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Erbil in the Iraqi Council of Representatives Elections 2010–2025

In the second parliamentary election of Iraq in 2010, 5 lists/alliances won seats. In the third election of 2014, 4 lists won. In the fourth election of 2018, 6 lists won. In the fifth election of 2021, only 3 lists won seats in the Council of Representatives. On 7/3/2010, the number of eligible voters was 917,685. For the upcoming sixth election (scheduled 11/11/2025), the number of eligible voters in Erbil is 1,410,112. That means the number of eligible voters has increased by 492,427 (53.7%) between 2010–2025. However, voter participation has decreased: from 680,408 voters in 2010 to only 444,253 voters in 2021 – a decline of 236,155 voters (35%). Although many general elections have been held for both the Kurdistan Parliament and the Iraqi Council of Representatives across Iraq and the Kurdistan Region (including Erbil) during the past two decades, the Kurdistan Parliament elections were mostly held on a single-constituency system, except for the latest one on 20/10/2024, which was conducted with multiple constituencies. In contrast, the Iraqi parliamentary elections were always conducted with multi-constituency divisions, but until the fifth election (2021), Erbil was considered a single constituency. In the 2021 election, under the new law, Erbil was divided into 4 constituencies. This report reviews the results of Iraqi parliamentary elections in Erbil, analyzing eligible voters, participation rates, competing parties, and winning seats. 1. Erbil in the 2010 Iraqi Parliamentary Election (7/3/2010) Eligible voters: 917,685 Actual voters: 680,408 (74%) Seats: 14 general + 1 minority (Christian) Results: Kurdistan Alliance (PDK + PUK + others): 458,403 votes → 10 seats PDK: 306,775 votes → 8 seats PUK: 124,632 votes → 2 seats Gorran Movement: 103,397 votes → 2 seats Kurdistan Islamic Group (Komal): 70,662 votes → 1 seat Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU): 51,065 votes → 1 seat 2. Erbil in the 2014 Iraqi Parliamentary Election (30/4/2014) Eligible voters: 936,557 Actual voters: 744,489 (79.5%) Seats: 15 Results: PDK: 354,735 votes (48%) → 7 seats PUK: 168,688 votes (23%) → 4 seats Gorran: 104,059 votes (14%) → 2 seats Komal: 80,492 votes (11%) → 2 seats KIU: 26,323 votes (4%) → 0 seats 3. Erbil in the 2018 Iraqi Parliamentary Election (12/5/2018) Eligible voters: 1,123,219 Actual voters: 642,232 (57.2%) Seats: 15 Results: PDK: 321,920 votes (50%) → 8 seats PUK: 79,945 votes (12%) → 2 seats New Generation: 70,833 votes (11%) → 2 seats Gorran: 40,863 votes (6%) → 1 seat Komal: 36,784 votes (6%) → 1 seat Coalition for Democracy & Justice: 50,537 votes (8%) → 1 seat KIU: 24,475 votes (4%) → 0 seats 4. Erbil in the 2021 Iraqi Parliamentary Election (10/10/2021) Eligible voters: 1,238,379 Actual voters: 444,253 (35.9%) Seats: 15 (across 4 constituencies) Results: PDK: 262,800 votes (59.2%) → 11 seats New Generation: 79,245 votes (17.8%) → 3 seats PUK: 65,862 votes (14.8%) → 1 seat Komal for Justice: 19,517 votes (4.4%) → 0 seats Gorran (in alliance with PUK): 4,245 votes (1%) → 0 seats KIU: 3,990 votes (0.9%) → 0 seats Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party: 2,167 votes (0.5%) → 0 seats Independents & small groups: 6,427 votes (1.4%) → 0 seats 5. Eligible Voters & Participation Trends in Erbil (2010–2025) 2010: 917,685 eligible – 680,408 voted (74%) 2014: 936,557 eligible – 744,489 voted (79.5%) 2018: 1,123,219 eligible – 642,232 voted (57.2%) 2021: 1,238,379 eligible – 444,253 voted (35.9%) 2025 (projected): 1,410,112 eligible – turnout TBD Key points: The number of eligible voters grew by 53.7% (492,427 more) between 2010–2025. The number of actual voters declined by 35% between 2010 (680k) and 2021 (444k).

Open Dialogue on Journalists’ Issues

Today at the main office of Draw, an open dialogue was held on “The Situation of Journalism and Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region.” The discussion, moderated by writer and journalist Kemal Raouf, brought together writers and journalists to exchange views on the topic. In particular, considerable attention was given to the current state of freedom of expression and journalism in the Kurdistan Region, which many argue is under pressure. Have the government and those in power restricted freedom of expression? Especially after the imprisonment of Sherwan Sherwani, the attack on Hemen Mamand, and the incidents in Lalazar—as well as other recent events across the Kurdistan Region—many journalists and activists have felt an atmosphere of anxiety and uncertainty. Where is this situation heading? Is it a normal state of affairs, or is it a reflection of broader domestic, regional, and geopolitical dynamics?

