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Attacks on Energy Infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region (2018–2025)

Draw Media KRG, Department of Media and Information Introduction The energy sector in the Kurdistan Region - an essential component of both Iraq’s national energy framework and the wider regional energy market - has been subjected to a sustained pattern of targeted attacks since 2018. What initially appeared as sporadic and low-impact incidents have evolved into increasingly sophisticated strikes employing ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This report documents the scope and consequences of these attacks, including material damages, operational disruption, and human casualties. Identifies outlines the implications for energy security and investment stability in the region. All findings are presented on the basis of verified data and factual reporting, without political interpretation. 1. Timeline and Evolution of Targeting: The campaign targeting energy-related assets in the Kurdistan Region can be divided into four distinct phases, each characterised by changes in method, precision, and objective. Phase I (2018–2021): Low-Accuracy Harassment Attacks During this period, oil fields and refineries were sporadically targeted with unguided Katyusha rockets. These attacks were largely imprecise, resulting in minimal damage and limited operational disruption. Their primary effect was symbolic rather than structural. Phase II (2022): Shift to Precision and Strategic Targeting In 2022, the nature of the attacks escalated significantly with the use of long-range, high-precision weaponry. • 13 March 2022: Twelve ballistic missiles struck a private residence in Erbil belonging to an energy sector investor (CEO of KAR Group), completely destroying the property. This marked the first documented instance of direct targeting of private capital through a precision missile attack. • April–May 2022: Grad rockets and UAVs launched from the Nineveh Plains targeted the Kalak refinery, damaging fuel storage facilities and confirming a shift toward degrading energy processing infrastructure. Phase III (2023–2024): Direct Strikes on Production and Personnel This phase was characterised by direct attacks intended to cause disruption to operations and loss of life: • 26 April 2024: A UAV strike on the Khor Mor gas field killed four technical staff and temporarily halted gas production, demonstrating the capability to strike active operational facilities. • 15 December 2024: A ballistic strike on the home of businessman Peshraw Dizayee, CEO of Falcon Group, resulted in the deaths of the investor, members of his family—including his infant daughter—and civilian guests. Phase IV (2025): Systemically Disruption of Energy Supply By 2025, attacks appeared designed to inflict widespread economic damage across interconnected energy systems: • July 2025: Coordinated UAV attacks targeted five oil fields - Khurmala, Sarsang, Peshkhabur, Tawke, and Sheikhan - reducing oil production by an estimated 220,000 barrels per day. • 26 November 2025: A precision strike hit an LPG storage facility at the Khor Mor gas field. 2. Data Background: Electricity System Impact: Khor Mor Field Attack: The table below provides a comparative overview of electricity production and supply conditions before and after the November 2025 attack on the Khor Mor gas field, illustrating the immediate impact of the disruption on power generation and regional electricity availability. 3. Summary of Major Incidents and Impacts (2022–2025): The following table summarises the most significant attacks targeting energy-related assets between 2022 and 2025, including the date, location, weapon type, point of launch, and the resulting operational, economic, and human impacts. 4. Economic and Energy Security Implications: The cumulative impact of these attacks has: • Disrupted oil and gas production and processing capacity • Reduced electricity generation and stability across the Kurdistan Region • Affected household and industrial power supply • Increased operational risks and insurance costs for investors Short-term disruptions have translated into broader economic consequences, particularly during peak seasonal demand, with ripple effects extending beyond the Kurdistan Region into Iraq’s national grid. Conclusion: The period from 2018 to 2025 reflects a clear evolution in the targeting of energy infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region - from low-impact harassment to precision strikes aimed at systemic disruption. The data presented demonstrate that energy installations, personnel, and associated civilian environments have increasingly become focal points of attack. This report aims to contribute to informed understanding among policymakers, energy stakeholders, researchers, and international partners by presenting a factual record of events and their consequences. Continued monitoring, documentation, and protection of critical energy infrastructure remain essential for safeguarding energy security, economic stability, and civilian well-being. Source; KRG, Department of Media and Information

French Consul General Visits "Draw" Media Platform

Draw Media The Consul General of France in the Kurdistan Region visited the Draw Media Organization to discuss the outcomes of the elections and the state of press freedom in the Kurdistan Region. Yann Brem, the French Consul General in the Kurdistan Region, visited the Draw Media Organization in Sulaimani. During the visit, Draw presented data and graphics related to the results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections and the standing of political forces, supported by books and publications previously produced by Draw. The organization also highlighted its reports and findings concerning elections and freedom of expression in the Kurdistan Region, focusing on how election results may impact the overall situation in the region.

