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The Kurdish Gas Gambit

by Yerevan Saeed The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) recent multibillion-dollar gas agreements with U.S. energy companies represent a significant and multifaceted strategic gambit. However, those deals demand a clear policy response from the U.S. policy-making circle. Washington should support these deals as a part of broader strategy to bolster Iraq’s energy diversification and economic resilience and regional stability. The U.S. should also encourage conflict resolution between Erbil and Baghdad over hydrocarbon issues and institutional reform and transparency in Iraqi Kurdistan. These deals transcend expansion of the KRG’s hydrocarbons sector, signaling a high-stakes maneuver on three interconnected fronts: Erbil’s persistent quest for economic autonomy from Baghdad, Washington’s recalibrated Middle East policy, and the shifting dynamics of Kurdish internal politics. But the deals also come with tremendous risks. They have already invited the ire of the Iraqi authorities, and worsened Erbil-Baghdad relations. Moreover, the Kurdish political parties have failed to coalesce around the deals to form a new government, and internal social stability is fraying after Baghdad’s punitive financial measures in response to the deals have prevented the KRG from paying civil servants’ salaries since April. Signed amid a complex regional landscape and enduring disputes with Baghdad, these agreements could usher in a new phase in the political economy of Iraqi Kurdistan, one driven by natural gas and laden with geopolitical implications that extend far beyond the energy sector itself. These include the potential to weaken Iran’s political influence in Iraq, dry up revenue from oil smuggling that benefits pro-Iranian militia groups and, most importantly, weaken Tehran’s influence in its traditional stronghold in the eastern part of the Kurdistan Region. Strategic Timing and Geopolitical Optics The $110 billion worth of agreements, finalized during KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s May 2025 visit to Washington, are strategically timed. Although under the deals had been under negotiation for two years, the announcement of the final agreements with U.S. firms HKN Energy and WesternZagros coincided with a discernible shift in foreign policy under the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Washington appears to be increasingly prioritizing the Kurdistan Region over federal Iraq, indicating a growing U.S. interest in strengthening an alternative power center in the Middle East, with Erbil emerging as a key player. This assertive commercial diplomacy, emboldened by Trump’s high-profile Gulf tour and the resulting multibillion dollar agreements, highlights a broader recalibration of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The first agreement, valued at $40 billion, grants HKN Energy and ONEX Group development rights for the Miran Gas Field, estimated to hold 8 trillion standard cubic feet of natural gas. The second, a $70 billion arrangement with WesternZagros, targets the Topkhana-Kurdamir blocks, which are estimated to hold reserves of 5 trillion standard cubic feet of gas and nearly a billion barrels of oil. The gas fields in Sulaymaniyah province historically have fallen within Iran’s political sphere of influence, making the deal particularly noteworthy. These are not simply commercial ventures; their locations, immense scale, and the backing of U.S. firms suggest a calculated American effort to underwrite economic autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan while directly challenging Iran’s longstanding influence in northeastern Iraq. This strategic alignment also feeds into Washington’s broader objectives of stabilizing global energy markets and undermining illicit oil flows that have historically bolstered Iran’s regional proxy networks. The Trump administration’s active support for reopening the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP), which has remained closed since 2023 following a legal dispute between Iraq and Turkey, aims to route Kurdish oil through formal, transparent channels. By doing so, the U.S. seeks to marginalize black-market routes that enrich actors outside the state system, including Iranian-aligned militias that smuggle oil from Kirkuk to Iran via the Mandali border crossing, thereby tightening the economic noose around its regional adversary and disrupting those groups’ financial lifelines. The Kurds: From Division to Strategic Convergence These agreements also reflect a fundamental strategic reorientation within the KRG itself. Prime Minister Barzani has consistently sought to position natural gas as a cornerstone of his Cabinet’s legacy, a policy ambition that gained particular urgency during the height of Europe’s energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 but stalled due to divisions between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Historically, the issue of gas has been a major source of contention and a fault line in intra-Kurdish politics, particularly between the KDP and the PUK. Tensions reached a crescendo when in 2021, the KDP-led government awarded a significant contract to the KAR Group, a politically aligned domestic firm, to expand the gas pipeline network. This expansion was designed to transport gas from producing fields in the PUK area to Erbil and then onward to Dohuk, a city near the Turkish border. The overarching, long-term goal has been to connect this pipeline to Turkey’s existing gas infrastructure, thereby gaining access to European markets. While the vision was undeniably bold, it was also fraught with political complexities and internal challenges as the PUK viewed it as an overreach. PUK leaders, including Bafel Talabani, vociferously denounced the pipeline deal, criticizing it as opaque and exclusionary. The PUK reportedly obstructed pipeline expansion efforts in areas under its control, effectively halting even the initial phase of the project. Talabani famously warned that gas would not leave Kurdistan in the same manner as oil had, alleging mismanagement and secrecy. However, current events suggests that gas is transitioning from a symbol of political exclusion into a potential vehicle for cautious realignment. Faced with unprecedented foreign investment and the opportunity to establish Iraqi Kurdistan as a crucial regional energy hub, both the KDP and PUK appear to share powerful incentives for coordination. Quiet signs of cooperation have begun to emerge as evidenced by the gas deals, as both parties recognize that continued fragmentation could imperil critical infrastructure development, erode international investor confidence, and forfeit significant leverage in ongoing negotiations with Baghdad. This potential for convergence is particularly significant for the PUK as these deals offer a potential pathway to regain some of its lost status and influence vis-à-vis the dominant KDP. History lends credence to this possibility; the oil-driven strategic agreement of 2007 between the two Kurdish factions ushered in a period of relative political stability and economic prosperity, despite its eventual shortcomings. The KDP, despite its recent electoral successes, appears to finally recognize the PUK’s capacity for disruption, particularly through alliances with certain factions in Baghdad, evidenced by numerous Iraqi Supreme Court rulings against the KRG initiated by PUK-aligned actors. With Kurdish public confidence in the government at an ebb, the prospects for a similar strategic alignment around gas will largely depend on the establishment of transparent and inclusive mechanisms that actively prevent a repetition of the patronage-driven politics that have long undermined effective Kurdish governance. KRG Gas Plans and Risks Iraqi Kurdistan’s proven gas reserves of 25 trillion of cubic feet constitute 20 percent of Iraq’s total reserves. The Kurdish resources are primarily non-associated gas, meaning they are not a byproduct of oil extraction. This type of gas is generally easier and less costly to extract with fewer technical challenges compared with associated gas. These types of reserves, which offer higher economic value and greater potential for independent development and export, attract considerable commercial interest. Currently, the KRI’s gas production fluctuates between 540 million and 680 million standard cubic feet per day (MMSCFD), with over 520 MMSCFD of non-associated gas produced at the Khor Mor Field, operated by the UAE-based Dana Gas. This counts for over 90 percent of the Kurdistan Region’s total production. Additional production includes 140 MMSCFD of associated gas from the Khurmala Dome near Erbil, operated by KAR Group, and between 5 MMSCFD and 14 MMSCFD of associated gas from the Sarqala Field in the Garmiyan area of Sulaymaniyah, operated by WesternZagros and Russia’s Gazprom. The K250 project currently under development in Khor Mor is expected to increase the field’s total output to nearly 800 MMSCFD. Although Dana Gas announced that the expansion would be completed in the first quarter of 2026, industrial sources indicated that the project has been fast-tracked to be finished by the end of 2025 or earlier. In parallel, Dana Gas has started working on the Chamchamal Gas Field, which is expected to bring an additional 70 MMSCFD online by the end of 2026. If these timelines are met, the Kurdistan region’s gas output will surpass 1 billion MMSCFD, sufficient not only to meet domestic power generation demands but also to provide a surplus enabling Kurdistan to export both inside Iraq and potentially to Turkey, moving beyond mere domestic consumption. The Kurdistan region has ambitious plans to produce up to 1.5 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas by 2027. The new gas contracts with the U.S.