Barzani Warns of ISIS Resurgence if U.S. Withdraws

Masoud Barzani: 🔻 If America withdraws, I fear ISIS will return 🔻 I hope Abdullah Öcalan will be freed Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), stated that he has no doubt the same scenario after 2012 could repeat itself and that the Islamic State (ISIS) may re-emerge if the international coalition forces led by the United States withdraw from the region. He emphasized that the threat of ISIS remains, and this has been officially announced. In an interview with France 24, Barzani spoke about the situation of the Kurdish minority in Syria, the disarmament of the PKK in Turkey, and the planned withdrawal of coalition forces led by the U.S. from Iraq by the end of this year. According to the source, regarding Syria’s situation, Barzani said: in March of this year, an agreement was signed between Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Ahmed Jarba, former Syrian opposition leader. The agreement referred to unifying Kurdish military and civilian institutions with the central government. However, Barzani noted that this agreement has not yet been implemented, which in his view has created risks of withdrawal, disruption, and worsening relations between Kurds and Arabs, as well as external interventions. Barzani stressed the need to resolve issues through dialogue, not war, since war is not a solution, and governments must take into account the diversity of their societies. Regarding the possibility of Turkish military action against the SDF, Barzani said he believes Turkey supports a peaceful resolution and has backed the March agreement so it can be implemented. He also welcomed the disarmament of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), expressing hope that it could pave the way for peace and the release of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Barzani said: I hope he will be freed.

Dispute Deepens Within Kurdistan’s Human Rights Team Over Lalazar Case and Political Bias

A section of the Independent Human Rights Team rejects a recent statement, calling it politically motivated. They stress Slemani security cooperated in cases like Lalazar, but question the Team’s silence on Khorshid Herki, Hemen Mamand, Sherwan Sherwani, Shwan Saber, Sheikh Adham Barzani, and Rashid Agha, warning such bias harms credibility. On September 5, 2025, the Independent Human Rights Team in the Kurdistan Region issued a statement criticizing Slemani security forces for withholding information on missing persons linked to the Lalazar clashes and the case of Aram Qadir, urging transparency, family access, and the formation of a high-level investigative committee.

What do the data and forecasts tell us..?

By: Luqman Hawiz Important Note: The information and analyses presented here are based on available collected data. The forecasts and datasets regarding the likelihood of continuing neutral conditions and a return to La Niña in the ENSO state have been published by NOAA, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the world’s primary agency for weather, climate, and ocean monitoring. In past years, I have based all my forecasts on NOAA data, and at least 70%–80% of those forecasts proved accurate. However, since weather forecasts generally depend on many changing variables, predictions can’t be 100% accurate. To fully understand, please also read the conclusion, which includes further analysis. Unfortunately, in Kurdistan’s social media scene, only a few individuals, such as Aras Jabar and Sirwan Salih (and perhaps others I don’t know), present scientific weather discussions with data-based analysis. Many others claim to be “meteorologists” but share predictions without any scientific basis or reliable data. Please be cautious and don’t believe every prediction from unqualified sources. In summary, the forecasts based on data tell us the following (with more details below): Very briefly, rainfall during the upcoming 2025–2026 wet season will be below average, especially in October, November, December, and January. Overall, from October 2025 through March 2026, rainfall will be lower than the average of a normal year. However, compared with last year’s rainfall, it will be slightly better because the La Niña phase expected this season is weaker than the strong La Niña that dominated last year. Generally, rainfall in most areas of Kurdistan will be about 40% to 60% of a normal year’s rainfall, varying depending on location. More scientific context: In general, during El Niño events, rainfall across Syria, southern and central Iraq, Kurdistan, and Iran tends to be normal or above average. Most of the time, it is above average. During neutral ENSO phases, rainfall tends to be normal or slightly below average. During La Niña events, rainfall is significantly below average, leading to dry or semi-dry seasons. What are El Niño, La Niña, and ENSO Neutral conditions in meteorology? These phenomena occur in the central Pacific Ocean near the equator. La Niña = cooling of surface waters in the central and eastern Pacific by about 1–2°C below the long-term average. El Niño = warming of the same waters by about 1–2°C above the average. Neutral ENSO = when temperatures are close to the long-term average. These shifts occur due to changes in wind speed and direction over the Pacific, and they influence weather patterns globally—especially in the Americas, the Middle East, Europe, and East Asia. Each phase can last from several months to up to two years. How were El Niño, La Niña, and Neutral phases last year and this year, and what’s expected for the upcoming season? 2023–2024 winter: Strong El Niño was present → resulted in a wet, rainy season (forecasted correctly). Spring 2024: El Niño ended. March 2024 – February 2025: Strong La Niña dominated → resulted in a dry 2024–2025 season (forecasted correctly). Since March 2025: Neutral conditions have prevailed (no El Niño, no La Niña). Forecast for Fall 2025: A weaker La Niña is expected to re-emerge around late September or October 2025, possibly lasting until February 2026. This means below-average rainfall again, though less severe than last year. Spring 2026: Neutral conditions are expected to return, which may improve rainfall in March–April 2026 compared to winter months. Additional regional factor: Due to climate change and global warming, the surface temperature of the Red Sea has been steadily rising in recent years. This has increased evaporation and the frequency of humid air masses moving north. As a result, flash floods and heavy downpours in Saudi Arabia have become more common in recent years. This sometimes also affects southern and central Iraq. For this year, such Red Sea influences are again likely, but with weaker effects on Kurdistan compared to Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq.

