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News / Kurdistan

The biggest gap between paychecks in the Kurdistan Region

For nearly a season, spanning the months of May, June, and July, public sector employees in the Kurdistan Region have not received their salaries. This marks the longest period without pay in the history of the Kurdistan Regional Government's cabinets, at least since the fall of the Ba'ath regime and the participation of the Kurds in the Iraqi political process. The monthly payroll for public employees in the Kurdistan Region amounts to (958) billion dinars, totaling (2 trillion and 874 billion) dinars for the three months. Currently, the Kurdistan Regional Government is solely looking to Baghdad to cover these salaries, despite the region having several other sources of income. Internal Revenue: According to statements from officials at the Ministry of Finance, this amounts to (320 billion) dinars monthly, which totals (960 billion) dinars for the three months. KRG Oil Revenue: According to a report by the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, this is approximately (400 billion) dinars per month, totaling (1 trillion and 200 billion) dinars for the three months. Coalition Funds: These amount to (20 billion) dinars monthly, adding up to (60 billion) dinars over the three months. Baghdad is scheduled to disburse the salaries for May, but employees are not optimistic that the agreement between Erbil and Baghdad will resolve the salary crisis. According to a poll conducted by (Draw Media) on Facebook, 94% of participants do not believe the salary issue has been resolved and think that, despite the decision to pay May's salaries, the problem will continue. As it stands, the Kurdistan Regional Government's only hope for distributing salaries lies with funds from the central government in Baghdad.

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Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces: Growing Numbers and a Multi-Billion Dollar Budget

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), or Hashd al-Shaabi, a powerful paramilitary umbrella organization in Iraq, has seen a significant increase in its number of fighters and its budget in recent years. As of 2024, the force boasts a membership of over 238,000, a substantial jump from approximately 60,000 in 2014, and its budget has swelled to an estimated $2.9 billion. This growth underscores the PMF's expanding influence within Iraq's security and political landscape. Formation and Legal Status The PMF was formed in 2014 following a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's highest Shia religious authority, calling for volunteers to fight against the Islamic State (IS) group. Initially a collection of volunteer militias, the PMF was officially recognized by the Iraqi parliament in 2016, integrating it into the state's security apparatus and placing it under the formal command of the prime minister. Despite this, many of its factions, particularly those with strong ties to Iran, operate with a degree of autonomy. Budget and Personnel Growth The PMF's budget has seen a steady and rapid increase. In 2019-2022, its general budget was $2.16 billion, which rose to $2.6 billion in 2023 and is projected to be around $2.9 billion in 2024. According to the 2024 budget tables, the allocation for PMF salaries increased from 3.5 trillion Iraqi dinars in 2023 to 3.9 trillion dinars in 2024, an 11.4% increase. The number of PMF members has also seen a dramatic rise. From around 60,000 volunteers in 2014, the force grew to over 122,000 by 2021. By the end of 2023, this number had jumped to 204,000 and now stands at 238,000 fighters, constituting approximately 16.5% of Iraq's total security and armed forces. Composition and Leadership The PMF is a diverse coalition, though predominantly Shia. It is estimated that Shia Muslims make up about 85% of the force, with the remaining 15% composed of Sunni Muslims. However, the leadership is overwhelmingly controlled by Shia figures. The PMF is chaired by Falih al-Fayyadh. The deputy head is Abdul-Aziz al-Mohammadawi, also known as Abu Fadak. Many of the most powerful groups within the PMF are backed by Iran. Key Brigades and Factions The PMF is composed of numerous brigades, often affiliated with specific political parties or religious authorities. Some of the most prominent include: Badr Organization: Led by Hadi al-Amiri, it is one of the oldest and most powerful factions, with 15 brigades. Kata'ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades): An influential group with strong ties to Iran, controlling several brigades. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous): Another influential Iran-aligned group that emerged from the Sadrist movement, with three brigades. Saraya al-Salam (Peace Brigades): Affiliated with the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr, consisting of three brigades. Atabat Brigades: Forces affiliated with the holy shrines in Karbala and Najaf, generally seen as more loyal to the Iraqi state. Tribal Mobilization (Hashd al-Asha'iri): Comprised of Sunni tribal fighters who joined the fight against IS. Minority Brigades: Including Christian groups like the Babylon Brigades and Shabak forces from the Nineveh Plains.  

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Damage of Drone Attacks on Oil Fields in the Kurdistan Region

Five major oil fields in the Kurdistan Region — Sheikhan, Tawke, Peshkabour, Khurmala, and Sarsang — were targeted by drone attacks, halting around 50% of production, amounting to 145,000 barrels of oil per day. Sheikhan Field, producing over 35,000 barrels/day, was shut down. Tawke Field, producing 29,000 barrels/day, was hit and closed. Peshkabour, with over 50,000 barrels/day, also suffered damage. Sarsang, producing 30,000 barrels/day, was attacked on July 15, 2025, halting operations. Khurmala, the largest with over 100,000 barrels/day, was attacked twice, damaging water pipelines. These attacks severely impact Kurdistan’s oil sector — the backbone of its economy — and threaten regional security. Daily oil production has dropped from 280,000 to around 135,000 barrels. The perpetrators are unknown, though initial investigations hint at armed groups linked to foreign backers.

