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An assassination, a feud and the fight for power in Iraq's Kurdistan

(Reuters, Draw Media The marriage of convenience between Iraqi Kurdistan's political dynasties is on the rocks. While the dominant Barzani and Talabani clans have long been at loggerheads over power and resources in a region rich in oil and gas, power-sharing governments have largely kept a lid on mistrust since the two sides fought a civil war in the 1990s. But the lingering acrimony has spilled into the open with a vengeance since a rare assassination in the city of Erbil, and the fallout is putting the uneasy alliance through one of its stiffest tests since the war, diplomats and analysts say. On Oct. 7, shortly after Hawker Abdullah Rasoul set off in an SUV from his home on a leafy street in Erbil, a bomb ripped through the car, killing him and wounding four family members. Rasoul was an intelligence officer, and a defector. After nearly two decades with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), a party dominated by the Talabani family, he moved to Erbil this year and switched sides, three security sources and a Kurdish source told Reuters. When he was killed, Rasoul, 41, was helping the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the party ruled by the Barzani family that he had been keeping tabs on for years, the sources said. The brazen assassination was captured by security cameras and the KDP released a 27-minute video about the killing, pointing the finger of blame firmly at the PUK. The PUK has strongly denied the accusations, saying they are politically driven, but the killing has triggered a series of incidents that have strained the power-sharing arrangement. Political relations have deteriorated to the point where PUK ministers have boycotted meetings of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), long a symbol of peaceful power-sharing. Some PUK officials say privately that without compromise on a range of issues, the party might eventually break away and form its own administration in its Sulaimaniya stronghold. The antagonism is also complicating a project to expand one of the biggest gasfields in Iraq, which is in PUK territory, damaging the region's hopes of starting exports to Europe and earning much-needed revenue. The rifts are a source of alarm to Western countries, and especially the United States. It has backed both factions, most recently in the fight against Islamic State. Washington is worried about the spreading influence of Iran, which has long-standing ties to the PUK and has stepped up missile attacks on Iranian Kurdish dissidents in northern Iraq in recent weeks. A U.S. official told Reuters that Washington was extremely concerned about the recent tensions between the PUK and KDP. "What we try to explain to our partners up here is that we don't want unity for unity's sake, we need you guys to be able to cooperate with each other on certain discreet issues that are in our interest, but also in your interest," the official said. After Rasoul's death, the KDP-dominated Regional Security Council accused a PUK security agency of the killing. It detained six men it identified as operatives involved and issued arrest warrants for another four senior PUK security officials, according to security council statement a week after the attack. PUK officials reached out to the government shortly after the assassination to help with the investigation, but they did not receive a response and have had no access to the findings, a senior PUK official said. Neither the security council, the government nor a spokesperson for the PUK responded to questions for this story. Long-simmering mistrust between the two sides had already deepened this year due to a wave of defections from PUK security agencies. The senior PUK official told Reuters there had been eight. He said the PUK believed its former head of intelligence, Salman Amin, who defected earlier this year, had been encouraging people to switch sides. Amin has been another bone of contention. Following his move to Erbil, Kurdish Prime Minister Masrour Barzani gave him a senior security role, further enraging the PUK, the senior party official said. Reuters was unable to reach Amin for comment. Barzani's office did not respond to requests for comment. While analysts say a return to full-blown civil war is unlikely, a tense standoff between armed security personnel in Erbil last month underlined the risk of escalation. With relations deteriorating, PUK forces raided Amin's home in Sulaimaniya on Oct. 24, four PUK members and a Kurdish official said. Three of the sources said the PUK was looking for sensitive documents Amin had taken from its intelligence office and weapons. In a tit-for-tat move, about 100 security men commanded by Amin approached the house of Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani in Erbil the next day and threatened to raid it, the PUK sources and the official said. Three of the sources said Kurdish President Nechrivan Barzani had to intervene to defuse the situation. "It could've easily turned ugly," the senior PUK official said. Then, on Nov. 9, PUK leader Bafel Talabani flew to Erbil accompanied by Qubad, dozens of security personnel, and one of the men wanted for Rasoul's killing, in a move seen as being deliberately provocative, according to a Kurdish source. The group was unable to leave the airport until the president intervened again, the source said. The stakes are high for the Kurds, who were big winners from the downfall of Saddam Hussein. They deepened their autonomy, attracted foreign investment in oil and gas, and secured a slice of power in Baghdad, where the president must be a Kurd. But despite their oil riches, the region suffers from high unemployment and chronic public services, encouraging many people to try to emigrate to Europe. Attacks by neighbouring Turkey and Iran on Kurdish militants there have underlined the limited control Iraqi Kurds have over their frontiers. Analysts say the rivalry is also weakening the influence Kurds have within Iraq's federal centre in Baghdad. That's complicating disputes over the ownership of oil and gas assets, as well as allocations from the federal budget. "It affects social peace, it affects stability ... and it affects the overall economic situation in terms of market and business confidence," said Shivan Fazil at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "(The rift) is more about wasted opportunities and how these tensions distract the KRG from addressing the governance issues and meeting the needs of its population, and hence exacerbating grievances," Fazil said. Set against the current backdrop of political strife among Iraqi Shi'ites, the fragile government in the north adds to a picture of a country still wracked by instability two decades after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. And Baghdad is watching events in Kurdistan closely. An Iraqi state security source said the PUK and KDP were being led by hawks and that their power struggle was at "a very critical stage". Ties between the two groups have been strained in the past, notably in 2017 when the Kurds held a referendum that won overwhelming support for independence from Baghdad, only to backfire when Iraqi forces seized swathes of Kurdish territory. The PUK and KDP traded blame, particularly over the loss of the city of Kirkuk, which has one of Iraq's oldest and biggest oilfields. This year, the two sides were locked in a dispute over who should become Iraq's president. The federal post finally went to KDP-backed Abdul Latif Rashid in October, rather than the PUK's candidate, Barham Salih. Mike Fleet, an Iraq analyst, said the KDP no longer felt it needed to abide by past power-sharing agreements. "These two parties can't play ball with each other, they have less say and less of a voice because they don't have a united voice in Baghdad anymore," he said. "A lot of the impact of that is on the people who rely on the current system to get paid, and salaries aren't, so quality of life is becoming more difficult, especially in Sulaimaniya," he said, referring to the PUK's stronghold. Analysts say the KDP is seeking to assert itself at a time when the PUK has been weakened a leadership feud, financial pressures and delayed salary payments. The PUK has long complained that the regional administration in Erbil does not distribute revenues equally, accusing the KDP of favouring its areas. "Why should we tolerate this?" said one of the PUK officials. "We have a list of demands, and I still have hope that we won't get to a separation, but we won't have a choice if they don't deliver."

Bafel Talabani: I prevented the gas pipeline from being laid

The PUK leader discusses deteriorating political rivalries within Kurdistan and their impact on both gas development and impending negotiations with Baghdad over oil rights. Iraq Oil Report, Draw Media Few individuals are as important to the development of the Kurdistan region's gas sector as Bafel Talabani, the president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls the territory in Sulaimaniya province where the most prolific fields lie. Talabani is also a central actor in the ongoing struggle between the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), its longtime rival and nominal partner in the Kurdistan region's governance. Their deteriorating relationship has left the regional government hamstrung as it navigates renewed tensions with Baghdad that threaten its ability to continue independently managing its oil and gas sector. In an interview with Iraq Oil Report at the Baghdad residence of his late father, former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader criticized the KDP for withholding funding from Sulaimaniya. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is currently “very politicized,” he said — “a de facto twin administration, because Suli is expected to fund Suli.” One casualty of this antagonistic atmosphere has been the KRG's plans to build new gas pipelines to bring additional feedstock to power plants in both PUK and KDP-controlled territory — a network that could also be used to facilitate future exports to Turkey. After the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) awarded the contract to the Iraqi-Kurdish company KAR Group, which is close to the KDP, security forces controlled by the PUK prevented the company from accessing key territory, effectively putting the project on ice. Talabani confirmed he is personally opposed to the project, arguing the contract was granted KAR Group with “no process” and “no tender.” “Kar Group was not awarded [the contract]. Kar Group was given it,” he said. “It is an insult to the people of Kurdistan and Iraq for these things to happen.” Talabani said he wants to be involved in strategic decision-making about the energy sector but claimed the KDP has frozen its political rivals out of the process. Absent a viable partner in Erbil, he suggested, cooperation with Baghdad looks increasingly attractive. “I do not understand the unwillingness to work with Baghdad,” he said. "Basra is 1,000 times richer than the entirety of Kurdistan. Just Basra. And if the prime minister came to me and said, ‘Hey, Bafel, put your little teapot on this table, and you can be a part of the huge table, including Basra’ — to me, that sounds like a bloody good deal."

We’re America’s most loyal ally in Syria. Don’t forget us.