-based energy companies and the additional production from current producing fields, if expansions come online, will give Iraqi Kurdistan the potential to become a regional hub for both gas and electricity production. However, this strategic approach remains under debate inside the Kurdish government. A key point of contention is whether the region should prioritize gas exports or focus on exporting electricity to the rest of Iraq and possibly neighboring countries. Some Kurdish officials argue that focusing on electricity could cause fewer political and legal problems with Baghdad and ease geopolitical tensions, especially with the powerful neighboring countries that fear displacement from Iraq’s lucrative energy market. Others favor direct natural gas exports to end users as the more efficient and profitable strategy. They point to the shifting geopolitical landscape following the fall of the Assad regime and Tehran’s weakening influence in the Middle East, suggesting this moment presents an opportunity for Kurdistan to initiate large-scale gas production and eventual exportation without the same risks of sabotage and retaliation that plagued the sector in recent years. Yet, recent security developments reaffirm significant risks in Kurdistan despite the relative weakening of Iranian influence and its proxy groups. Since June 16, at least eight attacks by uncrewed aerial vehicles have targeted key urban and strategic areas, including Erbil, Duhok, Sulaymaniyah, and Garmiyan. These incidents underscore the sustained capacity for disruption by the nonstate actors, particularly those aligned with Iranian interests. In one incident, a drone loaded with two missiles ran out of fuel and crashed about 10 kilometers from the Sarqala oil field operated by WesternZagros, signaling the vulnerability of energy sector. This incident could have been a warning to WesternZagros, as the gas fields it was awarded as part of the recent contracts are relatively near Sarqala. The KRG accused some factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella of Shiite militia groups aligned with Iran, of orchestrating the strikes and working to undermine Kurdistan’s stability. Baghdad, however, rejected those claims and defended the PMF. While Baghdad had opened investigations into earlier attacks in the Kurdistan region, no findings of accountability were published, further eroding trust between the two governments. This also marks a political inflection point. For the first time, the Iraqi federal government and an affiliated militia group appear to be strategically aligned in opposition to the KRG, not only through inaction but also through coordinated political messaging and military posturing.  this situation is further complicated by the second military maneuver in less than a year during which Iraqi forces reportedly took over the Qanbar gas and oil field close to the recent gas concessions in Garmiyan area. These unliteral -movements have raised concerns over Baghdad’s strategic intentions, prompting the KRG to reinforce Peshmerga forces and place them on high alert. Collectively, these developments indicate that while the direct threat from Iranian-backed groups may have diminished, underlining volatility and tensions between the Kurdistan region and federal Iraq remain elevated with implications for both stability and foreign investment. Kurdistan’s Electricity Potential The Kurdistan region’s electricity sector is loaded with potential. Iraqi Kurdistan has a generation capacity of 8.2 gigawatts (GW) of electricity with more than 84% powered by natural gas and the remainder consisting of hydropower and diesel generation. However, fuel shortages, drought, and budgetary issues have limited generation to just slightly over half of that capacity. The region has long possessed the infrastructure necessary to provide continuous 24-hour power flow. But it has consistently struggled to meet that potential due to a combination of limited gas production and refining capacity, diminishing water reserves, increasing demand encouraged by population growth and inexpensive pricing, the KRG’s ongoing financial crisis, and its inability to collect electricity tariffs to pay for fuel. In response, the KRG has initiated a series of reforms aimed at modernizing and privatizing the electricity sector, including installation of smart meters and the awarding of contracts to companies with affiliation with the dominant political parties. Most recently, the KRG implemented a 300 percent increase in dynamic electricity tariffs in an attempt to curb demand and move closer to round-the-clock electricity supply. However, critics of the policy shift have pointed out its failure to account for the average household income in the region, raising concerns over affordability and social equity. According to officials at the KRG Ministry of Electricity, the region requires an average of 5.2 GW to meet peak demand in winter and summer. With an existing generation capacity exceeding this demand, the region holds a promising potential to transition from a net consumer to a net exporter of energy, particularly if planned gas expansions projects come online as expected. Yet realizing this potential will depend on not only optimizing its infrastructure but also addressing political stability, fuel supply, grid stability and national grid integration issues. Despite these challenges, the KRG has already commercialized electricity through exportation of 1.6 GW to federal Iraq. This could serve as a proven, operational model that can be scaled to meet broader national demand should Iraqi federal authorities have the political will to implement it. The KRG power supply to Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Diyala provinces is based on annual power purchase agreements with Kar Group, Qaiwan Group, and Mass Holding Limited, generating nearly $10 billion in revenues for the Kurdistan region. Importantly, the KRG electricity exports helps relieve significant social and political pressure on the federal government, which continues to suffer from chronic power shortage across much of Iraq. By helping the federal government to address the national challenges at least partially, Baghdad seems to have more to win from a Kurdish region that can supply national power grids than to resist deals than could subvert electricity generation in the future. This electricity partnership could become a constructive framework through which Erbil and Baghdad might think creatively to address broader unresolved issues, including oil and gas, budget transfers, and revenue sharing mechanisms. However, even if the model proves to be an economic and technical success, concerns pertaining to issues of transparency and accountability persist. It remains unclear how the KRG’s treasury has benefited from the energy sales revenue. . The KRG Ministry of Electricity, for example, does not provide comprehensive or consistent financial disclosure in its official reports. Primarily, nearly 400 megawatts of transmitted electricity are omitted or missing from daily reporting, according to sources at the electricity agency. This raises legitimate questions about the accuracy of operational data and governance of public resources. Without effective overnight and improved institutional transparency, public trust and long term policy support might be undermined and investors will have second thoughts regarding financing future power projects.  Legal Deadlock Meets Strategic Drift The protracted conflict between Erbil and Baghdad is the ultimate manifestation of the unresolved question of contested sovereignty over natural resources. In the absence of a comprehensive national hydrocarbon law, in which the powers of the federal government and the regional government are clearly defined, Iraq continues to operate in a legal gray zone. Consequently, the foundation of the agreement between the KRG and the federal government over energy and the budget is vulnerable to reversal as the national balance of power and geopolitical power shift on a broader level. Both governments are subject to these shifts which force them to walk away from deals they previously supported, fueling a cycle of mistrust and breakdowns. The federal government in Baghdad has, predictably, rejected the KRG’s latest natural gas initiatives. Citing the 2022 Supreme Court ruling that declared the KRG’s independent oil and gas law unconstitutional, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil has denounced the deals with HKN Energy and WesternZagros as clear violations of federal authority. Baghdad took concrete steps to both relay its displeasure to the KRG and the international oil companies (IOCs) operating in the Kurdistan region. The Oil Ministry’s condemnation of the recent KRG actions was quickly followed by fiscal retaliation, including delays in budget transfers to Erbil.  In a letter dated May 29, the Iraqi Finance Minister Taif Sami Mohammed informed the KRG that no further disbursements could be made, saying the region had already exceeded its allocation under the 2025 federal budget. This measure has plunged the KRG into a deep financial crisis, with civil servant’s salaries unpaid since April 2025, leading to growing frustrations toward Kurdish leadership. In the outstanding oil and gas dispute between Erbil and Baghdad, the federal government has increasingly relied on financial levers to exert pressure on the KRG. This approach mirrors the logic underpinning the international sanctions, where economic constraints are designed to compel political concessions or policy choice changes. However, as with sanctions regimes globally, the burden has disproportionally fallen on the civilian population rather than the political leadership. In the Kurdistan region, rather than inducing policy shifts by the ruling elite, Baghdad’s fiscal pressure has exacerbated economic hardship for ordinary Kurds. Furthermore, despite substantial progress in the trilateral negotiations between the federal government, the KRG and international oil companies to resume oil exports via the critical Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP), Baghdad suspended talks, effectively neutralizing any progress made in previous negotiations. The ITP has remained offline since March 2023 following a ruling by the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce in a long-running arbitration case. The body determined that Turkey had breached a 1973 treaty governing the ITP by enabling the KRG to use it for oil exports without the approval of Baghdad. The closure has denied all parties, including the KRG, Baghdad, and foreign investors, access to a vital export corridor, leading to $25 billion losses in revenues. The Oil Ministry’s swift and forceful rejection of the deals suggests a hardening of Baghdad’s stance, viewing the KRG gas deals as a direct affront to national sovereignty. Although Baghdad is likely to be frustrated with the continued pipeline closure — and as long as the ITP is technically operational, it must make a monthly payment of $25 million to Türkiye, it appears to be willing to absorb these financial losses. The federal government’s posture indicates that sovereignty over the energy sector takes precedence over short-term economic costs. Following Baghdad’s threats in May, the Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan, which represents key U.S.