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Kurdistan Justice Group Holds its Fifth Congress

Today, in the city of Erbil, the Kurdistan Justice Group (KJG) is holding its fifth congress, with over 900 members in attendance. The fifth congress of the Justice Group is a review congress of its past four years, as its seats and votes have decreased in the last two elections for the Kurdistan and Iraqi parliaments. The Kurdistan Justice Group This party was originally named the Kurdistan Islamic Group (Komal). It was founded on May 31, 2001, after splitting from the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. Since its establishment, it has been led by Ali Bapir, meaning its leader has not changed for 24 years. In February 2021, the Islamic Group held its (fourth) congress in Sulaymaniyah. In that congress, as the first Islamic party in the Kurdistan Region, it removed the "Islamic" suffix from its name, changing it from the Kurdistan Islamic Group to the Kurdistan Justice Group. In addition to this, the title of the party's top person was changed from "Emir" to "President." The Kurdistan Justice Group has held five congresses to date: First Congress: 10-11-12/11/2005 in Sulaymaniyah Second Congress: 15-16-17/ /2010 in Erbil (Translator's note: Month missing in original text) Third Congress: 30-31/5 and 1/6/2015 in Erbil Fourth Congress: 18-19/2/2021 in Sulaymaniyah Fifth Congress: 19-20/7/2025 in Erbil In the period between the last two congresses, the Justice Group's seats and votes have decreased. In the last election, its seats in the Kurdistan Parliament were reduced from 7 to 3 seats, and in the Iraqi Parliament, its seats were reduced from 2) seats to 1) seat. (Translator's note: The original text contained a typo stating a reduction to 19 seats, which is corrected here based on the subsequent data.) In the sixth session elections of the Kurdistan Parliament, the Kurdistan Justice Group obtained 64,864 votes and 3 seats, but the KJG leadership decided not to enter the Kurdistan Parliament, claiming the election was "designed." In the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections, the Kurdistan Justice Group obtained 64,156 votes and 1 seat. Kurdistan Justice Group's Position in Past Elections  

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The text of the agreement between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad

This agreement is effective until 31/12/2025. A new agreement will be required for the year 2026. First: The Oil File KRG will begin exporting all oil produced from the Region's fields, amounting to two hundred and thirty thousand (230,000) barrels per day, in addition to any future increases, through the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). The Federal Ministry of Finance will provide the Regional Government with $16 per barrel, in accordance with the amended Federal General Budget Law. A daily amount of 50,000 barrels will be allocated for domestic use in the Region, provided that the Regional Government commits to paying the production costs for this quantity. If the Region requires it, the Federal Ministry of Oil will allocate an amount of derivatives equivalent to the refining of 15,000 barrels. A joint committee from the Federal Ministry of Oil and the Regional Ministry of Natural Resources will assess the Region's actual need for oil derivatives for allocation purposes and will submit its report within two weeks. Second: The Non-Oil Revenue File The Regional Government will hand over an amount of 120 billion dinars for each of the months of May and June to the Federal Ministry of Finance. A working team from the Federal and Regional Boards of Supreme Audit will be formed to audit and classify non-oil revenues and determine the Federal Government's share thereof, within one month. The Ministry of Finance will immediately begin disbursing the salaries of the Region's employees for the months of May, June, and subsequent months.

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German Consul visited Draw Media, discussed oil, salaries, elections

The German Consul General in the Kurdistan Region visited Draw Media, where discussions focused on issues related to oil and salaries, elections, and freedom of expression. Albrecht von Wittke, the German Consul General in the Kurdistan Region, and Ihsan Walzi, Advisor for Political Affairs and Public Relations, visited Draw Media Organization to discuss the issue of freedom of expression and the current situation in the Kurdistan Region. Draw Media used data and graphics on oil production and revenues in the Kurdistan Region to highlight problems related to salaries and election challenges.

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​​​​​​​Sarsang... The Story of a Flared Gas Field

The Sarsang oil field, located in the Duhok Governorate, spans an area of 420 square kilometers and is divided into two separate oil zones: Swara Tuka and East Swara Tuka. Each contains three independent oil reservoirs. Estimates suggest the field holds 2 billion barrels of recoverable oil. The oil here is light and sweet, with a high API gravity and low sulfur content, making it compatible with Brent crude and requiring minimal refining. The operating expenditure (OPEX) for production is low, approximately $5.6 per barrel. On November 6, 2007, the Iraqi Ministry of Natural Resources awarded an exploration and production sharing contract (EPSC) to the American company HKN. Exploration began in 2008, and oil was discovered in 2011. According to a February 2014 report from the Ministry of Natural Resources, 213 workers were employed at the site by HKN at that time, with 173 of them being local, representing 81% local workforce participation. The field also contains natural gas, which has mostly been flared. In March 2022, Kamal Mohammed, then Minister of Electricity and acting Minister of Natural Resources, met with two foreign companies and requested studies on how to utilize the flared gas for power generation. This would both help solve electricity supply issues and protect the environment. Ownership shares in the Sarsang field currently stand as follows: 62% – HKN (U.S.) 18% – ShaMaran Petroleum (Canada), which purchased the French company Total's stake for $155 million in September 2022. 20% – Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) As of 2021, Total's share in the field was producing around 3,500 barrels per day. Field Capacity and Production Zones: 1. Swara Tuka (Main Zone): Contains 6 wells Production capacity: 29,000 barrels/day Oil quality: API 36–39 2. East Swara Tuka: Contains 1 well Production capacity: 2,500 barrels/day Oil quality: API 36–39 In June 2022, after a Federal Supreme Court ruling that invalidated the KRG’s oil and gas law, Iraq’s Oil Ministry increased pressure on international oil companies in the region. The American service company Schlumberger, which had been working with HKN in the Sarsang field since 2012, withdrew from Kurdistan. It had drilled 7 wells at the site and held contracts to drill 5 more to increase daily production to 50,000 barrels by 2023. Similarly, Baker Hughes, another U.S. oilfield services company, also withdrew during previous political tensions between Baghdad and Erbil. In March 2023, just before KRG crude exports to Turkey halted (March 25, 2023), Sarsang’s daily output had reached 43,000 barrels/day. After the halt, production dropped to 33,600 barrels/day. Recent Financials: In Q1 of 2024, ShaMaran Petroleum announced: Total revenue: $22.59 million Daily average production: 37,200 barrels Sales: 3.35 million barrels This sales volume exceeded pre-export shutdown levels. Historical Production Growth (2016–2024): 2016: 5,000 bpd 2017: 10,000 bpd 2018: 17,000 bpd 2019: 23,000 bpd 2020: 24,000 bpd 2021: 31,000 bpd 2022: 33,000 bpd 2023: 43,000 bpd (until exports halted in March) → then dropped to 33,600 bpd 2024: 37,000 bpd Sources: KRG Ministry of Natural Resources: https://archive.gov.krd/mnr/mnr.krg.org/index.php/en.html ShaMaran Petroleum: https://shamaranpetroleum.com/ HKN Energy: https://www.hknenergy.com/ Total's withdrawal: https://drawmedia.net/page_detail?smart-id=11071 Iraq Business News: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2022/06/29/schlumberger-withdraws-from-iraqi-kurdistan/ ATTAQA energy news: https://attaqa.net/...

