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(130) Cases of human rights violations have been recorded in East Kurdistan

Draw Media According to the report of Hangaw Human Rights Organization, 130 cases of human rights violations have been registered in East Kurdistan, including seven smugglers killed by security forces and seven executions. According to the statistics of Hangaw Human Rights Center, at least 130 cases of human rights violations have been registered in Kurdistan during the month of July (Kolbar) smugglers (47 cases) In the past month, 47 (Kolbars) smugglers, carry goods across the Iran-Iraq border, have been killed in Kurdistan, seven of them got shot directly by Iranian armed forces. Of the 40 injured Kolbars, 30 were killed by Iranian armed forces, four by landmine explosions and six by natural disasters. Executions and deaths in prison (7 cases) In July this year, at least seven Kurdish prisoners from Kermanshah, Sawlawa, Dewlan, Bijar, Tikab, Shirvan and Chardaul were executed, which two of them were women. Six of them were sentenced on charges of premeditated murder and one on charges of drug trafficking. 9 civilians killed and injured in mine explosions At least six citizens have been seriously injured in landmine explosions in the cities of Bana and Mehran in the past month. Meanwhile, two brothers, aged 9 and 12, named Matin Rashidi and Mahdi Rashidi, were shot dead by Iranian armed forces and a citizen from Mehran city of Ilam province was wounded. Arrests and sentences (60 cases) According to Hangaw, at least 53 Kurdish citizens, including three women and five boys under the age of 18, have been arrested by Iranian security agencies on charges of political and civil activities in the past month. Seven Kurdish activists all were sentenced to 19 years and six months in prison on charges of political activity. Labor (7 cases) During this period, at least two workers from Bokan, Sanaa, Mahabad died in work accidents.

The “Full Barzani”: How Diplomatic Meetings with the Barzani Family Are Shaping Iraqi Kurdish Politics

by Winthrop Rodgers For high-ranking officials visiting the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, there is a well-established expectation that they will meet separately with three political figures from the same family and party: Masoud, Nechirvan, and Masrour Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). This ritual reveal some of the dynamics at play regarding domestic politics and diplomatic practices in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (KRI) and the country writ large. However outside officials themselves might see it, this protocol reinforces top-down family rule in the KRI and principally serves the KDP’s own political interests. Domestic instances can also be important signals when tea-leaf reading on the government formation underway in Iraq. For foreign diplomats, it is an unwritten but strongly understood rule that visiting heads of government, cabinet ministers, and ambassadors will request to meet with KDP leader Masoud Barzani, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani during trips through Erbil, sometimes just a few hours total after a more lengthy visit to Baghdad. These meetings reflect how power is kept close within the family in the KRI: Masoud is Masrour’s father and Nechirvan’s uncle, making the latter two first cousins. Nechirvan is Masrour’s direct predecessor as prime minister and successor to Masoud as president. In a nod to the U.S. political concept of the “Full Ginsburg,” I have dubbed the protocol exhibition of meeting all three politicians in one go the “Full Barzani.” It’s quite a regular occurrence; I’ve documented at least 31 instances of this phenomenon since April 12–approximately one every eleven days. Moreover, this list is non-exhaustive and only includes instances that are publicly acknowledged by the KRG on social media or KDP-affiliated media channels. Private and sensitive meetings are obviously not included, and the KRG and KDP are selective about what meetings with what countries they choose to reveal and highlight. The occasions for the meetings vary; some are one-off affairs, like when Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde came through Erbil last November during an Iraq trip, or courtesy calls for new or departing ambassadors, such as the arrival tour for France’s new ambassador to Iraq Eric Chevallier in September. Other officials repeat this cycle regularly, like UN Special Representative for Iraq Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert or US Ambassador Matthew Tueller, who has pulled a “Full Barzani” at least nine times since February 2020. Foreign visitors from all corners engage in this practice. Former UK Ambassador Stephen Hickey did a “full Barzani” at least five times during his tenure, highlighting the UK government’s apparent desire for close ties with the KDP. Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov completed a set in December, during which Prime Minister Masrour Barzani “reaffirmed the historic friendship between our peoples and more cooperation.” Then Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif did a "Full Barzani" last April. German, Australian, Saudi, Canadian, Italian, and European Union officials have completed their own in the past year, while numerous others have met with two out of three Barzanis. Still more engage with all three over a longer period of time. Pope Francis managed the rare feat of getting all three Barzanis in the same room together during his historic visit in March 2021, an exception to the usual protocol dictating separate meetings for each. For diplomats, the meetings are arranged through the KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations and the offices of the three men. Failure to make a request to meet with all “Three B’s,” as they are colloquially known, would raise question marks and be perceived as a slight by the KDP. Even so, the arrangement is a highly unusual one. While the KRI has some powers to engage with foreign governments outlined in Article 121 of the Iraqi constitution, it is uncommon for such narrow, personal, and partisan protocol arrangements to exist for diplomats at a sub-national level or to be so rigorously expected. Visitors can get angry tellings-off from KRG officials if they deviate from the KDP-approved programming. Domestically, Iraqi government and party officials also engage in the practice. For instance, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi met all three Barzanis following the Erbil missile attack in March. Iraqi President Barham Salih has had at least two rounds since last April, including one in November as he sought reelection in the face of a KDP challenge. Other visits yield their significance in retrospect: notably, Sadrist official Nassar al-Rubaiee’s “Full Barzani” last June prefaced the attempt to form a “national majority government” between the Sadrists, KDP, and Sunni blocs following the federal elections in October. With government formation ongoing, it is worthwhile to keep an eye on who pays call on the KDP leadership in Erbil. Of course, the KDP is hardly the only political party in the Kurdistan Region. KRG Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani of the Sulaymaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is occasionally included in meetings with the prime minister, while his brother—PUK leader Bafel Talabani—might get his own face-to-face with visitors. Nevertheless, the KDP is by far the biggest game in town during official meetings in Erbil. Spare a thought also for the KRI’s opposition parties or independents, for whom there is little time or attention amid a packed schedule of Barzani meetings. One must be content to imagine what officials and diplomats might gain from a more diverse range of perspectives and contacts. There are likewise no women represented in the top ranks of the KDP, so their voices are effectively excluded from these high-level discussions—which ought to include the dangerous rise in femicides in the KRI. It is also worth reflecting on what this practice means for the state of the KDP itself. The act of meeting separately with each Barzani is reflective of the KDP’s tribal, patriarchal, and factional character and serves as a way of balancing egos. In the internal hierarchy of the party, Masoud ranks highest while his son and nephew defer to him during combined affairs. Meeting Masrour or Nechirvan by themselves allows them to speak in service of their own political interests. However, there are also extreme political and personal differences within the KDP bubbling beneath the surface and at play in the insistence on separation. A particularly combustible rivalry is developing between Nechirvan and Masrour (the latter backed by Masoud), which has the potential to explode at a future date. The pettiness of this factionalism was ludicrously on display at this year’s Munich Security Conference, when Masrour and Nechirvan led separate delegations and even met some of the same people in different meetings. While tracking “Full Barzani” meetings may also be instructive for casual political analysis, the substantive impact of this insistence on separate meetings is more insidious. It is clear that KDP’s purpose in enforcing this protocol is to reinforce a perception about the Barzani family’s centrality in Kurdish and Iraqi politics to the exclusion of all others. Moreover, these meetings help strengthen the power of Masoud, Nechirvan, and Masrour both within the party and in the broader political field. Officials who acquiesce to this arrangement are legitimizing and playing into these implicit messages, even if this is not their intent. Ask many ordinary citizens in the KRI to describe their political leaders—both KDP and PUK—and they will call them “mafias.” Anti-democratic signals are flashing bright red: voter turnout is down; young people and middle-class families are leaving in droves for Europe; journalists and activists are arrested and jailed on trumped up charges; the KRG is not paying public servants. It is up to outside officials to decide how to manage those dynamics and perceptions about how they engage with the Kurdistan Region’s political leadership: whether it is business as usual or time for a new approach.

