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Iraq's oil ministry says oil exports from Kurdistan region through Turkish pipeline set to resume

Iraq's oil ministry said in a statement on Saturday that all procedures had been completed to allow the resumption of exports through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline. Iraq's oil minister said on Monday that oil exports from the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region will resume next week, resolving a near two-year dispute that has disrupted crude flows as ties between Baghdad and Erbil improve. US President Donald Trump's administration is putting pressure on Iraq to allow Kurdish oil exports to restart or face sanctions alongside Iran, sources have told news agency Reuters. An Iraqi official later denied pressure or the threat of sanctions. The federal government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held technical talks following the oil minister's statements earlier this week to iron out details necessary for the resumption of exports, such as a payment mechanism acceptable to oil companies. The Iraqi oil minister's announcement comes after the Iraqi parliament approved on February 2 a budget amendment that set a rate of $16 per barrel for oil transport and production costs in Kurdistan. The amendment also requires the KRG transfer its oil output to the state-run State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) The oil ministry in its Saturday statement asked the KRG to start delivering crude to SOMO in order for exports to resume.

BP’s Return to Kirkuk

Yerevan Saeed On January 15 in London, the Iraqi government and British Petroleum signed a long-awaited comprehensive energy agreement aimed at developing the northern oil fields of Kirkuk, which are estimated to contain proven reserves exceeding 9 billion barrels of oil. The deal marked a historic return for BP to Kirkuk, the oil-rich province where in 1927 the company, then the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, made its first oil discovery. The discovery not only influenced Iraq’s political history and economic development, but it has also exacerbated the conflict between the Kurds and successive Iraqi governments over Kirkuk. This BP deal threatens to aggravate a century-old source of contention between Baghdad and Erbil. The final technical and commercial details of the BP deal have yet to be disclosed, though reports suggest that it may be a $25 billion investment, making it the second-biggest energy investment after TotalEnergies’s $27 billion megadeal signed in 2023. The agreement includes the development of Kirkuk’s Baba and Avana Domes as well as three adjacent fields: Bai Hassan, Jambur, and Khabbaz. The rehabilitation of existing facilities, alongside the construction of new infrastructure, such as gas expansion projects and drilling to stabilize production and reverse decline in the Kirkuk fields, is also part of the deal. Although the 2018 letter of intent between the Iraqi Oil Ministry and BP included expanding production at the Khurmala Dome, controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government and operated by the KAR Group since 2007, the status of the oil field in the deal remains unclear. Located about 22 miles southwest of Erbil, the Khurmala Dome produces about 150,000 barrels per day making it a vital revenue source for the KRG’s struggling economy amid budget cuts from Baghdad. If BP’s new deal with Baghdad includes Khurmala, the company risks becoming embroiled in Iraq’s volatile dispute over resource control. Such a move could exacerbate tensions between the KRG and the federal government. The BP project aims to stabilize and boost production at these strategically important oil fields. It will increase oil production from the current 300,000 b/d to 750,000 b/d, with a longer-term target of reaching 1 million b/d from Kirkuk fields. Such a boost in revenue streams will be important to support Iraq’s bloated public sector and fund key development initiatives. Additionally, the deal outlines plans to construct power plants that will generate electricity by utilizing associated gas from the oil fields to meet local energy needs. This electricity could lessen dependence on gas imports from Iran in the future and help Iraq to reach a key environmental goal: the elimination of gas flaring by 2028. On the surface, this agreement appears to be a major victory for Iraq, offering necessary cash for its struggling economy. However, the deal also risks exacerbating the long-standing conflict between the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil and the central Iraqi government in Baghdad, especially if the deal is implemented without consultation with Erbil. Kirkuk has always been a flashpoint for ethnic and political conflict, with both the Kurds and Iraq’s central government asserting claims to its sovereignty and resources. Prior to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani’s trip to London, his office had notified the KRG about the impending signing of the Kirkuk deal with BP. However, at the same time, Baghdad advised BP to engage in talks with the KRG only after the deal has been finalized. Given Kirkuk’s legal status and the Kurdish majority in the province, the KRG asserted its right to have a significant say in any major long-term energy agreements concerning the province. The KRG’s demand is clear: a seat at the table with BP and the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. The Kurdish population is apprehensive about energy deals in Kirkuk, particularly with BP, because of the experience of the discovery of oil by BP’s forebearer in newly British-founded Iraq. The extraction and commercialization of oil from Kirkuk in 1934 did not just stifle the hope of Kurdish autonomy, it laid the foundation for a century of oppression. The revenue generated by this oil wealth empowered successive Iraqi governments to systematically suppress the Kurdish population, using the resources to fuel a war on the Kurds. What began as a geopolitical and economic calculation by the British and the Anglo-Persian Petroleum Company reverberated through generations, trapping the Kurds in a cycle of marginalization and conflict. The new BP deal also repeats a dangerous precedent: a major foreign company entering the heart of a disputed province and aligning with one side engaged in a long-standing political and legal conflict. The interests of foreign corporations, particularly in resource-rich regions, have often had long-term ramifications that far exceeded the immediate economic benefits as has been the case in Aceh in Indonesia and the Biafra region in Nigeria, for example. BP’s decision to sign the deal without securing the consent of the KRG could deepen the divide between the central government and the Kurds, igniting tensions that could contribute to a fresh wave of conflict. In the past, the fate of major energy projects in Kirkuk was determined primarily by the exercise of power rather than through legal or political frameworks. BP’s path to the new deal in Kirkuk has been a long endeavor, with negotiations dating back to 2009. Progress has been consistently hampered by a multitude of factors, primarily the deeply strained political relationship between the KRG and Baghdad. Tensions were exacerbated by several other key factors: Kurdish political and military control of Kirkuk until October 2017, instability and security challenges in Kirkuk province, and the overall volatile environment for any major development projects on the national level. Kurdish dominance in the region hindered past efforts to reach a deal with BP. Now, Baghdad is asserting its power to finalize a deal. However, if this deal – concerning Iraq’s most contested province – is not handled carefully, it could have substantial detrimental consequences for political stability and economic development. A BP spokesperson said the agreement is not yet finalized, giving Baghdad the opportunity to meaningfully include the KRG, even if not as a direct partner. Including all relevant stakeholders will help to ensure the success of this mega-development project, protect it from future political or security upheavals, and contribute to the stability of Iraq as a whole.