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Oil and internal income revenue in 75 days?

Public sector employees in the Kurdistan Region have not received their salaries for 75 days — equivalent to two and a half months. The monthly salary requirement is 998 billion IQD, which means for 75 days, the total required is approximately 2 trillion and 495 billion IQD. If an employee’s monthly salary is 1 million IQD, then over 75 days, the salary owed would be 2 million and 500 thousand IQD. According to the reports from the Iraqi Ministry of Finance and the audit bureaus of both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region for the first four months of 2025: Internal revenues for those 75 days amounted to 730 billion IQD Oil revenues were 980 billion IQD Allied (donor) funds were 50 billion IQD Meanwhile, governmental non-salary expenses in the same 75 days totaled only 395 billion IQD Sources of Revenue in the Kurdistan Region The Kurdistan Region derives its income from four main sources: Funds from Baghdad Internal revenues Oil revenues Allied financial aid 1. Funds from Baghdad In 2025, the last monthly transfer from the Iraqi Government to the Kurdistan Region was used to cover April’s salary expenses. The following amounts were transferred: For April: 954,514,000,000 IQD on 13/5/2025 For March: 954,880,467,779 IQD on 26/3/2025 For February: 957,925,880,078 IQD on 12/3/2025 For January: 958,012,332,759 IQD on 4/2/2025 According to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, a total of 4.117 trillion IQD was sent to the Kurdistan Region over the first four months of 2025. However, a portion of that was deducted for loans and salary advances. 2. Internal Revenue Based on reports from the Iraqi Ministry of Finance and audit bureaus: For Jan–Apr 2025, Kurdistan's total internal revenue was 1.166 trillion IQD, or roughly 292 billion IQD per month However, the KRG claims its internal revenue is about 320 billion IQD monthly, of which 65 billion IQD is spent on security forces Total internal revenue for the past 6 months: 1.752 trillion IQD Internal revenue for the 75 days in question: 730 billion IQD 3. Oil Revenue KRG officials claim oil revenue is zero, but: In May, the Kurdistan Region produced an average of 299,705 barrels per day, sold at $33 per barrel This means monthly revenue reached approximately $297 million, or about 400 billion IQD According to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance: In the first four months of 2025, Kurdistan generated 1.568 trillion IQD in oil revenue, or 392 billion IQD monthly However, a portion of this goes to oil companies and operating costs If we take the Ministry's figure of 392 billion/month, then for 6 months: 2.352 trillion IQD, and for 75 days: 980 billion IQD 4. Allied Financial Aid Monthly support from international allies: 20 billion IQD, mostly to support the Peshmerga Over 6 months: 120 billion IQD For 75 days: 50 billion IQD Total Revenues in the First Half of 2025 Internal revenue: 1.752 trillion IQD Oil revenue: 2.352 trillion IQD Allied aid: 120 billion IQD Transfers from Baghdad: 4.117 trillion IQD Total funds available to the Kurdistan Regional Government in the first half of 2025: 8.342 trillion IQD Salary expenditure over 6 months: 4.117 trillion IQD Remaining amount (as per Iraqi MoF reports): 4.225 trillion IQD 75-Day Financial Breakdown From Baghdad: 0 IQD Internal revenue: 730 billion IQD Oil revenue: 980 billion IQD Allied aid: 50 billion IQD Total available funds: 1.76 trillion IQD Non-Salary Government Expenditures for 75 Days Ongoing obligations: 60 billion University and education lecturer salaries: 24 billion Contract employee salaries after 1/7/2024: 2.5 billion Waste management: 10 billion Hospital and prison food: 7 billion Fuel: 8 billion Medicines and medical supplies: 7 billion Transportation costs: 900 million Water disinfection materials: 800 million Grants: 4 billion Miscellaneous item repairs: 30.8 billion Total: 158 billion IQD Total 75-day expenditures (excluding salaries): 395 billion IQD Summary 75-day oil and internal revenue: 1.76 trillion IQD 75-day non-salary expenditure: 395 billion IQD One-month salary bill: 998 billion IQD Related Reports Salary expenditure methods in the Kurdistan Region KRG salary and revenue status after oil export halts Oil production and income from Kurdistan oil fields How much the KRG owes Baghdad and vice versa KRG total revenues (2023–2024) Iraq has transferred $12.5 billion to the Kurdistan Region in 3 years KRG oil and internal revenues over the past 3 years: 20 trillion IQD

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APIKUR Reaffirms Contractual Demands as Talks Advance on Iraq-Türkiye Oil Exports

The Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) has expressed support for the potential restart of oil exports through the Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline (ITP), while reaffirming its firm stance on key contractual obligations. APIKUR welcomed the recent increase in negotiations between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi federal government (GoI) aimed at restoring oil exports via the ITP in the near future. On July 12, 2025, representatives from APIKUR member companies and other international oil firms operating in the Kurdistan Region met with officials from both the KRG and the GoI. During the meeting, the companies restated their readiness to resume exports immediately, provided that legally binding agreements are established. These agreements must guarantee timely and transparent payments aligned with each company's existing contractual rights and include the settlement of any outstanding arrears. Payment methods should either be in cash or through in-kind transfers of oil entitlements, acceptable to both the companies and the KRG. “Our member companies are ready to restart exports as soon as signed agreements uphold our existing, internationally governed contracts,” said Myles B. Caggins III, APIKUR’s spokesperson. He emphasized that APIKUR has always insisted that production sharing contracts be fully respected and clarified that its members have never been involved in any discussions suggesting a departure from those agreements.