-backed firms, called for immediate trilateral talks involving the KRG, Baghdad, and international companies. The group warned that over $1 billion in debt remains unpaid to its members and that prolonged uncertainty could lead to an exodus of investors from Iraq. The steady pressure from U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and officials in Washington eventually encouraged Baghdad to return to the table last June. While negotiations have been serious, they have not yielded breakthroughs. The Iraqi government appears to have maximized its demands. The federal government demands that the KRG transfer its current and future oil production to the State Organization for Marketing of Oil. The KRG currently produces 282,000 barrels per day, including 236,000 for export and 46,000 for domestic use. The KRG has countered with a proposal of 280,000 bpd, insisting that it requires 120,000 barrels daily for local refineries and use. Moreover, the federal delegation has told the KRG delegations that they could not sign any written agreement. Instead, there would only be verbal agreement. This was under the pretext of avoiding such written agreement to be weaponized during the upcoming Iraqi Parliamentary elections slated for November 2025 against Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani who is expected to have his own election list. However, the Iraqi Shiite political elite is likely to intensify budgetary, financial, and political pressure on Erbil as electioneering tools to motivate their base for voter turnout, which makes agreements hard to reach and even if done, hard to keep. Compounding this is the increasing demand of oil companies on Baghdad, according to Iraqi sources, which has complicated any deal. The companies now are dissatisfied with the $16 per barrel price mandated in the 2025 budget law to cover production and transportation cost, and they also want a clear limit placed on Wood Mackenize, the consultancy tasked with assessing the Kurdistan region’s oil fields over concern that the firm’s authority could potentially interfere with their existing contracts with the KRG. Washington’s patience pertaining to the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline appears to be growing thin, given the pipeline shutdown’s economic and policy implications for the U.S. interests in the region, preventing at least 300,000 bpd of oil from reaching the market. Regional Realignment Through Energy For Washington, these deals represent far more than simply energy diversification. They give credence to Trump’s commercial diplomacy and foreign policy and embody a broader strategy of containment and influence realignment in the Middle East. By supporting large-scale U.S. investments in Kurdistan, particularly in historically Iranian-aligned zones like Sulaymaniyah, the Trump administration signals its clear intent to cultivate a viable alternative to both Baghdad’s centralizing tendencies and Tehran’s shadow economy. This strategic shift is underscored by tangible actions, including the anticipated relocation of the U.S. military footprint within the country with a concentration in the Kurdistan region while drawing down in federal Iraq. This strategic realignment, coupled with the ongoing planned inauguration of what will be among the largest U.S. consulates in the world, located in Erbil, underscores a deepening of ties between Washington and the KRG. While the U.S. has sought to streamline diplomatic missions elsewhere, this significant expansion in Erbil sends a powerful signal that the Trump administration’s engagement with the KRG is intended to be long-term and strategic and will no longer be solely dependent on the federal government in Baghdad. Despite the ambitious vision, this entire strategic architecture remains precarious. Baghdad’s legal and political retaliation, if sustained, could effectively freeze export pathways persistently, deter further investment, and worsen Erbil’s fiscal condition. Internally, the fragile détente between the KDP and PUK remains untested; they have failed to form a new government seven months after the election, and without institutionalized cooperation, mutual suspicion could once again unravel any progress. For the U.S. as well, overinvestment in a single, factionalized region within an inherently divided Iraq carries significant risks of regional backlash and diminished leverage in Baghdad. Moreover, the upcoming Iraqi elections could significantly alter the political picture. A new federal government, facing domestic pressures, might choose to reassert more aggressive control over energy policy, complicating Washington’s and Erbil’s strategic maneuvering. The potential for escalating tensions with Baghdad, particularly in the volatile context of Iraqi elections, could undermine internal stability and further complicate the already intricate web of Middle Eastern politics especially in the light of the failure of Tehran and Washington to reach a broader grand bargain. The KRG’s gas deals are likely to mark a turning point, not only in its energy strategy but also in its political positioning, both domestically and internationally. Yet success will depend on unwavering support from Washington and the KRG’s ability to weather Baghdad’s relentless political and economic pressure. What was once a profound source of internal Kurdish discord now has the potential to serve as a basis for pragmatic convergence. For Washington, these deals could offer a tangible mechanism to rebalance power in the Middle East without direct military intervention. However, the ultimate success of this audacious energy play hinges on resolving long-standing governance issues, establishing legal clarity regarding hydrocarbon resource management, and deftly navigating the volatile and problematic relationships among Erbil, Baghdad, and other regional stakeholders. As the dust settles on these announcements, the international community will be watching to see whether this Kurdish gambit yields the intended strategic gains or inadvertently weakens the Kurdistan region economically and politically, triggering a new wave of instability in an already turbulent region. Whether it leads to genuine economic empowerment and enhanced regional stability or collapses under the weight of protracted legal battles and persistent political fragmentation, the strategy will decisively determine the future trajectory of Iraq’s most dynamic, inherently fragile region. Policy Recommendations  1. Support a federal hydrocarbons law  The United States should prioritize brokering a comprehensive agreement between Erbil and Baghdad to pass the long-awaited federal hydrocarbons law. This legislation must clearly delineate the rights and responsibilities of both levels of government regarding energy exploration, production, and revenue-sharing. Such a legal framework represents the most sustainable mechanism for resolving the outstanding dispute over natural resources.  2. Enable the KRG’s emergence as a reginal energy hub  Washington should assist the KRG in realizing its potential as a regional energy hub. This would not only diversify and stabilize Iraq’s overall energy portfolio but also reduce its dependence on regional exports to fulfill gas and electricity demand. Through support for infrastructure agreements through public- private partnerships, the U.S. can help unlock Erbil’s gas and electricity production for both domestic and regional markets.  3. Deter sabotage and reinforce security of the energy sector  The U.S. must send an unambiguous message to those who seek to sabotage the KRG’s energy infrastructure. Protecting the Kurdish energy sector from threats, whether from state or nonstate actors, should be part of Washington’s broader strategic objective to support Iraq’s path to energy self sufficiency. Ensuring the undisrupted development of Kurdish gas aligns with U.S. interests in promoting energy security, regional stability, and economic resilience for Kurdistan and Iraq.  4. Promote transparency and good governance in the natural gas sector  Unlike the oil sector, which has long suffered from opacity and entrenched corruption, the emerging Kurdish gas sector presents an opportunity to set a new governance standard. The U.S. should condition its support to Erbil on its adoption of international best practices in transparency including contract disclosure, independent audits, and alignment with the global standards like the Extractive Industries Global Initiative. Enhancing transparency will not only attract investors but also help the KRG, which currently struggles with low levels of public trust, to rebuild confidence among its citizens. A natural gas sector governed by openness and accountability can shift public perceptions of natural resources from tools for elite enrichment to assets that serve the broader public good. This shift is a prerogative for long-term political stability and fair economic development in the region. 

