Draw Media
News / Kurdistan

APIKUR Objects to the Ministry of Oil's Actions

Draw Media   Designated International Oil Companies (IOCs), along with the Kurdistan Regional Government, have been negotiating in good faith with the Government of Iraq (GOI), including directly with Prime Minister Sudani’s office, to reach a resolution to resume exports through the Iraqi-Türkiye pipeline in accordance with our legal agreements and the Iraqi budget law.   We understand today the Ministry of Oil has demonstrated it is unwilling to negotiate a solution that honors IOCs contract sanctity and is attempting to establish a process to unilaterally alter the economic framework of legal and valid contracts between the KRG and IOCs. These actions by the Ministry of Oil are not acceptable, and the member companies of APIKUR will not resume exports until there is commitment from the GOI to honor our contracts including payment surety for past and future exports.   NEW YORK, N.Y. (March 28, 2025)  

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The Press Law is being implemented in Sulaimani

According to an order of the president of the Sulaimani Court of Appeal, "from now on the Press Law 2007 will be implemented and a judge will be dedicated to the cases of journalists." Judge Omar Ahmad, President of the Sulaimani Court of Appeal, issued two administrative orders regarding journalists and journalists' cases and states that, “In the public interest and better performance, we decided to: First: the Sulaimani Court of Investigation/1 will be responsible for hearing complaints related to journalists in Sulaimani, and Law No. 35 of 2007 on Journalism in Kurdistan will be applied to their cases. Second: All the above claims will be referred to the Sulaimani Court of Appeal/6 for resolution after the completion of the investigation stages. He also pointed out that "his order shall take effect from the date of its issuance."   Press Law in the Kurdistan Region, Law No. 35 of 2007 states: First: The press is free, and no censorship shall be imposed on it. Freedom of expression and publication shall be guaranteed to every citizen within the framework of respect for personal rights, liberties, and the privacy of individuals in accordance with the law, as well as being committed to the principles of ethics in the Bordeaux Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists, adopted by the 1954 World Congress of the International Federation of Journalists, amended in 1986. Second: A journalist may obtain information of importance to citizens and with relevance to the public interest. Third: In case of a legal suit, a journalist may keep secret the sources of information and news relevant to the suits brought before the courts unless the court decides otherwise. Fourth: Every natural or legal person shall have the right to possess and issue journals in accordance with the provisions of this Law. Fifth: No journal shall be closed down or confiscated.

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Iraqi Kurdistan faces a deepening economic crisis as unpaid wages pile up

