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OCCRP: Kurdistan’s ruling families have links with a group of mafia and Cigarette Smugglers

Smoke and Mirrors: How the “Father” of Iraq’s Cigarette Smugglers Built An Empire by OCCRP Iraqi tycoon Nizar Hanna Nasri sits atop an empire spanning pharmaceuticals, liquor imports, and some of Erbil’s most spectacular real estate developments. But his success was built on a far less visible foundation: A globe-spanning trade in black-market cigarettes. For most Iraqis, the sanctions of the 1990s were a nightmare. But for Nizar Hanna Nasri, they were an opportunity. With most basic commodities banned from being imported, smugglers could make fortunes circumventing the embargo and moving products into Iraq. One of the most profitable illicit trades was in cigarettes, and Nasri was one of the most successful operators. Publicly, Nasri is a real estate tycoon, bankrolling shopping malls, residential complexes, and office high-rises in the Iraqi Kurdish capital Erbil. But behind the scenes, he built an operation that still produces cigarettes for black markets across the Middle East, particularly neighboring Iran, nourishing an industry that funds organized crime, corrupt politicians and even militias. As a brief prepared by Adit, a French strategic intelligence company, put it: “The question of trade in cigarettes could seem a secondary question. It is not. It is used by all the military groups in the region, not all of which can be called terrorists, to finance their fighting.” Nasri, from Iraq’s Assyrian Christian minority, has come to be known as the “father” of Iraqi counterfeit cigarettes. Starting in the late 1980s, he built alliances with powerful political figures and monopolized the smuggling of black-market tobacco into Iraq before constructing a network of facilities to produce his own knock-off brands. Nasri’s company has since shifted its focus away from cigarettes, but the infrastructure he developed in the 1990s and 2000s is still in action. Industry sources estimate there are up to six illicit cigarette factories in operation in Iraq today. These include three linked to the operation Nasri built, OCCRP found. Reports in the 1990s and 2000s by international media and the World Health Organization highlighted the smuggling of black-market cigarettes in Iraq and the wider region. Nasri, however, was never publicly linked to the trade. He has managed to maintain a low public profile despite striking partnerships with some of Iraq’s most powerful politicians. But now, OCCRP has compiled one of the most detailed portraits of Nasri’s involvement in the illicit tobacco trade to date. Reporters analyzed thousands of leaked corporate intelligence documents, corroborating details through interviews with over 20 tobacco industry figures, smugglers, and Nasri’s former partners and competitors. Like many cigarette smugglers, Nasri relied on contracts with the world’s biggest tobacco companies, who employed him in markets from Belarus to Azerbaijan. Some of his business is legitimate: His Lebanon-based company, European Tobacco, has produced and distributed its own cigarette brands on at least three continents, including markets it is legally allowed to supply. But public records, confidential industry reports, and interviews with Nasri’s former and current associates show that this is only one aspect of his business: The same supply chains are also used to run a booming trade in black-market cigarettes in countries as far-flung as Cameroon and Moldova. His ersatz brands — such as Business Club, Vigor, and President — are sold on illicit markets in Europe and war zones in Africa. Over the years, Nasri has partnered with powerful figures, including former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani; former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev; Burkinabé smuggler and Philip Morris representative Apollinaire Compaoré; and even Saddam Hussein’s son Uday. Today, he remains a close ally of Iraqi Kurdistan’s ruling Barzani family, with whom he has numerous intertwined financial interests. “You can run this kind of business if you have close connections on the top level,” a former economic adviser to a regional tobacco distributor told OCCRP. “No other way.” In response to detailed questions, a lawyer representing the Nasri Group denied that Nasri or any company affiliated with him had ever been involved in smuggling or counterfeiting, and said any such charges were “false” and “unacceptable.” He said European Tobacco produced legitimate cigarettes under legally registered trademarks and that any apparent knock-offs were likely counterfeited and sold by third parties without their knowledge. “Our companies and the shareholders have not been involved in any illegal act and all of their business activities are in conformity with the laws and regulations of the countries where they take place,” he wrote. "You can run this kind of business if you have close connections on the top level. No other way." – A former economic adviser to a regional tobacco distributor He further denied that Nasri had ever exploited political influence for commercial gain: “Neither the Companies we own nor their shareholders have any political orientation or affiliation with any armed party. They conduct their business in broad daylight and have no special privileges. Also, our companies have no business relationship with any politician, neither inside nor outside Iraq.” The tobacco companies contacted by OCCRP — Japan Tobacco, British American Tobacco, Philip Morris, Imperial Brands, and SEITA — all declined to comment. 🔗Tobacco Spies In the late 2000s, corporate intelligence staff working for Japan Tobacco International assembled thousands of documents about tobacco counterfeiting and smuggling networks from China to the Middle East. These documents, leaked to OCCRP, identify key industry figures and describe their business activities, commercial associations, and relationships to politicians and organized crime syndicates. They include company records, bills of lading, passport copies, and briefings from numerous informants. While major tobacco companies commonly assemble corporate intelligence, the results are rarely leaked to the media. To corroborate the reports, OCCRP reviewed public records and interviewed senior industry executives and former operatives in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Russia. Birth of an Empire The 1990s were a golden era for Iraqi cigarette smugglers. Heavy sanctions, imposed by the United Nations against Saddam Hussein’s government after his invasion of Kuwait, led to a proliferation of smuggling routes to bring in basic commodities and sell sanctioned oil abroad. Born to an Assyrian jeweler in the ethnically diverse city of Kirkuk in 1961, Nasri is an architect by profession. But by the 1990s, the deprivations — and opportunities — presented by Iraq’s conflicts and deepening isolation had drawn him to a different profession entirely. Back then, tobacco giants regularly contracted smugglers under the guise of “duty free” or “transit” sales. Attracted by potential profits from closed or sanctioned markets, they hired distributors who supplied certain countries legally, but also funneled cigarettes into neighboring states illegally. The practice is said to have declined since a series of lawsuits in Europe in the early 2000s, but it is still known to occur. Local hubs for this trade included coastal cities in Cyprus and Turkey, such as Mersin, where the Nasri family ran at least six companies, including a distributor that managed warehouses for cigarettes later smuggled into Iraq. Traders in these cities leveraged cross-border commercial ties to move cigarettes into Kurdistan and other parts of Iraq, where they were then distributed throughout the region. Credit: Reuters/Alamy Stock PhotoKurdish smugglers load cigarettes onto a horse for illegal entry into Iran in October 2002. By 1994, the New York Times was describing Iraqi Kurdistan as “the largest black-market clearing house for cigarettes in the Middle East.” The region became so oversupplied with tobacco products that, in 2002, a spokesman for the Barzani family’s Kurdistan Democratic Party told the Wall Street Journal that to justify the volumes, “you’d have to find babies in their cradles smoking.” Nasri was among a cast of men who began to make fortunes in this illicit ecosystem. Although from diverse backgrounds, they were united by their organized crime connections, links to diaspora communities created by years of upheaval, and a high tolerance for risk. “During Saddam’s time there was nobody from the West [working in these markets],” Hulusi Kaymaz, a former partner of Nasri’s based in Mersin, told OCCRP. “There was a big embargo. There were not even banks. Who took the risk? These kinds of guys.” The Nasri family entered the trade at the right time, setting up Golden Universal, Inc., in 1987, just a few years before the Gulf War started, to handle transactions out of Mersin. From there their operations kept expanding: In 1995, they founded another Mersin-based company, Dolphin Foreign Trade Limited, which signed an agreement with the French tobacco company SEITA to supply the former Soviet Union states, as well as Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria, and the United Arab Emirates. Industry