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News / Kurdistan

Distribution of projects and expenditures of the Kurdistan region provinces

Draw Media In the past two years, (2021 and 2022), 59% of the KRG projects were spent in the yellow zone and 41% in the green zone. In 2022, out of 851 proposed projects, 520 projects (61%) are in the yellow zone. Kurdistan Regional Government Projects and Expenditures in 2021 Based on a document, MP (Balen Ismail) published, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has agreed to spend 349 billion and 720 million dinars for projects in the provinces of the Kurdistan Region in 2021, according to letter number (2560 on 25/2/2021). The document shows, the amount of (205 billion and 370 million) dinars (59%) has been allocated for projects in Erbil, Duhok, Soran and Zakho (yellow zone). The amount of (144 billion and 350 million) (41%) has been allocated for projects in Sulaimani, Halabja, Garmian and Raperin provinces (green zone). Kurdistan Regional Government Projects and Expenditures in 2022 In 2022, out of 851 proposed projects, 520 projects (61%) are in the yellow zone and 331 projects (39%) are in the green zone. The amount of (187 billion and 54 million) dinars (59%) has been allocated for (520) projects in Erbil, Duhok, Soran and Zakho (yellow zone). The amount of (128 billion and 293 million) with (41%) has been allocated for (331) projects in Sulaimani, Halabja, Garmian and Raperin provinces (green zone). *Yellow zone, green zone: The dividing border that separates the KDP “Yellow” and the PUK “Green” (colour of flags) zones of influence, respectively.

Bafel Talabani: We will withdraw from the government if Sulaymaniyah problems will not be solved

Draw Media According to the information Draw Media obtained from several sources in the meeting of the top leaders of the Kurdish political parties, Bafel Talabani threatened to withdraw from the government, if Sulaymaniyah governorate problems will not be solved. He said the PUK has been providing the expenses of Sulaymanya governarate instead of the government for several months.

The PUK and KDP did not reach an agreement

Draw Media The meeting of the top leaders of the Kurdish political parties ended without agreement. The fate of the elections was handed over to another session next September. The PUK and KDP agreed on the electoral method, but no agreement was reached on the seats of the minorities. In the meeting of the top leaders of the Kurdish political parties in the Presidency office of the Kurdistan Region, UN Representative Jeanine Plasschaert also attended, the parties have once again failed to reach a final agreement on how to hold the sixth round of parliamentary elections. According to (Draw) sources the PUK and Gorran Movement have made some compromises and agreed to hold elections in a single constituency, while the PUK previously was leading the front of parties that called for multi-circuit election system. Despite the convergence on the electoral system (single constituency), however, the PUK, KDP and the parties did not reach an agreement on how to distribute the 11 quota seats of the minorities and the voter’s registration, therefore, the date of the election could not be determined at the meeting. Eventually the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region and the UN representative has agreed with the first person of the parties to meet again in early September to discuss the elections.

The KRG oil in the past three Julys

Draw Media Oil sales in the Kurdistan Region decreased by 6.8% in July 2022 compared to July (2020). However, the net oil revenue (handed over to the government) in July (2022) increased by 181%. In Iraqi dinars, the amount of returned income is much larger because of the change in the value of the Iraqi dinar. In July 2022, the total net income returned to government in dinars increased by 245%. Which means (698 billion 691 million 304 thousand 81) dinars more than the amount submitted to the Kurdistan Regional Government in July (2020). The amount of oil sold in the Kurdistan Region in July (2020 – 2021 - 2022) According to a report by Deloitte on (10/1/2021), the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) sold 13 million 238 thousand 661 barrels of oil to foreign countries in July 2020 through the Turkish port of Ceyhan. However, according to another report by Deloitte published on March 17, 2022, the Kurdistan Regional Government sold 13 million 58 thousand 810 barrels of oil to foreign countries through the Turkish port of Ceyhan in July 2021. Accordingly, the sale of oil in July (2021) was less than July (2020) by (1.4%) or (179 thousand 851) barrels of oil less than July 2020. According to information in July 2022, the Kurdistan Regional Government sold 12 million 340 thousand barrels of oil through the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Accordingly, compared to July a year earlier KRG oil sale decreased by 5.5% which was 718,810 barrels of oil less. Compared to July 2020, sales decreased further by 6.8% or 898 thousand 661 barrels of oil less.

Violations against Journalists in one day was higher than the past six months

Draw Media Only in one day 78 violations against journalists were recorded during the demonstrations of August 6, 2022. While in the first quarter of this year 63 violations were committed against journalists. On Saturday, August 6, twenty-six journalists were arrested during the demonstrations throughout the Kurdistan Region, but in the past six months two journalists have been arrested. According to the Metro Center for Press Freedom, the violations against journalists during Saturday's demonstrations are as follows: 🔻 78 violations committed against 60 journalists and media channels: 🔹 26 Arrests 🔹 4 Raids on houses 🔹 16 Prevention 🔹 8 Tear gas injuries 🔹 23 Confiscation of journalistic materials: 🔹 1 Media Channel Closed According to the report of the Protection Committee of Press Freedom and Journalists' Rights in Kurdistan journalist’s syndicate from 1-1-2022 to 31-6-2022: 🔻 63 violations committed against journalists and media outlets: 🔹 (2) cases of arrest 🔹 (8) Cases of discrimination and not allowing media coverage 🔹 (3) cases of breaking journalistic equipment and seizure 🔹 (4) cases of attack and insult 🔹 (1) Threats 🔹 (1) 1 Media Channel Closed 🔹 (1) Cases of attacks on media channels