Escaping From Duopoly Rule

How a Two-party System Drives Iraqi Kurdish Migration En Masse? byMera Jasm Bakr In mid-2021 the EU experienced an influx of several tens of thousands of immigrants, primarily from Iraqi Kurdistan. Belarusian authorities fueled the situation by increasing the number of flights from the Middle East and issuing Belarusian visas. Some European countries have described the crisis as “hybrid warfare” waged by Belarus against the EU. But what made Iraqi Kurds seek a better life abroad? Mera Jasm Bakr analyzes the drivers for the emigration from Iraqi Kurdistan. Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) appeared to be a thriving region in the north of the country, even called the "other Iraq" by many. The region experienced considerable economic and infrastructural development after the collapse of the Baath regime, in contrast to the central and southern provinces plagued by economic and security crises. However, when throngs of migrants appeared at the border between Belarus and Poland in November 2021, it came as a surprise to many that the majority of the migrants stranded at the border were Iraqi Kurds. What drove the Iraqi Kurds to migrate en masse? The duopoly rule of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), since the formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 1992, has created a political status quo that has caused widespread disillusionment and has left citizens with little to no hope for economic and political reforms. Importantly, the two parties' patronage-based economy is no longer able to absorb the majority of its supporters into the labor force. Amidst the absence of any meaningful political and economic reforms, as well as a growing population on the margins of the KDP-PUK client network, Iraqi Kurdish migration to Europe will continue to surge. Click here to read the report in full.

Distribution of projects and expenditures of the Kurdistan region provinces

Draw Media In the past two years, (2021 and 2022), 59% of the KRG projects were spent in the yellow zone and 41% in the green zone. In 2022, out of 851 proposed projects, 520 projects (61%) are in the yellow zone. Kurdistan Regional Government Projects and Expenditures in 2021 Based on a document, MP (Balen Ismail) published, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has agreed to spend 349 billion and 720 million dinars for projects in the provinces of the Kurdistan Region in 2021, according to letter number (2560 on 25/2/2021). The document shows, the amount of (205 billion and 370 million) dinars (59%) has been allocated for projects in Erbil, Duhok, Soran and Zakho (yellow zone). The amount of (144 billion and 350 million) (41%) has been allocated for projects in Sulaimani, Halabja, Garmian and Raperin provinces (green zone). Kurdistan Regional Government Projects and Expenditures in 2022 In 2022, out of 851 proposed projects, 520 projects (61%) are in the yellow zone and 331 projects (39%) are in the green zone. The amount of (187 billion and 54 million) dinars (59%) has been allocated for (520) projects in Erbil, Duhok, Soran and Zakho (yellow zone). The amount of (128 billion and 293 million) with (41%) has been allocated for (331) projects in Sulaimani, Halabja, Garmian and Raperin provinces (green zone). *Yellow zone, green zone: The dividing border that separates the KDP “Yellow” and the PUK “Green” (colour of flags) zones of influence, respectively.

Bafel Talabani: We will withdraw from the government if Sulaymaniyah problems will not be solved

Draw Media According to the information Draw Media obtained from several sources in the meeting of the top leaders of the Kurdish political parties, Bafel Talabani threatened to withdraw from the government, if Sulaymaniyah governorate problems will not be solved. He said the PUK has been providing the expenses of Sulaymanya governarate instead of the government for several months.

The PUK and KDP did not reach an agreement

Draw Media The meeting of the top leaders of the Kurdish political parties ended without agreement. The fate of the elections was handed over to another session next September. The PUK and KDP agreed on the electoral method, but no agreement was reached on the seats of the minorities. In the meeting of the top leaders of the Kurdish political parties in the Presidency office of the Kurdistan Region, UN Representative Jeanine Plasschaert also attended, the parties have once again failed to reach a final agreement on how to hold the sixth round of parliamentary elections. According to (Draw) sources the PUK and Gorran Movement have made some compromises and agreed to hold elections in a single constituency, while the PUK previously was leading the front of parties that called for multi-circuit election system. Despite the convergence on the electoral system (single constituency), however, the PUK, KDP and the parties did not reach an agreement on how to distribute the 11 quota seats of the minorities and the voter’s registration, therefore, the date of the election could not be determined at the meeting. Eventually the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region and the UN representative has agreed with the first person of the parties to meet again in early September to discuss the elections.

