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The Kurdistan region's income in March 2022

Draw Media A schedule that has been sent to Draw, Shows the Kurdistan region's total income and Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah’s portion of the KRG income. 🔹 Total oil revenue: 800 billion dinars 🔹 Total non-oil revenue: 300 billion dinars 🔹 International Coalition financial aid: 32 billion dinars Total KRG revenue: one trillion and 132 billion dinars 🔹 Sulaymaniyah’s Portion: 388 billion dinars by 34% 🔹 (Erbil and Duhok)’s Portion: 744 billion dinars by 66%

Kurdistan Regional Government Income for April 2022

Non-oil income •The region's non-oil revenues for April = (164 billion) dinars (which will be spent on salaries) • Coalition Financial aid for Peshmerga forces = (31 billion 500 million) dinars Oil revenues (pipeline export) • The Kurdistan Region exported 13 million and 616 thousand barrels of oil through the Turkish port of Jayhan in April 2022. • The average price of Brent oil for April was $ 104.58. • Because the region sells its oil for less than $12, The average price of KRG oil for April was.$92.58. So: (13 million and 616 thousand) barrels X (92.58) dollars = (1 billion, 260 million, 569 thousand and 280) dollars. In Iraqi dinar is: (1 billion, 260 million, 569 thousand and 280) dollars X (1450) dinars = (1 trillion 827 billion, 825 million and 456 thousand) dinars. • According to Deloitte's latest report, 56% of oil revenues will go to the production expenses and 44% remains for the Ministry of Natural Resources. - So: (1 billion, 260 million, 569 thousand and 280) dollars X (56%) = (705 million, 918 thousand and 797) dollars go to the oil process costs. It means in dinar: (705 million, 918 thousand and 797) dollars X (1450 dinars = (1 trillion, 23 billion, 582 million and 255 thousand and 360) dinars is oil expenditure. - (1 billion, 260 million, 569 thousand and 280) dollars X (44%) = (554 million, 650 thousand and 483) dollars of the income will remain in April. Oil revenue in Dinar is 554 million, 650 thousand-, and 483-dollars X (1,450) dinars= (804 billion, 243 million, 200 thousand, and 640) dinars. Total income in April 2022 (in dinar) • (804 billion, 243 million, 200 thousand and 640) oil income + (164 billion) non-oil income + (31 billion 500 million) from allies = (999 billion, 743 million, 200 thousand and 640) dinars

Report: Kurdish Authorities 'Likely Involved' in Citizen Journalist’s Killing

Draw Media, VOA On the 12th anniversary of the death of Kurdish journalist Sardasht Osman, an investigation by three press advocacy groups claims Iraqi Kurdish authorities were “likely directly involved” and that Osman was assassinated because of a satirical blog post. The investigation’s results were published in a 43-page report Wednesday by A Safer World For The Truth, a collaborative initiative of Free Press Unlimited (FPU), the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), and Reporters without Borders (RSF). The groups said they interviewed dozens of witnesses, analyzed case files, and reviewed satellite photos in concluding that Osman, a citizen journalist, was targeted for an article written a year earlier criticizing the family of then-Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani. Osman's body was found on May 6, 2010, in Mosul, two days after he’d been abducted outside his college campus in the Iraqi Kurdish capital, Irbil. He had been shot in the head. “This report reveals serious flaws in the official investigation into the kidnap and assassination of Sardasht and finds credible allegations that Kurdish authorities were directly involved in the murder,” the group’s report states. VOA reached out to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) for comment on the report but has not received a response. The KRG had accused the now-defunct terror group Ansar al-Islam of carrying out the killing. Barzani has previously denied any involvement in Osman's death. Osman was 23 when he died and a student at the University of Salahaddin in Irbil. The offending blog post, titled "I am in love with Barzani’s daughter,” lampooned Barzani's family for nepotism and corruption. After publishing his article, Osman wrote that he had received death threats and was interrogated by the security forces. “There are always people who don’t want to listen when you start telling the truth, who get furious at the slightest whisper. To stay alive though, we must tell the truth. I will continue to write until the last minute of my life,” he wrote. Numerous reports have documented how the Barzani and Talabani families have dominated Kurdistan for decades and allegedly amassed vast hidden wealth using their control of the regional government, security forces and oil resources. A Safer World For The Truth describes itself as “a people's tribunal” in a world where impunity for crimes against journalists is common. The initiative so far has investigated impunity in the killings of five journalists. In Osman’s case, the KRG created a special committee to investigate the matter. But the journalist groups found numerous problems in the committee’s work, making the explanation that terrorists were to blame implausible. “First, we found that after the assassination, Kurdish authorities consistently harassed and threatened Sardasht’s family and friends, and threatened journalists who wrote about the case. Additionally, Kurdish authorities banned various publications about Sardasht’s life, work and assassination,” the report states. “The location where Sardasht was kidnapped was constantly monitored by CCTV cameras and armed guards, yet the armed guards did not prevent the kidnapping; nor did the committee analyze CCTV footage of the kidnapping,” the investigation found. An original autopsy report disappeared, the group said, as did its author. An official autopsy report was inconsistent with other physical evidence, and the KRG committee never interviewed Osman’s family and friends or investigated the threats he’d received. Jules Swinkels, lead researcher for the group’s report said in a statement: “The case of Sardasht is emblematic of what can happen when journalists push the boundaries of their confined freedom of expression.” "[Osman] wrote satirically about Kurdistan’s most powerful individuals and was kidnapped and assassinated because of it. Tragically, his case demonstrates that a complete lack of political will to investigate and solve murders of journalists domestically is one of the main reasons for impunity," Swinkels added. In the years since Osman's death, at least 22 other journalists have been killed in Iraq, including several who died in KRG-controlled areas, according to the CPJ. The report called on the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, which have all aided the KRG financially and militarily, to press Kurdish authorities “to investigate threats against, attacks on and murders of journalists according to international standards, including a re-investigation of the case of Sardasht Osman.”

