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Article 140: 18 Years After Deadline, Implementation Still Pending

Article 140, as an extension of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law, remains unimplemented 18 years after the constitutional deadline expired. From 2005 to 2025, several committees were formed to implement Article 140, with more than 2 trillion Iraqi dinars allocated, yet it has not been carried out. Following the events of October 16, Arabization policies resumed under imposed administrations, major administrative changes were made, and dozens of senior Kurdish officials were removed. Despite the Federal Supreme Court’s 2019 ruling affirming that Article 140 remains valid until fully implemented, and despite UN mediation efforts, political obstacles and the imposed security situation have delayed its execution. Article 140, extending Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law, was designed to resolve the issue of disputed territories outside the Kurdistan Region’s administration. Its implementation was structured in three phases and was to be completed by the end of 2007, but it remains pending. Between 2005 and 2025, multiple committees were formed and over 2 trillion dinars allocated, yet implementation has stalled. After October 16, Arabization policies resumed under imposed administrations, significantly reducing Kurdish representation in senior posts. In 2019, the Federal Supreme Court reaffirmed the article’s validity until full implementation, but political and security barriers persist. Constitutional Text of Article 140 First: The executive authority shall take the necessary steps to complete the implementation of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law in all its provisions. Second: The responsibility placed upon the Transitional Government shall transfer to the elected executive authority under this Constitution, to fully implement normalization, census, and ultimately a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed areas to determine the will of their citizens, no later than December 31, 2007. Foundations of Article 140 Article 140 outlines a three-stage process: Normalization – Reversing Arabization policies, returning displaced persons, compensating victims, and repealing ethnic cleansing decisions. Census – Conducting a transparent population census reflecting real demographics. Referendum – Allowing residents to decide whether to remain under federal administration or join the Kurdistan Region. These phases were meant to be completed before the end of 2007. Committees and Implementation Decisions Implementation began under Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. Committees were formed during the governments of Ayad Allawi (2005) and Ibrahim al-Jaafari (2006), but took no substantive steps. Under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s first government, Executive Order No. 46 established a committee that issued key decisions, including: Reinstating employees dismissed for political or ethnic reasons (Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians). Returning displaced families and compensating them. Returning relocated Arab families to their original areas with compensation. Cancelling agricultural contracts linked to demographic change policies. Addressing land disputes and compensating affected residents. Subsequent governments formed additional committees, including the High Committee headed by Hadi al-Amiri under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, but without tangible results. Achievements and Obstacles Achievements were minimal. Key obstacles included: Failure to appoint committee leadership on time. Short government tenures. Lack of genuine political will within Iraq’s federal authorities. Land Files and Administrative Borders Efforts to annul Ba’ath-era decisions targeting Kurdish lands led to thousands of agricultural contracts being revoked. However, the Ministry of Justice and certain Kirkuk judges failed to implement cabinet decisions. Although laws were passed to annul Ba’ath Revolutionary Command Council decrees and restore property, practical steps remain absent. The Property Claims Commission (Law No. 13 of 2010) has been largely ineffective due to political obstacles. Allocated Funds Executive Order No. 46 (2006) allocated $200 million for normalization and compensation. Between 2006 and 2025, special budget items were designated for Article 140, yet implementation has remained incomplete due to lack of transparency and oversight mechanisms. Political Agreements and International Role Erbil Agreement (2010): Signed between Masoud Barzani and Nouri al-Maliki, it reaffirmed commitment to Article 140 and constitutional provisions. UN Mediation (UNAMI): The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq proposed solutions for disputed territories, including census and administrative arrangements, but political disagreements prevented implementation. Federal Supreme Court Rulings: Decisions in 2017 and 2019 reaffirmed Article 140’s continued validity, while placing disputed areas under federal authority until resolution. Post-October 16, 2017 Developments Iraqi forces and Popular Mobilization Forces moved into disputed territories, leading to displacement, alleged violations, and renewed Arabization measures. Administrative changes reduced Kurdish representation in Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu, Khanaqin, Sinjar, and other areas. Agricultural lands were reassigned to Arab settlers, and oil fields came under federal control. Tuz Khurmatu Events On October 16, 2017, armed attacks targeted Kurdish neighborhoods and institutions, resulting in displacement, property destruction, and looting. Renewed Arabization After 2017: Kurdish administrative positions were replaced. Arab settlers received documentation and residency support. Agricultural lands were reassigned. International organizations raised concerns over violations and called for neutral protection forces.