The KRG oil in the past three Julys

Draw Media Oil sales in the Kurdistan Region decreased by 6.8% in July 2022 compared to July (2020). However, the net oil revenue (handed over to the government) in July (2022) increased by 181%. In Iraqi dinars, the amount of returned income is much larger because of the change in the value of the Iraqi dinar. In July 2022, the total net income returned to government in dinars increased by 245%. Which means (698 billion 691 million 304 thousand 81) dinars more than the amount submitted to the Kurdistan Regional Government in July (2020). The amount of oil sold in the Kurdistan Region in July (2020 – 2021 - 2022) According to a report by Deloitte on (10/1/2021), the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) sold 13 million 238 thousand 661 barrels of oil to foreign countries in July 2020 through the Turkish port of Ceyhan. However, according to another report by Deloitte published on March 17, 2022, the Kurdistan Regional Government sold 13 million 58 thousand 810 barrels of oil to foreign countries through the Turkish port of Ceyhan in July 2021. Accordingly, the sale of oil in July (2021) was less than July (2020) by (1.4%) or (179 thousand 851) barrels of oil less than July 2020. According to information in July 2022, the Kurdistan Regional Government sold 12 million 340 thousand barrels of oil through the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Accordingly, compared to July a year earlier KRG oil sale decreased by 5.5% which was 718,810 barrels of oil less. Compared to July 2020, sales decreased further by 6.8% or 898 thousand 661 barrels of oil less.

Violations against Journalists in one day was higher than the past six months

Draw Media Only in one day 78 violations against journalists were recorded during the demonstrations of August 6, 2022. While in the first quarter of this year 63 violations were committed against journalists. On Saturday, August 6, twenty-six journalists were arrested during the demonstrations throughout the Kurdistan Region, but in the past six months two journalists have been arrested. According to the Metro Center for Press Freedom, the violations against journalists during Saturday's demonstrations are as follows: 🔻 78 violations committed against 60 journalists and media channels: 🔹 26 Arrests 🔹 4 Raids on houses 🔹 16 Prevention 🔹 8 Tear gas injuries 🔹 23 Confiscation of journalistic materials: 🔹 1 Media Channel Closed According to the report of the Protection Committee of Press Freedom and Journalists' Rights in Kurdistan journalist’s syndicate from 1-1-2022 to 31-6-2022: 🔻 63 violations committed against journalists and media outlets: 🔹 (2) cases of arrest 🔹 (8) Cases of discrimination and not allowing media coverage 🔹 (3) cases of breaking journalistic equipment and seizure 🔹 (4) cases of attack and insult 🔹 (1) Threats 🔹 (1) 1 Media Channel Closed 🔹 (1) Cases of attacks on media channels

Barzani's Failures on Freedom of Expression in Iraqi Kurdistan

Drawmedia by Diary Marif-washingtoninstitute The Kurdish Region of Iraq, rife with economic and security challenges, is witnessing increased censorship and suppression of free speech. Afew weeks ago, to mark the third anniversary of his cabinet, Prime Minister of the KRG Masrour Barzani delivered a speech summarizing the result of his reforms and the achievements of his government in the past three years. He likewise promised to expand his government’s progress in freedom of speech. Barzani characterized the government efforts to "expand the scope of freedom of expression and speech and laid the groundworks for creating a more responsible journalism in the Kurdistan Region (KRI)." However, the reality of the current government is that its activities have run contrary to these values, and what Masrour Barzani has promised during both this latest and prior speeches. Masrour Barzani was appointed prime minister of the ninth cabinet of the KRG on July 10, 2019, replacing his cousin Nechirvan Barzani. In his inaugural address, Masrour Barzani promised to build a strong Kurdistan: carry out reforms, unite political parties, and promote free and independent journalism. Yet words are cheaper than actions, and the subsequent years have demonstrated that he did the exact opposite on the ground. Barzani put the KRG on the cliff as they faced several dire crises that will require decades to amend. Economic challenges, failure to pay salaries, threats to women, and security challenges all plague the KRI, but journalists struggle to report on these issues as self-censorship and enforced censorship increasingly haunt the KRI’s journalists. Retaliation against journalists and critics Since he was sworn as prime minister, the rate of crime and violations such as threats, harassment, and torture against journalists and activists has increased significantly. The Metro Center for Journalists' Rights and Advocacy published that 353 violations were committed against 260 journalists and media organizations in the Kurdistan Region in 2021 alone. One of the most striking crackdowns occurred in 2020, when Barzani arrested and put more than 80 journalists and activists behind bars in Dohuk province after demonstrating against corruption and poor public services. Despite a wide range of serious concerns and condemnation from other national, regional, and international levels to free them, the prime minister stubbornly maintained his stance. At the tail end of 2021, Kurdish university students demonstrated peacefully demanding their basic rights, such as payment of their financial grants that have been suspended for years and improvement of government university housing conditions. The Kurdish authorities, in contrast, answered brutally by dragging them into the streets, kicking their faces, firing live bullets in the air, and spreading snipers on the roof of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate. In 2022, the Barzani government has continued this same pattern of repressing journalists and diminishing the scope of civil freedoms. A few days after the third anniversary speech, two journalists were arrested in Erbil and Duhok due to their professional activities. And on July 22, Barzani’s security forces did not allow a peaceful demonstration in Erbil against Turkish bombardments in Kurdistan, which have collectively killed nearly 140 Kurdish and Iraqi civilians. The prime minister or his current government alone is not responsible for all crises that have occurred in the Iraqi Kurdistan. It's been exactly 31 years since Iraqi Kurdistan has been governed and ruined by the two major parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masoud Barzani (1946-present) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of former Iraqi president Jalal Talabani (1933-2017). Both parties have used a number of strategies over the years to silence the journalists, authors, and protesters who have raised their voices against corruption and injustice. Among both the KDP and PUK, the Talabanis and the Barzanis have more power than other leaders since they have controlled their parties by using security forces and money to protect their families' interests, especially the eldest sons of Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, BavelTalabani and Masrour Barzani. Barzani’s reputation among journalists Barzani's crackdowns on journalists reflect several aspects of his government. Most of his government members and cabinet ministers consist of senior officers with intelligence backgrounds, a branch known for its skepticism of the press. Masrour Barzani himself came to power with a robust intelligence background as head of KDP intelligence services. Nor has the Barzani family overall been tolerant of criticism directed towards them. In 2005, Barzani arrested the dissident writer Kamal Said Qadir and put him behind bars for posting “defamatory” articles about Kurdish authorities. But allegations of more violent repression also exist, including the assassination of the young journalist Sardasht Othman, who was kidnapped in the Iraqi Kurdistan capital of Erbil and killed in the vicinity of the Iraqi city of Mosul in 2010. Osman was a young journalist who criticized corruption, family rule, and nepotism; he specifically criticized the Barzanis in several pieces. In one of his articles, “I am in Love with Barzani’s Daughter,” Osman sarcastically wished to be the son-in-law of Masrour Barzani in order to be rich, protected, and have a better lifestyle. Osman broke a social taboo around the family with this article, and consequently there was speculation that the current prime minister was involved in Osman’s Murder. Barzani’s loyal security forces have also been accused of the 2016 assassination of the journalist Widad Hussein, who worked for a newspaper affiliated with the KDP’s rival PKK party, by his family. By and large, the rate of violence and crime in the KRI has increased, degrading trust and weakening the sense of community. This repression also has ripple effects on Iraqi Kurdish society, and is one of the contributing factors to the ongoing 2021-22 migrant crisis on Belarus’s border. There is also the concern of alienating and angering Kurdish young adults. It is this age group most susceptible to radicalization or quickest to protest, and many young Kurds are increasingly frustrated with restrictions on speech. Barzani should learn the lesson repeatedly echoed throughout the region on what happens political figures when they have impinged on peoples’ rights to demonstrate and free speech. If such repression continues, it will make it more likely, not less, for Kurds to come out and protest against a government that cannot or will not guarantee their freedoms.

