controlled zone, and his stubborn desire for the Peshmerga to stay under the control of his own party led to significant disruption and further division in the PUK zone and elsewhere. Although nominally united under one government, the bitter divisions between the KDP and PUK are just as deep-seated and intense now as they were when the PUK separated from the KDP in 1975. Having each established their own militias to protect their interests, the parties spent decades killing one another in the 1980s and during the civil war of the 1990s—a reality that cannot be easily undone. The wounds of past conflicts are still present in today’s parties, and any sign of friction nowadays is met with threats and the fear of another civil war. With such deeply-entrenched attitudes, Peshmerga forces simply do not listen to the Minister of Peshmerga Affairs and are instead loyal to political party leaders, protecting the interests of their party and competing against other parties. In return, the political parties incentivize the Peshmerga with monthly payslips and threaten them with firing or kidnapping if they refuse to act as protection to party leaders and their families. Even the fourteen brigades—consisting of around 40,000 Peshmerga fighters—that were nominally integrated in 2010 remained party-focused. In 2017, these brigades were once again separated as party tensions ran high during the Independence Referendum for the Kurdistan Region. The PUK troops withdrew from the disputed territories between Baghdad and Kurdistan and Iraqi forces replaced them. The KDP accused the PUK of collaborating with the Iraqi army and betraying the Kurdish cause, as the KDP knew the PUK and Iran had a secret agreement. The KDP claimed that Iran wanted Kurdistan not to be an independent country and forced the PUK not to support the referendum any longer. Although the 14 brigades remain officially integrated, they were called on and controlled by party leaders, not the ministry of Peshmerga. Since then, the process of Peshmerga reform stopped and the relationships between parties has continuously deteriorated. Making the situation worse, senior Peshmerga commanders and politicians of both parties know exactly what is at stake if unification were to occur. These authorities have been the sole beneficiaries of their own protection brigades, corrupt practices, and party dynamics, and they are not so willing to give up their power, especially to other parties. As a case in point, a senior PUK commander allegedly ordered an attack on the headquarters of the Gorran Movement in Sulaimaniyah in 2018 after the Gorran Party complained about vote violations and the results of the KRG elections. Clearly, any deviation from the divisive norm is a threat to party officials. Kurdish forces of Peshmerga. Photo @Levi Meir Clancy for Unsplash. Where Does the Aid Go U.S. support for the Peshmerga forces goes back to the 1970s, when the Peshmerga fought against the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein and the U.S. supported them in order to deter Saddam from falling into an alliance with the Soviet Union. In 1991, the U.S. and its allies played a major role in establishing and enforcing a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. They supported the Peshmerga to serve as a local fighting force to stabilize the area after Saddam’s regime was overthrown. In recent years, the U.S. and its allies have provided financial aid, arms, and training to the Peshmerga forces in the name of countering IS. But U.S. support has not actually gone to the low-level Peshmerga soldiers who fight IS forces on the frontlines. Instead, senior party officers and high-level Peshmergas—individuals who have never faced IS—receive the funds and guns. I talked to two Peshmerga soldiers for this project, one from the PUK and one from the KDP. Neither soldier has seen any U.S. ammunition or weapons on the frontline, and instead, they fight with their own guns and bullets. The Peshmergas do not get any money back for these expenditures, despite the fact that they cost an arm and leg. When asked, the Peshmergas revealed that most U.S. guns go to senior commanders and their personal guards, who have never fought IS. These guns are used to shoot and kill the civilian protesters who request basic rights in the KRG, or for the protection of tribes—not for eliminating the IS threat. In addition, a portion of guns also goes to the bodyguards of some political and military seniors who look after their farms and gardens in suburban areas. At the same time, a number of guns provided by the U.S. are sold on the market illegally, at times even going to IS forces that are able to pay. Several members of the KRG parliament and journalists have verified that senior Peshmergas have traded weapons with IS. Nevertheless, these officers have not been charged. The United States Needs to Take Action The U.S.