Barzani's Failures on Freedom of Expression in Iraqi Kurdistan
Drawmedia by Diary Marif-washingtoninstitute The Kurdish Region of Iraq, rife with economic and security challenges, is witnessing increased censorship and suppression of free speech. Afew weeks ago, to mark the third anniversary of his cabinet, Prime Minister of the KRG Masrour Barzani delivered a speech summarizing the result of his reforms and the achievements of his government in the past three years. He likewise promised to expand his government’s progress in freedom of speech. Barzani characterized the government efforts to "expand the scope of freedom of expression and speech and laid the groundworks for creating a more responsible journalism in the Kurdistan Region (KRI)." However, the reality of the current government is that its activities have run contrary to these values, and what Masrour Barzani has promised during both this latest and prior speeches. Masrour Barzani was appointed prime minister of the ninth cabinet of the KRG on July 10, 2019, replacing his cousin Nechirvan Barzani. In his inaugural address, Masrour Barzani promised to build a strong Kurdistan: carry out reforms, unite political parties, and promote free and independent journalism. Yet words are cheaper than actions, and the subsequent years have demonstrated that he did the exact opposite on the ground. Barzani put the KRG on the cliff as they faced several dire crises that will require decades to amend. Economic challenges, failure to pay salaries, threats to women, and security challenges all plague the KRI, but journalists struggle to report on these issues as self-censorship and enforced censorship increasingly haunt the KRI’s journalists. Retaliation against journalists and critics Since he was sworn as prime minister, the rate of crime and violations such as threats, harassment, and torture against journalists and activists has increased significantly. The Metro Center for Journalists' Rights and Advocacy published that 353 violations were committed against 260 journalists and media organizations in the Kurdistan Region in 2021 alone. One of the most striking crackdowns occurred in 2020, when Barzani arrested and put more than 80 journalists and activists behind bars in Dohuk province after demonstrating against corruption and poor public services. Despite a wide range of serious concerns and condemnation from other national, regional, and international levels to free them, the prime minister stubbornly maintained his stance. At the tail end of 2021, Kurdish university students demonstrated peacefully demanding their basic rights, such as payment of their financial grants that have been suspended for years and improvement of government university housing conditions. The Kurdish authorities, in contrast, answered brutally by dragging them into the streets, kicking their faces, firing live bullets in the air, and spreading snipers on the roof of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate. In 2022, the Barzani government has continued this same pattern of repressing journalists and diminishing the scope of civil freedoms. A few days after the third anniversary speech, two journalists were arrested in Erbil and Duhok due to their professional activities. And on July 22, Barzani’s security forces did not allow a peaceful demonstration in Erbil against Turkish bombardments in Kurdistan, which have collectively killed nearly 140 Kurdish and Iraqi civilians. The prime minister or his current government alone is not responsible for all crises that have occurred in the Iraqi Kurdistan. It's been exactly 31 years since Iraqi Kurdistan has been governed and ruined by the two major parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masoud Barzani (1946-present) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of former Iraqi president Jalal Talabani (1933-2017). Both parties have used a number of strategies over the years to silence the journalists, authors, and protesters who have raised their voices against corruption and injustice. Among both the KDP and PUK, the Talabanis and the Barzanis have more power than other leaders since they have controlled their parties by using security forces and money to protect their families' interests, especially the eldest sons of Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, BavelTalabani and Masrour Barzani. Barzani’s reputation among journalists Barzani's crackdowns on journalists reflect several aspects of his government. Most of his government members and cabinet ministers consist of senior officers with intelligence backgrounds, a branch known for its skepticism of the press. Masrour Barzani himself came to power with a robust intelligence background as head of KDP intelligence services. Nor has the Barzani family overall been tolerant of criticism directed towards them. In 2005, Barzani arrested the dissident writer Kamal Said Qadir and put him behind bars for posting “defamatory” articles about Kurdish authorities. But allegations of more violent repression also exist, including the assassination of the young journalist Sardasht Othman, who was kidnapped in the Iraqi Kurdistan capital of Erbil and killed in the vicinity of the Iraqi city of Mosul in 2010. Osman was a young journalist who criticized corruption, family rule, and nepotism; he specifically criticized the Barzanis in several pieces. In one of his articles, “I am in Love with Barzani’s Daughter,” Osman sarcastically wished to be the son-in-law of Masrour Barzani in order to be rich, protected, and have a better lifestyle. Osman broke a social taboo around the family with this article, and consequently there was speculation that the current prime minister was involved in Osman’s Murder. Barzani’s loyal security forces have also been accused of the 2016 assassination of the journalist Widad Hussein, who worked for a newspaper affiliated with the KDP’s rival PKK party, by his family. By and large, the rate of violence and crime in the KRI has increased, degrading trust and weakening the sense of community. This repression also has ripple effects on Iraqi Kurdish society, and is one of the contributing factors to the ongoing 2021-22 migrant crisis on Belarus’s border. There is also the concern of alienating and angering Kurdish young adults. It is this age group most susceptible to radicalization or quickest to protest, and many young Kurds are increasingly frustrated with restrictions on speech. Barzani should learn the lesson repeatedly echoed throughout the region on what happens political figures when they have impinged on peoples’ rights to demonstrate and free speech. If such repression continues, it will make it more likely, not less, for Kurds to come out and protest against a government that cannot or will not guarantee their freedoms.
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Turkey controls 3.5% of the Kurdistan Region
by Michael Knights Ankara is fighting a lethal and largely hidden counterinsurgency against PKK elements across the border, but the conflict’s rising profile may carry high costs for both U.S. interests and Iraqi sovereignty. On July 27, Iraq lodged a complaint against Turkey at the UN Security Council, and Iraqi militias fired rockets at the Turkish consulate in Mosul. Both actions were taken in retaliation for a July 20 Turkish artillery strike that killed nine Iraqis and wounded thirty-three in the Kurdistan Region resort of Parakh. They were also the most recent incidents in a conflict that has spanned decades, largely out of sight, and is now escalating quantitatively and qualitatively. The main beneficiaries of the clashes may be Iran-backed militias, who welcome having Turkey as a new rationale for so-called “resistance” (muqawama) attacks outside the framework of the Iraqi state. If the present trajectory continues, it risks endangering multiple U.S. and Iraqi interests. Why Has Turkey Been Operating Inside Iraq? In 1983, Turkey began conducting ground incursions and other cross-border operations against bases in northern Iraq belonging to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a Turkish militant group designated as a terrorist entity by Ankara, Washington, and other governments. Most of these strikes were launched in response to particularly painful PKK attacks that succeeded in killing soldiers or police personnel inside Turkey. At times, Saddam Hussein’s government gave tacit approval for Turkish operations up to three miles inside Iraq. By the mid-1990s, portions of this border belt—which the Turks dubbed the “Temporary Danger Zone”—had been expanded to ten miles. After Saddam withdrew his forces from the north in 1991, the local Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could not prevent seasoned PKK cells from establishing bases deeper inside Iraq. In response, Turkey sent lumbering armored units as far as fifteen miles across the border in pursuit of militants, eventually erecting a permanent artillery and helicopter base at Bamerni as both a forward observation post and a means of extending its reach against the PKK. Yet the group simply moved deeper into the Kurdistan Region, infiltrating Gara (25 miles inside the border), the Qandil Mountains (60 miles), the UN-monitored Rostam Joudi refugee camp in Makhmur district (110 miles), and Sinjar (which gave the PKK a pathway to the Syrian border). Beginning in 2008, Turkish airstrikes gradually supplanted ground incursions. The U.S. military provided intelligence for these strikes early on as a way of incentivizing a more selective approach, but Turkey has since become more reliant on its own drone and human intelligence sources. Expansion and Escalation Over the past few years, Turkey’s efforts to negate the PKK’s strategic depth have gone to extraordinary lengths. In Syria, it has undertaken large cross-border operations intended to displace the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (aka the YPG, which originated as an offshoot of the PKK) and replace them with Turkish-backed militias. In Iraq, Ankara’s cooperative relationship with the KDP has enabled it to employ a wide range of tactics across the border, often without attracting as much international attention. First, after the Islamic State captured Mosul and the local Turkish consulate staff in 2014, Ankara established its deepest base in Iraq: Zilkan. Constructed on the high ground overlooking Mosul, the base lies fifty miles inside the Kurdistan Region and provocatively within visual range of Iran-backed Iraqi militias on the Nineveh Plains. Second, Turkey has modernized its cross-border operations—instead of temporary incursions by ungainly armored units, it now launches longer campaigns each spring in which agile helicopter-transported special forces establish hilltop commando bases as deep as 20-30 miles inside Iraq in order to observe and block PKK lines of movement “with fire” (i.e., via snipers, machine guns, missiles, mortars, drones, and helicopters). Today, about 600 square miles of territory in the north is garrisoned by Turkish outposts and checkpoints, or approximately 3.5 percent of the Kurdistan Region and 0.3 percent of Iraq overall. Much of this territory was not fully controlled by Iraqi Kurdish forces prior to Turkey’s entrance, and it has since become increasingly depopulated due to the warlike conditions. Third, Turkey has greatly expanded its drone strikes, not only blanketing the border and Qandil areas, but also striking as far as 175 miles inside Iraq, hitting federally controlled areas such as Sinjar and Mosul. In many cases, Bayraktar drone crews track and target PKK leadership figures by either following them as they travel south from the border area or detecting them via spies on the ground if they enter urban areas (e.g., in search of medical treatment). Typically—though not invariably—these drone strikes are very successful operations with a low degree of collateral damage, akin to precise U.S. drone strikes undertaken against terrorist targets worldwide. Yet Turkey’s deep pursuit of the PKK has also brought it into areas where the group’s networks interlace with Iran-backed militias, creating a cycle of escalation that threatens to spiral out of control. This is most notable in Sinjar, where Tehran’s Yazidi partners intermingle fluidly with PKK militants. Ankara’s actions in these areas—such as targeting senior Yazidi militia commanders and killing civilians at Parakh—have drawn escalating militia rocket and drone attacks on its bases in Iraq, which usually prompts Turkish artillery, air, and drone strikes on the militias. Policy Recommendations Despite the PKK’s status as a designated terrorist organization and Turkey’s standing as a key NATO ally, Washington still has ample reasons to seek limits on the expanding conflict: • Iraqi sovereignty is suffering. As long as Turkey can strike deeper and deeper inside Iraq without international repercussions, it creates a more permissive environment for Iran to do the same. In March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps openly admitted to firing ballistic missiles at Erbil, but international criticism of this Iranian strike was undermined somewhat by the lack of equivalent concern expressed about Turkey’s infringements on Iraq’s sovereignty. Without a consistent approach, Washington will have difficulty bringing real pressure against Tehran to stop its routine infringements—whether they be direct strikes on Iranian Kurdish insurgent factions or proxy militia strikes unsanctioned by the Iraqi state. • Iran-backed militias are leveraging the crisis. As expected, Tehran’s muqawama partners are crowding to get in on anti-Turkish attacks. On July 22, following a drone strike on Turkey’s Bamerni base, the propaganda outlet Ashab al-Kahf issued a dire warning to Ankara: “Killing for killing, drone for drone, rocket for cannon.” Indeed, Turkey is providing militias with a new rationale for armed “resistance” against occupation at a time when they can no longer credibly claim to be fighting the Islamic State or the U.S.-led coalition. By enabling these groups to justify their illegal ownership and use of drones and rockets, Ankara is inadvertently corroding the stability of the Iraqi state. • Energy and water flows may suffer. Aside from the basic rationale of having U.S. partners be at peace with each other, Iraqi-Turkish cooperation is vital for exporting much-needed energy to Europe as a way of backfilling Russian supplies. Rising tensions after incidents like the Parakh tragedy will make it harder for Baghdad and Turkey to compromise on energy matters, particularly the soon-to-be-decided arbitration spurred by Ankara’s decision to give the Kurdistan Region direct access to the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline and export oil without Baghdad’s approval. Furthermore, Iraq and Syria both need more water from Turkey, as new U.S. ambassador Alina Romanowski highlighted in her inaugural policy initiative after arriving in Baghdad. This is unlikely under the current warlike conditions. Preventing or ameliorating crises between U.S. partners is generally much less of a drain on policymakers than repairing ruptures after the fact. If the United States wants to spend less time on the Middle East, the best way to do so is to keep a lid on tensions, not let them boil over. Yet Washington is already far behind the curve on helping Baghdad and Ankara think through a win-win settlement of the pipeline arbitration, despite clear indications of an impending policy train wreck. As for cross-border operations, the two neighbors have negotiated rules and redlines on this matter before and could do so again, particularly with U.S. mediation. Once the UN-monitored investigation of the Parakh incident is complete, a more comprehensive fact-finding effort should be conducted to determine exactly how widespread Turkish operations are in the remote, lightly-populated, twenty-mile-wide swath along the border. Investigators should also look at Iran’s routine artillery and airstrikes in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ultimately, Ankara has no business maintaining a large, provocative, unilaterally established military base as deep inside Iraq as Zilkan. The latest rocket strikes on the Mosul consulate show that this base and the brash incursion policy it represents are bad for Turkey—not to mention for Iraqi and U.S. interests. At the same time, Washington must not forget Turkey’s rationale for such behavior; after all, the United States would hardly accept a Foreign Terrorist Organization expanding a network of bases 20, 50, or even 100 miles from the homeland, nor would it back off a counterinsurgency strategy that seemed to be working (at least tactically). This dilemma suggests the need for Washington to renew serious multilateral efforts to de-escalate Turkish-PKK violence in a way that gives Ankara some reassurance on border security. Washington would benefit from being part of an Iraqi-Turkish solution and helping Baghdad gain credit for securing concessions from Ankara, ideally including a visible redeployment away from Zilkan. Failing that, Iran-backed militias will continue portraying themselves as the sole defenders of Iraq’s sovereignty.