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The KRG reported to Baghdad that its daily oil production is 282,000 barrels, while the true output exceeds 400,000 barrels.

Saroo Abdulwahid, head of the New Generation bloc in the Iraqi Parliament, stated during a press conference: 🔹The Iraqi government has requested the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to adhere to Iraq’s federal budget law. 🔹It has also called on the KRG to comply with the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court. 🔹The Region has informed Baghdad that it currently produces 282,000 barrels of oil daily, while its actual daily production exceeds 400,000 barrels. 🔹Baghdad has agreed to accept that amount if delivered to the SOMO company, but the KRG insists on handing over only 50,000 barrels per day. 🔹The Kurdistan Region also told Baghdad that it needs 115,000 barrels daily for internal consumption. Combined with 50,000 barrels, this totals 165,000 barrels, while the remaining 120,000 barrels are traded independently and not handed over to Baghdad. 🔹Ninety percent of the companies negotiating with the federal government have agreed to its demands, so any statements made by the government of Masrour or Qubad are far from the truth. 🔹According to the Federal Board of Supreme Audit, the Kurdistan Region only needs 42,000 barrels. 🔹The Iraqi government has proposed that the Kurdistan Region deliver that 42,000 barrels, in exchange for which the federal government would provide fuel (such as oil and gasoline) to Erbil at the same price as in other Iraqi provinces. The Region has rejected this offer. 🔹Baghdad has requested the KRG to begin an audit process. Without such auditing, salaries will not be sent to the Region. But the KRG refuses. 🔹Baghdad also demanded that within three to four months, all KRG public sector employees transfer their bank accounts to federal banks, so salaries can be paid directly. The Region has also rejected this request.

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Last Month Witnessed 32 Protests in the Kurdistan Region

Summary of Protests and Dissatisfaction – June 2025 In June 2025, citizens across cities in the Kurdistan Region organized 32 protest-related activities, including demonstrations, boycotts, and gatherings. By city: Sulaymaniyah: 18 activities Erbil: 8 activities Halabja: 1 activity Raparin Administration: 1 activity Garmiyan Administration: 4 activities By issue: 16 related to salary demands 9 for employment demands 3 related to public services 1 anti-war protest 3 with various other demands Notable incidents: In Sulaymaniyah, 81 teachers, activists, political cadres, and journalists were arrested but later released. In Duhok, a single case of abduction and torture by an armed group was documented. The individual was later released after enduring mistreatment. Some detainees in Sulaymaniyah reportedly suffered severe beatings during arrest by security forces. Two cases of public retraction (commonly referred to at the national level as “radio confessions”) were documented in Duhok, where both individuals had previously made critical statements that were later publicly withdrawn. Due to suppression and arrests, June was the worst month for freedom of expression. For the first time, the Kurdistan Region’s security agency requested an official apology for the mass arrests in Sulaymaniyah. June was also a troubling month for the protection of parliamentarians: Sipan Amêdî, a Kurdistan Parliament member from the New Generation faction, was attacked in Duhok. Ali Hama Salih, head of the Halwest faction in Parliament, was arrested in Sulaymaniyah. Network 19 for Monitoring Freedom of Expression This report was prepared by a coalition of human rights organizations, led by the Metro Center. The coalition adheres to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international instruments, particularly focusing on Article 19 of the Declaration.

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New Generation Faction: KDP Forces Abduct Sipan Amedi in Duhok

The New Generation Faction in the Kurdistan Parliament announced today that KDP forces in Duhok province abducted Sipan Amedi, a Kurdistan Parliament member from the New Generation Faction, and took him to an unknown location. "This gangster-like act by the PDK follows comments made by the MP about PDK leader Masoud Barzani, where Amedi questioned whether Barzani's life and a Peshmerga's life were the same," said the faction in a statement. The New Generation Faction condemned the KDP's behavior as a "mafia-style" abduction of a parliament member. They further asserted that Masoud Barzani and his family are not only deserving of Amedi's criticism but are also the primary cause of the Kurdish people's suffering, having impoverished Kurdistan through their "theft and looting."

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KRG to Supply 280,000 Barrels of Oil Daily via SOMO

A technical delegation from Baghdad returned after meetings in the Kurdistan Region, while the KRG delegation also arrived in Baghdad. Baghdad demands a monthly transfer of 150 billion Iraqi dinars from the KRG’s internal revenues and the daily delivery of 280,000 barrels of oil through SOMO. In return, Baghdad will cover public salaries and oil company expenses. Over two days, a technical delegation from the Iraqi government visited the Kurdistan Region and met with the KRG Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Council of Ministers’ Presidency, and oil companies. The Iraqi delegation has now returned to Baghdad. Today, a delegation from the KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources and the Council of Ministers arrived in Baghdad and held meetings with Iraq’s Ministry of Oil and SOMO, indicating progress toward an agreement. According to follow-up information: The Iraqi government is requesting 50% of the KRG’s internal revenues. These revenues are estimated at 300 billion IQD monthly, meaning the KRG must transfer 150 billion IQD monthly to Iraq’s Ministry of Finance. The KRG must export 280,000 barrels of oil daily through SOMO, and the revenue will go to Iraq’s Ministry of Finance. In return, Baghdad is expected to pay the salaries for May within this week and will pay June’s salaries after a final agreement is reached. For each barrel, $16 is allocated to oil production companies. With a global market price of approximately $65 per barrel, 280,000 barrels generate about $18.2 million per day, or 8.4 million barrels monthly would yield $546 million in monthly revenue. Out of this, $134 million is spent on production companies ($16 per barrel), meaning the Iraqi government retains about $412 million monthly. If the KRG were to sell the oil independently at its current price of $33 per barrel, the monthly revenue would be $277 million—$269 million less than selling through SOMO at global prices.