The income of the border crossings was more than 400 billion dinars in the last 3 months

Draw Media According to statistics from the Kurdistan Regional Government's General Directorate of Customs, the revenue of the border crossings was more than 400 billion dinars in the last 3 months January customs revenue: Ibrahim Khalil: 65 billion and 392 million dinars Haji Omaran: 14 billion and 102 million dinars Bashmakh: 10 billion and 538 million dinars Parwezkhan: 18 billion and 231 million dinars February 2022 customs revenue: Ibrahim Khalil: 77 billion and 172 million dinars Haji Omaran: 17 billion and 831 million dinars Bashmakh: 15 billion and 140 million dinars Parwezkhan: 21 billion and 642 million dinars March 2022 customs revenue: Ibrahim Khalil: 73 billion and 320 million dinars Haji Omaran: 22 billion and 488 million dinars Bashmakh: 17 billion and 238 million dinars Parwezkhan: 23 billion and 338 million dinars January customs revenues for airports: Erbil International Airport: one billion and 853 million dinars Sulaymaniyah International Airport: One billion and 27 million dinars General Coy: 2 billion and 880 million dinars February customs revenues for airports: Erbil International Airport: one billion and 461 million dinars Sulaymaniyah International Airport: One billion and 225 million dinars General Coy: 2 billion and 686 million dinars March customs revenues for airports: Erbil International Airport: one billion and 780 million dinars Sulaymaniyah International Airport: 784 million dinars General Coy: 2 billion and 564 million dinars Total Customs income of January 2022: 116 billion and 842 million dinars Total Customs income of February 2022: 142 billion and 56 million dinars Total Customs income of March 2022: 147 billion and 67 million dinars

ExxonMobil Quits Iraqi Kurdistan

Draw Media, mees The US supermajor’s bold 2011 Iraqi Kurdistan entry sent shockwaves through Iraq. A decade later ExxonMobil has quietly packed its bags and quit its last remaining asset, Pirmam, without producing a drop from any of the six blocks it picked up. Any prospective replacement may eye a gas-related tie-in with neighboring Bina Bawi. ExxonMobil has quit Iraqi Kurdistan, relinquishing its sole remaining license in the region – the Pirmam gas block. The supermajor’s contentious 2011 entry was spearheaded by then-CEO Rex Tillerson in the face of opposition not only from Baghdad but also from the US Department of State. A decade after sparking political outcry, Exxon has walked away without much to show. Attracting international majors was a cornerstone of Iraqi Kurdistan’s strategy for developing its nascent oil and gas sector a decade ago. Erbil’s success in bringing in the likes of ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron and Gazprom Neft helped provide a political shield against Baghdad’s opposition – the four firms are national champions from three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

How the Salaries of Sulaymaniyah's Civil Servants Are Provided?

