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The Road That Embodies Iraqi Kurdistan’s Dysfunctional Politics

Winthrop Rodgers The slow and dangerous drive from Sulaymaniyah to Erbil reveals the tensions between rival parties that hinder the region’s governance It’s a dusty dawn in Sulaymaniyah, in Iraq’s northern Kurdistan Region, and the heat is just beginning to build. After a moment of comfort enjoying strong tea, tangy yogurt and warm bread, I set off on the road between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. I’ve made this trip many times and often wonder: Why isn’t there a highway? Why is the main route between the Kurdistan Region’s two largest and most important cities a bumpy, dangerous, two-lane road? The lack of a smooth and efficient link between the two cities is undoubtedly a headache, but it is also a perfect example of how the Kurdistan Region’s internal divisions make the lives of ordinary people more difficult. Its partitioned transportation network reflects its dysfunctional politics in physical form. “It is the road to hell,” said Hiwa Khalakan, a shopkeeper. “You can never trust anything on this road. You just have to give yourself to God. “I was 10 years old when they said this road was going to become a highway, a divided one and everything, and now I am 37 and here we are,” he added, watching as vehicles crawled delicately over a jagged speed bump in his namesake village of Khalakan. Over the past three decades of self-government, the Kurdistan Region’s two notoriously quarrelsome ruling parties — the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) — have failed to develop a political system that works as a unified whole. Each party administers its own zone, relics of the civil war they fought in the 1990s: Sulaymaniyah and Halabja governorates are controlled by the PUK, while Erbil and Duhok governorates are the stronghold of the KDP. Neither party is able to meaningfully influence affairs in the opposing area. Always difficult, their relationship has deteriorated significantly over the last two years, making even the most basic kinds of governance nearly impossible. Yet the Kurdistan Region is still a small place. Business responsibilities and social ties transcend the political boundaries constructed by the parties. Each day, thousands of people get behind the wheel to make the journey. Needs must when the devil drives, as the saying goes. Granted, it is a beautiful trip. The so-called Smaquli route from Sulaymaniyah to Erbil winds its way through intersecting valleys. Mountain ranges are hazily etched in pale shades of blue. Pomegranate orchards grow in rows next to farmhouses, patrolled by honking, hissing geese. For much of the distance, however, the road is a single strip of unlined, meandering tarmac. Driving the grinding 125 miles routinely takes more than three hours. It is as if the interstate did not exist and everyone drove from Richmond to Washington, D.C., on a county byway. “It’s a really bad road. It’s really hard for us,” said Araz Hama Saeed, a bus driver, during a pit stop for a late dinner at the Kurdistan Azad restaurant in Kani Watman village. He makes a round trip between the cities at least once a week. “A road should not be like this if it goes between two big governorates. It’s really tiring.” It is dangerous, too. Rickety oil tankers and tractor-trailers take sharp curves at high speed and back up traffic when they slow on steep inclines. The cars behind peek out to see if they can seize a risky chance to overtake. The road surface is so broken in key sections that they become chokepoints. Traffic creeps along kicking up dust. At night, the road is an invisible ribbon in the dark with no lighting, median or guardrails. “We are always scared of the fast trucks on such a narrow road and of how the pavement has been damaged. It causes a lot of problems,” said Arazu Barawi, who runs Kurdistan Outdoor, a tourism agency. Yet the Kurdistan Region is hardly undeveloped. Several modern highways already exist and others are currently under construction. It is simply a matter of where they are located and what purpose they serve. The transportation networks within each party’s respective zone are much better than the roads that cross the line of partisan control, especially if they terminate at an international border. The parties take a cut of the customs revenue collected at these crossings, which is a powerful and self-serving motivator to make sure the road is good. For example, the KDP recently built a modern six-lane, divided highway from Erbil to Duhok, another major city within its zone. An extension then leads to the lucrative Ibrahim Khalil border crossing with Turkey. A fourth ring road designed to international standards is currently being built around Erbil city, with luxury villas and apartment complexes popping up alongside. To a lesser degree, the PUK has done the same. The drive from Sulaymaniyah to Penjwen and the Bashmakh border point with Iran is relatively smooth. A new highway to Ranya is under halting construction, but driving north from Sulaymaniyah it eventually turns away from Erbil, with new construction remaining firmly within the PUK zone. These teases of what is possible show the parochial mindset of the ruling parties. “I wish it was two-sided,” Saeed said of the Sulaymaniyah-Erbil road, using the local term for a divided highway or dual carriageway. “We know that highways are four- or even six-sided in other countries, but here it is all one-sided. We wish for a modern highway.” On the first stretch of the drive from Sulaymaniyah to the lakeside resort town of Dukan, drivers have a smooth run on a modern highway. It is by far the easiest section, leaving plenty of opportunity to enjoy the landscape. Shepherds bring out their flocks to nibble on the verge. In spring, clusters of almond trees are riots of pink and white petals. From high above, the massive bulk of Piramagrun Mountain frowns down on Fort Suse, a squat fortress built in 1977 by the Soviet Union for the Iraqi army that now serves as a prison for Islamic State group militants. Travelers encounter the first of five checkpoints on this route just past the town of Tasluja. Each post is staffed by the Asayish, the Kurdistan Region’s internal security service. Asayish units are affiliated either with the KDP or the PUK, depending on the zone. With Kalashnikovs slung over their shoulders, they check IDs, question drivers about their destinations and occasionally search vehicles. “The checkpoints slow us down,” said Barawi. “Because the trucks and lorries have to be stopped and checked, it causes a very long line of cars in frustrating traffic.” Ostensibly, the checkpoints are there to ensure security in a country where that cannot be taken for granted, but their political role is unavoidable. They are not only symbolic of which party is in control of a given area but are also a practical way of enforcing partisan interests. In 2015, the KDP stopped the then-speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament at one of its checkpoints to prevent him from traveling to Erbil and presiding over a session to debate the controversial decision by the leader of the KDP, Masoud Barzani, to extend his term as Kurdistan Region president. Barzani remained in power for another two years. After Dukan, the road narrows to just two lanes and twists its way through rolling farmland framed by flat mountain ridges on either side. Many drivers stop at Kani Watman, which marks the psychological halfway point to Erbil. It is famous for its cluster of restaurants serving Kurdish food. After a big meal, tea flows freely to give a much-needed boost to complete the rest of the trip. It is important to stay alert. Car crashes are common. According to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) General Traffic Police Directorate, at least 445 people were killed and another 7,250 were injured on the region’s roads last year. While a habit of not wearing seatbelts certainly contributes to the death toll, cars and trucks traveling head-on at high speed on two-lane roads are a major factor in the lethality of crashes. “A modern highway would be safer,” said Araz Abudullah, who works at the Kurdistan Azad restaurant. “It would bring more people. This is a strategic road for tourists and a bridge with the rest of Iraq.” The poor quality of the road surface also wears down both drivers and their vehicles. Smaquli is a notorious chokepoint caused when the road has to cross over the top of a small dam. For years, the approach would flood during winter rains. The government neglected the problem, and eventually, an opposition politician known for populist stunts hired an engineering crew and raised the road’s height by several meters. Nevertheless, problems in the area continued. Car-swallowing potholes caused by the constant truck traffic were left to fester. This spring, frustrated residents protested, blocking the route for hours. The PUK, which controls the area, scrambled to respond, and the road is currently undergoing major repairs. In the meantime, however, this vital route is reduced to a gravel surface. The party may be keen to placate residents ahead of tough elections expected next year, but most people are sick of such poor governance. “It’s more than just elections,” said Azad Kamal, sitting in a cloud of dust kicked up by the traffic passing a roadside teahouse in Smaquli. “Even during the civil war, the Baathist regime, and since then, this town has never been served. … Everything always falls on the people.” Shortly after Smaquli, travelers pass into KDP territory. The farms and mountain views are the same, but there are subtle changes. The political iconography on roadside billboards no longer depicts Mam Jalal, the bespectacled former leader of the PUK who died in 2017, but features Barzani, the KDP’s aging chieftain. The rest of the run to Erbil, however, remains a narrow, bumpy road with heavy traffic and periodic checkpoints. After a particularly harrowing stretch on either side of the village of Bakhchay Bchuk where the road snakes through a ridge of hills, the Kurdistan Region’s capital city finally emerges on the plain below, partially hidden under a permanent blanket of dust and pollution. Just like on the way out of Sulaymaniyah, the road here becomes a proper highway and a reminder of what is possible. There are other routes that drivers use to get between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, but each has its own problems. Politics remain the key factor. Divided highways link Kirkuk with both cities, forming two sides of a right triangle where the Smaquli route runs on the hypotenuse. Between 2014 and 2017, Kurdish forces were in full control of Kirkuk and most drivers chose to go through the city because of the better roads. This changed when the Iraqi security forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) took the area from the Peshmerga on Oct. 16, 2017, in the aftermath of the Kurdistan Region’s independence referendum. Since then, some Kurdish travelers believe traveling the Kirkuk route carries extra risk, given the presence of PMF militias. Deadly clashes on Sept. 2 between the city’s different ethnic populations may have reinforced this perception. Foreigners must hold a visa issued by Iraq’s federal government to travel from the Kurdistan Region to Kirkuk — a passport stamp from the KRG is insufficient — making it an inconvenient alternative for international tourists and businesspeople just going between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. Another route runs through the city of Koya, but this road is also not a divided highway, and for years it was full of truck traffic that tore up the blacktop. Protests and complaints from locals finally forced the authorities to ban the heavy vehicles from transiting through the city. With no bypass, truck drivers switched to the Smaquli route and caused the same problems there. KRG Minister of Construction and Housing Dana Abdulkareem Hamasalih, whose office is responsible for building intraprovincial roads, said that the KRG has a plan to build a divided highway between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah via Koya and a tunnel under Haibat Sultan Mountain. He estimated that this would cost around $370 million to complete. “However, the economic crisis created difficulties for continued implementation,” Hamasalih said. Since 2014, when Iraq’s federal government first cut off budget transfers to the KRG in retaliation for Erbil’s decision to start independent oil exports, the Kurdistan Region has endured a prolonged economic decline. The KRG regularly misses salary payments to employees at government ministries, and public services like electricity and water are notoriously bad. Financial pressures have certainly limited what projects the KRG can take on, but modern, divided highways are nevertheless being laid. The minister noted that the KRG has built 56 miles of divided highways since July 2019, when the current cabinet took office. Hamasalih denied there was any political reason that priority seems to be given to roads within partisan zones, rather than those that cross between them. The ministry does “its best to provide services for all parts of the Kurdistan Region,” he said over a messaging app. Out there on the road, however, it is clear whom people blame for the KRG’s failure to build a modern highway between its two biggest cities. Whatever negative role Baghdad plays in the Kurdistan Region’s finances, the KDP and PUK have had ample opportunity to work together and deliver for residents but have consistently failed to do so. “If the parties don’t work together, there will never be a road,” said Herish Hassan, sitting at the Smaquli teahouse. “We are disappointed. … Nothing has been done.” In Kani Watman, Saeed resignedly agreed. “You know how the Kurdish government is,” he said, before hoisting himself back into his bus, switching on the headlights and heading back into the night.  