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The Communist Party Enters the Race for the Christian "Quota" Seat

The Kurdistan Communist Party, which recently held its congress and renewed its leadership, is entering the Iraqi parliamentary elections with only one candidate, aiming to win the sole Christian "quota" seat in Erbil - The electoral system for quota seats operates on a single-constituency basis. For the upcoming sixth term of the Iraqi parliament elections, scheduled for November 11 this year, the Communist Party is participating with just one candidate. The party is supporting a female candidate, Thaera Yousif Aziz, for the Christian quota seat within Erbil governorate. According to the electoral system, out of the total 329 parliamentary seats in Iraq, only 9 are allocated as minority "quota" seats. Of these, Erbil has only one Christian quota seat. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), similar to its approach in Kirkuk, seeks to secure the seat through an alliance with the Chaldean Babylon Movement. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), as the ruling power in the capital, also wants to assign the seat to one of its affiliates. The Kurdistan Communist Party, therefore, finds itself in the middle of a political tug-of-war between the PUK and the KDP over Erbil’s single seat. The quota election system for minorities follows a single-constituency model, meaning that candidates running for the Christian quota seat in Erbil can receive votes from across all of Iraq, unlike general seats, where votes are confined to each province. Taking advantage of this system, the Communist Party aims to repeat its 2021 strategy by directing votes from its supporters across the Kurdistan Region and disputed areas toward Thaera Yousif Aziz in Erbil. In the October 2021 elections, using the same approach, the Communist Party succeeded in winning the Christian quota seat in Erbil for its candidate Farouq Hanna Atto Shamoun, who secured 5,495 votes. Following its latest congress, the Kurdistan Communist Party elected Abu Karwan as its new Secretary-General, replacing Kawa Mahmoud, and appointed Hiwa Omar as Deputy Secretary. This new leadership is now preparing for its first major political test on November 11, hoping to maintain at least the parliamentary seat previously held by Farouq Hanna.

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The KRG Treasury Contains Only 16% of the Needed Salary Funds

In the latest meeting of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Council of Ministers, no agreement was reached regarding the salaries issue. The Ministry of Finance reported that the regional treasury currently contains only 16% of the total funds required for public sector salaries. Prime Minister Masrour Barzani expressed optimism about an upcoming visit by an Iraqi delegation to help resolve the salary crisis. The KRG Council of Ministers convened today and discussed the issue of paying public sector salaries. Awat Sheikh Janab, the KRG Minister of Finance, presented a financial report and stated that the Region needs 820 billion dinars to distribute salaries, while the treasury currently holds only 160 billion dinars. This means that the monthly salary requirement in the Region is 980 billion dinars, and the available funds only cover 16% of it — leaving an 84% shortfall. As a result, the Council of Ministers did not issue any decision regarding the salaries and emphasized that all efforts must be directed toward reaching an agreement with Baghdad. During the meeting, Masrour Barzani stated that he had held talks with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani and the Head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaidan, and decided to send a high-level delegation within the next couple of days to negotiate a solution for the salary issue. In a press conference following the meeting, Prime Minister Barzani declared: “If we fail to reach an agreement with Baghdad regarding the salaries, whatever resources we have within the Kurdistan Region will be used — through reducing expenditures in every possible way — to ensure the public is not left without support. If we are unable to fully provide the salary rights in time and as needed, we will certainly do our best within our capacity to distribute what we can.” He also stated that there had been an intention to resume salary payments even through partial disbursement, depending on the revenues available to the KRG. If no agreement is reached with Baghdad, the Region will rely on partial salary distribution according to its own revenue capacity. Revenue Sources of the Kurdistan Region (as per the Iraqi Ministry of Finance report): Oil revenues for the first four months of 2025 amounted to 1 trillion and 166 billion dinars, averaging 300 billion dinars per month. Oil revenues for the first four months of 2025 amounted to 1 trillion and 568 billion dinars, averaging 390 billion dinars per month. Baghdad funds: Not received Coalition funds: 20 billion dinars

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US Playing Taiwan Card to Contain China