Barzani's Failures on Freedom of Expression in Iraqi Kurdistan

Drawmedia by Diary Marif-washingtoninstitute The Kurdish Region of Iraq, rife with economic and security challenges, is witnessing increased censorship and suppression of free speech. Afew weeks ago, to mark the third anniversary of his cabinet, Prime Minister of the KRG Masrour Barzani delivered a speech summarizing the result of his reforms and the achievements of his government in the past three years. He likewise promised to expand his government’s progress in freedom of speech. Barzani characterized the government efforts to "expand the scope of freedom of expression and speech and laid the groundworks for creating a more responsible journalism in the Kurdistan Region (KRI)." However, the reality of the current government is that its activities have run contrary to these values, and what Masrour Barzani has promised during both this latest and prior speeches. Masrour Barzani was appointed prime minister of the ninth cabinet of the KRG on July 10, 2019, replacing his cousin Nechirvan Barzani. In his inaugural address, Masrour Barzani promised to build a strong Kurdistan: carry out reforms, unite political parties, and promote free and independent journalism. Yet words are cheaper than actions, and the subsequent years have demonstrated that he did the exact opposite on the ground. Barzani put the KRG on the cliff as they faced several dire crises that will require decades to amend. Economic challenges, failure to pay salaries, threats to women, and security challenges all plague the KRI, but journalists struggle to report on these issues as self-censorship and enforced censorship increasingly haunt the KRI’s journalists. Retaliation against journalists and critics Since he was sworn as prime minister, the rate of crime and violations such as threats, harassment, and torture against journalists and activists has increased significantly. The Metro Center for Journalists' Rights and Advocacy published that 353 violations were committed against 260 journalists and media organizations in the Kurdistan Region in 2021 alone. One of the most striking crackdowns occurred in 2020, when Barzani arrested and put more than 80 journalists and activists behind bars in Dohuk province after demonstrating against corruption and poor public services. Despite a wide range of serious concerns and condemnation from other national, regional, and international levels to free them, the prime minister stubbornly maintained his stance. At the tail end of 2021, Kurdish university students demonstrated peacefully demanding their basic rights, such as payment of their financial grants that have been suspended for years and improvement of government university housing conditions. The Kurdish authorities, in contrast, answered brutally by dragging them into the streets, kicking their faces, firing live bullets in the air, and spreading snipers on the roof of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate. In 2022, the Barzani government has continued this same pattern of repressing journalists and diminishing the scope of civil freedoms. A few days after the third anniversary speech, two journalists were arrested in Erbil and Duhok due to their professional activities. And on July 22, Barzani’s security forces did not allow a peaceful demonstration in Erbil against Turkish bombardments in Kurdistan, which have collectively killed nearly 140 Kurdish and Iraqi civilians. The prime minister or his current government alone is not responsible for all crises that have occurred in the Iraqi Kurdistan. It's been exactly 31 years since Iraqi Kurdistan has been governed and ruined by the two major parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masoud Barzani (1946-present) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of former Iraqi president Jalal Talabani (1933-2017). Both parties have used a number of strategies over the years to silence the journalists, authors, and protesters who have raised their voices against corruption and injustice. Among both the KDP and PUK, the Talabanis and the Barzanis have more power than other leaders since they have controlled their parties by using security forces and money to protect their families' interests, especially the eldest sons of Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, BavelTalabani and Masrour Barzani. Barzani’s reputation among journalists Barzani's crackdowns on journalists reflect several aspects of his government. Most of his government members and cabinet ministers consist of senior officers with intelligence backgrounds, a branch known for its skepticism of the press. Masrour Barzani himself came to power with a robust intelligence background as head of KDP intelligence services. Nor has the Barzani family overall been tolerant of criticism directed towards them. In 2005, Barzani arrested the dissident writer Kamal Said Qadir and put him behind bars for posting “defamatory” articles about Kurdish authorities. But allegations of more violent repression also exist, including the assassination of the young journalist Sardasht Othman, who was kidnapped in the Iraqi Kurdistan capital of Erbil and killed in the vicinity of the Iraqi city of Mosul in 2010. Osman was a young journalist who criticized corruption, family rule, and nepotism; he specifically criticized the Barzanis in several pieces. In one of his articles, “I am in Love with Barzani’s Daughter,” Osman sarcastically wished to be the son-in-law of Masrour Barzani in order to be rich, protected, and have a better lifestyle. Osman broke a social taboo around the family with this article, and consequently there was speculation that the current prime minister was involved in Osman’s Murder. Barzani’s loyal security forces have also been accused of the 2016 assassination of the journalist Widad Hussein, who worked for a newspaper affiliated with the KDP’s rival PKK party, by his family. By and large, the rate of violence and crime in the KRI has increased, degrading trust and weakening the sense of community. This repression also has ripple effects on Iraqi Kurdish society, and is one of the contributing factors to the ongoing 2021-22 migrant crisis on Belarus’s border. There is also the concern of alienating and angering Kurdish young adults. It is this age group most susceptible to radicalization or quickest to protest, and many young Kurds are increasingly frustrated with restrictions on speech. Barzani should learn the lesson repeatedly echoed throughout the region on what happens political figures when they have impinged on peoples’ rights to demonstrate and free speech. If such repression continues, it will make it more likely, not less, for Kurds to come out and protest against a government that cannot or will not guarantee their freedoms.

