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A Vote Against All: How Spoiled Ballots Became a Political Voice in Iraqi Kurdistan

By Winthrop Rodgers When Iraqi voters went to the polls on November 11 to elect a new parliament, some voters made a pragmatic calculation to support a party that could offer them patronage or employment. Others turned to political ideology, ethno-sectarian identity, or tribal affiliation to guide their choice. Despite better-than-expected turnout, millions stayed at home in protest or out of apathy. In the Kurdistan Region, hundreds of thousands resorted to deliberately spoiling their ballots to vent the deep frustrations that have come to define the political landscape there. This tactic has become an established part of the political scene in recent years, but is under-explored in comparison with debates about voter turnout. “I spoiled my ballot because I am tired of the corruption in the local parties and their complete lack of real change,” said one public school teacher in Sulaymaniyah, who spoke on condition of anonymity. According to an analysis of data from the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), independent outlet Draw Media reported that there were 290,205 invalid ballots across the three constituencies in the Kurdistan Region — amounting to just over 9% of the total votes cast. Sulaymaniyah province had the highest rate with 137,611 invalid ballots, or about 18.54% of that constituency’s total vote, followed by Erbil province with 116,900 ballots, 14.60%, and Duhok province with a comparatively smaller 34,694 ballots, 5.55%. Even though spoiled ballots represented a higher percentage of the total in the previous election in 2021, 15.9%, their absolute number actually increased by nearly 34,334 in 2025. Spoiled ballots came in different shapes. Some people subtly marked two or more parties on the ballot, while others wrote out political messages. Humorously, at least two voters indicated that they were supporting Argentine football superstar Lionel Messi this cycle. Ballot spoiling appears to be a phenomenon particular to the Kurdistan Region. While nearly one in every ten ballots in the Kurdistan Region — and almost one in five in Sulaymaniyah — were invalid, the rate in federal areas of Iraq was far lower. According to IHEC, Maysan province had the third-highest rate of invalid votes after Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, with 6.03%. Only two other federal provinces — Karbala and Diyala — cracked 5%. Mega-populous Baghdad was the only other constituency to have more than 100,000 invalid ballots. For global comparison, just 1.2% of ballots were rejected or invalid in the 2024 U.S. presidential elections. Meanwhile, in Ireland’s recent presidential election there was a public campaign to encourage voters to spoil their ballots led by figures on the political right. In the end, around 12.9% of ballots were spoiled, 10 times more than in the previous cycle. This comparative data suggests that the number of invalid ballots in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil are the result of deliberate action, rather than accidents by careless or clueless voters. This sense was also felt by local analysts and journalists. “I think most of these disregarded votes [were] canceled on purpose by people, by the voters themselves,” said Iraqi pollster Munqith Dagher. Reasons for spoiling a ballot? Observers identified several reasons behind spoiled ballots in the particular context of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. The first reason is to stage a dignified, if private, protest against the lack of viable political options. “I marked the ballot in a way that clearly made it invalid, a deliberate sign of rejection,” the teacher said. “For me to vote for a party next time, they would need to show genuine accountability, transparency, and real action against corruption — not just promises.” Second, some voters want to defy political pressure, but in a safe and protected way. Throughout the country, political parties exert tremendous influence through patronage, often by dispensing employment or government benefits. Voters who benefit are expected to repay their patrons on election day. One obvious and important sector is the security forces, which employ hundreds of thousands of potential voters and are disciplined and monitored institutions that often have close ties with political parties. In federal areas, this includes the military, police, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and tribal militias, while the Peshmerga and Asayish are the most relevant units in the Kurdistan Region. The security forces have their own special voting day, which fell on November 9 this cycle. Ostensibly, this frees them up to ensure security during general voting. However, it also gives their political patrons a chance to monitor who votes loyally and who does not. In the Kurdistan Region, it is widely believed that members of the security forces are encouraged to photograph their ballots, despite a ban on mobile phones in the voting booth, in order to prove how they voted. Anecdotally, some who do not authentically support the party that controls their unit spoil their ballot after taking the clean photo. “Many invalid votes likely resulted from the special voting of security forces, who were threatened or pressured to vote for the two major parties,” explained Neaz Naif Mustafa, a journalist at Draw Media. Several members of the security forces in the Kurdistan Region were approached while reporting this piece, but they either said that they cast valid votes or declined to answer questions out of sensitivity for their jobs. A third reason has to do