Draw Media washingtonpost-By Mazloum Abdi Mazloum Abdi is the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces. In 2014, the world learned about my hometown, Kobane, and my people, the Syrian Kurds, when we dealt the Islamic State its first major defeat in partnership with the United States and the Global Coalition. The alliances we forged there led to the end of the ISIS caliphate in 2019. Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates Today, Kobane is again under threat — and all the gains of those partnerships are also in danger. This time, the threat comes not from Islamic State terror, but from a U.S. ally and a member of NATO. For more than a week, the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has rained bombs down on our cities, killing civilians, destroying critical civilian infrastructure and targeting the Syrian Democratic Forces working to keep ISIS down. For the people of our region, the military defeat of the Islamic State was never our only goal. At every step of our fight against the terror group on the battlefield, we took steps to crush the ideology behind it by building a system based on inclusion, pluralism and equality. In Raqqa, for example, where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi once ruled over ISIS territory, Syrian women are now prominent leaders. In 2015, we established the Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition of Kurds, Arabs and Assyrians committed to defeating the Islamic State. In every city we liberated, our people built local administrations that, for the first time in Syria, represented all ethnicities and religions and gave women equal power. We’ve been criticized at times for falling short of the West’s democratic standards. Our system is not perfect: We had to build it while at war for our existence and under a crushing economic blockade. But in terms of the quality of governance and security we have been able to provide, we have outdone every other authority in Syria — and none of it would have been possible without the victory at Kobane and the international support for our resistance that it brought. Now the Turkish offensive against our region is putting all of that under renewed threat. One strike in the border city of Derik, home to Kurds, Yazidis and Christians, killed more than 10 civilians. Another targeted the base near the city of Hasakah, where I work with the United States to plan operations against ISIS, striking just hundreds of meters from U.S. forces. I believe it was an attempt on my life: Turkey has assassinated several of my colleagues in the SDF and our administration this year. Adding to the terror and chaos of the bombing campaign, Erdogan continues to threaten a ground invasion of our territory. We know what the consequences of such an attack will be, because Turkey has done this twice before. The Turkish invasions of Afrin in 2018 and Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad in 2019 displaced hundreds of thousands of people and disrupted the global fight against the Islamic State. After years of Turkish rule, these regions are now infamous for chaos, instability, infighting and the presence of extremists. Where our administration once protected ethnic coexistence, religious freedom and women’s rights, Turkish forces and Turkey-backed militias commit unspeakable abuses against ethnic and religious minorities and women with impunity. Under our administration, Afrin was the only part of northwest Syria untouched by radical Islamists. Since the area has come under Turkish control, groups affiliated with al-Qaeda operate freely on its territory. This summer, a U.S. drone strike killed Maher al-Agal, a top ISIS leader, there. Turkey is not threatening our people and the security and stability for which we have sacrificed so much because of anything we have done. As a pretext for war, Erdogan has accused our forces of involvement in a deadly bombing in Istanbul. Let me make it clear: We deplore and condemn this act of terror, reject all accusations of involvement and again offer our condolences to the victims. We reiterate our call for an investigation and are ready to assist if one takes place. We ask no one to fight for us. My people are still here because we have resisted alone countless times before. If we must, we will resist again. What we ask is for the world to be with us in a more difficult task: peace. We believe that the roots of the conflicts that have brought so much pain and suffering to our region are political. There is no inherent hatred between Kurds and Turks: Turkish leaders have made the political choice to see Kurds as a security threat and deny us our fundamental democratic rights. In the past, Erdogan has negotiated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to end the armed conflict between the group and the Turkish state and resolve the Kurdish question by peaceful means. When those talks were taking place, we lived in peace with our Turkish neighbors. If they were to restart, we would be able to do so again. And when our region was under threat in 2019, the PKK offered, in this very newspaper, to sit down and seek a political solution. The call went unanswered, and Turkey invaded and occupied two of our cities just months later. Had the international community stood firmly against a Turkish invasion and spoken up for peace, things may have gone very differently. Though no one can turn back time, we can learn from the tragedies of the past. We declare that we are ready to play a helpful role in restarting these talks and reaching the peace that we seek. We call on the international community to immediately take concrete steps to prevent a Turkish invasion and to promote a political solution to the Kurdish conflict based on democracy, coexistence and equal rights. The existence of our people and the security of the region depend on it.

KRG receives more than 1 trillion dinars in sales of oil in November

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) sold more than 10 million barrels of oil last month. The price of a barrel of oil was $79. The total revenue was (1 trillion and 191 billion) dinars, of which (667) billion dinars for expenditures and (524) billion dinars for the government treasury. non-oil income • The Kurdistan Regional Government's non-oil revenues for November = (287 billion) dinars (according to the Minister of Finance) • Coalition assistance to Peshmerga forces = (31 billion 500 million) dinars • Kurdistan Regional Government's share in the Iraqi budget = (0) dinars Oil revenues (external exports) • The Kurdistan Region exported 10 million 345 thousand barrels of oil in November 2022. • ($91.42) is the price of Brent crude for November. • Because the region sells its oil at $12 less, it means that it has sold an average of $79.42. So: (10 million and 345 thousand) barrels X (79.42) dollars = (821 million 599 thousand 900) dollars. It is: (821 million 599 thousand 900) dollars X (1450) dinars = (1 trillion 191 billion 139 million 855 thousand) dinars. • According to Deloitte's latest report (56%) of oil revenues go to expenditure and (44%) will remain to the Ministry of Natural Resources. - So: (821 million 599 thousand 900) dollars X (56%) = (460 million 95 thousand 944) dollars go to the oil process. - (821 million 599 thousand 900) dollars X (44%) = (361 million 503 thousand 956) dollars remain. Total revenue in November 2022 (Dinar) (524 billion 180 million 736 thousand 200) oil revenue + (287 billion) domestic revenue + (31 billion 500 million) coalition = (842 billion 680 million 736 thousand 200) dinars

HKN Energy revenue increased 61% during the first nine months of 2022

HKN Energy Ltd. (“HKN”) presents an operating and financial update for the nine months ended 30 September 2022. HKN holds a 62% PSC interest in the Sarsang Block in northern Kurdistan. Revenue increased 61% during the first nine months of 2022 and 32% for the third quarter 2022 from comparable periods in 2021. The increase is due primarily to an increase in realized oil price. Gross Production in 2022 was in line with prior year, averaging 29.8k bopd in the first nine months of 2022 and 30.1k bopd for the third quarter 2022. The new 25k bopd facility on Swara Tika achieved first oil in September 2022 and is currently producing approximately 18k bopd. 5 wells drilled during 2021 and 2022 have been tied-in to the new facility and we are currently optimizing well productivity to reach full production capacity. We drilled and completed the ST B8 well in August, which will add production to the new 25k bopd facility in late March 2023. Initial testing indicates potential production of over 5k bopd from the Kurra Chine B reservoir. Work on additional facility enhancements, including the amine system (which allows HKN to utilize natural gas as fuel) and water handling, will continue through 2023. HKN received 8 payments for oil sales during the first nine months of 2022, with total cash proceeds of $248.5 million (net to HKN). We have received payments for oil sales an average of 77 days after invoice during 2022. HKN amended its oil sales agreement with the KRG effective September 1, 2022. The amended agreement sets the price for Sarsang crude with reference to the market price realized by the KRG for the Kurdistan blend (KBT), rather than the Dated Brent price. Sarsang crude will earn a premium to KBT due to higher API and lower sulfur. The amendment also establishes terms for export via pipeline directly from the Sarsang Block boundary. This will ultimately allow for the export of over 90% of Sarsang crude entirely through pipelines and significantly reduce the use of trucks for oil transport. Cash balance plus short-term U.S. Treasury investments on 30 September 2022 was $142.8 million, including restricted cash of $10.6 million. Payment for June oil sales of $39.4 million (net to HKN) was received in October. The 3D seismic acquisition program covering the western half of Swara Tika concluded in Q3 2022 and we are currently processing and evaluating the acquired data. In August 2022 HKN declared and paid $168 million in dividends.

Widening divide between Kurdistan’s ruling parties raises new risks

Leaders are openly discussing the dissolution of a strategic agreement for united governance that has underpinned Kurdistan's stability and oil sector independence. Relations between Iraqi Kurdistan’s two main ruling parties are further deteriorating, posing a major challenge to effective governance of the semi-autonomous region, weakening Kurdish bargaining power in Baghdad, and delaying the development of natural gas resources. The conflict is so bad that PUK leader Bafel Talabani is openly questioning the viability of maintaining a unified regional government, instead floating the idea of reverting back to the days of "dual administration" — when the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) controlled Dohuk and Erbil provinces, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controlled Sulaimaniya, as disconnected government entities.

Syrian Kurdish commander says Kobani likely target of threatened Turkish ground offensive