Turkey controls 3.5% of the Kurdistan Region

by Michael Knights Ankara is fighting a lethal and largely hidden counterinsurgency against PKK elements across the border, but the conflict’s rising profile may carry high costs for both U.S. interests and Iraqi sovereignty. On July 27, Iraq lodged a complaint against Turkey at the UN Security Council, and Iraqi militias fired rockets at the Turkish consulate in Mosul. Both actions were taken in retaliation for a July 20 Turkish artillery strike that killed nine Iraqis and wounded thirty-three in the Kurdistan Region resort of Parakh. They were also the most recent incidents in a conflict that has spanned decades, largely out of sight, and is now escalating quantitatively and qualitatively. The main beneficiaries of the clashes may be Iran-backed militias, who welcome having Turkey as a new rationale for so-called “resistance” (muqawama) attacks outside the framework of the Iraqi state. If the present trajectory continues, it risks endangering multiple U.S. and Iraqi interests. Why Has Turkey Been Operating Inside Iraq? In 1983, Turkey began conducting ground incursions and other cross-border operations against bases in northern Iraq belonging to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a Turkish militant group designated as a terrorist entity by Ankara, Washington, and other governments. Most of these strikes were launched in response to particularly painful PKK attacks that succeeded in killing soldiers or police personnel inside Turkey. At times, Saddam Hussein’s government gave tacit approval for Turkish operations up to three miles inside Iraq. By the mid-1990s, portions of this border belt—which the Turks dubbed the “Temporary Danger Zone”—had been expanded to ten miles. After Saddam withdrew his forces from the north in 1991, the local Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could not prevent seasoned PKK cells from establishing bases deeper inside Iraq. In response, Turkey sent lumbering armored units as far as fifteen miles across the border in pursuit of militants, eventually erecting a permanent artillery and helicopter base at Bamerni as both a forward observation post and a means of extending its reach against the PKK. Yet the group simply moved deeper into the Kurdistan Region, infiltrating Gara (25 miles inside the border), the Qandil Mountains (60 miles), the UN-monitored Rostam Joudi refugee camp in Makhmur district (110 miles), and Sinjar (which gave the PKK a pathway to the Syrian border). Beginning in 2008, Turkish airstrikes gradually supplanted ground incursions. The U.S. military provided intelligence for these strikes early on as a way of incentivizing a more selective approach, but Turkey has since become more reliant on its own drone and human intelligence sources. Expansion and Escalation Over the past few years, Turkey’s efforts to negate the PKK’s strategic depth have gone to extraordinary lengths. In Syria, it has undertaken large cross-border operations intended to displace the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (aka the YPG, which originated as an offshoot of the PKK) and replace them with Turkish-backed militias. In Iraq, Ankara’s cooperative relationship with the KDP has enabled it to employ a wide range of tactics across the border, often without attracting as much international attention. First, after the Islamic State captured Mosul and the local Turkish consulate staff in 2014, Ankara established its deepest base in Iraq: Zilkan. Constructed on the high ground overlooking Mosul, the base lies fifty miles inside the Kurdistan Region and provocatively within visual range of Iran-backed Iraqi militias on the Nineveh Plains. Second, Turkey has modernized its cross-border operations—instead of temporary incursions by ungainly armored units, it now launches longer campaigns each spring in which agile helicopter-transported special forces establish hilltop commando bases as deep as 20-30 miles inside Iraq in order to observe and block PKK lines of movement “with fire” (i.e., via snipers, machine guns, missiles, mortars, drones, and helicopters). Today, about 600 square miles of territory in the north is garrisoned by Turkish outposts and checkpoints, or approximately 3.5 percent of the Kurdistan Region and 0.3 percent of Iraq overall. Much of this territory was not fully controlled by Iraqi Kurdish forces prior to Turkey’s entrance, and it has since become increasingly depopulated due to the warlike conditions. Third, Turkey has greatly expanded its drone strikes, not only blanketing the border and Qandil areas, but also striking as far as 175 miles inside Iraq, hitting federally controlled areas such as Sinjar and Mosul. In many cases, Bayraktar drone crews track and target PKK leadership figures by either following them as they travel south from the border area or detecting them via spies on the ground if they enter urban areas (e.g., in search of medical treatment). Typically—though not invariably—these drone strikes are very successful operations with a low degree of collateral damage, akin to precise U.S. drone strikes undertaken against terrorist targets worldwide. Yet Turkey’s deep pursuit of the PKK has also brought it into areas where the group’s networks interlace with Iran-backed militias, creating a cycle of escalation that threatens to spiral out of control. This is most notable in Sinjar, where Tehran’s Yazidi partners intermingle fluidly with PKK militants. Ankara’s actions in these areas—such as targeting senior Yazidi militia commanders and killing civilians at Parakh—have drawn escalating militia rocket and drone attacks on its bases in Iraq, which usually prompts Turkish artillery, air, and drone strikes on the militias. Policy Recommendations Despite the PKK’s status as a designated terrorist organization and Turkey’s standing as a key NATO ally, Washington still has ample reasons to seek limits on the expanding conflict: • Iraqi sovereignty is suffering. As long as Turkey can strike deeper and deeper inside Iraq without international repercussions, it creates a more permissive environment for Iran to do the same. In March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps openly admitted to firing ballistic missiles at Erbil, but international criticism of this Iranian strike was undermined somewhat by the lack of equivalent concern expressed about Turkey’s infringements on Iraq’s sovereignty. Without a consistent approach, Washington will have difficulty bringing real pressure against Tehran to stop its routine infringements—whether they be direct strikes on Iranian Kurdish insurgent factions or proxy militia strikes unsanctioned by the Iraqi state. • Iran-backed militias are leveraging the crisis. As expected, Tehran’s muqawama partners are crowding to get in on anti-Turkish attacks. On July 22, following a drone strike on Turkey’s Bamerni base, the propaganda outlet Ashab al-Kahf issued a dire warning to Ankara: “Killing for killing, drone for drone, rocket for cannon.” Indeed, Turkey is providing militias with a new rationale for armed “resistance” against occupation at a time when they can no longer credibly claim to be fighting the Islamic State or the U.S.-led coalition. By enabling these groups to justify their illegal ownership and use of drones and rockets, Ankara is inadvertently corroding the stability of the Iraqi state. • Energy and water flows may suffer. Aside from the basic rationale of having U.S. partners be at peace with each other, Iraqi-Turkish cooperation is vital for exporting much-needed energy to Europe as a way of backfilling Russian supplies. Rising tensions after incidents like the Parakh tragedy will make it harder for Baghdad and Turkey to compromise on energy matters, particularly the soon-to-be-decided arbitration spurred by Ankara’s decision to give the Kurdistan Region direct access to the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline and export oil without Baghdad’s approval. Furthermore, Iraq and Syria both need more water from Turkey, as new U.S. ambassador Alina Romanowski highlighted in her inaugural policy initiative after arriving in Baghdad. This is unlikely under the current warlike conditions. Preventing or ameliorating crises between U.S. partners is generally much less of a drain on policymakers than repairing ruptures after the fact. If the United States wants to spend less time on the Middle East, the best way to do so is to keep a lid on tensions, not let them boil over. Yet Washington is already far behind the curve on helping Baghdad and Ankara think through a win-win settlement of the pipeline arbitration, despite clear indications of an impending policy train wreck. As for cross-border operations, the two neighbors have negotiated rules and redlines on this matter before and could do so again, particularly with U.S. mediation. Once the UN-monitored investigation of the Parakh incident is complete, a more comprehensive fact-finding effort should be conducted to determine exactly how widespread Turkish operations are in the remote, lightly-populated, twenty-mile-wide swath along the border. Investigators should also look at Iran’s routine artillery and airstrikes in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ultimately, Ankara has no business maintaining a large, provocative, unilaterally established military base as deep inside Iraq as Zilkan. The latest rocket strikes on the Mosul consulate show that this base and the brash incursion policy it represents are bad for Turkey—not to mention for Iraqi and U.S. interests. At the same time, Washington must not forget Turkey’s rationale for such behavior; after all, the United States would hardly accept a Foreign Terrorist Organization expanding a network of bases 20, 50, or even 100 miles from the homeland, nor would it back off a counterinsurgency strategy that seemed to be working (at least tactically). This dilemma suggests the need for Washington to renew serious multilateral efforts to de-escalate Turkish-PKK violence in a way that gives Ankara some reassurance on border security. Washington would benefit from being part of an Iraqi-Turkish solution and helping Baghdad gain credit for securing concessions from Ankara, ideally including a visible redeployment away from Zilkan. Failing that, Iran-backed militias will continue portraying themselves as the sole defenders of Iraq’s sovereignty.