  Mr. Liu Jun, the Consul General of the People's Republic of China: In recent years, some people in the US have backtracked to make a fuss about UNGA Resolution 2758, claiming that the resolution did not address Taiwan’s political status. But the so-called undetermined status of Taiwan is nothing more than a revival of the “one China, one Taiwan” narrative from 1971. Behind this is the US hegemonic mindset and Cold War thinking that sees China as the US’ primary strategic rival and severest long-term challenge. In light of this, the US is trying to contain and suppress China by playing the “Taiwan card.” Q: What is United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758? A: During the 26th UNGA Session in 1971, Albania, Algeria, and 21 other countries submitted the draft resolution to restore the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the U.N. and to expel forthwith the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from the U.N. and all the organization related to it. This resolution, adopted with an overwhelming majority, was UNGA Resolution 2758. The full text of the resolution reads as follows:  The General Assembly, Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter, Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People’s Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Decide to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it. This resolution carries extensive and authoritative legal force, guiding and obligating all countries and international organizations to handle Taiwan-related issues in accordance with the one-China principle. Q: Why did the United Nations General Assembly adopt Resolution 2758 in 1971?  A: The United Nations was founded in 1945, with China as a founding member and one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. In 1949, the government of the People’s Republic of China was established, replacing the government of the Republic of China as the sole legal government representing the whole of China. It was a change of government without changing China as a subject of international law. China’s sovereignty and inherent territorial boundaries did not change. Rightfully, the government of the People’s Republic of China fully enjoys and exercises China’s sovereignty, including that over Taiwan. Within the UN system, it was only natural for the government of the People’s Republic of China to appoint representatives to participate in the work of the UN General Assembly and its related organs, expelling representatives of the Taiwan authorities that could no longer represent the Chinese people. However, due to interference from the government of the United States, China’s UN seat was illegally occupied by the authorities in Taiwan for a long time. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government and the Chinese people engaged in a resolute struggle to restore their legitimate seat at the UN, garnering increasing support from a growing number of peace-loving and justice-upholding nations. In the 1960s, with the rise of China’s international status and the continuous entry of many newly independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America into the UN, the US found it increasingly difficult to obstruct the People’s Republic of China from reclaiming its rightful seat at the UN. As the saying goes: “A just cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust cause finds little.” On October 25, 1971, the 26th session of the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 by an overwhelming majority: 76 votes for, 35 against and 17 abstentions. The resolution decided to restore all the rights of the People’s Republic of China at the UN, recognize the representatives of the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate representatives of China at the UN, and return the representation and seat of all of China, including Taiwan, to the government of the People’s Republic of China. For the Chinese people, this was a belated justice, completely resolving the representation question of all of China, including Taiwan, at the UN. Q: What is the historical significance of UNGA Resolution 2758? A: The historical significance of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 lies in it being the result of the collective efforts of all countries that love peace and uphold justice worldwide. It signified that the Chinese people, who account for a quarter of the world’s population, had returned to the stage of the UN, making the UN truly the most universal, representative and authoritative intergovernmental international organization. This is a victory for the Chinese people and for the people of the world, carrying significant meaning and profound impact for both China and the world. The restoration of its legitimate seat in the UN opened a new chapter of cooperation between China and the UN. For over 50 years, the People’s Republic of China has consistently upheld and fulfilled its  responsibilities and missions as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, defended the UN Charter and principles, safeguarded the authority and status of the UN, supported the UN in playing a central role in international affairs, practiced multilateralism, and deepened cooperation with the UN. It has made significant contributions to upholding international fairness and justice, promoting world peace and development, strengthening friendly cooperation among countries, and advancing the cause of human progress. Q: What is the relationship between UNGA Resolution 2758 and the One-China Principle?   The core meaning of the one-China principle includes three aspects: there is but one China in the world, the Taiwan region is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.   The one-China principle is the premise and political foundation of UNGA Resolution 2758, while the resolution solemnly confirms and fully embodies the one-China principle. The resolution makes it clear that there is but one China in the world and that the Taiwan region is part of China, not a country. It affirms that China has one single seat in the U.N., and the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate representative of the whole of China, including Taiwan region. There is no such thing as “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” After the adoption of Resolution 2758, all official U.N. Documents referred to Taiwan as “Taiwan, Province of China”. It was clearly stated that in the official legal opinions of Legal Affairs of U.N. Secretariat that “the United Nations considers ‘Taiwan’ as a province of China with no separate status” and the “‘authorities’ in ‘Taipei’ are not considered to ... enjoy any form of government status.” This has been the consistent position of the U.N. And is clearly documented.   The adoption of Resolution 2758 had a wide-reaching and profound political impact on the practice of international relations. It effectively made the one-China principle a basic norm of international relations and a prevailing consensus in the international community. To date, 183 countries have established and developed diplomatic relations with China on the basis of the One-China principle. Q: What is the relationship between UNGA Resolution 2758 and international legal documents such as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation? A: In term of affirming the one-China principle, UNGA Resolution 2758 is consistent with the spirit of international legal documents such as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, and other international legal instruments. On December 1, 1943, the governments of China, the United States, and the United Kingdom issued the Cairo Declaration, stating that it is their purpose to have all territories Japan has stolen from China, such as Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, restored to China. On July 26, 1945,  the Potsdam Proclamation, signed by the same three countries and subsequently jointed by the the Soviet Union, reiterated that  “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out.” In September 1945, Japan signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, pledging to “carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation in good faith.” These international legal documents including the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender all confirmed China’s sovereignty over the Taiwan region. These documents are the great achievements of the World Anti-Fascist War and serve as the legal cornerstone of the post-war international order. Q: The terms of “Republic of China” and “Taiwan” did not appear in UNGA Resolution 2758. Does it mean the resolution has nothing to do with Taiwan?   A: The “government of the Republic of China” was an overthrown regime and hence no longer the legitimate government of China. It could not represent China, a sovereign state, in the international community. Therefore, the term “representatives of the government of the Republic of China” must not be used in UNGA Resolution 2758 adopted in 1971. The U.N. is an international organization of sovereign states, and accepts only representatives from such states. Since Taiwan is part of China, not a sovereign state. The U.N. Charter does not allow representatives in the name of Taiwan to be sent to the U.N. Thus, the phrase “expelling the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” instead. This is a precise and accurate legal wording.   Q: Why is it groundless to argue that UNGA Resolution 2758 “has nothing to do with Taiwan”? A: Taiwan has been Chinese territory since ancient times. The history in China, which encompasses 10,000 years of culture, and more than 5,000 years of civilization, records that our ancestors moved to Taiwan to live and thrive; that our compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait jointly resisted foreign aggression and regained Taiwan; and that the compatriots from both sides are working together for national rejuvenation.  Due to the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the government of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) was forced to cede the island of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan. Taiwan was occupied by foreign forces for half a century. The 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation clearly stipulated that the Chinese territory stolen by Japan, including Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, should be returned to China. On Sept 2, 1945, Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender, and pledged to faithfully fulfill the obligations enshrined in the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation. On Oct 25, the Chinese government announced that it was resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, and the ceremony to accept Japan’s surrender in Taiwan province of the China war theater of the Allied powers was held in Taipei. From that point forward, China had recovered Taiwan de jure and de facto through a host of documents with international legal effect. Taiwan does not have any other international legal status apart from being a part of China. The UNGA Resolution 2758, passed in 1971, based on the fact that China is a complete country and Taiwan is part of China, resolved the question of who is the legitimate representative of China. The Resolution explicitly declared “to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.” Chiang Kai-shek was the leader of the Taiwan authorities at that time, and the “representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” referred to the representatives of the Taiwan authorities. During the discussions that led to UNGA Resolution 2758, the United States had teamed up with a few countries to try to create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” and to push through a “dual representation” proposal. Many countries stepped forward, voicing their clear opposition and stressing that the proposal was “illegal and inconsistent with reality, justice and the principles of the UN Charter”. In the end, the proposal failed to make it to a vote and was discarded. The “representative of Chiang Kai-shek” also acknowledged, “Other countries have always emphasized that Taiwan is part of China’s territory, I couldn’t agree more”, and “The people of Taiwan are Chinese in terms of race, history and culture.” From the text and discussions of UNGA Resolution 2758, it is evident that both the recognition of the representatives of the People’s Republic of China government and the expulsion of the “representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” were carried out within the framework of one China simultaneously. Some forces clamoring that the Resolution “has nothing to do with Taiwan” are baseless; this is either due to historical ignorance or ulterior motives. Q: Resolution 2758 recognizes that “ the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations.”  what does “the only lawful” mean?   A: According to the international law, a sovereign state can only be represented by a single central government. The resolution makes it clear that there is only one seat for China in the U.N., namely, the People’s Republic of China, and that there is only one China in the world, so there is no such thing as “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” The government of the People’s Republic of China naturally enjoys and exercises full sovereignty over China, including sovereignty over Taiwan.   Q: Why does challenging UNGA Resolution 2758 amount to a challenge to the post-World War II international order and the authority of U.N.?   A: Resolution 2758 clearly states that “Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,” “the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter.” This reflects the resolution’s clear position on upholding the authority of the United Nations. The United Nations is at the center of the post-World War II international order. The restoration of the People’s Republic of China’s lawful seat of in the U.N. marked the return of the Chinese people, or one-forth of the world’s population, back to the stage of the U.N. This is of great,far-reaching significance both to China and the world. Any attempt to challenge Resolution 2758 constitutes not only a challenge to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also a challenge to the authority of the U.N. as well as the post-World War II international order. Flagrantly reversing the course of history is absurd and highly dangerous. Q: Why are some people in the United States attempting to maliciously politicize UNGA Resolution 2758? A: The United States, as a signatory to the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, is fully aware of the historical and legal fact that Taiwan is part of China. The one-China principle forms the political foundation of Sino-US relations. The US made serious commitments on the Taiwan question in the three joint communiqués it signed with China. The US side clearly stated that the US Government recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, and acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. This political commitment forms the political foundation for Sino-US relations, represents the essence of the US’ one-China policy and is fully aligned with the spirit of Resolution 2758. Since then, every US administration has made clear commitments on the Taiwan question, acknowledging that adhering to Resolution 2758 is an obligation the US must fulfill as a member of the United Nations. In recent years, some people in the US have backtracked to make a fuss about UNGA Resolution 2758, claiming that the resolution did not address Taiwan’s political status. But the so-called undetermined status of Taiwan is nothing more than a revival of the “one China, one Taiwan” narrative from 1971. Behind this is the US hegemonic mindset and Cold War thinking that sees China as the US’ primary strategic rival and severest long-term challenge. In light of this, the US is trying to contain and suppress China by playing the “Taiwan card.” Challenging Resolution 2758 disregards historical and legal facts and contradicts the serious political commitments made by successive US administrations in the three Sino-US joint communiqués. This exposes some US forces’ double-standard and hegemonic practice of using international law and basic international relations principles when they suit it, and discarding them when they are inconvenient. The era of hegemony and force dominating international relations is long gone. Playing the “Taiwan card” and trying to use Taiwan as a pawn to suppress China run counter to the underlying global trends and will inevitably fail.  

