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Dana Gas made a net profit of $43m in first quarter of 2025

The Emirati giant Dana Gas, operating the Kurdistan Region’s Khor Mor Gas Plant, stated Thursday that it generated $43 million in net profit for the first quarter of 2025, a 13 percent increase compared to the same timeframe last year. Dana Gas reports "a net profit of AED 158 million ($43mm) for Q1 2025, a 13% increase compared to AED 140 million ($38mm) in the same period last year, despite lower oil prices,” the company said in a statement. It attributed the increase to “stronger gas prices in Egypt following the Consolidation Concession Agreement, lower depreciation, depletion, and amortization (DDA) charges, along with reduced finance costs." The Emirati giant noted that revenue for the quarter of 2025 stood at $91 million, six million dollars lower compared to the first three months of 2024. "The year-on-year decline was primarily due to lower production in Egypt, coupled with lower realized hydrocarbon prices; however, this was partially offset by improved gas pricing in Egypt and higher condensate price realization in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI),” the statement explained. The UAE-based company has played a pivotal role in the production of the Kurdistan Region’s natural gas since 2007. The Khor Mor gas field is a major fuel source for electricity generation plants in the Region, with production currently at 525 million standard cubic feet of natural gas per day. "Production in the KRI remained strong in the first quarter of 2025. In early March, Dana Gas and its partner Crescent Petroleum announced that cumulative production from the Khor Mor field had reached 500 million barrels of oil equivalent, reflecting the strength and consistency of operations since 2008,” Dana Gas reported. It stated that daily gas production at Khor Mor "reached 525 million standard cubic feet, marking a 75% increase since 2017. The field continues to support over 75% of the Kurdistan Region’s power generation needs.” Dana Gas reports that it has invested $3.5 billion to date at Khor Mor, with operations having created "more than 20,000 direct and indirect job opportunities in the region.” Dana Gas plans to increase gas production by 50 percent in the Kurdistan Region next year. With the completion of the one-billion-dollar KM250 project, an expansion of the Khor Mor field expected by the first quarter of 2026, daily production will reach nearly one billion standard cubic feet of gas per day, enough to equip the Kurdistan Region to provide 24-hour electricity. The KM250 will also "significantly boost Dana Gas’s financial performance and cash flow,” the company states.

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Will Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan help bolster the Kurdish cause in Syria?

