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APIKUR calls for US to put Baghdad ‘on notice’ over ‘politically motivated’ exports halt

The Association of Petroleum Industry in the Kurdistan Region (APIKUR) has urged the US to pressure Baghdad to resume oil exports from the region via Turkey at the Munich Security Conference. “We need immediate Congressional action to put Government of Iraq leadership on notice that they must implement a full budget for Iraq’s Kurdistan Region and get the oil flowing through the Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline,” APIKUR spokesman Myles Caggins told INSIGHT today. The two-day conference, presents an opportunity to tell Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shiaa Al-Sudani “to promptly resolve the oil and budgetary issues if he expects to get more U.S. financial assistance”, Caggins warned. Meanwhile, APIKUR called for US action on the “politically-driven blockade” in a letter addressed to Senate whip and chair of the Justice Committee Senator Dick Durbin dated 12 February. It urges him to raise this “critical issue” with Iraqi and Kurdistan Region leaders during the conference and “pressure” the Iraqi government to “promptly take the steps required to reopen the Iraqi-Türkiye pipeline”, implement an amended federal budget law and provide international oil companies with surety of payment for exports. “The continued closure is effectively a politically-driven oil blockade that directly harms U.S. interests and investments,” it says, putting the cost of the exports halt at “an estimated $1 billion monthly—while [Iraq is] continuing to receive tax dollars from the U.S.”. Highlighting the damage to US companies and investment, the letter also suggests that “conditions on future US assistance to Iraq must be considered if Iraq continues to economically strangle the Kurdistan Region and U.S. oil investments, production and export”. Iraqi Oil Minister Hayan Abdul-Ghani told reporters earlier this week that negotiations between his ministry and international oil companies (IOCs) on resuming crude exports via the Turkish port at Ceyhan were “on the right track” and that he expected agreements would be reached in the near future. Exports were suspended after Paris-based arbitration over the Iraq-Turkey pipeline issued a decision last March. Ankara says it is ready for exports to resume.

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The U.S. Consulate welcomes the KRG Ministry of Culture’s decision to cancel media directive No. 1

U.S. consulate general in Erbil announced that they welcome the KRG Ministry of Culture’s decision to cancel media directive No. 1, 2023 passed in May 2023, which would have introduced new security vetting requirements for online journalists which the U.S. consulate said that they believe “it would have chilled media freedom.” The U.S. consulate in Erbil also said: This decision to cancel the directive reflects the KRG’s responsiveness to concerns raised by the international community as well as local efforts to improve media freedoms. We are committed to working with our local and international partners to continue to improve and promote media freedom and responsible media.  

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A United States Court warns Masrour Barzani

"Complaint has been filed" He must respond or give an explanation to the court within 21 days United States District Court for the District of Columbia has issued a notice to Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, asking him to respond to the request within 21 days. The warning is a complaint filed by the Kurdistan Victims Fund against Masrour Barzani and a number of other officials.

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Minister of Culture and Youth canceled the directive

Following a wave of protests, the Minister of Culture and Youth has finally canceled a directive that had handed the government over the criteria for media content. The (KRG) Minister of Culture and Youth Hama Hama Saeed has officially repealed the directive number (1) of 2023 on (regulation of media work in the Kurdistan Region). In the middle of last year, the directive sparked a wave of protests from journalists and writers against Masrour Barzani's cabinet, which, along with the decline in livelihoods and services, took measures to restrict freedom of the press. Some of the criticism was directed at the PUK, as the minister of culture belongs to the PUK. Dr. Saman Fawzi, a university professor and expert in media law, pointed out the weaknesses in the guidelines of the Ministry of Culture and said, "The directive contains many dangerous points for journalists and media outlets. It is not even useful for amendment, so it should be rejected". Weaknesses of the Ministry of Culture's guidelines: • Because there is no parliament to pass a law to regulate the work of the media, the government has taken the opportunity to issue this guideline. • However, there must be an independent committee to issue these guidelines, not belonging to the government. • In the guidelines, the title is one thing, and the content is something else. There are many problems in terms of form. There are ethical issues, but they are treated as laws in this guideline, which is a problem. • According to Article 9, this directive does not cover the field of journalism and journalists, but why later does it define journalists? We do not understand what it means. • Licensing issue: France has not had a journalism license for more than 100 years. Kurdistan was the last place that denied the license in the journalism law. But now the directive says the license is under the authority of the Ministry of Culture, but after the approval of the Ministry of Interior, which it creates many problems. • There are many taxes and fees: In Article 7, the satellite (40) million dinars, Television (20) million, Fees of broadcasting companies (30) million dinars, This is a blow to the free media that cannot afford that amount. • Article 4, paragraph 4, deals with defamation, insult and harassment.  Nobody knows what they mean by annoying? These concepts carry different interpretations. • Article 4, paragraph 17 states that the criteria for media content are issued by the Media and Information Office of the Kurdistan Regional Government. That is, the government tells the media what to do and what to publish. • Article 11 states that a board of representatives of the Ministry of Interior, Culture and the Media and Information department shall be formed to implement this directive. That is, the government itself implements the guidelines on journalists. • In Article 13, paragraph, discusses the closure of electronic publishing tools and social media pages. This is a very severe punishment, It is like an execution for journalism. • Article 12, paragraph 12, states that the disclosure of government documents is not authorized for publication, that is, no government documents should be published in the future, all those documents related to the corruption cases in the government should not be published. • In the guidelines of the Ministry of Culture, the treatment for shadow media, those whose background is unknown and the character behind it is unknown, insults and attacks this and that, is not addressed, which it should have had a solution to those issues. • Between rejecting, canceling and amending this guideline of the Ministry of Culture, I am in favor of rejecting it completely because you do not know where to change it.  