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The Kurdistan Regional Government Revenue for July 2022
Draw Media The total revenues of the Kurdistan Region (oil and non-oil) in July 2022 that returned to the government was (1 trillion and 106 billion) dinars. The total oil revenue of the Kurdistan Region in July was (2 trillion and 106 billion) dinars, more than (1 trillion) dinars went to the expenditure of the oil process and (1 trillion and 106 billion) dinars remained for the government treasury. Non-oil revenues • Non-oil revenues for July = (287 billion) dinars (according to the latest statements of the Minister of Finance) • International Coalition financial assistance to the Peshmerga forces = (31 billion 500 million) dinars • Kurdistan Region's share of the Iraqi budget = (0) dinars Oil revenues (pipeline exports) • In July 2022, the Kurdistan Region exported 12 million 340 thousand barrels of oil through the Turkish Port of Jayhan. • Average Brent oil price for July was ($111.93). • Because the region sells its oil for $12 less, it sells oil at an average of $99.93 So: (12 million 340 thousand) barrels X (99.93) dollars = (1 billion 233 million 136 thousand 200) dollars. • According to the latest Deloitte report, 56% of oil revenues are spent on expenditures and 44% remains for the government So: (1 billion 233 million 136 thousand 200) dollars X (56%) = (690 million 556 thousand 272) dollars go to the cost of the oil process. And (1 billion 233 million 136 thousand 200) dollars X (44%) = (542 million 579 thousand 728) dollars remaining oil revenue for KRG Total Revenue in July 2022 (Dinar) (786 billion 740 million 895 thousand 600) IQD oil revenue + (287 billion) IQD local revenue + (31 billion 500 million) IQD Financial assistance = (1 trillion 105 billion 240 million 895 thousand 600) dinars
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Turkey’s War in Northern Iraq: By the Numbers
Draw Media The Washington Institute: by Michael Knights Ankara is fighting a lethal and largely hidden counterinsurgency against PKK elements across the border, but the conflict’s rising profile may carry high costs for both U.S. interests and Iraqi sovereignty. On July 27, Iraq lodged a complaint against Turkey at the UN Security Council, and Iraqi militias fired rockets at the Turkish consulate in Mosul. Both actions were taken in retaliation for a July 20 Turkish artillery strike that killed nine Iraqis and wounded thirty-three in the Kurdistan Region resort of Parakh. They were also the most recent incidents in a conflict that has spanned decades, largely out of sight, and is now escalating quantitatively and qualitatively. The main beneficiaries of the clashes may be Iran-backed militias, who welcome having Turkey as a new rationale for so-called “resistance” (muqawama) attacks outside the framework of the Iraqi state. If the present trajectory continues, it risks endangering multiple U.S. and Iraqi interests. Why Has Turkey Been Operating Inside Iraq? In 1983, Turkey began conducting ground incursions and other cross-border operations against bases in northern Iraq belonging to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a Turkish militant group designated as a terrorist entity by Ankara, Washington, and other governments. Most of these strikes were launched in response to particularly painful PKK attacks that succeeded in killing soldiers or police personnel inside Turkey. At times, Saddam Hussein’s government gave tacit approval for Turkish operations up to three miles inside Iraq. By the mid-1990s, portions of this border belt—which the Turks dubbed the “Temporary Danger Zone”—had been expanded to ten miles. After Saddam withdrew his forces from the north in 1991, the local Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could not prevent seasoned PKK cells from establishing bases deeper inside Iraq. In response, Turkey sent lumbering armored units as far as fifteen miles across the border in pursuit of militants, eventually erecting a permanent artillery and helicopter base at Bamerni as both a forward observation post and a means of extending its reach against the PKK. Yet the group simply moved deeper into the Kurdistan Region, infiltrating Gara (25 miles inside the border), the Qandil Mountains (60 miles), the UN-monitored Rostam Joudi refugee camp in Makhmur district (110 miles), and Sinjar (which gave the PKK a pathway to the Syrian border). Beginning in 2008, Turkish airstrikes gradually supplanted ground incursions. The U.S. military provided intelligence for these strikes early on as a way of incentivizing a more selective approach, but Turkey has since become more reliant on its own drone and human intelligence sources. Expansion and Escalation Over the past few years, Turkey’s efforts to negate the PKK’s strategic depth have gone to extraordinary lengths. In Syria, it has undertaken large cross-border operations intended to displace the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (aka the YPG, which originated as an offshoot of the PKK) and replace them with Turkish-backed militias. In Iraq, Ankara’s cooperative relationship with the KDP has enabled it to employ a wide range of tactics across the border, often without attracting as much international attention. First, after the Islamic State captured Mosul and the local Turkish consulate staff in 2014, Ankara established its deepest base in Iraq: Zilkan. Constructed on the high ground overlooking Mosul, the base lies fifty miles inside the Kurdistan Region and provocatively within visual range of Iran-backed Iraqi militias on the Nineveh Plains. Second, Turkey has modernized its cross-border operations—instead of temporary incursions by ungainly armored units, it now launches longer campaigns each spring in which agile helicopter-transported special forces establish hilltop commando bases as deep as 20-30 miles inside Iraq in order to observe and block PKK lines of movement “with fire” (i.e., via snipers, machine guns, missiles, mortars, drones, and helicopters). Today, about 600 square miles of territory in the north is garrisoned by Turkish outposts and checkpoints, or approximately 3.5 percent of the Kurdistan Region and 0.3 percent of Iraq overall. Much of this territory was not fully controlled by Iraqi Kurdish forces prior to Turkey’s entrance, and it has since become increasingly depopulated due to the warlike conditions. Third, Turkey has greatly expanded its drone strikes, not only blanketing the border and Qandil areas, but also striking as far as 175 miles inside Iraq, hitting federally controlled areas such as Sinjar and Mosul. In many cases, Bayraktar drone crews track and target PKK leadership figures by either following them as they travel south from the border area or detecting them via spies on the ground if they enter urban areas (e.g., in search of medical treatment). Typically—though not invariably—these drone strikes are very successful operations with a low degree of collateral damage, akin to precise U.S. drone strikes undertaken against terrorist targets worldwide. Yet Turkey’s deep pursuit of the PKK has also brought it into areas where the group’s networks interlace with Iran-backed militias, creating a cycle of escalation that threatens to spiral out of control. This is most notable in Sinjar, where Tehran’s Yazidi partners intermingle fluidly with PKK militants. Ankara’s actions in these areas—such as targeting senior Yazidi militia commanders and killing civilians at Parakh—have drawn escalating militia rocket and drone attacks on its bases in Iraq, which usually prompts Turkish artillery, air, and drone strikes on the militias. Open image Policy Recommendations Despite the PKK’s status as a designated terrorist organization and Turkey’s standing as a key NATO ally, Washington still has ample reasons to seek limits on the expanding conflict: Iraqi sovereignty is suffering. As long as Turkey can strike deeper and deeper inside Iraq without international repercussions, it creates a more permissive environment for Iran to do the same. In March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps openly admitted to firing ballistic missiles at Erbil, but international criticism of this Iranian strike was undermined somewhat by the lack of equivalent concern expressed about Turkey’s infringements on Iraq’s sovereignty. Without a consistent approach, Washington will have difficulty bringing real pressure against Tehran to stop its routine infringements—whether they be direct strikes on Iranian Kurdish insurgent factions or proxy militia strikes unsanctioned by the Iraqi state. Iran-backed militias are leveraging the crisis. As expected, Tehran’s muqawama partners are crowding to get in on anti-Turkish attacks. On July 22, following a drone strike on Turkey’s Bamerni base, the propaganda outlet Ashab al-Kahf issued a dire warning to Ankara: “Killing for killing, drone for drone, rocket for cannon.” Indeed, Turkey is providing militias with a new rationale for armed “resistance” against occupation at a time when they can no longer credibly claim to be fighting the Islamic State or the U.S.-led coalition. By enabling these groups to justify their illegal ownership and use of drones and rockets, Ankara is inadvertently corroding the stability of the Iraqi state. Energy and water flows may suffer. Aside from the basic rationale of having U.S. partners be at peace with each other, Iraqi-Turkish cooperation is vital for exporting much-needed energy to Europe as a way of backfilling Russian supplies. Rising tensions after incidents like the Parakh tragedy will make it harder for Baghdad and Turkey to compromise on energy matters, particularly the soon-to-be-decided arbitration spurred by Ankara’s decision to give the Kurdistan Region direct access to the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline and export oil without Baghdad’s approval. Furthermore, Iraq and Syria both need more water from Turkey, as new U.S. ambassador Alina Romanowski highlighted in her inaugural policy initiative after arriving in Baghdad. This is unlikely under the current warlike conditions. Preventing or ameliorating crises between U.S. partners is generally much less of a drain on policymakers than repairing ruptures after the fact. If the United States wants to spend less time on the Middle East, the best way to do so is to keep a lid on tensions, not let them boil over. Yet Washington is already far behind the curve on helping Baghdad and Ankara think through a win-win settlement of the pipeline arbitration, despite clear indications of an impending policy train wreck. As for cross-border operations, the two neighbors have negotiated rules and redlines on this matter before and could do so again, particularly with U.S. mediation. Once the UN-monitored investigation of the Parakh incident is complete, a more comprehensive fact-finding effort should be conducted to determine exactly how widespread Turkish operations are in the remote, lightly-populated, twenty-mile-wide swath along the border. Investigators should also look at Iran’s routine artillery and airstrikes in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ultimately, Ankara has no business maintaining a large, provocative, unilaterally established military base as deep inside Iraq as Zilkan. The latest rocket strikes on the Mosul consulate show that this base and the brash incursion policy it represents are bad for Turkey—not to mention for Iraqi and U.S. interests. At the same time, Washington must not forget Turkey’s rationale for such behavior; after all, the United States would hardly accept a Foreign Terrorist Organization expanding a network of bases 20, 50, or even 100 miles from the homeland, nor would it back off a counterinsurgency strategy that seemed to be working (at least tactically). This dilemma suggests the need for Washington to renew serious multilateral efforts to de-escalate Turkish-PKK violence in a way that gives Ankara some reassurance on border security. Washington would benefit from being part of an Iraqi-Turkish solution and helping Baghdad gain credit for securing concessions from Ankara, ideally including a visible redeployment away from Zilkan. Failing that, Iran-backed militias will continue portraying themselves as the sole defenders of Iraq’s sovereignty.