Momen Zellmi - amwaj.media   The political upheaval in Syria, marked by the fall of former president Bashar Al-Assad and the rise of Sunni Islamist rule, has potentially opened new doors for Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan. Potentially aiming to piggy-back on ideological and political affinities with Syria’s new administration, such actors view the transition in Damascus as an opportunity to build alliances—and further leverage those links to advocate for Kurdish rights. However, one pressing question remains: can cross-border outreach help ensure Kurdish political and cultural autonomy in Syria, or will such efforts only further complicate the political aspirations of Kurdish Islamists in Iraq? Critically, this follows significant losses by such actors in Iraqi elections in recent years, giving rise to marked introspection. Facing intense criticism that they privilege their Muslim identity over their Kurdish ethnicity, Iraq’s Kurdish Islamists risk stoking further censure if they hitch their political project to that of the new rulers in Damascus.   The praise of Iraq’s Kurdish Islamists Kurdish Islamist parties in Iraq have wasted no time seeking to ingratiate themselves into the Syrian context since the fall of Assad last December. However, their divergent responses signal deep strategic divides within the movement, reflecting the distinct strands of Kurdish Islamism—shaped by decades of ideological evolution, factional splits and shifting alliances. Perhaps the most bold outreach has come from Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) head Irfan Ali Abdulazeez, who only weeks after Assad’s downfall announced the reopening of his group’s offices in Damascus. Abdulazeez claimed the move aimed at “engaging in dialogue” to find “better solutions for the issues facing our Kurdish brothers.” He further emphasized his group’s historical ties with Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, although he did not elaborate on the nature of those ties. It has been suggested, however, that some of IMK’s cadres may have fought alongside Sharaa-led forces as far back as 2013, which were then known as the Nusrah Front. For his part, Ali Bapir, the leader of the Kurdistan Justice Group—also known as Komal and itself a splinter group from IMK—is reported to have sent a congratulatory letter to Sharaa shortly after his takeover of Damascus. The letter further called on the Syrian leader to address several claimed injustices against Kurds under the previous Syrian regime, including the stripping of citizenship, marriage rights and work opportunities. Such overtures may aim to serve a dual purpose, claiming a vested interest in Syrian and pan-Kurdish affairs while also opening privileged avenues to the new authorities in Damascus. This dynamic encapsulates the inherent balancing act of Iraq’s Kurdish Islamist parties: privileging roots in their Kurdish identity, while at the same time highlighting the Islamic character of their political vision.   Kurdish or Islamist? The claimed cross-border affinities expressed by Iraqi Kurdish Islamists have also served as a liability. Both Abdulazeez and Bapir have long faced criticism over their ties to militant groups such as Al-Qaeda. Bapir was jailed for 22 months in a US-run detention facility near Baghdad after the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, over alleged ties to militants. He was only released after renouncing militancy and dedicating himself to political and religious outreach. As a product of late-20th century transnational militant Islamism, both IMK and the Kurdistan Justice Group have also faced accusations from other Kurdish parties that they privilege their Islamist political visions over their ethnic roots. This accusation has seemingly proved effective, with observers pointing to their lackluster performance in Iraq’s Oct. 2023 provincial elections. Hawkar Ali, a university professor in Sulaimaniya, told Amwaj.media that the Oct. 2024 Kurdistan Parliament elections were also disappointing for Islamist parties. Both the Kurdistan Justice Group, which won only three seats, and IMK, which failed to secure any seats, outright rejected the results alleging that the polls were manipulated. According to Ali, the two groups likely believe that Iran and Turkey influenced the outcomes of the elections, thereby marginalizing their presence in the political landscape. Consequently, Abdulazeez and Bapir are now seeking to broaden their regional and international relationships, particularly through Syria, as a strategy to