with Iraq’s electoral procedures. Some minority religious and ethnic groups have quota seats in parliament, but controversially the lists are open, so any voter, regardless of identity, can cast a ballot. Some political parties like the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and PMF factions run organized campaigns to encourage their supporters, particularly those casting ballots during the special vote, to vote in these races and ensure that their proxies win. Mustafa suggested that some of these voters “unintentionally select both their party list and a quota candidate, which automatically invalidates the vote.” Fourth, some voters remain concerned that their voting cards will be used to commit electoral fraud. One public servant, also speaking on condition of anonymity, said that by casting a spoiled ballot they had ensured that no party would steal their vote. “I truly do not trust this whole electronic system. I do not trust the electoral commission,” they said. In recent cycles, a number of biometric safeguards were put in place to prevent parties from stealing votes or packing ballot boxes, including thumbprint and facial recognition scans that are linked to a person’s voter card. Nevertheless, the persistent fears about electoral fraud reflect how widespread rigging was in past cycles and the negative effect that fraud has on voter psychology. Poisoned water, spoiled ballots However, the most common reason for spoiling a ballot is frustration with the lack of options at the ballot box. Many voters, including a large portion of those who stayed home, do not believe that the political parties will improve their lives. A second public school teacher said they spoiled their vote because “none of the parties had my trust. The experiences of recent years have proved this.” In particular they cited the decade-long salary crisis, the ineffectiveness of parliament, and the poor viability of independent candidates as reasons for their political disappointment. “I marked the names of several parties and candidates, so as not to leave my voting card unsealed lest it be forged,” the second teacher explained, citing additional fears about fraud. The rate of spoiling ballots often reflects local conditions. In places where voters are frustrated, it can make its presence dramatically visible. Spoiling is less common in constituencies where voters are more content or their behavior is heavily regulated by social and political forces. Draw Media identified one section of Darbandikhan, a town in Sulaymaniyah province, where invalid ballots “won” the second largest vote total compared with actual political parties. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which runs the political machine in the province, received 3,346 votes, or about 25% of the total cast, followed by 2,685 invalid ballots, or about 20%. The relatively new opposition party, Halwest, came in third with 2,221 votes. No other party received more than 1,500 votes in that section. Darbandikhan used to be a stronghold of the opposition Gorran (Change) Movement in the late 2000s and early 2010s, but voters progressively soured on the party after it joined the cabinet of the regional government. Gorran decided not to run this cycle after losing supporters and splintering into two factions. A particular sources of anger among Darbandikahn’s residents is poor water quality. The town sits downstream of Sulaymaniyah city and major industrial sites. As a result, untreated sewage and toxic chemicals have collected in the nearby reservoir and allegedly contributed to high cancer rates among locals. The PUK has repeatedly promised to build a water treatment plant, but the project remains incomplete. Residents staged a month-long sit-in and general strike in March 2023 to voice their anger over the issue to no avail. Disappointed with the failure of the opposition and forced to endure a disgusting and dangerous public health crisis by the local ruling party, voters apparently decided to spoil their ballots. “The leaders of political parties should be concerned about this,” said Dagher. Duhok province, where the 5.55% rate of invalid ballots was noticeably lower than elsewhere in the Kurdistan Region, potentially offers a counterexample. In recent years, the KDP has spent considerable time and money attempting to improve public services. Along with the economy, potholes and blackouts are among the most common complaints from voters. By actually fulfilling past campaign promises, the KDP may have won over some voters who would otherwise have been tempted to spoil their ballots. Voter behavior in Duhok is also guided by several hierarchical influences that discourage dissent, however private it may be. First, the KDP is not shy about punishing those who challenge its power. It has put dozens of journalists and activists behind bars in recent years, including an episode infamously known as the Badinan trials. Second, Duhok is also a strongly tribal part of the Kurdistan Region and members often follow the guidance of their tribal leader at the ballot box. Nevertheless, the nearly 300,000 invalid ballots in the Kurdistan Region provides a dire warning for ruling and opposition parties alike. This phenomenon may be less visible than a low turnout rate, but it strongly indicates dissatisfaction with the political options before voters and a willingness to take a stand. “I chose to cast a ballot instead of staying home because not voting can be dismissed, but a spoiled ballot shows I was present and still refused to support any of them,” the first teacher concluded. Winthrop Rodgers is a Chatham House associate fellow and journalist who focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.