Shaikan Oil Field: Production and Revenue of the First Half of 2025

Source: Roonbin Organization for Transparency in Oil Processes Author: Yadgar Sdiq Galali Summary of Production and Revenues The Shaikan oil field’s average daily production in the first eight months of 2025 was 41,638 barrels per day, sold at an average price of $27 per barrel. Total revenues: $268 million Share of companies: 44.6% → $100 million for Gulf Keystone (GKP) and $19 million for MOL Share of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG): $148 million → 55.4% Introduction This report is based on company reports, joint-production agreements, and field data verified by our observers. It: Tracks monthly production and sales. Details revenues and cost-sharing between KRG, GKP, and MOL. Discloses company debts, costs, and profits. Provides background on Shaikan field and its reserves. Uses simplified language for public accessibility. Production Trends (Jan – Aug 2025) Jan – May: Production averaged >46,500 barrels/day. June: Dropped to 31,800 bpd due to Eid al-Adha and the 12-day Iran–Israel war. July: Further fell to 21,200 bpd after a drone strike near Shaikan (affecting nearby fields). August: Recovered to 39,600 bpd by Aug 26. Current output stabilized at ~45,000 bpd (26,000 from PF-1, 19,000 from PF-2). Comparison: H1 2025 production: 44,100 bpd (+12% vs H1 2024 at 39,252 bpd). First 8 months total: 9.6 million barrels. Revenues Average oil price (H1 2025): $27.8/bbl → up 6% from $26.3 in H1 2024. Still $44.1 below Brent crude (average Brent price: $71.9). Total revenues H1 2025: $221.9m GKP: $83.1m (+17% vs 2024) MOL: $16m KRG: $122.8m Total revenues Jan–Aug 2025: $268.9m GKP: $100.7m MOL: $19.3m KRG: $148.8m Costs & Profits Operating costs (H1 2025): $26.9m (+13% from 2024, mainly due to reopening two wells). Operating cost per barrel: ~$4.4 (unchanged). Capital expenditure: $18.1m (up from $7.8m in 2024, mainly for PF-2 upgrades). Expected to reach $30–35m by year-end 2025. Profit distribution: $25m already paid to shareholders in H1 2025. Another $25m scheduled for Sept 30. Total dividends 2025: $50m → $0.1152/share. Future Plans PF-2 water handling unit scheduled for 2027, expected to add 4,000–8,000 bpd and reduce gas flaring. Oil continues to be sold to domestic buyers in Kurdistan since pipeline exports stopped. Price range: $27–28/bbl. Company Debts & KRG Arrears Total KRG debts to GKP + MOL: $192.8m (including $150.5m unpaid costs + $42.3m unpaid profits). GKP share: $151.1m (120.4m opex + 30.7m profit). MOL share: $42.7m (30.1m opex + 11.6m profit). KRG commercial debt: $171m, tied to crude exports (Oct 2022 – Mar 2023). Shaikan Field Overview Location: Duhok governorate, 60 km NW of Erbil. Operators: Gulf Keystone (UK) 80%, MOL (Hungary) 20%. Oil discovered: Aug 2009, production began 2013. Total produced (up to Aug 26, 2025): 145m barrels. Oil quality: heavy crude, API 27°, high sulfur, discounted by ~$23–29 below Brent. Wells: 18 total, tied to PF-1 & PF-2 facilities (capacity: 60,000 bpd). Reserves (end of 2023): 1P (Proven): 224m barrels 2P (Probable): 489m barrels Production lifespan estimate: ~28 years → economic cutoff in 2047. The Shaikan oil field remained stable despite war and drone attacks in mid-2025. Production averaged 41.6k bpd in the first 8 months, generating $268m revenues (55.4% to KRG). Costs remain low ($4.4/bbl), and dividend payments continue. However, KRG still owes $192.8m in arrears to the companies.