Draw Media - March oil revenue: one billion and 128 million dollars - Oil revenue to the government treasury: 551 million dollars - Oil revenue for salary: 366 million for salary, (66%) - Oil revenue for expenditure: $ 185 million, (34%) - Oil income and Baghdad financial aid for Sulaymaniyah salary: 193 million dollars Sulaymaniyah should allocate 48 million dollars of internal income for civil servants’ monthly salary - Sulaymaniyah needs $248 million per month for civil servant’s salary - The total salary of the KRG civil servants: is 893 billion dinars monthly -The total salary of Sulaymaniyah civil servants: is 365 billion dinars monthly -The KRG sends 287 billion dinars monthly for Sulaymaniyah’s salary - Sulaymaniyah’s salary deficit is 78 billion dinars, which will be filled with internal income - From the Sulaymaniyah’s internal income (15) billion dinars will be sent to national institutions in Erbil monthly - From the Sulaymaniyah’s internal income (7) billion dinars will be paid to students and contract teachers monthly - With internal income and oil revenues, the civil servant salaries would be easily provided, but the government has lost the control and the internal income does not return to banks and the oil and internal revenues are not transparent, some of those revenues are unknown, so how much local income increases and how much higher the price of oil is, the salary problem would not be solved. - The KRG Income for March: Oil income: 810 billion dinars Baghdad financial aid: 200 billion dinars - Internal income: 370 billion dinars - Coalition financial aid: 27 billion dinars - Total March revenue: one trillion and 407 billion dinars - The total amount of civil servant Salary: is 893 billion dinars - The remaining amount for the KRG: 514 billion dinars (after extracting the salary)

65% of Oil Reserves and 7% of Oil Production Are in the PUK Zone.

Draw Media Part one Of the 57 oil and gas blocks, 23 oil and 2 gas blocks are located in the PUK zone in Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, and Garmian provinces, where 13 foreign companies are investigating, searching, and digging oil production (except gas). According to the information, Sulaymaniyah’s oil reserves are estimated at more than 36 billion barrels which are 65 percent of the region's total oil reserves. This comes at a time when of the 9 blocks that have reached the production stage in the PUK zone, making up only 7.3 percent of the region's oil production. First, the oil reserves of the Kurdistan Region and the share of Sulaymaniyah governorate in it Different information is available on the size of the region's oil reserves, but official KRG information since 2010 indicates that 45 billion barrels of oil reserves are estimated to be in the Kurdistan Region, which has been published on the KRG's official website. On August 19, 2010, the former minister of natural resources, Ashti Hawrami, announced at a press conference about the oil reserves in the Kurdistan Region that "There are 45 billion barrels of oil in the Kurdistan Region." According to a 2015 Report by the Door Organization for Kurdistan Oil Information, "The Kurdistan Region has 50 billion barrels of stable oil reserve and 80 billion barrels of unstable oil reserve,", also the press information indicates that Sulaymaniyah’s oil reserves are estimated at more than 36 billion barrels and 65 percent of the region's total oil reserves. Second, the oil blocks of Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, and Garmian administration Of the 57 blocks (oil and gas), 23 oil blocks and 2 gas blocks, are located in the PUK zone borders of Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, and Garmian provinces, where 13 foreign companies now operating in the area. The companies are from (8) the different countries (United States, Russia, Canada, Turkey, Korea, Spain, Australia, and Italy). 1. Betwata block: 650 Squares kilometers, in Sulaymaniyah province, it starts from Hajiawa town and reaches Betwata, Balisan, Khoshnawati.‌ 2. Shakrok block: In Sulaimaniyah province, it starts in the Khedrani district in Dukan until near Shaqlawa. 418 square kilometers. 3. Qaladze block: In Sulaymaniyah province, it covers all Kaladze districts, Marqa, Dukan Lake, and Rania. It is about 2,000 kilometers square. 4. Khalakan block: In Sulaymaniyah province, Kalakan town, Haybat Sultan Mountain, and a part of Koya plain until Little Zab River. 624 square kilometers have (2,450) billion barrels of oil. 5. Piramagrun block: In Sulaimaniyah province, east of Dukan-Sulaymaniyah road and the foothills of Piramagrun mountain till it reaches Dukan town, it is more than 730 square kilometers. 6. Miran block: In Sulaimaniyah province, it starts from Tasluja, west of Dukan-Sulaymaniyah road, including a part of Agjalar, Bazian, and Chamy Razan Resort. It's 1015 square kilometers. Contains two big oil fields; east Miran which is expected to have 1,637 billion barrels of oil, and west Miran, which contains 4,808 billion barrels of oil. 7. Bazian block: In Sulaimaniyah province, Sagarma mountain, west of Bazian, Takia town, and part of Agjalar in Chamchamal district. Its 473 square kilometers, and has 1,178 billion barrels of oil reserve. 8. North Sangawa block: In Garmian. is located north of Sangaw in the Chamchamal district. it contains 6,163 billion barrels of oil in 492 square kilometers. 9. Top xana block, In Garmian. East of Qadir Karam district and Jabari area. Contains 4 billion barrels of oil in 945 square kilometers, despite a large amount of gas. 10. Taza block, In Garmian. Including a part of Nawjul and west of Qadir Karam district. It is expected to be 3 billion in oil and a large amount of gas in 700 square kilometers. 11. Palkana block: In Garmian, Duzkhurmatu, and Jabara districts, which is 529 square kilometers, containing 1.58 billion barrels of oil reserve. 12. Penjwen Block: In Sulaymaniyah province. Extends from the center of Penjwen to the Iranian border, and it is worth mentioning that no investment has been made in this block so far. 13. East Arabat block: in Sulaymaniyah province, it covers Siwail, Barzanja, and a part of Sharazur to Nalparez district in Penjwen district and is 700 km square. 14. Arabat block, in Sulaimaniyah city. Extends from Arabat to New-Halabja District. Including Goizha and Azmar mountain. Its 974 square kilometers contain 1,177 billion barrels of oil. 15. Baranan block: In Sulaymaniyah province, containing south-east of Sulaymaniyah and Baranan mountain until it reaches Darbandikhan lake. It's 722 square kilometers. 16. Qaradagh block: In Sulaymaniyah province, including the Qaradagh area and the east of Sagarma Mountain and west of the Sirwan River to Darbandikhan. it contains 4,896 billion barrels of oil in 846 square kilometers. 17. South Sangawa block: In Garmian, it covers the center of the Sangaw district and its surroundings. It is 846 square kilometers and is expected to have 2 billion barrels of oil and one trillion cubic meters of natural gas. 18. Kordamir block: In Garmian. Located in the south of Sangaw district and the north of the Kalar district until the Sirwan River. contains 5,129 billion barrels of oil reserve in 620 square kilometers. 19. Garmian block: Including the northern district of Kalar, Bawanur, Sarqalla, and Sheikh Tawel. Contains more than 4 billion barrels of oil in 2120 square Kilometers. 20. Shakal block: In the Garmian area, it covers the south of Kalar, Rizgari district, and Kafri district. which contains about 2 billion barrels of oil in 832 square kilometers. 21. Chia Surkh block: In Garmian. Located on the east of the Sirwan River. Extents from Qoratu and Maidan district in Khanaqin until the Iranian border. Contains 5,656 billion barrels of oil in 938 square kilometers. 22. Qara Hanjir block: In Garmian, it is located between Chamchamal and Kirkuk, which Contains Shwan, Qara Hanjir, and the Takai Jabari district. It’s expected to be 5 to 10 billion barrels of oil in 1,200 square Kilometers. 23. Halabja block: in Sulaymaniyah province, it is located in the Halabja district. Contains Khurmal, Sirwan, Biara, Gelejal, Halabja district center, and a part of Sayed Sadiq. Contain an estimated 650 million barrels of oil in about 1000 square kilometers.