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Kurdistan Islamic Union Decides Election List Leaders

The Kurdistan Islamic Union has decided on the heads of its candidate lists for the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled for November 11, 2025. Osama Jamil, former Iraqi MP, will lead the list in Erbil Dr. Musenna Amin, current MP, will lead the list in Sulaymaniyah Dr. Jamal Kocher, current MP, will lead the list in Duhok In the previous Iraqi parliamentary elections, the Kurdistan Islamic Union received 108,010 votes, securing four seats: Two in Sulaymaniyah Two in Duhok In the sixth term of the Kurdistan Parliament elections, the party secured seven seats, receiving a total of 117,444 votes, broken down as follows: Erbil: 24,178 votes – 1 seat Sulaymaniyah: 42,847 votes – 2 seats Duhok: 42,687 votes – 2 seats Halabja: 7,847 votes – 1 seat  

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Why Does Iran Threaten to Close the Strait of Hormuz?

📍 Geopolitical Importance of the Strait of Hormuz: The Strait of Hormuz links the Arabian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, and from there to the Indian Ocean. Around 19% of international oil needs and 11.1% of global maritime trade pass through it. On average, 20 million barrels of oil per day are transported via this narrow strait, making it one of the most critical oil and gas transit routes in the world. Roughly 20 to 30 oil tankers cross it daily—one every 6 minutes. Any disruption here immediately affects global oil prices. 🔥 Iran’s Threats to Close the Strait: Iran has repeatedly threatened to shut the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic retaliation tool. For example: In 1983, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (senior Iranian leader) said Iran could turn the strait into a "wall of fire" using artillery and even close it with Kalashnikov rifles if necessary. In 2018, then-President Hassan Rouhani warned the U.S. that blocking Iranian oil exports would mean no oil could pass through the strait at all. On June 14, 2025, after Israeli airstrikes on Iran, General Ismail Kowsari of the Revolutionary Guard stated that Iran is considering closing the Strait as part of its response options. Iran views the strait as a pressure point: if its oil exports are blocked, it can threaten global energy stability in response. 🌐 Why the Strait of Hormuz Matters Globally: It's the main export route for oil from countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Iraq. It’s also the main path for Qatari natural gas, making it vital for Asian and European markets. The strait is only 50 km wide, with a navigable channel just 10.5 km wide, which makes it easy to block militarily. ⚓ Comparison with Other Major Global Maritime Routes: Here we compare Hormuz with other strategic waterways: Malacca Strait (16% of global oil trade; major route for Asian economies). Suez Canal (6% of global oil trade; 12% of maritime trade). Bab el-Mandeb (connects the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea; 10% of trade). Danish Straits (3% oil, 3.9% global trade). Bosporus Strait (2% oil, 3.1% trade; key route for Russian exports). Panama Canal (1% oil, 3% trade). In 2023, these seven routes carried 6.5 billion tons of goods worth over $8 trillion, showing their economic significance. 📌 Conclusion: Iran threatens to close the Strait of Hormuz as a bargaining chip—to deter pressure, sanctions, or military aggression, especially from the U.S. or Israel. Shutting the strait would cripple global oil supplies and escalate geopolitical tensions. Despite the severity of the threat, Iran uses it strategically rather than practically, aware of its regional and international consequences, which would be immense.

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PUK Political Bureau Approves Internal Changes

On June 16, 2025, the Political Bureau of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) approved several leadership changes within the party: Samir Hawrami appointed as Head of the Government Board and Elected Councils of the PUK Faisal Karim Khan appointed as Head of the PUK Social Board Faryal Abdullah appointed as Head of the Board of Organizations of the PUK Rabiha Hamad appointed as Head of the PUK Martyrs Board Ziad Jabar appointed as Head of the PUK Organizing Board Sarkawt Zaki appointed as Head of the Sulaimani and Chamchamal Organization Headquarters; Sarkawt Hassan removed from Head of the Chamchamal Headquarters Burhan Saeed Sofi appointed as Head of the Peshmerga and Interior Organization Bureau Raber Sayed Braim appointed as Head of the Board of Tekosheran Sheikh Shamal appointed as Head of the Foreign Relations Board Azhi Abdulqadir appointed as Head of the Youth Board These changes reflect the PUK’s efforts to reorganize its internal leadership structure.

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Iraq's Total Revenues and Expenditures, 2023–2024

Total Revenues and Expenditures of Iraq Between 2023 and 2024 Based on data from the Iraqi Ministry of Finance: 🔹 Total Revenue: In 2023: 135.681 trillion IQD, with a 3.8% increase, reaching 140.774 trillion IQD in 2024. 🔹 Oil Revenue: In 2023: 125.882 trillion IQD, with a 1.3% increase, reaching 127.536 trillion IQD in 2024. Non-oil Revenue: rose from 9.799 trillion IQD to 13.237 trillion IQD, marking a 35% growth. 🔹 Total Expenditures: In 2023: 142.435 trillion IQD, increased by 5.7% to 150.527 trillion IQD in 2024. 🔹 Operating Expenditures: In 2023: 118.242 trillion IQD, increased by 5.9% to 125.214 trillion IQD in 2024. Investment Expenditures: increased from 24.193 trillion IQD to 25.313 trillion IQD, a 4.6% rise. 🔹 Budget Deficit: In 2023: 6.754 trillion IQD, rose by 44.4% to 9.753 trillion IQD in 2024. 1. Iraq’s General Revenue (2023–2024) The Ministry of Finance publishes monthly reports on Iraq's general revenue and expenditures. The most recent annual report was released in early June 2025: 2023 Revenue: 135.681 trillion IQD 2024 Revenue: 140.774 trillion IQD, a 3.8% or 5.092 trillion IQD increase Main sources of revenue: Oil revenue: 2023: 125.882 trillion IQD 2024: 127.536 trillion IQD, increase of 1.654 trillion IQD or 1.3% Non-oil revenue: 2023: 9.799 trillion IQD 2024: 13.237 trillion IQD, increase of 3.438 trillion IQD or 35.1% 2. Iraq’s General Expenditures (2023–2024) 2023 Expenditures: 142.435 trillion IQD 2024 Expenditures: 150.527 trillion IQD, increase of 8.091 trillion IQD or 5.7% Divided into two main sectors: Operational (Running) Costs: 2023: 118.242 trillion IQD 2024: 125.214 trillion IQD, up by 6.971 trillion IQD or 5.9% Investment Spending: 2023: 24.193 trillion IQD 2024: 25.313 trillion IQD, up by 1.120 trillion IQD or 4.6% 3. Budget Deficit Comparison (2023–2024) 2023 Deficit: 6.754 trillion IQD 2024 Deficit: 9.753 trillion IQD Increase of 2.999 trillion IQD or 44.4% 4. Investment Sector Spending (2023–2024) Investment spending grew by 4.6%, from 24.193 trillion IQD to 25.313 trillion IQD. Breakdown by sectors: Agriculture: 2023: 488 billion IQD 2024: 224 billion IQD, 54% decrease Industry: 2023: 11.789 trillion IQD 2024: 13.740 trillion IQD, 16.5% increase Transport & Communication: 2023: 3.126 trillion IQD 2024: 3.003 trillion IQD, 4% decrease Roads & Public Services: 2023: 7.379 trillion IQD 2024: 7.034 trillion IQD, 4.7% decrease Education: 2023: 1.411 trillion IQD 2024: 1.313 trillion IQD, 7% decrease 5. Spending by Iraq’s Three Presidencies (2023–2024) Total expenditures by the three presidencies increased by 4.5%, from 10.870 trillion IQD in 2023 to 11.361 trillion IQD in 2024. Breakdown: Council of Representatives (Parliament): 2023: 582 billion IQD 2024: 612 billion IQD, 5.2% increase Presidency of the Republic: 2023: 71.958 billion IQD 2024: 69.375 billion IQD, 3.6% decrease Council of Ministers: 2023: 10.216 trillion IQD 2024: 10.679 trillion IQD, 4.5% increase