-Kurdish military action against Saddam Hussein’s regime and IS is one example of successful cooperation in the Middle East. Each side needs the other; the U.S. needs to exist in the area to protect its interests and stop the incursion of Russia, China, and Iran into the KRG. At the same time, the Kurds need the U.S. to protect themselves from extremist groups and threats from neighbouring countries. Furthermore, over the past 20 years, the U.S. has not had smooth relations with Shiite groups as they support Iran, while the Sunni groups have consistently clashed with American troops during the post-Saddam era. The Kurdish Peshmerga, in contrast, has consistently supported connections with the U.S. But in the last decade, the Kurdish leadership has taken advantage of the Peshmerga and continues to misuse their relationship with the U.S. This situation does not facilitate the U.S.’s regional interests and may force them to rethink other new partnerships and even to stop supporting the Peshmerga forces. But the U.S. should not cut off this relationship. In doing so, the U.S. may lose an epicentre of power in the region and cost the Kurdish authorities their long-standing security from militia attacks from neighbouring countries. If this happens, it will be the end of the Kurdish region of power, similar to the collapse of power in Afghanistan after the U.S.’s abrupt departure. Mahmoud’s most recent display with his private militia is only one link in a long chain of corrupt practices, personal brigades, and divisive tensions within the Peshmerga. To this day, Peshmerga forces remain loyal to their singular parties or party leaders, ignoring their stated purpose of protecting the Kurdish people as a whole and co-opting aid for themselves. By continuing with existing aid practices, U.S. officials fail to serve Kurdistan and its people. To change this reality, there are several steps the U.S. needs to take. First, they should push for abolishing the non-integrated PUK’s 70 units and the KDP’s 80 units—forces that only work for their parties. Second, the U.S. can curtail the KDP’s Zerevani forces and the PUK’s emergency forces, as well as the parties’ militia academies in Zakho and Qalasholan. Finally, the U.S. should investigate where the weapons and financial aid go and how they are used. Ideally, the Peshmerga must employ professionals in high positions who have no party affiliations. Without these steps and several more beyond, the U.S. support only helps parties and their corrupt politicians and commanders, not Kurdistan’s citizens. Diary Marif References: Van Wilgenburg, W. and M. Fumerton, “Kurdistan’s political armies: The challenge of unifying the Peshmerga forces” Carnegie Middle East Center, 2015. Arif, B. H. and T. M. Mokhtar, “The Kurdish civil war (1994–1998) and its consequences for the governing system in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”, Asian Affairs, 2022. culturico https://culturico.com/2023/03/29/why-the-united-states-should-stop-supporting-the-iraqi-kurdish-peshmerga/
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'Iraq is not an Islamic country': Minorities protest Baghdad's alcohol ban as unconstitutional
The Iraqi government's renewed effort to prohibit alcohol is not only worrisome for Christian and Yazidi minorities, but also raises constitutionality questions. Draw Media, Al-Monitor Iraq officially banned the import, production and sale of alcoholic beverages of all kinds on March 4, in a repeat of a ban that was passed in 2016, but its implementation was paused due to strong objections from secularists and minorities at the time. The new law imposes fines for violations of between 10 million and 25 million dinars ($7,700-$19,000). Last month, the law instituting the ban was published in Iraq's official gazette, paving the way for implementation. The coalition of new Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who took office last October, is dominated by Shiite Islamist parties and militias in the so-called Coordination Framework who support the ban. Now, with the law going into effect, liquor stores are still open in Baghdad, Erbil and other parts of the country. But some Iraqis, especially those from the Yazidi and Christian communities, are raising concerns. 'Not an Islamic country' Iraq has great religious diversity. The majority of the population is Shiite and Sunni Muslims, but there are also sizable communities of Christians, Yazidis, Zorastrians, Mandaeans and others. Some analysts believe the law is a step toward turning Iraq into an Islamic country. "This is ethnic discrimination," Diya Butros, an activist in the predominantly Chaldean Catholic town of Ankawa, told Al-Monitor. "It's a violation of the rights of non-Muslim religions that do not forbid alcohol." Ali Saheb, an Iraqi political analyst, told Independent Arabia on March 6 that Iraq is not an Islamic country, and "Some religions allow drinking alcohol, and the government cannot impose a certain opinion or ideology on others." Unlike Islam, the Yazidi and Christian faiths do not forbid alcohol consumption. Some even use it in their religious rituals. Others argue the law violates the Iraqi constitution, which guarantees personal, religious and cultural freedom. Mirza Dinnayi is a Yazidi activist and chairman of Luftbrucke Irak, a non-governmental organization that helps victims of conflict in Iraq. He told Al-Monitor, "The law is contrary to the constitution because Iraq is a multi-ethnic, -religious and -cultural country, and drinking alcohol is not prohibited for many." Dinnayi also argued that if alcohol drinkers turn to other alternatives, the ban could provide an opportunity for the spread of drug use “The majority of Muslim countries do not ban alcohol, but rather regulate