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The governor of Sulaimani for the PUK and Halabja for Gorran

According to (Draw Media) investigation, in a meeting between a delegation of the (PUK) and the Gorran Movement led by Gubad Talabani and Mustafa Sayed Qadir, the exchange of posts in Sulaimani, Halabja, Garmian and Raperin have been discussed. After the 2014 provincial council elections, the PUK and Gorran signed an agreement on November 12, 2014 to distribute local government posts in Sulaimani, Halabja, Garmian and Raperin. The PUK and Gorran are scheduled to exchange posts as follows. • The post of governor of Sulaimani will be transferred from Gorran to PUK • The post of governor of Halabja will be transferred from the PUK to Gorran • The post of governor of Sulaimani, which is the PUK, will be given to Gorran • The post of governor of Halabja, which is the PUK, will be given to Gorran Currently in (Sulaimani, Halabja, Garmian, Raperin) the Gorran Movement run these posts: • Governor of Sulaimani • Deputy Governor of Halabja • Deputy Chief of Garmian Administration • Deputy Head of Raperin Administration • Governor of Kalar • Governor of Darbandikhan • Governor of Penjwen • Governor of Haladze • Director General of Agriculture of Sulaimani • Director General of Traffic in Sulaimani • Director General of Education of Sulaimani • Director General of Culture of Sulaimani • Director General of Sulaimani Municipalities • Deputy Director General of Health in Sulaimani • Director of Parezkhan International Gateway • Director of Bashmakh Customs • President of Charmo University • Director General of Health Garmian • Director of Forest Police • Arbat District Director • Director of Barzanja District  

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Foreign oil companies demand 423 billion dinars monthly to extract oil from the Kurdistan Region

According to Soran Omar Member of the Iraqi Parliament, Foreign oil companies demand 423 billion dinars monthly to extract oil from the Kurdistan Region. However, the main problem between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad is the oil issue. According to Article 12/2/A of Law No. 13 of 2023, the budget law for the years 2023-2024-2025 requires KRG to deliver no less than 400,000 barrels of crude oil daily to the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) for export through the port of Ceyhan, or for local use in case of non-exportation. According to the same article (13/2/c), the fee for extraction and transportation of oil will be provided by the Federal Ministry of Finance at the equivalent price of Iraq for the transportation and production of a barrel of oil

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Partisan press: The dominance of party-backed media in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region