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Turkey's Grip in the Kurdistan Region's oil sector
Sponsored by (NED) In the first quarter of this year, the Turkish company received 252 million dollars in oil from the Kurdistan region. According to Deloitte data, for each barrel of oil, 7 dollars go for the Turkish companies, which is 8 percent of the Kurdistan region's oil revenues. According to Deloitte data, the amount of money paid to both Turkish energy companies (TEC and TPIC) instead of loans and pipeline fees in the first quarter of this year was as follows. # The total amount spent on the two companies in the first quarter of this year was (252 million 455 thousand 135) dollars. # The total amount spent on a daily basis will be (2 million 805 thousand 57) dollars. # From each barrel of oil about 7 dollars went for the two Turkish companies. # (8.33%) of the oil revenue (through pipelines) went to the two Turkish companies. Turkey's benefits from the Kurdistan Region's oil sector Deloitte has released its report for the first quarter of 2022, according to the statistics and audits of Deloitte for the Kurdistan Region from January 1 to March 31, The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exported 36 million 453 thousand 590 barrels of oil through the pipeline to the Turkish Port of Jayhan during the first three months of this year, of which after storage and purification from water composition, only (34 million 923 thousand 168) barrels of oil were delivered to buyers. On average, each barrel of oil in the region was sold for $86.73, with total revenues of 3 billion, 28 million, 903,497 US dollars. According to the report, the Kurdistan Regional Government has paid two types of money to two Turkish companies, namely; Payment for the tariff of the Turkish Energy Company (TEC) for the transportation of the KRG oil. Repayment of debts of Turkish Energy Company (TEC) and Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC). The total amount of money paid to the two companies was (252 million 455 thousand 135) dollars. (125 million) dollars instead of loans and (127 million 455 thousand 252) dollars instead of transportation of Kurdistan Regional Government oil within Turkish territory. So that: # Each barrel of oil sold at (86.73) dollars and (6.93) dollars went to the two Turkish companies. # The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exported 36 million 453 thousand 590 barrels of oil, 34 million 923 thousand 168 barrels were delivered to buyers, the total value was (3 billion 28 million 903 thousand 497) dollars. 8.33 percent of this amount or $252 million, 455,135 were paid to two Turkish companies. Total payments to Turkish companies in the first quarter of 2022 Based on the above analysis, the amount of money spent by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in exchange for loans and pipeline rents to the two Turkish energy companies (TEC) and (TPIC) in the first quarter of this year. # Total expenditure in the first quarter of this year was (252 million 455 thousand 135) dollars. # The total amount spent for December, which was (31) days, was (86 million 956 thousand 769) dollars. # The total amount spent for February, which was (28) days, was (78 million 541 thousand 597) dollars. # The total amount spent for March, which was (31) days, was (86 million 956 thousand 769) dollars. # The daily amount spent was (2 million 805 thousand 57) dollars for the Turkish companies.
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The British Consul General visited Draw Media
Draw Media British Consul General David Hunt visited the office of Draw Media in Sulaymaniyah. He declared the British government’s support for freedom of expression as a fundamental human right. British Consul General also discussed journalism and freedom of expression in the Kurdistan Region and stressed the importance of the independent media within the Kurdistan region of Iraq.
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Gendarmerie in the territory of the Kurdistan Region
Draw Media Since 2015, 138 civilians have been killed in the Kurdistan Region by Turkish bombings. According to a map of the Turkish presidency, there are 37 Turkish intelligence bases in the Kurdistan Region, which contain thousands of soldiers, hundreds of tanks, artillery and heavy weapons. Bombing On Wednesday, July 20, 2022, Turkey shelled the tourist area (Parakh) in Zakho district, killed (10) civilians and injured more than (20) others, all of whom were Arab tourists. Reactions from within the Kurdistan Region have been transferred to the Iraqi streets. The demands to the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Iraqi territory have increased because these incidents have been repeated dozens of times. According to the Iraqi Kurdistan Team (CPT), 138 civilians have been killed in the Kurdistan Region since 2015 due to Turkish shelling. According to the director of Darkari district of the village of (Parakh), Turkey fired 693 artillery shells and 70 rockets into the area in July 2020 alone, damaging most of the villages in the area. According to Jabar Yawar, former Secretary General of the Peshmerga Ministry in the Kurdistan Region, the number of Turkish air strikes on the Kurdistan Region in the past four years has reached (398) attacks, in addition to (425) artillery attacks More than 20 civilians have been killed in the attacks, which have destroyed border villages, hospitals, roads, bridges and schools. Turkey in the Kurdistan Region The history of Turkey's military presence in the Kurdistan Region dates back to 1997, but the Turkish army's cross-border operations against the PKK date back to the 1980s. Turkey has been conducting military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) since 1983, both inside and outside the country. • In May 1983, Turkey launched its first cross-border military operation in agreement with the Iraqi government, involving thousands of Turkish troops. • In October 1984 and August 1986, Turkey launched two more military operations, but neither succeeded in eliminating PKK guerrillas. • After a period of silence, Turkey launched its fourth operation in 1991 under the name of “Gochan”, which was the year in which Turkish military headquarters and bases increased throughout Kurdistan provinces. • In 1992, the late Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal wrote a letter to Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan (imprisoned in Turkey since 1999) asking him to reduce military attacks against the Turkish army as a starting point for negotiations. But the efforts failed to reach a tangible result. • In the same year, Turkey launched another operation involving 15,000 troops, using tanks, heavy artillery and fighter jets, but it was unsuccessful. The forces withdrew 20 days after the operation began. • After that, a number of other operations were conducted in 1993, 1994 and 1995 with the participation of tens of thousands of soldiers. In the last operation with the help of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (30,000) soldiers participated in the operation, which lasted (45 days) to take control of the area "Haftanin", but was unsuccessful, after a month and a half Turkey withdrew from the offensive. • In early 1999, the number of operations conducted by Turkey in the Kurdistan Region to destroy PKK guerrillas reached 24 operations. In 2000, 2007 and 2008, Turkey conducted similar operations too. Turkey in the Kurdistan Region With the continuous attacks and invasions of Turkey to the Kurdistan Region, the number of Turkish military and intelligence bases in the Kurdistan Region is increasing day by day. According to a map released by the Turkish presidency, Turkey has 37 military and intelligence bases in the Kurdistan Region. Turkey has dozens of bases in the Kurdistan Region. After the arrival of ISIS, under the pretext of liberating Mosul, in December 2015, Turkey brought a large force of about (900 soldiers), (16 tanks) and (20 armored vehicles) to Bashik near Mosul. Turkey's excuse for bringing the force was to fight ISIS, but in 2015, out of 300 air strikes and operations, only three were against ISIS, while 297 were against the bases in the areas under the control of the PKK, which means that 1% of Turkey's attacks on ISIS and 99% of the attacks were on the PKK. This is when Turkey has several other military bases in the Kurdistan Region, especially after the civil war, with the consent of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), within the framework of the "peacekeeping" force, in 1997, a large Turkish force was deployed in Bamerni, Amedi district, consisting of a military airport, 38 Tanks and 738 soldiers. In 1997, Turkey opened three more military bases in Dereluk, 40 km north of Amedi district. In the same year, Turkey established another military base in Kani Masi of Amedi district and Sersi village, 30 km north of Zakho. All the Turkish military bases in the Kurdistan Region are located near the border between the PKK and the KDP. According to a report by the Southern Protest Network published in December 2015, the number of Turkish forces in the Kurdistan Region had reached (3 thousand 235) officers, soldiers and gendarmerie of the Turkish army with various types of weapons and ammunition. According to the report, Turkey has (58) tanks, (27) armored vehicles, (31) artillery and (26) mortars, (17) RPGs and (10) machine guns, (40) military vehicles in the Kurdistan regio. According to the report, the Turkish army is deployed in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG) on 13 military bases and headquarters in the border areas of Duhok province, which has an intelligence department in all military bases: * The largest Turkish military base in terms of the number of soldiers, is in (Kani Masi) district. There are 580 soldiers, 91 officers, 240 gendarmes and 340 strike forces in the base. The largest Turkish military base in terms of logistics is the Bamerni military base, located opposite Bamerni district. Inside the military base there is the largest intelligence unit belonging to the army. There are also 30 tanks, eight armored vehicles, six mortars and six military vehicles, in addition to an advanced sound equipment used for espionage. * Batufa military base has a special intelligence unit consisting of 20 people. The Batufa military base is the largest intelligence base in Zakho district. It has 400 soldiers, 6 tanks, 21 armored vehicles, 14 military vehicles. * The military base (Kribi) in Zakho district has (414) soldiers, (6) tanks, (15) RPGs, (2) machine guns, (6) armored vehicles, (11) artillery, (14) military vehicles. * Sinki barracks contains 80 soldiers and a 120 mm cannon. * Seiri military base is located in Amedi district. It has 75 soldiers, 6 tanks, three machine guns, 6 mortars and 4 armored vehicles. * Kubki military base in Amedi district. It has deployed 130 troops and two tanks. * Qumri military base in Matina area has 70 soldiers and a number of military equipment. * Kukhi Spi military base has 70 soldiers and a number of military equipment. * 70 soldiers and a number of military equipment are stationed in the Daray Davatiya military base in Haftanîn. * Sar-e-Ziri military base has deployed 60 soldiers. * In Gali Zakho base has deployed (34) soldiers. * 45 soldiers with full weapons and military equipment have been deployed in Amedi military base. * The headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency is located in the center of Amedi district. * The headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency is located in the center of Batufa district. * Headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency in Zakho district in Bedari neighborhood. * Headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency in the center of Duhok district in Grebasi neighborhood. * Turkish military base in Bashik. The presence of the Turkish army in the Kurdistan Region is only to protect Turkey's security and gather information about South Kurdistan, especially about the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The presence of this Military hasn’t had any benefit for the Kurdistan region. When ISIS attacked Erbil, Turkey refused to send troops, even refused to use the forces of these military bases, while the Bamarne military base is a military airport and Turkey could attack ISIS from there. According to a report by the BBC, Turkey has 27 additional bases in the Kurdistan Region, some sources say that the number has now increased to 32 bases. Turkey's main goal in building more military bases in the Kurdistan Region, especially in the areas of Batofan, Bamerni and Amedi, is to control the two areas "Haftanin and Matina", both considered two strategic areas for future military operations against the PKK. An agreement for Crossing the border The invasion of the Turkish army into the Kurdistan Region is considered a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, but Iraq has not taken any practical steps except for some protests, because Iraq and Turkey signed an agreement in 1982, according to the agreement. The main goal of the agreement was to attack the PKK for Turkey and the Kurdish revolution in South Kurdistan for the Iraqi government. In 1995, another agreement was signed between Iraq and Turkey. In 2007, when the Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari was renewed, instead of ending the border crossing, the distance was increased from 20 kilometers to 25 kilometers.