Federal Supreme Court Rejects Appeals and Revokes Suspension of 3 Controversial Laws

Iraq's Federal Supreme Court decided on Tuesday to revoke its previous judicial injunction that had suspended the implementation of the three "controversial" laws: the General Amnesty Law, the Personal Status Law, and the Property Reclamation Law. At the same time, the court emphasized that any laws contradicting the constitution cannot be enacted. During a public session, the court president announced the dismissal of the legal challenge filed against the three laws. Judge Jassim Abboud Al-Amiri, President of the Federal Court, highlighted the role of the Constitution in defining the framework of government, the powers and limitations of authorities, and the protection of rights and freedoms. He explained that the Iraqi parliament, elected by direct vote, represents the people and has the authority to legislate and make decisions. Al-Amiri also referenced Article 37 of the parliament’s internal regulations, which states that a new agenda item cannot be discussed until the previous one is concluded. He emphasized that no law may contradict the Constitution, which is the supreme law of Iraq according to Article 13 of the 2005 Constitution.

Kurdistan oil exports to Turkey set to resume after landmark subsidy deal in Iraqi parliament

The Iraqi government, Kurdish authorities, and international oil companies have collectively welcomed a recent amendment to Iraq's federal budget, aimed at restarting oil exports from the Kurdistan Region through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline after a near two-year suspension. On Sunday, Iraq's parliament endorsed a budget amendment to subsidize production costs for international oil companies operating in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region. This adjustment raises the compensation rate to $16 per barrel, significantly higher than the previous rate of $7.9 per barrel for transport and production costs. The flow of oil through the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) pipeline was halted by Turkey in March 2023 following an International Chamber of Commerce ruling that required Ankara to compensate Baghdad $1.5 billion for unauthorized exports by the KRG between 2014 and 2018, which led to an estimated loss of $19 billion in revenue for Iraq. In a statement, Basim Al-Awadi, spokesperson for the Iraqi government, relayed Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani’s appreciation for the "responsible and constructive step" taken by the Council of Representatives in approving the amendment. This measure, he said, bolsters political stability and showcases the high level of cooperation between the government and the Council of Representatives. Sudani called on both the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Federal Ministry of Oil to immediately implement the amendment to optimize investment in natural resources, particularly oil. Masrour Barzani, the KRG Prime Minister, also supported the legislative change, thanking those who backed the amendment and the KRG negotiating team for addressing the salary issue. "I hope that this positive step in amending the budget law will be the beginning of resolving all other disputes and the federal government's commitment to provide financial entitlements of the Kurdistan Region," Barzani wrote on the X platform. What happens next? In cooperation with the KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources, Iraq's oil ministry plans to hire an international consultant within 60 days to evaluate fair production and transportation costs. Should no consensus be reached, the Iraqi cabinet will independently appoint a consultancy. The budget amendment, proposed by Iraq's cabinet in November 2024, also requires that the KRG transfer its oil output to the state-controlled State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). The Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) has welcomed this legislative change. Myles B. Caggins III, APIKUR spokesman, told The New Arab, "APIKUR welcomes the Iraqi Council of Representatives' budget law amendment and remains focused on reaching agreements to restore oil exports through the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline." Soran Omar, a lawmaker from the Kurdistan Justice Group in the Iraqi parliament, stated to TNA, "The Kurdistan Region's oil will be handed over to the SOMO company. In return, for 60 days, the region will receive $16 for each barrel of oil produced and delivered to SOMO." He added, "During the 60 days, an international company will be brought in to determine the actual cost of producing a barrel of oil in the region." "I hope both governments remain committed to implementing this agreement. The implementation will take place after its publication in the Iraqi Gazette. If the Kurdistan Region complies, it will receive its full budget and salaries," Omar continued. Khor Mor fire Separately, Sudani ordered the formation of a technical security committee to investigate the circumstances of a fire incident at the Khor Mor gas field in Sulaimaniyah Province. The Security Media Cell reported, "The incident led to a minor fire near the fuel tank which did not affect it, with no human or material losses, nor did it impact the operation and production of the field." Sudani ordered a security committee to investigate the incident, stressing that attempts to harm the economy and public welfare will not be tolerated, and security forces will take firm action against any threats. The Khor Mor gas field, located southwest of Sulaimaniyah, is being developed by the UAE's Dana Gas company and produces natural gas for almost 80 per cent of the