documents released in a lawsuit say the British-based Imperial Brands (formerly known as Imperial Tobacco Group) and British American Tobacco also approached him. By the late 1990s, Nasri was distributing billions of cigarettes a year in a mix of legal and illegal markets, according to a contract and leaked industry documents seen by OCCRP. One 2009 Japan Tobacco brief put the number as high as 10 billion a month, although this was not possible to confirm. It’s difficult to determine how much Nasri made from the trade, but estimates of his cut suggest he was clearing millions — perhaps tens of millions — of dollars a year. Three former associates described Nasri as reserved, polite, and well-mannered. His family’s social media posts offer a portrait of a refined lifestyle, with his mother celebrating Christmas in a marble-floored salon and his son buying a McLaren 720S, worth over $250,000. But documents reviewed by OCCRP suggest he could also be aggressive when defending his interests. In 2006, SEITA brought arbitration proceedings against Nasri in the International Commercial Court in Geneva as part of a years-long business dispute. A document submitted to the ICC mentions claims against Dolphin, including forgery and launching a denigration campaign against SEITA. SEITA had tried to cut Nasri out of their local operations in favor of his partner, Tareq Al-Hasan. In retaliation, documents submitted to the proceedings indicate, Nasri forged documents while requesting that Erbil authorities seize SEITA’s local cigarette imports. According to an ICC document, over $97 million were in dispute. After years of litigation, the arbitral body sided with SEITA, ordering Dolphin to pay damages and costs, according to a document sent by Imperial Tobacco to shareholders. Another document, submitted by security officials in Kirkuk, suggested that Nasri tried to bribe an Iraqi expert supposed to weigh in on his case. A Japan Tobacco report further said Nasri denied denigrating SEITA’s image during their dispute. Imperial Brands, which bought SEITA in 2008, and Nasri both declined to comment on the case. Strange Bedfellows Even before these incidents, Nasri had proven willing to put business considerations before political and ethnic rivalries. By the late 1990s, his partners included not only members of Iraqi Kurdistan’s ruling Barzani family, but the son of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, against whom the Kurds had struggled in years of conflict that killed tens of thousands of people. Corporate records show Nasri and partners used Kani Commercial Company as he sought to monopolize the cigarette supply chain into Iraqi Kurdistan, thereby making themselves indispensable to any tobacco company that wanted to do business there. Kani Commercial is briefly mentioned in a Wall Street Journal article and a 1998 Duhok academic journal on monopoly businesses in Kurdistan, but the company has almost no presence in public records. Internal records, invoices, and correspondence obtained by OCCRP show it was based in Dohuk and billed expenses to European Tobacco, while receiving a share of profits from one of Nasri’s other operations. His partners in Kani included businessman Saed Barzani, according to internal company documents contained in the JTI leak obtained by OCCRP. Nasri’s association with Saed began in the late 1990s when he hired him and his two brothers, Sardar and Sarfar, to work at European Tobacco’s Athens business, according to one Japan Tobacco brief. Before that, the brothers had no clear tobacco industry experience. They had spent decades in the United States, where their ventures included a TGI Friday’s restaurant in Alexandria, Virginia. Andreas Koutroukides, who became executive managing director of Saed Barzani’s conglomerate Eagle Group, said Saed acted as the financial “trustee”of Nechirvan Barzani, who succeeded his uncle Masoud as Iraqi Kurdish president in 2019. Documents reviewed by OCCRP revealed that Nasri also had links to Nechirvan Barzani. One expenses spreadsheet filed by Japan Tobacco informants showed that two of Nasri’s companies, European Tobacco and Nasri Group, paid personal expenses for Nechirvan in 2004 and 2005. These included mobile phone bills, expenses related to a Cadillac in the United Arab Emirates, and what appear to be cash payments as high as $25,000. Credit: Georg Kristiansen/Alamy Stock PhotoNechirvin Barzani, the Iraqi Kurdish president with alleged business ties to Nasri, is pictured in 2007, when he was Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan. In 2003, Saed Barzani bought a 9,384-square-foot villa near CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia for $7 million, according to U.S. property records. Reports among the leaked Japan Tobacco documents indicated Saed was an unsuccessful businessman in the 1980s and 1990s who would not have been able to afford the property until after he started making money with Nasri. Two years later, Barzani transferred the mansion at no cost to a woman named Nabila Mustafa, who appeared to be Nechirvan Barzani’s wife. Public records also show that Nechirvan’s brother, Barez Barzani, used the villa’s address for a company office in 2018. In response to questions from OCCRP, a lawyer for Nechirvan Barzani said that he “rejects in the strongest possible terms any allegation or inference of wrongdoing” and suggested that “external agents” were using OCCRP as a proxy for political attacks against Barzani. “The Office of the President is mindful of a co-ordinated campaign by those opposed to his policies to initiate and deploy derogatory and untrue allegations into the public domain for political reasons,” the lawyer wrote. Saed Barzani died in 2019. His brother, who was made Eagle Group’s vice chairman, did not respond to questions sent by email. With Nechirvan’s support, Kani was able to monopolize cigarette imports into the region. Kani took between $9 and $30 for every “master case” of 10,000 cigarettes — each case had a street value of roughly $250 — that reached the Kurdish region, according to two of Nasri’s former associates. One Japan Tobacco brief claimed Kani collected the money as a “transit tax,” making both Nasri and the Barzanis “very wealthy.” Two senior tobacco executives in Iraq estimated the business brought in $150 million to $200 million a year. By 2008, a Japan Tobacco analyst claimed Nasri and the Barzanis were “so closely tied together financially that they need each other to succeed in Northern Iraq.” It was in this context that Nasri began working with Saddam Hussein’s eldest son, Uday, according to court documents and press reports. Uday had been taking his own cut on cigarette imports into Iraq since at least 1995. He oversaw an elite clique of Iraqi tobacco traders that included Nasri’s partner, Tareq Al-Hasan, and Waheb Tabra, who later became a key figure in Nasri’s operations. A 2002 Wall Street Journal report estimated that Uday made around $10 million a year from the trade, although tobacco executives in Iraq told OCCRP the figure may have been closer to $20 million. Hasan declined to comment and Tabra did not respond to questions sent by OCCRP. Under the arrangement, Nasri smuggled cigarettes into Iraqi Kurdistan, thereby circumventing the U.N. embargo, and then sent them south where traders including Hasan oversaw their distribution in the rest of Iraq. The 2003 overthrow of Saddam and the death of Uday in a gunfight with U.S. troops in Mosul in July that year put an end to the deal. But none of this slowed Nasri’s business — in fact, it began to thrive like never before. Counterfeits and Militant Groups Shortly after Uday’s death, Nasri took advantage of the chaos in Iraq to build his own counterfeiting operation. He began producing knock-offs of major international brands such as Marlboros and Rothmans, as well as popular Iranian brands such as Bahman and Farvardin, according to industry sources and corporate intelligence reports, destined for markets in Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Lebanon. Over time, Iraq itself was transforming from a transit country, where tobacco products were smuggled through into neighboring countries, into a primary source of contraband cigarettes. This fact was underlined by a growing number of seizures at the Turkish border, where authorities were concerned about commissions extracted by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, against which Ankara had been fighting for decades. It was a lucrative business, according to a former employee of U.K.