Draw Media al-monitor - Amberin Zaman Following Turkish airstrikes on his main headquarters in northeast Syria, SDF commander Mazlum Kobane talks with Al-Monitor about Erdogan's threats of a new ground offensive. In his first interview with international media following Tuesday's drone strike on his main headquarters in northeast Syria, Mazlum Kobane (also known as Mazloum Abdi), the commander of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), said that the most likely target of a potential Turkish ground offensive against the Kurdish-controlled areas would be his native city of Kobani. Two members of the US-backed group died in that attack. This marks the first time a Turkish drone targeted an area within such close proximity of a US base in Syria. A bastion of Kurdish nationalism in Syria, Kobani is where the anti-Islamic State alliance between the US-led coalition and the Syrian Kurds was formed. Kobane aired frustration at what he called the weak response by Russia and the United States to the dozens of Turkish airstrikes that claimed at least 11 civilian lives in the Kurdish-controlled area earlier this week. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has enhanced Turkey’s value in the eyes of Russia and the West alike. Many believe the limp response of both sides to Turkey’s escalating war against the Syrian Kurds is due to their desire to pull Ankara to their respective sides. Kobane agreed. He said unless the Kremlin and Washington stood firm, Turkey would likely follow through on repeated threats to move its troops against his forces as it has done in two separate invasions in 2018 and 2019. Any such action, he said, would further destabilize the area and torpedo US-led efforts to root out remnants of the Islamic State. Kobane attributed Turkey’s latest attacks to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s efforts to stoke up nationalist sentiments ahead of elections next year. A prolonged economic downturn with runaway inflation and rising joblessness is threatening Erdogan’s near two decades in power. What better distraction than war? Turkey argues that armed Syrian Kurdish groups and their alleged Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) mentors were responsible for a Nov. 13 bomb attack in Istanbul that claimed six lives. This week’s airstrikes were billed as revenge for those deaths. Kobane denied any connection to the bombing, saying he wants peaceful, neighborly ties with Ankara. Al-Monitor: Can you confirm that your headquarters adjoining a US-led coalition base in Hasakah where I interviewed you numerous times was struck in a Turkish drone attack today? Kobane: Yes. The drone struck an area around 500 meters away from that building. Al-Monitor: You are on Turkey’s most wanted list. Were you the target of that attack? Kobane: I can’t say that for sure. But it’s also a fact that Turkey tried to kill me in the past on several occasions and this is where I am known to carry out my activities. Al-Monitor: Do you believe that Turkey gave advance notice to the United States ahead of the attack because US and coalition forces are stationed literally next to your own headquarters? Kobane: The Turks know that the Americans are present there. It's a joint facility. We carry out joint training of our forces there. One would have to ask the Americans themselves if they were forewarned, but as far as we know, the Turks carried out a de facto attack. Al-Monitor: What do you mean by that? Kobane: I don’t think the Americans knew that this attack was going to take place. We can say the attack took place despite their presence there. Al-Monitor: Were you there when the attack occurred? Kobane: I can’t tell you that. Al-Monitor: Do you believe that Turkey will actually carry out a ground offensive as President Erdogan again threatened today? Kobane: We take these threats seriously. Unless there is a serious effort to deter Turkey, especially on the part of the United States and Russia, they will do it. Al-Monitor: The Department of Defense and the State Department put out separate statements warning against further escalation, as did the Russians, who said they had been working for months to prevent a Turkish assault. What did you make of those statements? Kobane: They are absolutely not strong enough when compared against Turkey’s threats and certainly not enough to deter further Turkish aggression. They need to do more. Al-Monitor: But we also know that without a green light from either Washington or Moscow, Turkey cannot conduct a ground offensive against Kurdish forces located in their respective zones of influence. Any successful ground operation would require support from the air, as we saw in Turkey’s previous invasions. Unless Russia and the United States allow Turkish planes to use the airspace under their control, Turkey won’t be able to move, right? Kobane: It’s true that unless they are granted such permission, the Turks will not carry out a ground offensive. That, anyway, is what I believe and what our people believe. If there is a ground invasion it will be because such permission was accorded or because [Russia and the United States] chose to remain silent. Al-Monitor: Surely you’ve spoken to the Americans. Did they tell you that they would not authorize a Turkish incursion? Kobane: That has been their stance until the present. They tell us that they do not approve of any such action by Turkey and that they would oppose it. After today’s attack we spoke to our US interlocutors. But this is a brand new situation and so we are jointly assessing it. Al-Monitor: Did you try to reach White House Coordinator for the Middle East Brett McGurk after the attack? Kobane: My people spoke to his people, but I did not speak to him personally. To be honest, we had our hands full with all that happened today. Al-Monitor: Then what did the US officials you did speak to following the attack have to say? Kobane: They said they were not expecting such an attack and that they were assessing this new situation. I am hoping that a result of this assessment the United States will adopt a far firmer stance in the face of Turkish aggression against our people. Al-Monitor: And what are the Russians saying? Kobane: They are saying more or less what the Americans are saying, but I would add that they are even less firm with Turkey. Russia does oppose a Turkish land incursion, but it's just not enough. Kobani, Manbij, all those areas that are being targeted by Turkey are under Russian control. Al-Monitor: Turkey officials claimed to the media after the latest wave of airstrikes against your lands that they did not use Syrian airspace. They said they launched their attacks from Turkish territory. Kobane: The Turkish Armed Forces are lying. They just attacked an area 70 kilometers deep into our territory between Raqqa and Hasakah which is controlled jointly by US and Russian forces. Al-Monitor: Well, that must have shaken your trust in both Russia and the United States then? Kobane: A lot hinges on how they respond to this new situation. These attacks have reached a critical threshold. They need to deter them from hereon. Al-Monitor: Is it fair to say that the conflict in Ukraine is a factor in all of this? Turkey has emerged as a key player because of its geographic location and its close ties to Russia and Ukraine, among other things. Russia clearly wants to keep relations with Ankara on an even keel, much as does Washington and its European allies. Is this happening at the expense of the Kurds? Kobane: There is little doubt that Turkey has taken advantage of the conflict and marketed itself successfully to the United States and Russia alike. And if both of these countries are failing to meet our expectations in the face of Turkish aggression against us, it is partly related to the dynamics around the Ukraine conflict. It’s also true that US interest in the Middle East and in Syria in particular has waned. Al-Monitor: So how do you defend yourself in this situation? What are your options? Will you need to turn to Damascus for its help? Kobane: That is naturally what Russia wants. They want us to seek an agreement with the Syrian regime. As for the United States, they need to articulate a clearer policy on Syria. They have no strategy beyond fighting [the Islamic State] and have failed to formulate a clear policy with regard to the future of the areas under our control. The absence of this policy makes it harder for us to negotiate successfully with Damascus. Al-Monitor: Yet the United States is not opposed to your holding talks with Damascus? Kobane: That’s right. Al-Monitor: What is the obstacle to an agreement with Damascus? Kobane: They aren’t ready, and Russia is not applying enough pressure on them. The other problem, of course, is that the government in Damascus sees itself as irreplaceable, without alternative, and this mindset makes them that more intractable and unresponsive to our demands. Al-Monitor: Have the protests in Iran and the fact that they are concentrated in Kurdish majority areas have any impact on the dynamics in Syria? Kobane: We haven’t had any dealings with Iran on these issues, but the unrest in Iran is certainly having an effect on the dynamics in Syria. That said, Iran is seized with its own internal problems. We have not observed them increasing their influence in Syria in any noticeable way. Al-Monitor: Should Erdogan make good on his threats of a land invasion, which part of northeast Syria is he likely to attack this time? Kobane: They have recently spoken of Manbij, but we believe their true target is Kobani. Kobani is highly symbolic for the Kurds. It’s where our national struggle was launched and also where the fight against the Islamic State took off. It’s also of strategic significance, as it will allow Turkey to join Azaz [west of the Euphrates river] to the areas Turkey seized in October 2019. Al-Monitor: Have you noticed any increased military activity by Turkey, like a troop buildup and the like, near Kobani? Kobane: Not until now. All we’ve had are airstrikes. But an operation against Kobani would not require all that much preparation. Al-Monitor: For Russia, Kobani is more dispensable than, say, Manbij or Tell Rifaat, which are vital for the defense of Aleppo. So perhaps it would be less resistant to the idea of a Turkish invasion of Kobani? Kobane: It’s true they are more concerned by areas lying west of the Euphrates. But for the Americans, Kobani is a symbol. Al-Monitor: Are you concerned that Turkey may act in concert with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) fighters in any ground invasion? That worry has certainly been aired by some of your colleagues. Kobane: Recent developments which saw HTS take over parts of Afrin, and its relations with Turkey in general, point to potential preparations for a jointly coordinated attack against us. Turkey will want to use them in an operation against Manbij and the areas around it. Al-Monitor: Why is Turkey attacking you so intensively at this particular time? Kobane: Turkey is opposed to gains by any Kurds, be they in Syria, Iraq, Iran or inside Turkey itself. Turkey wants to destroy our autonomous administration. That’s its overarching goal. But most immediately there is the question of elections in Turkey. Though these attacks, Erdogan and his government are laying the ground, setting the public mood for the forthcoming elections. Al-Monitor: I am currently in Erbil, as you know, and senior officials here keep saying that if you were to draw a clear line between yourself and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK], Turkey would be ready to work with you. What’s your response? Kobane: I don’t believe that this is the real issue. It’s just an excuse. Turkey is against all Kurdish gains. If the [opposition Syrian] Kurdish National Council were running this region, it too would face the same hostility from Turkey. Turkey is against the Kurds. Al-Monitor: Some analysts in Turkey contend that the Istanbul bombing was carried out by deep state elements bent on derailing Erdogan’s potential new overture to the Kurds and in particular to the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Does that make sense to you? Kobane: We’ve heard these theories. The truth is that there are two paths that lie before Erdogan ahead of the elections. He can either reach an agreement with the Kurdish movement, and that would give him an edge in the elections, or ignite a war. They’ve chosen war. Erdogan has chosen war. Al-Monitor: So who do you believe was responsible for the Istanbul bomb attack? Kobane: I believe it was an act of provocation that was conceived by the Turkish government in order to lay the ground for the war against us. We did a lot of research and have concluded that the attack was perpetrated by Syrian opposition groups operating under Turkey’s control. We established, for example, and I am revealing this information to the media for the first time, that the woman who was arrested for planting the bomb comes from a family linked to the Islamic State. Three of her brothers died fighting for the Islamic State. One died in Raqqa, another in Manbij, and a third died in Iraq. Another brother is a commander in the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition in Afrin. She was married to three different Islamic State fighters and the family is from Aleppo. We had absolutely nothing to do with the bombing and we have no such policy. Al-Monitor: You have vowed to respond to Turkey’s attacks. The SDF spokesman Farhad Shami tweeted in Turkish about “revenge.” Are you planning to go to war against Turkey? Kobane: No, we are planning to defend our lands against Turkey, to fight if they attack us inside our lands, in Serekaniye [Ras el Ain] in Azaz, in Afrin, in Jarabulus. We have no intention or desire to fight Turkey inside Turkish lands. Al-Monitor: I know you are super busy, so one final question. I have done numerous interviews with you over the course of the years and each time you have expressed your desire for peaceful relations with Turkey. Do you still think peace with Turkey is possible for as long as Erdogan is in power? Kobane: Judging by past experience and Turkey’s recent attacks, sadly, my answer would have to be no. Al-Monitor: But then we just saw Erdogan shake hands with Egypt's president El Sisi and with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, men he’s long reviled and fiercely criticized. He could maybe shake hands with you too, no? Kobane: It's true that Erdogan is the master of U-turns. He is super pragmatic. Let us hope that there can be peace between us and Turkey one day.

