The Share of the Foreign Companies in the KRG’s Oil Blocks

Draw Media The Kurdistan Region is divided into 57 oil and gas blocks, in Erbil province (21%), Sulaymaniyah province 21%, Duhok, including Mosul province, 32%, and in Garmian with the disputed areas 26% of the blocks. The Ministry of Natural Resources has signed contracts with about 40 foreign companies in 56 blocks, and the KRG's share of all blocks does not exceed 20 percent - 25 percent. In The Kurdistan Region, there are only nine active oil blocks. Seven of them are located in Erbil and Duhok provinces making up 92.7 percent of all the region's oil products, and 7.2 percent of which are located between Sulaymaniyah and Garmian. First: geographical division of Kurdistan region's oil blocks The Kurdistan Region is divided into 57 (oil and gas) metal blocks, 17 of which are located within the borders of disputed areas (but within the KRG's authority). The blocks are divided into areas and provinces in the region in a way that Erbil governorate 12 blocks, Sulaymaniyah governorate 12 blocks, Duhok governorate 18 blocks, and Garmian 15 blocks. Details of the geographical distribution of the oil blocks 1. Tauka block: In Duhok province, it is located in the Zakho district, which is 594 square kilometers and has a total of 1.9 billion barrels of oil. 2. Duhok Center Block: it is located in the north of Duhok city and the middle of the province and is 600 kilometers square. 3. Slevani block: In Duhok province, it covers the south of Zakho district to Mosul Lake and is 700 kilometers square. 4. Sindi-Amedi block: In Duhok province, this block covers Amedi district, Sindi plain, and the north of Zakho district. It’s 2358 km square. 5. Sarsang block: In Duhok province, includes Sarsang, Swaratuka, and northeast of Duhok. Its 1,085 kilometers square and is expected to have 2 billion barrels of oil reserve. 6. Bir Bahr block: In Duhok province, the northern city of Duhok. Its 350 kilometers, contains 1.92 billion barrels of oil reserve. 7. Sheikh Adi block: In Duhok province, it is located in the east of Duhok city and north of Shekhan. It’s 180 square kilometers and contains 1.9 billion barrels of oil reserve. 8. Duhok block: Located in the Center of the Duhok district and the south of Duhok city and Smel district. It’s 162 square kilometers. Contains (2.2) billion barrels of oil reserve. 9. Alqush block: In Duhok governorate, it is located in the south of Duhok city, and its a 331 km square area. 10. Atrush block: In Duhok province. Located the south of the Duhok district. It’s 269 square kilometers and contains 3 billion barrels of oil. 11. Shekhan Block: In Duhok province, 283 square kilometers, It is estimated to be about 10.5 billion barrels of oil reserve. 12. Ain Safni Block: Locate in the Ain Safni area in eastern Mosul. Its 840 kilometers and contains one billion barrels of oil. 13. Dinarta block: In Duhok governorate, includes, Mirga Sur, Barzan, south Akre, and Shiladze. It is 1,139 square kilometers. 14. Akra-Bejil block: In Duhok province, Includes, the Akre district and the Bijil district until the Bekhma area, Its 889 square kilometers and more than one billion barrels of oil reserve. 15. Ruvia block: In Duhok province, Includes, the south of bardarash and the north of the Akre district. It’s 517 square kilometers and contains 1 billion barrels of oil. 16. Sarta block: In Erbil province, it is located in the west of Masif district and south of Akre. It is 607 square kilometers and contains 1 billion barrels of oil. 17. Barda Rash block: In Duhok province, located in the Bardarash district. It is 265 kilometers square and contains 1.5 billion barrels of oil. 18. Bashik block: Located in the town of Bashik in the east of Mosul. It is 350 square kilometers. 19. Erbil block: It is located northwest of Erbil and the Bastora area. It’s 313 square kilometers and is expected to be 1 billion barrels of oil. 20. Erbil Damir Dagh block: Erbil city, Erbil plain, Makhmur road, and Kalak district. it is 1531 square kilometers. 21. Harir block: In Erbil province, Harir district, northern Shaqlawa districts until Soran, 700 kilometers. it is expected to contain about one billion barrels of oil. 22. Pirmam block: In Erbil province. Located in the center of the Pirmam district, and Sary rash area. 180 Squares kilometers. 23. Betwata block: 650 Squares kilometers, in Sulaymaniyah province, it starts from Hajiawa town and reaches Betwata, Balisan, Khoshnawati. 24. Choman: From Erbil province, it was first given to the Turkish Energy company, but then the company withdrew from the block. 25. Handren: In Erbil province. Just like the Choman block was given to the Turkish Energy company, the company later withdrew from this block too. 26. Shakrok block: In Sulaimaniyah province, it starts in the Khedrani district in Dukan until near Shaqlawa. 418 square kilometers. 27. Safin block: In Erbil governorate. Starts from Safina mountain to Hizop, it is 500 square kilometers. 28. Bana Bawe block: In Erbil province, it covers from the Hiran and Nazinin areas to Goma span, in 240 square kilometers has more than a billion barrels of oil. 29. Shorsh Block: In Erbil province, From the north-east of Erbil and the Degala district to Goma span, in 526 square kilometers. 30. Mala Umer Block: In Erbil province, it is south-east of Erbil and 285 square kilometers, is expected to be 500 million barrels of oil. 31. Qushtpa block: In Erbil province, it starts from Qushtapa, south of Erbil, to Dubzu and Prde. it’s 1,180 Square kilometers. 32. Qaladze block: In Sulaymaniyah province, it covers all Kaladze districts, Marqa, Dukan Lake, and Rania. It is about 2,000 kilometers square. 