Performance of Dana Gas Company in the Khor Mor Gas Field

Based on the latest financial and operational report of the Emirati company Dana Gas at the Khor Mor gas field: Khor Mor and Chemchemal are major gas fields containing several trillion cubic feet of gas reserves along with 3.1 billion barrels of condensate (naphtha) reserves, of which 1.1 billion barrels belong to Dana Gas. During 15 years of operation, the company has produced 500 million barrels of condensate, with peak condensate production recorded in 2024. Pearl Petroleum, the main gas producer supported by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), supplies the gas required to generate about 2,000 megawatts of electricity in 4–5 power plants. The KM250 expansion project—the plan to expand the gas field—is being constructed at a cost of $806 million. The United States provided $250 million in loans in 2021 for the project. The Khor Mor gas field reached its first production phase in October 2008, at which time only gas and condensate (naphtha) were produced at about 100 million cubic feet per day (MMscfd). In a new effort, in 2023, production significantly increased to about 500 MMscfd of gas, 86 MMscfd of naphtha, and 68 MMscfd of LPG. The company plans that, after the completion of KM250 in 2026, production will rise to 810 MMscfd of gas, 127 MMscfd of naphtha, and 105 MMscfd of LPG. Based on the latest financial and operational disclosures of Dana Gas in the Khor Mor gas field, the company describes the wealth of the field and its relatively low depletion as globally significant. Dana Gas contributes to energy security in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Aside from Khor Mor, the company is also in the initial appraisal and early development phase in the Chemchemal gas field. Khor Mor and Chemchemal jointly contain several trillion cubic feet of gas along with 3.1 billion barrels of condensate, 1.1 billion barrels of which belong to Dana Gas. Over 15 years, the company has produced 500 million barrels of condensate, peaking in 2024. Pearl Petroleum, the primary operator, provides gas for generating about 2,000 MW of electricity in 4–5 power plants. Total investment in the Khor Mor field so far has reached $2.055 billion. The KM250 project, with a total cost of $806 million, received $250 million in loans from the United States in 2021. Work began in January 2020 by the American company Exterran, which was later bought by Enerflex in 2022. By November 2024, the company had raised $350 million in bonds to support further field development. Dana Gas expects a significant increase in output once KM250 is completed in 2026, with gas production nearly doubling. Production Levels of Gas, Naphtha, and LPG in Khor Mor (2008–2026) 2008: First production—around 100 MMscfd of gas and condensate. 2010: Production nearly doubled to 191 MMscfd, including LPG. 2011: Production rose to 335 MMscfd, covering KRG domestic needs and enabling export of surplus gas. 2019: Significant increase: 383 MMscfd gas, 83 MMscfd naphtha, 64 MMscfd LPG. 2023: Another major rise to 500 MMscfd gas, 86 MMscfd naphtha, 68 MMscfd LPG. 2026 (forecast): With KM250 completed: 810 MMscfd gas, 127 MMscfd naphtha, 105 MMscfd LPG. In the chart (mentioned in the text), a dotted light-grey line shows the amount of gas allocated to KRG power generation, which is 305 MMscfd. Gas above 305 MMscfd represents surplus gas available for sale.

Nearly 6 Million Barrels – Kurdistan’s Oil Exports in October

Iraq’s Ministry of Oil has released the final statistics for oil exports and revenues for October. According to the data prepared by SOMO (Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization), total crude oil exports for October reached 110,923,047 barrels (including condensates). Oil revenues for the month exceeded 7.030 billion USD. Iraq’s oil exports for October were divided as follows: From central and southern Iraqi fields: 104,816,106 barrels From the Kurdistan Region through Turkey’s international port: 5,834,864 barrels Exports to Jordan: 272,077 barrels

Dissolution of Parliament or Completion of Quorum?