-based tobacco company Gallaher Group, who once interviewed for jobs with Nasri. “A case of 10,000 Marlboros is light as a feather and has a street value of anywhere from $1,500 to over $10,000 depending on the consumer country’s level of development and excise taxes,” he told OCCRP. “A truckload of these cases is just a truck loaded with money.” Koutroukides estimated that Nasri’s counterfeiting operation, known as “Abkazia,” was making half a million to a million dollars a day starting in 2004. The Middle East Company for Reconstruction and Investment, or MECRI, a cigarette and construction company associated with the operation, cleared $700 million annually, according to a 30-page prospectus on Nasri’s and Saed Barzani’s projects from 2008 issued by a Barzani-linked company, the Eagle Group. Proceeds from the illicit tobacco trade often end up in the hands of organized crime networks, paramilitaries, and insurgents from across the political spectrum, sometimes in the form of transit fees along smuggling routes. A 2015 report by the Paris-based Center for the Analysis of Terrorism noted that cigarette smuggling from Kurdish territory into areas held by the Islamic State was “likely” allowing the Islamist group to extract tolls from the trade. Shia paramilitaries have also reportedly profited. It is difficult to estimate how much money from Nasri’s trade goes to militant groups. But one Japan Tobacco case file noted that a “substantial portion” of the counterfeits from the Abkazia operation were smuggled into Iran “with the connivance and support of the Peshmerga,” the Kurdish region’s military forces, as well as “various other ‘militia’ and possibly insurgent groups active in the border region, as well as corrupt security forces.” The same brief noted that “at a minimum” Nasri and Tabra, his partner, would have had to “pay fees to one or more of these groups in order to protect their shipments moving across country.” OCCRP was able to identify four facilities — two active, two inactive — affiliated with the Akbazia operation, including one on the territory of a former chicken farm near the Tigris River outside Dohuk. A report by a multinational tobacco company, a rival to Japan Tobacco, said the chicken farm facility was still active as of 2019. Internal company emails and Nasri’s former business partners say the plant was linked to Tabra as recently as 2018 and is still operating under the control of the Barzanis. A sister factory in Erbil was mentioned in an unsigned 2008 lease agreement in which Nasri handed over the management of the Abkazia operation to his business partner Tabra, along with 40 percent of the profits. Another sister factory, located near the former chicken factory, appears in the internal records of one of Tabra’s companies. These are no longer operating. The fourth Akbazia facility, located in the northern city of Sulaymaniyah, produced millions of cigarettes, largely for export to Iran. The facility was leased from a company linked to Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and a longtime rival of the Barzanis, according to corporate intelligence reports and industry sources. Talabani, who was president of Iraq at the time, died in 2017. Credit: blickwinkel/Alamy Stock PhotoA view of Sulaymaniyah, where a factory linked to Nasri produced millions of cigarettes for export to Iran. The same rival to Japan Tobacco visited this site and wrote about it in early 2019, noting that it was run as part of the Nokan Group, which had ties to Talabani and his wife, Hero Khan. A technician working at the factory told OCCRP he did not know what brands were being made. Nokan Group and a spokesperson for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Talabani’s political party, did not respond to emailed questions. Despite handing over management of the Abkazia operation factories to Tabra, Nasri and Saed Barzani retained 60 percent of the profits as silent partners. According to the Japan Tobacco brief, Nasri still made a “huge cash amount” from the factories. While his Iraqi factories produced the bulk of his counterfeits, leaked documents show Nasri also used facilities in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Hong Kong to make black-market cigarettes sent on to countries from Cameroon to Uzbekistan. Nasri’s brands, such as Business Club and Vigor, are still sold on the black market in Europe. In 2020, Ukrainian authorities nabbed 34 million illicit Business Clubs on their way to the Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria. A lawyer representing the Nasri Group said European Tobacco conformed with all laws in the countries where it operated. He said some third parties had previously “counterfeited our trademarks (notably Business Club) and sold them without our knowledge, either online, or in Africa and in other parts of the world.” “European Tobacco Inc. took certain legal measures against such illegal behaviors that came to its knowledge,” he said. He said the company did not have factories or activities in Iraq, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, or Europe. “In case there are illegal activities taking place in such countries, or elsewhere, both companies would not be related to them or bear any responsibility whatsoever for them,” he wrote. New Frontiers Today, Nasri’s involvement in the cigarette trade is relegated to a footnote on the website of his Lebanon-based Nasri Group of Companies, which previously described European Tobacco as its “foundation business.” Instead, the company touts its real estate and liquor and pharmaceutical marketing and distribution businesses. Center stage in this portfolio are millions of square meters of developments in Erbil, many of which broke ground after the 2003 invasion. They include a sprawling residential complex called Dream City, an office building, and the 120,000 square-meter “Downtown Erbil” shopping mall near the city’s ancient citadel. Estimates for the value of these properties run into the billions of dollars. Credit: MLBARIONA/Alamy Stock PhotoThe Downtown Erbil shopping mall. The transition has not been entirely seamless. One Japan Tobacco brief from 2009 described two of his projects as plagued by “inefficient administration and corruption.” Nearly two decades after it was started, his Dream City project is still unfinished. But public records, leaked documents and interviews show Nasri has nevertheless maintained his partnership with the Barzanis, specifically through MECRI and a successor company, Salah Al Din Holding. MECRI, which leased out the Abkazia facilities, has also overseen Nasri’s main property developments. Through a lawyer, Nasri declined to comment on specific questions about the construction projects. Publicly listed phone numbers and email addresses for Salah Al Din Holding were disconnected. Nasri’s shared interests with the Barzanis also include the Eagle Group. The company is headed by Saed Barzani, according to Koutroukides, the 2008 prospectus and a company registry certificate obtained by OCCRP. It claims to have carried out projects for the United Nations Development Program and the U.S. military.” Like their other businesses, the company’s ownership is difficult to trace in public registries. But a 30-page prospectus from 2008 showed that the company claimed to own Nasri Group and other Nasri interests. Eagle Group also manages Kurdistan’s first private bank, now called Region Trade Bank, whose four shareholders include Nasri and Saed Barzani, as well as Nasri’s brother, Nameer. According to leaked correspondence and intelligence briefs, Nasri banked proceeds from his cigarette operation at Region Trade Bank. Koutroukides, who oversaw the bank while at Eagle Group, also said the bank accepted Nasri’s cigarette money, and that Nasri was “using and abusing” bank funds. Saed’s brother Sardar at times withdrew millions of dollars from the vault at will, he said. Region Trade Bank did not respond to emailed questions. The Fitch Ratings credit rating agency rated the bank a “substantial credit risk” last year, reflecting its “limited franchise, unstable business model, volatile and concentrated customer deposit base and low profitability.” Smuggling Continues For big tobacco companies, the salad days of Iraqi smuggling are over. In 2000, the European Union filed a major lawsuit on smuggling-related charges against three of the world’s biggest tobacco companies. Another lawsuit that followed in 2002 against one of these tobacco companies included allegations about their illicit Iraq trade. Those companies — Philip Morris, Japan Tobacco, and RJR Reynolds (which later became part of Japan Tobacco) — eventually struck settlement agreements, which they rebranded as “cooperation agreements,” with the European Union. So did Imperial Tobacco and British American Tobacco, whose agreements released Imperial Tobacco from liability for smuggling, though they were not part of the suit. They collectively paid $1.9 billion in fines. Still, Iraq remains a major source of black-market cigarettes for the region. Statistics OCCRP obtained from Imperial Tobacco, supported by U.N. trade data, show that as many as 65 billion cigarettes still reach the country annually, although the range varies widely — more than three times its prewar consumption. The illicit operation Nasri built still rolls cigarettes, while a constellation of former business partners and associates run other illicit factories from Sulaymaniyah to Baghdad. Iraqi tobacco executives, meanwhile, say the Barzanis still take a cut on cigarettes brought into the country. Nasri’s operations are also ongoing. In Baghdad, Nasri’s former partner, Waheb Tabra, has licensed a new tobacco factory. In Sulaymaniyah, the factory associated with Talabani is still in operation. Nasri himself appears to have stepped back from day-to-day operations, his businesses remain active. European Tobacco — which in recent years sent illegal cigarettes to Europe — maintains a London-based entity, directed by Nizar’s brothers, which still files annual financial reports. Research on this story was provided by OCCRP ID. Fact-checking was provided by the OCCRP Fact-Checking Desk.