Kurdistan region's power plants. The Sulaimaniyah-based General Directorate of Counter Terrorism, in a statement revealed that a suicide drone attack was directed at the Khor Mor gas field late on Sunday. "According to intelligence reports, the drone was launched from the Bashir area and was carried out by militia and outlaw groups. The attack did not result in any casualties or material damage, and both the field and the Dana Gas company are fully secured," reads the statement. It also added that security agencies assure citizens that they are closely monitoring this violation and will announce any new information regarding this matter. Four Yemeni nationals were killed and two others were wounded when a suicide drone hit the Khor Mor gas field in Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region late on 26 April. The KRG has blamed the attack on the Iran-backed militias in Iraq. Dana Gas (PJSC) announced that a drone targeted the vicinity of the Khor Mor gas field and confirmed that the attack caused no injuries or damage to production facilities, and operations continue uninterrupted under strict security protocols. Iraq heavily depends on imported gas from Iran to produce electricity, and recently Al-Sudani said his government is planning to purchase gas from the Khor Mor gas field and connect the field with power plants in Kirkuk via a new gas pipeline. Source: The New Arab

Iraq’s oil exports to US surge by 118,000 bpd in a week

Iraq's oil exports to the United States rose by 118,000 barrels per day (bpd) compared to the previous week, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) announced on Sunday. According to the EIA data, US crude oil imports from top 9 countries averaged 5.981 million bpd last week, down by 92,000 barrels from the previous week's 6.073 million bpd. "Iraq's oil exports to the US reached 336,000 bpd, up by 118,000 bpd from the previous week's 218,000 bpd," it confirmed. The US's highest oil revenue last week came from Canada, averaging 3.716 million bpd, followed by Mexico at 521,000 barrels, Saudi Arabia at 417,000 barrels, and Venezuela at 319,000 barrels. The US also imported 283,000 bpd from Colombia, 114,000 from Brazil, 102,000 from Ecuador, and 92,000 from Nigeria.

Iraq makes huge oil discovery but faces Opec restrictions

Reuters Iraq has announced the discovery of a massive oil field expected to significantly increase the country’s hydrocarbon reserves, but Baghdad will face a number of challenges in its attempt to exploit the new resource. The field, located in the central part of the country, contains more than 2 billion barrels of medium and light crude oil, with a projected daily output of 5,000 barrels, according to the Iraqi news agency. Iraq, the second-largest Opec producer after Saudi Arabia, holds the world’s fifth-largest proven oil reserves, amounting to 145 billion barrels. This represents 17 percent of the Middle East proven reserves. Most of the country’s oil is in the southern Basra region, the Diyala region east of Baghdad, and north-eastern Kirkuk. The latest discovery is part of the south-eastern Baghdad field and was made in collaboration with EBS, based in China. Iraq’s goal is to boost its oil reserves to 160 billion barrels, as announced by oil minister Hayan Abdel Ghani last year and reported by Al Arabiya. Baghdad also aims to boost its oil production capacity to 6 million bpd by 2028. Iraq pumps 4 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil and has been singled out by Opec+ for its overproduction multiple times. The lack of compliance with quotas offsets the producer group’s efforts to push prices up. While its oil production is expected to rise by only 200,000 bpd by the end of 2026, under the Opec+ agreement Iraq has yet to compensate for overproduction since January 2024, which means that some existing fields will be constrained, according to analysts. “There is no space for new developments without cutting existing fields further,” James Forbes, London-based senior analyst for upstream oil at Facts Global Energy, told AGBI. Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, Iraq’s prime minister, has said the country wants to ramp up exports and reduce its reliance on gas imports from its eastern neighbour Iran, which account for a third of its gas needs. But years of war, political instability, an inhospitable investment environment and rampant corruption have led to underinvestment in the sector. “There are also fiscal issues, as creating value from barrels is difficult,” Alexandre Araman, director at Wood Mackenzie, said. Western international companies have pulled back, and about one-third of Iraq’s proven reserves and two-thirds of current production are managed by Chinese companies. Oil exports represent more than 90 percent of Iraq’s state budget. The government is pushing to rebuild its economy while preparing for parliamentary elections this year. Since his election in 2022, Al-Sudani has been striving to regain the confidence of international investors, including introducing better contract terms for international oil companies compared to the previous technical service contracts. He has also engaged in diplomatic efforts with Iran’s geopolitical rivals, including a visit to Washington, although with limited success: US companies are cautiously re-entering Iraq’s energy sector. TotalEnergies of France was the first major to sign a significant $27 billion deal for multiple energy-related projects. BP of the UK signed a memorandum of understanding to rehabilitate and develop four oilfields operated by North Oil Company in Kirkuk. New Iraqi elections for the Council of Representatives—the country’s main legislative body—are scheduled for next year.