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has begun preparations for reconvening parliament and forming the government. The issue of completing the parliamentary quorum has been resolved, but the KDP wants to settle the matter of voting on the presidencies of parliament and government. The Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtu) will participate in the parliamentary session but will not join the government. The New Generation Movement (Naway Nwê) will attend the parliamentary session, and its participation in the government is likely. The People’s Front will attend the session as well. The PUK, however, currently does not want the 10th cabinet to be formed, nor does it want the KDP to negotiate with other parties to form the government in the way it intends. Still, the KDP is no longer willing to wait for the PUK and will use all available cards. Dissolution of the Kurdistan Parliament There has been talk for a while about dissolving the Kurdistan Parliament due to the KDP and PUK’s failure to reach an agreement on forming the government. Meanwhile, the results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections have shifted votes toward the KDP and several other smaller parties. If new elections are held in the Kurdistan Region, the seat distribution would likely change—especially benefiting the KDP. Based on Iraq’s election results, the KDP, which currently holds 39 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament, could rise to around 45–47 seats, while the PUK and New Generation would likely lose seats. More than 400 days have passed since the Kurdistan parliamentary elections were annulled, and the presidency of the parliament has not been elected. Legal Bases for Dissolving the Parliament According to Article 10(4) of the amended Presidency Law of the Kurdistan Region (No. 1 of 2005), the Kurdistan Parliament may be dissolved in the following cases: If more than half of its members resign. If the legal quorum is not achieved within 45 days after being called to session by the President of the Region. If parliament fails to grant confidence to three consecutive cabinet formations. If the electoral system changes while less than six months remain of the parliament’s term. Even though dissolving the parliament is legally possible through a presidential decree, political realities suggest that the KDP’s push for dissolution might simply be a pressure card to force other parties to complete the quorum. Holding new elections would take more than six months, and the electoral commission’s mandate expires next January. Under current conditions, it is highly unlikely that elections will be held soon. All indicators point instead toward reconvening parliament, electing the parliamentary presidencies, electing the president of the region, and then forming the government. What Happens Next? Masoud Barzani, President of the KDP, has repeatedly stated that the pre-election political arrangements with the PUK are no longer valid after the elections. This means the positions previously agreed upon will not be granted to the PUK. The PUK does not accept this, so the KDP is testing alternative paths to forming the government. The KDP now wants parliament to reconvene at any cost and to elect the parliamentary presidencies. According to independent sources: The National Stance (Halwesti Nishtimani) has decided not to join the new cabinet and will remain in opposition but will participate in the Iraqi government. The Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtu) will not join the cabinet but will participate in the parliamentary session, enabling the quorum for parliamentary meetings—but not for electing the presidencies. The Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal) may participate in the parliamentary session (but this is not officially confirmed). The People’s Front will attend the parliamentary session. The New Generation has been approached by the KDP several times and appears willing to join the cabinet if the issue of Shaswar Abdulwahid’s imprisonment is addressed. New Generation wants to turn its participation into leverage against the PUK to secure Shaswar’s release. If New Generation joins the government, this would recreate the 2019 cabinet scenario in which the KDP and the Gorran Movement formed a coalition first, and the PUK joined later. With New Generation’s participation, the quorum for electing the parliamentary presidencies would be completed, solving the KDP’s main problem. Even if New Generation refuses to join the cabinet, its attendance at the parliamentary session—because it has a candidate for parliament’s presidency—ensures a quorum for the session itself, though not for electing the presidencies (which requires 51 votes). KDP’s Quorum Strategy The KDP wants at least 51 votes in the hall to elect the parliamentary presidencies. Their current potential quorum breakdown: KDP: 39 seats New Generation: 15 seats Yekgirtu: 7 seats People’s Front: 1 seat Independents: 3 seats Total: 65 MPs This exceeds the 50+1 quorum needed for holding the session. But for electing the parliament speaker, deputy speaker, and secretary, 51 votes are needed. Without agreement with one of the main blocs, the KDP cannot reach this number. If the KDP and New Generation reach an agreement: KDP: 39 New Generation: 15 Independents: 3 Total: 57 votes This is more than enough to elect the parliamentary presidencies and later the president of the region and the prime minister. Election of the President of the Region After electing the parliamentary presidencies, the next step is to elect the President of the Kurdistan Region. According to the amended 2019 Presidency Law: Parliament elects the President. Voting must begin within 30 days after electing the parliamentary presidencies. The President is elected by an open vote, requiring 50+1 votes (51 MPs). If no candidate meets this threshold, the election proceeds to a second round, where only a simple majority is needed (unless there is only one candidate). Election of the Prime Minister After electing the President: Parliament grants confidence to the nominee for Prime Minister. The President tasks the nominee with forming the cabinet within 30 days. Parliament must approve the cabinet with 51 votes. The entire process of electing the presidencies and forming the cabinet will be complicated, but the KDP has clearly decided to no longer wait for the PUK. The KDP now pursues two simultaneous tracks: Forming the new Kurdistan Regional Government. Negotiating for the new federal government in Baghdad. If the KDP and PUK enter both negotiation tracks simultaneously, conflicts may deepen. But if the positions in Erbil and Baghdad are bundled together, reaching a deal may become easier—especially since both parties aspire to the Kurdish share of the Iraqi presidency, which could lead to a renewed two-candidate standoff in Baghdad similar to previous years.