One month since the KRG became inactive

It has been about a month since the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) became inactive, while Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Masrour Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, have both been outside the country for several days. According to follow-ups: Masoud Barzani, the KDP President, has been in Germany for medical check-ups for several days and has not yet returned. Masrour Barzani, the KRG Prime Minister, has been in the United States with his family for more than 20 days. Normally, the KRG Council of Ministers convenes every Wednesday, but due to the Prime Minister’s absence, the council has not met for four consecutive weeks. The last meeting was held on July 30, 2025, meaning that the government has effectively been inactive for about a month. This inactivity comes as the month of September approaches, while civil servants in the Kurdistan Region still have not received their June salaries, despite the existence of a government and parliament amid ongoing crises, conflicts, and political turmoil in the region.

Fate of Lahur Sheikh Jangi

Lahur Sheikh Jangi, leader of the (People's Front ), is currently in the custody of the Sulaimani security forces. Will he be tried in court? Or will be handed over to the UK as a British citizen? Did he surrender, or was he captured? Who was the commander in Lalazar who was able to escape? Beginning of the Events Over the past two months, especially after the protests in Sulaimani and their suppression by the security forces — with fears that others would also join in — some PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) leaders believed there was a security shake-up. Several senior military officers gathered to discuss these concerns, raising suspicions of a coup or internal instability. The PUK then launched security operations. A week before the attack on Lalazar, armed clashes took place around 5:00 AM. Two people were injured in the fighting. Lahur Sheikh Jangi’s associates informed Asayish (security) about the incident, but officials at Lalazar insisted they had already provided videos and evidence to Asayish, which had ignored them. Bafel Talabani’s side is talking about an assassination attempt, accusing Lahur Sheikh Jangi and another security official of trying to assassinate Bafel Talabani using a drone. Lahur dismissed this, saying it was internal PUK disputes, not a plot linked to him. On August 20, Bafel Talabani traveled to Baghdad, informing several embassies (US, UK, France) and Iraqi political leaders about plans to strike against Lahur Sheikh Jangi. He returned to Dabashan (PUK HQ) the same evening under heavy security with convoys and helicopters flying overhead. On August 21, in the afternoon, checkpoints were closed and all roads monitored to prevent Lahur’s associates from moving. Security forces, including counter-terrorism, commandos, and SWAT, were fully mobilized with armored vehicles, artillery, and drones, set for 3:00 AM. Lalazar was defended by about 200 men from the KRG Interior Ministry alongside Polad Sheikh Jangi, Rebwar Hamid Haji Ghali, and Ahmed Asaf. However, none of Lahur’s traditional allies or defectors joined them. At night, Lahur called Sulaimani’s Asayish chief, asking about the attacking forces. He was told there was a warrant for his arrest and urged to surrender. During the heated exchanges, Bafel Talabani himself intervened several times by phone, insisting Lahur must give up. Lahur refused, warning, “You will pay the price if you come.” Around 3:30 AM, heavy clashes broke out. For more than three hours, counter-terrorism forces, commando units, armored vehicles, drones, and artillery were used. Lalazar’s defenders resisted fiercely. Eventually, drones bombarded Lalazar, allowing commandos to storm the compound. By then, many of Lahur’s men were out of ammunition and surrendered. Lahur was captured while trying to help his brother Polad Sheikh Jangi, who had been badly wounded. Wahab Halabjai escorted Lahur, Polad, Zino Mohammed, and Fink Ahmed out of the compound under arrest. Awat Sheikh Jangi Awat, Lahur’s sister, insisted on joining the fight despite her ill health, saying she couldn’t abandon her brothers. She stayed with them until the end, even at the moment of Lahur’s capture. Lahur’s other brothers — Aras, Hiwa, and Ako — were abroad. His wife and children were also not in Kurdistan. Other Commanders Rebwar Hamid Haji Ghali: Fought for hours, refusing to surrender. Eventually, his father was pressured to persuade him. He finally gave up after running out of ammunition. Ahmed Asaf: The only commander who escaped. He continued fighting until the last moment, then broke out during the chaos. He later posted on Facebook: “I will never surrender; I’d rather be a free hawk than a chained slave.” Casualties Officially, Asayish reported 3 security personnel killed and 19 injured. Unofficially, around 30 fighters from Lahur’s side were killed or injured, including six of his personal guards. Fate of Lahur Sheikh Jangi After capture, Lahur was transferred directly to the Asayish prison. Polad, shot in the leg, was hospitalized. Other detainees were moved to Kani Goma prison. Zino Mohammed and Fink Ahmed were later released. Initially, charges were under Article 56 of Iraqi law (conspiracy to disturb public security). Later, it shifted to Article 406 (premeditated murder), tied to the deaths of security officers. Bafel Talabani insists Lahur must be tried because: He allegedly attempted a coup. He fought against official security forces. Security officers were killed. But the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) clarified that the operation was conducted by PUK party forces, not official government security forces, and that the cabinet was not informed until after it started. UK Citizenship Both Lahur and Polad hold British passports. The UK government has raised concerns with Bafel Talabani. Some discussions considered allowing Lahur and Polad to leave politics and resettle in the UK. But current indications point toward trial and sentencing in Kurdistan.