Iraqi Oil Ministry: There has been no cessation of crude oil exports to Syria

On Sunday, the Iraqi Oil Ministry refuted claims of having contracts to supply crude oil to Syria, dismissing reports about the cessation of Iraqi crude oil exports to its neighboring country. In an official statement, the ministry clarified, "The State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) confirms that there are no contracts with the Syrian side to supply them with crude oil. Consequently, there has been no cessation of crude oil exports to Syria." The ministry urged media outlets and interested parties to verify their information from official sources before publication. A day earlier, a source within the Iraqi Oil Ministry informed Shafaq News that crude oil flows to Syria had been halted following the fall of Al-Assad regime. Prior to the cessation, exports included approximately 33,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil and 120,000 tons of black oil monthly.

US Secretary of State conveyed direct "threats" to Iraqi Prime Minister

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken conveyed direct "threats" to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani concerning Iran-backed armed factions in Iraq, informed political sources revealed on Saturday. "Blinken clearly and directly conveyed threats from Washington during his meeting with Al-Sudani regarding the armed groups’ future and their movements," according to the sources. Blinken emphasized that "the new US administration would work vigorously to eliminate any influence of these factions, especially after their cross-border operations targeting US bases in Syria and various targets inside Israel over the past period." "Blinken warned Al-Sudani against any military actions by these groups in Syria in the coming phase, driven by Tehran, and held the Iraqi government accountable for any actions taken by them," the sources continued, adding, "The US Secretary stressed the necessity of controlling the factions and genuinely disarming them in the coming phase, as they pose a threat to regional security, not just Iraq. Otherwise, Washington would play a role in curbing them through sanctions and specific military operations." On Friday, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken made an "unannounced" visit to Iraq, where he met with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani. According to the US Department of State, Blinken urged the Iraqi government to support the democratic transition in Syria following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad's regime, highlighting Iraq's role in enhancing its sovereignty and regional stability. The US Department of State quoted Blinken during his meeting with Al-Sudani, reaffirming Washington's commitment to "supporting Iraq's security and sovereignty," stressing the need to continue efforts to "prevent the resurgence of ISIS." He noted that the positive changes witnessed in Iraq enhance its future success prospects and emphasized the importance of Iraq and regional countries in supporting Syria to achieve a comprehensive political transition that protects minorities and ends sectarianism.

Iraq Parliament Ends Year With No Kurdistan Oil Deal

The Iraqi parliament ended this year’s session without finalizing a deal with the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan for the exports of crude oil from the northern region. According to local media, the deal was to be debated last Thursday, along with several other topics, but since then no update regarding any decision on the deal has been issued, suggesting the Iraqi parliament has delayed the final decision on the deal for January when the new parliamentary session will begin. One report by Shafaq said that the topic of Kurdish oil exports had led to a deadlock among members of parliament who could not reach an agreement about the compensation that Baghdad would owe the Kurdish government for the costs of producing and transporting the oil. The difference of opinion prompted the Kurdish parliamentarians to withdraw from the discussion, effectively ending it. One of the Kurdish members of parliament told Shafaq that the disagreement centered on the cost of oil extraction in Kurdistan. He also said that to settle the matter, “a specialized international company would visit the KRG's oil fields to assess the cost of oil extraction, in line with the budget law amendment and a political agreement between the two sides.” Deliveries of Kurdish crude oil have been suspended for over a year amid a dispute between the central government in Baghdad and Turkey over who had the power to authorize these deliveries. The impasse followed an International Chamber of Commerce ruling in March 2023. The ICC ruled in favor of Iraq, which had argued that Turkey should not allow Kurdish oil exports via the Iraq-Turkey pipeline and the Turkish port of Ceyhan without approval from the federal government of Iraq. The ruling had an impact on international oil companies operating in Kurdistan, which suspended operations until they had clarity on any changes in their terms of operation in the region. There was also a dispute between the government in Baghdad and the one in Erbil over these oil deliveries and who gets to keep the money from their sales on international markets. Most of these have been settled but the deal has yet to be finalized. By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