Turkey controls 3.5% of the Kurdistan Region

by Michael Knights Ankara is fighting a lethal and largely hidden counterinsurgency against PKK elements across the border, but the conflict’s rising profile may carry high costs for both U.S. interests and Iraqi sovereignty. On July 27, Iraq lodged a complaint against Turkey at the UN Security Council, and Iraqi militias fired rockets at the Turkish consulate in Mosul. Both actions were taken in retaliation for a July 20 Turkish artillery strike that killed nine Iraqis and wounded thirty-three in the Kurdistan Region resort of Parakh. They were also the most recent incidents in a conflict that has spanned decades, largely out of sight, and is now escalating quantitatively and qualitatively. The main beneficiaries of the clashes may be Iran-backed militias, who welcome having Turkey as a new rationale for so-called “resistance” (muqawama) attacks outside the framework of the Iraqi state. If the present trajectory continues, it risks endangering multiple U.S. and Iraqi interests. Why Has Turkey Been Operating Inside Iraq? In 1983, Turkey began conducting ground incursions and other cross-border operations against bases in northern Iraq belonging to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a Turkish militant group designated as a terrorist entity by Ankara, Washington, and other governments. Most of these strikes were launched in response to particularly painful PKK attacks that succeeded in killing soldiers or police personnel inside Turkey. At times, Saddam Hussein’s government gave tacit approval for Turkish operations up to three miles inside Iraq. By the mid-1990s, portions of this border belt—which the Turks dubbed the “Temporary Danger Zone”—had been expanded to ten miles. After Saddam withdrew his forces from the north in 1991, the local Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could not prevent seasoned PKK cells from establishing bases deeper inside Iraq. In response, Turkey sent lumbering armored units as far as fifteen miles across the border in pursuit of militants, eventually erecting a permanent artillery and helicopter base at Bamerni as both a forward observation post and a means of extending its reach against the PKK. Yet the group simply moved deeper into the Kurdistan Region, infiltrating Gara (25 miles inside the border), the Qandil Mountains (60 miles), the UN-monitored Rostam Joudi refugee camp in Makhmur district (110 miles), and Sinjar (which gave the PKK a pathway to the Syrian border). Beginning in 2008, Turkish airstrikes gradually supplanted ground incursions. The U.S. military provided intelligence for these strikes early on as a way of incentivizing a more selective approach, but Turkey has since become more reliant on its own drone and human intelligence sources. Expansion and Escalation Over the past few years, Turkey’s efforts to negate the PKK’s strategic depth have gone to extraordinary lengths. In Syria, it has undertaken large cross-border operations intended to displace the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (aka the YPG, which originated as an offshoot of the PKK) and replace them with Turkish-backed militias. In Iraq, Ankara’s cooperative relationship with the KDP has enabled it to employ a wide range of tactics across the border, often without attracting as much international attention. First, after the Islamic State captured Mosul and the local Turkish consulate staff in 2014, Ankara established its deepest base in Iraq: Zilkan. Constructed on the high ground overlooking Mosul, the base lies fifty miles inside the Kurdistan Region and provocatively within visual range of Iran-backed Iraqi militias on the Nineveh Plains. Second, Turkey has modernized its cross-border operations—instead of temporary incursions by ungainly armored units, it now launches longer campaigns each spring in which agile helicopter-transported special forces establish hilltop commando bases as deep as 20-30 miles inside Iraq in order to observe and block PKK lines of movement “with fire” (i.e., via snipers, machine guns, missiles, mortars, drones, and helicopters). Today, about 600 square miles of territory in the north is garrisoned by Turkish outposts and checkpoints, or approximately 3.5 percent of the Kurdistan Region and 0.3 percent of Iraq overall. Much of this territory was not fully controlled by Iraqi Kurdish forces prior to Turkey’s entrance, and it has since become increasingly depopulated due to the warlike conditions. Third, Turkey has greatly expanded its drone strikes, not only blanketing the border and Qandil areas, but also striking as far as 175 miles inside Iraq, hitting federally controlled areas such as Sinjar and Mosul. In many cases, Bayraktar drone crews track and target PKK leadership figures by either following them as they travel south from the border area or detecting them via spies on the ground if they enter urban areas (e.g., in search of medical treatment). Typically—though not invariably—these drone strikes are very successful operations with a low degree of collateral damage, akin to precise U.S. drone strikes undertaken against terrorist targets worldwide. Yet Turkey’s deep pursuit of the PKK has also brought it into areas where the group’s networks interlace with Iran-backed militias, creating a cycle of escalation that threatens to spiral out of control. This is most notable in Sinjar, where Tehran’s Yazidi partners intermingle fluidly with PKK militants. Ankara’s actions in these areas—such as targeting senior Yazidi militia commanders and killing civilians at Parakh—have drawn escalating militia rocket and drone attacks on its bases in Iraq, which usually prompts Turkish artillery, air, and drone strikes on the militias. Policy Recommendations Despite the PKK’s status as a designated terrorist organization and Turkey’s standing as a key NATO ally, Washington still has ample reasons to seek limits on the expanding conflict: • Iraqi sovereignty is suffering. As long as Turkey can strike deeper and deeper inside Iraq without international repercussions, it creates a more permissive environment for Iran to do the same. In March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps openly admitted to firing ballistic missiles at Erbil, but international criticism of this Iranian strike was undermined somewhat by the lack of equivalent concern expressed about Turkey’s infringements on Iraq’s sovereignty. Without a consistent approach, Washington will have difficulty bringing real pressure against Tehran to stop its routine infringements—whether they be direct strikes on Iranian Kurdish insurgent factions or proxy militia strikes unsanctioned by the Iraqi state. • Iran-backed militias are leveraging the crisis. As expected, Tehran’s muqawama partners are crowding to get in on anti-Turkish attacks. On July 22, following a drone strike on Turkey’s Bamerni base, the propaganda outlet Ashab al-Kahf issued a dire warning to Ankara: “Killing for killing, drone for drone, rocket for cannon.” Indeed, Turkey is providing militias with a new rationale for armed “resistance” against occupation at a time when they can no longer credibly claim to be fighting the Islamic State or the U.S.-led coalition. By enabling these groups to justify their illegal ownership and use of drones and rockets, Ankara is inadvertently corroding the stability of the Iraqi state. • Energy and water flows may suffer. Aside from the basic rationale of having U.S. partners be at peace with each other, Iraqi-Turkish cooperation is vital for exporting much-needed energy to Europe as a way of backfilling Russian supplies. Rising tensions after incidents like the Parakh tragedy will make it harder for Baghdad and Turkey to compromise on energy matters, particularly the soon-to-be-decided arbitration spurred by Ankara’s decision to give the Kurdistan Region direct access to the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline and export oil without Baghdad’s approval. Furthermore, Iraq and Syria both need more water from Turkey, as new U.S. ambassador Alina Romanowski highlighted in her inaugural policy initiative after arriving in Baghdad. This is unlikely under the current warlike conditions. Preventing or ameliorating crises between U.S. partners is generally much less of a drain on policymakers than repairing ruptures after the fact. If the United States wants to spend less time on the Middle East, the best way to do so is to keep a lid on tensions, not let them boil over. Yet Washington is already far behind the curve on helping Baghdad and Ankara think through a win-win settlement of the pipeline arbitration, despite clear indications of an impending policy train wreck. As for cross-border operations, the two neighbors have negotiated rules and redlines on this matter before and could do so again, particularly with U.S. mediation. Once the UN-monitored investigation of the Parakh incident is complete, a more comprehensive fact-finding effort should be conducted to determine exactly how widespread Turkish operations are in the remote, lightly-populated, twenty-mile-wide swath along the border. Investigators should also look at Iran’s routine artillery and airstrikes in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ultimately, Ankara has no business maintaining a large, provocative, unilaterally established military base as deep inside Iraq as Zilkan. The latest rocket strikes on the Mosul consulate show that this base and the brash incursion policy it represents are bad for Turkey—not to mention for Iraqi and U.S. interests. At the same time, Washington must not forget Turkey’s rationale for such behavior; after all, the United States would hardly accept a Foreign Terrorist Organization expanding a network of bases 20, 50, or even 100 miles from the homeland, nor would it back off a counterinsurgency strategy that seemed to be working (at least tactically). This dilemma suggests the need for Washington to renew serious multilateral efforts to de-escalate Turkish-PKK violence in a way that gives Ankara some reassurance on border security. Washington would benefit from being part of an Iraqi-Turkish solution and helping Baghdad gain credit for securing concessions from Ankara, ideally including a visible redeployment away from Zilkan. Failing that, Iran-backed militias will continue portraying themselves as the sole defenders of Iraq’s sovereignty.