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Iraq's Revenue and Expenditure in 2024

🔻 Following the end of the first half of 2025, the Iraqi Ministry of Finance released its final report for the year 2024. According to the report: 🔹 Total revenues exceeded 140 trillion and 774 billion IQD, more than 127 trillion, 536 billion, and 400 million IQD of which (91%) came from oil revenues. In contrast, 9% — over 13 trillion, 237 billion, and 705 million IQD — came from non-oil sources. 🔹 Total expenditures surpassed 150 trillion and 527 billion IQD, with more than 125 trillion and 214 billion IQD (83%) allocated to operational spending, and 17% — over 25 trillion, 313 billion, and 302 million IQD — directed toward investment spending. 🔹 Based on these figures, the federal budget experienced a deficit of 7%, totaling over 9 trillion and 753 billion IQD. 🔹 According to the report, over 60 trillion and 53 billion IQD was spent on public sector salaries, accounting for 40% of Iraq’s total revenue. 🔹 The amount of money allocated to the Kurdistan Regional Government and social welfare programs exceeded 10 trillion and 786 billion IQD, which represents 7% of Iraq’s total government spending for 2024.

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How much does the Kurdistan Region owe Baghdad, and how much does Baghdad owe the Kurdistan Region?

🔻Based on reports from: Iraq’s Ministry of Finance Kurdistan Region’s Ministry of Finance Iraq’s Federal Board of Supreme Audit Kurdistan Region’s Board of Audit For the period (2023 - 2024 - first four months of 2025): 🔹 Oil revenues of the Kurdistan Region: 10 trillion 983 billion IQD 🔹 Non-oil revenues of the Kurdistan Region: 10 trillion 522 billion IQD 🔹 Total funds received from Baghdad: 18 trillion 107 billion IQD 🔹 Total actual expenditures of the Kurdistan Region (2023-2024-April 2025): 27 trillion 177 billion IQD 🔹 The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has missed 5 months of salary payments during this period. Ministry and Audit Reports: The Iraqi Ministry of Finance, in a letter dated 28/5/2025, refers to audit documents from the Federal Board of Supreme Audit (dated 9/4/2025 and 25/5/2025), confirming oil and non-oil revenues of the Kurdistan Region, validated by both the federal and regional audit boards. An amount of 199 billion, 364 million, and 211 thousand IQD had been transferred to the federal treasury by April 2025, as per Article 13/First/A of the Federal Budget Law No. 13 (2023–2025). According to audit reports from both Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, here are the detailed figures: 1. Oil Revenues of the Kurdistan Region: 2023: 4 trillion 708 billion 587 million 855 thousand IQD 2024: 4 trillion 706 billion 430 million 390 thousand IQD First 4 months of 2025: 1 trillion 568 billion 810 million 130 thousand IQD Total (2023–April 2025): 10 trillion 983 billion 828 million 375 thousand IQD ⚠️ None of this amount was returned to the central government’s treasury. 2. Non-Oil Revenues of the Kurdistan Region: 2023: 4 trillion 656 billion 554 million 483 thousand IQD 2024: 4 trillion 700 billion 9 million 926 thousand IQD First 4 months of 2025: 1 trillion 166 billion 125 million 957 thousand IQD Total (2023–April 2025): 10 trillion 522 billion 690 million 366 thousand IQD 3. Total Funds Received from Baghdad: 2023: 3 trillion 98 billion IQD 2024: 10 trillion 786 billion IQD First 4 months of 2025: 4 trillion 223 billion IQD Total (2023–April 2025): 18 trillion 107 billion IQD 4. Total Revenue Available to the KRG (2023–2025): Oil Revenues: 10 trillion 983 billion IQD Non-Oil Revenues: 10 trillion 522 billion IQD Transfers from Baghdad: 18 trillion 107 billion IQD Total Revenue: 39 trillion 612 billion IQD 5. KRG’s Share of Federal Expenditure (2023–2025): 2023: 10 trillion 567 billion 893 million IQD 2024: 12 trillion 167 billion 876 million IQD First 4 months of 2025: 4 trillion 443 billion IQD Total (2023–April 2025): 27 trillion 178 billion IQD 6. KRG’s Allocated Share vs. Received Funds: Total allocated share (2023–April 2025): 27 trillion 177 billion IQD Total received from Baghdad: 18 trillion 107 billion IQD Remaining unpaid share: 9 trillion 70 billion IQD

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Kurdistan Region’s Financial Records (2023 to April 2025)

Summary: According to multiple official documents from the Iraqi government detailing the Kurdistan Region’s accounts from 2023 to April 2025, the Region's total revenues exceeded 41 trillion 516 billion 842 million IQD, while its allocated share under the Federal Budget Law was approximately 26 trillion 400 billion IQD. This means that approximately 16 trillion 511 billion IQD remains unaccounted for by the KRG. Breakdown: Oil revenues: over 6 trillion 275 billion 240 million IQD Non-oil revenues: 10 trillion 522 billion 690 million IQD Loans from commercial and state banks: 2 trillion 607 billion IQD Funding from the federal government: over 18 trillion 1 billion 838 million IQD The Region returned 598 billion 515 million IQD to the federal government Q1 2025 Financial Summary: From January to April 2025, the KRG received $2.264 billion from its designated budget share. However, oil revenue contributions to the federal treasury were less than 15%, and the KRG did not remit any oil revenues to Baghdad. Total revenues in this period: over 6 trillion 653 billion 75 million IQD Refund to federal government: around 200 billion IQD Budget allocation: over 3 trillion 664 billion IQD Remaining with KRG: approx. 2 trillion 999 billion IQD Breakdown: Oil revenues: 1 trillion 568 billion 810 million IQD Non-oil revenues: 1 trillion 166 billion 126 million IQD Federal funding: over 4 trillion 117 billion 485 million IQD Refund to Baghdad: only 199 billion 346 million IQD 2024 Financial Summary: The KRG received $6.05 billion from its budget allocation. Oil revenue remitted to the federal treasury was below 10%, with no oil revenues transferred. Total revenues: over 20 trillion 164 billion 624 million IQD Refund to Baghdad: over 399 billion IQD Budget allocation: approx. 12 trillion 168 billion IQD Remaining with KRG: approx. 7 trillion 998 billion IQD Breakdown: Oil revenues: over 4 trillion 706 billion 430 million IQD Non-oil revenues: 4 trillion 700 billion 9 million IQD Commercial bank loan: 371 billion IQD Federal funding: over 10 trillion 786 billion 352 million IQD Refund to Baghdad: approx. 399 billion 169 million IQD 2023 Financial Summary: The KRG received $4.1 billion more than its allocated share. No oil or non-oil revenues were remitted to the federal treasury. Total revenues: approx. 14 trillion 700 billion IQD Budget allocation: approx. 10 trillion 568 billion IQD Remaining with KRG: over 5 trillion 525 billion 300 million IQD Breakdown: Oil revenues: over 4 trillion 708 billion 587 million IQD Non-oil revenues: approx. 4 trillion 656 billion 555 million IQD Government bank loans: 1 trillion 600 billion IQD Commercial bank loans: 636 billion IQD Federal transfers: approx. 3.1 trillion IQD via multiple decisions and decrees

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