counteract this perceived regional neglect by regional powers—and to strengthen their influence on the regional stage. Perhaps wary of this reality, not all of Iraq’s Kurdish Islamist groups seem so eager to reach out to the new Syrian administration. Muthanna Amin, leader of the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), has expressed optimism about Sharaa’s seeming shift towards a more moderate position, while underscoring the shared principles between his own group and Syria’s new Islamist rulers. Amin further noted that his movement aims to mediate peaceful solutions for Kurdish autonomy and broader disputes in Syria, likely aiming at positioning itself as a bridge between Sharaa’s government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). While these organizations’ dual Kurdish-Islamist identity has often been seen as a liability, in this context it may prove to be an opportunity for them to act as privileged political interlocutors.   Regional context of cross-border outreach To Iraq’s Kurdish Islamists, the opportunity to engage with Sharaa holds significant potential. Strong connections with the new Syrian government would surely prove a boon to their collective hope that the authorities in Damascus will rectify past wrongs, and provide Syrian Kurds with the recognition they were denied under Assad. However, not all seem convinced that such a diplomatic role for Iraq’s Kurdish Islamist groups is appropriate. Aziz Raouf, an Iraqi Kurdish analyst, argues that individual political parties have no right to build relations with foreign governments and powers, saying that is the role of governments. Speaking to Amwaj.media, Raouf in parallel criticized homegrown Kurdish Islamists for failing to utilize their regional relationships, including with Iran and Turkey, to advance Kurdish interests. If IMK and the Kurdistan Justice Group do hope to play a more central role in regional dynamics, broader engagement will be necessary given the complexities and cross-border nature of Kurdish issues. For example, in Syria a major point of contention is the future of the SDF, which played a vital role in the fight against the Islamic State group (IS) and also established autonomous rule in the northeast of the country. However, to Turkey, the SDF is viewed as a direct extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group designated as a terrorist organization by Ankara and several other governments. This creates a paradox for Kurdish Islamists who seek to mediate between the SDF and Sharaa’s administration, while potentially managing the geostrategic demands of Turkish interests both in Iraq and Syria. Unlike Kurdish Islamists’ relatively strong ties with Ankara, their relationships with the SDF remain confrontational, making any mediation attempt incredibly fraught. A fragile opportunity The key challenge for Kurdish Islamist factions in Iraq is to find a middle path. While a tall order, such a move could see their stock rise, both politically and electorally, by demonstrating their ability to act pragmatically on the regional stage. Erbil-based researcher Payraw Anwar told Amwaj.media that Islamist political forces in the Kurdistan region of Iraq will be hard pressed to influence domestic policy in Syria on the Kurdish issue. He attributed this to fundamental ideological differences among Kurdish factions across the region, charging that "Islamist parties see religious identity above ethnic and national identity, while nationalist forces prioritize nationalism above religion." Given these apparent dynamics, it seems that the success of outreach to Syrian actors by Iraqi Kurdish Islamists hinges on their ability to effectively leverage historical ties and ideological affinities. However, there are no guarantees that Sharaa will embrace any solution to the Kurdish issue in Syria that may come from Iraqi actors. Ultimately, the potential for cooperation between Iraq’s Kurdish Islamist factions and Syria’s new leadership could be the key to resolving some of the longstanding issues facing Kurds in Syria. Whether this opportunity is seized, or falls victim to regional rivalries, will certainly play a role in shaping the future of Syrian Kurds.   https://amwaj.media/en/author/24504108 * Momen Zellmi is a political analyst, researcher and diplomatic consultant based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan. He has a PhD in Language Education Policy and an MA in English language, and has published numerous works in the fields of politics, language and educational policy, gender, and culture.