ASYCUDA System and Iraq’s Economic Transformation

Here is what should be known about the ASYCUDA system, which has recently become a subject of controversy in Iraq: The main function of this system is to eliminate paper-based and manual procedures at customs and convert everything into electronic processing—from collecting customs duties, inspecting shipments, to monitoring revenues. The system is highly precise and does not allow any money to “pass through” unofficially. This has made traders feel the impact of higher costs that they previously avoided, either illegally or through under-declaration. Baghdad intends to implement the same ASYCUDA system at all border crossings, including Ibrahim Khalil, Bashmakh, and Parwezkhan. Implementing the system means Baghdad can monitor, through central servers, every shipment and every dinar of revenue collected. This puts pressure on the Kurdistan Region to transparently hand over revenues or account for them within the federal budget. If the Kurdistan Region does not implement the system, Baghdad may impose customs checkpoints at internal crossings (such as between Kirkuk and Erbil), which could disrupt trade and increase prices within the Kurdistan Region. If Baghdad does not recognize the Kurdistan Region’s customs and does not unify the system, traders could be forced to pay customs twice—once at Ibrahim Khalil and again upon reaching Kirkuk or Mosul. This “double taxation” encourages smuggling. Iraq is currently facing a major economic turning point. The implementation of the ASYCUDA system is not merely a shift from paper to digital customs procedures, but a declared effort by the state to enforce the rule of law and transparency in one of its most corruption-prone sectors. If implemented properly, ASYCUDA acts like a “painful surgery” for Iraq’s economy: On the one hand, it reduces corruption and increases state revenues. On the other hand, if poorly implemented, it may increase living costs and cause dissatisfaction among traders. Iraq’s problem is not a lack of technology, but excessive political interference. ASYCUDA is like a mirror—it reveals the system’s flaws but cannot fix them on its own. What is the ASYCUDA System? ASYCUDA stands for Automated System for Customs Data. It is a modern computerized customs management system developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Its core functions include: Eliminating paper-based customs procedures Electronic customs declarations Automated tariff calculation Shipment inspection and tracking Revenue monitoring The Iraqi government aims to use the system to prevent corruption, fraud, and tax evasion, as the system automatically calculates standardized global tariffs. However, traders complain that the system is strict and applies high tariff rates, increasing import costs and consumer prices. Technical Features of ASYCUDA The system includes several digital components: 1. Electronic Manifest (e-Manifest): Shipment information is submitted before arriving at the border. 2. Risk Management System: Shipments are categorized into three risk levels: Green: No inspection required Yellow: Document inspection only Red: Full physical inspection 3. Banking Integration: Payments must be made electronically through banks, preventing cash corruption. Global Benefits of ASYCUDA The system is used in more than 100 countries, including Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. Its benefits include: Faster processing (from 2 weeks to 2 days) Increased government revenues by 20% to 30% Accurate trade and economic data for planning Why is ASYCUDA Controversial in Iraq? The controversy lies not in the system itself but in how it is implemented: 1. New tariff policies: The system strictly enforces tariff rates, preventing manipulation. 2. Weak digital infrastructure: Many customs employees and traders lack digital training. 3. Standardized tariffs: Regional variations in customs rates are eliminated, affecting local markets. Impact on the Kurdistan Region Key issues include: 1. Unified border control: Baghdad wants the same system applied across all borders, including Kurdistan Region crossings. 2. Revenue transparency: Baghdad will monitor regional customs revenues electronically. 3. Trade disruption risks: Failure to implement the system may result in internal customs barriers. Impact of Smuggling and Informal Crossings If smuggling routes remain open: Legal traders will face unfair competition Government revenues may decrease Smuggling networks will benefit financially Solutions include: Joint federal-regional customs enforcement Electronic verification systems at checkpoints Lower tariffs to discourage smuggling Most Affected Economic Sectors Food sector: Basic goods have low tariffs, but the costs of packaged food have increased. Construction sector: Higher tariffs on imported construction materials increase building costs. Vehicles and electronics: More accurate classification increases taxes on cars and devices. Luxury goods: Tariffs increased significantly, up to 30–50%. Political and Institutional Challenges ASYCUDA highlights deeper structural issues: Technology alone cannot solve corruption without political reform Political influence still allows some traders to bypass regulations Smaller traders face more pressure than politically connected ones ASYCUDA represents a major transformation in Iraq’s customs system. It can: Reduce corruption Increase government revenue Improve transparency But without political cooperation, proper implementation, and enforcement against smuggling, its economic benefits may be limited and could increase costs for citizens and businesses.

Report: Iraq’s Electricity Sector Faces Major Gap Between Spending and Revenue

A recent assessment by Eco Iraq has highlighted a significant imbalance in Iraq’s electricity sector, pointing to a wide gap between monthly expenditures and collected revenues. According to the analysis, Iraq spends nearly 600 billion Iraqi dinars per month on the electricity sector. However, the monthly revenue generated from electricity bill collections reportedly does not exceed one billion dinars. The report states that most of the sector’s spending goes toward salaries, maintenance, and fuel purchases, rather than long-term investment or expanding production capacity. Current electricity generation is estimated at approximately 28,000 megawatts, while national demand is estimated at around 50,000 megawatts. Eco Iraq’s assessment suggests that the revenue collected represents only about 0.17% of total monthly expenditures in the sector. The organization argues that this disparity reflects weaknesses in financial management and revenue collection systems. The analysis concludes that the persistent gap between spending and income places additional pressure on Iraq’s public finances and contributes to ongoing fiscal challenges.

What is the new customs tariff that sparked protests in Iraq?

Baghdad, Basra, and several central and southern provinces witnessed protests and shop closures opposing the implementation of a new customs tariff system (ASYCUDA) at border crossings. Traders demand amending the decision, saying it harms consumers’ purchasing power. However, economic experts argue that the reform aims to protect local production, regulate foreign trade, increase state revenues, reduce smuggling, and address long-standing economic imbalances. They say most food items are taxed at only 5%, lower than in many countries, and Iraq does not impose VAT. Supporters view the tariff as a necessary economic reform serving national interests, despite resistance from traders benefiting from the previous system iPhone 17 and Luxury Goods One widely discussed example is the claim that the new customs tariff will raise mobile phone prices — including the “iPhone 17” — to an imaginary level of $1,800. However, this comparison overlooks the fact that electronic device prices vary from one country to another due to company pricing policies and taxes and customs duties applied in each country. In many European countries, the official price of devices is already higher than in Iraq, and customs duties and Value Added Tax (VAT) are added, significantly increasing the final price. In contrast, Iraq does not impose VAT or a sales tax, making such comparisons inaccurate. These goods are considered luxury (non-essential) items, typically purchased by middle- or high-income earners rather than by low-income citizens. Economically, it is logical to impose higher tariffs on non-essential goods while protecting essential goods that affect the daily lives of all citizens. Experts also note that Iraq is among the few countries that do not implement VAT, while most countries — including Gulf states — rely on this tax, which is applied to the final sale price, not just imports. This creates a heavier burden on consumers in those countries than in Iraq. When calculating total customs and taxes until goods reach the end consumer, prices in Iraq remain relatively lower, undermining claims of “unprecedented price hikes.” Consumer Protection Does Not Mean Chaotic Imports Protecting consumers is not limited to keeping prices low; it also involves ensuring product quality, preventing markets from being flooded with substandard goods, and maintaining a balance between imports and domestic production. Uncontrolled imports in previous years weakened the national industry and turned Iraq into a purely consumer market, according to experts. From this perspective, imposing customs duties based on the type of goods is a normal market-regulation measure, not a policy aimed at harming traders or citizens.