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Several people intend to nominate themselves for the post of President of the Republic of Iraq

Although the sixth parliamentary term of Iraq has not yet held its first session, the main political components of Iraq have still not agreed on distributing the sovereign posts. The Shiite blocs have not settled on a candidate for prime minister, the Sunni blocs are divided over the candidate for speaker of parliament, and the Kurds—especially the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—are engaged in ongoing disputes over the post of President of the Republic. The Federal Supreme Judicial Council has set the timetable for electing the presidencies, stating that after the 14th of this month, the Iraqi parliament must hold its first session within 15 days to elect the speaker of parliament and his deputies. However, as in previous terms, if the parties do not agree on the posts, the first parliamentary session may be held and then left open until the parties reach an agreement on the candidates. According to Article (72) of the Iraqi Constitution, after the first session and the election of the parliamentary presidency, the Council of Representatives must, within (30 days), elect a new President of the Republic by a two-thirds majority—meaning (220 votes) out of the total (329 seats). If no presidential candidate receives a two-thirds majority in the first round of voting, then, according to Article 70 of the Constitution, in the second round, the candidate who receives the highest number of votes will become President of the Republic. Since 2005 until now, the post of President of the Republic has, as a political convention, been held by the Kurds, and within the Kurdish house by the PUK. However, this is the second presidential term in which the KDP says that while the post is the Kurds’ right, it is not necessarily the PUK’s exclusive right, and therefore it will nominate its own candidate. At the meeting of the KDP Central Committee, two delegations were formed: one for forming the Kurdistan Regional Government and another for forming the Iraqi federal government. In other words, the KDP is focusing on Baghdad’s sovereign posts and believes it is the strongest force in Kurdistan and holds the majority of Kurdish seats. Meanwhile, in recent days, the PUK has sent a delegation to Baghdad, hoping that the presidency will remain with it as before. At present, the Iraqi presidency is disputed on one hand between the PUK and the KDP, and on the other hand, several individuals are eyeing the post. Bafel Talabani: So far, Bafel Talabani has not officially announced his candidacy for the presidency, but his name has been discussed in political circles. The focus of criticism is that he does not speak Arabic, although this is not a legal or constitutional requirement for presidential candidates. According to follow-ups, Bafel Talabani holds a bachelor’s degree and has no issue in that regard. For this reason, he does not want to enter a political battle unless he is fully confident that he will be the consensus candidate and win. According to follow-ups, the opinions of Iraqi leaders and political factions were sought; some of them did not support him, while others said that the post belongs to the Kurds and that an agreement should be reached with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Requirements for a presidential candidate (He must be born in Iraq and to an Iraqi mother and father, be at least 40 years old, possess full legal competence, have a good reputation and sufficient experience, and must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude) — Article (68) of the Constitution. If Bafel Talabani does not run, the name being discussed and expected is Nizar Amidi to become the PUK’s official candidate for the post of President of the Republic. He spent nearly 10 years working alongside Mam Jalal in the presidency, and is currently a member of the PUK Political Bureau and head of its Political Bureau office in Baghdad. Latif Rashid, the President of the Republic of Iraq, intends to run for a second term. Faraydoun Abdulqader intends to nominate himself for the post of President of the Republic of Iraq. Information indicates that he has visited Baghdad and held meetings with some Iraqi leaders, and in Kurdistan, he has met with Barzani and announced his intention to run. The names of several veteran and newer PUK leaders are also being mentioned for the post. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which has formed a negotiation delegation for Iraq’s sovereign posts, is also eyeing the position. It is possible that if the PUK relinquishes certain posts in the Kurdistan Region, the KDP may, in return, step back from the post of President of the Republic of Iraq. The KDP’s potential candidates are Dr. Fuad Hussein, Rebar Ahmed, and Fazel Mirani. Resolving the presidency between the PUK and the KDP depends on several scenarios: If the KDP and PUK reach an agreement on the posts, it is expected that the KDP will agree to give the presidency to the PUK. In that case, both parties would support a single candidate—a PUK candidate approved by the KDP. If they fail to reach an agreement, the KDP will nominate its own independent candidate and lobby Iraqi political forces, similar to 2018 when Fuad Hussein was the KDP candidate against Barham Salih, and Barham Salih ultimately won. In 2021, Hoshyar Zebari was nominated but later disqualified by a Federal Court decision; the KDP then nominated Rebar Ahmed, before withdrawing him in favor of Latif Rashid and against Barham Salih. If no agreement is reached, the KDP may support a candidate from outside its party—meaning a PUK candidate, but unofficially, against the PUK’s official candidate.

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Details of the PUK–KDP Meeting

No agreement was reached at the meeting between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Pirman, and no discussion took place regarding posts, ranks, or power-sharing. The meeting was not positive and returned to square one. There is a possibility that a new negotiating delegation may be formed. A source present at the KDP–PUK meeting in Pirman revealed details of the meeting to (Draw), stating that the talks did not witness any new progress and that no type of agreement was reached on positions or issues. It can be said that the meeting was not successful and that matters reverted to the starting point. The source explained that at the beginning of the meeting, the PUK delegation posed a question to the KDP delegation: should the talks resume from where they stopped before the elections, or should they start from a different point? The KDP delegation clearly informed the PUK delegation that what was discussed before the elections is one thing, and now, after the elections, it is another matter; therefore, talks must restart from a different point. Consequently, the PUK delegation told the KDP delegation that they do not consider it appropriate to continue in this manner at this stage and that they would return to their Political Bureau to decide whether this delegation should continue or be changed. This is because what the KDP delegation is seeking differs from what had previously been agreed upon, meaning that the talks have returned to point zero. The meeting lasted a short time and then concluded, with both the KDP and PUK delegations returning to their respective party Political Bureaus to make decisions. The source told (Draw) that during the meeting, there was no discussion whatsoever about any Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) posts. The KDP delegation was of the view that, at this stage, talks should be devoted to forming the KRG and resolving that issue, and only after forming the regional government should discussions take place regarding Baghdad positions. However, the PUK delegation informed the KDP delegation that both issues are close in timing and should be discussed together as a single package. Currently, Shiite and Sunni forces are establishing their own posts; therefore, the Kurds must also prepare themselves and intensify talks to resolve the issue of the presidency of the republic and finalize that post. The PUK believes it deserves, based on merit, the positions of President of the Kurdistan Region and the Presidency of the Republic of Iraq. Therefore, an agreement must be reached on a PUK candidate. In other words, the PUK favored treating both issues as one package, while the KDP favored first settling the Kurdistan Region and KRG posts, and then addressing Baghdad. During the meeting, the KDP delegation in particular conveyed strong criticisms and complaints to the PUK delegation, especially questioning why the PUK did not accept the KDP’s proposals for forming the government, why they delayed the pre-election agreement, and why they still do not want to resolve this issue now. The PUK delegation reiterated to the KDP delegation that posts and issues must be treated as one package and discussed and resolved together. More than a year and one month have passed since the sixth-term Kurdistan Region parliamentary elections were held. In the post-election negotiations, the KDP and PUK reached an agreement on the government’s “program,” but failed to reach an agreement on how to distribute positions. In the most recent elections, out of a total of 100 parliamentary seats, the KDP won 39 seats, and the PUK won 23 seats, ranking first and second respectively, while the New Generation Movement came third with 15 seats.