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As Turkey intensifies war on Kurdish militants in Iraq, civilians are suffering

Reuters By AMINA ISMAIL and LENA MASRI Seventeen-year-old Samir Saado was finishing his cleaning shift at the village medical centre when an airstrike hit the building. "I didn't see anything other than dust and smoke," said Saado, a member of Iraq’s minority Yazidi community. "My leg was stuck under the rubble. I called for help and people were coming but the planes kept striking.” At least four civilians were killed that day, Aug. 17, 2021, local officials said. Among the dead was Saado’s father, who worked as a cook at the centre in Iraq’s northern Sinjar province, about 100 km (62 miles) from the Turkish border. Saado suffered a broken pelvis and a cracked skull. The strike was part of escalating attacks by Turkish aircraft and drones in mainly Kurdish areas of Iraq and Syria, which have since continued, a Reuters data analysis shows. Western firms have supplied critical components for the drones, which Kurdish and Iraqi officials say Turkey is deploying with increasing frequency. Airstrikes have surged since Turkey launched “Operation Claw-Lock” in April last year. The aim, the Turkish Defence Ministry says, is to protect Turkey’s borders and “neutralise terrorism and terrorists at source.” Earlier this month , Turkey unleashed air strikes on militant targets in northern Iraq and Syria after the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) said it was behind a bomb attack near government buildings in Ankara, in which two police officers were injured. Northern Iraq is the base of the PKK, which over decades has carried out many deadly attacks in Turkey and is labelled a terrorist organisation by the United States and European Union. Turkish operations in Syria target the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a militia that Ankara says is a PKK-affiliated terrorist group. The YPG is part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a U.S. ally against Islamic State. Turkey’s Defence Ministry said in a statement to Reuters that all of its operations fall “within the framework of international law, respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all our neighbours.” “In the planning and execution of the operations, only terrorists and their positions, warehouses and shelters are targeted, and the utmost care and sensitivity is shown to prevent harm to civilians and to prevent damage to infrastructure and cultural sites.” Any claims to the contrary “are unfounded, slanderous, and lies,” the statement said. Reuters could not reach the PKK. The Syrian Democratic Forces said Turkish strikes in Syria are unjustified. A YPG spokesperson said its forces “did not fire a single shot in the direction of the Turkish state.” Reuters analysed violent incidents recorded by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a global research organisation that collects reports from media outlets, government reports, non-governmental groups and other sources. This analysis shows that in 2022, Turkey carried out at least 2,044 airstrikes in mostly Kurdish areas of Iraq and Syria, a 53% increase on the previous year and the highest number since ACLED began documenting strikes across the two countries in 2017. The figure is likely a conservative estimate because Reuters’ analysis excluded airstrikes that may have been conducted in battle. ACLED draws information about airstrikes in northern Iraq and Syria from sources including the PKK’s military wing, the Turkish state-owned news agency Anadolu and conflict monitors the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Airwars and Liveuamap...Continue Reading...