Three Party Leaders in Prison in Sulaymaniyah

According to reports, three party leaders (Lahur Sheikh Jangi, leader of Berêy Gel; Shaswar Abdulwahid, leader of New Generation; and Aram Qadir, former leader of Hawpaimani) are currently imprisoned in Sulaymaniyah. 1. Lahur Sheikh Jangi – Leader of Berêy Gel Lahur Sheikh Jangi, leader of Berêy Gel, who holds 2 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament, was arrested today after security forces took control of the party’s main headquarters in Lalazar. He is now being held in the Kani Goma prison and is set to face trial under Article 406 of the Iraqi Penal Code. 2. Shaswar Abdulwahid – Leader of the New Generation Movement On August 12, 2025, by a judge’s ruling, Shaswar Abdulwahid, leader of the New Generation Movement, who holds 15 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament and 9 seats in the Iraqi Parliament, was arrested. He was previously sentenced in absentia to six months in prison, and on Thursday, he was brought before the court. His trial is scheduled for August 28. Currently, he is being held in the Police Detention & Transfer Facility in Salam Camp. 3. Aram Qadir – Former Leader of the National Alliance (Hawpaimani) On July 10, 2025, Aram Qadir, former leader of the Hawpaimani (National Alliance), was arrested in Sulaymaniyah. However, the reason for his arrest remains unknown, and it is not clear where he is being held.

Clashes End, Security Forces Take Control of Lalezar

Last night, large units of Counter-Terrorism, Commando, and SWAT forces surrounded the residence of Lahur Sheikh Jangi, head of the "Berêy Gel" faction, in Sarchnar, Sulaimani. The Sulaimani court spokesperson announced that an arrest warrant was issued for Lahur Sheikh Jangi under Article 56, which concerns groups conspiring to undermine security and stability. At around 3:30 a.m. this morning, clashes erupted between the two sides. Using heavy weapons, tanks, and various arms, the forces attacked Lalezar, where nearly 200 armed men loyal to Lahur Sheikh Jangi resisted for about three hours. By 6:30 a.m., the security forces entered Lalezar, arresting Lahur Sheikh Jangi, Polad Sheikh Jangi, and Aso Sheikh Jangi, bringing the fighting to an end. During the confrontation, three security personnel were killed and several others were injured.