Public sector workers in Iraqi Kurdistan, a semi-autonomous region of northern Iraq, have endured irregular and delayed salary payments for more than a decade. Many of these people are owed staggering amounts of money – US$50,000 (£38,700) on average, and as much as US$120,000 for higher-level employees. The region’s 6.5 million inhabitants have been caught in the middle of an unresolved political and financial conflict between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Iraq’s federal government in Baghdad. The conflict centres on disputes primarily over territorial control and oil revenues. There are longstanding political tensions over Kurdish autonomy and governance in northern Iraq, particularly in disputed areas like oil-rich Kirkuk. The KRG held a referendum for independence in 2017, which was backed decisively by people living in northern Iraq. The electoral commission said 92% of the 3.3 million people who cast their ballots supported secession. Baghdad, which had opposed the vote, rejected the result. It swiftly imposed sanctions on the region and sent Iraqi troops to retake several contested territories. Iraq’s Supreme Court ruled later in the year that, in order to preserve the unity of Iraq, no Iraqi province was allowed to secede. Another major issue is the KRG’s independent export of the region’s oil production. Baghdad is opposed to this too, insisting that all of Iraq’s oil revenues must be centrally managed. The KRG, however, argues that its right to manage natural resources is protected under Iraq’s constitution. The dispute escalated in 2023 when Iraq’s Supreme Court ruled that revenues from Iraqi oil and gas must be fairly distributed to all of Iraq’s people, regardless of where it is found. This ruling has led to budget cuts in Iraqi Kurdistan. These unresolved disputes have left Iraqi Kurdistan in economic and political limbo, with frequent salary delays for public sector employees and growing public frustration. A map of the approximate Kurdish-populated region of Iraq. Awder Shwan / Shutterstock Iraqi Kurdistan is now experiencing a wider economic downturn, as the region’s limited private sector is also being affected by the salary crisis. Public sector employees make up a significant portion of the workforce. When they do not get paid on time, they cut back on spending. Businesses, from small shops to large retailers, are experiencing a slowdown in economic activity, leading to closures and layoffs. Adding to the hardship is the lack of reliable access to basic services such as water and electricity. Many Kurdish households only receive water for a few days each week, forcing families to ration their supply or buy expensive private alternatives. The situation with electricity is even worse. Government-provided power is available only for set hours each day, leaving households and businesses reliant on costly private generators. While ordinary people suffer from water shortages and power cuts, the region’s ruling elite enjoy uninterrupted access to luxury services. The inconsistency in the provision of these essential services is not due to a lack of resources, but a failure of governance. The ruling elite – dominated by the Barzani and Talabani families – have amassed vast wealth since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 through their monopolisation of key industries. Investigations suggest that substantial amounts of the region’s oil wealth have been diverted through opaque contracts and off-the-books transactions. Instead of channelling Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil revenues into public services, healthcare or infrastructure, large sums reportedly disappear into private accounts, foreign investments and elite patronage networks. This mismanagement has resulted in billions of US dollars in unaccounted oil revenues. People celebrate the first anniversary of the Kurdistan Independence referendum in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, in 2018. Gailan Haji / EPA This economic monopoly has also reinforced a jobs-for-votes system. Reliant on government wages, the KRG’s 1.2 million civil servants feel pressured to support the region’s dominant parties, the Kurdistan Democratic party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. To maintain this political stranglehold, the two parties have suppressed private sector growth, ensuring economic dependency on public jobs. The telecommunications sector, for example, is dominated by Barzani-linked Korek Telecom and Talabani-linked Asiacell, with bureaucratic barriers blocking private competition. Meanwhile, weak banking infrastructure and a lack of investment incentives stifle private sector growth, pushing people toward government jobs controlled by the ruling parties. Salaries and promotions often depend on political loyalty, reinforcing economic dependency and making independent enterprise difficult. Creating a debt crisis The unpaid salary backlog has forced many of Iraqi Kurdistan’s residents into massive personal debt. Many civil servants have been forced to borrow money from family, friends or banks just to cover rent, food, medical bills and tuition for their children. The mounting financial pressure has also led to an increase in divorce rates. Even if the KRG returns to paying salaries on time, the backlog must still be paid. Both Baghdad and the KRG are legally responsible for ensuring public sector workers receive the money they are owed. Ignoring these arrears is a clear violation of the constitutional and international obligations that Iraq has committed to, which include the UN’s sustainable development goals. Bamo Nouri The right to a fair wage and timely compensation is enshrined in Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which Iraq is a signatory to. And Iraq’s own constitution guarantees citizens the right to social and economic welfare, which includes timely wages. Iraqi Kurdistan’s salary crisis is also contributing to the global refugee crisis. The Crossing, a documentary that aired on ITV in 2022 about the capsizing of a dinghy of asylum seekers in the English Channel, demonstrated that economic despair has prompted many Kurds to risk their lives on dangerous migration routes in search of stability and opportunity. Without a structured repayment plan, the crisis will remain unresolved – even if salaries are paid moving forward.

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Kurdish Leader’s Call for Peace Could Reshape the Middle East