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KRG calls for restart of Kurdish oil exports

The Kurdistan Region’s Council of Ministers said on Wednesday that it has met its obligations for resuming the Region’s oil exports, calling on the relevant authorities in Erbil and Baghdad to restart the process “as soon as possible.” Kurdish Prime Minister Masrour Barzani affirmed in a statement that the KRG fully backs ongoing talks with the federal government and international oil companies to resume crude exports under Iraq’s federal budget law. He emphasized, “There are no longer any technical or political obstacles on our side.” Senior officials at the meeting, including Cabinet Secretary Amanj Rahim and Council of Ministers Chief Umid Sabah, reviewed the status of tripartite negotiations between the KRG, Baghdad, and oil companies. They described the recent talks as constructive and said efforts are ongoing to finalize pending issues and reach an agreement. The KRG further called on all sides—including Iraq’s state oil marketer SOMO and private firms—to maintain momentum and work toward an agreement that would restart exports and prevent further financial losses to the federal treasury, which the KRG estimates have exceeded $10 billion due to the prolonged halt. The KRG stressed the need to prioritize retirees’ rights and tasked the Ministries of Finance and Economy, Peshmerga Affairs, and Interior with forming a joint committee to develop mechanisms for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pensions and entitlements across civil, military, and security sectors.

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An attempt is being made by the Kurdish opposition groups to form a coalition ahead of elections

Kurdish opposition parties are holding intensive talks to form a unified electoral coalition ahead of Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary elections in November, seeking to reshape the political landscape away from the dominance of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). According to Draw Media information the Kurdistan Justice Group initiated the efforts, holding a series of meetings with the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and the People’s Front, which resulted in a preliminary agreement to form a joint electoral alliance. Contacts have also been made with the New Generation Movement (al-Jeel al-Jadeed-NGM) and the National Position Trend, both of which expressed initial approval to join the coalition. Discussions are underway with independent political figures and other groups to broaden support for the project, with a broader meeting expected in the coming days to finalize the coalition’s framework and electoral strategy, the sources added. These developments come as the KDP and PUK are considering running on a joint list in disputed areas during the upcoming parliamentary elections, in an effort to secure stronger representation in these sensitive regions.  

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DNO reports higher production in Kurdistan

The Norwegian oil and gas company DNO announces that production in Kurdistan and the North Sea increased in the first quarter. Total gross production in Kurdistan rose to 82,081 barrels of oil equivalent per day (76,310), compared to 74,163 in the previous quarter, while North Sea production increased to 8,864 barrels per day. Net production in the North Sea was higher than in Kurdistan, at 19,296 and 18,464 barrels per day respectively. In addition, the company reported a net share of 3 375 barrels per day from the Ivory Coast. DNO’s share of crude oil from the Tawke license during the quarter has been sold to local buyers as the Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline remained closed. All payments are made in advance of loadings with the vast majority transferred directly into DNO’s international bank accounts.