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Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) visited Darw Media

A team of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) Loghman Fattahi the U.S. advocacy manager, Doja Daoud MENA correspondent at the Committee to Protect Journalists, and Soran Rashid, Representative of the organization in the Kurdistan Region, visited Darw Media Organization. The meeting discussed the situation of journalists, freedom of expression and freedom of the press in the Kurdistan Region and the challenges facing journalism in the region.  Draw Media team provided graphic, data and investigative reports regarding the statistics of violations have been committed against journalists and the press in the Kurdistan region in the past 15 years.    

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Kurdistan urges swift action to recover billions in lost oil revenues

APIKUR welcomes Iraq-Turkey pipeline readiness but emphasizes need for resolving contractual issues, citing $1 billion monthly revenue loss for Iraqis. The Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) welcomed the recent announcement by the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey at ADIPEC in Abu Dhabi, with respect to the readiness of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline (ITP) and its resumption of operations. APIKUR views this development as a crucial step towards the long-anticipated recommencement of international crude oil exports from the Kurdistan Region. In a statement issued 3 October, APIKUR emphasized the importance of resolving outstanding contractual issues before its member companies can resume oil production for pipeline exports. Myles B. Caggins III, spokesman for APIKUR, expressed concern over the ongoing delays in reopening the Iraq-Turkey pipeline and resolving the contractual entitlements issue. He noted, “The delays in re-opening the Iraq-Turkey pipeline and resolving IOC contractual entitlements are costing Iraqis an estimated $1 billion per month in lost revenues. APIKUR members are keen to work with the Governments of Kurdistan and Iraq to reinstate these revenues and even increase them through maximizing production. We believe this can be done quickly and efficiently, after payment arrangements are agreed and existing contractual arrangements are respected.” According to the production sharing contracts (PSCs) held by IOCs, they have the right to receive their respective shares of crude oil and can independently sell these entitlements. However, the lack of agreement on payment terms has forced APIKUR member companies to seek buyers who can guarantee timely payment, including upfront payments. These PSCs are legally governed by English law, with dispute resolution procedures set out in international arbitration at the London Court of International Arbitration. In August, APIKUR urged both the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to uphold the contractual rights of International Oil Companies (IOCs) and ensure their inclusion in the execution of the budget and forthcoming hydrocarbon legislation. APIKUR emphasized that the implementation of the recently approved Iraqi budget and the proposed oil and gas bill must safeguard IOCs’ entitlement to cost recovery and a share of profits.  

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APIKUR members are currently owed nearly $1 billion

The Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan ('APIKUR') notes that the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of Türkiye has stated that the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline ('ITP') is ready to resume operations. APIKUR welcomes this development, which can be a step towards the long-awaited recommencement of international export of crude oil produced in the Kurdistan Region. APIKUR reiterates that, even if the ITP reopens, the member companies of APIKUR will not be in a position to produce oil for pipeline exports until it is clear how International Oil Companies ('IOCs') will be paid for their contractual entitlements of oil already sold and delivered for export in the past and for future sales of such oil for export. APIKUR members are currently owed nearly $1 billion in overdue and unpaid arrears. IOCs holding production sharing contracts ('PSCs') have the right to, amongst other things, take in kind and separately sell their respective entitlement shares of crude oil. Absent agreement on payments as set out above, our member companies will have to sell their contractual entitlements of crude oil to buyers who can give certainty of payments for oil deliveries, e.g., through upfront payments. The PSCs in question establish contractual rights that are governed by English law with dispute resolution via international arbitration at the London Court of International Arbitration. “The delays in re-opening the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline and resolving IOC contractual entitlements are costing Iraqis an estimated $1 billion per month in lost revenues,” said Myles B. Caggins III, spokesman for APIKUR.“APIKUR members are keen to work with the Governments of Kurdistan and Iraq to reinstate these revenues and even increase them through maximizing production. We believe this can be done quickly and efficiently, after payment arrangements are agreed and existing contractual arrangements are respected.” APIKUR again calls on all parties to urgently engage with each other in a constructive manner to put in place mutually beneficial commercial solutions that will encourage international investment for the benefit of all Iraqis.

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How to Stop Iraqi Kurdistan’s “Bleeding”