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Distribution of the Population of the Kurdistan Region by Administrative Units

Based on statistics from Iraq’s Ministry of Planning for the general population census within the borders of the Kurdistan Region provinces (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok) for 2024: The total population of the Kurdistan Region is 6,519,129. Of these, 2,841,634 people (43.59%) live in the central districts of the provincial capitals (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok), while 3,677,495 people (56.41%) live within the administrative boundaries of districts, subdistricts, and villages. At the district level, Zakho district in Duhok Governorate has the highest population (398,876), while Mawat district in Sulaymaniyah Governorate has the lowest (3,843). The population of Erbil Governorate is 2,517,534. Of these, 1,288,538 (51.2%) live in the central district, and 1,228,996 (48.8%) live in other districts, subdistricts, and villages. Bnaslawa district has the highest share (12.5%), while Sidsakan district has the lowest (0.76%). The population of Sulaymaniyah Governorate is 2,401,724. Of these, 1,056,067 (44%) live in the central district, and 1,345,657 (56%) live in other administrative areas. Kalar district has the highest share (8.9%), while Mawat district has the lowest (0.16%). The population of Duhok Governorate is 1,599,871. Of these, 497,029 (31.1%) live in the central district, and 1,102,842 (68.9%) live in other districts, subdistricts, and villages. Zakho district has the highest share (24.9%), while Batifa district, with 19,000 residents (1.2%), has the lowest. The tables below clarify the numerical and percentage distribution of the population across the administrative units of the Kurdistan Region’s provinces (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok).

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KDP and PUK prevent one another’s officials from passing checkpoints

On December 15, at the Koya checkpoint, several KDP officials and their bodyguards were prevented from going to Sulaimani. In response, at Degala and Smaqoli checkpoints, a minister, a member of the Political Bureau, and a member of the PUK leadership were prevented from going to Erbil.  The General Security Directorate – Erbil said in a clarification: On Monday, at the Koya border checkpoint, forces affiliated with that checkpoint prevented several KDP officials and their bodyguards from heading to Sulaimani and told them that, without prior coordination, they could not enter the Sulaimani area. This caused surprise, because movement for citizens throughout the Kurdistan Region is free, and all bodyguards are permitted to carry weapons. In response to that action, measures at the checkpoints were tightened, and movement was restricted; however, after clarification was given that what happened was a mistake and not intentional, the situation at the checkpoints returned to normal. We request that such incidents not be repeated and that accountability be pursued against those who created this situation. According to Draw’s follow-up, at the Degala checkpoint—after the incident at the Koya checkpoint— Fahmi Burhan, head of the Board of the Kurdistani Areas Outside the Region (with ministerial rank), and a member of the PUK Political Bureau, who were traveling from Sulaimani to Erbil, were prevented from entering Erbil and turned back. At the Smaqoli checkpoint, Luqman Wardi, a member of the PUK leadership, was also prevented from going to Erbil and was turned back.  