33. Khalakan block: In Sulaymaniyah province, Kalakan town, Haybat Sultan Mountain, and a part of Koya plain until Little Zab River. In 624 square kilometers has (2,450) billion barrels of oil. 34. Taqtaq blocks: is located in Koya district, Taqtaq district, and Aghja district in Chamchamal, containing more than one billion barrels of oil reserve, 951 square kilometers. 35. Piramagrun block: In Sulaimaniyah province, east of Dukan-Sulaymaniyah road and the foothills of Piramagrun mountain till it reaches Dukan town, it is more than 730 square kilometers. 36. Miran block: In Sulaimaniyah province, it starts from Tasluja, west of Dukan-Sulaymaniyah road, including a part of Agjalar, Bazian, and Chamy Razan Resort. It's 1015 square kilometers. Contains two big oil fields; east Miran which is expected to have 1,637 billion barrels of oil, and west Miran, which contains 4,808 billion barrels of oil. 37. Bazian block: In Sulaimaniyah province, Sagarma mountain, west of Bazian, Takia town, and part of Agjalar in Chamchamal district. Its 473 square kilometers, and has 1,178 billion barrels of oil reserve. 38. North Sangawa block: In Garmian. it is located north of Sangaw in Chamchamal district. it contains 6,163 billion barrels of oil in 492 square kilometers. 39. Top xana block, In Garmian. East of Qadir Karam district and Jabari area. Contains 4 billion barrels of oil in 945 square kilometers, despite a large amount of gas. 40. Taza block, In Garmian. Including a part of Nawjul and west of Qadir Karam district. It is expected to be 3 billion in oil and a large amount of gas in 700 square kilometers. 41. Palkana block: In Garmian, Duzkhurmatu, and Jabara district, which is 529 square kilometers, containing 1.58 billion barrels of oil reserve. 42. Penjwen Block: In Sulaymaniyah province. Extends from the center of Penjwen to the Iranian border, and it is worth mentioning that no investment has been made in this block so far. 43. East Arabat block: in Sulaymaniyah province, it covers Siwail, Barzanja, and a part of Sharazur to Nalparez district in Penjwen district and is 700 km square. 44. Arabat block, in Sulaimaniyah city. Extends from Arabat to New-Halabja District. Including Goizha and Azmar mountain. Its 974 square kilometers, containing 1,177 billion barrels of oil. 45. Baranan block: In Sulaymaniyah province, containing south-east of Sulaymaniyah and Baranan mountain until it reaches Darbandikhan lake. It's 722 square kilometers. 46. Qaradagh block: In Sulaymaniyah province, including the Qaradagh area and the east of Sagarma Mountain and west of the Sirwan River to Darbandikhan. it contains 4,896 billion barrels of oil in 846 square kilometers. 47. South Sangawa block: In Garmian, it covers the center of the Sangaw district and its surroundings. It is 846 square kilometers and is expected to have 2 billion barrels of oil and one trillion cubic meters of natural gas. 48. Kordamir block: In Garmian. Located in the south of Sangaw district and the north of the Kalar district until the Sirwan River. contains 5,129 billion barrels of oil reserve in 620 square kilometers. 49. Garmian block: Including the northern district of Kalar, Bawanur, Sarqalla, and Sheikh Tawel. Contains more than 4 billion barrels of oil in 2120 square Kilometers. 50. Shakal block: In the Garmian area, it covers the south of Kalar, Rizgari district, and Kafri district. which contains about 2 billion barrels of oil in 832 square kilometers. 51. Chia Surkh block: In Garmian. Located in the east of the Sirwan River. Extents from Qoratu and Maidan district in Khanaqin until the Iranian border. Contains 5,656 billion barrels of oil in 938 square kilometers. 52. Kor Mor Block, in Garmian: The first Block of Kor Mor; is located in the Qadir Karam district of Chamchamal. Containing more than 2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas in 510 square kilometers. Second Block of Kor Mor; It’s a separate block from the Qadir Karam block. It’s around 300 square kilometers and has a large amount of gas and oil. 53. Chamchamal block: In Garmian area. Extends from small Zab until Basara river to Chamchamal district, and its 1169 square kilometers 54. Qara Hanjir block: In Garmian, it is located between Chamchamal and Kirkuk, which Contains Shwan, Qara Hanjir, and the Takai Jabari district. It’s expected to be 5 to 10 billion barrels of oil in 1,200 square Kilometers. 55. Khurmala block: In Erbil province, it is in the southwest of Erbil. Extends from Kirkuk field, which includes both Khurmala and the Avana of Khurmala. 56. Halabja block: in Sulaymaniyah province, it is located in Halabja district. Contains Khurmal, Sirwan, Biara, Gelejal, Halabja district center, and a part of Sayed Sadiq. Contain an estimated 650 million barrels of oil in about 1000 square kilometers. 57. Jabal Kand block: It covers the northeast of Mosul and is 400 square kilometers. Second: foreign companies in the Kurdistan Region The KRG has started oil contracts with foreign companies from 2002 until 2013, the number of companies in the Kurdistan Region to develop the region's oil sector has reached about 40 companies. Third: the share of foreign companies in the oil and gas blocks of the Kurdistan region As we mentioned earlier, the Kurdistan Region is divided into 57 oil and gas blocks, the Ministry of Natural Resources has signed contracts with about 40 foreign companies in 56 blocks, and the Kurdistan Region's share of all blocks does not exceed 20%-25%. Fourth: The stages of work and production capability in oil blocks The oil blocks are generally divided into three types, two of which are oil blocks (those in production and those in pre-production), the third of which are gas blocks.                                                                       