How Was the Session to Elect the President Postponed?

The special parliamentary session to elect Iraq’s new president has been postponed to a date yet to be officially set. Due to disagreements between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), concerns have emerged about the risk of breaching Iraq’s constitutional deadlines. To address this, reliance has been placed on official holidays. According to the constitution, for the session to convene, at least 220 MPs must be present out of 329, and the president is elected in the first round by the same number of votes. Otherwise, the process moves to a second round. With continued KDP–PUK disagreements, there is a possibility of forming a “blocking third.” Why the Session Was Postponed The Iraqi Council of Representatives was scheduled to elect a new president on Tuesday, January 27, but at the request of the KDP and PUK, the session was postponed. Although Parliament has not formally announced a new date, a request submitted by Shakhawan Abdullah, head of the KDP parliamentary bloc, proposed postponing the session to Sunday, February 1, 2026, to allow Kurdish parties to reach an agreement on a candidate. Constitutional Deadline Debate Article 72 of the Iraqi Constitution states that after the first session and election of the parliamentary presidency, Parliament must elect a new president within 30 days. Parliament elected its presidency on December 29, 2025, and opened presidential nominations on December 31, 2025, making January 28, 2026, the constitutional deadline. Based on this, some political actors consider postponing the session to February 1 a violation of constitutional timelines. However, Sraw Abdulwahid, head of the New Generation Movement bloc, argues that official holidays are not counted within the constitutional time frame, allowing for an extension. How Is the President Elected? According to Federal Supreme Court Decision No. 16 (February 3, 2022), interpreting Article 70 of the Constitution, the quorum for a presidential election session is two-thirds of Parliament—220 MPs. If no candidate secures two-thirds of the votes in the first round, a second round is held, where the candidate with the highest number of votes wins. The quorum remains the same even in the second round, and the process continues even if some MPs leave the session. The “Blocking Third” In 2022, during the fifth parliamentary term, Shiite forces split into two camps, leading the Federal Supreme Court to set the quorum at two-thirds. This enabled pro-Iran Shiite factions to form a “blocking third” (110 MPs) to prevent quorum completion, ultimately collapsing the Sadr–Barzani–Halbousi alliance. In the current term, a similar scenario could arise if the KDP and PUK fail to agree on a single candidate and if Shiite and Sunni blocs exploit Kurdish divisions. Presidency vs. Interior Ministry By political convention since 2003, the presidency is allocated to the Kurds and has historically gone to the PUK. As in previous terms, the KDP has again nominated its own candidate. PUK candidate: Nazar Amidi KDP candidate: Fouad Hussein No agreement has yet been reached on a unified Kurdish candidate. The KDP insists that whoever wins the presidency must relinquish four Kurdish ministerial posts in Baghdad. The PUK, meanwhile, wants to maintain its current gains and demands two ministerial posts, in addition to supporting a KDP candidate for second deputy speaker of Parliament. These disputes are intertwined with disagreements over the formation of the 10th Kurdistan Regional Government cabinet, particularly over the Interior Ministry, which the PUK claims. The KDP is seen as pressuring the PUK in Baghdad via the presidency, while the PUK pressures the KDP in Erbil via the Interior Ministry. Resolving one could unlock the other. Final List of Presidential Candidates Parliament announced a final list of 19 candidates for the presidency: Shwan Hwaiz Fariq Namq Ahmed Abdullah Tawfiq Ahmed Hussein Gah Hassan Mohammed Sinjari Najmuddin Abdul Karim Hama Karim Nasrallah Asu Faridun Ali Saman Ali Ismail Shali Sabah Saleh Saeed Abdullah Mohammed Ali Vaher Al-Aliawi Abdul Latif Mohammed Jamal Rashid Sheikh Mohammed Iqbal Abdullah Amin Halawi Nazar Mohammed Saeed Mohammed Kanji Sardar Abdullah Mahmoud Taymez Fouad Mohammed Hussein Beki Manni Amin Nader Nozad Hadi Mouloud Khalid Siddiq Aziz Mohammed Yzad Majid Hassan Rafi Abdullah Hamid Mousa Salim Hawas Ali Al-Saadi

Sheikh Maqsoud Battle: Casualties and Key Units

The five-day battle for Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo City ended on January 10, 2026, with Syrian Transitional Government (STG) forces capturing the last SDF-held neighborhoods after more than a year of intermittent clashes and failed negotiations. Based on pro-STG announcements, at least 39 government soldiers were killed between January 6–10, with over half of the deaths occurring on January 9–10 during the final assaults on Ashrafiyah and Sheikh Maqsoud. Nearly half of the fallen were from Aleppo, reflecting STG policy of deploying fighters within their home governorates, and most were experienced opposition veterans rather than new recruits. The bulk of casualties came from the 60th and 72nd Divisions, with the 60th Division serving as the primary assault force and other divisions providing fire support. As fighting intensified on January 8, senior defense leadership formed a joint operations room, leading to the capture of Ashrafiyah and then Sheikh Maqsoud. The final assault involved elite units from the 52nd Special Forces Division, while limited armored support came from the 76th Division.