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"Tawella is the center of political decision-making, the surprise comes after the holidays"

Draw Media Aso Faraidoon, a member of the PUK fraction in the Iraqi parliament, tweeted: 🔹 (Tawella, a beautiful village in northeastern Halabja, Paul Bremer mentioned in his book that he witnessed several meetings between the late President Mam Jalal and General Qasim Sulaimani in that village.  After a decade their successors meet in the same place and important decisions are made. The surprise is after the Eid al-Adha holidays. 🔸 This tweet refers to a recent secret meeting between Bafel Talabani and a senior Iranian official in Jamil Hawrami’s Garden in Tawella. A meeting which the details are still unknown and it is expected that the issues of forming the new Iraqi government and the post of the president have been solved. Tawella; is a small town in Halabja Governorate, Kurdistan Region, Iraq about 34 km east of Halabja on the border of Iran.  

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KRG revenue for June

Prepared by: Anwar Karim The revenue of the Kurdistan Region in June was (995 billion) dinars, the Kurdistan Regional Government sold (11 million 305 thousand) barrels of oil last month, the total oil revenue was (1 billion 253 million) dollars. (702 million) dollars of which have gone for the companies’ expenses and the rest ($551 million) remains for the government treasury. summary Non-oil revenues • Non-oil revenues for June = (164 billion) dinars (which spends on salaries, according to information, the amount is almost double) • Coalition assistance to the Peshmerga forces = (31 billion 500 million) dinars • Kurdistan Region's share of the Iraqi budget = (0) dinars Oil revenues (pipeline exports) • In June 2022, the Kurdistan Region exported 11 million 305 thousand barrels of oil through the Turkish Port of Jayhan. • The average price of Brent oil for June was $122.86. • Because the region sells its oil at $12 less, so KRG sold its oil at an average of $ (110.86) So: (11 million 305 thousand) barrels X (110.86) dollars = (1 billion 253 million 272 thousand 300) dollars. That is, in dinars, it is: (1 billion 253 million 272 thousand 300) dollars X (1450) dinars = (1 trillion 817 billion 244 million 835 thousand) dinars. • According to the latest Deloitte report, 56% of oil revenues are spent on expenditures and 44% remains for the Ministry of Natural Resources. - So: (1 billion 253 million 272 thousand 300) dollars X (56%) = (701 million 832 thousand 488) dollars go to the cost of the oil process. That is, in dinars, it is: (701 million 832 thousand 488) dollars X ((1450 dinars = (1 trillion 17 billion 657 million 107 thousand 600) dinars oil expenditure. - (1 billion 253 million 272 thousand 300) dollars X (44%) = (551 million 839 thousand 812) dollars remaining. Oil revenue in dinars is: (551 million 839 thousand 812) dollars X (1450) dinars = (799 billion 587 million 727 thousand 400) dinars. Total Revenue in June 2022 (Dinar) (799 billion 587 million 727 thousand 400) oil revenue + (164 billion) domestic revenue + (31 billion 500 million) allies = (995 billion 87 million 727 thousand 400) dinars

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Civilian casualties of Turkish operations in the Kurdistan Region