The Kurdistan Regional Government Revenue for July 2022

Draw Media The total revenues of the Kurdistan Region (oil and non-oil) in July 2022 that returned to the government was (1 trillion and 106 billion) dinars. The total oil revenue of the Kurdistan Region in July was (2 trillion and 106 billion) dinars, more than (1 trillion) dinars went to the expenditure of the oil process and (1 trillion and 106 billion) dinars remained for the government treasury. Non-oil revenues • Non-oil revenues for July = (287 billion) dinars (according to the latest statements of the Minister of Finance) • International Coalition financial assistance to the Peshmerga forces = (31 billion 500 million) dinars • Kurdistan Region's share of the Iraqi budget = (0) dinars Oil revenues (pipeline exports) • In July 2022, the Kurdistan Region exported 12 million 340 thousand barrels of oil through the Turkish Port of Jayhan. • Average Brent oil price for July was ($111.93). • Because the region sells its oil for $12 less, it sells oil at an average of $99.93 So: (12 million 340 thousand) barrels X (99.93) dollars = (1 billion 233 million 136 thousand 200) dollars. • According to the latest Deloitte report, 56% of oil revenues are spent on expenditures and 44% remains for the government So: (1 billion 233 million 136 thousand 200) dollars X (56%) = (690 million 556 thousand 272) dollars go to the cost of the oil process. And (1 billion 233 million 136 thousand 200) dollars X (44%) = (542 million 579 thousand 728) dollars remaining oil revenue for KRG Total Revenue in July 2022 (Dinar) (786 billion 740 million 895 thousand 600) IQD oil revenue + (287 billion) IQD local revenue + (31 billion 500 million) IQD Financial assistance = (1 trillion 105 billion 240 million 895 thousand 600) dinars

Turkey’s War in Northern Iraq: By the Numbers

Draw Media The Washington Institute: by Michael Knights Ankara is fighting a lethal and largely hidden counterinsurgency against PKK elements across the border, but the conflict’s rising profile may carry high costs for both U.S. interests and Iraqi sovereignty. On July 27, Iraq lodged a complaint against Turkey at the UN Security Council, and Iraqi militias fired rockets at the Turkish consulate in Mosul. Both actions were taken in retaliation for a July 20 Turkish artillery strike that killed nine Iraqis and wounded thirty-three in the Kurdistan Region resort of Parakh. They were also the most recent incidents in a conflict that has spanned decades, largely out of sight, and is now escalating quantitatively and qualitatively. The main beneficiaries of the clashes may be Iran-backed militias, who welcome having Turkey as a new rationale for so-called “resistance” (muqawama) attacks outside the framework of the Iraqi state. If the present trajectory continues, it risks endangering multiple U.S. and Iraqi interests. Why Has Turkey Been Operating Inside Iraq? In 1983, Turkey began conducting ground incursions and other cross-border operations against bases in northern Iraq belonging to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a Turkish militant group designated as a terrorist entity by Ankara, Washington, and other governments. Most of these strikes were launched in response to particularly painful PKK attacks that succeeded in killing soldiers or police personnel inside Turkey. At times, Saddam Hussein’s government gave tacit approval for Turkish operations up to three miles inside Iraq. By the mid-1990s, portions of this border belt—which the Turks dubbed the “Temporary Danger Zone”—had been expanded to ten miles. After Saddam withdrew his forces from the north in 1991, the local Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could not prevent seasoned PKK cells from establishing bases deeper inside Iraq. In response, Turkey sent lumbering armored units as far as fifteen miles across the border in pursuit of militants, eventually erecting a permanent artillery and helicopter base at Bamerni as both a forward observation post and a means of extending its reach against the PKK. Yet the group simply moved deeper into the Kurdistan Region, infiltrating Gara (25 miles inside the border), the Qandil Mountains (60 miles), the UN-monitored Rostam Joudi refugee camp in Makhmur district (110 miles), and Sinjar (which gave the PKK a pathway to the Syrian border). Beginning in 2008, Turkish airstrikes gradually supplanted ground incursions. The U.S. military provided intelligence for these strikes early on as a way of incentivizing a more selective approach, but Turkey has since become more reliant on its own drone and human intelligence sources. Expansion and Escalation Over the past few years, Turkey’s efforts to negate the PKK’s strategic depth have gone to extraordinary lengths. In Syria, it has undertaken large cross-border operations intended to displace the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (aka the YPG, which originated as an offshoot of the PKK) and replace them with Turkish-backed militias. In Iraq, Ankara’s cooperative relationship with the KDP has enabled it to employ a wide range of tactics across the border, often without attracting as much international attention. First, after the Islamic State captured Mosul and the local Turkish consulate staff in 2014, Ankara established its deepest base in Iraq: Zilkan. Constructed on the high ground overlooking Mosul, the base lies fifty miles inside the Kurdistan Region and provocatively within visual range of Iran-backed Iraqi militias on the Nineveh Plains. Second, Turkey has modernized its cross-border operations—instead of temporary incursions by ungainly armored units, it now launches longer campaigns each spring in which agile helicopter-transported special forces establish hilltop commando bases as deep as 20-30 miles inside Iraq in order to observe and block PKK lines of movement “with fire” (i.e., via snipers, machine guns, missiles, mortars, drones, and helicopters). Today, about 600 square miles of territory in the north is garrisoned by Turkish outposts and checkpoints, or approximately 3.5 percent of the Kurdistan Region and 0.3 percent of Iraq overall. Much of this territory was not fully controlled by Iraqi Kurdish forces prior to Turkey’s entrance, and it has since become increasingly depopulated due to the warlike conditions. Third, Turkey has greatly expanded its drone strikes, not only blanketing the border and Qandil areas, but also striking as far as 175 miles inside Iraq, hitting federally controlled areas such as Sinjar and Mosul. In many cases, Bayraktar drone crews track and target PKK leadership figures by either following them as they travel south from the border area or detecting them via spies on the ground if they enter urban areas (e.g., in search of medical treatment). Typically—though not invariably—these drone strikes are very successful operations with a low degree of collateral damage, akin to precise U.S. drone strikes undertaken against terrorist targets worldwide. Yet Turkey’s deep pursuit of the PKK has also brought it into areas where the group’s networks interlace with Iran-backed militias, creating a cycle of escalation that threatens to spiral out of control. This is most notable in Sinjar, where Tehran’s Yazidi partners intermingle fluidly with PKK militants. Ankara’s actions in these areas—such as targeting senior Yazidi militia commanders and killing civilians at Parakh—have drawn escalating militia rocket and drone attacks on its bases in Iraq, which usually prompts Turkish artillery, air, and drone strikes on the militias. Open image Policy Recommendations Despite the PKK’s status as a designated terrorist organization and Turkey’s standing as a key NATO ally, Washington still has ample reasons to seek limits on the expanding conflict: Iraqi sovereignty is suffering. As long as Turkey can strike deeper and deeper inside Iraq without international repercussions, it creates a more permissive environment for Iran to do the same. In March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps openly admitted to firing ballistic missiles at Erbil, but international criticism of this Iranian strike was undermined somewhat by the lack of equivalent concern expressed about Turkey’s infringements on Iraq’s sovereignty. Without a consistent approach, Washington will have difficulty bringing real pressure against Tehran to stop its routine infringements—whether they be direct strikes on Iranian Kurdish insurgent factions or proxy militia strikes unsanctioned by the Iraqi state. Iran-backed militias are leveraging the crisis. As expected, Tehran’s muqawama partners are crowding to get in on anti-Turkish attacks. On July 22, following a drone strike on Turkey’s Bamerni base, the propaganda outlet Ashab al-Kahf issued a dire warning to Ankara: “Killing for killing, drone for drone, rocket for cannon.” Indeed, Turkey is providing militias with a new rationale for armed “resistance” against occupation at a time when they can no longer credibly claim to be fighting the Islamic State or the U.S.-led coalition. By enabling these groups to justify their illegal ownership and use of drones and rockets, Ankara is inadvertently corroding the stability of the Iraqi state. Energy and water flows may suffer. Aside from the basic rationale of having U.S. partners be at peace with each other, Iraqi-Turkish cooperation is vital for exporting much-needed energy to Europe as a way of backfilling Russian supplies. Rising tensions after incidents like the Parakh tragedy will make it harder for Baghdad and Turkey to compromise on energy matters, particularly the soon-to-be-decided arbitration spurred by Ankara’s decision to give the Kurdistan Region direct access to the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline and export oil without Baghdad’s approval. Furthermore, Iraq and Syria both need more water from Turkey, as new U.S. ambassador Alina Romanowski highlighted in her inaugural policy initiative after arriving in Baghdad. This is unlikely under the current warlike conditions. Preventing or ameliorating crises between U.S. partners is generally much less of a drain on policymakers than repairing ruptures after the fact. If the United States wants to spend less time on the Middle East, the best way to do so is to keep a lid on tensions, not let them boil over. Yet Washington is already far behind the curve on helping Baghdad and Ankara think through a win-win settlement of the pipeline arbitration, despite clear indications of an impending policy train wreck. As for cross-border operations, the two neighbors have negotiated rules and redlines on this matter before and could do so again, particularly with U.S. mediation. Once the UN-monitored investigation of the Parakh incident is complete, a more comprehensive fact-finding effort should be conducted to determine exactly how widespread Turkish operations are in the remote, lightly-populated, twenty-mile-wide swath along the border. Investigators should also look at Iran’s routine artillery and airstrikes in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ultimately, Ankara has no business maintaining a large, provocative, unilaterally established military base as deep inside Iraq as Zilkan. The latest rocket strikes on the Mosul consulate show that this base and the brash incursion policy it represents are bad for Turkey—not to mention for Iraqi and U.S. interests. At the same time, Washington must not forget Turkey’s rationale for such behavior; after all, the United States would hardly accept a Foreign Terrorist Organization expanding a network of bases 20, 50, or even 100 miles from the homeland, nor would it back off a counterinsurgency strategy that seemed to be working (at least tactically). This dilemma suggests the need for Washington to renew serious multilateral efforts to de-escalate Turkish-PKK violence in a way that gives Ankara some reassurance on border security. Washington would benefit from being part of an Iraqi-Turkish solution and helping Baghdad gain credit for securing concessions from Ankara, ideally including a visible redeployment away from Zilkan. Failing that, Iran-backed militias will continue portraying themselves as the sole defenders of Iraq’s sovereignty.