PUK and KDP votes in disputed areas

Votes of the PUK and KDP in the Kurdish regions outside the administration of the Kurdistan Region in the elections of 2021 – 2023 – 2025 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): 2021: 145,139 2023: 217,475 2025: 278,904 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): 2021: 177,810 2023: 182,662 2025: 258,436 The quota seats for the PUK and KDP are not reflected in these figures.

Invalid/Blank Votes in the Kurdistan Region

Invalid/Blank votes in the Iraqi Parliamentary Elections – 11/11/2025 – in the Kurdistan Region Invalid/Blank Votes: Erbil: 116,900 Sulaimani: 137,611 Duhok: 34,694 Total: 290,205

Changes in Political Party Votes across Kurdistan Regional Governorates

🔻 Votes of political parties at the level of the Kurdistan Region’s governorates between the last two elections — the Kurdistan Parliament elections (2024) and the Iraqi Council of Representatives elections (2025): 🔹 The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) increased its votes by about 64,000, a rise of 8%. 🔹 The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) lost around 53,000 votes, a decrease of 13%. 🔹 The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) gained around 46,000 votes, an increase of 39%. 🔹 The Halwest movement gained approximately 100,000 votes, an increase of 179%. 🔹 The New Generation Movement lost about 169,000 votes, a decrease of 58%. 🔹 The Justice Group (Komalî Dadgarî) lost around 17,000 votes, a decrease of 26%. 🔹 The Berey Gel (People’s Path) lost about 14,000 votes, a decrease of 42%.

Final (Unofficial) Results of the Special Vote

Total (Overall): Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP / Parti): 94,666 votes Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK / Yeketî): 78,230 votes Halwest: 7,895 votes New Generation (Naway Nwe): 4,808 votes Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgrtu): 4,512 votes Komal (Kurdistan Islamic Group): 1,338 votes People's Front / Baray Gel): 1,153 votes Erbil (Hewler): KDP: 32,255 votes PUK: 12,512 votes Halwest: 2,298 votes Haidar Faili: 1,373 votes New Generation: 1,286 votes Yekgrtu: 670 votes Komal: 385 votes Baray Gel: 297 votes Asir Ibrahim: 55 votes Sulaimani: PUK: 42,913 votes KDP: 6,302 votes Halwest: 4,891 votes New Generation: 2,320 votes Yekgirtû: 1,580 votes Komal: 909 votes Baray Gel: 739 votes Duhok: KDP: 26,475 votes Yekgirtû: 2,260 votes Halwest: 686 votes New Generation: 536 votes PUK: 507 votes Komal: 44 votes Baray Gel: 31 votes Invalid (Spoiled) Votes: Sulaimani: 19,645 votes Erbil: 13,465 votes Duhok: 5,460 votes Total Invalid Votes: 38,570 votes

Participation and Boycott in General Elections (1992–2024)