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Recent Iraqi Supreme Court Decision Likely to Trigger Investment Arbitration Claims
Draw: gibsondunn Click for PDF On February 15, 2022, the Federal Supreme Court of the Republic of Iraq (“Iraq”) issued a sweeping decision upending the existing legal framework governing the oil sector in the country (“Court Decision”).[1] The Government of Iraq has since taken numerous steps to implement the decision, which may have significant and far-reaching repercussions on international oil companies operating under petroleum contracts with the Kurdistan Regional Government (“KRG”). The Court Decision, among other things, purports to (i) repeal the Kurdistan Region Oil and Gas Law (No. 22 of 2007) based on which the KRG has entered into Production Sharing Contracts (“PSCs”) with international oil companies, (ii) rule that the Federal Ministry of Oil is entitled to pursue the nullification of any contracts entered into by the KRG with third parties regarding oil exploration, extraction, export and sale, (iii) rule that the Ministry of Oil and the Federal Board of Supreme Audit are entitled to review and revise any oil contracts entered into by the KRG, and (iv) order the KRG to hand over to the federal government all oil production it has extracted from oilfields. In response to the Court Decision, the KRG Prime Minister reaffirmed the KRG’s commitment to its contracts with international oil companies and emphasized that the KRG will not relinquish any of its rights.[2] In addition, on May 30, 2022, Kurdistan’s Judicial Council released a statement challenging the legality of the Court Decision and the validity and competence of the Court itself.[3] While the Court Decision does not automatically terminate contracts with international oil companies, the Government of Iraq has indicated that it intends to force the cancellation or substantial revision of such contracts. On February 26, 2022, the Oil Minister of Iraq issued an order creating a committee with the purpose of executing the Court Decision.[4] On March 24, 2022, the Oil Minister issued an order to the KRG to send for its review copies of all oil and gas contracts it has entered into since 2004.[5] The Oil Minister has also proposed establishing a state-owned regional oil company that would manage oil assets in the KRG and that would be overseen by the Government of Iraq.[6] More recently, the Oil Ministry has also commenced proceedings with several international oil companies, summoning such companies to appear before the Court in Baghdad on June 5, 2022.[7] While the date of the initial hearing was postponed in order to allow for the summons to be perfected, the proceedings are ongoing.[8] Such interference by the Iraqi Government seems all but certain to lead international oil companies to commence legal proceedings against Iraq if the matter is not resolved promptly. The affected investors are expected to seek redress before international fora, in particular, contract-based arbitrations under the terms of the PSCs and, in parallel, treaty-based arbitrations under applicable international investment agreements. Given the number of international oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region pursuant to long-term contracts with the KRG (over 30), Iraq’s exposure to damages claims could well reach tens of billions of dollars. I. Contract Claims under Production Sharing Contracts Iraq could be held contractually liable for breaching the PSCs by taking any action to either terminate or modify these agreements. It could also be held liable for violating the stabilization clause (contained within the KRG Model PSC (“Model PSC”)) if it takes any measure altering the fiscal or economic conditions resulting from laws or regulations in force on the date of signature of these agreements.[9] Iraq could be contractually on the hook since, as a matter of Iraqi constitutional law, the KRG is a constituent subdivision of Iraq.[10] In the circumstances, international and/or English legal principles such as attribution or alter ego are likely to be relevant (English law being the applicable law stipulated in the Model PSC).h .[11] In this regard, Claimants could in particular point to a recent decision by the High Court of Justice in England which found, in connection with breaches of two oil and gas PSCs, that acts by the KRG “were done in exercise of the sovereign authority of the state of Iraq.”[12] Investors are expected to initiate arbitrations seated in London, England, and governed by the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) Rules, as expressly provided for in the Model PSC.[13] Notably, the Model PSC broadly defines the scope of “disputes” to cover, among other things, any dispute as to the “existence,” “validity,” “enforceability,” or “termination” of the contract.[14] II. Treaty Claims under Applicable International Investment Agreements Iraq has also entered into several Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) and multilateral Treaties with Investment Provisions (“TIPs”) that provide substantive protections to investors and commit Iraq to resolving disputes through arbitration. For example, the Japan-Iraq Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) protects against “expropriation” and “arbitrary measures” and affirms that investors are to be afforded both “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security.”[15] Similarly, investors who are nationals of a member State of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (“OIC”) can initiate arbitration pursuant to the OIC Investment Agreement. The OIC Investment Agreement both protects nationals of OIC Member States against expropriation and allows such nationals, through its most-favored-nation provision, to avail themselves of substantive protections contained in other investment treaties to which Iraq is a party.[16] III. Conclusion The international oil companies impacted by the Court Decision have numerous legal avenues for seeking redress as a result of the substantial harm they may suffer. It is therefore very possible that Iraq will find itself subject to numerous claims in the range of tens of billions of dollars (if not more) before international fora for years to come due to the Court Decision and the Government’s actions to implement that decision. ______________________ [1] Federal Minister of Oil and Ali Shadad Fares v. Minister of Natural Resources of the Kurdistan Region and Speaker of Parliament of the Kurdistan Region, Supreme Court of the Republic of Iraq, 59/Federal/2012 unified with 110/Federal/2019 (15 February 2022). [2] Press Conference of Masrour Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 3 March 2022. [3] Statement of the Judicial Council of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq No. 1511, 30 May 2022. The KRG maintains that the Court was not properly constituted as the Federal Supreme Court capable of determining matters of constitutional law. [4] Iraq Oil Reporter, Uncertainty Deepens After Landmark Ruling Against Kurdistan’s Oil Sector, 8 March 2022, accessible: https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/uncertainty-deepens-after-landmark-ruling-against-kurdistans-oil-sector-44651/ [5] Iraq Oil Reporter, Uncertainty Deepens After Landmark Ruling Against Kurdistan’s Oil Sector, 8 March 2022, accessible: https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/uncertainty-deepens-after-landmark-ruling-against-kurdistans-oil-sector-44651/ [6] Iraq Oil Reporter, Baghdad Launches Legal Action Against Kurdistan’s Oil Companies, 2 June 2022, accessible here. [7] Iraq Oil Reporter, Kurdistan Opens New Front in Baghdad Legal Battles, 9 June 2022, accessible: https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/kurdistan-opens-new-front-in-baghdad-legal-battles-44896/ [8] Iraq Oil Reporter, Kurdistan Opens New Front in Baghdad Legal Battles, 9 June 2022, accessible: https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/kurdistan-opens-new-front-in-baghdad-legal-battles-44896/ [9] Model Production Sharing Contract, Kurdistan Regional Government, Article 43. [10] See Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, Article 117. [11] Model Production Sharing Contract, Kurdistan Regional Government, Article 43; See Chevron Bangladesh Block Twelve, Ltd. and Chevron Bangladesh Blocks Thirteen and Fourteen, Ltd. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/10, Award (17 May 2010); Perenco Ecuador Limited v. Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Jurisdiction (30 June 2011). [12] Dynasty Company for Oil and Gas Trading Limited v. Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq and Dr. Ashti Hawrami, English High Court of Justice 2021 EWHC 953 (Comm) (23 April 2021). [13] Model Production Sharing Contract, Kurdistan Regional Government, Article 42.1. [14] Model Production Sharing Contract, Kurdistan Regional Government, Article 42.1. [15] Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Iraq for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 25 February 2014, Articles 5(1), 5(2), and 5(3). [16] OIC Agreement, Articles 8 and 10. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s International Arbitration practice group, or the following authors: Rahim Moloo – New York (+1 212-351-2413, [email protected]) Jeff Sullivan QC – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4231, [email protected]) Abdallah Salam – New York (+1 212-351-2355, [email protected]) Please also feel free to contact the following practice group leaders: International Arbitration Group: Cyrus Benson – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4239, [email protected]) Penny Madden QC – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4226, [email protected]) © 2022 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
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Deloitte report on oil revenues and sales in the Kurdistan Region
🔻 The Kurdistan Regional Government has sold (34) million barrels through pipelines. 🔻 The average price of the oil sold was (86.7) per barrel. 🔻 The total oil revenue for the first three months of 2022 is 1 billion 343 million) dollars. Draw Media Deloitte has released its audit report on the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan Region for the first quarter of 2022: 🔹 The Kurdistan Region has exported about 36.5 million barrels of crude oil through pipelines to world markets in the past three months. 🔹 Crude oil exported by pipeline was 36 million 453 thousand 590 barrels. 🔹 sales to refineries were 284 thousand 436 barrels 🔹 total exports and consumption was 39 million 88 thousand 710 barrels. 🔹Analyzed the sale of crude oil exported by pipeline, 34 million 923 thousand 168 barrels of crude oil were transported to buyers, the average price obtained for one barrel of oil sold, was 86,730 dollars. 🔹The report said that the loan of Turkish Energy Company (TEC) and Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC) was $ 125 million 🔹The net cash balance received by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) during the sale of oil and related activities was 1 billion 343 million 481 thousand 232 dollars during the three months. Export and consumption of oil 🔹Crude oil exported by pipeline: 36,453,590 barrels 🔹Crude oil corrected for refining by the Ministry of Natural Resources: 2,226,083 barrels 🔹Sales to refineries: 284,436 barrels 🔹Local sales: 124,436 barrels 🔹Total exports and consumption was 39,088,710 barrels Analysis of sales of exported crude oil by pipeline 🔹Crude oil transported to buyers: 34,923,168 barrels 🔹Total value of crude oil sold: 3,0228,903,497 US dollars 🔹Average price of oil sold: 86.730 dollars 🔹Total value of crude oil and condensate sold (exported through pipelines and local sales: 3,063,356,891 US dollars 🔹Change in customer account receipts: 175,114,220 US dollars 🔹Interest, other fees and deposits: 58,300,940 US dollars 🔹Payment for financial entitlements of oil producers: 1,022,935,075 US dollars 🔹Payment for Turkish Energy Company tariff: 127,455,135 US dollars 🔹Amount of money paid to Kurdistan Pipeline Company (KPC) according to the pipeline concession agreement: 122,165,292 US dollars 🔹Loan of Turkish Energy Company (TEC) and Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC): 125,000,000 US dollars 🔹Payments to third parties paid by or on behalf of the Kurdistan Regional Government: 88,544,997 US dollars 🔹Net cash balance received by the Kurdistan Regional Government during the sale of oil and related activities: 1,343,841,232 US dollars