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Attacks on Energy Infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region (2018–2025)

  Draw Media KRG, Department of Media and Information Introduction The energy sector in the Kurdistan Region - an essential component of both Iraq’s national energy framework and the wider regional energy market - has been subjected to a sustained pattern of targeted attacks since 2018. What initially appeared as sporadic and low-impact incidents have evolved into increasingly sophisticated strikes employing ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This report documents the scope and consequences of these attacks, including material damages, operational disruption, and human casualties. Identifies outlines the implications for energy security and investment stability in the region.  All findings are presented on the basis of verified data and factual reporting, without political interpretation. 1. Timeline and Evolution of Targeting: The campaign targeting energy-related assets in the Kurdistan Region can be divided into four distinct phases, each characterised by changes in method, precision, and objective. Phase I (2018–2021): Low-Accuracy Harassment Attacks During this period, oil fields and refineries were sporadically targeted with unguided Katyusha rockets. These attacks were largely imprecise, resulting in minimal damage and limited operational disruption. Their primary effect was symbolic rather than structural.  Phase II (2022): Shift to Precision and Strategic Targeting In 2022, the nature of the attacks escalated significantly with the use of long-range, high-precision weaponry.  •    13 March 2022: Twelve ballistic missiles struck a private residence in Erbil belonging to an energy sector investor (CEO of KAR Group), completely destroying the property. This marked the first documented instance of direct targeting of private capital through a precision missile attack. •    April–May 2022: Grad rockets and UAVs launched from the Nineveh Plains targeted the Kalak refinery, damaging fuel storage facilities and confirming a shift toward degrading energy processing infrastructure. Phase III (2023–2024): Direct Strikes on Production and Personnel This phase was characterised by direct attacks intended to cause disruption to operations and loss of life: •    26 April 2024: A UAV strike on the Khor Mor gas field killed four technical staff and temporarily halted gas production, demonstrating the capability to strike active operational facilities. •    15 December 2024: A ballistic strike on the home of businessman Peshraw Dizayee, CEO of Falcon Group, resulted in the deaths of the investor, members of his family—including his infant daughter—and civilian guests. Phase IV (2025): Systemically Disruption of Energy Supply By 2025, attacks appeared designed to inflict widespread economic damage across interconnected energy systems: •    July 2025: Coordinated UAV attacks targeted five oil fields - Khurmala, Sarsang, Peshkhabur, Tawke, and Sheikhan - reducing oil production by an estimated 220,000 barrels per day. •    26 November 2025: A precision strike hit an LPG storage facility at the Khor Mor gas field. 2. Data Background: Electricity System Impact: Khor Mor Field Attack: The table below provides a comparative overview of electricity production and supply conditions before and after the November 2025 attack on the Khor Mor gas field, illustrating the immediate impact of the disruption on power generation and regional electricity availability.   3. Summary of Major Incidents and Impacts (2022–2025): The following table summarises the most significant attacks targeting energy-related assets between 2022 and 2025, including the date, location, weapon type, point of launch, and the resulting operational, economic, and human impacts.   4. Economic and Energy Security Implications: The cumulative impact of these attacks has: •    Disrupted oil and gas production and processing capacity •    Reduced electricity generation and stability across the Kurdistan Region •    Affected household and industrial power supply •    Increased operational risks and insurance costs for investors Short-term disruptions have translated into broader economic consequences, particularly during peak seasonal demand, with ripple effects extending beyond the Kurdistan Region into Iraq’s national grid. Conclusion: The period from 2018 to 2025 reflects a clear evolution in the targeting of energy infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region - from low-impact harassment to precision strikes aimed at systemic disruption. The data presented demonstrate that energy installations, personnel, and associated civilian environments have increasingly become focal points of attack. This report aims to contribute to informed understanding among policymakers, energy stakeholders, researchers, and international partners by presenting a factual record of events and their consequences. Continued monitoring, documentation, and protection of critical energy infrastructure remain essential for safeguarding energy security, economic stability, and civilian well-being.   Source; KRG, Department of Media and Information    

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French Consul General Visits "Draw" Media Platform

Draw Media The Consul General of France in the Kurdistan Region visited the Draw Media Organization to discuss the outcomes of the elections and the state of press freedom in the Kurdistan Region. Yann Brem, the French Consul General in the Kurdistan Region, visited the Draw Media Organization in Sulaimani. During the visit, Draw presented data and graphics related to the results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections and the standing of political forces, supported by books and publications previously produced by Draw. The organization also highlighted its reports and findings concerning elections and freedom of expression in the Kurdistan Region, focusing on how election results may impact the overall situation in the region.    

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Performance of Dana Gas Company in the Khor Mor Gas Field