Draw Media By  Binar FK، Middle East & North Africa   Historic call opens rare opportunity to de-escalate long-standing conflict across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran After spending a quarter of his life in solitary confinement in a Turkish prison on İmralı Island, Abdullah Öcalan — the 76-year-old leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — last week issued a handwritten letter calling for “peace and a democratic society.” Just 48 hours later, the PKK – a group long branded as “terrorist” by Turkey and the United States among others — declared an immediate ceasefire with Turkey, a stunning shift after 40 years of armed resistance. Öcalan’s message was unequivocal: “Convene your congress, integrate with the state and society voluntarily, and make a decision; all groups must lay down their arms, and the PKK must dissolve itself.” The historic call by Öcalan opens a rare opportunity for de-escalation of a long-standing conflict in a region plagued by far too many. But resolving the conflict through dialogue will not be easy and will require a serious undertaking by all stakeholders. If successful, however, this development could reshape Turkey’s domestic landscape, alleviate regional tensions, and reverberate across Syria, Iraq, and Iran — all countries with significant and often restive Kurdish minority populations. Turkey The PKK according to Öcalan was a historical necessity that emerged in reaction to the complete “denial of Kurdish reality, restrictions on basic rights and freedoms, especially freedom of expression.” Turkish authorities have limited the ability of Kurds – some 15 million people, or 18-20 percent of the country’s population – from using their native language in schools, media or other official settings or achieving other autonomous rights. Over nearly four decades, PKK resistance has led to significant violence, killing some 40,000 people. It has been a central factor in Turkey’s security calculus, used as justification for extensive military operations in the country’s southeast as well as frequent incursions into Syria and Iraq.  However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is seeking a constitutional amendment that would allow him to serve more than two terms, needs support beyond his ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party from Turkish nationalist voters or pro-Kurdish political parties. Turkish local election results in 2024 showed the nationalist opposition Republican Peoples’ Party or CHP outpacing the AK party by 37 to 35 percent. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) took 5.70 percent, a significant share in Turkey’s fragmented electoral landscape. The results also further solidified Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu of the CHP as Erdoğan’s primary challenger. A perceived triumph over the PKK could improve Erdogan’s political standing among his religious base and Turkish nationalists as well. Demobilization of the PKK would require legal and security guarantees for fighters and an approach to transitional justice that addresses root causes.  This could create an environment where the Kurds could engage more politically and peacefully to achieve the goals of the Kurdish struggle for basic cultural, linguistic and local representation rights. “Respect for identities, free self-expression, democratic self-organization of each segment of society based on their own socio-economic and political structures, are only possible through the existence of a democratic society and political space.”  Öcalan outlined in his letter.  Syria The major announcement by the PKK leader coincides with significant developments in Turkey’s neighbor, Syria, where the four-decade-old Assad dictatorship collapsed abruptly in December in the face of Turkish-backed Syrian forces. In northern Syria, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a largely ethnic Kurdish group, established an autonomous area after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and later became the principal American ally in the fight against the Islamic State. Turkey, however, regards the group as an offshoot of the PKK and has backed the rival Syrian National Army (SNA). It launched several military campaigns against SDF-controlled territories occupying the Kurdish-majority city of Afrin in 2018 and other offensives and incursions into Syria in succeeding years. SDF chief General Mazloum Abdi turned down Öcalan’s call to disarm and dissolve, stating that it “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.” Nevertheless, Abdi welcomed the letter, calling it “a historic opportunity to build peace and a key to opening correct and constructive relations in the region.” It remains unclear whether Syrian Kurds will be able to resolve their differences with the new government in Damascus led by a former jihadist group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Abdi has affirmed the SDF’s commitment to Syrian unity but seeks to maintain his forces within a new national army and to retain considerable autonomy for Kurdish areas under a decentralized, secular, and civil state. There have been reports of ongoing talks between Damascus and Syrian Kurds but interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa excluded the SDF from a recent national conference to chart a political roadmap.  If, however, an agreement can be reached between the SDF and the Sharaa government, that could help alleviate tensions with Turkey and serve the interests of minority communities in northeastern Syria. Iraq and the KRI In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), leaders across the political spectrum welcomed Öcalan’s proposal. KRI President Nechirvan Barzani and the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Bafel Talabani, both lauded the proposed dissolution of the PKK as what Talabani called a “responsible and necessary call at this stage to unite the Kurds and resolve issues through peaceful dialogue based on partnership and solidarity.” The PKK presence in the Qandil mountains of northern Iraq has been a persistent source of friction with Turkey, which has repeatedly launched strikes and ground incursions into KRI territories. If the PKK dissolves, it would remove the Turkish incentive to continue such strikes and help to stabilize the area.  Sinjar, home to the Yazidi ethnic minority, would likely also benefit. In 2014, when ISIS launched an onslaught on Sinjar, forcing some 250,000 Yazidis to flee to Mount Sinjar and endure a siege there, the PKK and its affiliates conducted a rescue operation, establishing a safe corridor for civilians to flee. Kurdish and Iraqi authorities have sought to reassert their authority through the Sinjar Agreement to establish a new governance and security framework, but it has yet to be carried out. PKK disarmament could facilitate the implementation of this agreement. The KRI could also be a key player in providing logistical and technical support, potentially offering asylum to senior PKK leaders and overseeing the disarmament process. Iran Iran’s Kurdish minority has a history of resistance to rule from Tehran, dating back to the creation of a Soviet-backed Kurdish enclave in the aftermath of World War II and an uprising after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. A dismantling of the PKK could have a significant impact on similar movements in Iran, including the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). PJAK was founded on the ideology of the PKK but has maintained a ceasefire with the Islamic regime since 2011. Öcalan referred to the group in his letter, writing that “all groups must lay down their arms.” Iran considers other Kurdish opposition armed groups as threats and in September 2018 launched a missile strike on the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in the town of Koya in Iraqi Kurdistan. This new paradigm could help Iran, which has seen its regional allies weakened over the past 15 months, revise its stance on indigenous Kurds. Meysam Moradi, an expert on Kurdish issues from Kermanshah, Iran, who is studying international politics and governance at Roskilde University in Denmark, told this author that the Iranian establishment is closely monitoring regional developments in light of Öcalan’s initiative. “It is understandable that Iran would initiate measures in response to these shifts,” he said. “A key factor in this equation is the recent Kurdish experience in Syria and the establishment of a semi-autonomous region, which enjoys support from the West. Tehran is deeply aware of these unprecedented geopolitical changes in the region and will likely adopt pre-emptive measures to mitigate their impact, which may include implementing a similar ‘peace process’ model within the country.” Öcalan’s historic call for the PKK to dissolve represents a significant opportunity for peace and political integration in a wide swath of the Middle East, with potential to reshape not only Turkey’s security and political dynamics but also impacting broader regional stability. If all parties engage sincerely, this moment could transform longstanding conflict into constructive political dialogue, fostering a more inclusive and democratic society across the region. Binar FK is a Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and is pursuing Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame. Based in the United States, he writes on and researches political and security issues in the Middle East. He previously worked in journalism, covering wars and conflicts in the region, focusing on extremist groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other militias.