Presidential Nominees in Iraq

Monday is the final deadline for registering the names of candidates for the position of President of Iraq. So far, among the Kurds, those who have declared their candidacy include (Aso Faridun, Shwan Dawudi, Musana Amin, Hussein Sinjari, Latif Rashid…). It is expected that by Monday, a number of other political figures will also declare their candidacy for this post. Opposition Parties: The opposition parties (Halwest, Yekgirtu, Komal, and possibly New Generation as well) are expected to nominate a candidate for the position of President of Iraq. The decision is that Dr. Musana Amin, a Yekgirtu MP, will be the opposition’s candidate. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): So far, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has not officially announced its candidate. Although the name of Nizar Amidi, a member of the PUK Political Bureau and former secretary to Jalal Talabani, has been mentioned as the official PUK candidate, discussions behind the scenes suggest that Bafel Talabani, the PUK president, is expected to become the candidate. According to follow-ups, Bafel Talabani meets the conditions, as he was born in 1973 in the house of Ibrahim Ahmad in Baghdad, is over 40 years old, and holds a bachelor’s degree. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): So far, the Kurdistan Democratic Party has not officially announced its candidate. Although in the previous two rounds, the KDP had candidates for the position of President of Iraq: In 2018, the KDP nominated Dr. Fuad Hussein against Barham Salih, but he was not elected. In 2022, the KDP nominated Hoshyar Zebari, but he was excluded; afterward, Rebar Ahmed was nominated and later withdrew. Therefore, during the third round of electing the second deputy speaker of the Iraqi parliament, Bafel Talabani announced to the KDP delegation that they would vote for the KDP’s candidate. It is unclear whether this PUK position was part of an agreement in exchange for the presidency or merely a unilateral stance. However, it is not expected that the presidency would easily be handed to the PUK unless there is an agreement on giving the presidency to the PUK and the PUK agrees to the formation of a new Kurdistan Regional Government cabinet in the manner desired by the KDP. On the 29th of last month, Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, announced his conditions for the position of President of Iraq, stating that Kurdish parties must reach a unified position on the post and that it should not be decided unilaterally by any one party. Independents: So far, a large number of individuals have officially registered their names as independent candidates for the position of President of Iraq, unaffiliated with any political party, including Shwan Dawudi, Aso Faridun, Latif Rashid, Hussein Sinjari… The position of President of Iraq, as a political convention, goes to the Kurdish component, similar to the position of Speaker of Parliament going to the Sunnis and the position of Prime Minister going to the Shiites. Conditions for Presidential Nomination According to Law No. (8) of 2012: Must be born in Iraq to an Iraqi father and mother. Must be mentally sound and at least 40 years old. Must have a good reputation and political experience, be honest, clean-handed, just, and loyal to the homeland. Must not have an educational level lower than a university bachelor’s degree, and the degree must be recognized by the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. Must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Must not be subject to procedures of accountability and justice, or any other similar legal procedures. Election of the President: After the first session and the election of the parliamentary leadership, the Council of Representatives of Iraq must, within (30 days), elect a new President by a two-thirds majority, meaning 220 votes. out of the total (329 seats), in accordance with Article (72) of the Constitution. If, in the first round of voting, none of the presidential candidates obtains a two-thirds majority, then according to Article (70) of the Constitution, in the second round the candidate who receives the highest number of votes will become President. Presidents of Iraq: 2005 – 2014: Jalal Talabani 2014 – 2018: Dr. Fuad Masum 2018 – 2022: Dr. Barham Salih 2022 – 2025: Dr. Latif Rashid

Iraq Reclaims West Qurna-2 From Russia, Seeks U.S. Operator

Iraq’s Ministry of Oil has taken over the West Qurna-2 oil field from the Russian company Lukoil, and plans to transfer it to an American company. In a statement published by the Ministry, it announced issuing a direct and exclusive invitation to a number of major U.S. companies to enter direct negotiations, with the aim of submitting their proposals and bids for taking over the operation of the West Qurna-2 field. According to the offers and requirements, the contract will be awarded for the development of the field. The Ministry highlighted that transferring the management of West Qurna-2 to one of the American companies could serve the shared strategic interests, strengthen the stability of global oil markets, ensure the continuity of Iraq’s oil production and its supply to the market, and enhance bilateral economic relations between Iraq and the United States through the transfer of advanced technology. Lukoil, the second-largest oil company in Russia, has recently been subjected to sanctions by the United States and the United Kingdom, which caused its operations in the West Qurna-2 field to halt. Due to these sanctions, the Iraqi government suspended payments of both cash and crude oil to the Russian company. In addition to suspending payments, SOMO, Iraq’s state oil marketing company, also halted the export of crude produced from West Qurna-2, which ultimately forced the Russian company to withdraw from the field.

Participation and Boycott of the Parliamentary Elections

Across Iraq, a total of 21,406,882 eligible voters were recorded. Of these, 11,997,084 people cast their ballots, representing a 56% turnout. Among the votes cast, 11,267,161 were valid (93.9%), while 729,923 ballots were voided (6%). Sulaimani Province registered the highest number of invalid ballots: 137,611 invalid votes out of 742,256 total, amounting to 18.5%. Erbil Province followed with the next highest proportion of invalid votes.