  Based on the latest financial and operational report of the Emirati company Dana Gas at the Khor Mor gas field: Khor Mor and Chemchemal are major gas fields containing several trillion cubic feet of gas reserves along with 3.1 billion barrels of condensate (naphtha) reserves, of which 1.1 billion barrels belong to Dana Gas. During 15 years of operation, the company has produced 500 million barrels of condensate, with peak condensate production recorded in 2024. Pearl Petroleum, the main gas producer supported by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), supplies the gas required to generate about 2,000 megawatts of electricity in 4–5 power plants. The KM250 expansion project—the plan to expand the gas field—is being constructed at a cost of $806 million. The United States provided $250 million in loans in 2021 for the project. The Khor Mor gas field reached its first production phase in October 2008, at which time only gas and condensate (naphtha) were produced at about 100 million cubic feet per day (MMscfd). In a new effort, in 2023, production significantly increased to about 500 MMscfd of gas, 86 MMscfd of naphtha, and 68 MMscfd of LPG. The company plans that, after the completion of KM250 in 2026, production will rise to 810 MMscfd of gas, 127 MMscfd of naphtha, and 105 MMscfd of LPG. Based on the latest financial and operational disclosures of Dana Gas in the Khor Mor gas field, the company describes the wealth of the field and its relatively low depletion as globally significant. Dana Gas contributes to energy security in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Aside from Khor Mor, the company is also in the initial appraisal and early development phase in the Chemchemal gas field. Khor Mor and Chemchemal jointly contain several trillion cubic feet of gas along with 3.1 billion barrels of condensate, 1.1 billion barrels of which belong to Dana Gas. Over 15 years, the company has produced 500 million barrels of condensate, peaking in 2024. Pearl Petroleum, the primary operator, provides gas for generating about 2,000 MW of electricity in 4–5 power plants. Total investment in the Khor Mor field so far has reached $2.055 billion. The KM250 project, with a total cost of $806 million, received $250 million in loans from the United States in 2021. Work began in January 2020 by the American company Exterran, which was later bought by Enerflex in 2022. By November 2024, the company had raised $350 million in bonds to support further field development. Dana Gas expects a significant increase in output once KM250 is completed in 2026, with gas production nearly doubling. Production Levels of Gas, Naphtha, and LPG in Khor Mor (2008–2026) 2008: First production—around 100 MMscfd of gas and condensate. 2010: Production nearly doubled to 191 MMscfd, including LPG. 2011: Production rose to 335 MMscfd, covering KRG domestic needs and enabling export of surplus gas. 2019: Significant increase: 383 MMscfd gas, 83 MMscfd naphtha, 64 MMscfd LPG. 2023: Another major rise to 500 MMscfd gas, 86 MMscfd naphtha, 68 MMscfd LPG. 2026 (forecast): With KM250 completed: 810 MMscfd gas, 127 MMscfd naphtha, 105 MMscfd LPG. In the chart (mentioned in the text), a dotted light-grey line shows the amount of gas allocated to KRG power generation, which is 305 MMscfd. Gas above 305 MMscfd represents surplus gas available for sale.

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Nearly 6 Million Barrels – Kurdistan’s Oil Exports in October

Iraq’s Ministry of Oil has released the final statistics for oil exports and revenues for October. According to the data prepared by SOMO (Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization), total crude oil exports for October reached 110,923,047 barrels (including condensates). Oil revenues for the month exceeded 7.030 billion USD. Iraq’s oil exports for October were divided as follows: From central and southern Iraqi fields: 104,816,106 barrels From the Kurdistan Region through Turkey’s international port: 5,834,864 barrels Exports to Jordan: 272,077 barrels

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Dissolution of Parliament or Completion of Quorum?