The cost of producing a barrel of oil in the region is $20 to $25, but in Basra it is $4 to $5

A member of the Finance Committee of the Iraqi Parliament said "The cost of producing oil in the Kurdistan Region is $20 to $25 a barrel, while the cost of oil in Basra is $4 to $5 a barrel". Muain Kazemi, a member of the Finance Committee of the Iraqi Parliament, told PUK media: "The Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have agreed to increase the cost of oil production to $16". He said, "The cost of producing a barrel of oil in the Kurdistan Region is very high, between $20 and $25, but in Basra it is between $4 and $5." "The agreement between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on the oil production of the Kurdistan Region, consists of exporting oil to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey, under the supervision of SOMO, which belongs to the Iraqi Oil Ministry," he said. He added, "In return, Iraq will pay oil production costs of $16 per barrel out of 400,000 barrels per day for the first phase, until the costs are reviewed in coordination with the Kurdistan Regional Government". He added, "The oil contracts between the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government with oil companies will be reviewed because the cost of oil production is very, very high compared to Basra oil". On November 5, the Iraqi Council of Ministers approved the resumption of oil exports from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq after 19 months of suspension.

Iraq’s Census: Fears fuel Tensions in Kirkuk

Kirkuk, an oil-rich governorate at the center of longstanding territorial and political disputes between Iraq's central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), is once again a focal point of tensions as calls to delay the upcoming national census grow louder. Local political actors are concerned that the census could shift the delicate balance of power in the region, with many viewing it as a potential tool to reshape the demographic landscape. While the census is seen as essential for national planning, critics argue that the timing is inappropriate in a region as contested as Kirkuk. Political and ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, have voiced concerns that the census may be used to undermine their claims or bolster those of their rivals. Ministry of Planning: Census to Proceed Despite these concerns, Iraq’s Ministry of Planning announced that it will move forward with the nationwide census, including in Kirkuk. On Monday, Abdul Zahra al-Hindawi, the Ministry’s spokesperson, expressed surprise at the calls for delay, emphasizing that the census is not politically motivated but purely intended for economic and developmental purposes. "The Ministry of Planning is committed to conducting the census across all Iraqi governorates, including Kirkuk," al-Hindawi told Shafaq News Agency. "We’ve made significant progress since the start of the data collection on September 1, and the census will continue as scheduled." Al-Hindawi stressed that the census is a necessary step to address Iraq’s rapid population growth, which exceeded 43 million by the end of last year. "Iraq is witnessing a population increase of more than one million people annually. The census will help determine the actual needs of each governorate in terms of health, education, housing, and services," he added. Economic and Developmental Focus The Ministry has sought to distance the census from any political connotations, framing it as a purely administrative exercise aimed at ensuring a fair distribution of resources based on population size. "The census is an economic and developmental tool, not a political one. It will provide data essential for future planning, including the equitable distribution of wealth across Iraq’s governorates," al-Hindawi said. He further reassured all communities in Kirkuk, including Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, that the census is a neutral endeavor aimed at benefiting everyone equally. "The census is designed to identify developmental gaps, and its results will be used to enhance services for all Iraqis," he noted. However, these assurances have done little to assuage the concerns of many in Kirkuk, particularly Kurdish leaders who view the census as a potential flashpoint in the ongoing struggle over the governorate’s political status. Kurdish Concerns: Article 140 and Demographic Displacement Among the most vocal critics of the census is Mohammad Kamal, head of the third branch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Kirkuk. In a press conference last week, Kamal acknowledged the importance of preparations for the census but called for a postponement in Kirkuk until the implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. "The preparations for the census are necessary, but the situation in Kirkuk is different from the rest of Iraq," Kamal said. "The governorate is not ready for this process, and many displaced Kurds have yet to return." Kamal’s reference to Article 140 highlights the underlying political issues that make the census so contentious in Kirkuk. Article 140 is a constitutional provision that outlines the steps needed to resolve territorial disputes in areas like Kirkuk, which are claimed by both Baghdad and the KRG. The article mandates a three-step process: normalization, a census, and a referendum. These steps were supposed to be completed by December 31, 2007, but have remained largely unfulfilled, leaving Kirkuk’s political status unresolved. Historical Context: Article 140 and Kirkuk’s Disputed Status At the heart of Kurdish demands is the implementation of Article 140, which many view as essential to addressing the demographic changes imposed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. During the 1980s, Saddam forcibly displaced thousands of Kurds from Kirkuk and replaced them with Arabs in an attempt to change the ethnic balance in the region. Kamal noted that in 1988, the Ba'ath regime destroyed over 4,500 Kurdish villages, relocating their inhabitants to the Kurdistan Region. "Many of these displaced residents are still living in the Kurdistan Region, and conducting a census without accounting for this historical injustice would distort the results," he warned. For Kurdish leaders, addressing the legacy of forced displacement and implementing Article 140 are prerequisites to any meaningful census in Kirkuk. They argue that moving forward with the census before resolving these issues could lead to skewed results, exacerbating tensions in an already volatile region. Sinjar: Concerns Over IDP Return Before the Census Similar concerns