Bilal Wahab Federal pressure and disastrous internal missteps have brought the KRG to the brink, raising the need for more active U.S. mediation. In a recent letter to President Biden that was soon reinforced by three U.S. lawmakers, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government expressed his alarm over the region’s survival. Noting that the KRG is “bleeding economically and hemorrhaging politically,” he laid the blame on Baghdad’s “dishonorable campaign” against Erbil. Barzani has a point—federal authorities have indeed been undoing the KRG’s hard-won autonomy in the years since the Islamic State fell and the Kurds launched an unsuccessful independence bid. Most notably, Baghdad has recentralized policymaking in the capital and blocked Kurdish oil exports amid a decade-old dispute over energy management.  Yet Barzani’s narrative does not tell the whole story. The United States has long supported Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy, security, and development, fostering greater stability and pro-American sentiment. At the same time, however, Washington has overlooked the KRG’s vulnerabilities—namely, the internal divisions, corruption, and democratic backsliding that have diminished Erbil’s reliability and brought on the current existential crisis. The United States has a strategic interest in continuing to promote a stable and prosperous KRG, but it cannot do so without addressing the region’s internal problems. A Multipronged Push… After the KRG’s ill-fated independence referendum in 2017, Baghdad dramatically accelerated its efforts to erode the region’s autonomy—partly through military action, with significant help from Iran and Turkey (see below). The Shia political camp behind the current government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani also holds a grudge against the main Kurdish parties for complicating its gradual takeover following the 2021 election. Power has since tipped definitively in Baghdad’s favor, with the Federal Supreme Court (FSC), parliament, and Iran-backed militias siding against the KRG on oil issues and steadily weakening its authority. For instance, officials in Erbil have cited half a dozen FSC cases since 2017 that rolled back the KRG’s constitutional rights. In February 2022, the region’s oil and gas industry was ruled illegal. A year later, Ankara closed its pipeline to northern Iraq after losing to Baghdad in arbitration, halting KRG oil exports that first began flowing in 2014. The KRG has lost $5 billion in revenue since the pipeline closed, along with precious bargaining power in Baghdad. Its oil and gas facilities have also been hit repeatedly by militia rocket attacks. In addition, the FSC and parliament recently derailed a budget deal between Prime Ministers Sudani and Barzani, citing the KRG’s lack of financial transparency. As a result, Erbil has been unable to pay public salaries for three months—a stark contrast to its aspirations for independence just a few years back. Some politicians in Baghdad are also seeking to shut down the region’s diplomatic outposts in up to fourteen countries. On top of militia violence, the KRG is also under attack from its neighbors Turkey and Iran, who have intensified their drone and missile strikes against armed Kurdish opposition groups. When Turkish officials visited Iraq last month, they did not pledge to end these attacks or resolve the oil dispute; instead, they pressured the KRG to cooperate against Ankara’s domestic nemesis, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Iran has issued a similar warning: disarm local Iranian Kurdish groups that oppose the regime in Tehran or face broader military intervention. Thus cornered, the KRG has let Iraqi border guards take over from the Peshmerga—a decision that had the side effect of surrendering half the region’s customs revenue to the federal government. ...Against a House Divided Rather than uniting to withstand Baghdad’s escalating encroachment, the two main Kurdish parties, led by the Barzani and Talabani families, have been locked in a bitter struggle for power and resources, using politics in Baghdad, Ankara, and Tehran to undermine each other. This has made the KRG less secure and less capable of protecting its rights, essentially squandering Erbil’s democratic credentials among its people and U.S. officials. The two parties are now in a state of cold war, behaving as foes rather than coalition partners. Internally, they failed to hold KRG elections in October 2022 as scheduled, opting to extend their term instead—a move that the FSC rejected as illegal. Without a valid electoral commission, the KRG has forfeited its ability to organize local polls in preparation for the new target date of February 2024, ceding that power to Baghdad.  On the economic front, the KRG has neglected investment opportunities and wasted its oil money on public jobs and pensions, mostly for ruling party loyalists. The result is a huge and costly bureaucracy—in a region of 5.5 million people, the KRG has an astounding 1.4 million employees and pensioners on its rolls at a cost of $750 million per month. Notwithstanding the need for austerity measures on that front, the KRG cannot pay these individuals in the immediate term without oil revenue and must fall back on Baghdad’s national budget. As such, the KRG’s dream of independence is now a fight for survival, and the angry public has reacted with protests. Erbil has cracked down on this dissent, and some Kurdish parliamentarians have called for expelling the U.S. consul-general for criticizing the KRG’s record on human rights. Washington’s Role In 2016, Congress mandated that the Pentagon dispense $20 million per month for Peshmerga salaries to help stave off instability and encourage security reform. In return, Erbil promised to bring the mostly partisan force back under unified command and away from the two ruling parties. Seven years later, however, only a third of its estimated 160,000 fighters report to the KRG’s Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, a body that has been without a minister for a year due to continued political infighting. Washington cannot afford to let the KRG or the rest of Iraq slide into chaos or conflict. As elections approach, the risk of ethnic violence looms—the recent deadly clashes in Kirkuk are a warning shot in that regard. The threat of an Islamic State comeback is also real if coalition and Iraqi forces ease pressure on the group, as U.S. officials readily acknowledge. Washington therefore needs to reengage with the Kurdish and Iraqi governments, not as a passive advisor but as an active mediator and guarantor. In particular, it should help Kurdish factions reunite, reassert their voice in Baghdad, and regain their public’s confidence. This includes using lessons learned from the end of the Kurdish civil war in 1998 to mediate between the Kurdish parties today. Earlier this month, Prime Minister Barzani and Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani paid a joint visit to Baghdad and secured a loan for KRG salaries; Washington should take follow-on steps that support such collective efforts. Finally, Prime Minister Sudani’s expected White House meeting with President Biden needs to include high-level KRG representation. This would signal that the United States recognizes the Kurds as essential partners in federal Iraq’s future. More broadly, by helping the Kurds help themselves, Washington can put a floor on the KRG’s losses and secure the region’s long-term interests in a stable, democratic Iraq. 

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Iran Is Exploiting Divisions and U.S. Inaction in Iraqi Kurdistan