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"False Claims Mislead Kurdish Zoroastrians"
Draw Media Every four years, the World Zoroastrian Congress features different Zoroastrian voices from around the world, but this year there have been recent erroneous reports published in Kurdish media, by organizations, and by individuals about certain activities at the Congress. According to a press release which has been sent to Draw Media by the organizers of the (World Zoroastrian Congress) to state the facts and to make the correct information publicly available. In the press release they mention that, at the opening ceremony of the Congress, a procession of about 40 invited and preselected mobeds and mobediyars (religious priests) from around the world filed onto the stage to offer benediction and prayers. But one of the attendees by the name of Awat Darya, who was not invited to participate since she is not a mobed or mobediyar. Later, the Rudaw Media Network reported Awat’s claims with the following: “Awat was holding the rank of asrawan before, but in this conference, she has been promoted to two ranks above that, to the rank of mobed. According to Awat Darya herself, this is the first time a Kurd has been awarded this rank.” The World Zoroastrian Congress is upset about Awat behaviours and says “this statement by Ms. Awat is a blatant lie”. The World Zoroastrian Congress is an international gathering of Zoroastrians from all over the world. It has been held every four years with the first one in 1960. This year’s Congress was held in New York City, July 1-4, 2022, and was attended by approximately 1,200 people. Here is the full text of the press release
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OCCRP: Kurdistan’s ruling families have links with a group of mafia and Cigarette Smugglers
Smoke and Mirrors: How the “Father” of Iraq’s Cigarette Smugglers Built An Empire by OCCRP Iraqi tycoon Nizar Hanna Nasri sits atop an empire spanning pharmaceuticals, liquor imports, and some of Erbil’s most spectacular real estate developments. But his success was built on a far less visible foundation: A globe-spanning trade in black-market cigarettes. For most Iraqis, the sanctions of the 1990s were a nightmare. But for Nizar Hanna Nasri, they were an opportunity. With most basic commodities banned from being imported, smugglers could make fortunes circumventing the embargo and moving products into Iraq. One of the most profitable illicit trades was in cigarettes, and Nasri was one of the most successful operators. Publicly, Nasri is a real estate tycoon, bankrolling shopping malls, residential complexes, and office high-rises in the Iraqi Kurdish capital Erbil. But behind the scenes, he built an operation that still produces cigarettes for black markets across the Middle East, particularly neighboring Iran, nourishing an industry that funds organized crime, corrupt politicians and even militias. As a brief prepared by Adit, a French strategic intelligence company, put it: “The question of trade in cigarettes could seem a secondary question. It is not. It is used by all the military groups in the region, not all of which can be called terrorists, to finance their fighting.” Nasri, from Iraq’s Assyrian Christian minority, has come to be known as the “father” of Iraqi counterfeit cigarettes. Starting in the late 1980s, he built alliances with powerful political figures and monopolized the smuggling of black-market tobacco into Iraq before constructing a network of facilities to produce his own knock-off brands. Nasri’s company has since shifted its focus away from cigarettes, but the infrastructure he developed in the 1990s and 2000s is still in action. Industry sources estimate there are up to six illicit cigarette factories in operation in Iraq today. These include three linked to the operation Nasri built, OCCRP found. Reports in the 1990s and 2000s by international media and the World Health Organization highlighted the smuggling of black-market cigarettes in Iraq and the wider region. Nasri, however, was never publicly linked to the trade. He has managed to maintain a low public profile despite striking partnerships with some of Iraq’s most powerful politicians. But now, OCCRP has compiled one of the most detailed portraits of Nasri’s involvement in the illicit tobacco trade to date. Reporters analyzed thousands of leaked corporate intelligence documents, corroborating details through interviews with over 20 tobacco industry figures, smugglers, and Nasri’s former partners and competitors. Like many cigarette smugglers, Nasri relied on contracts with the world’s biggest tobacco companies, who employed him in markets from Belarus to Azerbaijan. Some of his business is legitimate: His Lebanon-based company, European Tobacco, has produced and distributed its own cigarette brands on at least three continents, including markets it is legally allowed to supply. But public records, confidential industry reports, and interviews with Nasri’s former and current associates show that this is only one aspect of his business: The same supply chains are also used to run a booming trade in black-market cigarettes in countries as far-flung as Cameroon and Moldova. His ersatz brands — such as Business Club, Vigor, and President — are sold on illicit markets in Europe and war zones in Africa. Over the years, Nasri has partnered with powerful figures, including former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani; former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev; Burkinabé smuggler and Philip Morris representative Apollinaire Compaoré; and even Saddam Hussein’s son Uday. Today, he remains a close ally of Iraqi Kurdistan’s ruling Barzani family, with whom he has numerous intertwined financial interests. “You can run this kind of business if you have close connections on the top level,” a former economic adviser to a regional tobacco distributor told OCCRP. “No other way.” In response to detailed questions, a lawyer representing the Nasri Group denied that Nasri or any company affiliated with him had ever been involved in smuggling or counterfeiting, and said any such charges were “false” and “unacceptable.” He said European Tobacco produced legitimate cigarettes under legally registered trademarks and that any apparent knock-offs were likely counterfeited and sold by third parties without their knowledge. “Our companies and the shareholders have not been involved in any illegal act and all of their business activities are in conformity with the laws and regulations of the countries where they take place,” he wrote. "You can run this kind of business if you have close connections on the top level. No other way." – A former economic adviser to a regional tobacco distributor He further denied that Nasri had ever exploited political influence for commercial gain: “Neither the Companies we own nor their shareholders have any political orientation or affiliation with any armed party. They conduct their business in broad daylight and have no special privileges. Also, our companies have no business relationship with any politician, neither inside nor outside Iraq.” The tobacco companies contacted by OCCRP — Japan Tobacco, British American Tobacco, Philip Morris, Imperial Brands, and SEITA — all declined to comment. 🔗Tobacco Spies In the late 2000s, corporate intelligence staff working for Japan Tobacco International assembled thousands of documents about tobacco counterfeiting and smuggling networks from China to the Middle East. These documents, leaked to OCCRP, identify key industry figures and describe their business activities, commercial associations, and relationships to politicians and organized crime syndicates. They include company records, bills of lading, passport copies, and briefings from numerous informants. While major tobacco companies commonly assemble corporate intelligence, the results are rarely leaked to the media. To corroborate the reports, OCCRP reviewed public records and interviewed senior industry executives and former operatives in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Russia. Birth of an Empire The 1990s were a golden era for Iraqi cigarette smugglers. Heavy sanctions, imposed by the United Nations against Saddam Hussein’s government after his invasion of Kuwait, led to a proliferation of smuggling routes to bring in basic commodities and sell sanctioned oil abroad. Born to an Assyrian jeweler in the ethnically diverse city of Kirkuk in 1961, Nasri is an architect by profession. But by the 1990s, the deprivations — and opportunities — presented by Iraq’s conflicts and deepening isolation had drawn him to a different profession entirely. Back then, tobacco giants regularly contracted smugglers under the guise of “duty free” or “transit” sales. Attracted by potential profits from closed or sanctioned markets, they hired distributors who supplied certain countries legally, but also funneled cigarettes into neighboring states illegally. The practice is said to have declined since a series of lawsuits in Europe in the early 2000s, but it is still known to occur. Local hubs for this trade included coastal cities in Cyprus and Turkey, such as Mersin, where the Nasri family ran at least six companies, including a distributor that managed warehouses for cigarettes later smuggled into Iraq. Traders in these cities leveraged cross-border commercial ties to move cigarettes into Kurdistan and other parts of Iraq, where they were then distributed throughout the region. Credit: Reuters/Alamy Stock PhotoKurdish smugglers load cigarettes onto a horse for illegal entry into Iran in October 2002. By 1994, the New York Times was describing Iraqi Kurdistan as “the largest black-market clearing house for cigarettes in the Middle East.” The region became so oversupplied with tobacco products that, in 2002, a spokesman for the Barzani family’s Kurdistan Democratic Party told the Wall Street Journal that to justify the volumes, “you’d have to find babies in their cradles smoking.” Nasri was among a cast of men who began to make fortunes in this illicit ecosystem. Although from diverse backgrounds, they were united by their organized crime connections, links to diaspora communities created by years of upheaval, and a high tolerance for risk. “During Saddam’s time there was nobody from the West [working in these markets],” Hulusi Kaymaz, a former partner of Nasri’s based in Mersin, told OCCRP. “There was a big embargo. There were not even banks. Who took the risk? These kinds of guys.” The Nasri family entered the trade at the right time, setting up Golden Universal, Inc., in 1987, just a few years before the Gulf War started, to handle transactions out of Mersin. From there their operations kept expanding: In 1995, they founded another Mersin-based company, Dolphin Foreign Trade Limited, which signed an agreement with the French tobacco company SEITA to supply the former Soviet Union states, as well as Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria, and the United Arab Emirates. Industry documents released in a lawsuit say the British-based Imperial Brands (formerly known as Imperial Tobacco Group) and British American Tobacco also approached him. By the late 1990s, Nasri was distributing billions of cigarettes a year in a mix of legal and illegal markets, according to a contract and leaked industry documents seen by OCCRP. One 2009 Japan Tobacco brief put the number as high as 10 billion a month, although this was not possible to confirm. It’s difficult to determine how much Nasri made from the trade, but estimates of his cut suggest he was clearing millions — perhaps tens of millions — of dollars a year. Three former associates described Nasri as reserved, polite, and well-mannered. His family’s social media posts offer a portrait of a refined lifestyle, with his mother celebrating Christmas in a marble-floored salon and his son buying a McLaren 720S, worth over $250,000. But documents reviewed by OCCRP suggest he could also be aggressive when defending his interests. In 