Since the first parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region in 1992, the Kurdistan Region has held 13 general elections for the Kurdistan Parliament, Provincial Councils, and the Iraqi Council of Representatives. 1. First Kurdistan Parliament Elections (May 19, 1992) Eligible voters: 1,112,000 Votes cast: 971,953 Turnout: 87.4% Invalid votes: 4,724 Valid votes: 967,229 Breakdown: Erbil: 333,802 valid (87.4%) Sulaymaniyah: 347,952 valid (87.3%) Duhok: 197,370 valid (87.6%) Kirkuk region: 88,114 valid (87.3%) 2. Second Kurdistan Parliament elections (Jan 30, 2005) Eligible voters: 2,290,736 Votes cast: 1,753,919 Turnout: 76.6% 3. First Provincial Council Elections (Jan 30, 2005) Eligible voters: 2,290,736 Votes cast: 1,767,993 Turnout: 77.2% 4. First Iraqi National Assembly Elections (Jan 30, 2005) Eligible voters: 2,290,736 Votes cast: ≈2,175,551 (95%) within Kurdistan under the “Kurdistan Alliance” Highest recorded turnout in the history of New Iraq (95%) 5. Third Kurdistan Parliament elections (July 25, 2009) Eligible voters: 2,518,773 Votes cast: 1,876,196 Turnout: 74.5% 6. Second Iraqi Parliamentary Elections (Mar 7, 2010) Eligible voters: 2,590,274 Votes cast: 1,938,754 Turnout: 74.8% Breakdown: Erbil: 74% Sulaymaniyah: 76% Duhok: 74% 7. Fourth Kurdistan Parliament elections (Sept 21, 2013) Eligible voters: 2,653,743 Votes cast: 1,978,382 Turnout: 74.6% 8. Third Iraqi Parliament Elections (Apr 30, 2014) Eligible voters: 2,717,082 Votes cast: 2,128,167 Turnout: 78.3% Breakdown: Erbil: 79% Sulaymaniyah: 76% Duhok: 80% 9. Second Provincial Council Elections (Apr 30, 2014) Eligible voters: 2,717,082 Votes cast: 2,161,038 Turnout: 79.5% 10. Fourth Iraqi Parliament Elections (May 12, 2018) Eligible voters: 3,758,896 Votes cast: 1,799,686 Turnout: 47.9% 11. Fifth Kurdistan Parliament election (Sept 30, 2018) Eligible voters: 3,085,461 Votes cast: 1,845,979 Turnout: 59.8% 12. Early Iraqi Parliament Elections (Oct 10, 2021) Eligible voters: 3,450,773 Votes cast: 1,233,451 Turnout: 35.7% Lowest recorded turnout since 1992. Breakdown: Erbil: 35.7% Sulaymaniyah: 28.3% Duhok: 48.1% 13. Sixth Kurdistan Parliament elections (Oct 20, 2024) Eligible voters (biometric card updated): 2,899,578 Votes cast: 2,085,949 Turnout: 72% Invalid votes: 206,434 Breakdown: Erbil: 75% Sulaymaniyah: 66% Duhok: 78% Halabja: 69% Summary Analysis Over 32 years, voter eligibility in the Kurdistan Region increased from 1.1 million (1992) to nearly 3.8 million (2024) — a 210% increase. However, actual participation only grew by about 27%. Turnout has declined sharply over time, from 87.4% (1992) to 35.7% (2021), with a recovery to 72% in the 2024 regional vote. Peak turnout: 95% (Iraqi Parliament 2005) Lowest turnout: 35.7% (Iraqi Parliament 2021) 2024 recovery: 72% (Kurdistan Parliament) Long-term trend: eligible voters tripled, but turnout rates declined overall — showing voter fatigue and distrust over time.

Revenue in Sulaymaniyah Province dropped by 12% last week

The Transparency Platform for Oversight and Organization of Non-Oil Revenues in the provinces of Sulaymaniyah and Halabja, and the administrations of Raparin and Garmian, announced: Revenue for Sulaymaniyah Province between October 25–31, 2025, amounted to 12 billion and 509 million dinars, of which 95% was in cash and 5% in checks. Revenue for October 18–24, 2025, was 14 billion and 311 million dinars, showing a 12% decrease. Total revenue for October so far: 69 billion and 7 million dinars. Total revenue for September: 66 billion and 681 million dinars. Total revenue for August: 62 billion and 924 million dinars, with 85% in cash and 15% in checks. Total revenue for July: 118 billion and 926 million dinars, with 28% in cash, 67% via settlement, and 5% in checks. Total revenue for June: 139 billion and 173 million dinars, showing a decrease of 76 billion dinars (54%).