Election Campaign Spending Estimated at $3 Billion

? Dirty political money is being used as fuel for election campaigns. This leads to the election of people who view government positions as opportunities to recover their campaign expenses through suspicious or fake contracts. This creates a dangerous cycle: illegally obtained money buys power, and power produces more illegal money. ? Statistics indicate that winning a single parliamentary seat in some provinces costs up to $5 million. This means a list or alliance aiming for 10 seats needs about 50 billion Iraqi dinars. Previously, campaign costs per seat ranged between 750 million to 1.5 billion dinars. ? Financial experts estimate that political blocs and parties will collectively spend about $3 billion on the 2025 elections — the largest campaign expenditure Iraq has ever witnessed. ? Election observers describe ongoing campaigns, especially in major cities, as extravagant and unnecessary, with tens of thousands of banners, posters, and photos covering streets and even cemeteries. ? The spending limit for strong candidates often exceeds $1 million, while mid-level candidates spend several hundred thousand dollars, and weaker ones around ten thousand dollars. ? The excessive and chaotic budgets of many lists and blocs often originate from: Illegal sources, such as fake contracts and oil smuggling revenues, Corrupt commercial networks, or Foreign regional funding is tied to political or economic agendas. ? The question remains: What is the real value of elections that offer no hope for change, dominated by large parties that divide everything among themselves under the so-called “quota system”? Where Does the Campaign Money Come From? Economic analysts suggest that total spending by political blocs, coalitions, and candidates across various stages of the 2025 election campaign — up to the end of October — has surpassed 4 trillion Iraqi dinars. Observers note that campaign extravagance extends to large rallies, tribal gatherings, and concerts with gift distributions, alongside traditional posters and billboards. These expenses, often without limits, have raised pressing questions from politicians and researchers alike: Where is this money coming from, and how are these political groups funding their campaigns? While no official answers have been provided, leaked information and insider remarks reveal several main sources of funding: Money from ministries and state institutions controlled by certain parties, Funds diverted from senior administrative posts or regional governments, Budget allocations from public projects or foreign aid programs are channeled through party-linked offices. Lack of Transparency and Accountability According to economist Ali Muslim, Iraq still lacks an effective financial disclosure system, making it “one of the region’s highest spenders and least transparent states.” He warns that the absence of accountability not only undermines the integrity of elections but also erodes citizens’ trust in state institutions. Muslim adds: “The same scenario repeats before every election: massive spending during campaigns, followed by an economic slowdown afterward.” He stresses that without a strict campaign finance law, Iraq faces growing financial risks that could prolong its economic crisis indefinitely. Legal Framework and Weak Oversight Although Iraqi election law (Law No. 9 of 2020) and the Law on Political Parties require candidates to declare their funding sources, practical monitoring is almost nonexistent. The Independent High Electoral Commission, the Anti-Money Laundering Office, the Integrity Commission, and the Board of Supreme Audit all operate without proper coordination or a unified information system, preventing effective tracking of money flows. Under Article 4(3) of the Anti-Money Laundering Law (Law No. 39 of 2015), the office is responsible for investigating suspicious financial transactions related to money laundering, terrorism financing, or other financial crimes. However, no public data has been released so far regarding the money circulating in the election campaigns, making it, in experts’ words, “one of the murkiest files in Iraq’s financial and political landscape.” Sunni Lists Lead in Campaign Spending Reports indicate that Sunni blocs top the list of big spenders, relying heavily on tribal and family networks and region-based funding. Shiite blocs, particularly those in Baghdad, follow behind. In a televised interview, Yazan Mishaan al-Jubouri, head of the “Our Hawks” alliance, revealed that securing a single parliamentary seat costs about 5 billion dinars, meaning a 10-seat target requires 50 billion dinars. He added that costs previously ranged from 750 million to 1.5 billion dinars per seat, depending on local political and social conditions. His father, Mishaan al-Jubouri, a veteran Sunni politician from Salahuddin, estimated the current cost per seat at 10 billion dinars, describing the upcoming elections as “the most corrupt in Iraq’s modern history.” A candidate from Anbar, speaking anonymously, confirmed that spending for strong candidates often exceeds $1 million, while weaker ones spend only a few thousand dollars, with much of the money provided directly by political parties. Economist Manar al-Ubaidi estimates total real campaign spending to be between 3 and 4 trillion dinars, possibly higher due to the lack of official financial data. He concludes: “The financial dimension of Iraq’s election campaigns has slipped out of control. Funds are being spent without transparency or oversight, and the responsible authorities operate in silos without coordination.” As a result, Iraq’s elections have become a multi-billion-dollar competition funded by opaque money, reinforcing corruption rather than democracy. Source: Report by NIRIJ Network

Will Iraq Hold Free and Fair Elections?

According to the results of a survey conducted by the Draw Media Organization, 55% of participants believe that the elections will be rigged, 22% think it will be designed or manipulated, and only 15% believe that the elections will be clean and fair. In recent months, Draw Media Organization carried out three on-the-ground surveys exploring voter participation, boycotts, and public skepticism about possible election manipulation. Here are the findings for one of those questions. Question: Do you think the upcoming parliamentary elections in Iraq will be conducted fairly and without fraud? 55% of participants believe the election will be rigged 22% believe it will be designed/manipulated 15% believe it will be clean and fair 9% said they don’t know Among all participants, only 15% think the elections will be clean and fair, while 77% believe they will be rigged or manipulated. Survey results by gender: Rigged: Men 55%, Women 53% Manipulated/Designed: Men 22%, Women 21% Clean and fair: Men 15%, Women 16% Don’t know: Men 8%, Women 10% Survey results by city/region: Rigged: Raperin 60%, Halabja 42% Manipulated/Designed: Raperin 24%, Halabja 25% Clean and fair: Raperin 6%, Halabja 26%