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Barzani and Talabani to Lead KDP–PUK Meeting Tomorrow in Pirmam

The political bureaus of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are set to meet tomorrow in Pirmam, with both party leaders—Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani—expected to attend. A source from the KDP’s political bureau told Draw Media that the purpose of the meeting is to coordinate positions and unify their stance on ongoing issues between Erbil and Baghdad, particularly regarding public sector salaries and oil-related matters. It has now been 73 days since government employees in the Kurdistan Region received their last paycheck. Despite numerous meetings, committees, and delegations, no resolution has been reached. While Barzani’s office claimed last night that efforts are ongoing to resolve the crisis, sources indicate these are not serious attempts to strike a long-term agreement—rather, they are aimed at securing the release of just one round of salaries.

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Turkey has launched 1,678 assaults on the Kurdistan Region so far this year.

Report by: Iraqi Kurdistan Team of the American organization CPT (Community Peacemaker Teams) Turkish military attacks and bombardments in the first six months of this year: From January 1 to June 30, the Turkish military conducted 1,678 attacks and bombardments on the territory of the Kurdistan Region. 1,484 of these attacks targeted the borders of Duhok Governorate, 140 targeted Erbil Governorate, 54 targeted Sulaimani Governorate, and zero attacks targeted Nineveh Governorate. As a result of these Turkish military attacks and bombardments in the first half of the year, 9 civilian residents became victims: 3 were killed and 6 were injured. In the first six months of the year, the Turkish military conducted: 1,232 attacks through artillery shelling, 397 via fighter jets and drones, 43 via helicopters, 5 through the use of light weapons, and 1 attack via detonation. In June alone, the Turkish military carried out 550 attacks on the Kurdistan Region: 541 of these targeted Duhok Governorate, 9 targeted the Erbil Governorate. Compared to May, the number of attacks in June increased by 8%. Since the announcement of the unilateral ceasefire by the PKK in March, the Turkish military has not carried out any attacks or bombardments in Sulaimani Governorate. Report by: Iraqi Kurdistan Team of the American organization CPT