Draw Media, CPT Press Release: Turkish forces are killing children, wounding farmers and targeting villages under the auspices of 'Claw-Lock' operation Map of civilian casualties of Turkish military operation ‘Claw-Lock’ (June 2022). Community Peacemaker Teams and its partners denounce the killing of children, wounding of farmers and targeting of villages by Turkish Forces in northern Iraq under the auspices of 'Claw-Lock' operation Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) launched a new military campaign codenamed ‘Claw-Lock’ within Iraqi Kurdistan on 17 April 2022, with the aim of attaining total military control over the mountainous border region spanning roughly 180kms from east to west and up to 15kms south of the Iraq-Turkey borderline. Within the last month, 21 May to 21 June 2022, Turkish military operations have claimed the lives of 3 children and 2 adult civilians, as well as caused physical harm to 15 civilians in northern Iraq. 'Claw-Lock' aims to occupy the estimated 20% of the mountainous border regions currently uncontrolled by the Turkish Armed Forces. The campaign began with massive aerial bombardments and deployments of special forces troops up to 12-15km south of the Turkey-Iraq border in the areas of Zap and Avashin that have previously been cleared of the civilian population. While fighting against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgents in those areas, the TAF began conducting targeted drone strikes against PKK members as far south as Kalar, 280 km from the Iraq-Turkey border.  Two drone strikes have resulted in civilian deaths, including one child.  The first civilians killed during 'Claw-Lock' were 43-year-old Aram Haji Kaka Khan and his 50-year-old brother-in-law Ismaeel Ibraheem in the village of Tutaqal, 140km south of the Iraq-Turkey border. At 5:15am on 21 May, Aram Haji, Tutaqal's mukhtar (chieftain), heard a Turkish airstrike in the village. Several hours later, he and Ismaeel set out to investigate the site of the explosions. They discovered a number of badly wounded PKK members and attempted to transport them to a hospital. A TAF drone fired a missile into their car, killing Aram, Ismaeel and the combatants. By targeting a civilian vehicle that was carrying civilians and wounded combatants, the Turkish Armed Forces committed war crimes. The two brothers-in-law were survivors of Saddam Hussein’s genocidal Anfal campaign in the 1980s, which was especially brutal in the area around Tutaqal. Following the 21 May incident, 8 out of 10 families have fled the village for fear of further bombings. On 15 June, in Sinune sub-district in Sinjar (Shangal), a Turkish drone bombed the headquarters of Shangal Resistance Unit (YBŞ), an organization related to the PKK. The explosion destroyed and damaged nearby houses, including a bookstore. In the bookstore, a 12-year-old Yezidi boy, Salih Khdir was killed while helping his father take care of the books. Salih Khdir’s grandfather and eight other civilians were injured in the strike. The Turkish bombardment of a built-up residential neighborhood constitutes a war crime. The area of the attack is predominately inhabited by the survivors of the 2014-2015 ISIS genocide against the Yezidi population. Since 2018, Turkish forces have been building bases on mountain peaks and ranges from the Sidakan area on the Iraq-Iran border to Haftanin in Zakho. Between the beginning of 'Claw-Lock' on 17 April and 25 April, the TAF constructed four new bases - two in Avashin and two in Zap. On 16 June, construction began on a new base on Kurazharo mountain above Shiladze.  The Turkish military has also developed a network of roads connecting the military bases and Turkish territory to facilitate resupply and reinforcement and strengthen their matrix of control over the occupied areas. From the mountain emplacements, Turkish artillery began firing on civilians living in and working on the agricultural lands in the valleys. On 15 and 17 June, in the border regions, Turkish soldiers wounded five civilians in two villages by firing at them from their bases.  The agricultural village of Parakhe sits in a valley 8km from the Iraq-Turkey border in the Darkar sub-district region. Thirty families permanently call the village home, with others returning to work their familial land seasonally. In the past two years, Turkish forces have constructed two bases in the mountains overlooking Parakhe. At 3:49pm on 15 June, 53-year-old farmer Nazir Omer and his son, 24-year-old Mohammad Nazir were irrigating their fig and pomegranate orchard when artillery fire from a nearby Turkish base crashed around, injuring both men. Nazir Omer told CPT that during the explosions, he fainted and woke up at a hospital in Zakho with two shrapnel wounds in his back. His relatives had rescued the unconscious men and rushed them to hospital in Zakho. Mohammed had suffered a shrapnel wound to the palm of his hand.  Community Peacemaker Teams (CPT) visiting Nazir Omer in Zakho Emergency Hospital, 17 June 2022 From his hospital bed, Nazir Omer told CPT that in October 2021, around 150 Turkish soldiers descended on Parakhe from their newly constructed base above. The soldiers proceeded from house to house, warning residents that if they collaborated with PKK, the village would be fired upon.  While the residents of Parakhe state that the PKK members do not operate in the village, they have reported hearing artillery shells land twice around Parakhe in the months preceding the recent attack. The shelling on 15 June was the first bombardment to target the village directly, with Nazir Omer and Mohammed the first Parakhe residents to be wounded. In addition to committing a war crime by directly targeting civilians, CPT-IK fears that the Turkish military intends to pressure Parakhe villagers into abandoning their homes and lands creating a landscape 'cleansed' of the civilian population around Turkish military bases. This practice has been observed in areas adjacent to dozens of bases throughout the border regions. Such forced civilian displacements and restrictions on access to livelihood are breaches of international humanitarian law.  At 5:10pm on 17 June, Turkish soldiers fired multiple bursts of heavy machine gun fire at civilians on the lands of Kesta village. Located in Kani Masi sub-district, Amedi district, the Kesta is 9km south of the Turkey-Iraq border. The injured were three local women, 28-year old Kazhin Taha Saeed, 49-year-old Nazira Abdulstar Ahmad and Nazira's 24-year-old daughter-in-law Fawzya Diyar Omer, who were enjoying a Friday picnic. The gunfire came from a Turkish base on Zneri Kesta mountain overlooking Kesta. After building the base in April 2021, the Turkish military began to repeatedly fire upon the village - forcing its entire population into displacement. In 2022, some families started to return to tend or visit their abandoned farms.     On 26 May, 1000 people, originating from Zewe Sery, met together in the town of Bamarne in the Amedi district. It was the first time in three years that the former residents, and their relatives, were able to hold their festival - an annual event to bring together the Zewe Sery's families who were forced into displacement in the 1990s due to the Turkey-PKK conflict.  In the late afternoon, three boys were playing football at the edge of the gathering. Without warning, at least three mortar shells exploded in rapid succession metres from the boys. 13-year-old Yousif Kovan and 11-year-old Avand Hishyar were killed. 8-year-old Sipan Farhad was severely wounded.  Kovan, Hishyar and Farhad, the fathers of killed and injured boys of the 26 May attack holding phones with pictures of Yousif and Avand on them, Shiladze, 16 June 2022. According to the Kurdistan Region’s Directorate General of Counter Terrorism’s (CTD) narrative, which was widely shared by the political parties' media, the mortars were fired by the PKK. However, analysis of the attack location and of the evidence collected by CPT-IK instead points to the Turkish Armed Forces as the probable responsible party. Relatives of the killed boys reported to CPT-IK that they heard drones hovering over the crowd during the day. The proximity of the gathering (800m) to the large Turkish military base in Bamarne, the ballistic precision of the munitions combined with the drone surveillance suggests that gathering was deliberately targeted as a warning or for lethal effect. Additionally, Metina mountain, the PKK alleged firing position, is under the control of the Turkish and the Kurdistan Regional Government military forces. Since 2015, the Turkish Armed Forces have killed up to 129 civilians and wounded up to 180 civilians in northern Iraq. ‘Claw-Lock’ is another in a succession of Turkish military operations which has visited death and displacement upon the people of this region. Community Peacemaker Teams together with the partners of the international ‘End Cross Border Bombings’ campaign denounce each death and the harm that has been done to civilians by the Turkish Armed Forces.  Protect civilian lives! Bring life back to the border regions - Let civilians return to their villages! 

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Khor Mor is stuck between the PUK and KDP projects