2006, SEITA brought arbitration proceedings against Nasri in the International Commercial Court in Geneva as part of a years-long business dispute. A document submitted to the ICC mentions claims against Dolphin, including forgery and launching a denigration campaign against SEITA. SEITA had tried to cut Nasri out of their local operations in favor of his partner, Tareq Al-Hasan. In retaliation, documents submitted to the proceedings indicate, Nasri forged documents while requesting that Erbil authorities seize SEITA’s local cigarette imports. According to an ICC document, over $97 million were in dispute. After years of litigation, the arbitral body sided with SEITA, ordering Dolphin to pay damages and costs, according to a document sent by Imperial Tobacco to shareholders. Another document, submitted by security officials in Kirkuk, suggested that Nasri tried to bribe an Iraqi expert supposed to weigh in on his case. A Japan Tobacco report further said Nasri denied denigrating SEITA’s image during their dispute. Imperial Brands, which bought SEITA in 2008, and Nasri both declined to comment on the case. Strange Bedfellows Even before these incidents, Nasri had proven willing to put business considerations before political and ethnic rivalries. By the late 1990s, his partners included not only members of Iraqi Kurdistan’s ruling Barzani family, but the son of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, against whom the Kurds had struggled in years of conflict that killed tens of thousands of people. Corporate records show Nasri and partners used Kani Commercial Company as he sought to monopolize the cigarette supply chain into Iraqi Kurdistan, thereby making themselves indispensable to any tobacco company that wanted to do business there. Kani Commercial is briefly mentioned in a Wall Street Journal article and a 1998 Duhok academic journal on monopoly businesses in Kurdistan, but the company has almost no presence in public records. Internal records, invoices, and correspondence obtained by OCCRP show it was based in Dohuk and billed expenses to European Tobacco, while receiving a share of profits from one of Nasri’s other operations. His partners in Kani included businessman Saed Barzani, according to internal company documents contained in the JTI leak obtained by OCCRP. Nasri’s association with Saed began in the late 1990s when he hired him and his two brothers, Sardar and Sarfar, to work at European Tobacco’s Athens business, according to one Japan Tobacco brief. Before that, the brothers had no clear tobacco industry experience. They had spent decades in the United States, where their ventures included a TGI Friday’s restaurant in Alexandria, Virginia. Andreas Koutroukides, who became executive managing director of Saed Barzani’s conglomerate Eagle Group, said Saed acted as the financial “trustee”of Nechirvan Barzani, who succeeded his uncle Masoud as Iraqi Kurdish president in 2019. Documents reviewed by OCCRP revealed that Nasri also had links to Nechirvan Barzani. One expenses spreadsheet filed by Japan Tobacco informants showed that two of Nasri’s companies, European Tobacco and Nasri Group, paid personal expenses for Nechirvan in 2004 and 2005. These included mobile phone bills, expenses related to a Cadillac in the United Arab Emirates, and what appear to be cash payments as high as $25,000. Credit: Georg Kristiansen/Alamy Stock PhotoNechirvin Barzani, the Iraqi Kurdish president with alleged business ties to Nasri, is pictured in 2007, when he was Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan. In 2003, Saed Barzani bought a 9,384-square-foot villa near CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia for $7 million, according to U.S. property records. Reports among the leaked Japan Tobacco documents indicated Saed was an unsuccessful businessman in the 1980s and 1990s who would not have been able to afford the property until after he started making money with Nasri. Two years later, Barzani transferred the mansion at no cost to a woman named Nabila Mustafa, who appeared to be Nechirvan Barzani’s wife. Public records also show that Nechirvan’s brother, Barez Barzani, used the villa’s address for a company office in 2018. In response to questions from OCCRP, a lawyer for Nechirvan Barzani said that he “rejects in the strongest possible terms any allegation or inference of wrongdoing” and suggested that “external agents” were using OCCRP as a proxy for political attacks against Barzani. “The Office of the President is mindful of a co-ordinated campaign by those opposed to his policies to initiate and deploy derogatory and untrue allegations into the public domain for political reasons,” the lawyer wrote. Saed Barzani died in 2019. His brother, who was made Eagle Group’s vice chairman, did not respond to questions sent by email. With Nechirvan’s support, Kani was able to monopolize cigarette imports into the region. Kani took between $9 and $30 for every “master case” of 10,000 cigarettes — each case had a street value of roughly $250 — that reached the Kurdish region, according to two of Nasri’s former associates. One Japan Tobacco brief claimed Kani collected the money as a “transit tax,” making both Nasri and the Barzanis “very wealthy.” Two senior tobacco executives in Iraq estimated the business brought in $150 million to $200 million a year. By 2008, a Japan Tobacco analyst claimed Nasri and the Barzanis were “so closely tied together financially that they need each other to succeed in Northern Iraq.” It was in this context that Nasri began working with Saddam Hussein’s eldest son, Uday, according to court documents and press reports. Uday had been taking his own cut on cigarette imports into Iraq since at least 1995. He oversaw an elite clique of Iraqi tobacco traders that included Nasri’s partner, Tareq Al-Hasan, and Waheb Tabra, who later became a key figure in Nasri’s operations. A 2002 Wall Street Journal report estimated that Uday made around $10 million a year from the trade, although tobacco executives in Iraq told OCCRP the figure may have been closer to $20 million. Hasan declined to comment and Tabra did not respond to questions sent by OCCRP. Under the arrangement, Nasri smuggled cigarettes into Iraqi Kurdistan, thereby circumventing the U.N. embargo, and then sent them south where traders including Hasan oversaw their distribution in the rest of Iraq. The 2003 overthrow of Saddam and the death of Uday in a gunfight with U.S. troops in Mosul in July that year put an end to the deal. But none of this slowed Nasri’s business — in fact, it began to thrive like never before. Counterfeits and Militant Groups Shortly after Uday’s death, Nasri took advantage of the chaos in Iraq to build his own counterfeiting operation. He began producing knock-offs of major international brands such as Marlboros and Rothmans, as well as popular Iranian brands such as Bahman and Farvardin, according to industry sources and corporate intelligence reports, destined for markets in Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Lebanon. Over time, Iraq itself was transforming from a transit country, where tobacco products were smuggled through into neighboring countries, into a primary source of contraband cigarettes. This fact was underlined by a growing number of seizures at the Turkish border, where authorities were concerned about commissions extracted by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, against which Ankara had been fighting for decades. It was a lucrative business, according to a former employee of U.K.-based tobacco company Gallaher Group, who once interviewed for jobs with Nasri. “A case of 10,000 Marlboros is light as a feather and has a street value of anywhere from $1,500 to over $10,000 depending on the consumer country’s level of development and excise taxes,” he told OCCRP. “A truckload of these cases is just a truck loaded with money.” Koutroukides estimated that Nasri’s counterfeiting operation, known as “Abkazia,” was making half a million to a million dollars a day starting in 2004. The Middle East Company for Reconstruction and Investment, or MECRI, a cigarette and construction company associated with the operation, cleared $700 million annually, according to a 30-page prospectus on Nasri’s and Saed Barzani’s projects from 2008 issued by a Barzani-linked company, the Eagle Group. Proceeds from the illicit tobacco trade often end up in the hands of organized crime networks, paramilitaries, and insurgents from across the political spectrum, sometimes in the form of transit fees along smuggling routes. A 2015 report by the Paris-based Center for the Analysis of Terrorism noted that cigarette smuggling from Kurdish territory into areas held by the Islamic State was “likely” allowing the Islamist group to extract tolls from the trade. Shia paramilitaries have also reportedly profited. It is difficult to estimate how much money from Nasri’s trade goes to militant groups. But one Japan Tobacco case file noted that a “substantial portion” of the counterfeits from the Abkazia operation were smuggled into Iran “with the connivance and support of the Peshmerga,” the Kurdish region’s military forces, as well as “various other ‘militia’ and possibly insurgent groups active in the border region, as well as corrupt security forces.” The same brief noted that “at a minimum” Nasri and Tabra, his partner, would have had to “pay fees to one or more of these groups in order to protect their shipments moving across country.” OCCRP was able to identify four facilities — two active, two inactive — affiliated with the Akbazia operation, including one on the territory of a former chicken farm near the Tigris River outside Dohuk. A report by a multinational tobacco company, a rival to Japan Tobacco, said the chicken farm facility was still active as of 2019. Internal company emails and Nasri’s former business partners say the plant was linked to Tabra as recently as 2018 and is still operating under the control of the Barzanis. A sister factory in Erbil was mentioned in an unsigned 2008 lease agreement in which Nasri handed over the management of the Abkazia operation to his business partner Tabra, along with 40 percent of the profits. Another sister factory, located near the former chicken factory, appears in the internal records of one of Tabra’s companies. These are no longer operating. The fourth Akbazia facility, located in the northern city of Sulaymaniyah, produced millions of cigarettes, largely for export to Iran. The facility was leased from a company linked to Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and a longtime rival of the Barzanis, according to corporate intelligence reports and industry sources. Talabani, who was president of Iraq at the time, died in 2017. Credit: blickwinkel/Alamy Stock PhotoA view of Sulaymaniyah, where a factory linked to Nasri produced millions of cigarettes for export to Iran. The same rival to Japan Tobacco visited this site and wrote about it in early 2019, noting that it was run as part of the Nokan Group, which had ties to Talabani and his wife, Hero Khan. A technician working at the factory told OCCRP he did not know what brands were being made. Nokan Group and a spokesperson for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Talabani’s political party, did not respond to emailed questions. Despite handing over management of the Abkazia operation factories to Tabra, Nasri and Saed Barzani retained 60 percent of the profits as silent partners. According to the Japan Tobacco brief, Nasri still made a “huge cash amount” from the factories. While his Iraqi factories produced the bulk of his counterfeits, leaked documents show Nasri also used facilities in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Hong Kong to make black-market cigarettes sent on to countries from Cameroon to Uzbekistan. Nasri’s brands, such as Business Club and Vigor, are still sold on the black market in Europe. In 2020, Ukrainian authorities nabbed 34 million illicit Business Clubs on their way to the Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria. A lawyer representing the Nasri Group said European Tobacco conformed with all laws in the countries where it operated. He said some third parties had previously “counterfeited our trademarks (notably Business Club) and sold