it. Why doesn’t the Iraqi government do something similar, instead of banning it totally?” The law is especially troublesome for Yazidis and Christians, who manage the overwhelming majority of alcohol shops in the country. Many Christians and Yazidis have been attacked in recent years for working in this sector, and some fear this law could lead to an increase in violence against them. It is therefore unsurprising that Iraqi civil society groups have come out strongly against the law. More than 1,000 prominent Iraqi researchers, academics, journalists and activists drafted an open letter to the secretary general of the United Nations earlier this month criticizing the ban. In addition to the objections on constitutional grounds, the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq may reject the law. The Kurdistan Region is home to much of Iraq's Christian and foreign population, particularly in Ankawa and the nearby regional capital Erbil. A KRG customs official told the Kurdish news outlet Rudaw earlier this month that they reserve the right to make their own decision on the ban. Religious authorities' views The law is religiously motivated by the Islamic prohibition on alcohol, but Shiite religious authorities did not play a role in it. The highest religious authority for Iraq's Shiite majority, in the holy city of Najaf, is headed by Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Throughout the 21st century, Sistani has vocally supported a civil state and rejected the imposition of religion. Sistani has not commented on the law, but a prominent cleric told Al-Monitor that the religious authority in Najaf is against this legislation or any similar action. “The religious authority in Najaf has been always calling for a ‘civil state’ in Iraq, rejecting any kind of imposition of religiosity in the state institution,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity. The source referred to stances taken by Sistani in the past, such as when he rejected the Personal Status Law in 2013 due to its imposition of Sharia, as well as the leader's rejection of displaying religious symbols in state offices. When asked about Sistani's current silence, the cleric said, “Sistani had made it very clear for a long time that he is against such a law, and there is no need to repeat the same thing.” With corruption and militia control rampant in Iraq, however, many worry that the ban will drive Iraqis to the black market to purchase alcohol. In this context, the ban may increase drug smuggling into the country, as well as encourage other forms of substance abuse.
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Report Reveals Only One Million Iraqi Women Are Employed
According to this United Nations report, women’s participation rates in the global labour market between the ages of 25 and 54 increased in the 1990s to between 60 and 85 percent. Unfortunately, this has not been the case for Iraqi women, whereby women’s entry into the labour market is a huge challenge in Iraq. Increasing women’s participation in the labour force would improve the productive capacity of the country and support economic growth. In turn, this could help give women the ability to express their opinion in society and play a leading role in the family. To date, there is little research that explores the reason for the decline in women’s participation in the labour force in Iraq. Despite the importance of the subject, research that has been conducted is on a limited scale. The latest report in 2021 was conducted by the International Labor Organization, in cooperation with the Ministry of Planning, and the Central Statistical Organization. The report shockingly revealed that “there are 13 million women within the working age, of whom only one million are engaged in work.” Iraqi Women’s Participation in the Labour Force in Numbers Those aged 15 and older, who are of working age, account for 6.63% of the total population of Iraq. Men constitute 50.3% and women are 49.7% – almost half of the country’s population. Unfortunately, this percentage is not reflected in women’s participation in the labour force, nor in equal access to resources and opportunities. According to the 2021 Labor Force Survey in Iraq, the percentage of the labour force in Iraq reached 39.5% of the total population of working age. Men accounted for 86.6% while women were only 13.4%. The labour force participation rate for women was 10.6%, compared to 68% for males. These rates are among the lowest rates of female labour participation in the world. This significant decrease in women’s labour force participation is due to several reasons, including Iraq’s instability, a lack of culturally sensitive spaces, financial constraints, and a competitive job market with few jobs available. In addition to the unemployment rate, which reached 16.5% in Iraq, the above graphic shows that there is one unemployed person for every 5 people. On the other hand, the female unemployment rate reached 28%, which is double the male unemployment rate of 14%. According to the results of the Ministry of Planning / Central Statistical Organization, women tend to be more concentrated in the fields of services (73%) and agriculture (14%), compared to 62% and 7%, respectively, for men. The results also showed that the following sectors are male dominated: Construction and related professions Protection services Drivers of cars, trucks and motorcyclists Sales representatives While the professions dominated by women are: Primary education and kindergarten High school Garment industry and related professions As for the preferences of work sectors, 71% of women prefer to work in the government sector, while 29% of them prefer to work in the private sector. While for men, 34% of them prefer to work in the government sector and 65% of them prefer to work in the private sector. Steps to Expand the Scope of Women’s Work The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report indicated that Iraq ranked 154 out of 156 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index for the year 2021. These numbers show the seriousness and importance of the issue. Unless real and decisive steps are taken to support women, Iraqi women will continue to fall behind. Institutions must work together to reduce the gap by developing female talent for the industries of the future. Additionally, the government must develop legislation for early marriage and childbearing, as is the case in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has placed women as a priority in the labour market, in both its private and public sectors, and in all aspects of life. Removing these disparities would reduce the unemployment rate, raise the level of women’s participation, enhance competition among jobseekers, revitalise the efforts of many vital sectors and ultimately grow the country’s GDP. In The End Women have an important and active role in society, and they represent half of it! Despite the limited opportunities and obstacles faced, many Iraqi women have proven that they can be successful and contributing members of society. But the question is, where does the problem lie in these statistics? The percentage of women’s participation in the labour market in developing countries, including Iraq, is less than the global average, noting that the percentage of women’s participation in developed countries is more than 67%. What Iraqi women need today is not limited to increasing available job opportunities, but we must also realise the many complexities and challenges that women face in the labour market. And as the data has highlighted, we need to facilitate women’s participation in the workforce by addressing social norms, establishing sound policies, and real commitment to implement these frameworks across the country. Today, we live in a rapidly evolving digital world where the digital economy can provide more opportunities for women to be involved in the workforce, and create new job opportunities that women can easily adapt to. This work has been done by the support of MiCT organisation and Germany cooperation GIZ Iraq.
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The quota seats…Point of Election Conflict
Draw Media Religious and ethnic minorities quota seats have become the main problem facing the parties for the sixth session of the Kurdistan Parliament. Some are in favor of distributing the quota seats among the provinces. Others believe that the minorities’ representation in Parliament do not express their opinions and are monopolized by the political parties. The total number of votes obtained by the minorities in the first round of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections was (11 thousand 971) votes. In the last parliamentary elections, their total votes increased to 23 thousand 165 votes. The share of the minorities in the Kurdistan Parliament is one of the points of contention between the political parties and some call it the "The Knotty Spot of the elections." Some parties believe that the quota seats are monopolized by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and in parliament, the representatives of the minorities decide in their interests. Therefore, some parties are in favor of dividing the quota seats among the constituencies, so that a Turkmen seat for Kfri district and a Christian seat for Sulaymaniyah province. In Iraq, 2.3% of the seats in the House of Representatives are reserved for some communities. But others have not been given any political opportunities. In the Kurdistan Region, 10% of the seats in parliament are allocated to the communities. These figures do not fully reflect the rights of minorities, since the voices of minorities are rising from time to time, they say that those appointed in parliament do not represent the communities. This is despite the fact that the Yazidis and Kakais, who are largely residents of the Kurdistan Region, have no representation in the Kurdistan Parliament. According to Article 36 of the Kurdistan Parliamentary Election Law No.1 of 1992, amended: First, five seats will be allocated to the Chaldeans, Syrians and Assyrians. Second, five seats will be allocated to the Turkmen. Third, one seat will be allocated to Armenians. Now the main point of disagreement between the political parties, especially the PUK, the opposition and the independents Now the main point of disagreement between the political parties, especially the PUK, the opposition and the independents against the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is the distribution of community seats and voter registration for communities.
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