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has begun preparations for reconvening parliament and forming the government. The issue of completing the parliamentary quorum has been resolved, but the KDP wants to settle the matter of voting on the presidencies of parliament and government. The Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtu) will participate in the parliamentary session but will not join the government. The New Generation Movement (Naway Nwê) will attend the parliamentary session, and its participation in the government is likely. The People’s Front will attend the session as well. The PUK, however, currently does not want the 10th cabinet to be formed, nor does it want the KDP to negotiate with other parties to form the government in the way it intends. Still, the KDP is no longer willing to wait for the PUK and will use all available cards. Dissolution of the Kurdistan Parliament There has been talk for a while about dissolving the Kurdistan Parliament due to the KDP and PUK’s failure to reach an agreement on forming the government. Meanwhile, the results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections have shifted votes toward the KDP and several other smaller parties. If new elections are held in the Kurdistan Region, the seat distribution would likely change—especially benefiting the KDP. Based on Iraq’s election results, the KDP, which currently holds 39 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament, could rise to around 45–47 seats, while the PUK and New Generation would likely lose seats. More than 400 days have passed since the Kurdistan parliamentary elections were annulled, and the presidency of the parliament has not been elected. Legal Bases for Dissolving the Parliament According to Article 10(4) of the amended Presidency Law of the Kurdistan Region (No. 1 of 2005), the Kurdistan Parliament may be dissolved in the following cases: If more than half of its members resign. If the legal quorum is not achieved within 45 days after being called to session by the President of the Region. If parliament fails to grant confidence to three consecutive cabinet formations. If the electoral system changes while less than six months remain of the parliament’s term. Even though dissolving the parliament is legally possible through a presidential decree, political realities suggest that the KDP’s push for dissolution might simply be a pressure card to force other parties to complete the quorum. Holding new elections would take more than six months, and the electoral commission’s mandate expires next January. Under current conditions, it is highly unlikely that elections will be held soon. All indicators point instead toward reconvening parliament, electing the parliamentary presidencies, electing the president of the region, and then forming the government. What Happens Next? Masoud Barzani, President of the KDP, has repeatedly stated that the pre-election political arrangements with the PUK are no longer valid after the elections. This means the positions previously agreed upon will not be granted to the PUK. The PUK does not accept this, so the KDP is testing alternative paths to forming the government. The KDP now wants parliament to reconvene at any cost and to elect the parliamentary presidencies. According to independent sources: The National Stance (Halwesti Nishtimani) has decided not to join the new cabinet and will remain in opposition but will participate in the Iraqi government. The Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtu) will not join the cabinet but will participate in the parliamentary session, enabling the quorum for parliamentary meetings—but not for electing the presidencies. The Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal) may participate in the parliamentary session (but this is not officially confirmed). The People’s Front will attend the parliamentary session. The New Generation has been approached by the KDP several times and appears willing to join the cabinet if the issue of Shaswar Abdulwahid’s imprisonment is addressed. New Generation wants to turn its participation into leverage against the PUK to secure Shaswar’s release. If New Generation joins the government, this would recreate the 2019 cabinet scenario in which the KDP and the Gorran Movement formed a coalition first, and the PUK joined later. With New Generation’s participation, the quorum for electing the parliamentary presidencies would be completed, solving the KDP’s main problem. Even if New Generation refuses to join the cabinet, its attendance at the parliamentary session—because it has a candidate for parliament’s presidency—ensures a quorum for the session itself, though not for electing the presidencies (which requires 51 votes). KDP’s Quorum Strategy The KDP wants at least 51 votes in the hall to elect the parliamentary presidencies. Their current potential quorum breakdown: KDP: 39 seats New Generation: 15 seats Yekgirtu: 7 seats People’s Front: 1 seat Independents: 3 seats Total: 65 MPs This exceeds the 50+1 quorum needed for holding the session. But for electing the parliament speaker, deputy speaker, and secretary, 51 votes are needed. Without agreement with one of the main blocs, the KDP cannot reach this number. If the KDP and New Generation reach an agreement: KDP: 39 New Generation: 15 Independents: 3 Total: 57 votes This is more than enough to elect the parliamentary presidencies and later the president of the region and the prime minister. Election of the President of the Region After electing the parliamentary presidencies, the next step is to elect the President of the Kurdistan Region. According to the amended 2019 Presidency Law: Parliament elects the President. Voting must begin within 30 days after electing the parliamentary presidencies. The President is elected by an open vote, requiring 50+1 votes (51 MPs). If no candidate meets this threshold, the election proceeds to a second round, where only a simple majority is needed (unless there is only one candidate). Election of the Prime Minister After electing the President: Parliament grants confidence to the nominee for Prime Minister. The President tasks the nominee with forming the cabinet within 30 days. Parliament must approve the cabinet with 51 votes. The entire process of electing the presidencies and forming the cabinet will be complicated, but the KDP has clearly decided to no longer wait for the PUK. The KDP now pursues two simultaneous tracks: Forming the new Kurdistan Regional Government. Negotiating for the new federal government in Baghdad. If the KDP and PUK enter both negotiation tracks simultaneously, conflicts may deepen. But if the positions in Erbil and Baghdad are bundled together, reaching a deal may become easier—especially since both parties aspire to the Kurdish share of the Iraqi presidency, which could lead to a renewed two-candidate standoff in Baghdad similar to previous years.

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PUK and KDP votes in disputed areas

Votes of the PUK and KDP in the Kurdish regions outside the administration of the Kurdistan Region in the elections of 2021 – 2023 – 2025 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): 2021: 145,139 2023: 217,475 2025: 278,904 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): 2021: 177,810 2023: 182,662 2025: 258,436 The quota seats for the PUK and KDP are not reflected in these figures.

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Invalid/Blank Votes in the Kurdistan Region

Invalid/Blank votes in the Iraqi Parliamentary Elections – 11/11/2025 – in the Kurdistan Region Invalid/Blank Votes: Erbil: 116,900 Sulaimani: 137,611 Duhok: 34,694 Total: 289,205

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Changes in Political Party Votes across Kurdistan Regional Governorates

🔻 Votes of political parties at the level of the Kurdistan Region’s governorates between the last two elections — the Kurdistan Parliament elections (2024) and the Iraqi Council of Representatives elections (2025): 🔹 The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) increased its votes by about 64,000, a rise of 8%. 🔹 The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) lost around 53,000 votes, a decrease of 13%. 🔹 The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) gained around 46,000 votes, an increase of 39%. 🔹 The Halwest movement gained approximately 100,000 votes, an increase of 179%. 🔹 The New Generation Movement lost about 169,000 votes, a decrease of 58%. 🔹 The Justice Group (Komalî Dadgarî) lost around 17,000 votes, a decrease of 26%. 🔹 The Berey Gel (People’s Path) lost about 14,000 votes, a decrease of 42%.