Northern Iraq and the Kurdistani Disputed Territories

By Fred Aprim It is stated that territorial disputes are often linked to wealth through the control of natural resources, but they can also be driven by sectarian, religious, ethnic and national security reasons. There are several border and land disputes in the world today, few had led to military conflicts and others could escalate to military confrontation at any given minute. Amanda Ellery explains that territorial disputes are known for being motivated by states’ desire to increase power; however, countries often choose to enter territorial disputes for normative reasons too. Whenever territories under dispute are valuable to countries in terms of natural resources, conflicts can be expected to escalate. The escalation of conflicts also means a tragedy to human beings, especially those unprotected and vulnerable. The more recent conflict between the Iraqi government and officials of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq (KRI) over the so-called disputed territories has devastated both the indigenous Assyrians and Yezidis. Vast areas of these territories are new claims as they were introduced by the empowered Kurds after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The Kurds attempted all possible to capitalize from the rise of anarchy and lawlessness in Iraq, which weakened the central government. Before we proceed, it is important to understand that northern Iraq is historic Assyria. This is an unequivocal historical fact. Over the last few centuries, the Kurds have increased their numbers by welcoming more Kurds from Turkey and Iran. In contrast, the indigenous Assyrians have continued to leave their historic homes and villages, because of continuous attacks on their lands and the Kurdish armed rebellion since 1961. On Sept 25, 2017, the then KRI president and still the leader the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Masoud Barzani, authorized an independence referendum of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region. About 93 percent of the Kurdish voters supported a Kurdish secession. [i] The case for carving the KRI and other alleged disputed territories from Iraq and establishing a Kurdistan on Assyrian lands has been propagated by Kurdish nationalists, historians and leaders for some time. According to MEMRI, on the one-hundredth anniversary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 19, 1916), Barzani made a public speech in which he stated that the said agreement had failed and that Iraq is too sectarian and that “if partnership cannot be achieved, let us be brothers and good neighbors.”[ii] The Kurds have no intention to live in Iraq indefinitely. They are waiting for the right moment to transform the current regional 2009 draft constitution to a central law of the illusive Kurdistan. The Iraqi Supreme Court ruled that Barzani’s referendum on Kurdish independence was unconstitutional. Following the vote, Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-’Abadi with the help of al-Hashd al-Sha’abi militias (Popular Mobilization Forces), Baghdad seized control of the alleged Kurdistani disputed territories, including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk,[iii] which the Kurds occupied after the withdrawal of ISIS.[iv] Barzani was forced to resign his position as the president of the KRI, replaced by his nephew, Nechirvan Barzani. Later, Nechirvan nominated his cousin, Masrour Barzani (Masoud’s son), to replace him as the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Barzani family enterprise dominates political and economic life in the KRI capital of Arbil. The leadership in the KRI and the KRG has been a family affair since the escape of Mulla Mustafa Barzani (Masoud’s father) from Iran in 1946 after the collapse of the Kurdish Mahabad Republic and later entering Iraq. The Mahabad Republic lasted 11 months only. It is interesting to know that Masoud Barzani was born in Iran. On June 12, 2008, the president of Washington Kurdish Institute, Dr. Najmaldin Karim, issued a statement[v] in which he criticized the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) for its arbitrary recommendations regarding the issue of the disputed territories. Dr. Karim added, UNAMI has failed to address the core elements of Article 140 of the Iraq Constitution that commit the Iraqi government to reverse past racist policies through the process of normalization and referendum, which was negotiated and decided as a fair way to resolve the territorial issues. He then said that the issue is too important to the future of Kurdistan and Iraq as a whole to accept further equivocation and procrastination. He urged the leadership of Kurdistan Alliance and the KRG to stand firm against the deliberate encroachment upon historical and legitimate Kurdish rights. However, not a single Kurdish leader addresses the land disputes between the Kurdish newcomers and the indigenous Assyrians. On June 13, 2008, United Press International (UPI) reported that UNAMI had released a report on June 5 regarding four districts in Iraq to serve as benchmarks for the Iraqi government to reach broader national reconciliation measures as part of the Iraqi Constitution. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution seeks to reverse ethnic policies implemented by Saddam Hussein. Masoud Barzani issued a statement that the UN report was not a suitable essence for solving the problems and that it runs contrary to the constitutional demands of applying Article 140.[vi] However, we must understand that many important articles of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution were written ambiguously by non-Iraqis which opened the doors for personal interpretations later on. In its report, the UN said that the KRG can administer the cities of Akre (Aqra) and Makhmour in the Nineveh province while Baghdad would control Hamdaniya, also in Nineveh, and Mandali in Diyala province. Kurdish leaders sent a letter to the UN special envoy to Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, expressing their displeasure with the report. Kurdish lawmaker Arez Abdullah added that the report did not “respect the will of Kurds concerning disputed areas.” It is not understood what Abdullah is trying to say since the Hamdaniya District was historically inhabited by Assyrians and Yezidis and few other smaller religious groups, but never had a Kurdish presence. Why are the Kurdish officials claiming that the historic Assyrian Nineveh Plain (al-Hamdaniya, Tel Kaif and al-Shaikhan Districts) is a Kurdistani disputed territory? Assyrian lawmakers continued their efforts to prevent the Kurdish accession of the Nineveh Plain and other illegal practices by the Kurdish leaders. In a letter dated April 25, 2008, from the Assyrian General Conference to Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, the Assyrian group expressed concerns about the mission of de Mistura and the Kurdish pressure and activities. The group suggested to the UN to do the followings: Work for normalization of the situation under international supervision and protection of the United Nations according to the census in 1957 before holding any referendum in the northern governorates of Iraq. Consideration of the Assyrian General Conference, demand and support the establishment of the Assyrian region in northern Iraq. Taking into consideration the fact that the Nineveh Governorate and surroundings are linked to central administration. Taking into consideration the current Duhok Governorate was one of the administrative districts of Nineveh Governorate. The inclusion of the Duhok Governorate in the disputed areas as it was subjected to demographic and geographic changes that negatively impacted the Assyrian national presence and the issue of the province is still not resolved.[vii] Efforts by the Assyrian and some non-Assyrian groups to protect the Assyrian regions continued. On October 21, 2017, Dr. Salim Abd Allah al-Jiburi, head of the Iraqi Parliament, forwarded a request from Imad Youkhana, Deputy Secretary General of the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), to the Iraqi Federal Court, requesting clarification on several issues related to the so-called disputed territories. First, he requested a definition for the term disputed territories. Second, he asked what standards were applied to identify regions that were disputed. Third, he inquired about the entities that would decide those territories. [viii] In the words of Dr. Michael Youash, this issue has not been contested in formal political processes but, rather, as part of a “facts-on-the-ground-realpolitik-power-contest” between Baghdad and Arbil. The drift between Baghdad and Arbil continues today at the expense of the most vulnerable indigenous Assyrians and Yezidis in northern Iraq. The alleged disputed territories is a very vital point that the Kurds try to keep on the negotiation table while they look ahead to the future and their elusive state. Three regions in Iraq the Kurds desire the most are: the oil-rich Kirkuk[ix]; the Nineveh Plain with its newly discovered large oil reserves; and finally, Yezidis’ Sinjar, further to the west, in an effort to create a wide border between the KRI and Syria. Currently, that border outlet is narrow through Nohadra (Duhok), but the Kurds desire to enlarge it through the annexation of Sinjar to create a wide corridor between the Kurds in northern Iraq and those in Syria toward a Greater Kurdistan. On June 12, 2014, following the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive, during which ISIS secured control of Tikrit, northern Baghdad, and nearby areas in Syria, the Iraqi army evacuated Kirkuk, and the Kurdish Peshmerga occupied the city. More Kurds were allowed to enter the city in an attempt to change Kirkuk’s demographic in anticipation of future census and elections. We must also consider the followings: First, the Peshmerga confiscated the arms of the indigenous Assyrians and Yezidis only weeks before the invasion of ISIS claiming that they, the Peshmerga, will protect them. Second, as ISIS initiated their attack on Nineveh Plain, the peshmerga withdrew without any real fight leaving the indigenous Assyrians and Yezidis in the region under the mercy of ISIS. Usama al-Nujaifi, a Sunni Arab from Mosul, Nineveh Governorate, served as Minister of Industry in the 2005–2006 Iraqi Transitional Government. He later won a seat in the 2010 Iraqi parliamentary elections. While heading a parliamentary committee to assess the humanitarian situation in Nineveh Governorate, he criticized the conduct of Governor Duraid Kashmoula (governor of the Nineveh Province 2004–2009), stating, “We have seen no trace of the huge sums of money said to have been appropriated for the province and could gather no idea on how they were spent.” In October 2008, he declared that the 2008 attacks on the Christians in Mosul were carried out by the Kurdish Peshmerga and intelligence operatives. [x] On May 17, 2009, al-Nujaifi asked that Kurdish militias (Peshmerga) be removed from the non-Kurdish districts of Sinjar, Zamar, Telkaif, Shekhan, Ba’asheqa, and Makhmor in the Nineveh Province. He stated that the Kurdish Peshmerga terrorizes the inhabitants, imprisons and threaten the people, and transfers those they apprehend to other areas in the three Kurdish-controlled governorates. [xi] However, a weak central government in Baghdad handed the KRG leaders the opportunities to dig in in all the new territories they controlled illegally. A human rights report asserted that when the Peshmerga joined with the Iraqi Army and al-Hashd al-Sha’abi (PMU) to fight IS (ISIS), they used a special pattern of destroying buildings, homes, and even entire villages during the fighting, especially those villages that fell within the so-called disputed territories. The Kurdish leaders understand that the displaced people who were chased out by IS from their homes in those territories would not be able to return to their homes if those homes were destroyed. These leaders also understand that any rebuilding would take years, if not decades, during which time many of the original inhabitants would be relocated and settled in other regions or even countries. Thus, the plans by Kurds to move in and claim those territories would have less opposition. The report identified seventeen villages in Kirkuk and four in the Nineveh Governorate that were unlawfully demolished between September 2014 and May 2016. The report went on to state, “In a further 62 villages that researchers were not able to visit, satellite imagery provides evidence of destruction after Kurdish security forces recaptured them, but a lack of witness accounts did not allow for definitive conclusions as to the reasons and responsibility for the destruction.”[xii] Other observers, like Congressman Wolf, agreed with the analysis that the political struggle between the Iraqi government and the KRG over the alleged disputed territories is crucial for the displaced population.[xiii] Assyrians in Iraq and elsewhere fear a return to these areas and to relive the nightmarish battles over the disputed lands. Security remains the main deterrent preventing the return of the displaced populations and refugees. The Nineveh Plain is under the control of various militias and armed forces, including Iraqi security forces, the KDP Peshmerga, PMF Brigade 30, and PMF Babylon Brigade 50, and a smaller defensive Assyrian Nineveh Plain Protection Unit (NPU). The NPU, on its own, does not have the resources to compete with the Kurdish and the nongovernmental Arab militias. The indigenous Assyrians, Yezidis, Mandeans, and other minority ethnic and religious groups do not possess the military power, creating a struggle to pass any reasonable solution in regards to the future of these smaller indigenous communities. The October 2003 Chaldo-Assyrian National Conference in Baghdad agreed on a reliant direct link between the planned new Nineveh Plain governorate with the central government for financial sustainability. Shortly after the conclusion of the conference, the KRG leadership entitled the Nineveh Plain as part of the alleged disputed territories and began, first, coercing the Assyrian religious leaders, who had previously agreed to the outcomes of the October Conference, to back out and reject the recommendations and second, began to rephrase the language of their draft KRI constitution to include many of the districts of the Nineveh Plain as part of the KRI region and included the Nineveh Plain as part of the so-called disputed territories. The Nineveh Plain was eligible to become a governorate based on the initial approval of the Iraqi Council of Ministers in 2014 and in accordance with Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution. It was the invasion of ISIS of Nineveh that placed the plan on the back burner. ISIS invasion benefited the Kurds since not a single town, village or region within the KRI was attacked by ISIS. Five years have passed since the defeat of ISIS in Iraq. Yet not a single Assyrian village has been fully rehabilitated and re-inhabited. Many homes remain destroyed and/or deserted and many towns and villages still lack the basic and essential services that were destroyed by ISIS. There is a reason why the KRG delays any discussion on the rebuilding of the abandoned villages and towns in the Nineveh Plain. The longer it takes to reconstruct, the less are the chances that the original occupants would return. Meanwhile, the Peshmerga and Shia militias continue to assert themselves in the Nineveh Plain. From one side, the KRG fuels the alleged disputed territories’ argument with the central government in Baghdad. On the other, the KDP and Sunni Arabs within the Nineveh Governorate deliberate on the future of Nineveh Plain despite the fact that the region was never a part of the so-called disputed territories or part of Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. This was confirmed by the decisions of the Iraqi Federal Court and by a UN report in 2007. The indigenous Assyrians and Yezidis deserve to live free, in peace and prosperity on their ancestral lands along the rest of the Iraqi people. The United Nations declaration on human rights and the rights of indigenous people must be applied to the indigenous Assyrians and Yezidis in Iraq. However, the apathetic leaders in Baghdad and their land grabbing counterparts in Arbil make it impossible for the indigenous groups to survive peacefully on their ancestral lands. [i] “Iraqi Kurds decisively back independence in referendum,”BBC News, September 27, 2017. [ii] MEMRI, “Kurdish President Barzani: The Sykes-Picot Agreement Has Failed; It Is Time to Establish a Kurdish State,” Special Dispatch 6444, May 23, 2016, https://www.memri.org/reports, accessed February 27, 2019. [iii] Wikipedia, s.v., “2018 Iraqi parliamentary election,” accessed April 24, 2020. [iv] “Iraq Supreme Court rules Kurdish referendum unconstitutional,” BBC,November 20, 2017. [v] WKI Press Release, June 12, 2008. [vi] The Kurdish Globe. [vii] Ishaia Isho to Ban Ki-moon, April 25, 2008, Assyrian General Conference. http://www.assyriangc.com/9.html, accessed December 10, 2020. [viii] Frederick Aprim. “The Betrayal of the Powerless”. Xlibris Press. 2020. Appendix B [ix] According to the 1957 Iraqi census of before Arabization, Kirkuk was 40 percent Turkoman and 35 percent Kurdish. George Packer, “The Next Iraqi War?” The New Yorker, October 4, 2004. 64. [x] Wikipedia, s.v., “Osama al-Nujaifi,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_al-Nujaifi. [xi] Iraq News Network, http://www.aliraqnews.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=24518. [xii] “Marked With An ‘X’ – Iraqi Kurdish Forces’ Destruction of Villages, Homes in Conflict with ISIS,” Human Rights Watch, November 13, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/report. [xiii] Helen Malko, a study titled, “Heritage Wars: A Cultural Genocide in Iraq.” Published in, Cultural Genocide: Law, Politics, and Global Manifestations, edited by Jeffrey S. Bachman, Routledge, 2019.