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Protests increased by 13% in 2025

"Compared to the protest activities of the previous month (January), which numbered 48, there has been a 13 percent increase,” Alliance 19 said in a statement. According to Alliance 19, the most common protests were for salaries (41 percent of all demands), employment (17 percent), and services (9 percent), adding that, "61% of the activities were in Sulaimani, 31% in Erbil, 6% in Duhok, and 2% in Halabja." Last February, the largest strike of teachers and employees was organized in Sulaimani, which lasted from January 28 to February 11. Alliance 19 is a human rights monitor consisting of advocates and civil society organizations. It is supervised by the Metro Center for Journalists’ Rights and Advocacy.

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PKK declares ceasefire with Turkey after more than 40 years of conflict

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) on Saturday declared a ceasefire with Turkey, bringing an end to more than 40 years of bloodshed. The imprisoned leader of the Kurdish militant group, Abdullah Ocalan, this week called for the PKK to disband. The Executive Committee of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) released a statement in response to the historic call made by Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan on 27 February. Öcalan highlighted the urgent need for democratization in Turkey and called for the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve itself. The PKK Executive Committee's written statement titled 'To Our Patriotic People and Democratic Public Opinion' reads as follows:  “Leader Abdullah Öcalan's February 27 statement titled “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” is a Manifesto of the Age that illuminates the path of all forces of freedom and democracy. We respectfully salute Leader Apo [Abdullah Öcalan] for presenting such a manifesto for democratic society to our people and humanity." It was the first reaction from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) after Ocalan this week called for the dissolution of the group and asked it to lay down arms. "In order to pave the way for the implementation of leader Apo's call for peace and democratic society, we are declaring a ceasefire effective from today," the PKK executive committee said referring to Ocalan and quoted by the pro-PKK ANF news agency. "We agree with the content of the call as it is and we say that we will follow and implement it," the committee based in northern Iraq said. "None of our forces will take armed action unless attacked," it added. The PKK designated a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, has waged an insurgency since 1984 with the aim of carving out a homeland for Kurds, who account for around 20 percent of Turkey's 85 million people. But more recently, the group calls for more autonomy, cultural and linguistic rights rather than independence. Since Ocalan was jailed in 1999 there have been various attempts to end the bloodshed, which has cost more than 40,000 lives. After several meetings with Ocalan at his island prison, the pro-Kurdish DEM party on Thursday relayed his appeal for PKK to lay down its weapons and convene a congress to announce the organisation's dissolution.

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Draw Media's Discussion with the Chinese Consul General

"China and its influence in the Middle East, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region" China's policy in the Middle East, Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region was discussed at the office of the Darw Media organization. The Chinese Consul General in the Kurdistan Region, Mr. Liu Jun, discussed the situation in the Middle East and China's foreign policy towards the Middle East, especially the issue of changes in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and relations between China, the Kurdistan Region, and Iraq. Several topics were discussed by the participants: - The discussion focused on China's views on the Kurdish issue and where the Kurdistan Region is on China's agenda. - Chinese goods have covered the Kurdistan Region's markets today, on what basis and quality are the Chinese items produced and imported? - China as a large and influential country in the world, has a great economic and political position, what role does it play in the changes in the Middle East? - China's role is more in the economic, cultural, and technological fields, but it is now moving towards a political role.

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Boost in payments to KRG oil firms may help restart Iraq-Türkiye pipeline