294 Working Hours in Four Years; 76 MPs Didn’t Speak at All

During four years, the Fifth Term of the Iraqi Parliament has worked for only 294 hours and 42 minutes. In every session, out of the total 329 MPs, 156 MPs were absent, and 76 MPs never spoke even once. As Iraq and the Kurdistan Region prepare for the Sixth Parliamentary Election, new data reveal that the Fifth Term has significantly declined compared to the previous term in areas such as (number of sessions, legislation output, minister questioning, MP attendance, and total working hours). More details are included in this report. A New Assessment MADARIK Institute — an Iraqi non-profit monitoring organization founded in 2004 — has published its final report on the performance of the Fifth Term of the Iraqi Council of Representatives. This report has attracted major media attention, especially as the country moves toward elections for the Sixth Parliamentary Term on 11/11 of this year. The report sets multiple evaluation indicators for MPs and ranks the best and worst based on: Participation in the first and second readings of proposed laws Participation in general topic discussions in Parliament Use of procedural points (points of order) Submitting legislative proposals Questioning ministers and officials A Brief Note on the Electoral System Before presenting performance details, the report highlights changes to the electoral system triggered by the 2019–2021 protests, which demanded electoral reform. The electoral law used in 2018 — the Sainte-Laguë system — was abolished. Each governorate had previously been a single electoral district. Under the new system, elections were based on multiple districts, and independent candidates were recognized. Iraq was divided into 83 districts, with a quota of 25% seats for women and 9 seats for minorities. The early elections of the Fifth Term took place on 10/10/2021: 3,225 candidates (men & women) From 108 parties and 21 alliances Plus 789 independent candidates On 11/30/2021, the Electoral Commission announced: 22,116,368 eligible voters 9,629,601 votes cast (44% turnout) Results: Of 329 seats: 137 seats for coalition parties 148 seats for single parties 44 seats for independents Due to issues at 33 polling stations, manual recounts changed 5 winners. Overall: 217 MPs (66%) entered for the first time 68 MPs (19%) returned for a second term 35 MPs (10%) returned for a third term Only 2 MPs had served five terms Younger MPs increased compared to the previous term. Among male candidates, the top 10 vote-getters included six KDP MPs from Erbil, Duhok, and Kirkuk. Among women, Suroor Abdul-Wahid ranked first nationwide, along with several other Kurdish MPs. A number of MPs also won with very small vote totals, listed in the report. Parliamentary Sessions The first session of the Fifth Term was held on 1/9/2022, in which: Mohammed al-Halbousi: Speaker with 200 votes Hakem al-Zamili (Sadrist): First Deputy Speaker with 182 votes Shakhawan Abdullah (KDP): Second Deputy Speaker with 180 votes This session triggered four constitutional challenges at the Federal Supreme Court, putting parliamentary activity on hold for 12 days. On 6/12/2022, Sadrist MPs — including Deputy Speaker al-Zamili — resigned from Parliament. Their seats were filled by alternative MPs on 6/23/2022, and Mohsen al-Mandlawi was elected as First Deputy Speaker. Later, mass protests — including the storming of Parliament — halted its work for 25 days, until 10/13/2022, when Latif Rashid was elected President and he tasked Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani to form a government. On 10/27/2022, Parliament approved the new cabinet except the Reconstruction and Environment ministries, which were reserved for Kurds. Parliamentary Performance Compared to previous terms, the Fifth Parliament declined in: Session count Laws passed Ministerial questioning MP attendance Total working time The term cancelled 20 sessions after agendas were already published. There were also many MP replacements due to resignations and ministerial appointments — particularly after the Sadrist mass resignation of 73 MPs. MP Activity According to the evaluation metrics: Most active speaker: Adel Hashoush Hatemi — spoke 80 times Followed by: Faleh Hasan Khazaali — 66 times Raed Hamdan Ajab — 55 times In contrast: 76 MPs never spoke nor submitted a single procedural point — including a number of Kurdish MPs. Additional statistics: 48 MPs spoke only once in four years 48 MPs spoke twice 25 MPs spoke three times 18 MPs spoke four times The table also shows the most active Kurdish MPs from the PUK parliamentary faction. A party-by-party comparison is included showing how many MPs each party had, and how many actually participated in debates. Oversight Role The oversight performance — including minister questioning and formal inquiries — is summarized in a dedicated table showing individual MP actions. MP Attendance Average attendance was only 173 MPs per session out of 329 — meaning 156 MPs absent on average. Working Hours In total: Parliament worked 294 hours and 42 minutes in four years Equivalent to 2.2 hours per session, across 132 sessions

The Kurdish Role in Iraq’s Governance (2006–2010)