The Kurdistan Regional Government Revenue for July 2022

Draw Media The total revenues of the Kurdistan Region (oil and non-oil) in July 2022 that returned to the government was (1 trillion and 106 billion) dinars. The total oil revenue of the Kurdistan Region in July was (2 trillion and 106 billion) dinars, more than (1 trillion) dinars went to the expenditure of the oil process and (1 trillion and 106 billion) dinars remained for the government treasury. Non-oil revenues • Non-oil revenues for July = (287 billion) dinars (according to the latest statements of the Minister of Finance) • International Coalition financial assistance to the Peshmerga forces = (31 billion 500 million) dinars • Kurdistan Region's share of the Iraqi budget = (0) dinars Oil revenues (pipeline exports) • In July 2022, the Kurdistan Region exported 12 million 340 thousand barrels of oil through the Turkish Port of Jayhan. • Average Brent oil price for July was ($111.93). • Because the region sells its oil for $12 less, it sells oil at an average of $99.93 So: (12 million 340 thousand) barrels X (99.93) dollars = (1 billion 233 million 136 thousand 200) dollars. • According to the latest Deloitte report, 56% of oil revenues are spent on expenditures and 44% remains for the government So: (1 billion 233 million 136 thousand 200) dollars X (56%) = (690 million 556 thousand 272) dollars go to the cost of the oil process. And (1 billion 233 million 136 thousand 200) dollars X (44%) = (542 million 579 thousand 728) dollars remaining oil revenue for KRG Total Revenue in July 2022 (Dinar) (786 billion 740 million 895 thousand 600) IQD oil revenue + (287 billion) IQD local revenue + (31 billion 500 million) IQD Financial assistance = (1 trillion 105 billion 240 million 895 thousand 600) dinars