by Daily  Sabah with AA The approval of a plan by the Iraqi Parliament to increase payments to international oil companies operating in the semiautonomous northern region is seen as a pivotal move to restart oil exports to Türkiye, according to the experts, also suggesting both parties have a strong incentive to "make this work." On Feb. 2, the Iraqi Parliament approved amendments to the budget law aimed at subsidizing the production costs of international oil companies operating in the northern region of Iraq, controlled by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). As part of this, the cost of extracting and transporting each barrel of oil from the region was set at $16. The KRG had previously rejected an offer of $7.90 per barrel, deeming it too low. Following the agreement, attention shifted to the Iraq-Türkiye oil pipeline, the launch of which had been delayed due to disputes over cost. Expectations of resuming oil flow through the pipeline grew stronger after Iraqi Oil Minister Hayan Abdel-Ghani's announcement on Feb. 4 that KRG oil would be delivered to Iraq's State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) and that necessary procedures were underway with Türkiye to export oil from the Ceyhan Port. Oil flow from Iraq to Ceyhan Port ceased on March 25, 2023, following the arbitration ruling by the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) concerning oil exports between Türkiye and Iraq. Additionally, the earthquakes centered in Kahramanmaraş on Feb. 6, 2023, further disrupted the use of the pipeline. In April 2024, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar stated that Türkiye was not at fault for the issues surrounding the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline.     He noted that the pipeline had been ready for operation since Oct. 4, 2023, but ongoing disagreements between the northern Iraqi administration and the central government had hindered its activation. It has been reported that the halt in oil exports from Iraq to Türkiye resulted in a loss of $23 billion for the region. 'Strong incentive to make this work' Baghdad's revision to payments is a crucial step toward the resumption of Iraqi oil shipments through Türkiye, Alberic Mongrenier, executive director of the European Initiative for Energy Security, told Anadolu Agency (AA) recently. "The central government and the KRG still need to agree on the hiring of an independent consultant to assess the production and transport costs of KRG's oil, which will cause some friction," Mongrenier said. Given the economic importance of the issue and the fact that exports have stalled for two years, Mongrenier acknowledged that "both parties have a strong incentive to make this work." Noting that the KRG generates the majority of its revenues from oil, Mongrenier emphasized that resuming exports will greatly benefit Iraq by easing the economic pressure in the region. While acknowledging the potential for future friction over the cost rate, Mongrenier stated that the agreement would be viable, as the determined transportation and production cost of $16 is nearly double the previous rate. However, Mongrenier also added that the compromise could have negative repercussions for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), noting that it could complicate Iraq's ability to adhere to production cuts. Ankara-Baghdad dialogue Francesco Sassi, a Bologna-based research fellow in energy geopolitics and markets at Ricerche Industriali ed Energetiche (RIE), stated that the dialogue between Ankara and Baghdad will progress positively if oil flows to Türkiye are resumed. Sassi stated that the agreement has a critical role in optimizing Iraq's oil exports as the country prepares for elections this year. Stabilizing Iraq's economy through more efficient and transparent management of its oil reserves is a crucial step, especially during the period of high volatility in oil prices, driven by growing protectionist policies and tariff wars between the U.S. and global powers, Sassi noted. Also, resuming oil flows to Türkiye "could contribute to facilitate the dialogue between Ankara and Baghdad, strained as a consequence of the regime change in Syria," Sassi concluded.

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Protests in Erbil: 31 journalists and media outlets were subjected to violations

Hozan Qadir, Head of the Reporters' Organisation for Rights and Development (RORD), expressed his concern "Numerous violations were committed against media outlets and journalists during the protests, particularly at the Degala checkpoint. These actions are deeply concerning to us." According to RORD, violations occurred against 9 media organizations and 22 journalists, with 9 of them suffering injuries from tear gas. Additionally, a security force in plain clothes, operating under the Asayish name, raided the KNN satellite office in Erbil, confiscating journalistic equipment, mobile phones, and personal belongings. In a further escalation, security forces stopped 4 media teams from returning to Erbil after covering the events in Degala. The Politic Press team was also detained by Asayish forces while conducting a press interview in Erbil. As of the latest reports, they remain in custody.

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KRG Council of Ministers Directs Resumption of Oil Exports in Coordination with Federal Authorities

Prime Minister Masrour Barzani chaired a session of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Council of Ministers, with Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani in attendance. Prime Minister Barzani expressed gratitude to all parties involved in reaching an agreement with the Iraqi Government regarding public sector salaries, the Kurdistan Region’s budget share, and amendment to the Special Budget Law governing the Region's oil export. The agenda item addressed a report on the framework of the agreement between the KRG Ministry of Finance and the Federal Ministry of Finance concerning public sector salaries and the Region’s financial entitlements. The Council approved adherence to the employment numbers allocated for the KRG’s public sector in 2025, based on the figures and expenditures presented during the meeting. Additionally, it sanctioned the transfer of pensions management for Peshmerga, military, security forces, as well as the benefits for dependents of martyrs and Anfal victims, to the General Directorate of Pensions at the Ministry of Finance, the sole designated authority overseeing pensions across the region. Subsequently, the Head of the Department of Information Technology presented a report on the Digital Identity-Based Payroll Management System (PMS) project for the region's employees. The Council then instructed the Ministry of Natural Resources to maintain coordination with the federal Ministry of Oil, State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO), and oil-producing companies in the region to ensure the swift resumption of Kurdistan Region’s oil exports through SOMO, with the revenue directed to the federal budget. Finally, the Ministry of Finance and Economy was directed to deposit the Kurdistan Region’s federal budget contribution for January 2025 to the Federal Ministry of Finance.