18 Billion Dinars of Sulaymaniyah Revenue Would Be Sent to Erbil Monthly

Draw Media In Sulaymaniyah, 75 billion dinars would be allocated monthly for salary funding, 18 billion dinars would be sent to Erbil for the expenses of national institutions and 7 billion dinars would be spent on students, Lecturers’ and contract teachers’ salaries. A source at the Kurdistan Regional Bank, the Sulaymaniyah branch, told Draw Media that in the past three months, the revenues allocated for salaries were as follows: January: 75 billion and 521 million dinars February: 75 billion and 680 million dinars March: 78 billion and 260 million dinars In addition, according to the source, Sulaymaniyah’s funding for the Minara Bank in Erbil for the expenses of national institutions in the last three months was 54 billion and 558 million dinars, which means (18 billion dinars) per month is being sent to Erbil from Sulaymaniyah. In addition to these expenses, 7 billion dinars would be allocated monthly for students’, lecturers', and contract teachers' funds. It means monthly salary expenses and the money on Sulaymaniyah's income would be sent to Erbil is about 100 billion dinars, in addition to the cost of rubbish companies, medicines, prisoners' food, (most of which have been stopped) This is at a time when parliamentarians are talking about that the Sulaymaniyah's income will not return to the government and will be taken by the high officials of the PUK, which has caused the lack of cash in Sulaymaniyah banks.