? On December 15, 2005, elections were held for Iraq’s Council of Representatives, with 326 lists, parties, and individual candidates participating. Among them was the Kurdistan Alliance List, which included most of the Kurdish parties except the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU). The Kurdistan Alliance won 19.27% of Iraq’s total votes, securing 53 seats in Parliament, while the Kurdistan Islamic Union gained 1.82% of the votes and 5 parliamentary seats. ? On May 20, 2006, Nouri al-Maliki announced his new government. The Kurds took part and held several key positions. Alongside Jalal Talabani, who retained the presidency, the Deputy Speakers of Parliament were Aref Tayfour and Dr. Roz Nuri Shaways. Kurds also had representation in the Iraqi National Security Council and held 57 seats in Parliament. Kurdish figures who held ministerial positions included: Dr. Barham Salih – Deputy Prime Minister Hoshyar Zebari – Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Latif Rashid – Minister of Water Resources Fawzi Hariri – Minister of Industry Bayan Dazyee – Minister of Municipalities Dara Nuraddin – Minister of Justice Ali Baban – Minister of Planning Narmin Othman – Minister of Environment 1. Election of the First Term of Iraq’s Council of Representatives – Kurdish Participation On December 15, 2005, another election for Iraq’s Council of Representatives took place, with 326 lists, parties, and individuals competing. The Kurdistan Alliance List included most Kurdish parties, while the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) participated independently. On December 6, 2005, the KIU’s offices in the Badinan region were burned down. The KIU accused supporters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of involvement in the attacks. According to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)’s final results, the Kurdistan Alliance won 19.27% of Iraq’s votes, gaining 53 seats out of 275 total parliamentary seats. This represented a decline of about 6% from the January 30, 2005, elections, in which the alliance had secured 25% of the seats (75 seats). Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Islamic Union received 1.82% of the votes and 5 seats in the Iraqi Parliament. Election Date Kurdish Vote Share Kurdish Seats January 15, 2005 21% 58 seats January 30, 2005 27% 75 seats December 15, 2005 19.27% 53 seats 2. Kurdish Role in Nouri al-Maliki’s First Cabinet (2006–2010) After Kurdish dissatisfaction with Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s government and following the December 15, 2005, elections, Nouri al-Maliki formed a new cabinet on May 20, 2006. The Kurds held several ministerial posts. In addition to Jalal Talabani serving as President, the Kurds held: Aref Tayfour and Dr. Roz Nuri Shaways as Deputy Speakers of Parliament, Kurdish representation in the National Security Council, and 57 members of Parliament. Kurdish ministers: Dr. Barham Salih – Deputy Prime Minister Hoshyar Zebari – Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Latif Rashid – Minister of Water Resources Fawzi Hariri – Minister of Industry Bayan Dazyee – Minister of Municipalities Dara Nuraddin – Minister of Justice Ali Baban – Minister of Planning Narmin Othman – Minister of Environment During al-Maliki’s first cabinet, Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution — which outlined the process for resolving the status of disputed territories — reached its final deadline on December 31, 2007, without implementation. Kurdish representatives did not take a unified stance regarding their failure.

Iraqâ€™s General Elections (2005â€“2023)

? Iraq and its people are approaching their ninth general election since the regime change in 2003. After five parliamentary terms and three rounds of provincial council elections, the country is now heading toward the sixth parliamentary election, scheduled for November 2025. ? Statistics show that voter turnout in Iraq has been declining after each election. For example, in the first parliamentary elections (January 2005), out of 15.5 million registered voters, 11.89 million participated — a turnout of 79%. But in the most recent parliamentary elections (2021), out of 22.1 million registered voters, only 9.6 million participated — 43.5% turnout. ? Similarly, in the first provincial elections (2009), out of 14.6 million voters, 7.14 million voted (48% turnout). But in the most recent provincial council elections (2023), out of 16.2 million voters, only 5.6 million voted (41% turnout). Introduction Iraq is heading into its ninth general election since the 2003 regime change. After five parliamentary sessions and three provincial council elections, the sixth parliamentary election is scheduled for November 2025. Political and security changes, along with citizens’ disillusionment with Iraq’s political system, have significantly impacted election results and voter turnout. Yet, dominant political blocs have managed to maintain enough popular bases to secure influence in forming governments. This has intensified political competition and deepened divisions between factions. These elections were often marred by political and security crises that shaped their outcomes and government formation, while also fueling sectarian rivalries among Iraq’s political forces. Below is a summary of the eight major elections and trends in Iraqi voter behavior. 1. Parliamentary Election (2005) The first election after the U.S.-led invasion was tied to the demand for a new political system. Shiite voters, long excluded from power, mobilized strongly, while Kurds consolidated their influence. Many Sunni leaders boycotted, viewing the process as illegitimate. United Iraqi Alliance (led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim): ~128–140 seats (over 4 million votes). Kurdistan Alliance (KDP, PUK, others): 53 seats; Kurdistan Islamic Union: 5 seats. Iraqi Accord Front (Sunni-led, Adnan al-Dulaimi): 44 seats. Iraqiya List (Iyad Allawi): 25 seats. Iraqi National Dialogue Front (Saleh al-Mutlaq): 11 seats. 2. Provincial Elections (2009) The first provincial elections were held (excluding Kurdistan and Kirkuk). They followed years of sectarian war (2006–07). State of Law Coalition (Nouri al-Maliki): 126 seats (~1.36m votes). Shahid al-Mihrab List (Abdul Aziz al-Hakim): 52 seats. Sadrist Trend: 43 seats. Iraqiya (Allawi): 26 seats. National Reform Trend (Ibrahim al-Jaafari): 23 seats. Sunni forces collectively: 78 seats (various leaders: Tareq al-Hashemi, Saleh al-Mutlaq, etc.). Kurdish parties: 20 seats. Other groups: 72 seats. This gave Maliki and his allies dominance, while Sunnis regained ground. 3. Parliamentary Election (2010) Marked by nationalist, cross-sectarian campaigning. Iraqiya List (Iyad Allawi): 91 seats (later reduced to 89). State of Law (Maliki): 89 seats. National Iraqi Alliance (ISCI, Sadrists, etc.): 70 seats. Kurdistan Alliance: 43 seats. Gorran Movement: 8 seats. Kurdistan Islamic Union: 4 seats. Despite Allawi’s win, Maliki retained power through post-election alliances. 4. Provincial Elections (2013) Held amid protests, unrest, and security crackdowns under Maliki. State of Law: 102 seats (~1.9m votes). ISCI: 66 seats (~943k votes). Sadrist Trend: 60 seats (~653k votes). Mutahidun (al-Nujaifi): 35 seats. Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Dialogue Front: 18 seats. Kurdish List: 17 seats. Iyad Allawi’s List: 16 seats. Others: ~133 seats. 5. Parliamentary Election (2014) Held during the ISIS rise. Soon after, Mosul and other provinces fell. State of Law: 92 seats. Sadrist “Ahrar” Alliance: 33 seats. ISCI “Citizens’ Alliance”: 30 seats. Mutahidun (Sunni): 23 seats. National Coalition (Allawi): 21 seats. Kurds: 64 seats (KDP 27, PUK 21, Gorran 9, KIU 4, Komal 3). Despite his bloc’s win, Maliki was pushed aside; Haider al-Abadi became PM. 6. Parliamentary Election (2018) First after ISIS defeat. Sairoon Alliance (Sadristhe ts + allies): 54 seats. Fatah Alliance (Hadi al-Amiri): 47 seats. Nasr Alliance (Haider al-Abadi): 42 seats. State of Law: 25 seats. KDP: 26 seats. Wataniya (Allawi): 21 seats. Hikma (al-Hakim): 19 seats. PUK: 18 seats. Others: small blocs. 7. Parliamentary Election (2021) Snap elections following the 2019 October protests. Sadrist Movement: 73 seats. Progress Party (Taqaddum, Halbousi): 37 seats. KDP: 31 seats. State of Law (Maliki): 38 seats. Fatah Alliance (Amiri): 17 seats. Azm Alliance (Khanjar): 14 seats. Others: New Generation (9), independents, etc. After Sadrists withdrew, seats were redistributed, Coordination Framework bloc consolidated ~130 seats. 8. Provincial Elections (2023) First, since 2013, after the councils had been dissolved in 2019. Nabni (We Build, Amiri): 43 seats. State of Law (Maliki): 35 seats. State Forces Alliance (al-Hakim): 23 seats. Progress (Halbousi): 21 seats. Sovereignty Alliance: 14 seats. Decision (Tasmeem): 12 seats. Azm: 10 seats. Hasm National: 8 seats. KDP: 6 seats.