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Kurdistan Parliament, Behind Scenes of Conflicts

From Draw Media Publications Kurdistan Parliament, Behind Scenes of Conflicts Series 1 of (Kharmani Darw)  Kharmani Darw is a documentary program produced by Draw Media Organization. Conflicts and disagreements in the Kurdistan Parliament from three different perspectives: - Yousef Mohammed, Speaker of the Fourth Session of the Kurdistan Parliament -Rewaz Fayeq, Speaker of the fifth session of the Kurdistan Parliament - Hemn Hawrami, Deputy Speaker of the Fifth Session of the Kurdistan Parliament

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A New Conflict Over Oil Exports Emerges Between the Federal Government and the Kurdistan Region

A member of the Iraqi parliament's Oil and Gas Committee disclosed a new dispute between the Kurdistan Region and the federal government over oil exports after the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources and the Iraqi Ministry of Oil failed to meet. The Kurdistan Region is demanding that Dana Gas receive a portion of its oil in exchange for gas production and supply. According to the federal budget law, the Kurdistan Region must supply 400,000 barrels of oil per day to SOMO; however, the region has claimed it can only produce 300,000 barrels and cannot supply the entire amount to Baghdad, Aso Faraidoon, a member of the Oil and Gas Committee, told Channel 8. Faraidoon explained that while the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad had agreed to allocate 46,000 barrels of oil for domestic needs, the Kurdistan Region has now requested 69,000 barrels per day to supply Dana Gas in exchange for gas production and supply to meet government needs. He said the Iraqi Oil Ministry has made it clear that this issue is outside its authority and is governed by the budget law. Faraidoon also mentioned that, in addition to the new issue, the ongoing concern regarding the financial entitlements of oil companies and guarantees for future expenses remains unresolved, with the Oil Ministry stating that the decision lies with the federal government. The Kurdistan Region’s oil exports have been suspended since March 2023, following a ruling from the Paris-based Arbitration Court in favor of the Iraqi federal government. KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani stated on November 16 that the suspension of oil exports has resulted in a $23 billion loss for the Kurdistan Region.

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KRG Wins $26 Million in Arbitration Against Genel Energy

The Kurdistan Regiononal Government has been awarded substantial legal costs in the arbitration case against Genel Energy Miran Bina Bawi Limited (GEMBBL). The award follows the arbitral tribunal’s Partial Award on Merits, received in December 2024, in which the tribunal held that the Government validly terminated the Bina Bawi and Miran PSCs and dismissed all of GEMBBL’s claims against the Government. On 4 April 2025, the arbitral tribunal issued its Final Award on Costs, in which it ordered GEMBBL to pay the Government US$26,868,905.29, plus post-award interest. The Government is very pleased with this successful outcome. Department of Media and Information

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APIKUR Objects to the Ministry of Oil's Actions

Draw Media   Designated International Oil Companies (IOCs), along with the Kurdistan Regional Government, have been negotiating in good faith with the Government of Iraq (GOI), including directly with Prime Minister Sudani’s office, to reach a resolution to resume exports through the Iraqi-Türkiye pipeline in accordance with our legal agreements and the Iraqi budget law.   We understand today the Ministry of Oil has demonstrated it is unwilling to negotiate a solution that honors IOCs contract sanctity and is attempting to establish a process to unilaterally alter the economic framework of legal and valid contracts between the KRG and IOCs. These actions by the Ministry of Oil are not acceptable, and the member companies of APIKUR will not resume exports until there is commitment from the GOI to honor our contracts including payment surety for past and future exports.   NEW YORK, N.Y. (March 28, 2025)  

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The Press Law is being implemented in Sulaimani