Draw Media Middle East Institute (MEI) - Winthrop Rodgers Attend any press conference in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region and the microphone bank on the podium is a swirl of reds, blues, yellows, blacks, and oranges representing different outlets. At first glance, this suggests a healthy press environment with a high degree of opportunity and competition, but in reality the media landscape is dominated by outlets affiliated with political parties. A kind of Kremlinology is necessary to parse the partisan affiliations represented. The ruling duopoly of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) oversees a galaxy of loyal platforms. Islamist and opposition parties are represented too. Party factions and individual politicians also fund specific outlets to boost their profiles, adding a further level of complexity. As a result, media coverage in the Kurdistan Region largely promotes the interests of politically motivated patrons, rather than performing a public service mission of providing impartial and high-quality information to all audiences. There are some independent outlets, but they have limited reach due to lack of funding and harassment by the authorities. Their work ends up drowned out by the party-funded enterprises. For both the Kurdish public and foreign observers, this skews the playing field and creates a biased perception of events and what issues are important. Moreover, the resulting system produces reporting that is centered on the daily activities of the political elite, rather than stories that tackle systemic problems like corruption, the economy, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses. When these issues are covered by partisan outlets, they are framed to highlight the most positive possible interpretation or used to score points against political opponents. This analysis is an attempt to explain how party-affiliated outlets came to dominate the media landscape in the Kurdistan Region and the impact that has on Kurdish citizens and foreign stakeholders. It is not a comprehensive guide to Kurdish media, but it will provide insight into the positioning of some major outlets. The development of party media The dominance of party-affiliated media is partially a legacy of the Kurdistan Region’s political development. Until 1991, Kurdish areas of Iraq were administrated by the central government in Baghdad, including during the Ba’athist dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Media in this environment was highly restricted and largely came from official state organs. Non-state media existed as well in the form of newspapers and radio stations run by the KDP and the PUK as part of their organized resistance to the Iraqi government. Therefore, connections between media, government, and political parties are hardly unusual. In fact, they are the norm historically. For a period in the 2000s, however, independent media flourished in the Kurdistan Region. Newspapers like Hawlati and Awene and Livin magazine published news and commentary that challenged the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the ruling parties. Editors and reporters took on big stories, including investigations into corruption. “People were eager to read them and waited for the new editions. They had a real impact,” Surkew Mohammed, editor-in-chief of web-based independent news outlet Peregraf, said in an interview. Independent media is different from party-affiliated outlets both in how they are funded and how they cover the news. The first aspect is obvious, though a lack of financial transparency in the Kurdistan Region means that there are few clear lines between outlets and their patrons. Shell companies and trusted associates stand in for politicians on official documentation, but the connections are evident. The second aspect is tested by whether an outlet is able to report news or opinion pieces that are critical of its patron. For an authentically independent outlet, all public figures and newsworthy events are fair game for both positive and negative stories. In the Kurdistan Region, this editorial approach is rarely seen in practice. Instead, party-affiliated outlets decide what and how to cover developments based on the political calculations of their benefactors. Of course, all of the outlets mentioned in this piece vocally proclaim their independence and many use it heavily in their marketing. “It’s just using the term, like ‘democracy.’ It is seen as a good thing. … They use the term to justify themselves and their activities,” Mohammed explained. In most cases, it is simply a parlor trick that frequently succeeds in duping outsiders who are unfamiliar with the context; in others, those who know better deliberately ignore outlets’ partisan characters. The relatively open period for independent media in the mid-2000s was overtaken by the end of the decade by technological changes and the emergence of satellite television stations as the primary medium of news dissemination. Far more expensive to produce than a newspaper, Kurdish-language television is dominated by the political parties and wealthy businesspeople. Kurdistan TV, Zagros TV, and Kurdsat were early efforts, but today channels like Rudaw, Nalia Radio and Television (NRT), and Kurdistan24 run constantly in offices and shops, during dinner, and throughout the evening as the background of everyday life in the Kurdistan Region. Television is a one-directional way of communicating. This fact serves the parties’ interests and allows them great latitude to shape the news. For the most part, they choose exactly what goes out over their airwaves. The political affiliation and editorial lines of each channel are well-known and many viewers will flip around the channels to see what each is saying about a given news item and correlate that with the views of specific parties or politicians. This shift away from independent newspapers towards party-affiliated outlets was closely followed by the exploding popularity of social media, particularly Facebook. Mobile devices enabled greater access to the internet and the parties rushed to exploit it. The old guard of newspapers were not agile enough and did not have the resources to adapt, but the TV stations established robust web-based news operations. As a result, they fully displaced most independent outlets as the primary source of news in the Kurdistan Region by the middle of the 2010s, co-opting journalists from the old newspapers along the way. This tracks with the political culture of the Kurdistan Region, where civil society and the state are relatively weak compared with the political parties. The KDP and the PUK in particular exert a high degree of influence over the institutions that make up civic life, including labor unions, universities, courts, and businesses. Media is no different in this regard, but plays a unique role as a purveyor and shaper of information. Before going further, it is important to note that the partisan affiliation of an outlet does not mean that individual journalists share that political commitment. Sometimes they do but, like viewers, they are largely subject to a system beyond their control. Working in Kurdish media is a politically fraught adventure. Reporters in the field are regularly targeted and attacked by members of the security forces based on their perceived political affiliation. Job security is tenuous, pay is low, and disloyalty is punished. Journalists respond to these dynamics in a variety of ways, but the focus in this analysis is the overall system rather than their individual actions.   KRG Coordinator for International Advocacy Dindar Zebari stands behind microphones of Kurdish media outlets at a press conference in Sulaymaniyah on May 6, 2021. Photo: Winthrop Rodgers.   Parsing the media landscape It takes a bit of time and experience to read a microphone bank in the Kurdistan Region and see what outlets and political interests are present to cover a given news event. Some analysts, including Hakeem Dawd Qaradaghi, have written helpful guides. However, they are quickly out of date amid the churn of new platforms starting up and old ones closing down, which includes the websites where these guides are published. Link death and deleted stories are a major problem for Kurdish media. A rundown of some of the major outlets may be helpful here. Of the two ruling parties, the KDP’s media operation is by far the most sophisticated. The party and its leaders fund a wide array of media outlets. The most prominent of these is Rudaw, which was established in 2013 and is backed by Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani. Though reliable statistics are hard to come by, it is likely the most-watched channel in the Kurdistan Region. Like many other outlets, Rudaw runs its television programming mainly in Sorani Kurdish. It also publishes news in other Kurdish dialects, Arabic, Turkish, and English on its website and social media platforms. This allows them to cater to different audiences and news coverage is tailored to appeal to each. The tone and content of the English services, for example, are often quite different from what is published or broadcast in Kurdish. For example, issues like human rights and press freedom receive sympathetic coverage from the English desk, while the segments in Kurdish will more closely follow the party line. Rudaw’s coverage is relatively comprehensive, which sets it apart from other partisan channels, but its reliance on party funding and reluctance to directly criticize Nechirvan Barzani’s leadership make its character clear. In recent years, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has risen