Turkey's Grip in the Kurdistan Region's oil sector

Sponsored by (NED) In the first quarter of this year, the Turkish company received 252 million dollars in oil from the Kurdistan region. According to Deloitte data, for each barrel of oil, 7 dollars go for the Turkish companies, which is 8 percent of the Kurdistan region's oil revenues. According to Deloitte data, the amount of money paid to both Turkish energy companies (TEC and TPIC) instead of loans and pipeline fees in the first quarter of this year was as follows. # The total amount spent on the two companies in the first quarter of this year was (252 million 455 thousand 135) dollars. # The total amount spent on a daily basis will be (2 million 805 thousand 57) dollars. # From each barrel of oil about 7 dollars went for the two Turkish companies. # (8.33%) of the oil revenue (through pipelines) went to the two Turkish companies. Turkey's benefits from the Kurdistan Region's oil sector Deloitte has released its report for the first quarter of 2022, according to the statistics and audits of Deloitte for the Kurdistan Region from January 1 to March 31, The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exported 36 million 453 thousand 590 barrels of oil through the pipeline to the Turkish Port of Jayhan during the first three months of this year, of which after storage and purification from water composition, only (34 million 923 thousand 168) barrels of oil were delivered to buyers. On average, each barrel of oil in the region was sold for $86.73, with total revenues of 3 billion, 28 million, 903,497 US dollars. According to the report, the Kurdistan Regional Government has paid two types of money to two Turkish companies, namely; Payment for the tariff of the Turkish Energy Company (TEC) for the transportation of the KRG oil. Repayment of debts of Turkish Energy Company (TEC) and Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC). The total amount of money paid to the two companies was (252 million 455 thousand 135) dollars. (125 million) dollars instead of loans and (127 million 455 thousand 252) dollars instead of transportation of Kurdistan Regional Government oil within Turkish territory. So that: # Each barrel of oil sold at (86.73) dollars and (6.93) dollars went to the two Turkish companies. # The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exported 36 million 453 thousand 590 barrels of oil, 34 million 923 thousand 168 barrels were delivered to buyers, the total value was (3 billion 28 million 903 thousand 497) dollars. 8.33 percent of this amount or $252 million, 455,135 were paid to two Turkish companies. Total payments to Turkish companies in the first quarter of 2022 Based on the above analysis, the amount of money spent by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in exchange for loans and pipeline rents to the two Turkish energy companies (TEC) and (TPIC) in the first quarter of this year. # Total expenditure in the first quarter of this year was (252 million 455 thousand 135) dollars. # The total amount spent for December, which was (31) days, was (86 million 956 thousand 769) dollars. # The total amount spent for February, which was (28) days, was (78 million 541 thousand 597) dollars. # The total amount spent for March, which was (31) days, was (86 million 956 thousand 769) dollars. # The daily amount spent was (2 million 805 thousand 57) dollars for the Turkish companies.