Foreign Policy In a private letter delivered to the White House earlier this month, the prime minister of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq warned that Kurdistan—and Iraq’s post-2003 federal system—faces imminent collapse unless the United States intervenes. Masrour Barzani sent his extraordinary warning amid mounting political and economic challenges for the autonomous region and an increasingly belligerent government in Baghdad. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is important to U.S. interests in several ways. Its Peshmerga forces are key partners in the fight against the Islamic State and other extremist groups and crucial to the West’s counterterrorism efforts in both Iraq and Syria. The region has historically constituted a buffer against tumult and turmoil in the rest of Iraq, providing a safe haven for nearly 1 million internally displaced people and refugees, while also containing the ascension of militant Iran-backed militia groups responsible for conducting numerous attacks on Western forces. However, with Washington now preoccupied by its intensifying rivalry with China and the war in Ukraine, little attention is being paid to Kurdistan. Sensing America’s focus is elsewhere, the KRG’s rivals, including militia groups designated as terrorists by the United States, have started circling. Kurdistan’s collapse would spell upheaval and chaos with implications stretching well beyond Iraq. The KRG has endured a string of troubles in recent years. Soon after Barzani took office in 2019, his cabinet was confronted with a pandemic, a military escalation between the United States and Iran and its affiliated militias, and an economic crisis after oil revenues took a huge hit when crude prices plummeted in 2020. Kurdistan has also been undermined by the rivalry between the two largest political parties, Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Their division weakened the Kurds’ bargaining power in Baghdad during negotiations over forming an Iraqi government after the 2021 parliamentary elections. Iran and its allies, including the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF)—the 200,000-strong  umbrella militia organization—exploited Kurdish discord by allying with the PUK to expand their influence over the Iraqi state. Iran-backed groups have also consolidated their control over the Iraqi judiciary, paving the way for a February 2022 ruling that Kurdish oil exports through Turkey were illegal. This influenced an international arbitration decision a year later that came to the same conclusion. Since then, Kurdish oil exports have stopped, crippling the region’s economy and impacting global energy markets—a win for the PMF and its hopes of neutering Kurdistan’s economic independence. Earlier this month, Iran-aligned groups massacred Kurdish protesters in the disputed oil-rich city of Kirkuk, which Kurdish forces had withdrawn from in 2017 after the PMF mobilized its militias with federal government backing. As part of an agreement between Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and Barzani, the KDP was to return to a base in the city, but the PMF moved to torpedo this by blocking a highway connecting Kirkuk to Erbil and other Kurdish provinces in August. The disruption to the lives of people who rely on the highway daily prompted the protests. Following the massacre, the Federal Supreme Court in Baghdad, which is aligned with the PMF, suspended the order for the KDP’s return. The divisions between the KDP and PUK have deeply undermined the KRG. Indeed, fraternal rivalry has been the Kurds’ Achilles’ heel for decades. Between 1994 and 1998, the two parties fought a civil war for control of the region, which was finally resolved through U.S. mediation. Their 1998 peace settlement paved the way for a strategic agreement that became the basis for Kurdistan’s golden era after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which gifted the Kurds outsized influence over the Iraqi state, expanded their autonomy, and precipitated an unprecedented economic boom. While today’s rivalry represents a clash of personalities within a new generation of Kurdish leaders, it also reflects the two parties’ respective trajectories since 2003. The KDP owes much of its power to its long-standing organizational discipline, which has delivered it electoral success and allowed it to control the prime minister’s office since 2012. The PUK, on the other hand, has been factionalized almost since its inception in the 1970s. In 2021, Bafel Talabani launched a coup to oust his cousin Lahur as co-chair of the party and head of its counterterrorism and intelligence forces. These violent dynamics have degraded the PUK’s ability to present a serious alternative to the KDP. Instead, it has opted for spoiler tactics, working with Iran-aligned groups in Baghdad to undermine its rival politically and economically. The PUK leadership regularly courts Iran-aligned individuals and factions sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department, sometimes against the backdrop of missile and drone attacks on Kurdistan by these groups. This raises serious questions for Washington and its relationship with the party, but also for the PUK itself. Looking to Iran and Baghdad may help the PUK reassert itself locally, but undermining Kurdistan as a whole to weaken the KDP is dangerously myopic since it relies on the good faith of the PMF, and it is potentially existential as it risks gambling the autonomy of Kurdistan in the long term. Kurdish woes and Iranian encroachment into Kurdistan have far-reaching implications for U.S. interests. The KRG is a vital ally in the campaign to secure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State. Intra-Kurdish divisions, Iran’s attempts to subjugate the Iraqi state, and Kurdistan’s economic turmoil all undermine the U.S. campaign against the Islamic State and empower Iranian-backed militant groups designated by Washington as terrorists. The U.S. base in Erbil province is one of Washington’s most important military bases and listening posts in the Middle East, serving as a special operations hub and a staging site for operations in both Iraq and Syria. The very presence of this base requires a political order that is conducive to maintaining the U.S.-KRG partnership, something Iran is hoping to weaken and, eventually, demolish by instrumentalizing the PUK. Iran has proved willing to play the long game to supplant the United States in Kurdistan, as it has done in Baghdad over the past two decades. Washington must, therefore, step in to pressure the PUK into ending its collusion with Tehran. The PUK and its leadership risk breaching U.S. sanctions that are designed to inhibit the capabilities of the designated Iran-aligned groups and officials the PUK partners with. These sanctions could underscore an effort by Washington to establish red lines for the PUK, both to contain Iran’s encroachment and to protect the credibility of its sanctions infrastructure. Washington must also discourage the PUK from threatening to return Kurdistan to the dual administrative structure of the 1990s, which would effectively dissolve the autonomy of Kurdistan and its hard-won rights under the 2005 Iraqi constitution. This system saw the two ruling parties govern their stronghold provinces as two separate administrations and empowered Iraq’s neighbors, while undermining U.S. strategic interests in Iraq and the region. Regional actors such as Turkey can also be brought into play. Ankara has escalated its drone attacks on the fighters and affiliates of the Turkish-Kurdish rebel group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who have found refuge in Sulaymaniyah, the PUK’s stronghold province. That has destabilized the province and added to the party’s woes, despite the PUK’s efforts to discourage further strikes. The PUK cannot force the PKK to withdraw, since this would trigger a violent conflict, but it can ill afford further Turkish attacks. However, it could strike a bargain with Ankara premised on a commitment to end its collusion with the PMF, which has PKK affiliates within its ranks. This would ensure that the PUK no longer directly or indirectly enables the PKK. It diminishes Iran’s influence, alleviates Turkish apprehensions, and reduces the geopolitical tensions that result from Turkish incursions. Moreover, Washington has failed to resist or condemn Baghdad’s punitive measures against the KRG’s economy, which have been engineered by Iran-aligned groups through the subjugation of the judiciary in Baghdad. The suspension of Kurdistan’s oil exports has also stopped 500,000 barrels per day of Kurdish oil from reaching global markets: some 10 percent of Iraq’s total exports, or 0.5 percent of global production. This has reverberations well beyond the region; Europe has relied increasingly on Kurdish oil since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. has so far been a bystander to both the intra-Kurdish escalation and Iran’s encroachment. Washington may believe that these problems are internal Kurdish matters, but this is a mistake. The ascension of the PMF and, therefore, its ability to exploit Kurdish discord can be directly tied to the legacy of U.S. engagement in Iraq over the past two decades, including Washington’s acquiescence to the group’s takeover of Kirkuk in 2017. The KRG has proved resilient, but this has its limits. A full collapse of the region’s economy would ultimately force it to capitulate to Iran. In practice, this means giving Iran a greater say over the contours of the KRG’s institutions, its armed forces, borders, and, most importantly, the future of the U.S. base in Erbil. Preventing this would require the United States to mediate intra-Kurdish tensions to unify Kurdish ranks in Baghdad to protect the KRG’s autonomy and restore its budgetary entitlements and its right to electorally contest disputed territories such as Kirkuk without being subjected to the coercive tactics of the PMF—while maintaining a healthy democratic rivalry at home. If Washington is serious about safeguarding its interests, it could start by convincing the PUK that its best hope of reversing its decline is by addressing its internal crisis, and not by turning to Iran—a self-defeating exercise. The PUK will struggle to match the KDP’s political supremacy: At best, it can hope to slow its rival’s ascension. At worst, its collusion with Iran gambles the fates of both the party and Sulaymaniyah. Secondly, the U.S. could focus its mediation on Kurdistan’s gas reserves, potentially addressing global shortages in the long term while propping up the KRG’s economy. The KDP has the political and constitutional legitimacy to move the sector forward and attract investors—but gas reserves are located primarily in PUK-controlled areas. The U.S. could encourage dialogue over developing these gas fields and securing Kurdistan’s position in what the International Energy Agency has described as a “golden age” of natural gas. It is precisely here—at home, and not in Baghdad or Tehran—where the PUK, with U.S. support, can push for its economic stake through a comprehensive arrangement with the KDP that includes a revenue-sharing agreement. Such a transactional engagement could be a stepping stone toward a wider settlement. The PUK blames the KDP for hoarding revenues and the fact that Sulaymaniyah has lagged behind other provinces, but that argument is weakened when Sulaymaniyah’s degradation is a reflection of the degradation of the PUK. The correlation is not coincidental. By continuing with its current path, the PUK risks detaching Sulaymaniyah’s 700,000 inhabitants from the economic transformation being led by Barzani, which will only add to the frustration of its supporters. That reform agenda could rescue Kurdistan from dependence on oil by diversifying the economy, improving efficiency, and promoting good governance. The alternative for the United States—standing by and watching the collapse of the KRG—would be a disaster for Iraq’s Kurds and for U.S. interests in the region. The KRG’s fate will play an important role in determining the contours of the wider Middle East.  