to power within the KDP and challenged his cousin Nechirvan politically. Concurrently, he has also sought to displace Rudaw as the top Kurdish outlet and replace it with outlets he controls. The most significant effort in this regard is Kurdistan24, which launched in 2015. Despite enviable levels of funding, it lags behind its older rival and its coverage in Kurdish, English, and other languages is little more than a regurgitation of KRG press releases. Masrour Barzani’s faction has a number of other outlets, including BasNews, that reinforce its message. The PUK’s media operations are far less sophisticated and reflect the party’s complex factionalism. Well-established satellite TV stations Kurdsat and Gali Kurdistan are associated with the party’s leadership, with Iraq’s First Lady Shanaz Ibrahim wielding influence over the former. PUK leader Bafel Talabani established Esta News in 2019 as he geared up to take power. Other party leaders like Qubad Talabani, Barham Salih, and Mala Bakhtiyar are believed to back smaller outlets to varying degrees. Both before and after he was ousted from the PUK, Lahur Sheikh Jangi sought influence through the media. His outlet, known as iPlus, was seized by the Talabanis as one of their first steps towards removing their rival cousin as party co-leader. “Both ruling parties established media organizations to tell the public the news in the way they want, not in the way the news happens,” Qaradaghi said in an interview. “The KDP is more successful mostly because it is a centralized and tribal party where only the Barzanis make decisions. This makes the job of the media crystal clear and [outlets] get direction from one source. On the PUK’s part, it is different … it is not a strong and centralized party.” The main opposition television channel is NRT, which launched just days before massive anti-corruption protests swept Sulaymaniyah Governorate in February 2011. Within a week, armed men stormed the channel’s office and set it on fire. This knocked NRT’s coverage of the protests off the air, but gave it a compelling origin story. Over the years, the authorities have continued to target its reporters and close down its offices to restrict coverage of protests. After its owner Shaswar Abdulwahid went into politics and founded the New Generation Movement in 2018, viewers increasingly see it as merely another party-funded operation. Nevertheless, NRT’s coverage remains highly critical of the Kurdistan Region’s ruling parties and it airs viewpoints that are passed over by KDP and PUK channels, which make it a widely viewed alternative. Other parties have their own outlets. The Change Movement (Gorran) runs Kurdish News Network (KNN), but the channel has never been as prominent as NRT or those backed by the KDP and the PUK. The Kurdistan Region’s two Islamist parties also have extensive media operations, which include both news and religious programming. The Kurdistan Islamist Union’s (KIU) main channel is Speda TV, while the Kurdistan Justice Group (KJG) runs Payam TV. While newspapers Hawlati and Awene have lost their influence, several web-based outlets have stepped in to take up the mantel of independent news coverage, including Peregraf, KirkukNow, and Draw Media. Some independent outlets are actively harassed by the authorities, but for the most part their main challenge is securing funding. Unlike their party-affiliated counterparts, they do not have access to deep-pocketed patrons. “At the beginning of Peregraf, I sold my own car to fund its start up. Following that, I received funding from the international community,” Mohammed said. Both Peregraf and Draw receive support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and KirkukNow is supported in part by the European Endowment for Democracy and Free Press Unlimited. Among some observers, this foreign funding is controversial because the funders are located in the US or Europe, but for its recipients it is key to their independence. There is some advertising revenue available, but businesses are subject to political influence, so it is not a reliable option. “[We] have only one way to work and this is through international funding and grants. Otherwise, we cannot survive,” Mohammed said. New ventures The KDP and the PUK are doubling down on their strategy and several new party-affiliated outlets have launched over the past several months. The bulk of these new ventures are associated with Masrour Barzani and his advisors, reflecting the prime minister’s growing power within the KDP. Established in February 2023, the Kurdistan Chronicle is a slickly produced, English-language magazine aimed at the international community with content that reads like an investment brochure for Barzani’s premiership. The prime minister’s signature initiatives like the export of produce to the Gulf dominate its coverage. Similarly, The New Region is oriented towards a global audience, but is newsier. Yet, the intent embodied in its name is unmistakable. Finally, Barzani’s operation has re-oriented Ava Media from entertainment broadcasting to a news platform that caters to Kurdish speakers. Barzani’s son and presumed heir, Areen Barzani, is regularly featured in its coverage.   A screenshot of Kurdistan 24’s January 12, 2024 coverage of KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s trip to Davos. Photo: Screenshot/Kurdistan24.   “The aim is to compete with Rudaw and mostly target the Kurdistan Region and other Kurdish areas,” said Qaradaghi, adding that Ava Media is allegedly “hiring Rudaw employees on massive wages.” They are also an attempt to blunt criticism of Barzani’s term as prime minister, which has seen significant political and economic upheaval, and improve the souring perception of his government in foreign capitals. However, Qaradaghi sees this as “conflating government, personal, and partisan roles.” Not to be outdone, PUK leader Bafel Talabani is also seeking to boost his profile. A political newcomer who has only held an official position within the PUK since December 2019, Talabani lacks the kind of connection that other Kurdish leaders, including his father Jalal Talabani, developed with the broader public beyond their core supporters. Therefore, his profile and apparent accomplishments must be constructed by friendly media. In January 2024, Channel 8 began airing after a long period of development. In addition to Talabani’s own political fortunes, the new outlet will likely seek to boost the PUK’s brand ahead of expected regional elections later this year. Who it harms The Kurdistan Region’s system of party-affiliated media skews coverage of news events and issues. This harms two distinct groups: Kurdish citizens, who are unable to access impartial information in their own language about their government and politics, and foreign observers, for whom information about the Kurdistan Region is largely viewed through partisan filters. While citizens have the option of choosing from a variety of party-supported outlets, which does mean some diversity of perspectives, there are many issues and viewpoints that the ruling parties are united in keeping off the airwaves. A good example of this is corruption, which is pervasive in the Kurdistan Region. Nevertheless, in-depth investigations into specific cases are rare. When it is mentioned, it mostly takes the form of hints and allegations rather than the kind of exploratory investigative journalism that occurs elsewhere. Lamentably, some of the most detailed stories about corruption have been published abroad by foreign journalists. That is not because of a lack of bravery, talent, or ambition on the part of Kurdish journalists — far from it — but rather because the system protects vested interests and punishes those who challenge it with unemployment or worse. Citizens are the biggest loser: They are denied the vital information that enables authentic democracy to function. Foreign observers are similarly offered a distorted view of economic and political dynamics in the Kurdistan Region focusing almost entirely on the activities and concerns of the elite, rather than the everyday experience of ordinary residents. Outlets like Rudaw, Kurdistan24, and the Kurdistan Chronicle publish accessibly in English and their platforms are optimized to appear in web searches. This is not trickery, but smart business practice that above all takes money to do well and consistently. The effect is that outside observers most frequently encounter the information these partisan outlets publish, while information that disrupts party-constructed narratives is not as easily available. It takes time, experience, and language skills to dig deeper. That is hard to do from behind a desk in Washington, Dubai, or Berlin. The Kurdistan Region would be much better served by independent, non-partisan media. However, such a shift would require major systemic changes that run counter to the region’s political development. A completely different funding model would also need to be put in place to support truly independent journalism. These are unlikely to happen in the near term, but recognizing this dual challenge is the first step to making sure that Kurdish citizens and foreign observers get the information they deserve.   Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist and researcher who focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy. His past work has appeared in Foreign Policy, the Index on Censorship, Al-Monitor, and Rest of World. Full disclosure: Rodgers was NRT’s English Editor from 2018-2021 and contributes to Peregraf’s English coverage. Main photo by Winthrop Rodgers The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.