Oil Pipeline Ready for Export

Employees of the North Oil Company in Zakho are awaiting the resumption of Kurdistan Region oil exports. According to Fuad Hussein, a temporary agreement has been reached for handing over the Kurdistan Region's oil. Following the agreement, Iraq’s Ministry of Oil is now waiting to receive oil from the Kurdistan Region. Based on (Dwar)’s follow-up, employees of the North Oil Company — which belongs to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil — are stationed in Zakho waiting for the restart of Kurdistan Region oil exports. The decision is that Kurdistan’s oil will flow through the pipeline from the Khurmala field to Zakho, where it will be delivered to the Measurement Station (MS) managed by the North Oil Company under Iraq’s Ministry of Oil. At this station, the oil will be measured before being pumped toward Turkey. Inside Turkish territory, the oil is received at PS 1 station, from where it is transferred to Ceyhan Port and handed over to SOMO (Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Company) for export. According to a statement by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Ministry of Natural Resources released on August 13, the KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil have agreed on a mechanism for resuming oil exports. The agreement was formally signed by 23 representatives — 17 of them from Iraq’s Ministry of Oil. Under the deal, after 50,000 barrels per day are reserved for domestic use in the Kurdistan Region, the remainder of the oil will be delivered to SOMO for export. Fuad Hussein, Iraq’s Foreign Minister and member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Political Bureau, told Al-Shams TV: “Erbil and Baghdad have reached a ‘temporary’ agreement on handing over the Kurdistan Region’s oil. This is only a temporary solution until the end of this year. It is based on two legal foundations: the current federal budget law and the rulings of the Federal Court. Therefore, starting next year, another, more permanent solution must be found.” Regarding why exports haven’t resumed yet and the current obstacles, Iraqi economic expert Nabil Marsoumi wrote on social media: International oil companies are still insisting on increasing the compensation for production costs, and Turkey has not yet formally confirmed its readiness to restart flows. Marsoumi highlighted two main obstacles to restarting Kurdistan Region oil exports: Consent of international oil companies: These companies are still demanding higher compensation for production costs. They are unwilling to accept a $16-per-barrel transport cost for exports. They have also raised the cost of trucking oil from the fields to the pipeline, estimated at 200–300 km. Furthermore, they want Baghdad to honor their commercial contracts, guarantee payment for past and future exports, ensure timely transfers of oil-sale revenues directly to the companies, and sign a written agreement with them. Turkey’s approval: Although Turkey had previously agreed in principle to receive the oil, it must issue an official notice to Iraq confirming its readiness to restart the pipeline flows. Once that happens, the oil will be loaded into tankers at Ceyhan Port, and SOMO will take charge of exporting it.

PUK and KDP Have Not Yet Agreed on the Posts

So far, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have not reached an agreement on the division of government posts, and no positions have been allocated between them. They have only agreed to intensify efforts to ensure that the Kurdistan Parliament begins its work and activities in September. They have also reached an understanding on parliamentary posts. Yesterday, at the PUK Political Bureau headquarters in Erbil, delegations from the KDP and PUK met to discuss forming the new cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The statement issued after the meeting said both sides agreed that serious and intensive efforts should be made to ensure that the sixth term of the Kurdistan Parliament begins its legislative and regular activities in September, and that steps to form the new cabinet continue. According to Dawar’s sources from KDP and PUK officials, the two sides have not yet agreed on the distribution of posts and have not allocated any positions. The KDP has not accepted part of the PUK’s demands, and the PUK has likewise not agreed to the KDP’s proposals on the division of posts. Regarding yesterday’s statement, it was only mentioned that efforts should be intensified for the Parliament to convene in September, not that there was an agreement for the Parliament to start sessions. Since the KDP and PUK have not yet agreed on the division of posts — including parliamentary positions — it remains unclear how parliamentary activities will begin. This may be due to the continued pressure from the international community, which repeatedly calls for speeding up the formation of the new KRG cabinet. In recent meetings between top government, KDP, and PUK leaders with ambassadors and consuls, they have stressed the importance of forming the new cabinet before the Iraqi parliamentary elections. On the KDP–PUK Negotiations: Although the two parties have agreed on the government’s program and agenda — and publicly announced their agreement in February — the division of posts remains unresolved. Negotiations are ongoing, with each side maintaining its own demands and rejecting some of the other’s proposals. The posts the KDP has claimed for itself: President of the Kurdistan Region Prime Minister of the KRG President of the Kurdistan Judicial Council Deputy Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament Minister of Interior Minister of Natural Resources Minister of Electricity Minister of Education Minister of Municipalities Head of the Council of Ministers’ Diwan The posts the KDP has proposed for the PUK: Speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament Vice President of the Kurdistan Region Deputy Prime Minister of the KRG Minister of Finance Minister of Higher Education Minister of Planning Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Minister of Reconstruction Minister of Agriculture Minister of Trade Minister of Peshmerga Affairs The PUK’s current demands: President of the Kurdistan Region Or a two-year term split for the Presidency and Premiership Minister of Interior Minister of Natural Resources Minister of Agriculture Minister of Finance Minister of Higher Education Minister of Agriculture (listed twice in their demands) Minister of Planning Secretary of the Council of Ministers According to Dawar’s findings, the negotiations are still far from an agreement on dividing the posts. Both sides have rejected several of each other’s proposals and continue to present new demands. Timeline and legal framework for forming the new cabinet: KDP and PUK officials, in their meetings with foreign diplomats and UN representatives, have emphasized that the new cabinet should be formed before the Iraqi parliamentary elections. Forming the government after the elections is considered too late, as time is running short. According to Law No. (1) of 2019 on the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, Article (4), Paragraph 1, after the election of the Parliament’s Presidency Board, the procedures for electing the President of the Region must begin within 30 days. This means the election and swearing-in of the Kurdistan Region’s President will take about 30 days. According to Articles (3) and (4) of Clause (56) of the 1992 Kurdistan Parliamentary Election Law, the President of the Executive Authority (Prime Minister) and the cabinet must be nominated and approved by the Kurdistan Parliament. Furthermore, according to Paragraph (12) of Article (10) of the amended Law No. (1) of 2005 on the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, after nomination by Parliament, the candidate for Prime Minister must be tasked with forming the cabinet within a period not exceeding 30 days. In other words, naming, assigning, and swearing in the new cabinet will also take 30 days. If the Parliament’s Presidency Board is formed in mid-September, the process of electing and swearing in the President, then forming and swearing in the new cabinet, would take around 60 days — putting the completion of the process in mid-November, about a week after the Iraqi Council of Representatives elections. This timeline assumes the KDP and PUK reach full agreement on all posts with no further disputes.