PUK is trying to set him free

Draw Media The Kirkuk Criminal Court imposed a one-year prison sentence on Jamal Shuker, the former mayor of Kirkuk, on the PUK’s share, in the case of selling 10 pieces of land. This is the second mayor in Kirkuk to be sentenced for corruption. Jamal Shukr, a former member of the Iraqi parliament from the PUK Fraction, was arrested by Kirkuk police and detained in Kirkuk prison. Jamal Shukr, formerly the mayor of Kirkuk on the share of the PUK, was sentenced to one year in prison by the Kirkuk Criminal Court on October 19 on the case of selling 10 pieces of land when he was the mayor of Kirkuk. In the same case, the Kirkuk Criminal Court sentenced 2 other municipal employees, but because they have no criminal background, the court did not carry out the sentence. In addition to the punishment of Jamal Shukir, the Kirkuk Criminal Court has granted the right to the complaint through the civil court ask for compensation. Before the fall of the Ba'athist regime in 2003, the municipality of Kirkuk placed 10 pieces of land on a bid and was sold to 10 members who were close to "The Ba'athist regime, but the municipality of Kirkuk once again sold those lands and manipulated the price of transactions. "We will formally condemn the decision with my lawyer on Sunday because I have no crime and I don't know why I was targeted," Jamal Shukr told Kirkuk Naw in a telephone call from prison. Shkur also mentioned that at the beginning he did not sign the official letters related to the sale of the lands, but the municipal ministry forced him to do so, “the work is not illegal and I will publish all the evidence in the near future," he said. According to Draw's information, PUK officials are now trying to find a way to get Jamal Shukri out of prison, fearing he will be sent to Baghdad, and for that, they are preparing a medical report on Jamal Shukri's health. Jamal Shukrak is the second mayor of Kirkuk, on the share of the PUK that he is accused of corruption. Abdul-Karim Hassan was previously sentenced to six months in prison by the Kirkuk court on the case of establishing a plastic factory. Transferring Jamal Shkur's to Baghdad may open the door to some new cases at the Kirkuk municipality border. Following the October 16 incidents and the return of the Iraqi army to Kirkuk province, several provincial administration officials have faced court over corruption cases in previous years, including (a former traffic manager, former president of Kirkuk University, and former director of Kirkuk education).

Iranians want to get the final answer from PDK

Iran's high delegation is scheduled to visit the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) next week and receive the party's response to the case of its alliance with Sadr and Halbousi. A senior source from the PDK's political bureau told Draw that the Party's political bureau is scheduled to meet in the next two days and decide on the issues of the tripartite coalition, the issue of President’s position, gas export, and the local election issues. According to the KDP source, Iran's delegation visits Erbil to get the final answer from KDP about the tripartite alliance. "If the KDP agrees to Iran's demands, Iran would handle some issues for the KDP, including: • Resolving the federal court's decision on oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region. • The candidate for President, who will be the KDP, and Massoud Barzani’s favorite. • The issue of the Kurdistan Regional Government's elections and attempts to bring the PUK and KDP back together on the suspended issues. If the KDP won’t agree to Iran's demands and remains in a trilateral alliance, there are some possibilities are expected: • The region's internal problems would be more complex and the possibility of two administrations will increase. • Federal court decisions will be fully implemented and KRG oil will be prohibited from exporting. • The PUK would agree with Somo and the gas of its area would be sold through Somo. Masrour Barzani's visit to Turkey and Britain is for gaining support for PDK's policies and agendas until they won’t be under Iranian pressure, as the KDP believes the federal court’s decision and the Erbil missile attack and the PUK's stance are part of Iran's pressure to force the KDP to compromise and withdraw from the trilateral alliance. Barzani has repeatedly told those who visited him that he would "never accept the pressures" and showed that he does not care even if they go back to two administrations. On March 10, an Iranian delegation led by former Iranian ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danai fard met in Erbil with KDP’s President Masoud Barzani, whose visit was aimed at convincing the Party to leave the trilateral alliance in order to form a pro-Iranian government in Iraq.