Turkey’s War in Northern Iraq: By the Numbers

Draw Media The Washington Institute: by Michael Knights Ankara is fighting a lethal and largely hidden counterinsurgency against PKK elements across the border, but the conflict’s rising profile may carry high costs for both U.S. interests and Iraqi sovereignty. On July 27, Iraq lodged a complaint against Turkey at the UN Security Council, and Iraqi militias fired rockets at the Turkish consulate in Mosul. Both actions were taken in retaliation for a July 20 Turkish artillery strike that killed nine Iraqis and wounded thirty-three in the Kurdistan Region resort of Parakh. They were also the most recent incidents in a conflict that has spanned decades, largely out of sight, and is now escalating quantitatively and qualitatively. The main beneficiaries of the clashes may be Iran-backed militias, who welcome having Turkey as a new rationale for so-called “resistance” (muqawama) attacks outside the framework of the Iraqi state. If the present trajectory continues, it risks endangering multiple U.S. and Iraqi interests. Why Has Turkey Been Operating Inside Iraq? In 1983, Turkey began conducting ground incursions and other cross-border operations against bases in northern Iraq belonging to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a Turkish militant group designated as a terrorist entity by Ankara, Washington, and other governments. Most of these strikes were launched in response to particularly painful PKK attacks that succeeded in killing soldiers or police personnel inside Turkey. At times, Saddam Hussein’s government gave tacit approval for Turkish operations up to three miles inside Iraq. By the mid-1990s, portions of this border belt—which the Turks dubbed the “Temporary Danger Zone”—had been expanded to ten miles. After Saddam withdrew his forces from the north in 1991, the local Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could not prevent seasoned PKK cells from establishing bases deeper inside Iraq. In response, Turkey sent lumbering armored units as far as fifteen miles across the border in pursuit of militants, eventually erecting a permanent artillery and helicopter base at Bamerni as both a forward observation post and a means of extending its reach against the PKK. Yet the group simply moved deeper into the Kurdistan Region, infiltrating Gara (25 miles inside the border), the Qandil Mountains (60 miles), the UN-monitored Rostam Joudi refugee camp in Makhmur district (110 miles), and Sinjar (which gave the PKK a pathway to the Syrian border). Beginning in 2008, Turkish airstrikes gradually supplanted ground incursions. The U.S. military provided intelligence for these strikes early on as a way of incentivizing a more selective approach, but Turkey has since become more reliant on its own drone and human intelligence sources. Expansion and Escalation Over the past few years, Turkey’s efforts to negate the PKK’s strategic depth have gone to extraordinary lengths. In Syria, it has undertaken large cross-border operations intended to displace the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (aka the YPG, which originated as an offshoot of the PKK) and replace them with Turkish-backed militias. In Iraq, Ankara’s cooperative relationship with the KDP has enabled it to employ a wide range of tactics across the border, often without attracting as much international attention. First, after the Islamic State captured Mosul and the local Turkish consulate staff in 2014, Ankara established its deepest base in Iraq: Zilkan. Constructed on the high ground overlooking Mosul, the base lies fifty miles inside the Kurdistan Region and provocatively within visual range of Iran-backed Iraqi militias on the Nineveh Plains. Second, Turkey has modernized its cross-border operations—instead of temporary incursions by ungainly armored units, it now launches longer campaigns each spring in which agile helicopter-transported special forces establish hilltop commando bases as deep as 20-30 miles inside Iraq in order to observe and block PKK lines of movement “with fire” (i.e., via snipers, machine guns, missiles, mortars, drones, and helicopters). Today, about 600 square miles of territory in the north is garrisoned by Turkish outposts and checkpoints, or approximately 3.5 percent of the Kurdistan Region and 0.3 percent of Iraq overall. Much of this territory was not fully controlled by Iraqi Kurdish forces prior to Turkey’s entrance, and it has since become increasingly depopulated due to the warlike conditions. Third, Turkey has greatly expanded its drone strikes, not only blanketing the border and Qandil areas, but also striking as far as 175 miles inside Iraq, hitting federally controlled areas such as Sinjar and Mosul. In many cases, Bayraktar drone crews track and target PKK leadership figures by either following them as they travel south from the border area or detecting them via spies on the ground if they enter urban areas (e.g., in search of medical treatment). Typically—though not invariably—these drone strikes are very successful operations with a low degree of collateral damage, akin to precise U.S. drone strikes undertaken against terrorist targets worldwide. Yet Turkey’s deep pursuit of the PKK has also brought it into areas where the group’s networks interlace with Iran-backed militias, creating a cycle of escalation that threatens to spiral out of control. This is most notable in Sinjar, where Tehran’s Yazidi partners intermingle fluidly with PKK militants. Ankara’s actions in these areas—such as targeting senior Yazidi militia commanders and killing civilians at Parakh—have drawn escalating militia rocket and drone attacks on its bases in Iraq, which usually prompts Turkish artillery, air, and drone strikes on the militias. Open image Policy Recommendations Despite the PKK’s status as a designated terrorist organization and Turkey’s standing as a key NATO ally, Washington still has ample reasons to seek limits on the expanding conflict: Iraqi sovereignty is suffering. As long as Turkey can strike deeper and deeper inside Iraq without international repercussions, it creates a more permissive environment for Iran to do the same. In March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps openly admitted to firing ballistic missiles at Erbil, but international criticism of this Iranian strike was undermined somewhat by the lack of equivalent concern expressed about Turkey’s infringements on Iraq’s sovereignty. Without a consistent approach, Washington will have difficulty bringing real pressure against Tehran to stop its routine infringements—whether they be direct strikes on Iranian Kurdish insurgent factions or proxy militia strikes unsanctioned by the Iraqi state. Iran-backed militias are leveraging the crisis. As expected, Tehran’s muqawama partners are crowding to get in on anti-Turkish attacks. On July 22, following a drone strike on Turkey’s Bamerni base, the propaganda outlet Ashab al-Kahf issued a dire warning to Ankara: “Killing for killing, drone for drone, rocket for cannon.” Indeed, Turkey is providing militias with a new rationale for armed “resistance” against occupation at a time when they can no longer credibly claim to be fighting the Islamic State or the U.S.-led coalition. By enabling these groups to justify their illegal ownership and use of drones and rockets, Ankara is inadvertently corroding the stability of the Iraqi state. Energy and water flows may suffer. Aside from the basic rationale of having U.S. partners be at peace with each other, Iraqi-Turkish cooperation is vital for exporting much-needed energy to Europe as a way of backfilling Russian supplies. Rising tensions after incidents like the Parakh tragedy will make it harder for Baghdad and Turkey to compromise on energy matters, particularly the soon-to-be-decided arbitration spurred by Ankara’s decision to give the Kurdistan Region direct access to the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline and export oil without Baghdad’s approval. Furthermore, Iraq and Syria both need more water from Turkey, as new U.S. ambassador Alina Romanowski highlighted in her inaugural policy initiative after arriving in Baghdad. This is unlikely under the current warlike conditions. Preventing or ameliorating crises between U.S. partners is generally much less of a drain on policymakers than repairing ruptures after the fact. If the United States wants to spend less time on the Middle East, the best way to do so is to keep a lid on tensions, not let them boil over. Yet Washington is already far behind the curve on helping Baghdad and Ankara think through a win-win settlement of the pipeline arbitration, despite clear indications of an impending policy train wreck. As for cross-border operations, the two neighbors have negotiated rules and redlines on this matter before and could do so again, particularly with U.S. mediation. Once the UN-monitored investigation of the Parakh incident is complete, a more comprehensive fact-finding effort should be conducted to determine exactly how widespread Turkish operations are in the remote, lightly-populated, twenty-mile-wide swath along the border. Investigators should also look at Iran’s routine artillery and airstrikes in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ultimately, Ankara has no business maintaining a large, provocative, unilaterally established military base as deep inside Iraq as Zilkan. The latest rocket strikes on the Mosul consulate show that this base and the brash incursion policy it represents are bad for Turkey—not to mention for Iraqi and U.S. interests. At the same time, Washington must not forget Turkey’s rationale for such behavior; after all, the United States would hardly accept a Foreign Terrorist Organization expanding a network of bases 20, 50, or even 100 miles from the homeland, nor would it back off a counterinsurgency strategy that seemed to be working (at least tactically). This dilemma suggests the need for Washington to renew serious multilateral efforts to de-escalate Turkish-PKK violence in a way that gives Ankara some reassurance on border security. Washington would benefit from being part of an Iraqi-Turkish solution and helping Baghdad gain credit for securing concessions from Ankara, ideally including a visible redeployment away from Zilkan. Failing that, Iran-backed militias will continue portraying themselves as the sole defenders of Iraq’s sovereignty.