ShaMaran in the Atrush and Sarsang Fields in the First Half of 2025

🔻 According to the press release of Canadian ShaMaran Petroleum Company for the first half of 2025: 🔹 The company’s total revenue in the first half of 2025 amounted to $71.27 million, while in the first half of 2024 it was $45.218 million. Accordingly, revenue increased by $26.052 million, or 58%. 🔹 The combined average daily production from both the Atrush and Sarsang fields in the first half of 2025 was 64,500 barrels of oil per day (bopd), compared to 56,100 bopd in the first half of 2024. This represents an increase of 8,400 bopd, or 15%. In the first half of this year, Atrush’s average daily production was 35,200 bopd and Sarsang’s was 29,300 bopd, whereas in the first half of 2024, Atrush averaged 22,500 bopd and Sarsang 33,600 bopd. 🔹 The Atrush block has not been affected by any drone attack impacts and has resumed full-capacity production, but in the Sarsang block, production restarted at a reduced rate due to damage sustained. Current assessments indicate that about half of Sarsang’s production capacity will remain offline until the end of October 2025. ShaMaran Petroleum Company Revenue in the First Half of 2025 According to ShaMaran Petroleum Company’s press release: The company’s total revenue in Q2 2025 amounted to $35.385 million, compared to $22.630 million in Q2 2024. This means Q2 2025 revenue increased by $12.755 million, or 56%, compared to the same period last year. Meanwhile, the company’s total revenue in the first half of 2025 was $71.27 million, compared to $45.218 million in the first half of 2024—an increase of $26.052 million, or 58%. Oil Production from the Sarsang and Atrush Fields in the First Half of 2025 ShaMaran Petroleum, which has stakes in both the Sarsang and Atrush oil fields, announced: The combined average daily production from the two fields in the first half of 2025 was 64,500 bopd, compared to 56,100 bopd in the first half of 2024, an increase of 8,400 bopd or 15%. In the first half of this year, Atrush produced an average of 35,200 bopd and Sarsang 29,300 bopd. In the first half of 2024, Atrush averaged 22,500 bopd and Sarsang 33,600 bopd. The company also revealed that on July 15, 2025, ShaMaran was informed by HKN Energy Ltd. (“HKN”), the operator of the Sarsang block, that production had been halted following an explosion at one of the facilities due to a suspected unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike. No casualties occurred, but three storage tanks and associated pipelines were damaged. Although no incident occurred in the Atrush block and there were no further UAV strikes on Sarsang, production in both blocks was temporarily shut down as a precautionary measure following similar incidents at other fields in the Kurdistan Region. HKN resumed production in both blocks once the situation stabilized and was deemed safe after consultations with the Kurdistan Regional Government. The Atrush block was unaffected and returned to full capacity production. However, in the Sarsang block, production restarted at a reduced rate due to the sustained damage, and current assessments indicate that approximately half of Sarsang’s production capacity will remain offline until late October 2025. Source: ShaMaran Reports Second Quarter 2025 Results, August 6, 2025 https://shamaranpetroleum.com/news/shamaran-reports-second-quarter-2025-results-122873/

Sulaimaniyah Police: "Shaswar Abdulwahid has been sentenced in absentia and will be brought before the court."