Iraqi oil ministry: Masrour Barzani has no intention of an agreement

Draw Media The Iraqi oil ministry is disappointed to have an agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government and accusing Masrour Barzani of not cooperating and not complying with the federal court's decision. The Iraqi government intends to formally call on Turkey to stop exporting the KRG oil, which may be the beginning of a tougher economic phase in the region. The Iraq's oil ministry decides The Iraqi oil ministry is expected to announce a strong stance on the Kurdistan Regional Government in the next few days, an informed source from Baghdad told Draw. According to the source, the Iraqi ministry of oil intends to formally inform the Iraqi Council of Ministers and the public that the regional government, particularly Masrour Barzani himself, is not complying with the federal court's decision. After notifying the Iraqi government and the general public about the region's non-compliance, the Iraqi oil ministry wants to formally stop exporting the region's oil through the Jaihan port. 80% of the Kurdistan regional government's income comes from oil sales alone, and stopping oil exports paralyzes the region's economy and people's life in general. KRG and the federal court's decisions The regional government and the Iraqi oil ministry have not yet reached an agreement on implemention of the February 15 decision of the Federal Supreme Court. On The 11th of this month, for the first time since the supreme federal court's decision was issued, a delegation of the Kurdistan regional government went to Baghdad and met with the oil ministry officials. The Iraqi ministry of oil said the meeting was to discuss how to implement the federal court's decision on the Kurdistan Region, yet on the 15th of this month, Abdul-Hakim Khasraw, a member of the regional government delegation, said, "The visit of the regional delegation to Baghdad was not to negotiate on the decision," he said. "We have not been able to implement the federal court's decision because we have formally responded to Baghdad that we will negotiate based on the constitution, not the decision." On February 15 this year, after ten years of waiting, the Iraqi Supreme Federal Court settled the Iraqi government's legal status on the Kurdistan Regional Government's oil and gas case. The details of the federal court's decision are as follows: • Kurdistan Region's oil and gas law No. 22 of 2007 is unconstitutional and dismantled. • The KRG government shall abide by the handover of all oil products from the Kurdistan Region's fields and other areas, which the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Region extracts oil from) to the federal government. • The complaint has the right to investigate the cancellation of oil contracts signed by the Regional Government and the Representative of the Minister of Natural Resources with foreign parties, states, and companies regarding the discovery, extraction, export, and sale of oil and gas. • Obliging the Kurdistan Regional Government to allow the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the Federal Financial Supervisory Board to review all oil contracts that the Kurdistan Regional Government has made regarding the export and sale of oil and gas.

KRG: Oil revenues were (one billion and 128 million dollars)

Kurdistan Region's oil revenues in March were (one billion and 128 million dollars), and 551 million dollars of which remained for the government, meaning 810 billion dinars, which is close to the salaries of the KRG’s civil servants, without the international coalition’s monthly financial aid, and 200 billion dinars from Baghdad. According to a report presented at the last meeting of the KRG Council of Ministers by Omed Sabah, Head of the Council of Ministries Office of the Kurdistan Region in the presence of the Minister of Natural Resources, the region's oil revenues were as follows for March 2022. Daily: 421 thousand barrels of oil are exported March Exports: 11 million and 180 thousand barrels The average price of a barrel is 100 dollars and 88 cents The total revenue: was one billion and 128 million dollars Companies’ expenditure: 472 million dollars, 42% of the total revenue Pipeline rent: 60 million dollars 5% of the total revenue Companies loan: 45 million dollars 4% of the total revenue Total oil expenditure: 577 million dollars by 51% The remaining amount for KRG: 551 million dollars by 49% This means the total oil revenues for the government was 810 billion dinars when it requires 900 billion dinars for paying civil servant salaries in full. The data shows only the oil revenues are close enough to provide salaries without the other revenues. Internal income is about 370 billion dinars Coalition aid: 31 billion dinars Baghdad budget: 200 billion dinars The data presented by KRG proves that the Kurdistan Regional Government had enough money to distribute the March salary and before Eid al-Fitr start distributing the salaries of April, but by the decision of the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the distribution of salaries has been postponed so that the salary of April will be distributed after the Eid holidays, which will be close to May 10.

Air and Ground Attacks on Zap Area Have Started

Draw Media The HPG said in a statement on Monday the Turkish military bombarded the Zap region heavily and tried to raid the Brindaran cave in Zap but were blocked by the HPG forces. The group said eight Turkish soldiers were killed in the operation on Monday. The Turkish military did not provide information on casualties but the defense minister said the operation was "continuing successfully as planned,” according to Anadolu Agency. People’s Defense Forces (HPG) also mentioned that “The occupying Turkish army has been carrying out intense ground and aerial attacks against Medya Defense Zones for months. The Turkish offensive escalated in the Avaşîn and Zap regions, especially between April 14 and 17. A new invasion attack was launched by the Turkish army in the Avaşin and Zap regions on the evening of April 17.” The PKK media also published that on the same day of the KRG prime minister's visit, Masrour Barzani, to meet with Turkey’s president Rajab Taib Erdogan and the director of Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MİT) Hakan Fidan, Turkey launched a large-scale attack on zap, Matina, Avashin and Kurazharo areas, however today Turkey officially announced the start of the operation. On March 26, (Komalên Jinên Kurdistanê), KJK warned that the KDP and the State of Turkey had planned to launch a new attack on PKK guerrillas on April 15, and demanded that everyone have a role to prevent the conspiracy.