them without our knowledge, either online, or in Africa and in other parts of the world.” “European Tobacco Inc. took certain legal measures against such illegal behaviors that came to its knowledge,” he said. He said the company did not have factories or activities in Iraq, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, or Europe. “In case there are illegal activities taking place in such countries, or elsewhere, both companies would not be related to them or bear any responsibility whatsoever for them,” he wrote. New Frontiers Today, Nasri’s involvement in the cigarette trade is relegated to a footnote on the website of his Lebanon-based Nasri Group of Companies, which previously described European Tobacco as its “foundation business.” Instead, the company touts its real estate and liquor and pharmaceutical marketing and distribution businesses. Center stage in this portfolio are millions of square meters of developments in Erbil, many of which broke ground after the 2003 invasion. They include a sprawling residential complex called Dream City, an office building, and the 120,000 square-meter “Downtown Erbil” shopping mall near the city’s ancient citadel. Estimates for the value of these properties run into the billions of dollars. Credit: MLBARIONA/Alamy Stock PhotoThe Downtown Erbil shopping mall. The transition has not been entirely seamless. One Japan Tobacco brief from 2009 described two of his projects as plagued by “inefficient administration and corruption.” Nearly two decades after it was started, his Dream City project is still unfinished. But public records, leaked documents and interviews show Nasri has nevertheless maintained his partnership with the Barzanis, specifically through MECRI and a successor company, Salah Al Din Holding. MECRI, which leased out the Abkazia facilities, has also overseen Nasri’s main property developments. Through a lawyer, Nasri declined to comment on specific questions about the construction projects. Publicly listed phone numbers and email addresses for Salah Al Din Holding were disconnected. Nasri’s shared interests with the Barzanis also include the Eagle Group. The company is headed by Saed Barzani, according to Koutroukides, the 2008 prospectus and a company registry certificate obtained by OCCRP. It claims to have carried out projects for the United Nations Development Program and the U.S. military.” Like their other businesses, the company’s ownership is difficult to trace in public registries. But a 30-page prospectus from 2008 showed that the company claimed to own Nasri Group and other Nasri interests. Eagle Group also manages Kurdistan’s first private bank, now called Region Trade Bank, whose four shareholders include Nasri and Saed Barzani, as well as Nasri’s brother, Nameer. According to leaked correspondence and intelligence briefs, Nasri banked proceeds from his cigarette operation at Region Trade Bank. Koutroukides, who oversaw the bank while at Eagle Group, also said the bank accepted Nasri’s cigarette money, and that Nasri was “using and abusing” bank funds. Saed’s brother Sardar at times withdrew millions of dollars from the vault at will, he said. Region Trade Bank did not respond to emailed questions. The Fitch Ratings credit rating agency rated the bank a “substantial credit risk” last year, reflecting its “limited franchise, unstable business model, volatile and concentrated customer deposit base and low profitability.” Smuggling Continues For big tobacco companies, the salad days of Iraqi smuggling are over. In 2000, the European Union filed a major lawsuit on smuggling-related charges against three of the world’s biggest tobacco companies. Another lawsuit that followed in 2002 against one of these tobacco companies included allegations about their illicit Iraq trade. Those companies — Philip Morris, Japan Tobacco, and RJR Reynolds (which later became part of Japan Tobacco) — eventually struck settlement agreements, which they rebranded as “cooperation agreements,” with the European Union. So did Imperial Tobacco and British American Tobacco, whose agreements released Imperial Tobacco from liability for smuggling, though they were not part of the suit. They collectively paid $1.9 billion in fines. Still, Iraq remains a major source of black-market cigarettes for the region. Statistics OCCRP obtained from Imperial Tobacco, supported by U.N. trade data, show that as many as 65 billion cigarettes still reach the country annually, although the range varies widely — more than three times its prewar consumption. The illicit operation Nasri built still rolls cigarettes, while a constellation of former business partners and associates run other illicit factories from Sulaymaniyah to Baghdad. Iraqi tobacco executives, meanwhile, say the Barzanis still take a cut on cigarettes brought into the country. Nasri’s operations are also ongoing. In Baghdad, Nasri’s former partner, Waheb Tabra, has licensed a new tobacco factory. In Sulaymaniyah, the factory associated with Talabani is still in operation. Nasri himself appears to have stepped back from day-to-day operations, his businesses remain active. European Tobacco — which in recent years sent illegal cigarettes to Europe — maintains a London-based entity, directed by Nizar’s brothers, which still files annual financial reports. Research on this story was provided by OCCRP ID. Fact-checking was provided by the OCCRP Fact-Checking Desk.
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"Tawella is the center of political decision-making, the surprise comes after the holidays"
Draw Media Aso Faraidoon, a member of the PUK fraction in the Iraqi parliament, tweeted: 🔹 (Tawella, a beautiful village in northeastern Halabja, Paul Bremer mentioned in his book that he witnessed several meetings between the late President Mam Jalal and General Qasim Sulaimani in that village. After a decade their successors meet in the same place and important decisions are made. The surprise is after the Eid al-Adha holidays. 🔸 This tweet refers to a recent secret meeting between Bafel Talabani and a senior Iranian official in Jamil Hawrami’s Garden in Tawella. A meeting which the details are still unknown and it is expected that the issues of forming the new Iraqi government and the post of the president have been solved. Tawella; is a small town in Halabja Governorate, Kurdistan Region, Iraq about 34 km east of Halabja on the border of Iran.
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KRG revenue for June
Prepared by: Anwar Karim The revenue of the Kurdistan Region in June was (995 billion) dinars, the Kurdistan Regional Government sold (11 million 305 thousand) barrels of oil last month, the total oil revenue was (1 billion 253 million) dollars. (702 million) dollars of which have gone for the companies’ expenses and the rest ($551 million) remains for the government treasury. summary Non-oil revenues • Non-oil revenues for June = (164 billion) dinars (which spends on salaries, according to information, the amount is almost double) • Coalition assistance to the Peshmerga forces = (31 billion 500 million) dinars • Kurdistan Region's share of the Iraqi budget = (0) dinars Oil revenues (pipeline exports) • In June 2022, the Kurdistan Region exported 11 million 305 thousand barrels of oil through the Turkish Port of Jayhan. • The average price of Brent oil for June was $122.86. • Because the region sells its oil at $12 less, so KRG sold its oil at an average of $ (110.86) So: (11 million 305 thousand) barrels X (110.86) dollars = (1 billion 253 million 272 thousand 300) dollars. That is, in dinars, it is: (1 billion 253 million 272 thousand 300) dollars X (1450) dinars = (1 trillion 817 billion 244 million 835 thousand) dinars. • According to the latest Deloitte report, 56% of oil revenues are spent on expenditures and 44% remains for the Ministry of Natural Resources. - So: (1 billion 253 million 272 thousand 300) dollars X (56%) = (701 million 832 thousand 488) dollars go to the cost of the oil process. That is, in dinars, it is: (701 million 832 thousand 488) dollars X ((1450 dinars = (1 trillion 17 billion 657 million 107 thousand 600) dinars oil expenditure. - (1 billion 253 million 272 thousand 300) dollars X (44%) = (551 million 839 thousand 812) dollars remaining. Oil revenue in dinars is: (551 million 839 thousand 812) dollars X (1450) dinars = (799 billion 587 million 727 thousand 400) dinars. Total Revenue in June 2022 (Dinar) (799 billion 587 million 727 thousand 400) oil revenue + (164 billion) domestic revenue + (31 billion 500 million) allies = (995 billion 87 million 727 thousand 400) dinars
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Civilian casualties of Turkish operations in the Kurdistan Region
Draw Media, CPT Press Release: Turkish forces are killing children, wounding farmers and targeting villages under the auspices of 'Claw-Lock' operation Map of civilian casualties of Turkish military operation ‘Claw-Lock’ (June 2022). Community Peacemaker Teams and its partners denounce the killing of children, wounding of farmers and targeting of villages by Turkish Forces in northern Iraq under the auspices of 'Claw-Lock' operation Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) launched a new military campaign codenamed ‘Claw-Lock’ within Iraqi Kurdistan on 17 April 2022, with the aim of attaining total military control over the mountainous border region spanning roughly 180kms from east to west and up to 15kms south of the Iraq-Turkey borderline. Within the last month, 21 May to 21 June 2022, Turkish military operations have claimed the lives of 3 children and 2 adult civilians, as well as caused physical harm to 15 civilians in northern Iraq. 'Claw-Lock' aims to occupy the estimated 20% of the mountainous border regions currently uncontrolled by the Turkish Armed Forces. The campaign began with massive aerial bombardments and deployments of special forces troops up to 12-15km south of the Turkey-Iraq border in the areas of Zap and Avashin that have previously been cleared of the civilian population. While fighting against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgents in those areas, the TAF began conducting targeted drone strikes against PKK members as far south as Kalar, 280 km from the Iraq-Turkey border. Two drone strikes have resulted in civilian deaths, including one child. The first civilians killed during 'Claw-Lock' were 43-year-old Aram Haji Kaka Khan and his 50-year-old brother-in-law Ismaeel Ibraheem in the village of Tutaqal, 140km south of the Iraq-Turkey border. At 5:15am on 21 May, Aram Haji, Tutaqal's mukhtar (chieftain), heard a Turkish airstrike in the village. Several hours later, he and Ismaeel set out to investigate the site of the explosions. They discovered a number of badly wounded PKK members and attempted to transport them to a hospital. A TAF drone fired a missile into their car, killing Aram, Ismaeel and the combatants. By targeting a civilian vehicle that was carrying civilians and wounded combatants, the Turkish Armed Forces committed war crimes. The two brothers-in-law were survivors of Saddam Hussein’s genocidal Anfal campaign in the 1980s, which was especially brutal in the area around Tutaqal. Following the 21 May incident, 8 out of 10 families have fled the village for fear of further bombings. On 15 June, in Sinune sub-district in Sinjar (Shangal), a Turkish drone bombed the headquarters of Shangal Resistance Unit (YBŞ), an organization related to the PKK. The explosion destroyed and damaged nearby houses, including a bookstore. In the bookstore, a 12-year-old Yezidi boy, Salih Khdir was killed while helping his father take care of the books. Salih Khdir’s grandfather and eight other civilians were injured in the strike. The Turkish bombardment of a built-up residential neighborhood constitutes a war crime. The area of the attack is predominately inhabited by the survivors of the 2014-2015 ISIS genocide against the Yezidi population. Since 2018, Turkish forces have been building bases on mountain peaks and ranges from the Sidakan area on the Iraq-Iran border to Haftanin in Zakho. Between the beginning of 'Claw-Lock' on 17 April and 25 April, the TAF constructed four new bases - two in Avashin and two in Zap. On 16 June, construction began on a new base on Kurazharo mountain above Shiladze. The