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Kurdistan Oil Flows Not Expected to Resume Anytime Soon

 Perhaps no subject in the complex world of global oil involves so many intricate moving parts as the extraordinary relationship between the Federal Government of Iraq (FGI), based in Baghdad, and the government of Iraq’s northern semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan (KRG), centred in Erbil. It is only when something such as the suspension of major flows of oil from Kurdistan to Turkey occurs, as began on 25 March 2023, that many analysts start trying to unravel what has caused it. And they find themselves entering an Alice In Wonderland world in which anything is possible, but nothing is as it seems. In this world, it is very easy to lose sight of the wood for the trees sometimes, and this appears to be what has happened in a letter sent by foreign oil firms in Kurdistan to the U.S. Congress asking for help in having the export oil embargo lifted. Ironically, in fact, it is only towards the very end of the letter from the Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) that the group, which largely comprises the oil interests of several foreign firms directly or indirectly, inadvertently hits on the precise reasons why a full, clear, and transparent lifting of the embargo is unlikely to happen soon, if ever. The letter highlights that the halt in exports that affects between 400,000-500,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil from Iraqi Kurdistan must be lifted because it puts at risk over US$10 billion of U.S. and international investments in Kurdistan and because it is severely impacting the region’s economy and stability at a time when regional tensions are already heightened. “By keeping the West out of energy deals in Iraq – and closer to the new Iran-Saudi axis - the end of Western hegemony in the Middle East will become the decisive chapter in the West’s final demise,” said a very high-ranking Kremlin official at a meeting with senior government figures from Iran, just after the 10 March 2023 signing of the Iran-Saudi Arabia relationship resumption deal, brokered by China. The comment was exclusively relayed to OilPrice.com, just before the 25 March oil export embargo from Iraqi Kurdistan by a senior source who works closely with the European Union’s energy security apparatus, and we passed it on to our esteemed readers. Nothing whatsoever has changed to modify the view of either the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, or the senior figures in Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing who are helping to implement the ‘One Iraq Plan’ as it is referred to behind closed doors. If anything, the rising uncertainty in the Middle East emanating from fears of a dramatic escalation in the Israel-Hamas War are serving to expedite key elements of the plan, with the U.S.’s focus on that War. In essence, the bare mechanics of the ‘One Iraq Plan’, as broadly delineated by the senior Kremlin figure, are to cut off all sources of external revenue from the government of Iraqi Kurdistan – most significantly from independent oil sales by foreign companies operating there – before absorbing it into the rest of the country, under the sole rule of Baghdad, as analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. If that is understood, then everything that has subsequently happened in Iraq since the 10 March relationship resumption deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia makes perfect sense. The basic reason for this is that Iraqi Kurdistan has long been regarded by Russia, China, and Iran, as a key U.S. ally in the Middle East, and this will no longer be tolerated, which gives rise to two further choices. China to Hike the Price of Gasoline and Diesel The first is to give Iraqi Kurdistan its independence and sever all links between it and the rest of Iraq. This, though, is not an option on the table for three key reasons. One is that the main northern overland export route into Europe for all of Iraq runs through the Kurdistan region and into Turkey. The original Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) – controlled by the FGI in Baghdad - consisted of two pipes (a 40-inch one started up in 1977, and a 46-inch one started up in 1987), from the Kirkuk oil fields (also nominally owned by the FGI) on the border of the Iraqi Kurdistan to Ceyhan, which had a combined nameplate capacity of 1.6 million bpd. The FGI-controlled pipeline’s export capacity reached between 250,000 and 400,000 bpd when running normally, although it was subject to regular sabotage by various militant groups. The Iraqi Kurdistan’s KRG, in response to the regular attacks on the FGI pipeline, completed its own single-side track Taq field-Khurmala-Kirkuk/Ceyhan pipeline in the border town of Fishkhabur. This was part of its drive to raise oil exports above 1 million bpd. Clearly, Baghdad will never give these vital oil export links away. The second reason is that giving Iraqi Kurdistan independence would set a dangerous precedent for all other large Kurdish groups in the region to ask for the same. Iran’s Kurdish population is around 9 percent, Syria’s 10 percent, and Turkey’s about 18 percent. It is highly apposite to note in this context that the U.S. had privately assured the Iraqi Kurds in 2014 that in exchange for their Peshmerga armed forces taking the principal combat role against a surging ISIS, they would eventually be given their own independent country, as also detailed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. On 25 September 2017, then, a vote did take place in Iraqi Kurdistan, in which the 92.73 percent voted for full independence. It was immediately followed by elements of Iran’s military rolling into Iraq Kurdistan, including the prime oil-rich areas. Additionally, very senior officers from Iran’s Quds branch of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, and from its Vezarat-e Ettela’at Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran intelligence service, made it clear to several of Iraq Kurdistan’s leading politicians that it would not be in their best interests to continue to push for independence from Iraq.  At the same time, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a top military adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called for a blockade on Iraq Kurdistan’s land borders. Turkish President then as now, Recep Erdogan, also threatened to invade the Iraqi Kurdish area. He added that Turkey could also cut off the ITP export pipeline. The third reason is that having a fractious would-be breakaway region with ties to the U.S. makes the administration of Iraq’s massive oil and gas sector much more difficult for China and Russia. Moscow specifically took control of Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sector just after the abortive 2017 vote for independence to maintain a grip over the region with a view to reintegrating it back into the rest of Iraq, as also analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. In tandem with this, China has been building up its influence in southern Iraq, through multiple deals done in the oil and gas sector that have then been leveraged into bigger infrastructure deals across the south. The apotheosis of Beijing’s vision for China is all-encompassing ‘Iraq-China Framework Agreement’ of 2021. This, in turn, was an extension in scale and scope of the ‘Oil for Reconstruction and Investment’ agreement signed by Baghdad and Beijing in September 2019, which allowed Chinese firms to invest in infrastructure projects in Iraq in exchange for oil. Back in early April last year, OilPrice.com highlighted that oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan would only go ahead with the full blessing of Iran, Russia, and China. That has not been given, so there is no reason to expect it to end in any sustainable fashion any time soon. Conversely, however, the move to destroy any last vestiges of Iraqi Kurdistan independence remain in full swing. A clear statement on 3 August last year from Iraq Prime Minister, Mohammed Al-Sudani, highlighted that the new intended unified oil law – run, in every way that matters, out of Baghdad - will govern all oil and gas production and investments in both Iraq and its autonomous Kurdistan region and will constitute “a strong factor for Iraq’s unity”. As the senior E.U. source reiterated exclusively to OilPrice.com last week: “Baghdad has no interest at all in agreeing to any of Turkey’s terms or in Iraqi Kurdistan resuming its independent oil sales either.” He concluded: “As Baghdad does not see an independent Kurdistan in the future of Iraq, it sees the best solution as keeping the independent oil sales stopped and the Kurds financially paralyzed.” By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com  

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United States in Iraq: Withdraw but Do Not Disengage