Shaswar Abdulwahid, head of the New Generation Movement, has been arrested. According to the New Generation Movement, he was detained by a force belonging to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and taken to an unknown location. Surah Abdulwahid, head of the New Generation parliamentary bloc in the Iraqi Parliament, stated: a PUK force detained Shaswar Abdulwahid, acting on orders from Bafel Talabani and in coordination with Masrour Barzani. She claimed they fear Shaswar Abdulwahid’s stance and the elections, which is why they arrested him. A police spokesperson in Sulaimaniyah said that Shaswar Abdulwahid was arrested by Sulaimaniyah police and will be brought before a judge tomorrow. According to a statement from the Sulaimaniyah court, on 3 August 2025, Shaswar Abdulwahid was sentenced to six months in prison. The court ordered his arrest. Another statement, based on a complaint from a Sulaimaniyah security official, confirms there is an arrest warrant against him. Additionally, according to a complaint from former MP Shadi Newzad, he was sentenced to prison on charges of making threats, and the court requested his arrest. According to Dreaw’s follow-up with the court, Shaswar Abdulwahid had several complaints filed against him and had been notified, but he failed to appear before the court. Therefore, he was sentenced in absentia on three charges, totaling approximately three years and six months in prison. He will be brought before a judge but must serve his sentence before being released. In a video recording made before his arrest (and released after), Shaswar Abdulwahid says: "Through some people, I learned there was an attempt to arrest me. What they want from me is because of one thing: I speak out. They told us, ‘Yes, you said they are thieves.’ When this video is released, I won’t know if I’ve been arrested, disappeared, or killed. Their goal in arresting me is threefold: First, to stop me from managing the election campaign; second, to pressure me into surrendering; third, the PUK and KDP have agreed and are forming a government—they want to completely destroy my political movement. I say this before God Almighty: they want to silence me, but I won’t do it. Whatever happens to me, even if they kill me in prison, don’t stay silent. If what they say is true and they have any charges against me, let them try me in public court. If they have even a shred of honor and morality, and the courage, they should bring me openly before the people and try me in public."

Production within the framework of Genel Energy’s contracts

🔻 According to the latest report from the Turkish company Genel Energy for the first half of 2025, in all the oil fields in the Kurdistan Region in which the company has stakes, production levels were as follows: Tawke PSC area: In the first half of this year, average daily oil production reached 78,400 barrels per day (bpd). In Q1 2025, the average was 82,081 bpd, but in Q2 it dropped by 7,321 bpd (a 9% decline) to 74,760 bpd. Oil price: The company sold each barrel of oil at an average of $33 during the first half of this year, while the average Brent crude price in the same period was $72 per barrel. Revenue: The company’s revenue in H1 2025 amounted to $35.8 million, compared to $37.6 million in H1 2024. The report also stated that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) approved Genel Energy’s exit from the Sarta, Qara Dagh, and Taq Taq licenses, with minimal post-exit obligations. Revenue and production in H1 2025 According to the latest report, in the Tawke oil field in particular, average daily production was 78,400 bpd, down from 82,081 bpd in Q1 to 74,760 bpd in Q2 (a 9% drop). Revenue in H1 2025 was $35.8 million, compared to $37.6 million in H1 2024. Each barrel was sold at an average of $33, while Brent crude averaged $72. After the end of H1 2025, an unmanned drone attack targeted several Kurdistan Region oil fields, including Tawke, causing temporary production halts due to damage. The company stated that after assessing the damage, they are working on an appropriate plan to restore production levels. The report also mentioned that following exits from the Sarta, Qara Dagh, and Taq Taq licenses approved by the KRG, both receivables and costs owed to and from the KRG were reduced. The net receivables stood at around $50 million. Status of Taq Taq and Sarta fields Both Taq Taq and Sarta fields, operated by Genel Energy, have not produced oil since the suspension of Kurdistan’s oil exports on 25 March 2023, following a ruling by the Paris-based International Court of Arbitration. Only the Tawke field remains in production. Genel Energy’s fields in the Kurdistan Region The KRG has contracts with the Turkish company Genel Energy in four oil fields — Tawke, Taq Taq, Sarta, and Qara Dagh. The first three were producing before the export halt in March 2023, but only Tawke is still active. Tawke Field – Located in Duhok province. Norwegian company DNO holds 75%, while Genel Energy holds 25% of the PSC. Taq Taq Field – Located in the Taq Taq subdistrict of Koya, covering 951 km². Shares: Addax Petroleum (36%), Genel Energy (44%), and KRG’s KEPCO (20%). Genel Energy’s exit from Taq Taq has been approved by the KRG. Sarta Field – Located in Erbil province. Shares: Genel Energy (30%) and KEPCO (20%). Exit approved by the KRG. Qara Dagh Field – Located in Sulaymaniyah province, covering 846 km². Previously held by ExxonMobil (80%) and KEPCO (20%). After Exxon’s withdrawal, Genel Energy acquired 40%, but no production has begun. Exit from Qara Dagh has also been approved by the KRG. Source: Genel Energy PLC: Unaudited results for the period ended 30 June 2025, 05/08/2025 https://genelenergy.com/regulatory-news-press-releases/

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ShaMaran in the Atrush and Sarsang Fields in the First Half of 2025

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