Draw Media Two missile attacks on the Khor Mor field in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have threatened the sources of gas in the Kurdistan Region. There is suspicion of Hashd al-Shaabi forces. Bafel Talabani will go to Baghdad this week. Khor Mor gas is stuck between exports to Turkey and pipelines to households and local factories. Where were the katyusha directed from, and what is the message behind the missiles? More details in this report. Who's attacking? Katyusha missiles were fired twice in two days at Khor Mor field in Qadir Karam district of Chamchamal district. No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, and the PUK security forces, which control the area, have not pointed the finger at anyone. According to Darw, PUK officials suspect that Shiite armed militias in Duzkhurmatu are behind the attack. Military officials have determined the direction of the Katyushas. The rockets were fired at the village of Qalganlu in Nawjul, a district in Duzkhurmatu, which is only 5 kilometers away from the Khor Mor gas field. There is a security gap between the Peshmerga and Hashd Shaabi in the area. According to Draw information, the PUK president Bafel Talabani is to visit Baghdad on Sunday to talk to Iraqi government officials about the attacks on the Khor Mor field. Why Khor Mor? On May 5, the Northern Oil Company, which belongs to the Iraqi Oil Ministry, issued a statement saying that the Kurdistan Regional Government has exceeded the oil fields belonging to the Northern Company, including (Khurmala, Avana, Safiya, Khor Mor). Khurmala is the largest oil field under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), within the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) zone, which produces 175,000 barrels of oil per day. In the PUK zone, the Khor Mor field, the largest gas field in the Kurdistan Region and supplies gas to domestic households and power plants, is also in trouble, and Iraq is demanding it. The Northern Oil Company (NOC) has filed a lawsuit against the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the Iraqi courts over the Khurmala and Khor Mor oil fields. The Iraqi Oil Ministry has recently sent a letter to all companies operating in the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan Region following the failure of negotiations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to implement the decision of the Federal Supreme Court. They asked them to renew their contracts with the Iraqi government within three months, otherwise they would be blacklisted. Some believe that this situation has led Iraqi armed groups to shift their attacks from diplomatic positions to the Kurdistan Region's oil and gas facilities within the jurisdiction of the PUK and KDP. There is another view that the reason behind the attacks on Khor Mor is linked to a legal dispute between the UAE's Dana Gas and the Iranian government over gas the 25-year agreement was signed in 2005. Dana Gas won the first part of the case against Iran, worth $608 million. The court is scheduled to decide on the second part of the case in October. Iran is suspected of moving its war with UAE's Dana Gas to the Khor Mor field through Iraqi Shiite militias to send a message to the UAE that it could damage their economy. Kurdistan exports gas! In February, Kurdistan Regional Government President Nechirvan Barzani arrived in Ankara unexpectedly and was photographed with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. "I discussed with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani about exporting gas to Turkey," Erdogan told reporters after the meeting. Erdogan's statement was enough to put the Kurdistan Region under strong pressure from the Iraqi and Iranian governments, especially in those days when the director of Dana Gas said: “We can supply fuel to Iraq and Turkey with Chamchamal gas.” In the same month that Nechirvan visited Turkey (February), the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court suddenly ruled on a complaint filed by the Iraqi Oil Ministry, overturning the Kurdistan Region's oil and gas law and ordering the region to hand over its oil and gas to Baghdad. Gas pipeline over Bafel Talabani's dead body! The gas from the Khor Mor field is stuck between two projects, the KDP's project to export it to Turkey and the PUK's project to pipe the gas to households and local factories. On April 28, 2013, Bafel Talabani, the PUK leader, met with representatives of diplomatic envoys of and international organizations and agencies in Erbil, in this meeting on the issue of exporting Kurdistan gas Talabani said that "Gas won't go out of Kurdistan the way the oil has, with that level of mismanagement and lack of transparency," he also emphasized that, "If any attempt goes beyond these demands, the gas pipeline must be exported over the dead body of Bafel Jalal Talabani." Khor Mor... Kurdistan Gas Resources Khor Mor is located in the west of Qadir Karam district. Until 1976, this district belonged to Khurmatu district, which means that it was included in Kirkuk province, but that year it was added to Salahaddin province. Khor Mor was under the control of the Iraqi government until 2003. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the field fell back to the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2015, gas was produced in the field and piped to the Chamchamal and Erbil power plants. The current production of the farm is as follows: • Natural gas: 452 million cubic feet per day • Condensate: 22,000 barrels per day are transported by tankers to Khurmala station and mixed with Kurdistan Regional Government oil in order to improve its quality • (LPG): 1050 tons. Dana Gas sells it to local companies for $315 per ton. (South Kurdistan) company buys it and distribute it. Gas in the Kurdistan Region According to the official website of the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Kurdistan Region has 200 trillion cubic feet (5.7 trillion cubic meters) of natural gas reserves, which is 3% of the world's average gas reserves. However, this is the unproven reserves because the proven natural gas reserves of the region, according to US energy reports, is only (25 trillion) cubic feet. PUK controlled area reserves • Khor Mor field: 8.2 trillion cubic feet • Chamchamal field: 4.4 trillion cubic feet • Miran field: 3.46 trillion cubic feet • Palkana field: 1.6 trillion cubic feet KDP controlled area reserves • Banabawe field: 7.1 trillion cubic feet • Khormala field: 2 trillion 260 billion cubic meters • Sheikhan field: 900 billion cubic feet • Pirmam field: 880 billion cubic feet  

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PM Barzani discusses freedom of press with Kurdish journalists 

Draw Media, Kurdistan 24 Prime Minister Masrour Barzani held a candid discussion about freedom of the press with journalists from numerous media establishments in the Kurdistan Region on Monday. Barzani and the Kurdish journalists spent over three hours discussing a wide range of topics related to corruption, freedom of the press and speech, the reform process, Erbil-Baghdad relations, and relations between the media and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Freedom of press, Kurdish media landscape “Journalism is a sacred mission,” Prime Minister Barzani told the journalists at the beginning of their lengthy discussion, adding that he is a firm believer in free expression and press freedom in the Kurdistan Region. Later in the discussion, Barzani opened the floor for journalists to ask questions and share their views on the state of affairs in the Kurdistan Region. One issue repeatedly raised by multiple journalists was restrictions on press freedom. They said that the freedom of the press is “receding,” with people even facing jail time for “writing a comment”. Harassment of journalists or their family members was also mentioned by a member of the press, who said his wife had been one of the victims. Barzani explained that there is a distinction between a journalist doing their job and defamation, stressing that the latter cannot be tolerated as people’s reputations and rights are at stake. Barzani said, “one person’s freedom ends when another’s begins,” and stressed that a person’s right to free expression does not permit them to defame others. The prime minister denied that he owns any “unofficial media” or has attacked anyone personally through such platforms, as one journalist alleged in the discussion. Public discontent Another issue discussed was public discontent in the Kurdistan Region with the government and political process. A number of the attending journalists acknowledged the “negative atmosphere” in the media regarding people’s grievances over the day-to-day issues they face regarding the delivery of basic services. While acknowledging the issues the Kurdistan Region faces, Barzani charged that some of the media organizations had played a role in making people “disappointed” not only with the government but the Kurdistan Region itself, which negatively affected their sense of patriotism toward their homeland. “Loving the homeland should not be equated with endorsing the government,” he said. KRG Reforms The KRG’s ongoing reform process was also discussed, with some journalists expressing discontent with its progress. Mohammad of Rauf the editor-in-chief of Draw Media mentioned that the margin of freedom of the press has declined significantly in this cabinet, especially we were worried about the case of the Badinan journalists. The arrest of Sherwan Sherwani and his friends, who are still in jail, made us uncomfortable and unsecure about our journalistic works.  He added that corruption has increased and smuggling is openly carried out at the borders and no corrupt officials have faced arrest. Barzani responded by saying his cabinet’s fight against corruption is about reforming the system to make it resilient against corrupt practices rather than focusing on putting corrupt officials on trial. If the system is not reformed, it would be prone to such malign practices, he argued, adding that his reform program will take time to bear results.  

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The Board of Supreme Audit and the Commission of Integrity in the Audit of the Reform Law

Draw Media The Board of Supreme Audit and the Commission of Integrity, two institutions in the Kurdistan Region to monitor the integrity and control corruption, have not escaped safely from the audit of the reform law. In the Board of Supreme Audit (39) employees, and in the Commission of Integrity (11) employees have been given positions illegally who were previously transferred from the organizations to these two institutions.   Board of Supreme Audit in the Reform Report According to the third report of the Coordination and Monitoring Committee on the implementation of the reform law, a copy of which was obtained by (Draw): • The Board of Supreme Audit, which is an institution affiliated to the Kurdistan Parliament, has (389) employees. The audit of all employees of this institution has been completed and it was found that (39) employees have been illegally promoted and (31) employees have been given additional salaries illegally. The report indicates that due to the reform in the file of employees of the Board of Supreme Audit, the amount of (13 million 907 thousand) dinars has been returned to the general treasury. The monthly salary expenditure of this board is 749 million dinars.   Commission of Integrity in the reform report According to the third report of the Coordination and Monitoring Committee on the implementation of the reform law: • Commission of Integrity, which is a body under the Kurdistan Parliament, has 202 employees. The audit of all employees of this commission has been completed and it was found that 11 employees have been given ranks illegally and 7 employees have been paid salaries illegally. According to the report, the amount of (3 million 137 thousand) dinars returned to the general treasury due to the reforms made in the case of employees of this Commission. The monthly salary expenditure of the employees of the Commission is (267 million) dinars. According to Draw Media, the employees who were illegally promoted were previously in the organizations and were transferred to the two institutions. outcome: 17 million and 44 thousand dinars have been returned to the general treasury due to the audit of the files of employees of the two institutions.    