Draw media Sardar Aziz - EMAIRATES POLICY CENTER   Key Takeaways Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has reiterated his country’s demand for a quick and orderly negotiated exit of United States-led military forces from Iraq.  While Iran has to do something to justify its resistance narrative, it knows that pushing the relationship to the level of Iraq-US disengagement will harm its interests, too. Indirect Iranian presence has added regional issues to the US-Iraqi bilateral relationship. It further complicates the relationship and makes Iraq less capable of defending its interests.  Iran is in dire need of using its low-level proxy involvement in Iraq to support its resistance narrative in the wake of the Israel-Hamas conflict.    Speaking to Reuters on January 10, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani reiterated his country’s demand for a quick and orderly negotiated exit of United States-led military forces from Iraq. While describing the coalition forces as destabilizing, he did not set a timetable for the exit. This came after the end of an unofficial truce between the US army in Iraq and the Shia militias under the ruling coalition, the Coordination Framework. The truce commenced when the Sudani cabinet took charge and ended on October 7, 2023.   The pressure on US forces this time is different as the region struggles to control a potential wider conflict due to the Israeli-Gaza War. Domestically, Iraq is run by pro-Iran forces. The Sadr Movement, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Sunnis are either outside the government or weakened. While Iran has to do something to justify its resistance narrative, it knows that pushing the relationship to the level of Iraq-US disengagement will harm its interests, too. There is too much fog around the US-Iraqi relationship, especially on how and when to end the US presence in Iraq.   This is due to the involvement of too many actors: the US government, the Iraqi government, the Iraqi pro-Iranian militias, the Iranian government, and, to a lesser degree, other Iraqi components, Kurds and Sunnis. The current Iraqi government attempts to involve the broader public by sending a question to 20 million Iraqis on their mobiles, asking them whether they agree with the departure of the international coalition forces. It attempts to add a democratic flavor and makes the relationship murkier. Therefore, it is essential to demystify this fog and the different actors’ behaviors to understand the relationship’s current nature and potential future.   The Nature of the Relationship   On November 17, 2008, Ambassador Ryan Crocker finalized the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation with the Republic of Iraq. The US side calls the agreement Strategic Framework, while the Iraqis call it the Withdrawal Agreement, a linguistic but telling nuance. The agreement is based on several principles: Respect for sovereignty, defense cooperation, and rejection of violence to settle disputes. Moreover, the temporary presence of US forces in Iraq is at the request and invitation of its sovereign government and, with full respect for Iraq’s sovereignty, is part of the deal.   This agreement was given another life when Iraq came under pressure from ISIS. The US was initially reluctant, but after the fall of Mosul in 2014, Iraq requested air power. However, the strategic agreement remained the basis of the US-Iraqi relationship and negotiations. Both sides attempted to focus on different aspects at different times based on the need and urgency and diversify the relationship beyond security and the military. For instance, before the October 7 attack, they focused on economic cooperation, according to Sarhang Hamasaeed, the Director of the Middle East Programs at the United States Institute of Peace.   Initially, Iran was an external third party in the US-Iraq relationship. Iran’s presence turned the Iraq-US strategic relationship into a highly unpredictable and sometimes battleground, as Iran and the US collided on the nature of the relationship and the nature of the Iraqi state. Consequently, the third party has added geopolitical, sectarian, and emotional aspects to the relationship. The US drone strike killing Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and Popular Mobilization Forces Deputy Commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 2020 was a critical juncture. It put the Iraqi elites under pressure and led the Iraqi Council of Representatives to pass a resolution calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.   As a former Iraqi MP revealed, the air was highly retaliatory, and the government had to do something. The resolution was driven by emotional motivation rather than long-term Iraqi interest. The US-Iraq relationship has changed significantly due to Iran’s involvement. It has heightened Iranian apprehensions and concerns, particularly over the drive for a US pullout, given that Iraq is not equipped, either economically or militarily.   Secondly, the indirect Iranian presence has added regional issues to the US-Iraqi bilateral relationship. It further complicates the relationship and makes Iraq less capable of defending its interests. Thirdly, it has added the state of emergency aspect: When the Iran-US relationship escalates elsewhere, the Iranian proxies in Iraq respond. Fourthly, Iranian influence has made Iraqi society and politics increasingly polarized.   The Iraqi View: Strategic Ambiguity   In 2020, after the Council of Representatives voted to expel the US forces, Barbara A. Leaf and Bilal Wahab considered  nationalist sentiment and Iranian pressure as the main drivers behind the expulsion. This time, Iraqi nationalism is conspicuously absent, particularly considering Sadr’s exclusion from the political process. As a result, the US-Iraqi relationship and its current course are more Iranian and less focused on Iraqi concerns, especially from the Iraqi side.   In the case of US withdrawal, Iran is believed to continue to dominate further. Many might not be happy with the outcome, particularly in Sunni areas, where they would prefer a limited US military presence. This also holds for the Kurds. Falah Mustafa, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the President, said that the US representatives had reassured them of their decision not to withdraw. Despite Baghdad’s declaration, the Pentagon said it does not have plans to evacuate its approximately 2,500 personnel.   These statements show the US and Iraq’s lack of enthusiasm for a withdrawal. Besides the security aspect, a quick withdrawal will risk the country already facing economic and diplomatic consequences. The country’s current dollar situation indicates this. Entangled between Iran and the US, Iraq has to compromise and take the burden. Iraq can now heighten its rhetorical opposition to the US presence, especially in the media. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, PM Sudani, not worried that the coalition’s departure would undermine Iraqi military capabilities, said: “There is no cause for concern, as we have capable security forces that can control all areas of Iraq.”   This suggests Iraq is targeting military departures. According to US officials, adjustments to the international coalition, including about 900 troops from two dozen countries and 2,500 US troops, may be necessary to satisfy Iraqi rhetoric. The Iraqi PM intends to form an Iraq-US bilateral committee. From the Iraqi political doctrine perspective, the committee represents taking the longest route or not doing it at all. To placate two hostile powers in a precarious situation, the Iraqi government, the weakest link between the US and Iran, is forced to adopt strategic ambiguity, swinging between withdrawal and no withdrawal.   The US View   According to the former US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, David Schenker, the US neither wants to leave under threat nor believes the moment is right. Several factors directly and indirectly influence the present state of US-Iraq ties. The pre-Gaza assault on US policy toward Iran is in the background. The US had other priorities, such as Russia’s Ukraine invasion and China’s rise. Moreover, its internal politics considers the Afghanistan and Iraq wars as undeserving of US blood and wealth.   Accordingly, the US tried to buy off through agreements that would commit the Iranians to step back from the brink of the nuclear program. They want Tehran to release some Americans and refrain from aggressive activities in the Gulf against tanker traffic and US interests, allies, and assets across the Middle East. Iran seeks to have influence essentially by provocation. Indirect support for the Framework and the weakening of others in Iraq set the premise for further centralization and weakened federalism.   This reality is also behind the current Iraqi call for US withdrawal. Iran and its proxies in Iraq believe they have marginalized the others. The US tries to see the crisis as transitory and will soon defuse it, just like in 2019. At best, this might not be accurate. The US is now forced to revert to using hard power and the prospect of escalation, even though it hoped to move attention to the relationship’s economic, financial, and cultural parts. The US will suffer from this and lose influence within the country.   The Iranian-Iraqi militias are working to demilitarize the Iraqi relationship with the US, among them by expelling the advisors, even though they may wish to retain diplomatic and commercial ties. In addition, the US partners in Iraq are losing faith, particularly now that these groups have weakened the Kurdish troops, whom the US has traditionally considered to be more allying. As Iran attempts to gauge the US’s patience, the latter is being compelled to take more unwanted actions.   The Iranian View   Iraq is the most strategic country for Iran. For many Iranians, a place like Karbala is not a foreign place as Iraq is a threat and also a strategic asset to Iran, which it runs through the IRGC. However, despite its strong and close relationship with Iraqi elites, Iran is deeply unpopular with the Iraqi population, among them the Iraqi Shia. Iran, therefore, views US involvement in Iraq as posing a cultural and political threat besides a military one. Iran is thus opposed to a democratic state that supports America, is located nearby, and may serve as a role model for Iran’s disgruntled youth. Iran’s traditions and values are being challenged, particularly by women and youth, as seen by the republic’s most recent Jin, Jiyan, and Azadi rallies.   Attempts to create an Iraqi political culture opposing Western culture are part of the Iranian strategy in Iraq. The last two decades have shown that the US and Iran have an unwritten agreement to split the spoils in Iraq, as the Iraqi Kurdistan representative in Tehran believes. Others argue that “the Iran-Iraq bilateral relationship is crucial for both countries – it is deeply grounded in history and will continue despite the threat of boycotts, sanctions, and war.”   The Iranian campaign to drive Americans out of Iraq is different. Iran wants to see the US troops leave Iraq entirely. However, it does not want to disengage. The former entails the complete withdrawal of advisers supplying the Iraqi military with training assistance, terminating military interaction beyond regular Chief-of-Mission operations. The US has no base in Iraq, and the Iraqi government owns all joint base areas used by the US military, including those located within the Kurdish Regional Government.   While Iran does not want Iraq and the US to reach the disengagement level, i.e., withdrawing combat assistance and advisory units and relinquishing borrowed physical space on Iraqi military bases, the US withdrawal will impact the dollar flow to Iraq. That will harm the Iranian economy or might turn Iraq from an economic asset into a liability.   Where is the Situation in Iraq Headed?   The US-Iraq relationship is not isolated from the more significant global and regional developments. Geopolitical strategist Peter Zeihan says, “The period of US hyper-involvement in global affairs is ending.” This break in commitment will directly impact the world, particularly the Middle East. Aware of this prospect, neighboring countries are vying for influence and growth, and the US and Iraq are discussing their relationship in this context. The two countries’ delegates convened on January 25 to “start working group meetings of the US-Iraq Higher Military Commission (HMC)” following the delayed escalation.   The HMC will enable the transition to an enduring bilateral security partnership between the US and Iraq, building on the successes of Iraq’s Defeat-ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The committees will consider the ISIS threat, operational and environmental requirements, and the Iraqi security forces’ capability levels. The US seeks to expand security cooperation to promote stability in Iraq and the surrounding area.   Iraqi leaders and officials welcomed the negotiation, which was seen as an event to de-escalate. However, some doubt it. The Iraqis saw the meeting as a way to prepare for withdrawal. According to the Iraqi media, “withdrawal” was removed from the statement. All this happened prior to the January 28 attack on the T22 bases in northeastern Jordan, killing three US service members and injuring 25 others.   The Tanaf attack is anticipated to alter the engagement terms. The attack will put Biden under immense pressure at home from Trump and many Republican congress members. The strike demonstrated the futility of Biden’s deterrence strategy, which Iran and its allies view as a vulnerability. Now, the Biden administration has to punish Iran and its proxies and convince its constituency at home and its allies in the Middle East.   While there are calls for attacks on Iran, a direct US strike on Iranian land seems unlikely. Others have highlighted the possibility of covert action, which would not serve the present US government and the Biden administration, which aims to project US power and deter Iran from engaging in military aggression. The US is anticipated to move in several military, diplomatic, and economic capacities to target Iranian assets and militias in Iraq, which could lead to an escalation in Iraq.   Conclusions   The current push to expel Americans from Iraq is unlike any previous attempt, as the new drive is more Iranian. Iran is in dire need of using its low-level proxy involvement in Iraq to support its resistance narrative in the wake of the Israel-Hamas conflict. While officially, Iran might combine Iraq and Gaza, the real target is within Iraq, the only place where the Iranian proxy has the capacity and willingness to hit the Americans directly.   Iran seeks to solidify its coalition control over Iraq, pressuring the US to leave but not to disengage, thereby making the Framework the only powerful entity in Iraq, marginalizing others. Iran may not succeed in its goal as the US will not begin talks as long as drone attacks continue and will not leave under pressure. Iran manages to degrade parties and groups that it has not yet entirely subjugated, like the KDP and Sadr, restrict the US diplomats, and put the military and administration on high alert.   The US may strive to stay by changing the strategic agreement. However, it is rapidly losing its reputation and aura in Iraq, adversely impacting its soft power. The major actors might lose control, and the situation could worsen. Iraq is, therefore, a battlefield, but more significantly, it is a stage for performances and message-giving. It seems insufficient to attribute the US-Iraqi escalation in Iraq to the Israeli-Gaza War alone. More than anything else, Iran takes the US presence in Iraq seriously. This tit-for-tat will continue to pressure Americans and also shape the Iraqi political landscape.    