The British Consul General visited Draw Media

Draw Media British Consul General David Hunt visited the office of Draw Media in Sulaymaniyah. He declared the British government’s support for freedom of expression as a fundamental human right. British Consul General also discussed journalism and freedom of expression in the Kurdistan Region and stressed the importance of the independent media within the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

Gendarmerie in the territory of the Kurdistan Region

Draw Media Since 2015, 138 civilians have been killed in the Kurdistan Region by Turkish bombings. According to a map of the Turkish presidency, there are 37 Turkish intelligence bases in the Kurdistan Region, which contain thousands of soldiers, hundreds of tanks, artillery and heavy weapons. Bombing On Wednesday, July 20, 2022, Turkey shelled the tourist area (Parakh) in Zakho district, killed (10) civilians and injured more than (20) others, all of whom were Arab tourists. Reactions from within the Kurdistan Region have been transferred to the Iraqi streets. The demands to the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Iraqi territory have increased because these incidents have been repeated dozens of times. According to the Iraqi Kurdistan Team (CPT), 138 civilians have been killed in the Kurdistan Region since 2015 due to Turkish shelling. According to the director of Darkari district of the village of (Parakh), Turkey fired 693 artillery shells and 70 rockets into the area in July 2020 alone, damaging most of the villages in the area. According to Jabar Yawar, former Secretary General of the Peshmerga Ministry in the Kurdistan Region, the number of Turkish air strikes on the Kurdistan Region in the past four years has reached (398) attacks, in addition to (425) artillery attacks More than 20 civilians have been killed in the attacks, which have destroyed border villages, hospitals, roads, bridges and schools. Turkey in the Kurdistan Region The history of Turkey's military presence in the Kurdistan Region dates back to 1997, but the Turkish army's cross-border operations against the PKK date back to the 1980s. Turkey has been conducting military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) since 1983, both inside and outside the country. • In May 1983, Turkey launched its first cross-border military operation in agreement with the Iraqi government, involving thousands of Turkish troops. • In October 1984 and August 1986, Turkey launched two more military operations, but neither succeeded in eliminating PKK guerrillas. • After a period of silence, Turkey launched its fourth operation in 1991 under the name of “Gochan”, which was the year in which Turkish military headquarters and bases increased throughout Kurdistan provinces. • In 1992, the late Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal wrote a letter to Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan (imprisoned in Turkey since 1999) asking him to reduce military attacks against the Turkish army as a starting point for negotiations. But the efforts failed to reach a tangible result. • In the same year, Turkey launched another operation involving 15,000 troops, using tanks, heavy artillery and fighter jets, but it was unsuccessful. The forces withdrew 20 days after the operation began. • After that, a number of other operations were conducted in 1993, 1994 and 1995 with the participation of tens of thousands of soldiers. In the last operation with the help of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (30,000) soldiers participated in the operation, which lasted (45 days) to take control of the area "Haftanin", but was unsuccessful, after a month and a half Turkey withdrew from the offensive. • In early 1999, the number of operations conducted by Turkey in the Kurdistan Region to destroy PKK guerrillas reached 24 operations. In 2000, 2007 and 2008, Turkey conducted similar operations too. Turkey in the Kurdistan Region With the continuous attacks and invasions of Turkey to the Kurdistan Region, the number of Turkish military and intelligence bases in the Kurdistan Region is increasing day by day. According to a map released by the Turkish presidency, Turkey has 37 military and intelligence bases in the Kurdistan Region. Turkey has dozens of bases in the Kurdistan Region. After the arrival of ISIS, under the pretext of liberating Mosul, in December 2015, Turkey brought a large force of about (900 soldiers), (16 tanks) and (20 armored vehicles) to Bashik near Mosul. Turkey's excuse for bringing the force was to fight ISIS, but in 2015, out of 300 air strikes and operations, only three were against ISIS, while 297 were against the bases in the areas under the control of the PKK, which means that 1% of Turkey's attacks on ISIS and 99% of the attacks were on the PKK. This is when Turkey has several other military bases in the Kurdistan Region, especially after the civil war, with the consent of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), within the framework of the "peacekeeping" force, in 1997, a large Turkish force was deployed in Bamerni, Amedi district, consisting of a military airport, 38 Tanks and 738 soldiers. In 1997, Turkey opened three more military bases in Dereluk, 40 km north of Amedi district. In the same year, Turkey established another military base in Kani Masi of Amedi district and Sersi village, 30 km north of Zakho. All the Turkish military bases in the Kurdistan Region are located near the border between the PKK and the KDP. According to a report by the Southern Protest Network published in December 2015, the number of Turkish forces in the Kurdistan Region had reached (3 thousand 235) officers, soldiers and gendarmerie of the Turkish army with various types of weapons and ammunition. According to the report, Turkey has (58) tanks, (27) armored vehicles, (31) artillery and (26) mortars, (17) RPGs and (10) machine guns, (40) military vehicles in the Kurdistan regio. According to the report, the Turkish army is deployed in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG) on 13 military bases and headquarters in the border areas of Duhok province, which has an intelligence department in all military bases: * The largest Turkish military base in terms of the number of soldiers, is in (Kani Masi) district. There are 580 soldiers, 91 officers, 240 gendarmes and 340 strike forces in the base. The largest Turkish military base in terms of logistics is the Bamerni military base, located opposite Bamerni district. Inside the military base there is the largest intelligence unit belonging to the army. There are also 30 tanks, eight armored vehicles, six mortars and six military vehicles, in addition to an advanced sound equipment used for espionage. * Batufa military base has a special intelligence unit consisting of 20 people. The Batufa military base is the largest intelligence base in Zakho district. It has 400 soldiers, 6 tanks, 21 armored vehicles, 14 military vehicles. * The military base (Kribi) in Zakho district has (414) soldiers, (6) tanks, (15) RPGs, (2) machine guns, (6) armored vehicles, (11) artillery, (14) military vehicles. * Sinki barracks contains 80 soldiers and a 120 mm cannon. * Seiri military base is located in Amedi district. It has 75 soldiers, 6 tanks, three machine guns, 6 mortars and 4 armored vehicles. * Kubki military base in Amedi district. It has deployed 130 troops and two tanks. * Qumri military base in Matina area has 70 soldiers and a number of military equipment. * Kukhi Spi military base has 70 soldiers and a number of military equipment. * 70 soldiers and a number of military equipment are stationed in the Daray Davatiya military base in Haftanîn. * Sar-e-Ziri military base has deployed 60 soldiers. * In Gali Zakho base has deployed (34) soldiers. * 45 soldiers with full weapons and military equipment have been deployed in Amedi military base. * The headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency is located in the center of Amedi district. * The headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency is located in the center of Batufa district. * Headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency in Zakho district in Bedari neighborhood. * Headquarters of the MIT intelligence agency in the center of Duhok district in Grebasi neighborhood. * Turkish military base in Bashik. The presence of the Turkish army in the Kurdistan Region is only to protect Turkey's security and gather information about South Kurdistan, especially about the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The presence of this Military hasn’t had any benefit for the Kurdistan region. When ISIS attacked Erbil, Turkey refused to send troops, even refused to use the forces of these military bases, while the Bamarne military base is a military airport and Turkey could attack ISIS from there. According to a report by the BBC, Turkey has 27 additional bases in the Kurdistan Region, some sources say that the number has now increased to 32 bases. Turkey's main goal in building more military bases in the Kurdistan Region, especially in the areas of Batofan, Bamerni and Amedi, is to control the two areas "Haftanin and Matina", both considered two strategic areas for future military operations against the PKK. An agreement for Crossing the border The invasion of the Turkish army into the Kurdistan Region is considered a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, but Iraq has not taken any practical steps except for some protests, because Iraq and Turkey signed an agreement in 1982, according to the agreement. The main goal of the agreement was to attack the PKK for Turkey and the Kurdish revolution in South Kurdistan for the Iraqi government. In 1995, another agreement was signed between Iraq and Turkey. In 2007, when the Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari was renewed, instead of ending the border crossing, the distance was increased from 20 kilometers to 25 kilometers.