Turkish military has also developed a network of roads connecting the military bases and Turkish territory to facilitate resupply and reinforcement and strengthen their matrix of control over the occupied areas. From the mountain emplacements, Turkish artillery began firing on civilians living in and working on the agricultural lands in the valleys. On 15 and 17 June, in the border regions, Turkish soldiers wounded five civilians in two villages by firing at them from their bases. The agricultural village of Parakhe sits in a valley 8km from the Iraq-Turkey border in the Darkar sub-district region. Thirty families permanently call the village home, with others returning to work their familial land seasonally. In the past two years, Turkish forces have constructed two bases in the mountains overlooking Parakhe. At 3:49pm on 15 June, 53-year-old farmer Nazir Omer and his son, 24-year-old Mohammad Nazir were irrigating their fig and pomegranate orchard when artillery fire from a nearby Turkish base crashed around, injuring both men. Nazir Omer told CPT that during the explosions, he fainted and woke up at a hospital in Zakho with two shrapnel wounds in his back. His relatives had rescued the unconscious men and rushed them to hospital in Zakho. Mohammed had suffered a shrapnel wound to the palm of his hand. Community Peacemaker Teams (CPT) visiting Nazir Omer in Zakho Emergency Hospital, 17 June 2022 From his hospital bed, Nazir Omer told CPT that in October 2021, around 150 Turkish soldiers descended on Parakhe from their newly constructed base above. The soldiers proceeded from house to house, warning residents that if they collaborated with PKK, the village would be fired upon. While the residents of Parakhe state that the PKK members do not operate in the village, they have reported hearing artillery shells land twice around Parakhe in the months preceding the recent attack. The shelling on 15 June was the first bombardment to target the village directly, with Nazir Omer and Mohammed the first Parakhe residents to be wounded. In addition to committing a war crime by directly targeting civilians, CPT-IK fears that the Turkish military intends to pressure Parakhe villagers into abandoning their homes and lands creating a landscape 'cleansed' of the civilian population around Turkish military bases. This practice has been observed in areas adjacent to dozens of bases throughout the border regions. Such forced civilian displacements and restrictions on access to livelihood are breaches of international humanitarian law. At 5:10pm on 17 June, Turkish soldiers fired multiple bursts of heavy machine gun fire at civilians on the lands of Kesta village. Located in Kani Masi sub-district, Amedi district, the Kesta is 9km south of the Turkey-Iraq border. The injured were three local women, 28-year old Kazhin Taha Saeed, 49-year-old Nazira Abdulstar Ahmad and Nazira's 24-year-old daughter-in-law Fawzya Diyar Omer, who were enjoying a Friday picnic. The gunfire came from a Turkish base on Zneri Kesta mountain overlooking Kesta. After building the base in April 2021, the Turkish military began to repeatedly fire upon the village - forcing its entire population into displacement. In 2022, some families started to return to tend or visit their abandoned farms. On 26 May, 1000 people, originating from Zewe Sery, met together in the town of Bamarne in the Amedi district. It was the first time in three years that the former residents, and their relatives, were able to hold their festival - an annual event to bring together the Zewe Sery's families who were forced into displacement in the 1990s due to the Turkey-PKK conflict. In the late afternoon, three boys were playing football at the edge of the gathering. Without warning, at least three mortar shells exploded in rapid succession metres from the boys. 13-year-old Yousif Kovan and 11-year-old Avand Hishyar were killed. 8-year-old Sipan Farhad was severely wounded. Kovan, Hishyar and Farhad, the fathers of killed and injured boys of the 26 May attack holding phones with pictures of Yousif and Avand on them, Shiladze, 16 June 2022. According to the Kurdistan Region’s Directorate General of Counter Terrorism’s (CTD) narrative, which was widely shared by the political parties' media, the mortars were fired by the PKK. However, analysis of the attack location and of the evidence collected by CPT-IK instead points to the Turkish Armed Forces as the probable responsible party. Relatives of the killed boys reported to CPT-IK that they heard drones hovering over the crowd during the day. The proximity of the gathering (800m) to the large Turkish military base in Bamarne, the ballistic precision of the munitions combined with the drone surveillance suggests that gathering was deliberately targeted as a warning or for lethal effect. Additionally, Metina mountain, the PKK alleged firing position, is under the control of the Turkish and the Kurdistan Regional Government military forces. Since 2015, the Turkish Armed Forces have killed up to 129 civilians and wounded up to 180 civilians in northern Iraq. ‘Claw-Lock’ is another in a succession of Turkish military operations which has visited death and displacement upon the people of this region. Community Peacemaker Teams together with the partners of the international ‘End Cross Border Bombings’ campaign denounce each death and the harm that has been done to civilians by the Turkish Armed Forces. Protect civilian lives! Bring life back to the border regions - Let civilians return to their villages!
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Khor Mor is stuck between the PUK and KDP projects
Draw Media Two missile attacks on the Khor Mor field in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have threatened the sources of gas in the Kurdistan Region. There is suspicion of Hashd al-Shaabi forces. Bafel Talabani will go to Baghdad this week. Khor Mor gas is stuck between exports to Turkey and pipelines to households and local factories. Where were the katyusha directed from, and what is the message behind the missiles? More details in this report. Who's attacking? Katyusha missiles were fired twice in two days at Khor Mor field in Qadir Karam district of Chamchamal district. No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, and the PUK security forces, which control the area, have not pointed the finger at anyone. According to Darw, PUK officials suspect that Shiite armed militias in Duzkhurmatu are behind the attack. Military officials have determined the direction of the Katyushas. The rockets were fired at the village of Qalganlu in Nawjul, a district in Duzkhurmatu, which is only 5 kilometers away from the Khor Mor gas field. There is a security gap between the Peshmerga and Hashd Shaabi in the area. According to Draw information, the PUK president Bafel Talabani is to visit Baghdad on Sunday to talk to Iraqi government officials about the attacks on the Khor Mor field. Why Khor Mor? On May 5, the Northern Oil Company, which belongs to the Iraqi Oil Ministry, issued a statement saying that the Kurdistan Regional Government has exceeded the oil fields belonging to the Northern Company, including (Khurmala, Avana, Safiya, Khor Mor). Khurmala is the largest oil field under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), within the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) zone, which produces 175,000 barrels of oil per day. In the PUK zone, the Khor Mor field, the largest gas field in the Kurdistan Region and supplies gas to domestic households and power plants, is also in trouble, and Iraq is demanding it. The Northern Oil Company (NOC) has filed a lawsuit against the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the Iraqi courts over the Khurmala and Khor Mor oil fields. The Iraqi Oil Ministry has recently sent a letter to all companies operating in the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan Region following the failure of negotiations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to implement the decision of the Federal Supreme Court. They asked them to renew their contracts with the Iraqi government within three months, otherwise they would be blacklisted. Some believe that this situation has led Iraqi armed groups to shift their attacks from diplomatic positions to the Kurdistan Region's oil and gas facilities within the jurisdiction of the PUK and KDP. There is another view that the reason behind the attacks on Khor Mor is linked to a legal dispute between the UAE's Dana Gas and the Iranian government over gas the 25-year agreement was signed in 2005. Dana Gas won the first part of the case against Iran, worth $608 million. The court is scheduled to decide on the second part of the case in October. Iran is suspected of moving its war with UAE's Dana Gas to the Khor Mor field through Iraqi Shiite militias to send a message to the UAE that it could damage their economy. Kurdistan exports gas! In February, Kurdistan Regional Government President Nechirvan Barzani arrived in Ankara unexpectedly and was photographed with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. "I discussed with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani about exporting gas to Turkey," Erdogan told reporters after the meeting. Erdogan's statement was enough to put the Kurdistan Region under strong pressure from the Iraqi and Iranian governments, especially in those days when the director of Dana Gas said: “We can supply fuel to Iraq and Turkey with Chamchamal gas.” In the same month that Nechirvan visited Turkey (February), the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court suddenly ruled on a complaint filed by the Iraqi Oil Ministry, overturning the Kurdistan Region's oil and gas law and ordering the region to hand over its oil and gas to Baghdad. Gas pipeline over Bafel Talabani's dead body! The gas from the Khor Mor field is stuck between two projects, the KDP's project to export it to Turkey and the PUK's project to pipe the gas to households and local factories. On April 28, 2013, Bafel Talabani, the PUK leader, met with representatives of diplomatic envoys of and international organizations and agencies in Erbil, in this meeting on the issue of exporting Kurdistan gas Talabani said that "Gas won't go out of Kurdistan the way the oil has, with that level of mismanagement and lack of transparency," he also emphasized that, "If any attempt goes beyond these demands, the gas pipeline must be exported over the dead body of Bafel Jalal Talabani." Khor Mor... Kurdistan Gas Resources Khor Mor is located in the west of Qadir Karam district. Until 1976, this district belonged to Khurmatu district, which means that it was included in Kirkuk province, but that year it was added to Salahaddin province. Khor Mor was under the control of the Iraqi government until 2003. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the field fell back to the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2015, gas was produced in the field and piped to the Chamchamal and Erbil power plants. The current production of the farm is as follows: • Natural gas: 452 million cubic feet per day • Condensate: 22,000 barrels per day are transported by tankers to Khurmala station and mixed with Kurdistan Regional Government oil in order to improve its quality • (LPG): 1050 tons. Dana Gas sells it to local companies for $315 per ton. (South Kurdistan) company buys it and distribute it. Gas in the Kurdistan Region According to the official website of the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Kurdistan Region has 200 trillion cubic feet (5.7 trillion cubic meters) of natural gas reserves, which is 3% of the world's average gas reserves. However, this is the unproven reserves because the proven natural gas reserves of the region, according to US energy reports, is only (25 trillion) cubic feet. PUK controlled area reserves • Khor Mor field: 8.2 trillion cubic feet • Chamchamal field: 4.4 trillion cubic feet • Miran field: 3.46 trillion cubic feet • Palkana field: 1.6 trillion cubic feet KDP controlled area reserves • Banabawe field: 7.1 trillion cubic feet • Khormala field: 2 trillion 260 billion cubic meters • Sheikhan field: 900 billion cubic feet • Pirmam field: 880 billion cubic feet
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