According to an order of the president of the Sulaimani Court of Appeal, "from now on the Press Law 2007 will be implemented and a judge will be dedicated to the cases of journalists." Judge Omar Ahmad, President of the Sulaimani Court of Appeal, issued two administrative orders regarding journalists and journalists' cases and states that, “In the public interest and better performance, we decided to: First: the Sulaimani Court of Investigation/1 will be responsible for hearing complaints related to journalists in Sulaimani, and Law No. 35 of 2007 on Journalism in Kurdistan will be applied to their cases. Second: All the above claims will be referred to the Sulaimani Court of Appeal/6 for resolution after the completion of the investigation stages. He also pointed out that "his order shall take effect from the date of its issuance."   Press Law in the Kurdistan Region, Law No. 35 of 2007 states: First: The press is free, and no censorship shall be imposed on it. Freedom of expression and publication shall be guaranteed to every citizen within the framework of respect for personal rights, liberties, and the privacy of individuals in accordance with the law, as well as being committed to the principles of ethics in the Bordeaux Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists, adopted by the 1954 World Congress of the International Federation of Journalists, amended in 1986. Second: A journalist may obtain information of importance to citizens and with relevance to the public interest. Third: In case of a legal suit, a journalist may keep secret the sources of information and news relevant to the suits brought before the courts unless the court decides otherwise. Fourth: Every natural or legal person shall have the right to possess and issue journals in accordance with the provisions of this Law. Fifth: No journal shall be closed down or confiscated.

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Iraqi Kurdistan faces a deepening economic crisis as unpaid wages pile up

Public sector workers in Iraqi Kurdistan, a semi-autonomous region of northern Iraq, have endured irregular and delayed salary payments for more than a decade. Many of these people are owed staggering amounts of money – US$50,000 (£38,700) on average, and as much as US$120,000 for higher-level employees. The region’s 6.5 million inhabitants have been caught in the middle of an unresolved political and financial conflict between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Iraq’s federal government in Baghdad. The conflict centres on disputes primarily over territorial control and oil revenues. There are longstanding political tensions over Kurdish autonomy and governance in northern Iraq, particularly in disputed areas like oil-rich Kirkuk. The KRG held a referendum for independence in 2017, which was backed decisively by people living in northern Iraq. The electoral commission said 92% of the 3.3 million people who cast their ballots supported secession. Baghdad, which had opposed the vote, rejected the result. It swiftly imposed sanctions on the region and sent Iraqi troops to retake several contested territories. Iraq’s Supreme Court ruled later in the year that, in order to preserve the unity of Iraq, no Iraqi province was allowed to secede. Another major issue is the KRG’s independent export of the region’s oil production. Baghdad is opposed to this too, insisting that all of Iraq’s oil revenues must be centrally managed. The KRG, however, argues that its right to manage natural resources is protected under Iraq’s constitution. The dispute escalated in 2023 when Iraq’s Supreme Court ruled that revenues from Iraqi oil and gas must be fairly distributed to all of Iraq’s people, regardless of where it is found. This ruling has led to budget cuts in Iraqi Kurdistan. These unresolved disputes have left Iraqi Kurdistan in economic and political limbo, with frequent salary delays for public sector employees and growing public frustration. A map of the approximate Kurdish-populated region of Iraq. Awder Shwan / Shutterstock Iraqi Kurdistan is now experiencing a wider economic downturn, as the region’s limited private sector is also being affected by the salary crisis. Public sector employees make up a significant portion of the workforce. When they do not get paid on time, they cut back on spending. Businesses, from small shops to large retailers, are experiencing a slowdown in economic activity, leading to closures and layoffs. Adding to the hardship is the lack of reliable access to basic services such as water and electricity. Many Kurdish households only receive water for a few days each week, forcing families to ration their supply or buy expensive private alternatives. The situation with electricity is even worse. Government-provided power is available only for set hours each day, leaving households and businesses reliant on costly private generators. While ordinary people suffer from water shortages and power cuts, the region’s ruling elite enjoy uninterrupted access to luxury services. The inconsistency in the provision of these essential services is not due to a lack of resources, but a failure of governance. The ruling elite – dominated by the Barzani and Talabani families – have amassed vast wealth since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 through their monopolisation of key industries. Investigations suggest that substantial amounts of the region’s oil wealth have been diverted through opaque contracts and off-the-books transactions. Instead of channelling Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil revenues into public services, healthcare or infrastructure, large sums reportedly disappear into private accounts, foreign investments and elite patronage networks. This mismanagement has resulted in billions of US dollars in unaccounted oil revenues. People celebrate the first anniversary of the Kurdistan Independence referendum in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, in 2018. Gailan Haji / EPA This economic monopoly has also reinforced a jobs-for-votes system. Reliant on government wages, the KRG’s 1.2 million civil servants feel pressured to support the region’s dominant parties, the Kurdistan Democratic party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. To maintain this political stranglehold, the two parties have suppressed private sector growth, ensuring economic dependency on public jobs. The telecommunications sector, for example, is dominated by Barzani-linked Korek Telecom and Talabani-linked Asiacell, with bureaucratic barriers blocking private competition. Meanwhile, weak banking infrastructure and a lack of investment incentives stifle private sector growth, pushing people toward government jobs controlled by the ruling parties. Salaries and promotions often depend on political loyalty, reinforcing economic dependency and making independent enterprise difficult. Creating a debt crisis The unpaid salary backlog has forced many of Iraqi Kurdistan’s residents into massive personal debt. Many civil servants have been forced to borrow money from family, friends or banks just to cover rent, food, medical bills and tuition for their children. The mounting financial pressure has also led to an increase in divorce rates. Even if the KRG returns to paying salaries on time, the backlog must still be paid. Both Baghdad and the KRG are legally responsible for ensuring public sector workers receive the money they are owed. Ignoring these arrears is a clear violation of the constitutional and international obligations that Iraq has committed to, which include the UN’s sustainable development goals. Bamo Nouri The right to a fair wage and timely compensation is enshrined in Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which Iraq is a signatory to. And Iraq’s own constitution guarantees citizens the right to social and economic welfare, which includes timely wages. Iraqi Kurdistan’s salary crisis is also contributing to the global refugee crisis. The Crossing, a documentary that aired on ITV in 2022 about the capsizing of a dinghy of asylum seekers in the English Channel, demonstrated that economic despair has prompted many Kurds to risk their lives on dangerous migration routes in search of stability and opportunity. Without a structured repayment plan, the crisis will remain unresolved – even if salaries are paid moving forward.