are being raised in other parts of Iraq, particularly in the Sinjar district of Nineveh, where many internally displaced persons (IDPs) have yet to return following years of conflict. Mohammad Ahrees, a member of the Nineveh Council, emphasized the importance of ensuring the return of displaced residents before the census is conducted. "The situation in Sinjar is improving, with progress being made in security and service projects," Ahrees said. "However, the return of displaced persons is crucial before the census takes place. This will allow for an accurate assessment of the population, which is essential for determining the needs of the region." Ahrees underscored that the census will play a key role in documenting population and housing data, which in turn will help the central government allocate resources to areas based on their real needs. "The return of displaced residents to their areas will ensure that the census reflects the true demographic makeup of Sinjar and helps guide future development projects," he added. Broader Implications: Political Power and Resource Distribution The stakes for the census are high, not just in Kirkuk but across Iraq. The census will be the first comprehensive population count since 1987 when Saddam Hussein’s regime conducted the last nationwide census. A subsequent census was held in 1997 but excluded the Kurdistan Region, leaving Iraq without accurate population data for decades. Since 2003, the KRG has pushed for Kirkuk to be incorporated into its territory, a move that Baghdad has resisted. The census will be pivotal in determining whether the Kurds constitute the largest ethnic bloc in Kirkuk, potentially strengthening their claim to the governorate. For Iraq as a whole, the census is necessary for determining the population within the Kurdistan Region, which will influence its share of national revenue, currently set at around 12%. The census will also have remarkable implications for resource distribution, particularly oil revenue, which remains a key source of tension between Baghdad and Erbil. Hopes and Fears: Political Manipulation and Demographic Shifts Despite the Ministry of Planning’s assurances, fears of political manipulation continue to loom over the census. Ethnic groups in disputed territories like Kirkuk are wary that the results could shift the balance of power in ways that either bolster or undermine their political aspirations. The Kurds, in particular, fear that the census could fail to account for the displaced population, thereby skewing the results in favor of Arab and Turkmen groups. On the other hand, Arab and Turkmen leaders have expressed concerns that the census could solidify Kurdish claims to Kirkuk, further complicating efforts to resolve the region’s disputed status. For Iraq, a country still recovering from decades of conflict and ethnic violence, the census represents both an opportunity and a risk. If conducted fairly, it could provide much-needed clarity and help guide future development efforts. But if mishandled, it could deepen existing divisions and fuel further tensions. As Iraq moves forward with the census, the eyes of the nation will be on Kirkuk, where the results could have far-reaching implications for the future of the governorate and the country as a whole.

Oil Minister: Currently Iraq has 145 billion barrels of oil and 160 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves

The Minister of Oil, Hayan Abdul-Ghani, announced, on Monday, an increase in the efficiency of generation units to more than 65% for combined cycles. Deputy PM for Energy Affairs and Minister of Oil, Hayan Abdul-Ghani, held a meeting with the US side in the presence of the US Assistant Secretary of State, the Director of the Institute, the President of the US Chamber of Commerce, and several companies, during his visit to the Baker Institute, Houston, according to a statement by the ministry. Abdul-Ghani stressed the "depth of cooperation with the US side. 20 years of cooperation and partnership in various fields such as oil, energy, agriculture, trade, business, and at the governmental and investment levels for both sides," stressing "the importance of exchanging visions and ideas, as well as reviewing joint opportunities in the interest of both countries." "The Iraqi delegation includes an elite group of specialists and decision-makers in technical, oil and investment affairs; for a new round of growth rounds for the previously drawn frameworks as to open new areas of cooperation and partnership between the two parties," he noted. He explained that "the Ministry of Oil is very interested in cooperating with US and Western European companies that wish to visit Iraq and will receive great attention from the Iraqi side. In return, the Iraqi side will work to send high-level delegations to visit the US, after invitations are extended by solid companies; to discuss the proposed projects to reach levels of strategic partnership that serve the common interests of all parties." "Iraq is in an advanced position in the energy industry at the global and regional levels, which comes from its oil reserves that exceed 145 billion barrels of explored oil, with a production capacity of more than five million barrels of oil. It comes with a confirmed gas reserve of more than 130 trillion standard cubic feet and an expected reserve to reach more than 160 trillion cubic feet. This makes it a major and influential player at the regional and global levels," he pointed out. The Minister of Oil highlighted "The ministry's implementation of gas investment projects that have given clear progress in gas investment from various fields. The percentage of invested gas did not exceed 51% of associated gas in 2022, as this percentage increased to more than 65% in the current year. This came from the implementation of many projects related to gas investment through cooperation with international companies and national efforts. Gas flaring will be completely stopped by the end of 2028 so that Iraq will be one of the countries that contribute greatly to reducing thermal emissions and benefiting from this energy as well as employing it towards generating electricity and various industries." "In the refining sector, we are proud that we have recently added refining capacities exceeding 360 thousand barrels per day in the Karbala and North refineries and the fourth unit in the Basra refinery, in addition to supporting units distributed in other locations to suffice the country with a wide range of products that were included in the import basket. Rather, the ministry is in the process of exporting some of them, especially gas oil,” he added.