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Six months have passed since the suspension of the Kurdistan Region's oil

Draw Media The International Chamber of Commerce in Paris issued a 277-page resolution on February 13, 2023 and on March 25, 2023 officially suspended oil exports from the Kurdistan Region. According to the decision of the International Arbitration Chamber in Paris, the Kurdistan Regional Government is a constitutional and legal government within Iraq, but can not transport oil through pipelines, because the Kurdistan Region is not part of the IPT agreement, (the agreement was signed between Turkey and Iraq in 1973 on the oil pipeline). Six months have passed since the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi government reached an agreement, but oil exports have not yet resumed. Suspension of oil and financial losses Here we highlight the financial losses caused by the suspension of oil in the region during (25/3/2023 – 25/9/2023). in a way; 🔹 From (25/3/2023 – 25/9/2023) that is (6) months that oil exports have been suspended. 🔹 Based on Deloitte data before the suspension of oil exports, "an average of more than 12 million 461 thousand barrels of oil have been exported monthly." 🔹 That is, within (6) months, the oil exports would have reached more than (74 million 766 thousand) barrels of oil. 🔹 The average price of Brent oil during (25/3/2023 – 25/9/2023) was (82 dollars and 38 cents). 🔹 If the region had sold its oil at a discount of $15, as happened in the second and third quarters of 2022 then; 🔹 The average price of oil sold in the Kurdistan Region would have been (67 dollars and 38 cents). 🔹 The total value of oil exports was (5 billion 51 million 146 thousand) dollars. • If (54%) of the revenue would go to the expenditure of the oil process, it would be equivalent to (2 billion 727 million 619 thousand) dollars. • Accordingly, the amount of (2 billion 323 million 527 thousand) dollars at a rate of (46%) would be returned to the general treasury of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

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United states CG met with several independent media outlets

United states Consul General Mark Stroh met with journalists from several independent media outlets including Draw Media to learn about their work, the media landscape, and challenges faced by independent media. The United states Consul General commended the journalists on their ongoing efforts to provide impartial coverage of the politics, economy and society of the region. We continue to be concerned about recent backsliding on press freedom, including arbitrary detention, warrantless device searches, and lack of implementation of the IKR Press Law and Access to Information act.

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August production surges as KRG fields partially revive

Iraq Oil Report  Fields in Kurdistan are raising production and selling into the local market, as output increases despite the ongoing northern pipeline closure. Iraq’s crude oil production rose sharply in August as fields controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) increased output, reaching just under half of their total combined capacity. Nationwide output averaged 4.71 million bpd, up from 4.56 million bpd in July, according to Iraq Oil Report calculations based on field-by-field data. The gains were achieved despite the continued shutdown of the northern export pipeline, which has prevented the KRG from exporting its crude to world markets since late March.

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In letter to Biden, Barzani warns of Iraqi Kurdistan's collapse, urges mediation