DNO Reports Strong Third Quarter Results

DNO ASA, the Norwegian oil and gas operator, today reported third quarter operating profit of USD 191 million on revenues of USD 339 million driven by strong production at the flagship Kurdistan Tawke license and continued high oil and gas prices. In Kurdistan, gross operated production totaled 109,100 barrels of oil per day (bopd) in the quarter (107,200 bopd in the second quarter), of which the Peshkabir field contributed 62,000 bopd, the Tawke field 46,500 bopd and the newly commissioned Baeshiqa field 600 bopd. DNO’s net share of production from Kurdistan totaled 81,700 bopd in the quarter (80,400 bopd in the second quarter). In the North Sea, net production averaged 14,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boepd) in the quarter (11,600 boepd in the second quarter). In August, DNO announced the Ofelia discovery in the highly prospective Troll-Gjøa area offshore Norway, an area in which the Company holds 12 licenses and has scheduled a six-well exploration program over the next 12 months. Also in Norway, the Company continues to review its field development projects ahead of yearend 2022 investment decisions in light of recent proposed fiscal changes. The Company’s operational spend in the third quarter stood at USD 192 million, bringing the total to USD 548 million over the first nine months. Full-year 2022 operational spend is now expected to be USD 725 million, down from USD 800 million, largely due to the reduction in US dollar denominated spending in the North Sea. With a free cash flow of USD 151 million in the quarter, DNO continued to pare back gross debt. The outstanding amount of the DNO03 bond was reduced from USD 176 million to USD 131 million, while drawdowns under the reserve-based lending facility dropped from USD 95 million to USD 35 million. At the end of the quarter, gross cash deposits stood at USD 818 million and net cash totaled USD 252 million. Last month, the Company closed the transaction with its largest shareholder RAK Petroleum plc, in which DNO had an ownership interest, pursuant to an all-share transfer, to acquire gas and liquids production, development and exploration assets offshore Côte d’Ivoire. Following the inter-company transfer, DNO holds a 9.09 percent stake in Block CI-27 and an eight percent stake in exploration Block CI-12, both through Mondoil Enterprises, LLC, which, in turn, holds its stake through and participates in the management of Foxtrot International LDC, the operator of the two Côte d’Ivoire licenses. At its 2 November 2022 meeting, the Board of Directors approved a dividend payment of NOK 0.25 per share to be made in November 2022. With the completion of the DNO-RAK Petroleum transaction, the Board also announced that of one of its long-serving members, Shelley M. Watson, was stepping down to pursue other interests in her home country, Australia. “Shelley, whose last position was RAK Petroleum’s Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer, served as a DNO director for 12 years and is respected and liked by all who worked with her,” said Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, DNO’s Executive Chairman. “She will be missed,” he added.

DrawMedia.net / KRI Activists urge Canadian PM Justin Trudeau to pressure the KRG to stop their brutality against critics and freedom of the press

KRI Activists urge Canadian PM Justin Trudeau to pressure the KRG to stop their brutality against critics and freedom of the press

Draw Media In an Open letter, a group of activists and journalists seeking intervention from Canadian PM Justin Trudeau to Pressure the KRG to stop their brutality against critics and freedom of the press and Advocate for the impartiality of the courts and the sovereignty of the law in the region. In October 2020, around 81 journalists and activists were arrested in Dohuk governorate of Iraqi Kurdistan, and have been behind bars because they had asked for basic rights: electricity, clean water, unpaid salaries and a solution to the high unemployment rate. The journalists had been unfortunately sentenced on the charges of “destabilizing national security and espionage”. This unjust case brought to light serious concerns about the increasing threat that narrows the scope of journalism and freedom of the press and human rights in Iraqi Kurdistan. Due to such pressures, many journalists have fled to European countries and North America - especially Canada. The mentioned journalists, their terms having finished, are still behind bars and they are mentally and psychologically tortured. They are prevented from talking to their families and relatives and are further isolated in prison. Sherwan Sherwani, one of the imprisoned journalists, claimed that Asayesh (Kurdish security forces) threatened to sexually assault his wife if he did not confess to the false charges that had been laid against him. Ayaz Karim, another convicted journalist, was forcefully and unlawfully stripped of his national identity document. The lawyer of the journalists, Aram Raafat was abducted on October 10th, 2022 as well. Such stories illuminate the escalating plight of journalists and activists in Iraqi Kurdistan. For many years now, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan hoped their government would uphold their promises of democracy and freedom of speech and press in the Middle East. But several journalists had been assassinated over the years, and they continue to face threats, abduction and torture by security forces. In October 2022, the Special Anti-Terrorism group in the city of Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan abducted and tortured two senior journalists, Sartip Qashqayi and Ibrahim Ali, for criticizing corruption, nepotism, and mistreatment of citizens. Some journalists had already fled to the neighbouring countries due to receiving death threats. These instances show that the practice of journalism and freedom of speech has been undermined. We, as a group of Kurdish Canadian journalists, writers, and artists strongly believe that freedom of journalism and freedom of expression are crucial aspects that contribute to the dignity and respect for humanity. According to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, freedom of expression and speech are fundamental rights of everyone. We mention this because Canada is a real partner of Iraq and Kurdistan Region, and we request that you and your cabinet condemn the unlawful imprisonment of the journalists and activists and pressure the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) to stop their brutality and injustices against critics and freedom of the press. The world was hoping that the KRG would become a beacon of freedom and justice not only for Iraq but for the rest of the Middle East. But unfortunately, the whole world is watching the crackdown on democracy and freedom of speech through politically motivated decisions and biased courts. We respectfully urge you to: Pressure the KRG to stop their brutality against critics and freedom of the press. Pressure the KRG to withdraw the false and illegal charges against these journalists and activists and release them. Advocate for the impartiality of the courts and the sovereignty of the law in the region. Sincerely, Lozan Yamolky, Poet Rzgar Hama Rashid, Theatre Artist Nasik Kadir, Social Researcher Khalid Sulaiman, Journalist Dr. Kawa Ibrahim, Political Activist Trifa Ali, Gender Activist Shanga Karim, Journalist Kazhal Hama Rashid, Gender activist Dilan Qadir, Writer Fatah Zaxoy, Political Analyst Goran Abdullah, Journalist Dinia Ismail, /Political Activist Niyazi Hamid, journalist Alla Lateef, Journalist Hardi Ahmed Darwesh, Journalist Taha Sulaiman, Journalist Masoud Hashmi, Journalist Jalal Mawlood, Political Activist Sherwan Othman, Political Activist Jalal Horeni, Journalist Nazhad Siwaily, Journalist Kamaran Mohamad, Journalist Shalaw Fatah, Journalist Hemin Raouf, Journalist Shorsh Hosseinzadeh, Writer Nasyar Awl, Political Activist Farhad Karimi, Political Activist Bahman Hassan, Journalist Kazhaw Jamal, Journalist Kochar Abubakr, Writer Dashti Sabah, Journalist Kordonya Hassan, Journalist Mahdi Mala Raheem, Journalist Khadijeh Sinei, Gender Activist Diary Marif, Journalist