The KRG exported oil in the first quarter of 2022

Draw Media In the first quarter of 2022, the KRG sold more than 36 million and 400 thousand barrels of oil through the Jayhan port to six different countries. After selling each barrel for $ 11 less than the international market, the value of the KRG oil was more than $ 3 billion and $ 200 million. 56 percent of that which, is $ 1 billion and $ 800 million went to the production costs, and only 44 percent of the revenue returned to the KRG which is one billion and 400 million dollars. First: exporting the Kurdistan region's oil in the first quarter of 2022 From the beginning of 2022 to the end of March of the same year, the KRG exported 36 million and 460 thousand barrels of oil through the Kurdistan region's oil pipeline. The daily average of oil exported was 405,177 barrels. In January 2022, KRG exported 414,839 barrels of oil per day, totaling 12 million and 860 thousand barrels per month. In February, KRG exported 407,143 barrels of oil per day, totaling 11 million 400 thousand barrels per month. Meanwhile, in March, the KRG exported 12 million and 200 thousand barrels of oil, an average of 393,548 barrels per day. Second, the price of the region's sold oil in the world markets The average price of Brent crude oil was more than $ 117 in March. For the three months, The average price of Brent crude oil was more than 100 dollars. According to Deloitte's reports in 2021, the KRG has sold its oil for less than $ 11-12 on average. In January 2022, when the average oil price was recorded at $86.51, if the KRG sold oil for less than $11 per barrel, the KRG oil price would be only $75.51 per barrel for that month. But in February, the average oil price rose to $97.13, so the KRG sold its oil for $86.13 While a significant rise was recorded in March and oil prices reached an average of $117.7, the KRG sold each barrel of oil for more than $106. Third: the Kurdistan region's oil revenues and expenditures in the first quarter of 2022 As we mentioned earlier, the KRG exported 36 million and 460 thousand barrels of oil in the first quarter of 2022, on average, each barrel of oil sold for about $90, While the average price of a barrel of oil was more than $100, the total revenue earned by selling oil through the pipelines was 3 billion, 254 million, and 680 thousand dollars. In January, total oil revenues were $971 million and $58 thousand. In February, total oil revenues were $981 million and $822 thousand. In March, the highest income came from oil sales, compared to the month and even previous years, which were one billion, 301 million, and 740 thousand US dollars. According to Deloitte’s latest reports to audit the Kurdistan Region's oil process in 2021, 56% of oil revenues go to the process expenditures, so the total revenue spent during the first quarter of 2022 on the oil process was $1 billion, 822 million, 621 thousand and 136 US dollars. The total revenue left for the KRG during the first quarter of 2022 is one billion, 432 million, 59 thousand, and 464 US dollars. Fourth: the Kurdistan region's oil customers in the first quarter of 2022 The region's oil was loaded by six different country ships in the first quarter of 2022, the Italian ships loading the region's highest oil from the Turkish port of Jayhan at a rate of 37 percent. After that, the Greek ships loaded the region's oil with 27%, followed by the Israelis (15%), Croatians (7%), Spanish (4%), and Romanians with 2%.

The “Full Barzani”: How Diplomatic Meetings with the Barzani Family Are Shaping Iraqi Kurdish Politics