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The Kurdish Gas Gambit

by Yerevan Saeed The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) recent multibillion-dollar gas agreements with U.S. energy companies represent a significant and multifaceted strategic gambit. However, those deals demand a clear policy response from the U.S. policy-making circle. Washington should support these deals as a part of broader strategy to bolster Iraq’s energy diversification and economic resilience and regional stability. The U.S. should also encourage conflict resolution between Erbil and Baghdad over hydrocarbon issues and institutional reform and transparency in Iraqi Kurdistan. These deals transcend expansion of the KRG’s hydrocarbons sector, signaling a high-stakes maneuver on three interconnected fronts: Erbil’s persistent quest for economic autonomy from Baghdad, Washington’s recalibrated Middle East policy, and the shifting dynamics of Kurdish internal politics. But the deals also come with tremendous risks. They have already invited the ire of the Iraqi authorities, and worsened Erbil-Baghdad relations. Moreover, the Kurdish political parties have failed to coalesce around the deals to form a new government, and internal social stability is fraying after Baghdad’s punitive financial measures in response to the deals have prevented the KRG from paying civil servants’ salaries since April. Signed amid a complex regional landscape and enduring disputes with Baghdad, these agreements could usher in a new phase in the political economy of Iraqi Kurdistan, one driven by natural gas and laden with geopolitical implications that extend far beyond the energy sector itself. These include the potential to weaken Iran’s political influence in Iraq, dry up revenue from oil smuggling that benefits pro-Iranian militia groups and, most importantly, weaken Tehran’s influence in its traditional stronghold in the eastern part of the Kurdistan Region. Strategic Timing and Geopolitical Optics The $110 billion worth of agreements, finalized during KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s May 2025 visit to Washington, are strategically timed. Although under the deals had been under negotiation for two years, the announcement of the final agreements with U.S. firms HKN Energy and WesternZagros coincided with a discernible shift in foreign policy under the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Washington appears to be increasingly prioritizing the Kurdistan Region over federal Iraq, indicating a growing U.S. interest in strengthening an alternative power center in the Middle East, with Erbil emerging as a key player. This assertive commercial diplomacy, emboldened by Trump’s high-profile Gulf tour and the resulting multibillion dollar agreements, highlights a broader recalibration of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The first agreement, valued at $40 billion, grants HKN Energy and ONEX Group development rights for the Miran Gas Field, estimated to hold 8 trillion standard cubic feet of natural gas. The second, a $70 billion arrangement with WesternZagros, targets the Topkhana-Kurdamir blocks, which are estimated to hold reserves of 5 trillion standard cubic feet of gas and nearly a billion barrels of oil. The gas fields in Sulaymaniyah province historically have fallen within Iran’s political sphere of influence, making the deal particularly noteworthy. These are not simply commercial ventures; their locations, immense scale, and the backing of U.S. firms suggest a calculated American effort to underwrite economic autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan while directly challenging Iran’s longstanding influence in northeastern Iraq. This strategic alignment also feeds into Washington’s broader objectives of stabilizing global energy markets and undermining illicit oil flows that have historically bolstered Iran’s regional proxy networks. The Trump administration’s active support for reopening the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP), which has remained closed since 2023 following a legal dispute between Iraq and Turkey, aims to route Kurdish oil through formal, transparent channels. By doing so, the U.S. seeks to marginalize black-market routes that enrich actors outside the state system, including Iranian-aligned militias that smuggle oil from Kirkuk to Iran via the Mandali border crossing, thereby tightening the economic noose around its regional adversary and disrupting those groups’ financial lifelines. The Kurds: From Division to Strategic Convergence These agreements also reflect a fundamental strategic reorientation within the KRG itself. Prime Minister Barzani has consistently sought to position natural gas as a cornerstone of his Cabinet’s legacy, a policy ambition that gained particular urgency during the height of Europe’s energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 but stalled due to divisions between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Historically, the issue of gas has been a major source of contention and a fault line in intra-Kurdish politics, particularly between the KDP and the PUK. Tensions reached a crescendo when in 2021, the KDP-led government awarded a significant contract to the KAR Group, a politically aligned domestic firm, to expand the gas pipeline network. This expansion was designed to transport gas from producing fields in the PUK area to Erbil and then onward to Dohuk, a city near the Turkish border. The overarching, long-term goal has been to connect this pipeline to Turkey’s existing gas infrastructure, thereby gaining access to European markets. While the vision was undeniably bold, it was also fraught with political complexities and internal challenges as the PUK viewed it as an overreach. PUK leaders, including Bafel Talabani, vociferously denounced the pipeline deal, criticizing it as opaque and exclusionary. The PUK reportedly obstructed pipeline expansion efforts in areas under its control, effectively halting even the initial phase of the project. Talabani famously warned that gas would not leave Kurdistan in the same manner as oil had, alleging mismanagement and secrecy. However, current events suggests that gas is transitioning from a symbol of political exclusion into a potential vehicle for cautious realignment. Faced with unprecedented foreign investment and the opportunity to establish Iraqi Kurdistan as a crucial regional energy hub, both the KDP and PUK appear to share powerful incentives for coordination. Quiet signs of cooperation have begun to emerge as evidenced by the gas deals, as both parties recognize that continued fragmentation could imperil critical infrastructure development, erode international investor confidence, and forfeit significant leverage in ongoing negotiations with Baghdad. This potential for convergence is particularly significant for the PUK as these deals offer a potential pathway to regain some of its lost status and influence vis-à-vis the dominant KDP. History lends credence to this possibility; the oil-driven strategic agreement of 2007 between the two Kurdish factions ushered in a period of relative political stability and economic prosperity, despite its eventual shortcomings. The KDP, despite its recent electoral successes, appears to finally recognize the PUK’s capacity for disruption, particularly through alliances with certain factions in Baghdad, evidenced by numerous Iraqi Supreme Court rulings against the KRG initiated by PUK-aligned actors. With Kurdish public confidence in the government at an ebb, the prospects for a similar strategic alignment around gas will largely depend on the establishment of transparent and inclusive mechanisms that actively prevent a repetition of the patronage-driven politics that have long undermined effective Kurdish governance. KRG Gas Plans and Risks Iraqi Kurdistan’s proven gas reserves of 25 trillion of cubic feet constitute 20 percent of Iraq’s total reserves. The Kurdish resources are primarily non-associated gas, meaning they are not a byproduct of oil extraction. This type of gas is generally easier and less costly to extract with fewer technical challenges compared with associated gas. These types of reserves, which offer higher economic value and greater potential for independent development and export, attract considerable commercial interest. Currently, the KRI’s gas production fluctuates between 540 million and 680 million standard cubic feet per day (MMSCFD), with over 520 MMSCFD of non-associated gas produced at the Khor Mor Field, operated by the UAE-based Dana Gas. This counts for over 90 percent of the Kurdistan Region’s total production. Additional production includes 140 MMSCFD of associated gas from the Khurmala Dome near Erbil, operated by KAR Group, and between 5 MMSCFD and 14 MMSCFD of associated gas from the Sarqala Field in the Garmiyan area of Sulaymaniyah, operated by WesternZagros and Russia’s Gazprom. The K250 project currently under development in Khor Mor is expected to increase the field’s total output to nearly 800 MMSCFD. Although Dana Gas announced that the expansion would be completed in the first quarter of 2026, industrial sources indicated that the project has been fast-tracked to be finished by the end of 2025 or earlier. In parallel, Dana Gas has started working on the Chamchamal Gas Field, which is expected to bring an additional 70 MMSCFD online by the end of 2026. If these timelines are met, the Kurdistan region’s gas output will surpass 1 billion MMSCFD, sufficient not only to meet domestic power generation demands but also to provide a surplus enabling Kurdistan to export both inside Iraq and potentially to Turkey, moving beyond mere domestic consumption. The Kurdistan region has ambitious plans to produce up to 1.5 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas by 2027. The new gas contracts with the U.S.