Dana Gas reports 64% increase in normalized Net Profit to $161 million

Dana Gas, natural gas Company in the Middle East, announced increase in its normalized net profit to 161 million on November 9. According to the announcement 11% of its production capacity is in Kurdistan Regional Government. “The gains in Dana Gas’s profitability in the first nine months of the year were driven by higher realized prices, prudent cost control and strong operational performance in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI),” the announcement added. For the first nine months of the year, the Company generated a net profit of AED 589 million ($161mm) or 8.4 fils per share, a 64% increase compared to an adjusted net profit (excluding the other income and impairments) of AED 358 million ($98 mm) in 9M 2021. The Company’s 9M revenues increased 24% year on year to AED 1,521 million ($415 million) compared to AED 1,224 ($334 million) in 9M 2021 whilst operating costs declined by 7%. The Company’s realized prices for the first nine months averaged $85/bbl for condensate and $43/boe for LPG compared to $51/bbl and $34/boe respectively in 9M 2021. In the first nine months, production in the KRI increased 1% and at the beginning of the fourth quarter, production capacity increased at the Khor Mor Gas Plant by 50 MMscf/d to 500 MMscf/d following the successful completion of further plant de-bottlenecking enhancements. Dr Patrick Allman-Ward, CEO of Dana Gas, commented: “Dana Gas produced another robust set of financial results in the first nine months of the year, reflecting the Company’s continued attention to cost controls amid higher production in the KRI and supportive hydrocarbon prices. While headwinds to the global economy are increasing amid higher inflation and slowing growth, the outlook remains positive given continued elevated energy prices and the Company’s strong balance sheet and low debt position.” Operations & Production The Group’s overall production in 9M 2022 was 60,600 boepd, a 4% reduction from 63,200 boepd in 9M 2021. This was due to a 10% production drop in Egypt, mainly as a result of natural field declines. Production output in the KRI increased slightly with production averaging 34,300 boepd in 9M 2022 versus 34,000 in 9M 2021. Liquidity The Company’s cash position as at September 30 stood at AED 784 million ($214mm), including AED 271 million ($74mm) held at the Pearl level. The Company distributed an interim dividend to shareholders in October for the first six months of 2022 of 4.5 fils per share, equivalent to AED 315 million ($86mm). Dana Gas is the Middle East’s first and largest regional private sector natural gas Company which founded in 2005. Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum made an agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 2007, and established The Kurdistan Gas Project.

Ex-intel chief Talabany warns Iraqi Kurds risk civil conflict leaving Turkey, Iran room to meddle