Controversy surrounds Iraq's Basra-Aqaba oil pipeline project

Iraq’s plan to diversify its oil export routes through the Basra-Aqaba pipeline is facing political resistance, primarily from Shia factions concerned about security and proximity to Israel. The 1,700-kilometer pipeline, intended to transport up to three million barrels of oil per day, aims to reduce Iraq's reliance on the Strait of Hormuz and mitigate regional risks. Critics argue that exporting via Aqaba in Jordan could increase costs and potentially expose Iraqi oil to Israeli access. Legal challenges to block the pipeline have so far been unsuccessful, with the Iraqi Federal Court dismissing a lawsuit against the project. The Iraqi federal government has allocated 6.4 trillion dinars from the 2024 budget to advance the pipeline, with revised project costs estimated at $8.5 billion. Despite its strategic potential, the pipeline remains a contentious issue amid Iraq's broader struggle to secure its oil exports while balancing internal political opposition and external pressures. As the country navigates these complexities, the outcome of the Basra-Aqaba pipeline project will significantly impact Iraq’s economic future and regional standing.

Iraq’s Watergate and the Fallout for U.S. Relations

Washington Institute by Michael Knights On August 28, news began to emerge from investigative reporting about a widespread political surveillance campaign involving the office of Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. The scale of the effort was so extensive that even Iraqi politicians and citizens—who are thoroughly used to corruption and scandal by now—were shocked by the case. For the United States, the scandal is yet another glaring indicator that Iraq is not as stable as it is sometimes presented to be, nor is its current government the reliable security and intelligence partner Washington needs. Who Wiretapped Who? The original reporting on the scandal has quickly been piled onto by other major Arab news outlets and Iraq’s notoriously leaky officials and political class. The seismic reverberations in Baghdad—including numerous emergency meetings by political factions—suggest that there is a lot of fire behind the visible smoke. The following points seem clear so far: Almost all of Iraq’s senior political figures were targeted for hacking or surveillance on their communication devices, including: Supreme Judicial Council head Judge Faeq Zaidan Former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and his son-in-law and commercial fixer, Yasser Abdul Sukhail al-Maliki Hadi al-Ameri, the head of two major Iran-backed political entities: the Coordination Framework and the Badr Organization Acting speaker of parliament and Badr affiliate Muhsin al-Mandalawi Former speaker of parliament Mohammed al-Halbousi (one of many Sunni Arab politicians targeted) Former prime minister Haider al-Abadi Humam Hamoudi, head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Ahmed Fatlawy, advisor to Hikma party chief Ammar al-Hakim (among numerous other political party figures targeted) Various figures in the president’s office Various officials in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Noticeably absent from the list so far are Sudani’s closest supporter, Qais al-Khazali, and senior members of his militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). Both Khazali and his militia have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities. The eavesdropping cell was based in the prime minister’s office and operated by a range of figures close to Sudani: Abdul Karim al-Sudani, the prime minister’s military secretary and a tribal relative Khalid al-Yaqoubi, Sudani’s security advisor Mohammed Johi, the cell leader and deputy director-general for administrative affairs in the prime minister’s office (Johi has confessed to the crime, and his electronic devices have been analyzed) Ahmed al-Sudani, another relative of the prime minister and acting head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) Eleven signals intelligence technicians from the INIS Technical Directorate’s Department of Eavesdropping Various officers at the National Security Service (NSS) and the Interior Ministry’s Federal Information and Investigations Agency (FIIA) Johi and others involved in the eavesdropping used INIS property, equipment, and vehicles to carry out the scheme, authorized by Ahmed al-Sudani. In addition, NSS personnel were seconded to Johi’s cell by the agency’s chief, Abu Ali al-Basri (aka Abdul Karim Abed Fadel Hussein), an effective pursuer of Sunni terrorists but also the Coordination Framework’s top witch-hunter against political adversaries. On September 3, the prime minister’s personal photographer was arrested in relation to the scheme. The eavesdropping cell attempted to entrap and develop compromising materials on various political figures, including members of parliament, judicial officials, intelligence officers, and female family members of important persons. The Ruin of INIS The surveillance scandal—which will likely bubble all the way through to the next government formation period after the October 2025 election—should come as no surprise given past warnings about the ruinous politicization of Iraq’s best intelligence agency, INIS, since early 2023, when Sudani placed his relative, Ahmed, in acting control of the organization. The CIA first built INIS from salvaged parts of Iraq’s pre-2003 intelligence agencies, then vetted and trained its personnel for twenty years. While the country’s numerous other intelligence agencies became deeply penetrated by Iran-backed militants, INIS remained a bastion of relative trustworthiness for the United States and other Western governments. This is why it was among the very few Iraqi entities entrusted with sensitive U.S. signals intelligence, equipment, and training. Yet all of this changed when Sudani became prime minister. Since 2022, Sudani’s government has purged many key U.S.