Turkey's Grip in the Kurdistan Region's oil sector

Sponsored by (NED) In the first quarter of this year, the Turkish company received 252 million dollars in oil from the Kurdistan region. According to Deloitte data, for each barrel of oil, 7 dollars go for the Turkish companies, which is 8 percent of the Kurdistan region's oil revenues. According to Deloitte data, the amount of money paid to both Turkish energy companies (TEC and TPIC) instead of loans and pipeline fees in the first quarter of this year was as follows. # The total amount spent on the two companies in the first quarter of this year was (252 million 455 thousand 135) dollars. # The total amount spent on a daily basis will be (2 million 805 thousand 57) dollars. # From each barrel of oil about 7 dollars went for the two Turkish companies. # (8.33%) of the oil revenue (through pipelines) went to the two Turkish companies. Turkey's benefits from the Kurdistan Region's oil sector Deloitte has released its report for the first quarter of 2022, according to the statistics and audits of Deloitte for the Kurdistan Region from January 1 to March 31, The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exported 36 million 453 thousand 590 barrels of oil through the pipeline to the Turkish Port of Jayhan during the first three months of this year, of which after storage and purification from water composition, only (34 million 923 thousand 168) barrels of oil were delivered to buyers. On average, each barrel of oil in the region was sold for $86.73, with total revenues of 3 billion, 28 million, 903,497 US dollars. According to the report, the Kurdistan Regional Government has paid two types of money to two Turkish companies, namely; Payment for the tariff of the Turkish Energy Company (TEC) for the transportation of the KRG oil. Repayment of debts of Turkish Energy Company (TEC) and Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC). The total amount of money paid to the two companies was (252 million 455 thousand 135) dollars. (125 million) dollars instead of loans and (127 million 455 thousand 252) dollars instead of transportation of Kurdistan Regional Government oil within Turkish territory. So that: # Each barrel of oil sold at (86.73) dollars and (6.93) dollars went to the two Turkish companies. # The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exported 36 million 453 thousand 590 barrels of oil, 34 million 923 thousand 168 barrels were delivered to buyers, the total value was (3 billion 28 million 903 thousand 497) dollars. 8.33 percent of this amount or $252 million, 455,135 were paid to two Turkish companies. Total payments to Turkish companies in the first quarter of 2022 Based on the above analysis, the amount of money spent by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in exchange for loans and pipeline rents to the two Turkish energy companies (TEC) and (TPIC) in the first quarter of this year. # Total expenditure in the first quarter of this year was (252 million 455 thousand 135) dollars. # The total amount spent for December, which was (31) days, was (86 million 956 thousand 769) dollars. # The total amount spent for February, which was (28) days, was (78 million 541 thousand 597) dollars. # The total amount spent for March, which was (31) days, was (86 million 956 thousand 769) dollars. # The daily amount spent was (2 million 805 thousand 57) dollars for the Turkish companies.

The British Consul General visited Draw Media

Draw Media British Consul General David Hunt visited the office of Draw Media in Sulaymaniyah. He declared the British government’s support for freedom of expression as a fundamental human right. British Consul General also discussed journalism and freedom of expression in the Kurdistan Region and stressed the importance of the independent media within the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