by Winthrop Rodgers For high-ranking officials visiting the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, there is a well-established expectation that they will meet separately with three political figures from the same family and party: Masoud, Nechirvan, and Masrour Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). This ritual reveals some of the dynamics at play regarding domestic politics and diplomatic practices in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (KRI) and the country writ large. However outside officials themselves might see it, this protocol reinforces top-down family rule in the KRI and principally serves the KDP’s own political interests. Domestic instances can also be important signals when tea-leaf reading on the government formation underway in Iraq. For foreign diplomats, it is an unwritten but strongly understood rule that visiting heads of government, cabinet ministers, and ambassadors will request to meet with KDP leader Masoud Barzani, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani during trips through Erbil, sometimes just a few hours total after a more lengthy visit to Baghdad. These meetings reflect how power is kept close within the family in the KRI: Masoud is Masrour’s father and Nechirvan’s uncle, making the latter two first cousins. Nechirvan is Masrour’s direct predecessor as prime minister and successor to Masoud as president. In a nod to the U.S. political concept of the “Full Ginsburg,” I have dubbed the protocol exhibition of meeting all three politicians in one go the “Full Barzani.” It’s quite a regular occurrence; I’ve documented at least 31 instances of this phenomenon since April 12–approximately one every eleven days. Moreover, this list is non-exhaustive and only includes instances that are publicly acknowledged by the KRG on social media or KDP-affiliated media channels. Private and sensitive meetings are obviously not included, and the KRG and KDP are selective about what meetings with what countries they choose to reveal and highlight. The occasions for the meetings vary; some are one-off affairs, like when Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde came through Erbil last November during an Iraq trip, or courtesy calls for new or departing ambassadors, such as the arrival tour for France’s new ambassador to Iraq Eric Chevallier in September. Other officials repeat this cycle regularly, like UN Special Representative for Iraq Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert or US Ambassador Matthew Tueller, who has pulled a “Full Barzani” at least nine times since February 2020. Foreign visitors from all corners engage in this practice. Former UK Ambassador Stephen Hickey did a “full Barzani” at least five times during his tenure, highlighting the UK government’s apparent desire for close ties with the KDP. Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov completed a set in December, during which Prime Minister Masrour Barzani “reaffirmed the historic friendship between our peoples and more cooperation.” Then Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif did a "Full Barzani" last April. German, Australian, Saudi, Canadian, Italian, and European Union officials have completed their own in the past year, while numerous others have met with two out of three Barzanis. Still more engage with all three over a longer period of time. Pope Francis managed the rare feat of getting all three Barzanis in the same room together during his historic visit in March 2021, an exception to the usual protocol dictating separate meetings for each. For diplomats, the meetings are arranged through the KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations and the offices of the three men. Failure to make a request to meet with all “Three B’s,” as they are colloquially known, would raise question marks and be perceived as a slight by the KDP. Even so, the arrangement is a highly unusual one. While the KRI has some powers to engage with foreign governments outlined in Article 121 of the Iraqi constitution, it is uncommon for such narrow, personal, and partisan protocol arrangements to exist for diplomats at a sub-national level or to be so rigorously expected. Visitors can get angry tellings-off from KRG officials if they deviate from the KDP-approved programming. Domestically, Iraqi government and party officials also engage in the practice. For instance, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi met all three Barzanis following the Erbil missile attack in March. Iraqi President Barham Salih has had at least two rounds since last April, including one in November as he sought reelection in the face of a KDP challenge. Other visits yield their significance in retrospect: notably, Sadrist official Nassar al-Rubaiee’s “Full Barzani” last June prefaced the attempt to form a “national majority government” between the Sadrists, KDP, and Sunni blocs following the federal elections in October. With government formation ongoing, it is worthwhile to keep an eye on who pays call on the KDP leadership in Erbil. Of course, the KDP is hardly the only political party in the Kurdistan Region. KRG Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani of the Sulaymaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is occasionally included in meetings with the prime minister, while his brother—PUK leader Bafel Talabani—might get his own face-to-face with visitors. Nevertheless, the KDP is by far the biggest game in town during official meetings in Erbil. Spare a thought also for the KRI’s opposition parties or independents, for whom there is little time or attention amid a packed schedule of Barzani meetings. One must be content to imagine what officials and diplomats might gain from a more diverse range of perspectives and contacts. There are likewise no women represented in the top ranks of the KDP, so their voices are effectively excluded from these high-level discussions—which ought to include the dangerous rise in femicides in the KRI. It is also worth reflecting on what this practice means for the state of the KDP itself. The act of meeting separately with each Barzani is reflective of the KDP’s tribal, patriarchal, and factional character and serves as a way of balancing egos. In the internal hierarchy of the party, Masoud ranks highest while his son and nephew defer to him during combined affairs. Meeting Masrour or Nechirvan by themselves allows them to speak in service of their own political interests. However, there are also extreme political and personal differences within the KDP bubbling beneath the surface and at play in the insistence on separation. A particularly combustible rivalry is developing between Nechirvan and Masrour (the latter backed by Masoud), which has the potential to explode at a future date. The pettiness of this factionalism was ludicrously on display at this year’s Munich Security Conference, when Masrour and Nechirvan led separate delegations and even met some of the same people in different meetings. While tracking “Full Barzani” meetings may also be instructive for casual political analysis, the substantive impact of this insistence on separate meetings is more insidious. It is clear that KDP’s purpose in enforcing this protocol is to reinforce a perception about the Barzani family’s centrality in Kurdish and Iraqi politics to the exclusion of all others. Moreover, these meetings help strengthen the power of Masoud, Nechirvan, and Masrour both within the party and in the broader political field. Officials who acquiesce to this arrangement are legitimizing and playing into these implicit messages, even if this is not their intent. Ask many ordinary citizens in the KRI to describe their political leaders—both KDP and PUK—and they will call them “mafias.” Anti-democratic signals are flashing bright red: voter turnout is down; young people and middle-class families are leaving in droves for Europe; journalists and activists are arrested and jailed on trumped up charges; the KRG is not paying public servants. It is up to outside officials to decide how to manage those dynamics and perceptions about how they engage with the Kurdistan Region’s political leadership: whether it is business as usual or time for a new approach