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Two senior officials close to the PKK were among the dead

Draw Media Two senior officials close to the PKK were in the vehicle that was targeted by Turkish drones near Kalar, they are (Farhad Derk and Haval Raperin). Turkish drones targeted a vehicle carrying five people, three women and two men, four of them were killed and one seriously injured near Kalar today. According to the investigations of (Draw Media) among the dead were: • Ms. Haval Raperin, member of the Kurdistan People's Congress close to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). • Farhad Derk, a member of the leadership of Tevdem, close to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The driver of the vehicle was seriously injured and is in hospital. The Turkish drone bombed the vehicle three times until it hit the target. According to the investigations of (Draw), these people have come to the Kurdistan Region from West Kurdistan and have been in Kalar for two days.  

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Investment in the 9th cabinet

Draw Media The Kurdistan Regional Government’s 9th cabinet has licensed 178 investment projects with a capital of more than 11 billion dollars, on an area of ​​more than 10,000 dunams of land. (118) of the projects located into the KDP’s zone, with a capital of more than (9 billion) dollars, which is (83%) of all the projects, on ​​(7.5 thousand) dunams of land. However, only 60 out of 178 investment projects located into the PUK zone, with less than $2 billion, which is only 16% of the capital of all the investment project within KRG, on an area of 3,000 dunams. First, investment in both zones - yellow (KDP) and green (PUK) According to the data of the Investment Board of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the ninth cabinet, which has released between (July 28, 2019 to April 5, 2022). It has licensed 178 investment projects with a capital of 11 billion 137 million 300 thousand 24 dollars, on an area of ​​10 thousand 393 dunams of land. Based on Draw Media analysis, 118 of the projects licensed by the Investment Board are located in Erbil and Duhok provinces. The amount of (9 billion 335 million 916 thousand 730) dollars has been spent for those projects at a rate of (83.83%) of the whole KRG investment projects, on an area of (7 thousand 479) dunams of land. In the same period of time, only (60) projects out of (178) investment projects are located in Suleimani, Halabja, Garmian and Raperin provinces. The amount of (1 billion 801 million 383 thousand 294) dollars has been spent at a rate of (16.17%), on an area of (2 thousand 914) dunams of land. Second, investment at the provincial and city levels 1. Erbil Province; (76) projects with a capital of more than (8.7 billion) dollars an average of (78.7%), on an area of ​​(4.7 thousand) dunams of land. 2. Halabja Province; (1) Project with a capital of more than (6.8 million) dollars, an average of (0.06%), on an area of ​​(7.2) dunams of land. 3. Garmian Administration; (9) Projects with a capital of more than (331.5 million) dollars, an average of (3%), on an area of ​​(935) dunams of land. 4. Raperin Administration; (4) Projects with a capital of (123.3 million) dollars, an average of (1.11%), on an area of ​​(117.5) dunams of land. 5. Sulaimani Province; (46) projects with a capital of more than (1.33 billion) dollars, an average of (12%), on an area of ​​(1,854) acres of land. 6. Duhok Province; (42) projects with a capital of about (569 million) dollars, an average of (5.11%), on an area of ​​(2 thousand 718) acres of land. Third, investment by different sectors 1. Commercial sector; (41) projects with a capital of (573 million) dollars, an average of (5.14%), on an area of ​​more than (537) dunams of land. 2. Banking sector; (1) Project with a capital of more than (315) dollars, an average of (0.14%), on an area of ​​less than (1) dunams of land. 3. Health sector; (11) projects with a capital of (89.5 million) dollars at a rate of (0.80%), on an area of ​​(14.6) dunams of land. 4. Industrial sector; (49) projects with a capital of (1.620 billion) dollars at a rate of (14.55%), on an area of ​​(1,190) dunams of land. 5. Service sector; (2) Project with a capital of (57.8 million) dollars at a rate of (0.52%), on an area of ​​(968) dunams of land. 6. Tourism sector; (29) projects with a capital greater than (7 billion) dollars at (64%), on an area of ​​(2 thousand 856) dunams of land. 7. Education sector; (18) projects with a capital of about (220) million dollars, an average of (2%), on an area of ​​(533) dunams of land. 8. Agricultural sector; (8) Projects with a capital of (363.48 million) dollars, an average of (3.26%), on an area of ​​(3 thousand) dunams of land.9. Housing Sector; (11) projects with a capital of more than (1 billion) dollars, an average of (9%), on an area of ​​(1,256) acres of land. 10. Arts Sector; (1) Project with a capital of (9 million 234 thousand) dollars, an average of (0.08), on an area of ​​(10) dunams of land. 11. Sports Sector; (7) Projects with a capital of about (58 million) dollars, an average of (0.52%), on an area of ​​(25) dunams of land. Fourth: investment capital in the ninth cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government Out of the 178 projects, 174 projects are being implemented by domestic investors with a capital of $6 billion and 193 million, which is 55.6% of the total investment capital since the ninth cabinet took office. However, only one Chinese company has received an investment license with a capital of $5 billion, an average of 44 percent of the total investment capital. (3) projects have been licensed jointly by Iraqi, Chinese, Turkish, Egyptian and Canadian companies with a capital of about (37 million 384 thousand) dollars, which is (0.34%) of the total investment capital. Fifth: Investment based on the Years 1. With the inauguration of the ninth cabinet from (28/7/2019) to (1/1/2020), licenses have been given to (16) projects with a capital of more than (485 million) dollars. 2. (1/1/2020 to 1/1/2021), licenses have been given to (77) projects with a capital of more than (2 billion and 18 million) dollars. 3. (1/1/2021 to 1/1/2022), licenses have been given to (69) projects with a capital of more than (8 billion 509 million) dollars. 4. (1/1/2022 to 5/4/2022), licenses have been given to (16) projects

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Gas price between two cabinets

Draw Media In the Kurdistan region there are three gas quality types (Super, Muhassan-Midgrade, Normal) The gas price increased significantly since 2018 in the KRG. The Super quality increased by (74%), Muhassan-Midgrade by (82%) and Normal by (77%).   🔻Gas prices on June 11, 2018 during the 8th cabinet: 🔹Super: 775 IQD 🔹 Muhassan-Midgrade: 700 IQD 🔹Normal:  650 IQD   🔻Gas prices on June 11, 2022 during the 9th cabinet: 🔹Super: 1350 IQD 🔹 Muhassan-Midgrade: 1275 IQD 🔹Normal: 1150 IQD   🔻Increase in gas prices in the 9th cabinet: 🔹Super: from (775 to 1350)IQD which is increased 575 IQD by (74%) 🔹 Muhassan-Midgrade: from (700 to 1275)IQD which is increased 575 IQD by (82%) 🔹Normal: from (650 to 1150)IQD which is increased 500 IQD by (77%) That means, in the past 4 years the gas price increased significantly in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The Super quality increased by (74%), Muhassan-Midgrade by (82%) and Normal by (77%).