British Consul General Visits (Draw Media)

Andrew Beasley, the British Consul General in the Kurdistan Region, along with consulate diplomatic staff — Ms. Julia Howard, Political Affairs Officer for Conflict-Affected Areas, and Dr. Henar Marouf, Political Officer at the British Consulate General — visited the office of the media organization Draw Media in Sulaymaniyah. The purpose of the visit was to discuss issues related to press freedom and the Iraqi parliamentary elections. During the meeting, Draw presented and shared with the Consul General and the consulate’s diplomatic staff its publications, research findings, and statistical data related to the elections — including the results of several surveys on voting patterns, party lists’ vote shares in previous elections, and predictions for the upcoming elections.

The German Consul General visits Draw media organization

The German Consul General in the Kurdistan Region paid a visit to the Draw Media Organization to discuss election issues and freedom of the press in the Kurdistan Region. Albrecht von Wittke, the German Consul General in the Kurdistan Region; Rebecca Matthes, the Consul for Political, Economic, and Public Affairs; and Ihsan Walzi, Political and Public Relations Adviser, visited the Draw Media Organization in Sulaimani. At Draw Media Organization, data and graphics related to the elections were presented, based on the publications and reports produced by Draw. The discussion also covered the results of several surveys, the status and influence of political parties in the elections, and the challenges facing the electoral process.

Special Voting in the Iraqi Parliamentary Elections – 11/11/2025

This report includes the votes of the political parties in the special voting (2013–2018–2024) and the differences in their votes during special voting across previous elections, as well as information on the upcoming special voting in the Iraqi parliamentary elections scheduled for November 11, 2025. Total Number of Eligible Voters for the 11/11/2025 Elections Total: 3,883,501 Those who have updated their biometric data: 3,068,350 → 79% Those who have not updated their biometric data: 815,151 → 21% Total valid voters: 3,068,350 General voters: 2,844,052 → 93% Special voters: 224,333 → 7% Erbil Province General voting: 1,002,087 → 92% Special voting: 85,793 → 8% Total: 1,087,880 Sulaimani Province General voting: 1,119,111 → 93% Special voting: 82,547 → 7% Total: 1,201,846 Duhok Province General voting: 722,853 → 93% Special voting: 55,993 → 7% Total: 778,846 Results of Special Voting in the Elections of 20/10/2024 Out of a total of 165,000 counted votes, Valid votes: 138,724 Invalid votes: 26,644 Together they form 19% of the total. Among the valid votes: KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party): 39% PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan): 24% New Generation Movement: 6% In the special voting, 215,960 people were eligible to vote. The turnout rate was 97%, meaning 208,521 people cast their votes. By province: Erbil: Eligible: 89,791 Turnout: 97% → 87,513 votes cast Sulaimani: Eligible: 78,661 Turnout: 97% → 76,501 votes cast Duhok: Eligible: 40,956 Turnout: 98% → 40,206 votes cast Halabja: Eligible: 952 Turnout: 96% → 917 votes cast Votes by Party in the Four Provinces of the Kurdistan Region From 215,960 eligible voters, 165,368 votes have been collected: Valid votes: 138,724 Invalid votes: 26,644 → 19% invalid Party results: Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): 64,585 votes → 39% Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): 39,823 votes → 24% New Generation Movement: 9,034 votes → 6% Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtu): 2,384 votes → 1% Hawlwest: 2,037 votes → 1% Justice Group (Komal): 1,979 votes → 1% People's Front: 1,869 votes → 1% Gorran (Change Movement): 450 votes → 0.3% Erbil Province Eligible special voters: 89,791 → 87,513 voted (97%) Out of 62,285 counted votes: Valid votes: 54,094 Invalid votes: 8,191 → 13% Party results: KDP: 37,595 votes PUK: 4,486 votes New Generation: 3,113 votes Justice Group (Komal): 622 votes Hawlwest (Stance): 507 votes Islamic Union (Yekgirtu): 476 votes (People’s Front): 406 votes Kurdistan Alliance: 136 votes Sulaimani Province Eligible special voters: 78,661 → 76,501 voted (97%) Out of 71,745 counted votes: Valid votes: 55,645 Invalid votes: 16,100 → 23% Party results: PUK: 33,681 votes New Generation: 4,825 votes KDP: 3,897 votes People's Front(People’s Path): 1,415 votes Hawlwest (Stance): 1,314 votes Justice Group (Komal): 1,250 votes Islamic Union (Yekgirtu): 932 votes Kurdistan Alliance: 532 votes Gorran Movement: 438 votes Sardam List: 241 votes Duhok Province Eligible: 40,956 → 40,206 voted (98%) Out of 31,338 counted votes: Valid votes: 28,985 Invalid votes: 2,353 Party results: KDP: 23,093 votes New Generation: 1,096 votes PUK: 1,656 votes Islamic Union: 940 votes Hawlwest: 216 votes Justice Group: 107 votes Gorran: 12 votes Kurdistan Alliance: 45 votes Halabja Province Eligible: 952 → 917 voted (96%) Known results: PUK: 509 votes Islamic Union: 35 votes New Generation: 28 votes Justice Group: 20 votes KDP: 12 votes Hawlwest: 10 votes (People’s Front): 6 votes Differences in Party Votes in Special Voting – Parliamentary Elections of 2013, 2018, and 2024 In the 2013 elections (21/9/2013): Out of 154,050 eligible special voters, 144,434 voted → 93.8% turnout Results across the three provinces of the Kurdistan Region (2013): KDP: 59,794 votes → 41.4% In 2018, KDP gained 62,656 votes (40%), increasing its share by 1.4% PUK: 36,349 votes → 25.2% In 2018, PUK got 44,870 votes (28.7%), an increase of 3.4% Gorran (Change Movement): 24,130 votes → 16.7% In 2018, Gorran got 9,303 votes (6%), a 10.7% drop, around 14,000 fewer votes (60% decrease) Komal (Islamic Group): 2013: 3,990 votes (2.8%) 2018: 4,095 votes (2.6%) → roughly unchanged Islamic Union (Yekgirtu): 2013: 4,923 votes (3.4%) 2018: Reform List 1,907 votes (1.2%) → 2.2% decrease, around 3,000 fewer votes, a 300% reduction Party Votes in the Kurdistan Region (Special Voting – 2024) Out of 215,960 eligible voters, the results were as follows: KDP: 82,979 votes PUK: 51,345 votes New Generation: 11,207 votes Islamic Union (Yekgirtu): 2,885 votes Hawlwest (Stance): 2,492 votes Justice Group (Komal): 2,391 votes (People’s Front): 2,110 votes Gorran Movement: 705 votes