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Striking teachers are demanding their salary arrears

On Monday, protests erupted in the city of Al-Sulaymaniyah as demonstrators called for the resolution of salary-related issues and expressed solidarity with hunger strikers protesting deteriorating living conditions in the Kurdistan Region. The striking teachers presented their demands in four points: 1. Respect for human dignity in the Kurdistan Region and the rule of law 2. Localization of employee salaries at the federal banks 3. Respecting Kurdistan citizens through the distribution of their salaries every thirty days and returning their salary arrears 4. Starting the process of the Kurdistan Region employees' promotions and allowances. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not paid 16 salaries in 2014-2024, while 44 salaries have been paid in arrears. The total amount of salaries that the KRG owes is 22 trillion and 580 billion dinars. The striking teachers are demanding the resumption of promotions that have been suspended since 1/1/2016, which means that each salaried employee has not been promoted twice. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has announced that the total monthly salaries of employees and pensioners are about one trillion dinars. The Kurdistan Region has several monthly revenues but does not disclose all: - 320 billion dinars domestic revenue - 20 billion dinars of International coalition aid for Peshmerga forces - 200 billion dinars of oil revenue (not returned to the treasury of the Ministry of Finance) - 760 billion dinars from Baghdad  Total revenues of the Kurdistan Region in 2024: - KRG Share from Baghdad: 10 trillion and 26 billion dinars - Domestic revenue: 4 trillion 347 billion dinars - Coalition aid: 240 billion dinars - Oil revenue for the government: 2 trillion 353 billion dinars The total revenue of the Kurdistan Region in 2024 will be 16 trillion 966 billion dinars

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The Kurds Place in the New Syria

Winthrop Rodgers- Draw Media The Kurdish-led administration in northeastern Syria faces a new political landscape following the fall of the Assad regime in early December. Amid so much uncertainty, there are many urgent questions about its future. These include local, national, regional, and geopolitical considerations. Finding answers is an urgent matter. First, what can be done about the internal divisions of Syria’s Kurds? Second, what is their place in the new Syria? Third, what will Turkey and other regional powers do? Finally, will the new US administration continue or change its current policies in northeastern Syria? Intra-Kurdish Affairs As in many other parts of Kurdistan, Syrian Kurdish politics is factional and divisive. The desirability of forming a unified front is widely acknowledged. It would help ensure cohesive and democratic governance, present a strong position in negotiations with the new powers in Damascus, and address the demands of regional and geopolitical actors. Nevertheless, unity has proved elusive amid disagreements between the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which adheres to the political program developed by Abdullah Öcalan, and the Kurdish National Council in Syria (ENKS), which is backed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In recent years, the US, France, and others have repeatedly tried to reconcile the two sides, but without success. However, the logjam seems to be breaking. On January 16, Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi and KDP leader Masoud Barzani met near Erbil for talks aimed at building Kurdish unity. The landmark meeting was brokered by the US, who reportedly transported Abdi to the Kurdistan Region. Both sides acknowledged that the talks were positive. The news sparked celebrations in Qamislo and other parts of northeastern Syria and was heartily welcomed by Kurds around the world. While this unexpected development is a positive step, it is just one part of the process. Previous agreements to manage the divisions between the Syrian Kurdish factions were not implemented. Whether this new initiative can bear fruit—and establish a unified Kurdish front in dealings with Damascus and foreign governments—will depend both on internal factors and the actions of many other groups. The New Syria Another urgent question is how the relatively well-established political and security structures that developed in northeastern Syria will interact with those emerging in Damascus. Strong democratic federal system is at the heart of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria’s (AANES) ideological and policy program, which stood in stark contrast to the centralism and ethnic authoritarianism espoused by the Assad regime. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the other Syrian rebel groups that are now in charge of the government in Damascus were also opposed to the Ba’athist model, but they do not share the outlook of the AANES. At this point, it seems unlikely that they will accept a federal structure that gives the Kurds the sort of autonomy found next door in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Perhaps a united Kurdish front will be strong enough to negotiate such an arrangement, but it is hardly guaranteed. Regardless, it is essential that Syrian Kurds and other religious and ethnic minorities have legal protections that are reliably enforced. This would both address the historical violations committed against them and help to establish the harmonious foundation that Syria needs in order to flourish. Whether Syrian Kurds find a cooperative partner in the new government in Damascus is an open question. The background and intentions of its leading factions—especially the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)—are extremely suspect. Caution is warranted, as is pragmatism. Turkey Looms Large Regional powers will also wield significant influence over the future of Kurds in Syria. The most important is Turkey, which has consistently opposed the establishment of a Kurdish entity on its southern border. It launched major military interventions against the SDF in 2016, 2018, and 2019 and frequently conducts airstrikes on military and civilian targets. Moreover, Ankara’s militia proxy, the SNA, has committed numerous atrocities against Kurdish civilians in places like Afrin. In recent weeks, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his political allies have adopted a new strategy to dealing with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), allowing meetings between Öcalan, who remains imprisoned in a Turkish detention facility, and Kurdish politicians. There is cautious optimism about this effort, which could change the trajectory of Kurds across the Middle East. Indeed, it likely enabled the Barzani-Abdi meeting to take place. However, it is equally clear that Ankara’s main policy objectives regarding Kurds in general and northeastern Syria in particular have not substantively changed. Turkish airstrikes continue and the rhetoric remains hostile. How Turkey manages the situation is perhaps the most consequential question posed here. To a lesser extent, Iran and Russia also play a role in the future of northeastern Syria. Both were major players in the Assad era and are diminished as a consequence of his fall. Nevertheless, they continue to have regional interests and will act opportunistically. It certainly merits watching. Trump’s Return Finally, how will President Donald Trump handle Syria on his return to the White House? Unlike most incoming presidents, Trump has an established track record, although it is not one that is encouraging for Kurds. In 2019, he unexpectedly announced that he planned to withdraw US troops from northeastern Syria, which gave a green light to Erdogan to launch Operation Peace Spring. While he was convinced to backtrack and maintain a US military presence, it is well-known that he holds a dim view about its value. That said, his national security team is made up of figures who are far more supportive of a robust US role in the Middle East, including presumptive Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz. Many see this as a positive sign that the new administration will maintain a US presence in northeastern Syria. There are two important caveats to this silver lining. First, it is hardly guaranteed that Trump’s aides will be able to guide his behavior. They are there to implement his policies rather than the other way around. Moreover, they are not the only ones that Trump listens to and the president has a habit of breaking subordinates if they displease him. Rubio is a former political rival that Trump routinely disparaged as “Little Marco.” The new secretary of state has a tricky path ahead of him. Second, observers often make the mistake of conflating support for the Kurds in the context of Washington’s geostrategic priorities with support for their political ambitions in the states where they live. Both Rubio and Waltz have good things to say about Kurds, but their focus is clearly on Iran and Islamic State (ISIS). It is worth remembering that it was the first Trump administration that opposed the 2017 independence referendum in the Kurdistan Region. Clues to how the US might respond to the new situation in Syria might be found in that episode. Understandably, there is a great deal of optimism about Syria’s future following the collapse of the Assad regime, but there is also great uncertainty. Local, national, regional, and geopolitical considerations are at play. Syrian Kurds must navigate these rough and often contradictory waters. These next few months are critical.  