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KRG: Oil and Gas Do Not Fall Under the Purview of the Federal Court

Draw Media Kurdistan’s judicial council said in a statement that the region's oil law would remain in force and will not change. :Statement from the Judicial Council of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq The Kurdistan Regional Government's tenure on the issue of oil and gas exploration on its territory is in accordance with the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. The provisions of Law No. 22, 2007, issued by the Kurdistan Regional Parliament, do not violate the Iraqi Constitution and therefore should be recognized as standing laws. The oil and gas sector do not fall under the exclusive purview of the Federal Government of Iraq as stated in Article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution, underpinned by Article 112 of the Iraqi Constitution which states the Federal Government is to manage oil and gas exploration of discovered fields, in conjunction with regional governments and oil-producing provinces. Of that, revenues are supposed to be distributed equally among the population of Iraq. Article 112 refers to existing oil wells and fields prior to the ratification of the Constitution in 2005. As such, oil fields discovered in the Kurdistan Region since 2005 fall under the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Accordingly, the texts of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Oil and Gas Law No. 22, 2007, remain in line with the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution. Past regimes have made regions unduly suffer and deprived them of their fair share of the revenue from oil and gas exploration in Iraq, limiting their progress and opportunities to prosper. The allocation of national oil and gas revenues should be regulated by law to prevent this from happening again.

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KRG revenue in May was 1.2 trillion dinars

Draw Media The total revenue of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in May was 1 trillion 213 billion dinars. Last May, the Kurdistan Region sold 12 million 730 thousand barrels of oil at $100 per barrel, earning 1 trillion 859 billion dinars. Only 818 billion dinars of that amount went for the government treasury. Non-oil revenues • Non-oil revenues for May = (164 billion) dinars (which will be spent on salaries, otherwise according to information, the amount is almost double) • Coalition financial aid to the Peshmerga forces = (31 billion 500 million) dinars • Kurdistan Region's share of the Iraqi budget = (200 billion) dinars Oil revenues (pipeline exports) • In May 2022, the Kurdistan Region exported 12 million 730 thousand barrels of oil through the Turkish Port of Jayhan • The average price of Brent oil for May is ($112.73). • Because the region sells its oil at $12 less, it sells oil at an average of $100.73 So: (12 million 730 thousand) barrels X (100.73) dollars = (1 billion 282 million 292 thousand 900) dollars. In dinars, it is: (1 billion 282 million 292 thousand 900) dollars X (1450) dinars = (1 trillion 859 billion 324 million 705 thousand) dinars. • According to the latest Deloitte report, 56% of oil revenues are spent on expenditures and 44% remains with the Ministry of Natural Resources. - So: (1 trillion 859 billion 324 million 705 thousand) dollars X (56%) = (718 million 84 thousand 24) dollars go to the cost of oil production process. In dinars, it is: (718 million 84 thousand 24) dollars X ((1450 dinars = (1 trillion 41 billion 221 million 834 thousand 800) dinars oil expenditure. - (1 trillion 859 billion 324 million 705 thousand) dollars X (44%) = (564 million 208 thousand 876) dollars of revenue remain for government. Oil revenue in dinars is: (564 million 208 thousand 876) dollars X (1450) dinars = (818 billion 102 million 870 thousand 200) dinars. Total Revenue in May 2022 (in Dinar) • (818 billion 102 million 870 thousand 200) oil revenue + (200 billion) share of the Iraqi budget + (164 billion) local income + (31 billion 500 million) from allies = (1 trillion 213 billion million 870 thousand 200) dinars.    

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300 Kurdish, Albanian and Bangladeshi refugees will be deported

Draw Media, Daily Mail Ministers are planning a mass deportation next week of foreign criminals and migrants who are in the UK illegally. The carefully choreographed operation, involving up to 300 foreign nationals, is believed to be the biggest deportation exercise ever attempted on one day. Charter flights booked by the Home Office are bound for Iraqi Kurdistan, Albania and Bangladesh on Tuesday. Those being deported are being held at immigration removal centers including Colnbrook, near Heathrow Airport, as they await the flights. They have been rounded up from all over Britain by immigration enforcement officers and detained over the past month. Each received a Home Office letter last weekend while in detention, giving details of their flight. The deportations will include the first ‘returns’ flight to the turbulent area of Iraqi Kurdistan in a decade, immigration lawyers say. It comes after the Nationality and Borders Bill became law last month, allowing easier removal of those living in the UK illegally because they are visa overstayers, failed asylum seekers or criminals sentenced to more than a year in prison. Earlier this month, killers, rapists and paedophiles were among those who dodged deportation to Jamaica with a series of last-minute legal challenges – and just seven boarded the plane. Last night, the Home Office said: ‘We make no apology for removing foreign criminals and those with no right to be in the UK. This is what the public rightly expects.’ It comes after the Government made a separate deal to send certain asylum seekers to Rwanda. While the department refused to comment on the details of Tuesday’s flights, the Daily Mail understands the deportees include Iraqi-Kurds, Albanians and Bangladeshi nationals. They will be flown, respectively, to their country’s capital cities: Erbil in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region, Tirana and Dhaka. The New Arab, a media outlet based in London, reported that Iraqi-Kurd politician Arian Taugozi said the operation followed a ‘secret deal’ between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Home Office. The ministry said a visit by the KRG’s prime minister Masrour Barzani last month was to ‘strengthen joint efforts to address migration challenges.    

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KRG oil in the control of two women

Draw Media When he first received the position, Kamal Atroshi threatened to tear to pieces those who are corrupt, but in the end, He knelt before two women close to the Barzani family. Kamal Atroshi, the man who said, “I will distribute oil to all the villages myself.” But during his service, the people died in cold. He talked about solving the gasoline problem and gasoline prices reached the highest level during his time. Did Kamal Atroshi resign due to illness or did he resign because he got disappointed? More details in this report. Is he sick or disappointed? A statement issued by the office of Prime Minister Masrour Barzani attributed the resignation of Kamal Atroshi to the health condition of the minister, but according to (Draw) information, the reason for the resignation is related to the interference in the affairs of his ministry. In particular, the influence of Dr. Ranya Majid, Masrour Barzani's assistant for economic affairs, in the affairs of the Ministry of Natural Resources. (Draw) has learned, that another part of Kamal Atroshi's concerns and his resignation from the Ministry of Natural Resources is related to the unlimited interference of another woman named Dr. Ghazala, the Director-General of Contracts and Companies in the Ministry of Natural Resources. When Atroshi took over as the minister of natural resources, his first promise was to change the structure of the ministry, as he said, “he wants to create an international structure for his ministry.” In late 2021, Kamal Atroshi left the ministry for a while, when there were rumors of his resignation, but later denied it, saying he had gone abroad for medical treatment. KRG oil in the control of two women Before and after the resignation of Kamal Atroshi, the KRG oil dossier is controlled by two women, all of whom are close to the Barzani family. Omid Sabah, the Cabinet Office Chief, who is Masrour Barzani's shadow in the government, is responsible for bringing back the KRG oil revenue from Citibank in the USA to the Egyptian bank in Dubai. After bringing BACK the money to Kurdistan, the oil revenue goes to RT Bank, the director of this bank is a woman named Hamela Abdulstar Gardi. Then she transfers the oil revenue to the Minara Bank for salary expenses. (Hamela Gardi),(Dr. Ghazala), as three women close to the Barzani family, dominate the oil dossier and revenues of the Kurdistan Region and no oil minister can encroach on the power of these three women in Masrour Barzani’s cabinet.  

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Plasschaert gathers the Kurdish leaders 

Draw  The head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert will meet with Kurdish leaders at the UN headquarters in Erbil next week, a senior source told Draw Media

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