The Sixth Term Election of the Kurdistan Parliament

The Sixth Term Election of the Kurdistan Parliament The election for the sixth term of the Kurdistan Parliament was held on October 20, 2024: 3,450,000 people had the right to vote 2,893,447 people renewed their biometric cards 2,085,949 people cast their votes 1,882,448 were valid votes 206,434 were invalid votes

Oil & Gas Dossier

Opinion

Attacks on Energy Infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region (2018–2025)

French Consul General Visits "Draw" Media Platform

Performance of Dana Gas Company in the Khor Mor Gas Field

Nearly 6 Million Barrels – Kurdistan’s Oil Exports in October

Dissolution of Parliament or Completion of Quorum?

PUK and KDP votes in disputed areas

Invalid/Blank Votes in the Kurdistan Region

Changes in Political Party Votes across Kurdistan Regional Governorates

Final (Unofficial) Results of the Special Vote

Participation and Boycott in General Elections (1992–2024)

Revenue in Sulaymaniyah Province dropped by 12% last week

British Consul General Visits (Draw Media)

The German Consul General visits Draw media organization

Special Voting in the Iraqi Parliamentary Elections – 11/11/2025

The Sixth Term Election of the Kurdistan Parliament

China's Path to 2035

Why the United States should stop supporting the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga

Kurdistan gas and diversification

Will Iraq Finally Revive This Mothballed Megaproject?

Iraq Reclaims West Qurna-2 From Russia, Seeks U.S. Operator

Performance of Dana Gas Company in the Khor Mor Gas Field

Attacks on Energy Infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region (2018–2025)

French Consul General Visits "Draw" Media Platform

All Contents are reserved by Draw media.

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