-based energy companies and the additional production from current producing fields, if expansions come online, will give Iraqi Kurdistan the potential to become a regional hub for both gas and electricity production. However, this strategic approach remains under debate inside the Kurdish government. A key point of contention is whether the region should prioritize gas exports or focus on exporting electricity to the rest of Iraq and possibly neighboring countries. Some Kurdish officials argue that focusing on electricity could cause fewer political and legal problems with Baghdad and ease geopolitical tensions, especially with the powerful neighboring countries that fear displacement from Iraq’s lucrative energy market. Others favor direct natural gas exports to end users as the more efficient and profitable strategy. They point to the shifting geopolitical landscape following the fall of the Assad regime and Tehran’s weakening influence in the Middle East, suggesting this moment presents an opportunity for Kurdistan to initiate large-scale gas production and eventual exportation without the same risks of sabotage and retaliation that plagued the sector in recent years. Yet, recent security developments reaffirm significant risks in Kurdistan despite the relative weakening of Iranian influence and its proxy groups. Since June 16, at least eight attacks by uncrewed aerial vehicles have targeted key urban and strategic areas, including Erbil, Duhok, Sulaymaniyah, and Garmiyan. These incidents underscore the sustained capacity for disruption by the nonstate actors, particularly those aligned with Iranian interests. In one incident, a drone loaded with two missiles ran out of fuel and crashed about 10 kilometers from the Sarqala oil field operated by WesternZagros, signaling the vulnerability of energy sector. This incident could have been a warning to WesternZagros, as the gas fields it was awarded as part of the recent contracts are relatively near Sarqala. The KRG accused some factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella of Shiite militia groups aligned with Iran, of orchestrating the strikes and working to undermine Kurdistan’s stability. Baghdad, however, rejected those claims and defended the PMF. While Baghdad had opened investigations into earlier attacks in the Kurdistan region, no findings of accountability were published, further eroding trust between the two governments. This also marks a political inflection point. For the first time, the Iraqi federal government and an affiliated militia group appear to be strategically aligned in opposition to the KRG, not only through inaction but also through coordinated political messaging and military posturing.  this situation is further complicated by the second military maneuver in less than a year during which Iraqi forces reportedly took over the Qanbar gas and oil field close to the recent gas concessions in Garmiyan area. These unliteral -movements have raised concerns over Baghdad’s strategic intentions, prompting the KRG to reinforce Peshmerga forces and place them on high alert. Collectively, these developments indicate that while the direct threat from Iranian-backed groups may have diminished, underlining volatility and tensions between the Kurdistan region and federal Iraq remain elevated with implications for both stability and foreign investment. Kurdistan’s Electricity Potential The Kurdistan region’s electricity sector is loaded with potential. Iraqi Kurdistan has a generation capacity of 8.2 gigawatts (GW) of electricity with more than 84% powered by natural gas and the remainder consisting of hydropower and diesel generation. However, fuel shortages, drought, and budgetary issues have limited generation to just slightly over half of that capacity. The region has long possessed the infrastructure necessary to provide continuous 24-hour power flow. But it has consistently struggled to meet that potential due to a combination of limited gas production and refining capacity, diminishing water reserves, increasing demand encouraged by population growth and inexpensive pricing, the KRG’s ongoing financial crisis, and its inability to collect electricity tariffs to pay for fuel. In response, the KRG has initiated a series of reforms aimed at modernizing and privatizing the electricity sector, including installation of smart meters and the awarding of contracts to companies with affiliation with the dominant political parties. Most recently, the KRG implemented a 300 percent increase in dynamic electricity tariffs in an attempt to curb demand and move closer to round-the-clock electricity supply. However, critics of the policy shift have pointed out its failure to account for the average household income in the region, raising concerns over affordability and social equity. According to officials at the KRG Ministry of Electricity, the region requires an average of 5.2 GW to meet peak demand in winter and summer. With an existing generation capacity exceeding this demand, the region holds a promising potential to transition from a net consumer to a net exporter of energy, particularly if planned gas expansions projects come online as expected. Yet realizing this potential will depend on not only optimizing its infrastructure but also addressing political stability, fuel supply, grid stability and national grid integration issues. Despite these challenges, the KRG has already commercialized electricity through exportation of 1.6 GW to federal Iraq. This could serve as a proven, operational model that can be scaled to meet broader national demand should Iraqi federal authorities have the political will to implement it. The KRG power supply to Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Diyala provinces is based on annual power purchase agreements with Kar Group, Qaiwan Group, and Mass Holding Limited, generating nearly $10 billion in revenues for the Kurdistan region. Importantly, the KRG electricity exports helps relieve significant social and political pressure on the federal government, which continues to suffer from chronic power shortage across much of Iraq. By helping the federal government to address the national challenges at least partially, Baghdad seems to have more to win from a Kurdish region that can supply national power grids than to resist deals than could subvert electricity generation in the future. This electricity partnership could become a constructive framework through which Erbil and Baghdad might think creatively to address broader unresolved issues, including oil and gas, budget transfers, and revenue sharing mechanisms. However, even if the model proves to be an economic and technical success, concerns pertaining to issues of transparency and accountability persist. It remains unclear how the KRG’s treasury has benefited from the energy sales revenue. . The KRG Ministry of Electricity, for example, does not provide comprehensive or consistent financial disclosure in its official reports. Primarily, nearly 400 megawatts of transmitted electricity are omitted or missing from daily reporting, according to sources at the electricity agency. This raises legitimate questions about the accuracy of operational data and governance of public resources. Without effective overnight and improved institutional transparency, public trust and long term policy support might be undermined and investors will have second thoughts regarding financing future power projects.  Legal Deadlock Meets Strategic Drift The protracted conflict between Erbil and Baghdad is the ultimate manifestation of the unresolved question of contested sovereignty over natural resources. In the absence of a comprehensive national hydrocarbon law, in which the powers of the federal government and the regional government are clearly defined, Iraq continues to operate in a legal gray zone. Consequently, the foundation of the agreement between the KRG and the federal government over energy and the budget is vulnerable to reversal as the national balance of power and geopolitical power shift on a broader level. Both governments are subject to these shifts which force them to walk away from deals they previously supported, fueling a cycle of mistrust and breakdowns. The federal government in Baghdad has, predictably, rejected the KRG’s latest natural gas initiatives. Citing the 2022 Supreme Court ruling that declared the KRG’s independent oil and gas law unconstitutional, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil has denounced the deals with HKN Energy and WesternZagros as clear violations of federal authority. Baghdad took concrete steps to both relay its displeasure to the KRG and the international oil companies (IOCs) operating in the Kurdistan region. The Oil Ministry’s condemnation of the recent KRG actions was quickly followed by fiscal retaliation, including delays in budget transfers to Erbil.  In a letter dated May 29, the Iraqi Finance Minister Taif Sami Mohammed informed the KRG that no further disbursements could be made, saying the region had already exceeded its allocation under the 2025 federal budget. This measure has plunged the KRG into a deep financial crisis, with civil servant’s salaries unpaid since April 2025, leading to growing frustrations toward Kurdish leadership. In the outstanding oil and gas dispute between Erbil and Baghdad, the federal government has increasingly relied on financial levers to exert pressure on the KRG. This approach mirrors the logic underpinning the international sanctions, where economic constraints are designed to compel political concessions or policy choice changes. However, as with sanctions regimes globally, the burden has disproportionally fallen on the civilian population rather than the political leadership. In the Kurdistan region, rather than inducing policy shifts by the ruling elite, Baghdad’s fiscal pressure has exacerbated economic hardship for ordinary Kurds. Furthermore, despite substantial progress in the trilateral negotiations between the federal government, the KRG and international oil companies to resume oil exports via the critical Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP), Baghdad suspended talks, effectively neutralizing any progress made in previous negotiations. The ITP has remained offline since March 2023 following a ruling by the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce in a long-running arbitration case. The body determined that Turkey had breached a 1973 treaty governing the ITP by enabling the KRG to use it for oil exports without the approval of Baghdad. The closure has denied all parties, including the KRG, Baghdad, and foreign investors, access to a vital export corridor, leading to $25 billion losses in revenues. The Oil Ministry’s swift and forceful rejection of the deals suggests a hardening of Baghdad’s stance, viewing the KRG gas deals as a direct affront to national sovereignty. Although Baghdad is likely to be frustrated with the continued pipeline closure — and as long as the ITP is technically operational, it must make a monthly payment of $25 million to Türkiye, it appears to be willing to absorb these financial losses. The federal government’s posture indicates that sovereignty over the energy sector takes precedence over short-term economic costs. Following Baghdad’s threats in May, the Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan, which represents key U.S.