Recent Iraqi Supreme Court Decision Likely to Trigger Investment Arbitration Claims

Draw: gibsondunn Click for PDF On February 15, 2022, the Federal Supreme Court of the Republic of Iraq (“Iraq”) issued a sweeping decision upending the existing legal framework governing the oil sector in the country (“Court Decision”).[1] The Government of Iraq has since taken numerous steps to implement the decision, which may have significant and far-reaching repercussions on international oil companies operating under petroleum contracts with the Kurdistan Regional Government (“KRG”). The Court Decision, among other things, purports to (i) repeal the Kurdistan Region Oil and Gas Law (No. 22 of 2007) based on which the KRG has entered into Production Sharing Contracts (“PSCs”) with international oil companies, (ii) rule that the Federal Ministry of Oil is entitled to pursue the nullification of any contracts entered into by the KRG with third parties regarding oil exploration, extraction, export and sale, (iii) rule that the Ministry of Oil and the Federal Board of Supreme Audit are entitled to review and revise any oil contracts entered into by the KRG, and (iv) order the KRG to hand over to the federal government all oil production it has extracted from oilfields. In response to the Court Decision, the KRG Prime Minister reaffirmed the KRG’s commitment to its contracts with international oil companies and emphasized that the KRG will not relinquish any of its rights.[2] In addition, on May 30, 2022, Kurdistan’s Judicial Council released a statement challenging the legality of the Court Decision and the validity and competence of the Court itself.[3] While the Court Decision does not automatically terminate contracts with international oil companies, the Government of Iraq has indicated that it intends to force the cancellation or substantial revision of such contracts. On February 26, 2022, the Oil Minister of Iraq issued an order creating a committee with the purpose of executing the Court Decision.[4] On March 24, 2022, the Oil Minister issued an order to the KRG to send for its review copies of all oil and gas contracts it has entered into since 2004.[5] The Oil Minister has also proposed establishing a state-owned regional oil company that would manage oil assets in the KRG and that would be overseen by the Government of Iraq.[6] More recently, the Oil Ministry has also commenced proceedings with several international oil companies, summoning such companies to appear before the Court in Baghdad on June 5, 2022.[7] While the date of the initial hearing was postponed in order to allow for the summons to be perfected, the proceedings are ongoing.[8] Such interference by the Iraqi Government seems all but certain to lead international oil companies to commence legal proceedings against Iraq if the matter is not resolved promptly. The affected investors are expected to seek redress before international fora, in particular, contract-based arbitrations under the terms of the PSCs and, in parallel, treaty-based arbitrations under applicable international investment agreements. Given the number of international oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region pursuant to long-term contracts with the KRG (over 30), Iraq’s exposure to damages claims could well reach tens of billions of dollars. I. Contract Claims under Production Sharing Contracts Iraq could be held contractually liable for breaching the PSCs by taking any action to either terminate or modify these agreements. It could also be held liable for violating the stabilization clause (contained within the KRG Model PSC (“Model PSC”)) if it takes any measure altering the fiscal or economic conditions resulting from laws or regulations in force on the date of signature of these agreements.[9] Iraq could be contractually on the hook since, as a matter of Iraqi constitutional law, the KRG is a constituent subdivision of Iraq.[10] In the circumstances, international and/or English legal principles such as attribution or alter ego are likely to be relevant (English law being the applicable law stipulated in the Model PSC).h .[11] In this regard, Claimants could in particular point to a recent decision by the High Court of Justice in England which found, in connection with breaches of two oil and gas PSCs, that acts by the KRG “were done in exercise of the sovereign authority of the state of Iraq.”[12] Investors are expected to initiate arbitrations seated in London, England, and governed by the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) Rules, as expressly provided for in the Model PSC.[13] Notably, the Model PSC broadly defines the scope of “disputes” to cover, among other things, any dispute as to the “existence,” “validity,” “enforceability,” or “termination” of the contract.[14] II. Treaty Claims under Applicable International Investment Agreements Iraq has also entered into several Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) and multilateral Treaties with Investment Provisions (“TIPs”) that provide substantive protections to investors and commit Iraq to resolving disputes through arbitration. For example, the Japan-Iraq Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) protects against “expropriation” and “arbitrary measures” and affirms that investors are to be afforded both “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security.”[15] Similarly, investors who are nationals of a member State of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (“OIC”) can initiate arbitration pursuant to the OIC Investment Agreement. The OIC Investment Agreement both protects nationals of OIC Member States against expropriation and allows such nationals, through its most-favored-nation provision, to avail themselves of substantive protections contained in other investment treaties to which Iraq is a party.[16] III. Conclusion The international oil companies impacted by the Court Decision have numerous legal avenues for seeking redress as a result of the substantial harm they may suffer. It is therefore very possible that Iraq will find itself subject to numerous claims in the range of tens of billions of dollars (if not more) before international fora for years to come due to the Court Decision and the Government’s actions to implement that decision. ______________________ [1] Federal Minister of Oil and Ali Shadad Fares v. Minister of Natural Resources of the Kurdistan Region and Speaker of Parliament of the Kurdistan Region, Supreme Court of the Republic of Iraq, 59/Federal/2012 unified with 110/Federal/2019 (15 February 2022). [2] Press Conference of Masrour Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 3 March 2022. [3] Statement of the Judicial Council of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq No. 1511, 30 May 2022. The KRG maintains that the Court was not properly constituted as the Federal Supreme Court capable of determining matters of constitutional law. [4] Iraq Oil Reporter, Uncertainty Deepens After Landmark Ruling Against Kurdistan’s Oil Sector, 8 March 2022, accessible: https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/uncertainty-deepens-after-landmark-ruling-against-kurdistans-oil-sector-44651/ [5] Iraq Oil Reporter, Uncertainty Deepens After Landmark Ruling Against Kurdistan’s Oil Sector, 8 March 2022, accessible: https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/uncertainty-deepens-after-landmark-ruling-against-kurdistans-oil-sector-44651/ [6] Iraq Oil Reporter, Baghdad Launches Legal Action Against Kurdistan’s Oil Companies, 2 June 2022, accessible here. [7] Iraq Oil Reporter, Kurdistan Opens New Front in Baghdad Legal Battles, 9 June 2022, accessible: https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/kurdistan-opens-new-front-in-baghdad-legal-battles-44896/ [8] Iraq Oil Reporter, Kurdistan Opens New Front in Baghdad Legal Battles, 9 June 2022, accessible: https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/kurdistan-opens-new-front-in-baghdad-legal-battles-44896/ [9] Model Production Sharing Contract, Kurdistan Regional Government, Article 43. [10] See Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, Article 117. [11] Model Production Sharing Contract, Kurdistan Regional Government, Article 43; See Chevron Bangladesh Block Twelve, Ltd. and Chevron Bangladesh Blocks Thirteen and Fourteen, Ltd. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/10, Award (17 May 2010); Perenco Ecuador Limited v. Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Jurisdiction (30 June 2011). [12] Dynasty Company for Oil and Gas Trading Limited v. Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq and Dr. Ashti Hawrami, English High Court of Justice 2021 EWHC 953 (Comm) (23 April 2021). [13] Model Production Sharing Contract, Kurdistan Regional Government, Article 42.1. [14] Model Production Sharing Contract, Kurdistan Regional Government, Article 42.1. [15] Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Iraq for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 25 February 2014, Articles 5(1), 5(2), and 5(3). [16] OIC Agreement, Articles 8 and 10. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s International Arbitration practice group, or the following authors: Rahim Moloo – New York (+1 212-351-2413, [email protected]) Jeff Sullivan QC – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4231, [email protected]) Abdallah Salam – New York (+1 212-351-2355, [email protected]) Please also feel free to contact the following practice group leaders: International Arbitration Group: Cyrus Benson – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4239, [email protected]) Penny Madden QC – London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4226, [email protected]) © 2022 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