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Number of security and military forces in the Kurdistan Region

🔻There are (433) thousand security and military forces in the region 🔻The monthly salary of the security forces is (455) billion dinars 🔸Number of security and military forces 🔹Peshmerga and Internal forces: 217 thousand 979 people 🔹 Police and security:: 104 thousand 699 people 🔹 Military pensioners: 110 thousand 729 people Total military force: 433 thousand 407 people   🔸Monthly salaries of security and military agencies: 🔹Ministry of Interior: 178 billion 489 million dinars 🔹Ministry of Peshmerga: 133 billion and 61 million dinars 🔹Security Council and agencies: 62 billion 997 million dinars 🔹Military pension: 75 billion 630 million dinars 🔹Total: (450 billion 177 million) dinars, which is 49% of the total salary of KRG

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British Consul General visits Draw Media

The new British Consulate-General in the Kurdistan Region, James Goldman, and a delegation from the the British Consulate-General in Erbil visited Draw media headquarter in Sulaymaniyah today. In a meeting with Draw Media editorial staff, the British consulate team discussed the Media environment and the freedom of the press in the Kurdistan region. They also focused on problems of the KRG civil servant salaries, livelihoods of people, and the future of oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region. (Draw) explained the situation of journalism and livelihoods of people with its reports, books and publications with statistics and data.  