-trusted INIS officers and replaced them with agents from Iran-backed militias. The new INIS counterintelligence director appointed in early 2023—whose job is to prevent penetration of the agency—is Faisal Ghazi al-Lami, a nephew of PMF chairman Faleh al-Fayyad and a long-term protege of Abu Ala al-Walai. Fayyad and Walai have been designated by the U.S. government for human rights abuses and terrorist activities, respectively. Moreover, the INIS director of surveillance is Wissam al-Mihyawi, another Fayyad nominee. The NSS—which was previously on the mend after years of terrorist infiltration—has also backslid since 2023, when Basri was given the keys to the agency. Top posts such as deputy director, director of operations, and head of Baghdad security operations were given to AAH officials. The current scandal only reinforces the degree to which Iraq’s most important and technically proficient intelligence agencies are sinking into the mire of Iran-backed militias and corrupt politicians. U.S. Policy Options The surveillance scandal should be an eye-opening moment for Western policymakers, on several counts. First, Washington should not try to paper over the damage that has been done to Sudani’s premiership. For years, U.S. officials have avoided acknowledging Sudani’s very close ties to AAH, a designated terrorist organization. The leader of such a group—Qais al-Khazali, himself a designated terrorist—should not be permitted to puppeteer Iraq’s government and, by extension, its relations with the United States. If new evidence emerges indicating that Sudani had direct knowledge of the eavesdropping campaign, Washington may need to adjust its attitude toward the prime minister more generally, in part because malign actors could easily use such evidence to gain power over him. The United States should not be more committed to Sudani’s political survival than his own sponsor, Khazali, who seems angered that such a scandal has emerged out of operational security errors made by a cell in the prime minister’s office. On August 31, Iran deployed a delegation to Baghdad in an attempt to shush the scandal, underlining the need for Washington to do just the opposite. Second, the United States should greatly restrict intelligence cooperation with INIS, NSS, and other agencies until they remove malign political appointees from their senior ranks, especially pro-militia and pro-Iran figures. After Sudani became prime minister, Washington turned a blind eye to his government’s disturbing appointments in the intelligence sector. Various factions will surely try to use the current scandal to inject a new crop of bad actors into senior intelligence roles. The United States must use its leverage as Iraq’s key counterterrorism partner to ensure that the government does not merely swap “bad” for “equally bad or worse” when cleaning up the scandal and appointing new officials to INIS, NSS, and FIIA. Third, Washington should broadly review its attitude toward Iraqi officials in sectors as diverse as the Counter Terrorism Service, airport authorities, port authorities, and key ministries (e.g., Finance, Interior, Oil, Transport, and even Higher Education, whose minister is a member of a U.S.-designated terrorist group yet moves freely around Western capitals). These and other agencies have been deeply penetrated in the same manner as INIS—a trend that began before 2022 but has greatly accelerated since then due to the Coordination Framework’s domination of Iraq’s executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The main lesson for U.S. officials is that the character and political will of Iraqi prime ministers is the most important factor in deciding the extent of this Iran-backed state capture, and thus the severity of potential damage to U.S.-Iraq relations.

Iraq's Oil Exports Surpass 108 Million Barrels in July

Iraq's oil exportation reached a significant milestone in July, with a total output of 108.5 million barrels, according to the latest figures released by the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) on Thursday. The Iraqi Oil Ministry detailed the exportation breakdown, stating that crude oil exportation and production in central and southern Iraq amounted to 106.1 million barrels in July. Meanwhile, the Qayara Oil Field contributed 2.4 million barrels to the total output during the same month. This exportation figure highlights the continued growth of Iraq's oil sector, despite ongoing challenges and fluctuations in the global oil market.