Deloitte report on oil revenues and sales in the Kurdistan Region

🔻 The Kurdistan Regional Government has sold (34) million barrels through pipelines. 🔻 The average price of the oil sold was (86.7) per barrel. 🔻 The total oil revenue for the first three months of 2022 is 1 billion 343 million) dollars. Draw Media Deloitte has released its audit report on the oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan Region for the first quarter of 2022: 🔹 The Kurdistan Region has exported about 36.5 million barrels of crude oil through pipelines to world markets in the past three months. 🔹 Crude oil exported by pipeline was 36 million 453 thousand 590 barrels. 🔹 sales to refineries were 284 thousand 436 barrels 🔹 total exports and consumption was 39 million 88 thousand 710 barrels. 🔹Analyzed the sale of crude oil exported by pipeline, 34 million 923 thousand 168 barrels of crude oil were transported to buyers, the average price obtained for one barrel of oil sold, was 86,730 dollars. 🔹The report said that the loan of Turkish Energy Company (TEC) and Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC) was $ 125 million 🔹The net cash balance received by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) during the sale of oil and related activities was 1 billion 343 million 481 thousand 232 dollars during the three months. Export and consumption of oil 🔹Crude oil exported by pipeline: 36,453,590 barrels 🔹Crude oil corrected for refining by the Ministry of Natural Resources: 2,226,083 barrels 🔹Sales to refineries: 284,436 barrels 🔹Local sales: 124,436 barrels 🔹Total exports and consumption was 39,088,710 barrels Analysis of sales of exported crude oil by pipeline 🔹Crude oil transported to buyers: 34,923,168 barrels 🔹Total value of crude oil sold: 3,0228,903,497 US dollars 🔹Average price of oil sold: 86.730 dollars 🔹Total value of crude oil and condensate sold (exported through pipelines and local sales: 3,063,356,891 US dollars 🔹Change in customer account receipts: 175,114,220 US dollars 🔹Interest, other fees and deposits: 58,300,940 US dollars 🔹Payment for financial entitlements of oil producers: 1,022,935,075 US dollars 🔹Payment for Turkish Energy Company tariff: 127,455,135 US dollars 🔹Amount of money paid to Kurdistan Pipeline Company (KPC) according to the pipeline concession agreement: 122,165,292 US dollars 🔹Loan of Turkish Energy Company (TEC) and Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC): 125,000,000 US dollars 🔹Payments to third parties paid by or on behalf of the Kurdistan Regional Government: 88,544,997 US dollars 🔹Net cash balance received by the Kurdistan Regional Government during the sale of oil and related activities: 1,343,841,232 US dollars

"False Claims Mislead Kurdish Zoroastrians"

Draw Media Every four years, the World Zoroastrian Congress features different Zoroastrian voices from around the world, but this year there have been recent erroneous reports published in Kurdish media, by organizations, and by individuals about certain activities at the Congress. According to a press release which has been sent to Draw Media by the organizers of the (World Zoroastrian Congress) to state the facts and to make the correct information publicly available. In the press release they mention that, at the opening ceremony of the Congress, a procession of about 40 invited and preselected mobeds and mobediyars (religious priests) from around the world filed onto the stage to offer benediction and prayers. But one of the attendees by the name of Awat Darya, who was not invited to participate since she is not a mobed or mobediyar. Later, the Rudaw Media Network reported Awat’s claims with the following: “Awat was holding the rank of asrawan before, but in this conference, she has been promoted to two ranks above that, to the rank of mobed. According to Awat Darya herself, this is the first time a Kurd has been awarded this rank.” The World Zoroastrian Congress is upset about Awat behaviours and says “this statement by Ms. Awat is a blatant lie”. The World Zoroastrian Congress is an international gathering of Zoroastrians from all over the world. It has been held every four years with the first one in 1960. This year’s Congress was held in New York City, July 1-4, 2022, and was attended by approximately 1,200 people. Here is the full text of the press release