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KRG revenue in 2024 was the highest in the past 11 years

In 2024, the Kurdistan Region received 10 trillion and 26 billion dinars from Baghdad, the highest in the past 11 years (2014-2024). The Kurdistan Region's revenue in 2024, was 16 trillion 966 billion dinars. That includes Baghdad's money, oil revenues, and 14 trillion and 613 billion dinars of domestic revenue. According to the official statement of the Ministry of Finance of the KRG in 2024, the amount of 10 trillion 26 billion 883 million dinars has reached the KRG Ministry of Finance from Baghdad  which was allocated for salaries. According to the investigations of Draw Media during the past 11 years from 2014 to 2024, the KRG has had the highest revenues in 2024. Money sent from Baghdad over 11 years 2014: 2 trillion and 280 billion dinars 2015: 2 trillion 476 billion dinars 2016: No money sent from Baghdad 2017: No money sent from Baghdad 2018: 3 trillion and 175 billion dinars 2019: 5 trillion 439 billion dinars 2020: 1 trillion 359 billion dinars 2021: 1 trillion and 200 billion dinars 2022: No money sent from Baghdad 2023: 4 trillion 298 billion dinars 2024: 10 trillion and 26 billion dinars  In total, 29 trillion and 53 billion dinars have come from Baghdad The Kurdistan Region has several other revenues, which in 2024 were as follows: - 10 trillion and 26 billion dinars came from Baghdad to the Kurdistan Region - Domestic revenue: (4 trillion, 347 billion dinars). - International Coalition Aid: (240 billion dinars). - Oil net revenue: (2 trillion and 74 billion dinars).  The total revenue of the Kurdistan Region in 2024 was 16 trillion and 966 billion dinars. Oil revenue alone was 14 trillion and 613 billion dinars.