al-monitor - Amberin Zaman KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani's letter to Biden is aimed at jolting the administration into action as tensions rise between Erbil and Baghdad. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has appealed to President Joe Biden to intervene in a deepening crisis with the central government in Baghdad, airing fears that the Kurdistan Region might even collapse as an entity if the crisis is left unchecked, Al-Monitor has learned. In a letter dated Sept. 3 that was addressed to Biden and delivered to the White House last Sunday, Barzani wrote, “I write to you now at another critical juncture in our history, one that I fear we may have difficulty overcoming. …[W]e are bleeding economically and hemorrhaging politically. For the first time in my tenure as prime minister, I hold grave concerns that this dishonorable campaign against us may cause the collapse of … the very model of a Federal Iraq that the United States sponsored in 2003 and purported to stand by since.” “We believe that your administration retains significant leverage with Baghdad,” Barzani said of Washington’s ability to diffuse the crisis. The cri de coeur comes amid escalating tensions between Erbil and Baghdad over budgetary allocations, oil sales and territories that both sides claim for their own. Barzani reiterated his calls for further US engagement to help resolve the disputes in a meeting on Monday in Erbil with US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski. With Washington’s attention focused on China and the conflict in Ukraine, Barzani’s letter is meant to jolt the administration into action before a descent into violence. That very specter loomed in the contested oil-rich province of Kirkuk last week when Kurds and Arabs allegedly bused in by Iran-backed Shiite militia groups clashed over a court decision preventing Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP) from reclaiming its headquarters in the regional capital. Four Kurds died in the protests that were eventually quelled by federal forces deployed to the city. “We are asking where the hell is the United States,” said a Kurdish official speaking not for attribution to Al-Monitor. The State Department declined to comment on the letter. A White House official speaking on background said, “We do not comment on private diplomatic engagements.” The White House had not responded to Barzani’s letter as of the time of publication of this article. Broken promises, broken trust Since US forces birthed the creation of a putatively democratic Iraq with the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the sides have tussled over what share of Iraq’s budget should go to the Kurds, with successive governments in Baghdad typically failing to hand over the amount of money agreed to at any given time. This, in turn, has left the KRG struggling to pay public sector employees who are due $625 million every month. In recent years, the refusal has stemmed from Baghdad’s view that the Iraqi Kurds have since 2014 been “illegally” selling Iraqi oil produced in the Kurdistan Region via Turkey without the central government’s consent. Iraq took the matter to an international court of arbitration, and Turkey was slapped with a $1.5 billion fine earlier this year when the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce ruled in Baghdad’s favor. In response, Turkey halted the flow of some 400,000 barrels per day of Kurdish crude and a further 75,000 barrels per day of Iraqi crude from the Kirkuk fields. Ankara is demanding that Baghdad waive the fine and drop another arbitration case pending against it in order to resume exports from the Turkish port of Ceyhan, leaving the Kurds deprived of at least $5 billion in revenue since exports ceased. The KRG has since agreed with Barzani’s words to make “extraordinary concessions in the negotiations with Baghdad in the hope of securing our future.” However, Barzani told Biden, “I regret to inform you that they have done the opposite. Our goodwill in agreeing to market our oil through the federal government in return for a just share of the federal budget has been blatantly forsaken.” The figure for oil revenues promised to the Kurdistan Region following talks in April between Barzani and Baghdad was $900 million per month. Yet the federal government has parted with far less, even as the Kurds have sent Baghdad the 85,000 barrels of crude every month pledged under that deal without receiving a penny for it, Kurdish officials say. On Sept. 2, federal authorities informed the KRG they would be willing to disburse $380 million per month in loans. Iraqi Kurdish officials have long aired frustration at what they say is the United States’ growing indifference to their plight, with letters going unanswered and senior US officials no longer engaging with the same frequency as they did under the previous administration when, for instance, the energy secretary would have monthly telephone calls with Barzani. “The American mantra is ‘we are not an occupying force anymore,’” the official briefing Al-Monitor said. “The basis of our engagement in the post-2003 order was entirely predicated on the agreement that the United States would act as the guarantor of the federal model. And up until [the full US withdrawal in] 2011, when that line was tested, the Americans would step in. The Americans were the guarantors, the honest brokers.” The official explained, “We are asking the United States to take a principled position on the agreement we had at the beginning [in 2005] on three key issues: oil, the budget and territory." “Shotgun wedding, amicable divorce” Ken Pollack, a former CIA intelligence analyst and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute who has written extensively on Iraq, agrees that the status quo is unsustainable and could lead to renewed civil conflict in Iraq. A weaker Iraq means a stronger Iran, which goes against US interests. But Washington’s interest in the country has taken a back seat to other pressing files. “Is Iraq a bigger priority for the United States than, say, Saudi-Israeli rapprochement? It’s hard to say that it is,” Pollack told Al-Monitor. Yet while the Kurds “get it intellectually,” Pollack contended, “emotionally they don’t.” They very much want to believe that the United States is still fully committed. Preserving that impression at the very least will cause Baghdad, Iran and the Kurds’ other large meddlesome neighbor, Turkey, to back off. Either way, Pollack concluded that the best solution for Iraq and the Kurds was an amicable divorce. “It was a shotgun wedding to begin with,” Pollack said. An administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity to Al-Monitor noted that the KDP and its chief rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), needed to settle their own disputes “before pointing fingers at us.” The two parties went to war in the early 1990s, and the distrust runs so deep that they have yet to unify their respective peshmerga forces under a single command. Rampant corruption — with much of Kurdistan’s wealth concentrated in the hands of the Barzanis and the Talabani family that runs the PUK — is feeding popular disaffection and dampening dreams of independence. At the same time, mounting repression of journalists has dented the Kurdistan Region’s claims that it is “the other” and hence better Iraq. An Iranian hand Many see Iran’s hand in the unfolding row between the KRG and Baghdad. With a large restive Kurdish minority of its own, Iran sees neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan and its pro-American leadership as a threat. Tehran’s attempts to weaken the KRG through its Iraqi Shiite allies have gained vigor since 2017 when the KRG held a referendum on independence that was fiercely opposed by Ankara, Baghdad and Washington. The ensuing volatility allowed federal troops to retake control of Kirkuk and other disputed territories the Kurds seized as Iraqi forces fled the Islamic State onslaught in 2014. The central government has since been doggedly seeking to tighten its grip. Iran is now threatening to attack the Kurdistan Region once again should it fail to disarm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in Kurdish territory by Sept. 19. The date coincides with the first anniversary of the mass protests that rocked Iran following the death in police custody of Iranian Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini. Iran blames the Iranian Kurdish opposition parties and their alleged Western backers — namely America and Israel — for the demonstrations, although the parties themselves admit they are weak and have little if any impact inside the Islamic Republic. James F. Jeffrey, a former US ambassador to Iraq who chairs the Wilson Center’s Middle East program, contended that Iran was clearly using an “all elements of power” strategy to assume effective control of Iraq, following “the Lebanon model” whereby it relies on Shiite militias and their political arms that are loyal to itself rather than Baghdad. The Trump administration, Jeffrey argued, “pushed back on this Iranian strategy by inventorying all the ways the United States and more generally the West and its institutions were important to Iraq and then threatened to start sending them down if the Iraqi government didn’t take specific steps we detailed to push back on specific Iranian or militia tentacles inside government structures.” The Biden administration, by contrast, “doesn’t seem to be doing anything in this regard,” likely because it doesn’t want to provoke Iran as it seeks to revive the nuclear deal. Amos Hochstein, special presidential coordinator for Global Infrastructure and Energy Security, for example, has not been to Iraqi Kurdistan since January, Jeffrey recalled. “This is the most current and most dramatic result of the US maintaining its hands-off approach.” “Behind all the specifics, it’s Iran dictating Iraqi government positions to ensure no deal will be realized that would get oil flowing again and that keeps the KRG afloat — exactly what Iran wants to ruin,” Jeffrey added. Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/09/letter-biden-barzani-warns-iraqi-kurdistans-collapse-urges-mediation#ixzz8D7uKKqRc  

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Opinion of Iraqi Arab Citizens About the Kurdistan Region and its Government