Al-monitor, Amberin Zaman Draw Media Ousted Iraqi Kurdish Intel Chief Lahur Talabany warns of civil conflict amid escalating tensions between the main Iraqi Kurdish factions, and insists that Kurds' future lies in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan is gripped by turbulence as it comes under mounting aggression from Iran and Turkey, and as Baghdad seeks to wrest full control of its oil and gas industry. Rampant corruption and a lack of economic opportunity are prompting a rising number of young Iraqi Kurds to flee the country. As if things were not bad enough, the two largest political parties — the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that was founded by Iraq’s first post-war president, the late Jalal Talabani — are quarreling again over power and money, prompting worries of a resurgence of the civil conflict that convulsed the region in the mid-1990s. The difference today is that not only are the parties at odds with each other, they are also mired in internal rivalries. Lahur Talabany, former co-chair of the PUK who led the Sulaimaniyah region’s intelligence services and the US-trained Counter Terrorism Group, was ousted by his cousins Bafel and Qubad Talabani last summer in a Byzantine power grab. It was the most overt manifestation yet of the intra-family feuds simmering in the Talabani and Barzani dynasties. Talabany, an architect of the United States’ alliance with the Syrian Kurds in the fight against the Islamic State, is well regarded in Western circles as a clearheaded and effective partner if ruthless in his own right. Despite recent setbacks, few believe his political career is over. Many are betting on a comeback because Talabany continues to enjoy popular support in his native Sulaimaniyah. We caught up with Talabany as he met with British officials in London this week and delivered a speech at the House of Commons Nov. 1 to a packed audience of mainly Iraqi Kurds. In his first ever interview with the media since relinquishing power, Talabany shared his views on a wide range of issues, from the protests in Iran to continuing tensions in Yazidi-dominated Sinjar. The former spy chief also shared unique insights on the slain Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and Turkey’s intelligence tsar Hakan Fidan. Here are the highlights of the interview that was lightly edited for clarity. Al-Monitor: As a top counter intelligence official in the KRG you have worked on the Iran file for long years, you lived in Iran as a younger man, you know Iran intimately. How do you assess the ongoing protests in Iran that began in September following the death of a Kurdish woman, Zhina Amini (also known as Mahsa Amini), at the hands of the regime’s morality police? Can this lead to any substantive change in the regime and its behavior? Talabany: There is definitely a difference between these demonstrations and the previous demonstrations. They are multi-ethnic, they are country wide, and women and youth are leading the protests. Not having a strong and united opposition that can guide the demonstrations and serve as an umbrella makes them unsustainable. If the Iranians see that this is getting out of control, they will really crack down. Al-Monitor: But they seem to be already really cracking down and yet they are continuing. Talabany: They are not behaving with the same brutality they did in previous protests because there are women and youngsters involved. I don’t believe the Iranians have shown all their cards yet. If they manage to keep the demonstrations going for the next few months, then there could be an opposition building. I already see among the Kurdish opposition groups, people who didn’t speak to one another are now communicating, meeting. I assume on the outside there are people reaching out to each other, Kurds to Persians, Persians to Kurds, but that depends on whether they can continue the demonstrations over an extended period. That’s key. Al-Monitor: There are different dynamics at play here. On the one hand you have a general anger felt by a large number of Iranians towards the regime. People are demanding freedom. On the other hand, you have grievances that are specific to Iran’s Kurds. In what ways do these grievances intersect and diverge? Talabany: There have always been grievances in Iranian Kurdistan. The Kurds have always been repressed. But the Kurds will never be able to change things on their own. So, this is a chance for everybody to come together. Al-Monitor: So some parallels with Iraq in 1991, when the Kurds took a lead role in organizing the opposition? Talabany: And then you saw the Shiites also taking a lead role. Underneath, there is something boiling for sure. Al-Monitor: But the difference then was that the Americans were very much involved in the regime change effort. Do you see any potential for Western intervention in Iran if these protests continue? Talabany: Ten months down the line, maybe. But at the moment there are nuclear negotiations going on. There is no united opposition. Who would replace the current regime in Iran? I don’t think the Americans want more chaos after what happened in Syria and Iraq. Iran is different. It will affect the whole region. There is too much at stake for everyone. Al-Monitor: The rallying slogan for these protests is "Jin Jiyan Azadi," or “Women Life Freedom.” It was coined by followers of Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the PKK, during the fight against the Islamic State. We know the PKK is active inside Iran and has an Iranian offshoot called PEJAK. Is the PKK involved in the demonstrations? Is it mobilizing its sympathizers against the regime? Talabany: We know there are relationships between the PEJAK and the PKK, this is known to everybody, even though the PKK denies it. PEJAK is very well organized inside Kurdish towns and villages inside Iran. They are probably the most well organized. There could be PEJAK involvement. But I am not talking about units sent from the mountains into the cities. These are people with loyalty to PEJAK who live inside Iranian Kurdistan who are taking part in the demonstrations. Al-Monitor: So PEJAK has no clearly defined role in them per se? Talabany: No, I don't think so. Al-Monitor: What is the potential fallout for Iraqi Kurdistan? Iran has struck Iranian Kurdish opposition groups inside Iraqi Kurdistan sending a very strong signal that it won’t tolerate any actions to further mobilize people against the regime. How far would Iran be willing to go against these groups outside Iran? Talabany: They have already applied a lot of pressure and I know that a team was summoned from Iraqi Kurdistan to go to Tehran. The KRG minister of interior was among them. Iranians want the disarmament of these groups and for them to be gathered in camps, away from the cities. Further down the road, they want them extradited to foreign countries in the same way that the MEK [Mujahedin-e-Khalq] was to Albania for example. It would be very sad for the KRG to go down that route and it would be difficult to actually pull off in logistical terms. But the Iranians are adamant and especially the Pasdaran [the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]. They have set a deadline for the KRG to take those steps. They are very aggressive as we’ve seen. It’s very clear the message they sent with those missile and drone attacks. And they could exploit rising tensions between the PUK and the KDP to take matters into their own hands again as the Iranian Kurdish opposition are scattered across zones controlled by both parties. Al-Monitor: Let’s talk about those tensions. In your address in the House of Commons, you spoke of the risk of renewed civil conflict between the PUK and the KDP. What’s going on? Talabany: There is huge disagreement on the way Kurdistan is governed. There are no more political meetings [between the two parties] taking place. Kak Qubad [Talabani] is speaking against Kak Masrour [Barzani] and Kak Qubad is speaking against Kak Masrour at the same forum. (Note: He is referring to a forum organized by the Middle East Research Institute, an Erbil based think tank that ended Nov. 2). Look, there were always real problems between the PUK and the KDP, but I was used as a scapegoat all the time, with both sides claiming I was the problem. Once I was moved out of the way, the real problems were exposed in their fullness and people realized it was deeper than Lahur. The PUK has always been unhappy about the way the KDP has governed and has the upper hand in everything. We identified these issues in the past, and tried to resolve them through dialogue with the KDP. But there was a team within the PUK, that was closer to the KDP, that was always trying to put the blame on the PUK. So those efforts didn’t get anywhere. Al-Monitor: Sorry, I don’t follow, a group within the PUK put the blame on the PUK? Talabany: Yes, led by Kak Qubad, who was close at the time with the KDP team and tried to put the blame back on the PUK. Now, finally it's coming down to his own brother [Bafel], who is also not getting along with the KDP. Kak Qubad feels like this is close to home, so he started to talk about these problems. Al-Monitor: Can you be more specific? What are the main problems between the PUK and the KDP? Talabany: There is a shortage of money in Sulaimaniyah at the moment. The PUK is blaming the KDP because there isn’t enough income from the borders. Apparently there was a deal done that 43% of the oil revenues would go towards the public sector employee wages for Sulaimaniyah and its regions and 57% for Erbil and Dohuk. The top up for the wages would have to come from the income that the governors raise from the borders and from revenue collected through electricity and other utilities. I think the PUK might have miscalculated things when agreeing to this deal because they feel there isn’t enough income coming in. Hundreds of projects in Sulaimaniyah have stopped because there isn’t enough money. This was an agreement struck between Kak Masrour and Kak Qubad in the past. But Kak Masrour now realizes that the money raised at the borders on the Sulaimaniyah side is not coming to the central pool for redistribution and that much of it is unaccounted for. Kak Masrour is, therefore, saying "Well I am not willing to cover Sulaimaniyah’s expenses through the income coming from Erbil and Dohuk. The money raised in Sulaimaniyah needs to come back to the government’s pockets." This makes the PUK look very bad in the Sulaimaniyah region. Wages are being paid late, even as they are being paid on time in Erbil. This never happened in the past. Also there was some money in the banks in Sulaimaniyah, probably over $400 million that went missing and was replaced with checks which were issued by the banks in the past as collateral to business people, who the banks owed money to. There is no money in the banks. It’s gone! Then there’s the case of this senior intelligence officer who was blown up with his wife and kids in Erbil. The KRG Security Council investigated and held some people accountable and unfortunately some of them proved to be members of the Counter Terrorism service in Sulaimaniyah. The PUK is not happy about this and wanted the information relating to the investigation to be withheld from the public. But it was made public the night before the election of the president [of Iraq] with the alleged perpetrators appearing on television and saying who was behind the killings. The Security Council is going full throttle with charges that the killings were an act of terrorism. Al-Monitor: Wasn’t the slain officer close to you? Talabany: He worked for me for 20 years, yes. Al-Monitor: Do you believe that you were being targeted through him? Talabany: Oh definitely. He’s not the first one. I had another four guys who I lost last year, brutally murdered while they were eating in a restaurant in Raniyah. But there was no investigation even though the families demanded there be one. One of them was a police colonel and he was on duty that day. He was very close to me. He would come to my house at night for my protection. He was murdered with three of his body guards because he was close to me. They are trying to drive away people close to me, which is very difficult to do. Al-Monitor: Why do certain members of your family oppose you so bitterly? We know the claims that you tried to poison your cousin, Bafel. Did you try to kill your cousin? Talabany: I went to the courts with those claims. I took them to court for accusing me of poisoning Bafel. He didn’t show up in court so the judge closed the case. All the other accusations ... I took my brothers to court. I rejected all of those of accusations and it was very clear after they tried to remove me, what happened within the party, bringing Kak Qubad forward. I know the game that’s going on. But I think they did it in a horrible way. They made me look bad and they made themselves look bad and the public doesn’t believe in them. This was a naked power grab, one hundred percent, and it was done in a very nasty way. Al-Monitor: Some people say you grew arrogant because you felt the Americans were fully behind you and that you acted in a disrespectful manner, particularly towards Massoud Barzani, who after all is the leading figure in Iraqi Kurdistan. Talabany: I never relied on the Americans for political stuff. Never. For counter terrorism, in the fight against terrorism, of course we heavily relied on the Americans. In politics, I tried to never rely on any outside powers. Look, I think as the head of the [PUK’s intelligence agency] Zanyari and the Counter Terrorism Group I antagonized a lot of people, neighboring countries; Turkey, Iran and I might have antagonized people in the KDP including Kak Massoud to be honest with you. But I felt it was my right. The PUK was going through very difficult times. Mam Jalal [Talabani] was sick. We had internal issues. Dr. Barham [Salih] split from the PUK. During all that period, besides the tough job that I had to do in protecting the Kurdistan Region and Rojava [Kurdish controlled northeast Syria]. I carried that heavy weight of the PUK on my shoulders because at the time Kak Qubad was not involved in any political stuff. Kak Bafel was not even in the country and Bafel’s mum was sick. I was left with all the burden dealing with the PUK’s internal problems and external pressure from the KDP which saw me as a threat because I bypassed them and traveled to Rojava when they had closed the borders with Rojava. Al-Monitor: You said you angered some of your neighbors. When IRGC Commander Qassem Soleimani was killed in January 2020, there was widespread speculation that you had provided the intel that allowed them to do it and that this is what proved your own undoing. Talabany: I totally reject it and I have rejected it in the past. These claims were part of the campaign to taint me, and to win the support of the Iranians. The Turks were already in place for this because of my support for Rojava and they wanted to make sure that the Iranians stayed on their side when it came to opposing the Syrian Kurds. Let’s be real. Does the United States really need me to provide it with intelligence on Qassem Soleimani? He flew from Beirut to Syria and from Syria to Iraq. It's beyond my reach. I totally reject these claims and I think that the Iranians realize I had nothing to do with it now, though some of them wanted to believe that it was possible at the time. I know people who have spoken to the Iranians and they know the full story. They know how it happened. Al-Monitor: What impact has Soleimani’s departure had on regional balances? Is there a big difference? Talabany: Oh yes! There’s a big difference. Qassem Soleimani was very familiar with the region. He knew people on an individual basis. He would come through the country, knock on people’s doors. Speak the same language. For example, Kak Massoud and Mam Jalal, he knew them for over 30 years. If he came through the region and sought a personal favor they would not be able to reject it. It’s not the same without him. The same goes for other Iraqi politicians as well. He knew them by name. Al-Monitor: How were your relations with him? Talabany: I met him only four times. On three of those occasions I quarreled with him. On the fourth meeting, just weeks before his death, we met at Dr. Barham’s house in Baghdad. I was very frank with him and I said "You aren’t going to like what I say." He was with [slain Iraqi Shiite militia commander] Abu Mahdi al Muhandis and Bafel was present, as were my brother, Aras, and Dr. Barham. I said "you’ve been a good friend to my uncle [Jalal Talabani] but the first time I got to know you, I was labeled a traitor amongst the Kurdish people because of what happened in Kirkuk [in 2017]. The way it was portrayed was that we helped the Shiite militias and the Iranians take Kirkuk [from the Iraqi Kurds] and you guys kept quiet about that. You were supposed to support the PUK to gain back the governorship of Kirkuk, you didn’t. You went and made a deal with Massoud Barzani and you even prevented the PUK from getting any positions in the government in Baghdad in the 2018 elections." I gave him further examples of when he stood against the PUK. I said "when Kak Barham stood for the presidency you tried to stop it from happening." Kak Barham was funny, he said, "No, no, Mr. Qassem Soleimani was supportive," and Soleimani said, “No, he is right. I was against you." Then Soleimani got up and said he was sorry to me three times and said "everything you said was right" and turned to Muhandis and said "you should go to Sulaimaniyah and mend fences with these guys." I never had a good relationship with him to be honest with you. He was pushing for Dr. Barham to be the secretary general of the PUK and for Bafel to be the deputy. I was not even in the list. That made me angry as well, for him to have the right to come and decide who becomes the secretary general of the PUK and who becomes the deputy, while I was doing all the work. Al-Monitor: Is there a new Soleimani who comes and tells you how to run your party? Talabany: Nobody can be the new Soleimani, just like there will never be another Mam Jalal. He’s just one of those guys who is irreplaceable. Al-Monitor: You said the other regional neighbor that you angered is Turkey. In our earlier conversation you described how you would go to Ankara and talk to Turkey’s national intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, about developing relations with the Syrian Kurds. How did we go from those cordial visits to Ankara wanting you out of the way? Talabany: When I got engaged in Rojava with advice from the Americans as well, I tried to keep Turkey informed of what was happening. I told them that this set of Syrian Kurds would not pose a threat to Turkey’s stability or to its national borders and that it would be better if we tried to build a relationship between the Kurds in Rojava and Ankara and look to open a border crossing between Turkey and Rojava. This was right at the beginning [of the Syrian conflict]. We made some progress. If you recall [Syrian Kurdish leader] Salih Muslim was freely going to Turkey and holding meetings with Turkish officials. Behind closed doors there were talks between the [Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units] YPG at the time and Turkish military intelligence. We made it through till the 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey when [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan lost the elections and the [pro-Kurdish Democratic Peoples’ Party] HDP was not willing to join forces with Erdogan to form a government. I remember the last time I was in Ankara I was told by Mr. Hakan Fidan it was all over and that they see these guys as an offshoot of the PKK. There’s no difference. Al-Monitor: But why the sudden shift? It’s not like they were unaware of their links to the PKK. Talabany: They knew who they were talking to, of course. But the HDP not participating in the government was one reason. I don’t have one hundred percent proof but I believe that the PKK is to blame for that to be honest. The PKK should have allowed, if they had any engagement with the HDP, for it to participate in the government. It was the first time the Kurds did so well in Turkish elections. We had over 80 members of parliament. Al-Monitor: How do you know that the PKK did not allow the HDP to support Erdogan in forming a government? Talabany: This is what everybody was saying. I believe there were meetings held between the HDP and the PKK and the PKK should have advised them to participate in the government. Since they didn’t, I assume the PKK didn’t allow them to participate in the government. I think it would have been a wiser thing for those guys to be given a chance and for the Kurds to take some ministries. They will never get another chance like this. Because that changed the dynamics of things. Look at what happened. It broke the peace talks and started the attacks on Rojava. Al-Monitor: Do you see any chance for a reversal, with Erdogan being such a pragmatist and the Kurds holding the key to power in the next elections? Talabany: We’ve seen Mr Erdogan go one way and go the opposite in the past. I think it’s in the interests of the Kurdish and the Turkish peoples for this to happen again. And if Kurds were given another chance and they could be the kingmakers, I would advise them from here to participate in any new government. Al-Monitor: Would you step up and be a mediator again? Talabany: I’ve always offered my mediation both to the Turkish government and the PKK in the past because I believe we can only achieve what we want to achieve through peace, especially as Kurds. We have no friends in the neighborhood. We are all alone. Any chance for peace, we should take it. Al-Monitor: You had a very striking message in the House of Commons both for the Iraqi and the Syrian Kurds, saying that the Syrian Kurds’ future lies in Damascus and that of the Iraqi Kurds in Baghdad. Talabany: I believe in that because we tried everything else and we were not successful. We tried a referendum [on Kurdish independence in 2017] and it backfired on us. We lost our major partners in the region, the friendships we built over the years. We lost the confidence of our people in the way we govern and the way we make certain decisions. I believe our future is with Iraq, whether we like it or not. This is a reality. If certain politicians want to push this nationalist idea, I totally disagree with them. I believe right now we have to be concentrating on the livelihood of our people. How can we provide better services, tackle unemployment, and provide better security and stability? I believe we can achieve that through Iraq despite the political dysfunction. We still have a parliament that is very active in Iraq and a judiciary system that is independent unlike the one in Kurdistan, unfortunately. Al-Monitor: But it’s also a very pro-Iranian government and there was an opportunity to have something different. Talabany: Look, the Kurds have gone along and played along because of the regional dynamics and what’s happening all around us. I think it was a wise move by everybody to participate in this government, whether it's pro-Iranian or not. Like I said, the pressure being applied from Turkey, the pressure being applied from Iran, at least the Kurds being part of the government could help ease some of this pressure. Al-Monitor: But you lost Barham Salih. That was quite a blow. Talabany: The PUK lost Barham Salih. I didn’t lose Barham Salih. He lost me a long time ago, unfortunately when he decided to keep quiet about all the wrongdoings in the PUK and kind of took sides with Bafel and had nothing good to say about me. He lost me. I feel like I was the one who put him in that position when Qassem Soleimani and the United States stood against him and more than half of the PUK and all of the KDP. I was the one who stood by him and fought for him till the last minute to become [Iraqi] President. Al-Monitor: Turning to Sinjar, because Sinjar is a very particular flashpoint where an array of forces, including Iran and Turkey, are in opposition and with no clear solution in sight. What can be done to fix the problem and bring peace to Sinjar and above all to the long suffering Yazidi people? Talabany: You know there was a Sinjar agreement between the KRG, Baghdad and the United Nations. It did not include the people living in Sinjar, the Yazidis. Trying to make a deal between Baghdad and the KRG on Sinjar without the Yazidis was a big mistake. I tried to relay this to [former Iraqi Prime Minister] Mustafa al-Khadimi. I told him "you need to engage with the people on the ground there. Don’t forget what happened in Sinjar in 2014 when the Islamic State attacked. These people are deeply wounded and they blame officials from Kurdistan for what happened and now you are trying to bring the officials from Kurdistan to have a deal on Sinjar excluding the people of Sinjar. It’s impossible to implement." Al-Monitor: Would that mean getting the PKK involved? Talabany: Not the PKK, the people of Sinjar. Okay, the PKK is present there because the PKK is the only one that stood in Sinjar and helped the Yazidis. We ran away as the Kurdish government and left the Yazidis on their own. Who got them out? Some PKK elements and some YPG elements stayed with the Yazidis and helped them. The PKK was willing to pull out its forces from Sinjar if the Sinjar people were included in the deal and I relayed this message to Mr. Kadhimi. Al-Monitor: Are you referring to the Shingal Resistance Units, the YBS, that were formed with the help of the PKK? Should they have been at the table? Talabany: Yes, who are they? Apart from a few leadership positions these are Yazidis from Sinjar. They became YBS because there was nobody else there at the time. That doesn’t mean they are PKK, that they are against Turkey, etc. Al-Monitor: Do you think Turkey can move into Sinjar at some point as it keeps threatening to? Talabany: The Iranian proxies in the area will make it very difficult. They are very anti-Turkey and they’ve made this very plain. But it depends on the dynamics in the region. If Iraq stabilizes politically it will be very difficult for Turkey. But if there is a security vacuum, a political vacuum, Turkey is always very good at taking advantage of these gaps. Al-Monitor: Moving to Syria, how do you see the future of the Rojava administration and America’s commitment to the Syrian Kurds going forward? Talabany: As I have said before, the Syrian Kurds have no future without finding a way with the Syrian government, whether it’s with [President Bashar] al-Assad or beyond Assad, their future is with Syria. No establishment will be allowed outside of the Syrian structure by the Turks because that’s suicide for Turkey, to allow another model of Iraqi Kurdistan to be built inside Syria. I know it’s difficult at the moment and that the Syrian government is not willing to negotiate but this doesn’t mean you lose hope because you have no other hope. This needs to happen while the Americans are still around. The Saudis, the Gulf countries can apply some pressure for basic Kurdish rights in Syria and offer money. Syria needs money. There are many tools that could be used to tailor this. Al-Monitor: But aren’t the Kurds in a bit of a bind? They need Americans for leverage in their dealings with the regime, yet the Americans are against all dealings with Assad. Talabany: I don’t think so. I’ve heard many times that the Americans have told them that they need to keep the dialogue open with the regime and to make their demands because they [the Americans] aren’t going to be around forever and they’ve been very frank about it. Al-Monitor: Why is nothing happening then? Talabany: I think [the commander in chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces] Mazlum Kobane is finding it very difficult with the Syrian regime at the moment. The old school Baathists, the old guard are even preventing Assad from making a deal. People like [Syria’s intelligence chief] Ali Mamlouk who are involved in the negotiations are preventing any progress. Al-Monitor: And meanwhile Mamlouk is talking to Hakan Fidan. Talabany: Yes, of course there are talks with Hakan Fidan. Turkey is pragmatic. They realize they have a big problem on their border. They have all those extremists that they themselves empowered there that will become a very big problem for Turkey in the future as well. Al-Monitor: Is Hakan Fidan the new Qassem Soleimani? Talabany: Hakan is very well educated and is very influential in the region. I think he is playing that role and you know he was very good friends with Qassem Soleimani. He admired Qassem Soleimani. Al-Monitor: Really? Talabany: He told me himself. He told me one time "if only Qassem Soleimani were better educated he would have led Iran." Hakan is playing a major role for Turkey. Al-Monitor: So last question: What lies ahead for Lahur Talabany? Talabany: My future plan is the future of the Kurdish people in Kurdistan. I didn’t leave them behind despite everything that happened to me and all the accusations and my house being surrounded [by security forces] for four months and me being asked to leave the country. What made me stay behind is the suffering that the Kurds are enduring. I am there for the people, not for myself. I see myself turning things around for the Kurdish people, one way or the other