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Kurdish Leader’s Call for Peace Could Reshape the Middle East

Draw Media By  Binar FK، Middle East & North Africa   Historic call opens rare opportunity to de-escalate long-standing conflict across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran After spending a quarter of his life in solitary confinement in a Turkish prison on İmralı Island, Abdullah Öcalan — the 76-year-old leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — last week issued a handwritten letter calling for “peace and a democratic society.” Just 48 hours later, the PKK – a group long branded as “terrorist” by Turkey and the United States among others — declared an immediate ceasefire with Turkey, a stunning shift after 40 years of armed resistance. Öcalan’s message was unequivocal: “Convene your congress, integrate with the state and society voluntarily, and make a decision; all groups must lay down their arms, and the PKK must dissolve itself.” The historic call by Öcalan opens a rare opportunity for de-escalation of a long-standing conflict in a region plagued by far too many. But resolving the conflict through dialogue will not be easy and will require a serious undertaking by all stakeholders. If successful, however, this development could reshape Turkey’s domestic landscape, alleviate regional tensions, and reverberate across Syria, Iraq, and Iran — all countries with significant and often restive Kurdish minority populations. Turkey The PKK according to Öcalan was a historical necessity that emerged in reaction to the complete “denial of Kurdish reality, restrictions on basic rights and freedoms, especially freedom of expression.” Turkish authorities have limited the ability of Kurds – some 15 million people, or 18-20 percent of the country’s population – from using their native language in schools, media or other official settings or achieving other autonomous rights. Over nearly four decades, PKK resistance has led to significant violence, killing some 40,000 people. It has been a central factor in Turkey’s security calculus, used as justification for extensive military operations in the country’s southeast as well as frequent incursions into Syria and Iraq.  However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is seeking a constitutional amendment that would allow him to serve more than two terms, needs support beyond his ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party from Turkish nationalist voters or pro-Kurdish political parties. Turkish local election results in 2024 showed the nationalist opposition Republican Peoples’ Party or CHP outpacing the AK party by 37 to 35 percent. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) took 5.70 percent, a significant share in Turkey’s fragmented electoral landscape. The results also further solidified Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu of the CHP as Erdoğan’s primary challenger. A perceived triumph over the PKK could improve Erdogan’s political standing among his religious base and Turkish nationalists as well. Demobilization of the PKK would require legal and security guarantees for fighters and an approach to transitional justice that addresses root causes.  This could create an environment where the Kurds could engage more politically and peacefully to achieve the goals of the Kurdish struggle for basic cultural, linguistic and local representation rights. “Respect for identities, free self-expression, democratic self-organization of each segment of society based on their own socio-economic and political structures, are only possible through the existence of a democratic society and political space.”  Öcalan outlined in his letter.  Syria The major announcement by the PKK leader coincides with significant developments in Turkey’s neighbor, Syria, where the four-decade-old Assad dictatorship collapsed abruptly in December in the face of Turkish-backed Syrian forces. In northern Syria, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a largely ethnic Kurdish group, established an autonomous area after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and later became the principal American ally in the fight against the Islamic State. Turkey, however, regards the group as an offshoot of the PKK and has backed the rival Syrian National Army (SNA). It launched several military campaigns against SDF-controlled territories occupying the Kurdish-majority city of Afrin in 2018 and other offensives and incursions into Syria in succeeding years. SDF chief General Mazloum Abdi turned down Öcalan’s call to disarm and dissolve, stating that it “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.” Nevertheless, Abdi welcomed the letter, calling it “a historic opportunity to build peace and a key to opening correct and constructive relations in the region.” It remains unclear whether Syrian Kurds will be able to resolve their differences with the new government in Damascus led by a former jihadist group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Abdi has affirmed the SDF’s commitment to Syrian unity but seeks to maintain his forces within a new national army and to retain considerable autonomy for Kurdish areas under a decentralized, secular, and civil state. There have been reports of ongoing talks between Damascus and Syrian Kurds but interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa excluded the SDF from a recent national conference to chart a political roadmap.  If, however, an agreement can be reached between the SDF and the Sharaa government, that could help alleviate tensions with Turkey and serve the interests of minority communities in northeastern Syria. Iraq and the KRI In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), leaders across the political spectrum welcomed Öcalan’s proposal. KRI President Nechirvan Barzani and the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Bafel Talabani, both lauded the proposed dissolution of the PKK as what Talabani called a “responsible and necessary call at this stage to unite the Kurds and resolve issues through peaceful dialogue based on partnership and solidarity.” The PKK presence in the Qandil mountains of northern Iraq has been a persistent source of friction with Turkey, which has repeatedly launched strikes and ground incursions into KRI territories. If the PKK dissolves, it would remove the Turkish incentive to continue such strikes and help to stabilize the area.  Sinjar, home to the Yazidi ethnic minority, would likely also benefit. In 2014, when ISIS launched an onslaught on Sinjar, forcing some 250,000 Yazidis to flee to Mount Sinjar and endure a siege there, the PKK and its affiliates conducted a rescue operation, establishing a safe corridor for civilians to flee. Kurdish and Iraqi authorities have sought to reassert their authority through the Sinjar Agreement to establish a new governance and security framework, but it has yet to be carried out. PKK disarmament could facilitate the implementation of this agreement. The KRI could also be a key player in providing logistical and technical support, potentially offering asylum to senior PKK leaders and overseeing the disarmament process. Iran Iran’s Kurdish minority has a history of resistance to rule from Tehran, dating back to the creation of a Soviet-backed Kurdish enclave in the aftermath of World War II and an uprising after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. A dismantling of the PKK could have a significant impact on similar movements in Iran, including the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). PJAK was founded on the ideology of the PKK but has maintained a ceasefire with the Islamic regime since 2011. Öcalan referred to the group in his letter, writing that “all groups must lay down their arms.” Iran considers other Kurdish opposition armed groups as threats and in September 2018 launched a missile strike on the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in the town of Koya in Iraqi Kurdistan. This new paradigm could help Iran, which has seen its regional allies weakened over the past 15 months, revise its stance on indigenous Kurds. Meysam Moradi, an expert on Kurdish issues from Kermanshah, Iran, who is studying international politics and governance at Roskilde University in Denmark, told this author that the Iranian establishment is closely monitoring regional developments in light of Öcalan’s initiative. “It is understandable that Iran would initiate measures in response to these shifts,” he said. “A key factor in this equation is the recent Kurdish experience in Syria and the establishment of a semi-autonomous region, which enjoys support from the West. Tehran is deeply aware of these unprecedented geopolitical changes in the region and will likely adopt pre-emptive measures to mitigate their impact, which may include implementing a similar ‘peace process’ model within the country.” Öcalan’s historic call for the PKK to dissolve represents a significant opportunity for peace and political integration in a wide swath of the Middle East, with potential to reshape not only Turkey’s security and political dynamics but also impacting broader regional stability. If all parties engage sincerely, this moment could transform longstanding conflict into constructive political dialogue, fostering a more inclusive and democratic society across the region. Binar FK is a Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and is pursuing Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame. Based in the United States, he writes on and researches political and security issues in the Middle East. He previously worked in journalism, covering wars and conflicts in the region, focusing on extremist groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other militias.