Draw Media Organization Department of Draw Survey Report title: Opinion of Iraqi Arab Citizens About the Kurdistan Region and its Government Relations between Baghdad and Erbil on the issues of public budget, salaries, and oil have constantly seen ups and downs. What effects have these ongoing political conflicts and challenges had on the people from both regions? To gain insights into the perspectives of Iraqi Arab citizens concerning topics such as oil, corruption, independence, and interregional relations, Draw Media Organization's Survey Department conducted a comprehensive survey. A total of 910 Arab citizens from 15 different provinces in Iraq participated in this survey, which was overseen by Assistant Professor Dr Niaz Najmalddin, a faculty member at University of Sulaimani. The survey was conducted between August 24th and September 4th, 2023, using an electronic platform. Conclusion: Here are the key findings from the survey: •    Almost 46% of respondents believe that it is the responsibility of the Iraqi government to provide salaries for employees of the Kurdistan Regional Government. •    About 81% of participants hold the view that the Kurdistan Region does not possess the right to extract and sell oil. •    The majority of participants, precisely 56%, hold the view that there is a significant degree of corruption within both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi government. This perspective suggests that, from the standpoint of Iraqi Arab citizens, both governments are perceived as being tainted by corruption. •    A significant majority, amounting to 61%, believe that the Kurdistan Regional Government has been more successful in delivering services to its citizens compared to the Iraqi government. •    Only a smaller proportion, 19%, consider the idea of the Kurdistan Region pursuing secession as normal. In contrast, almost 38% of respondents favor the dissolution of the Kurdistan Region. •    Regarding the transfer of the Kurdistan Region's governance model to Iraq, which has been stress on by some officials several times, 45% are in favor, while 55% are opposed to it. •    Additionally, a segment of the survey focused on the perspective of Arab respondents regarding tourism in the Kurdistan Region. Nearly 47% of those surveyed indicated a keen interest in visiting Sulaimani, while 33% expressed a desire to explore Erbil province. •    Also, 44% of respondents express a desire to live in the Kurdistan Region. •    Finally, a notable 57% of those who have visited the region express dissatisfaction with the checkpoints and security procedures in place.   Opinion of Iraqi Arab Citizens About the Kurdistan Region and its Government  

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Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government seeks int'l support to secure budgetary rights from Baghdad

The Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) called on the international community Wednesday to support the region in “asserting its constitutional rights, ensuring progress in payment from the federal budget.” Civil servants in the region have not received their salaries for the past two months due to the federal government's failure to allocate the KRG's share of the budget, according to a statement released after a Cabinet meeting of the KRG. The statement underscored that the Erbil administration has diligently fulfilled all of its obligations toward the Baghdad administration. For the year 2023, the KRG's allocated budget stands at roughly 16.4 trillion Iraqi dinars ($12.5 billion). According to the budgetary arrangement, 1.37 trillion dinars ($1.04 billion) should have been disbursed monthly to the KRG. However, the Iraqi government on Sept. 3 decided to allocate only 500 billion dinars ($382 million) per month, while no funds were allocated for salaries in July and August. The KRG called on the Iraqi government to reconsider its decision and stressed the urgent need for 906 billion dinars ($692 million) to cover the salaries of civil servants. The KRG also strongly condemned the violence perpetrated against Kurdish citizens in Kirkuk and urged the Iraqi government to swiftly bring the perpetrators to justice. Protests erupted in Kirkuk on Monday following the deaths of four demonstrators and injuries to 15 others over the weekend. The protests initially began in late August, triggered by a government decision to transfer control of the Kirkuk Operations Command headquarters to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP argued that the building had previously been under their control and should be returned to the party. Peshmerga forces affiliated with the KRG had taken over bases abandoned by the Iraqi army in Kirkuk after the emergence of the Daesh/ISIS terrorist group in 2014. However, in 2017, Iraqi government forces reasserted control over Kirkuk, ending the Peshmerga presence in the city.

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Iraq-Turkey oil flows not expected to resume before October

Reuters Iraqi oil flows to Turkey are not expected to resume before October, when Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan will likely visit Baghdad, sources said, after the trip originally scheduled for August was postponed. Turkey halted Iraqi northern oil export flows on March 25 after an arbitration ruling by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ordered Ankara to pay Baghdad damages of $1.5 billion for unauthorised exports by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) between 2014 and 2018. In April, Iraq petitioned a U.S. federal court to enforce the ICC arbitration award. A lack of progress on resolving this litigation was one of the reasons behind the postponement of Erdogan’s August visit, the sources said. Erdogan still intends to visit Baghdad and “wants an agreement to be signed”, but “so far the concrete steps expected by Iraq have not yet been taken”, resulting in slow progress, a senior Turkish official said. One of the steps Ankara is seeking is a halt to the U.S. litigation and as a result, Erdogan’s visit is scheduled for October, the source added. “Until now we have not received a definite timeline from Ankara on when the Turkish president is expected in Baghdad,” another source, an Iraqi foreign ministry official, said. “It could be the end of this month, or more likely in October, depending on the successful development of talks on energy issues which require a longer than expected time due to multiple thorny issues.” Energy officials in Baghdad and Ankara are “having complicated discussions”, with the resumption of flows “the most difficult question”, an Iraqi oil official with knowledge of the talks said, adding it was “not likely” flows would restart this month. Turkey has also sought a compromise to reduce the damages to be paid to Iraq under the ICC arbitration, two Iraqi oil officials close the talks said. Iraqi sources have previously said Turkey wants Iraq to drop a second arbitration case on exports covering the period from 2018 onwards. Turkey’s energy ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The KRG has lost roughly $4 billion since oil flows to Turkey’s Ceyhan Port through a pipeline were halted, two sources familiar with the matter said. (Reporting by Ahmed Rasheed in Baghdad; Additional reporting by Can Sezer and Jonathan Spicer in Istanbul; Writing by Yousef Saba in Dubai; Editing by Jan Harvey)  

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Iraqi Kurds protest unpaid salaries from Baghdad

 Thousands of people carrying flags of Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrated on Tuesday in the autonomous region over unpaid civil service salaries which they blamed on Baghdad, an AFP correspondent reported. The protest occurred in a region where activists usually accuse local Kurdistan authorities of repressing any sign of dissent. It came in the context of simmering tensions after protests turned violent and led to the deaths of four people on Saturday in the multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk, whose control has historically been disputed between Iraqi Kurdistan and federal authorities in Baghdad. "Kurdistan will not back down in the face of the Iraqi authorities' hostile policies," one banner said at the demonstration in Dohuk, the third-biggest city in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. "Solidarity with our people in Kirkuk," said another placard. An administrator in a hospital, Massoud Mohamed, said he had not received a salary in two months. "We must get our rights," the 45-year-old said. "They want to weaken our region." Iraqi Kurdistan has long accused Baghdad of not sending the necessary funds to pay civil servants. Previously the region, thanks to its oil exports, had independent funding that partially covered salaries. Since the end of March it has been deprived of this resource because of a dispute with Baghdad and Turkey, through which oil was exported. In principle, Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad later agreed that sales of Kurdish oil would pass through the federal government. In exchange for this, 12.6 percent of the federal budget is allocated to Iraqi Kurdistan. On Sunday, Baghdad unblocked a package of 500 billion dinars (about $380 million) for the region's salaries, but practically double that would be needed each month, according to the government of Iraqi Kurdistan. The violence in Kirkuk has added to tensions. Arab and Turkmen demonstrators had staged a sit-in near the headquarters of the Iraqi security forces in Kirkuk province on August 28, after media reports that Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani had ordered the site to be handed over to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which used to occupy it. In response, Kurdish protesters tried to reach the headquarters on Saturday, and the situation degenerated. Four Kurds were killed.  

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