A Worrying Sign For Oil Companies In Iraqi Kurdistan

In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), those remaining oil companies who have unilateral E&P deals with the Kurdistan Regional Government should be very concerned after Baghdad moved this week to invalidate three contracts between the KRG authorities and Gulf Keystone (UK-based), ShaMaran (Canadian), and Addax Petroleum (owned by Chinese Sinopec). As for UAE-based Dana Gas, the jury is still out. While Iraqi media initially reported that Dana Gas’ contract had also been invalidated by Baghdad, corrections soon emerged, noting that no decision had been rendered in Dana’s case. No sooner did the correction appear than Dana Gas was all over local media broadcasting ambitious plans to double natural gas production in the KRG. Gazprom Neft is also awaiting a decision. While an ongoing cause for concern among investors in this venue, so far, the KRG has simply ignored Baghdad’s court rulings and continued with business as usual. The formation of Iraq’s new government led by Prime Minister-designate Muhammad Al-Sudani was originally met with protests and a delayed parliamentary session Thursday to vote on granting the new government confidence. Late on Thursday, the new government was approved, ending a year-long deadlock. A majority of the 253 lawmakers voted to appoint 21 ministers, leaving only two posts undecided. Chaos has continued to spread in Iran this week, with two Revolutionary…Continue reading on oilprice.com

US Consulate Concerned over the arrest of journalists in Kurdistan

Draw Media U.S. Consul General in Erbil highlights that Promoting democracy, human rights, and freedom the press are key priorities for the U.S. Consulate General in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). During meeting with a group of journalists in the presence of Draw media representative Fazil Rafat, U.S. Consul General Ervin Hicks said that our priorities are effectively achieved by working with our partners in government, civil society, under-represented communities, religious organizations, and media outlets to encourage the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to ensure that democratic principles and values are the foundation for a free press, the freedom of peaceful assembly, protections against gender-based violence, equal opportunities for under-represented communities, and accountability for those who engage in violence against women. The U.S. Consulate General in the IKR remains concerned over the arrest and detention of journalists on charges related to their reporting. “Our concerns include reports of journalists being detained without cause or due process, assaulted, threatened, or having their electronic devices searched without warrants.” He added that “We are equally concerned over reports that certain media outlets and journalists, particularly women and members from under-represented communities, are being denied access to official press conferences, or are receiving inconsistent legal information that is impeding their ability to meet the registration process. We look forward to the KRG’s implementation of the Access to Information Law to promote accountability and bolster the ability of journalists to secure information from its Ministries.”

UK ambassador to Iraq meets with a group of Kurdish journalists

Draw Media British Ambassador to Iraq Mark Bryson-Richardson underlined The Importance of The Freedom of Expression and Speech during a meeting with a group of Kurdish Journalists in Erbil. Mark Bryson-Richardson said, he was Delighted to speak with activists and journalists in Erbil who are working to support free speech. British Ambassador to Iraq added that Freedom of expression is an important part of democracy and a fundamental right that governments, society as a whole, and all of us must work to nurture and protect. Draw media representative Alan Barznji attended the meeting which was held by the British Consulate General in Erbil.