Next Sunday… New deadline for the State Council to decide

The State Council has postponed its opinion regarding the disputes between Erbil and Baghdad to the beginning of next week, in the hope that a representative of the Kurdistan Region will participate in the meeting. It appears that this council does not want, as the Federal Supreme Court has done in the past, to become entangled in the political disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad or be seen as taking sides when issuing decisions. Due to differences of opinion among the members of the State Council, the council was unable to finalize and submit its view on the Erbil-Baghdad disputes regarding Kurdistan’s oil revenues. Today marked the fourth consecutive day that the council failed to submit its opinion on this issue, which had been referred to it by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and the Federal Council of Ministers. The State Council has postponed giving its opinion on this key point of contention between Erbil and Baghdad until the beginning of next week (Sunday), so that the KRG’s representative might also participate in the meeting. It had originally been scheduled that on Tuesday of this week—coinciding with the regular meeting of the Federal Council of Ministers—the State Council would return its opinion to the federal government. On Monday, the council requested that two advisors from the KRG’s Ministries of Finance and Justice attend the session to help finalize the decision. However, so far, no representative of the KRG has participated in the council’s meetings, and it remains unclear whether one will attend on Sunday as expected. Yesterday, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Council of Ministers held a meeting about its disputes with the federal government over oil revenues. In its statement regarding the Federal Council of Ministers’ decision to refer the matter to the State Council, the KRG stressed: “We reaffirm our constitutional and legal position on the collection of oil revenues and the designation of shares in the federal treasury, based on Article (12/Second-d) and (21/Second) of the Federal Budget Law, and Article 29 of the Federal Financial Management Law, as well as Section Three of the Federal Supreme Court’s Decision No. 224 of 2024/2/21. All of these are legal and federal rulings, and in clear and explicit language they organize the collection of domestic revenues, earmark a share for the federal treasury, and also designate a share for the Kurdistan Region. This was also reaffirmed in the KRG’s latest official memorandum submitted to the federal government.” Because the State Council must give an opinion on the Erbil-Baghdad dispute over Kurdistan’s oil revenues, and since this is the first time the council is directly involved in a dispute between the two governments, it does not want to fall into the fate of the Federal Supreme Court, whose president was forced to resign due to political pressure. Instead, the council seeks to maintain neutrality in its decision-making and present itself as an impartial institution—especially at a time when Iraq is heading toward new elections and the outlook for the country’s future governance remains uncertain.

Oil & Gas Dossier

Opinion

Article 140: 18 Years After Deadline, Implementation Still Pending

ASYCUDA System and Iraq’s Economic Transformation

Report: Iraq’s Electricity Sector Faces Major Gap Between Spending and Revenue

What is the new customs tariff that sparked protests in Iraq?

How Was the Session to Elect the President Postponed?

Sheikh Maqsoud Battle: Casualties and Key Units

Presidential Nominees in Iraq

Iraq Reclaims West Qurna-2 From Russia, Seeks U.S. Operator

Participation and Boycott of the Parliamentary Elections

Election Campaign Spending Estimated at $3 Billion

Will Iraq Hold Free and Fair Elections?

294 Working Hours in Four Years; 76 MPs Didn’t Speak at All

The Kurdish Role in Iraq’s Governance (2006–2010)

Iraqâ€™s General Elections (2005â€“2023)

Next Sunday… New deadline for the State Council to decide

China's Path to 2035

Why the United States should stop supporting the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga

Kurdistan gas and diversification

Will Iraq Finally Revive This Mothballed Megaproject?

ASYCUDA System and Iraq’s Economic Transformation

Ilham Ahmed Warns of New War in Syria, Criticizes Turkey’s Role

Dana Gas Reports $130 Million Profit in 2025

Article 140: 18 Years After Deadline, Implementation Still Pending

Statistics of Marriage and Divorce in the Kurdistan Region in 2025

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