-backed firms, called for immediate trilateral talks involving the KRG, Baghdad, and international companies. The group warned that over $1 billion in debt remains unpaid to its members and that prolonged uncertainty could lead to an exodus of investors from Iraq. The steady pressure from U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and officials in Washington eventually encouraged Baghdad to return to the table last June. While negotiations have been serious, they have not yielded breakthroughs. The Iraqi government appears to have maximized its demands. The federal government demands that the KRG transfer its current and future oil production to the State Organization for Marketing of Oil. The KRG currently produces 282,000 barrels per day, including 236,000 for export and 46,000 for domestic use. The KRG has countered with a proposal of 280,000 bpd, insisting that it requires 120,000 barrels daily for local refineries and use. Moreover, the federal delegation has told the KRG delegations that they could not sign any written agreement. Instead, there would only be verbal agreement. This was under the pretext of avoiding such written agreement to be weaponized during the upcoming Iraqi Parliamentary elections slated for November 2025 against Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani who is expected to have his own election list. However, the Iraqi Shiite political elite is likely to intensify budgetary, financial, and political pressure on Erbil as electioneering tools to motivate their base for voter turnout, which makes agreements hard to reach and even if done, hard to keep. Compounding this is the increasing demand of oil companies on Baghdad, according to Iraqi sources, which has complicated any deal. The companies now are dissatisfied with the $16 per barrel price mandated in the 2025 budget law to cover production and transportation cost, and they also want a clear limit placed on Wood Mackenize, the consultancy tasked with assessing the Kurdistan region’s oil fields over concern that the firm’s authority could potentially interfere with their existing contracts with the KRG. Washington’s patience pertaining to the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline appears to be growing thin, given the pipeline shutdown’s economic and policy implications for the U.S. interests in the region, preventing at least 300,000 bpd of oil from reaching the market. Regional Realignment Through Energy For Washington, these deals represent far more than simply energy diversification. They give credence to Trump’s commercial diplomacy and foreign policy and embody a broader strategy of containment and influence realignment in the Middle East. By supporting large-scale U.S. investments in Kurdistan, particularly in historically Iranian-aligned zones like Sulaymaniyah, the Trump administration signals its clear intent to cultivate a viable alternative to both Baghdad’s centralizing tendencies and Tehran’s shadow economy. This strategic shift is underscored by tangible actions, including the anticipated relocation of the U.S. military footprint within the country with a concentration in the Kurdistan region while drawing down in federal Iraq. This strategic realignment, coupled with the ongoing planned inauguration of what will be among the largest U.S. consulates in the world, located in Erbil, underscores a deepening of ties between Washington and the KRG. While the U.S. has sought to streamline diplomatic missions elsewhere, this significant expansion in Erbil sends a powerful signal that the Trump administration’s engagement with the KRG is intended to be long-term and strategic and will no longer be solely dependent on the federal government in Baghdad. Despite the ambitious vision, this entire strategic architecture remains precarious. Baghdad’s legal and political retaliation, if sustained, could effectively freeze export pathways persistently, deter further investment, and worsen Erbil’s fiscal condition. Internally, the fragile détente between the KDP and PUK remains untested; they have failed to form a new government seven months after the election, and without institutionalized cooperation, mutual suspicion could once again unravel any progress. For the U.S. as well, overinvestment in a single, factionalized region within an inherently divided Iraq carries significant risks of regional backlash and diminished leverage in Baghdad. Moreover, the upcoming Iraqi elections could significantly alter the political picture. A new federal government, facing domestic pressures, might choose to reassert more aggressive control over energy policy, complicating Washington’s and Erbil’s strategic maneuvering. The potential for escalating tensions with Baghdad, particularly in the volatile context of Iraqi elections, could undermine internal stability and further complicate the already intricate web of Middle Eastern politics especially in the light of the failure of Tehran and Washington to reach a broader grand bargain. The KRG’s gas deals are likely to mark a turning point, not only in its energy strategy but also in its political positioning, both domestically and internationally. Yet success will depend on unwavering support from Washington and the KRG’s ability to weather Baghdad’s relentless political and economic pressure. What was once a profound source of internal Kurdish discord now has the potential to serve as a basis for pragmatic convergence. For Washington, these deals could offer a tangible mechanism to rebalance power in the Middle East without direct military intervention. However, the ultimate success of this audacious energy play hinges on resolving long-standing governance issues, establishing legal clarity regarding hydrocarbon resource management, and deftly navigating the volatile and problematic relationships among Erbil, Baghdad, and other regional stakeholders. As the dust settles on these announcements, the international community will be watching to see whether this Kurdish gambit yields the intended strategic gains or inadvertently weakens the Kurdistan region economically and politically, triggering a new wave of instability in an already turbulent region. Whether it leads to genuine economic empowerment and enhanced regional stability or collapses under the weight of protracted legal battles and persistent political fragmentation, the strategy will decisively determine the future trajectory of Iraq’s most dynamic, inherently fragile region. Policy Recommendations  1. Support a federal hydrocarbons law  The United States should prioritize brokering a comprehensive agreement between Erbil and Baghdad to pass the long-awaited federal hydrocarbons law. This legislation must clearly delineate the rights and responsibilities of both levels of government regarding energy exploration, production, and revenue-sharing. Such a legal framework represents the most sustainable mechanism for resolving the outstanding dispute over natural resources.  2. Enable the KRG’s emergence as a reginal energy hub  Washington should assist the KRG in realizing its potential as a regional energy hub. This would not only diversify and stabilize Iraq’s overall energy portfolio but also reduce its dependence on regional exports to fulfill gas and electricity demand. Through support for infrastructure agreements through public- private partnerships, the U.S. can help unlock Erbil’s gas and electricity production for both domestic and regional markets.  3. Deter sabotage and reinforce security of the energy sector  The U.S. must send an unambiguous message to those who seek to sabotage the KRG’s energy infrastructure. Protecting the Kurdish energy sector from threats, whether from state or nonstate actors, should be part of Washington’s broader strategic objective to support Iraq’s path to energy self sufficiency. Ensuring the undisrupted development of Kurdish gas aligns with U.S. interests in promoting energy security, regional stability, and economic resilience for Kurdistan and Iraq.  4. Promote transparency and good governance in the natural gas sector  Unlike the oil sector, which has long suffered from opacity and entrenched corruption, the emerging Kurdish gas sector presents an opportunity to set a new governance standard. The U.S. should condition its support to Erbil on its adoption of international best practices in transparency including contract disclosure, independent audits, and alignment with the global standards like the Extractive Industries Global Initiative. Enhancing transparency will not only attract investors but also help the KRG, which currently struggles with low levels of public trust, to rebuild confidence among its citizens. A natural gas sector governed by openness and accountability can shift public perceptions of natural resources from tools for elite enrichment to assets that serve the broader public good. This shift is a prerogative for long-term political stability and fair economic development in the region. 