Gendarmerie in the territory of the Kurdistan Region

Draw Media Since 2015, 138 civilians have been killed in the Kurdistan Region by Turkish bombings. According to a map of the Turkish presidency, there are 37 Turkish intelligence bases in the Kurdistan Region, which contain thousands of soldiers, hundreds of tanks, artillery and heavy weapons. Bombing On Wednesday, July 20, 2022, Turkey shelled the tourist area (Parakh) in Zakho district, killed (10) civilians and injured more than (20) others, all of whom were Arab tourists. Reactions from within the Kurdistan Region have been transferred to the Iraqi streets. The demands to the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Iraqi territory have increased because these incidents have been repeated dozens of times. According to the Iraqi Kurdistan Team (CPT), 138 civilians have been killed in the Kurdistan Region since 2015 due to Turkish shelling. According to the director of Darkari district of the village of (Parakh), Turkey fired 693 artillery shells and 70 rockets into the area in July 2020 alone, damaging most of the villages in the area. According to Jabar Yawar, former Secretary General of the Peshmerga Ministry in the Kurdistan Region, the number of Turkish air strikes on the Kurdistan Region in the past four years has reached (398) attacks, in addition to (425) artillery attacks More than 20 civilians have been killed in the attacks, which have destroyed border villages, hospitals, roads, bridges and schools. Turkey in the Kurdistan Region The history of Turkey's military presence in the Kurdistan Region dates back to 1997, but the Turkish army's cross-border operations against the PKK date back to the 1980s. Turkey has been conducting military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) since 1983, both inside and outside the country. • In May 1983, Turkey launched its first cross-border military operation in agreement with the Iraqi government, involving thousands of Turkish troops. • In October 1984 and August 1986, Turkey launched two more military operations, but neither succeeded in eliminating PKK guerrillas. • After a period of silence, Turkey launched its fourth operation in 1991 under the name of “Gochan”, which was the year in which Turkish military headquarters and bases increased throughout Kurdistan provinces. • In 1992, the late Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal wrote a letter to Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan (imprisoned in Turkey since 1999) asking him to reduce military attacks against the Turkish army as a starting point for negotiations. But the efforts failed to reach a tangible result. • In the same year, Turkey launched another operation involving 15,000 troops, using tanks, heavy artillery and fighter jets, but it was unsuccessful. The forces withdrew 20 days after the operation began. • After that, a number of other operations were conducted in 1993, 1994 and 1995 with the participation of tens of thousands of soldiers. In the last operation with the help of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (30,000) soldiers participated in the operation, which lasted (45 days) to take control of the area "Haftanin", but was unsuccessful, after a month and a half Turkey withdrew from the offensive. • In early 1999, the number of operations conducted by Turkey in the Kurdistan Region to destroy PKK guerrillas reached 24 operations. In 2000, 2007 and 2008, Turkey conducted similar operations too. Turkey in the Kurdistan Region With the continuous attacks and invasions of Turkey to the Kurdistan Region, the number of Turkish military and intelligence bases in the Kurdistan Region is increasing day by day. According to a map released by the Turkish presidency, Turkey has 37 military and intelligence bases in the Kurdistan Region. Turkey has dozens of bases in the Kurdistan Region. After the arrival of ISIS, under the pretext of liberating Mosul, in December 2015, Turkey brought a large force of about (900 soldiers), (16 tanks) and (20 armored vehicles) to Bashik near Mosul. Turkey's excuse for bringing the force was to fight ISIS, but in 2015, out of 300 air strikes and operations, only three were against ISIS, while 297 were against the bases in the areas under the control of the PKK, which means that 1% of Turkey's attacks on ISIS and 99% of the attacks were on the PKK. This is when Turkey has several other military bases in the Kurdistan Region, especially after the civil war, with the consent of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), within the framework of the "peacekeeping" force, in 1997, a large Turkish force was deployed in Bamerni, Amedi district, consisting of a military airport, 38 Tanks and 738 soldiers. In 1997, Turkey opened three more military bases in Dereluk, 40 km north of Amedi district. In the same year, Turkey established another military base in Kani Masi of Amedi district and Sersi village, 30 km north of Zakho. All the Turkish military bases in the Kurdistan Region are located near the border between the PKK and the KDP. According to a report by the Southern Protest Network published in December 2015, the number of Turkish forces in the Kurdistan Region had reached (3 thousand 235) officers, soldiers and gendarmerie of the Turkish army with various types of weapons and ammunition. According to the report, Turkey has (58) tanks, (27) armored vehicles, (31) artillery and (26) mortars, (17) RPGs and (10) machine guns, (40) military vehicles in the Kurdistan regio. According to the report, the Turkish army is deployed in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG) on 13 military bases and headquarters in the border areas of Duhok province, which has an intelligence department in all military bases: * The largest Turkish military base in terms of the number of soldiers, is in (Kani Masi) district. There are 580 soldiers, 91 officers, 240 gendarmes and 340 strike forces in the base. The largest Turkish military base in terms of logistics is the Bamerni military base, located opposite Bamerni district. Inside the military base there is the largest intelligence unit belonging to the army. There are also 30 tanks, eight armored vehicles, six mortars and six military vehicles, in addition to an advanced sound equipment used for espionage. * Batufa military base has a special intelligence unit consisting of 20 people. The Batufa military base is the largest intelligence base in Zakho district. It has 400 soldiers, 6 tanks, 21 armored vehicles, 14 military vehicles. * The military base (Kribi) in Zakho district has (414) soldiers, (6) tanks, (15) RPGs, (2) machine guns, (6) armored vehicles, (11) artillery, (14) military vehicles. * Sinki barracks contains 80 soldiers and a 120 mm cannon. * Seiri military base is located in Amedi district. It has 75 soldiers, 6 tanks, three machine guns, 6 mortars and 4 armored vehicles. * Kubki military base in Amedi district. It has deployed 130 troops and two tanks. * Qumri military base in Matina area has 70 soldiers and a number of military equipment. * Kukhi Spi military base has 70 soldiers and a number of military equipment. * 70 soldiers and a number of military equipment are stationed in the Daray Davatiya military base in Haftanîn. * Sar-e-Ziri military base has deployed 60 soldiers. * In Gali Zakho base has deployed (34) soldiers. * 45 soldiers with full weapons and military equipment have been deployed in Amedi military base. * The headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency is located in the center of Amedi district. * The headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency is located in the center of Batufa district. * Headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency in Zakho district in Bedari neighborhood. * Headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency in the center of Duhok district in Grebasi neighborhood. * Turkish military base in Bashik. The presence of the Turkish army in the Kurdistan Region is only to protect Turkey's security and gather information about South Kurdistan, especially about the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The presence of this Military hasn’t had any benefit for the Kurdistan region. When ISIS attacked Erbil, Turkey refused to send troops, even refused to use the forces of these military bases, while the Bamarne military base is a military airport and Turkey could attack ISIS from there. According to a report by the BBC, Turkey has 27 additional bases in the Kurdistan Region, some sources say that the number has now increased to 32 bases. Turkey's main goal in building more military bases in the Kurdistan Region, especially in the areas of Batofan, Bamerni and Amedi, is to control the two areas "Haftanin and Matina", both considered two strategic areas for future military operations against the PKK. An agreement for Crossing the border The invasion of the Turkish army into the Kurdistan Region is considered a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, but Iraq has not taken any practical steps except for some protests, because Iraq and Turkey signed an agreement in 1982, according to the agreement. The main goal of the agreement was to attack the PKK for Turkey and the Kurdish revolution in South Kurdistan for the Iraqi government. In 1995, another agreement was signed between Iraq and Turkey. In 2007, when the Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari was renewed, instead of ending the border crossing, the distance was increased from 20 kilometers to 25 kilometers.