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Protests increased by 13% in 2025

"Compared to the protest activities of the previous month (January), which numbered 48, there has been a 13 percent increase,” Alliance 19 said in a statement. According to Alliance 19, the most common protests were for salaries (41 percent of all demands), employment (17 percent), and services (9 percent), adding that, "61% of the activities were in Sulaimani, 31% in Erbil, 6% in Duhok, and 2% in Halabja." Last February, the largest strike of teachers and employees was organized in Sulaimani, which lasted from January 28 to February 11. Alliance 19 is a human rights monitor consisting of advocates and civil society organizations. It is supervised by the Metro Center for Journalists’ Rights and Advocacy.

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PKK declares ceasefire with Turkey after more than 40 years of conflict

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) on Saturday declared a ceasefire with Turkey, bringing an end to more than 40 years of bloodshed. The imprisoned leader of the Kurdish militant group, Abdullah Ocalan, this week called for the PKK to disband. The Executive Committee of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) released a statement in response to the historic call made by Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan on 27 February. Öcalan highlighted the urgent need for democratization in Turkey and called for the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve itself. The PKK Executive Committee's written statement titled 'To Our Patriotic People and Democratic Public Opinion' reads as follows:  “Leader Abdullah Öcalan's February 27 statement titled “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” is a Manifesto of the Age that illuminates the path of all forces of freedom and democracy. We respectfully salute Leader Apo [Abdullah Öcalan] for presenting such a manifesto for democratic society to our people and humanity." It was the first reaction from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) after Ocalan this week called for the dissolution of the group and asked it to lay down arms. "In order to pave the way for the implementation of leader Apo's call for peace and democratic society, we are declaring a ceasefire effective from today," the PKK executive committee said referring to Ocalan and quoted by the pro-PKK ANF news agency. "We agree with the content of the call as it is and we say that we will follow and implement it," the committee based in northern Iraq said. "None of our forces will take armed action unless attacked," it added. The PKK designated a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, has waged an insurgency since 1984 with the aim of carving out a homeland for Kurds, who account for around 20 percent of Turkey's 85 million people. But more recently, the group calls for more autonomy, cultural and linguistic rights rather than independence. Since Ocalan was jailed in 1999 there have been various attempts to end the bloodshed, which has cost more than 40,000 lives. After several meetings with Ocalan at his island prison, the pro-Kurdish DEM party on Thursday relayed his appeal for PKK to lay down its weapons and convene a congress to announce the organisation's dissolution.

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Draw Media's Discussion with the Chinese Consul General

"China and its influence in the Middle East, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region" China's policy in the Middle East, Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region was discussed at the office of the Darw Media organization. The Chinese Consul General in the Kurdistan Region, Mr. Liu Jun, discussed the situation in the Middle East and China's foreign policy towards the Middle East, especially the issue of changes in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and relations between China, the Kurdistan Region, and Iraq. Several topics were discussed by the participants: - The discussion focused on China's views on the Kurdish issue and where the Kurdistan Region is on China's agenda. - Chinese goods have covered the Kurdistan Region's markets today, on what basis and quality are the Chinese items produced and imported? - China as a large and influential country in the world, has a great economic and political position, what role does it play in the changes in the Middle East? - China's role is more in the economic, cultural, and technological fields, but it is now moving towards a political role.

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