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Oil production from Sarsang and Atrush fields in the fourth quarter of 2023

Shamarani Petroleum announced the oil production data in the fourth quarter of 2023; 🔹 Sarsang oil field produced an average of (36 thousand 400) barrels of oil per day, each barrel sold at (42) dollars, which is (50%) lower than the price of Brent oil in the world markets. 🔹 The Atrush oil field produced an average of 9,006 barrels of oil per day, selling at $33 per barrel, which is 61% lower than the price of Brent oil in the world markets. Oil production from Sarsang and Atrush fields in the fourth quarter of 2023 The Sarsang operator was able to increase production and local sales during Q4 2023. The Atrush operator restarted production on November 7, 2023, and reached production and sales of approximately 20,000 bopd that month but was then curtailed to a maximum of 10,000 bopd for most of December 2023. The Atrush curtailment was primarily due to operational bottlenecks at local refineries receiving the crude through reversed-flow pipeline deliveries, and this situation continues in January 2024. As of December 31, 2023, ShaMaran had gross outstanding debt of $293 million and net debt of $193 million (including restricted and unrestricted cash and Company-owned bonds). The Company intends to use part of its owned bonds to satisfy the $22.5 million bond amortization amount due in January 2024. Pro forma for the amortization and interest payments at the end of January 2024, the Company forecasts gross debt of $271 million and net debt of $200 million (including restricted and unrestricted cash and Company-owned bonds). ShaMaran expects to publish its audited Q4 2023 operating and financial results on March 6, 2024. Except as otherwise indicated, all currency amounts indicated as “$” in this news release are expressed in United States dollars. About ShaMaran Petroleum Corp. ShaMaran is a Canadian independent oil and gas company focused on the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The Company indirectly holds an 18% working interest (22.5% paying interest) in the Sarsang Block, and, subject to closing the previously announced transaction, will increase its indirect 27.6% working interest in the Atrush Block to 50%. The Company is listed in Toronto on TSX Venture Exchange and in Stockholm on Nasdaq First North Growth Market (ticker “SNM”). ShaMaran is part of the Lundin Group of Companies.  

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UK confirms British businessman died in IRCG strike on Erbil site

A British citizen was killed during an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) strike on a site in northern Iraq, the UK government has confirmed. Five civilians, including two children, died in the missile strike in Erbil on Monday, according to Iraqi Kurdish officials. It targeted the family home of Kurdish businessman Peshraw Dizayee, who was killed alongside his 11-month-old daughter. Stephen Hitchen, the British ambassador to Iraq, confirmed the death of dual citizen Karam Mikhael in the attack. “I extend my deepest condolences to the families of all the victims of yesterday’s reckless attacks, and in particular to the family of British national Karam Mikhael. Our thoughts are with you during this difficult time," he said. Mr Mikhael's family, who held a wake for him on Wednesday, strongly rejected claims that he was involved in business with Israel, according to Kurdistan media site Rudaw. Mr Mikhael, the founder and Chief Executive of Manahil El Ryan, a consumer electronics distributor in Iraq and the country’s first online marketplace was attending a social gathering at the time of the strike, it said. The Erbil branch employs almost 150 people. The government said Foreign Secretary David Cameron raised his death during his meeting with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, in Davos on Wednesday. A representative said: “The Foreign Secretary condemned the attacks in Erbil in Iraq, which killed UK-Iraqi dual national Karam Mikhael. Attacks like this violate the sovereignty of other states.” Iran claimed Mr Dizayee’s house was a Mossad office, but his business empire has no apparent links to Israel, although his company's website says it is involved in oil services, a crowded sector in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The Prime Minister of Iraq's Kurdistan Region rejected the claim that the site was an Israeli spy base. The region previously exported oil to Israel, but has not done so since early last year, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy think tank said. The IRGC claimed the attacks in Iraq's Kurdish region, which consists of three provinces, were also aimed at “destroying anti-Iranian terrorist groups” in the area. The IRGC also hit targets in eastern Syria in a separate missile attack on the same night. In both instances, Iran claimed the attacks were in response to a January 3 bombing in Kerman, Iran, which killed nearly 100 people at an event commemorating Iranian general Qassem Suleimani’s death in a 2020 US air strike near Baghdad. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, had vowed a “harsh response” to the attack, which was claimed by ISIS, but which Tehran has blamed on Israel and the US. The IRGC has since struck the Baloch group Jaish ul Adl in Pakistan, which Iran has accused of taking part in an attack on a police station in the south of the country.

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Violations against journalists decreased by (42%) 

Compared to 2022, violations and arrests of journalists decreased by 42% in 2023. Violations decreased from 431 to 249 cases, arrests decreased from 64 to 37 cases. Metro Center for Journalists' Rights and Advocacy has released its annual report on the situation of journalists in the Kurdistan Region. According to the report, 249 violations were committed against 247 journalists in 2023, including: Prevention and discrimination: (134) cases Seizure of journalist's devices: (38) cases Arrest of journalists: (37) cases Attacks, Threats and Insults: (27) Arrest of journalists outside the Journalism Law (5) cases Cyber attack: (4) cases Breaking journalist's belongings (2) cases Raids on journalists' homes: (2) cases Violations against journalists 2022: (431) 2023: (249) Decreased: (182) (42%) Arrest of journalists 2022: (64) arrests 2023: (37) arrests Decreased: (27) cases Decreased by 42%

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US State Department condemns IRGC missile attacks on Erbil

 The US Department of State strongly condemned the missile attacks carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) against Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), on Tuesday, resulting in the death and injury of 10 civilians. The spokesperson for the Department, Mattew Miller, stated in a press release, "The United States strongly condemns the Iranian attacks in Erbil today and extends its condolences to the victims’ families." "We oppose Iran's reckless missile strikes, which undermine the stability of Iraq." He continued, "We support the efforts of the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to meet the aspirations of the Iraqi people." Furthermore, on Monday night, IRGC launched a fierce missile strike targeting civilian areas in Erbil, causing the death and injury of 10 civilians. It is noteworthy that IRGC had earlier claimed responsibility for the attacks that targeted Erbil and stated that they came "in response to the crimes of the Zionist regime against the Islamic Republic, the latest of which was the killing of several IRGC leaders by Zionist fire, targeting a main Mossad spy center in KRI and destroying it with ballistic missiles." The statement added that this Zionist center was the main one responsible for developing and launching espionage operations and planning terrorist activities in the region, especially against Iran. The Security Council of the Kurdistan Region condemned, early today, the missile bombardment conducted by IRGC, targeting various areas in Erbil, as a "blatant violation of the sovereignty" of the Region and Iraq. The Council stated that at 11:30 on the night of January 15 to January 16, 2024, IRGC bombarded several civilian areas in Erbil with ballistic missiles, resulting in the death of four civilians and the injury of six others, some of whom are in critical condition. The statement added that IRGC declared that the attack targeted several locations of groups opposed to Iran, pointing out that this excuse has no basis, and we reject it. They always use baseless excuses to attack Erbil. The statement emphasized that "Erbil, as a stable region, has never been a source of threat to any party." The statement continued that the strikes carried out by the IRGC on Erbil are a "flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the region and Iraq," and the federal government and the international community must not remain silent about this crime.

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