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The KRG reported to Baghdad that its daily oil production is 282,000 barrels, while the true output exceeds 400,000 barrels.

Saroo Abdulwahid, head of the New Generation bloc in the Iraqi Parliament, stated during a press conference: 🔹The Iraqi government has requested the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to adhere to Iraq’s federal budget law. 🔹It has also called on the KRG to comply with the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court. 🔹The Region has informed Baghdad that it currently produces 282,000 barrels of oil daily, while its actual daily production exceeds 400,000 barrels. 🔹Baghdad has agreed to accept that amount if delivered to the SOMO company, but the KRG insists on handing over only 50,000 barrels per day. 🔹The Kurdistan Region also told Baghdad that it needs 115,000 barrels daily for internal consumption. Combined with 50,000 barrels, this totals 165,000 barrels, while the remaining 120,000 barrels are traded independently and not handed over to Baghdad. 🔹Ninety percent of the companies negotiating with the federal government have agreed to its demands, so any statements made by the government of Masrour or Qubad are far from the truth. 🔹According to the Federal Board of Supreme Audit, the Kurdistan Region only needs 42,000 barrels. 🔹The Iraqi government has proposed that the Kurdistan Region deliver that 42,000 barrels, in exchange for which the federal government would provide fuel (such as oil and gasoline) to Erbil at the same price as in other Iraqi provinces. The Region has rejected this offer. 🔹Baghdad has requested the KRG to begin an audit process. Without such auditing, salaries will not be sent to the Region. But the KRG refuses. 🔹Baghdad also demanded that within three to four months, all KRG public sector employees transfer their bank accounts to federal banks, so salaries can be paid directly. The Region has also rejected this request.

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Last Month Witnessed 32 Protests in the Kurdistan Region

Summary of Protests and Dissatisfaction – June 2025 In June 2025, citizens across cities in the Kurdistan Region organized 32 protest-related activities, including demonstrations, boycotts, and gatherings. By city: Sulaymaniyah: 18 activities Erbil: 8 activities Halabja: 1 activity Raparin Administration: 1 activity Garmiyan Administration: 4 activities By issue: 16 related to salary demands 9 for employment demands 3 related to public services 1 anti-war protest 3 with various other demands Notable incidents: In Sulaymaniyah, 81 teachers, activists, political cadres, and journalists were arrested but later released. In Duhok, a single case of abduction and torture by an armed group was documented. The individual was later released after enduring mistreatment. Some detainees in Sulaymaniyah reportedly suffered severe beatings during arrest by security forces. Two cases of public retraction (commonly referred to at the national level as “radio confessions”) were documented in Duhok, where both individuals had previously made critical statements that were later publicly withdrawn. Due to suppression and arrests, June was the worst month for freedom of expression. For the first time, the Kurdistan Region’s security agency requested an official apology for the mass arrests in Sulaymaniyah. June was also a troubling month for the protection of parliamentarians: Sipan Amêdî, a Kurdistan Parliament member from the New Generation faction, was attacked in Duhok. Ali Hama Salih, head of the Halwest faction in Parliament, was arrested in Sulaymaniyah. Network 19 for Monitoring Freedom of Expression This report was prepared by a coalition of human rights organizations, led by the Metro Center. The coalition adheres to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international instruments, particularly focusing on Article 19 of the Declaration.

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New Generation Faction: KDP Forces Abduct Sipan Amedi in Duhok

The New Generation Faction in the Kurdistan Parliament announced today that KDP forces in Duhok province abducted Sipan Amedi, a Kurdistan Parliament member from the New Generation Faction, and took him to an unknown location. "This gangster-like act by the PDK follows comments made by the MP about PDK leader Masoud Barzani, where Amedi questioned whether Barzani's life and a Peshmerga's life were the same," said the faction in a statement. The New Generation Faction condemned the KDP's behavior as a "mafia-style" abduction of a parliament member. They further asserted that Masoud Barzani and his family are not only deserving of Amedi's criticism but are also the primary cause of the Kurdish people's suffering, having impoverished Kurdistan through their "theft and looting."

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