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Final (Unofficial) Results of the Special Vote

Total (Overall): Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP / Parti): 94,666 votes Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK / Yeketî): 78,230 votes Halwest: 7,895 votes New Generation (Naway Nwe): 4,808 votes Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgrtu): 4,512 votes Komal (Kurdistan Islamic Group): 1,338 votes People's Front / Baray Gel): 1,153 votes Erbil (Hewler): KDP: 32,255 votes PUK: 12,512 votes Halwest: 2,298 votes Haidar Faili: 1,373 votes New Generation: 1,286 votes Yekgrtu: 670 votes Komal: 385 votes Baray Gel: 297 votes Asir Ibrahim: 55 votes Sulaimani: PUK: 42,913 votes KDP: 6,302 votes Halwest: 4,891 votes New Generation: 2,320 votes Yekgirtû: 1,580 votes Komal: 909 votes Baray Gel: 739 votes Duhok: KDP: 26,475 votes Yekgirtû: 2,260 votes Halwest: 686 votes New Generation: 536 votes PUK: 507 votes Komal: 44 votes Baray Gel: 31 votes Invalid (Spoiled) Votes: Sulaimani: 19,645 votes Erbil: 13,465 votes Duhok: 5,460 votes Total Invalid Votes: 38,570 votes

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Participation and Boycott in General Elections (1992–2024)

Since the first parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region in 1992, the Kurdistan Region has held 13 general elections for the Kurdistan Parliament, Provincial Councils, and the Iraqi Council of Representatives. 1. First Kurdistan Parliament Elections (May 19, 1992) Eligible voters: 1,112,000 Votes cast: 971,953 Turnout: 87.4% Invalid votes: 4,724 Valid votes: 967,229 Breakdown: Erbil: 333,802 valid (87.4%) Sulaymaniyah: 347,952 valid (87.3%) Duhok: 197,370 valid (87.6%) Kirkuk region: 88,114 valid (87.3%) 2. Second Kurdistan Parliament elections  (Jan 30, 2005) Eligible voters: 2,290,736 Votes cast: 1,753,919 Turnout: 76.6% 3. First Provincial Council Elections (Jan 30, 2005) Eligible voters: 2,290,736 Votes cast: 1,767,993 Turnout: 77.2% 4. First Iraqi National Assembly Elections (Jan 30, 2005) Eligible voters: 2,290,736 Votes cast: ≈2,175,551 (95%) within Kurdistan under the “Kurdistan Alliance” Highest recorded turnout in the history of New Iraq (95%) 5. Third Kurdistan Parliament elections (July 25, 2009) Eligible voters: 2,518,773 Votes cast: 1,876,196 Turnout: 74.5% 6. Second Iraqi Parliamentary Elections (Mar 7, 2010) Eligible voters: 2,590,274 Votes cast: 1,938,754 Turnout: 74.8% Breakdown: Erbil: 74% Sulaymaniyah: 76% Duhok: 74% 7. Fourth Kurdistan Parliament elections (Sept 21, 2013) Eligible voters: 2,653,743 Votes cast: 1,978,382 Turnout: 74.6% 8. Third Iraqi Parliament Elections (Apr 30, 2014) Eligible voters: 2,717,082 Votes cast: 2,128,167 Turnout: 78.3% Breakdown: Erbil: 79% Sulaymaniyah: 76% Duhok: 80% 9. Second Provincial Council Elections (Apr 30, 2014) Eligible voters: 2,717,082 Votes cast: 2,161,038 Turnout: 79.5% 10. Fourth Iraqi Parliament Elections (May 12, 2018) Eligible voters: 3,758,896 Votes cast: 1,799,686 Turnout: 47.9% 11. Fifth Kurdistan Parliament election (Sept 30, 2018) Eligible voters: 3,085,461 Votes cast: 1,845,979 Turnout: 59.8% 12. Early Iraqi Parliament Elections (Oct 10, 2021) Eligible voters: 3,450,773 Votes cast: 1,233,451 Turnout: 35.7% Lowest recorded turnout since 1992. Breakdown: Erbil: 35.7% Sulaymaniyah: 28.3% Duhok: 48.1% 13. Sixth Kurdistan Parliament elections (Oct 20, 2024) Eligible voters (biometric card updated): 2,899,578 Votes cast: 2,085,949 Turnout: 72% Invalid votes: 206,434 Breakdown: Erbil: 75% Sulaymaniyah: 66% Duhok: 78% Halabja: 69% Summary Analysis Over 32 years, voter eligibility in the Kurdistan Region increased from 1.1 million (1992) to nearly 3.8 million (2024) — a 210% increase. However, actual participation only grew by about 27%. Turnout has declined sharply over time, from 87.4% (1992) to 35.7% (2021), with a recovery to 72% in the 2024 regional vote. Peak turnout: 95% (Iraqi Parliament 2005) Lowest turnout: 35.7% (Iraqi Parliament 2021) 2024 recovery: 72% (Kurdistan Parliament) Long-term trend: eligible voters tripled, but turnout rates declined overall — showing voter fatigue and distrust over time.

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