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Kurdistan Oil Company: A path to resolving oil disputes

The ongoing disputes over oil resources and revenue sharing between the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have long been a source of tension, hindering Iraqi national unity and its economic stability. Historical Background Oil has been a cornerstone of Iraq’s economy since its discovery in the early 20th century. The development of the oil sector has been closely tied to Iraq’s political trajectory, with periods of nationalization, international partnerships, and conflicts over resource control. Following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, the country adopted a federal system that granted regions, including Kurdistan, significant autonomy. Under the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, the Kurdistan Region gained considerable authority over its natural resources. Article 112 and Article 115 of the constitution allow the KRG to manage all the oil fields discovered after the constitution’s ratification. However, disputes arose over the interpretation of these provisions, particularly regarding revenue-sharing mechanisms and the rights to sign contracts with international oil companies (IOCs). Ongoing Strains And Conflicts Baghdad insists on central oversight of all oil exports and revenues, arguing that oil is a national resource that should benefit all Iraqis. In contrast, the KRG maintains that its constitutional rights grant it autonomy over the extraction and export of oil within its territory. These disagreements have often led to budgetary disputes. For years, Baghdad has withheld budget allocations to the KRG, accusing it of failing to meet production-sharing commitments. Meanwhile, Erbil has accused Baghdad of undermining its economic stability by using budget allocations as a political tool. The situation reached a breaking point in 2022 when a ruling by Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court deemed the KRG’s oil and gas law unconstitutional. While the Iraqi federal government claims sovereign authority over all oil production and exports, the KRG has independently managed its oil sector, exporting crude via Turkiye’s Ceyhan port and bypassing Baghdad. The 2023 arbitration ruling by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in favor of Iraq, which temporarily halted oil exports through Ceyhan, underscored the urgency of finding a sustainable resolution. These continuous tensions were addressed by Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani during his meetings with Iraqi officials in Baghdad this month. Barzani's visit to Baghdad aimed to resolve ongoing disputes over salaries, entitlements, and oil exportation—a process currently stalled due to high extraction costs for companies operating in Kurdistan. Speaking to Shafaq News Agency, parliamentary finance committee member Moeen Al-Kadhimi confirmed that the committee met with representatives from Iraq’s Ministry of Finance to discuss budget implementation for 2024. “The approved budget for 2024 is 211 trillion Iraqi dinars, but actual spending has been 156 trillion dinars so far, with revenues totaling only 137 trillion dinars. The deficit has been covered through loans,” Al-Kadhimi explained. He stressed the importance of a realistic 2025 budget, suggesting it should not exceed 150 trillion dinars. Once the revised budget law is approved by parliament, adjustments will account for Kurdistan's oil extraction and transportation costs, which range from $6 to $16 per barrel. In parallel, the parliamentary oil and gas committee has been working on amendments to the budget law that pertain to Kurdistan's oil sector. Committee member Basem Al-Gharibawi emphasized that any changes must comply with Iraqi law and the constitution. Proposals under discussion include amendments to Article 12 of the budget law, which would facilitate the formation of a "General Company for Kurdistan Region Oil." This entity, modeled after existing state oil companies, would operate under Iraq’s Ministry of Oil and oversee the extraction and exportation of oil in Kurdistan. “This proposal aims to resolve longstanding tensions between Baghdad and Erbil,” Al-Gharibawi said. What Could Be Done Next? In light of these challenges, the idea of establishing the Kurdistan Regional Oil Company (KROC) has gained traction as a potential solution. Modeled after Iraq’s state-owned oil companies, such as the North Oil Company and South Oil Company, KROC would operate under the supervision of the federal Ministry of Oil. This structure aims to reconcile the constitutional autonomy of the KRG with Baghdad’s demand for central oversight. The proposed company would handle the extraction, transportation, and exportation of oil from the Kurdistan Region, ensuring transparency and compliance with federal regulations. By creating a direct link between the KRG and the federal government, the KROC could help rebuild trust and establish a framework for equitable revenue sharing. Additionally, it could address concerns from IOCs about legal and financial stability, encouraging renewed investment in Kurdistan’s oil sector. Potential Challenges And Implications While the establishment of KROC presents a pathway to resolving disputes, significant challenges remain. Politically, it requires consensus between the KRG and Baghdad, as well as legislative amendments to Iraq’s budget and oil laws. These negotiations are likely to be contentious, given the deep-seated mistrust between the two sides. Economically, the success of KROC hinges on its ability to balance the interests of multiple stakeholders, including the federal government, the KRG, and IOCs. Ensuring transparency in revenue distribution and operational efficiency will be critical to its credibility. Additionally, KROC must address technical challenges, such as the cost of oil extraction in Kurdistan, which is higher than in other parts of Iraq due to the region’s geology. Source: Shafaq News

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Violations against journalists decreased by %27

Violations against journalists 2023: (249) 2024: (182) Decreased: (67) (27%) Arrest of journalists 2022: (37) arrests 2023: (24) arrests Decreased: (14) cases Decreased by 35% Source:Metro Center

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