Federal Court: The KRG must hand over oil to the federal government

Draw Media   The Supreme Federal Court of Iraq, which has the highest legal authority, has issued its final decision regarding the export of oil from the Kurdistan Region.   The Supreme Court decision summary:   • The Kurdistan Region's Oil and Gas Act No. 22 of 2007 has been repealed. • The Kurdistan regional government's commitment to (handing over all oil products from the Kurdistan region's farms and other areas, from which the ministry of natural resources extracts oil and is handed over to the federal government). • Claimant has the right to investigate the cancellation of oil contracts signed by the Regional Government and its representative (Minister of Natural Resources) with foreign parties, states, and companies regarding the discovery, extraction, export, and sale of oil.   The Kurdistan Regional Government's commitment to allow the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the Federal Financial Supervisory Bureau, to review all oil contracts signed by the Kurdistan Regional Government regarding the export and sale of oil and gas. To scrutinize them and determine the financial rights of the regional government, and determine the region's share of the public budget.

Dana Gas Company Last Year Got 184 million Dollars in Kurdistan Region

* The Company's Revenue Has Increased by 30% to 452 Million Dollars Sharjah-based Dana Gas, one of the region's largest private natural gas companies, swung to a record net profit in 2021 as revenue surged amid higher oil prices. Net profit for the 12 months to the end of December climbed to $317 million, compared to a loss of $376m in 2020, the company said in a statement to the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, where its shares are traded. The profit included other income of $608m related to an arbitration award against the state-owned National Iranian Oil Company. However, that was partially offset by impairments of $451m related to UAE gas assets and goodwill. Adjusted net profit for last year, excluding other income and impairments, came in at $128m, a more than 250 percent rise from 2020 adjusted profit of $36m, which reflects a robust underlying operating performance, the company said. Revenue increased 30 percent year-on-year to $452m in 2021, supported mainly by higher oil prices and increased production in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). “We closed the year on a strong financial footing as a result of a robust operational performance over the last 12 months, said Patrick Allman-Ward, chief executive of Dana Gas. “We had record gas and LPG production in the KRI in December, achieving a 50 percent growth in gas production over the past three years as well as record collections of $377m, all of which contributed to our record profit.” Average group production fell 2 percent year-on-year during 2021 to 62,100 barrels of oil equivalent per day, mainly driven by a 7 percent annual decline in Egypt production to 28,300 boepd. The production decline was offset by a 5 percent jump in output from the KRI, which reached 33,800 boepd at the end of 2021. In the KRI, the KM250 gas expansion project currently underway at the Khor Mor plant is progressing on schedule. The project is now fully financed after securing a seven-year $250m loan from the US International Development Finance Corporation in September 2021. The company, which spent about $126m in capital expenditure in 2021, is expected to maintain the same level of spending this year. During a media earnings call, it does not have an immediate requirement to raise further debt, Mr. Allman-Ward said. Cash balance at year-end stood at $185m, an increase of 70 percent compared to $109m at the end of 2020. The cash balance includes $67m held by Pearl Petroleum, of which Dana Gas has a 35 percent share. The group collected a total of $377m in 2021, up from $182m in collections in 2020. Egypt and KRI contributed $193m and $184m respectively. Collections from Egypt and the KRI rose 107 percent year-on-year in 2021, marking a record for the company on the back of a strong rebound in oil prices, an accelerated pace of payments from Egypt, and the settlement of past outstanding KRI receivables from 2019 and 2020. The company’s Egypt receivables stood at $24m at the end of December, the lowest level since Dana Gas started operations in the country in 2007. Total outstanding receivables in KRI at the end of last year came in at $43m. "The decrease in receivables in Egypt and the payment of past outstanding receivables in the KRI further strengthened the company’s balance sheet and allowed the additional interim dividend payment of 3.5 fils per share," Dana Gas said.  

Norwegian DNO revenue increased by 63% in 2021

🔹 More than 86% of its income is obtained from the Kurdistan region's oil 🔹For the first time, DNO revenue reaches more than 1 billion dollars Oslo, 10 February 2022 – DNO ASA, the Norwegian oil and gas operator, today reported record revenues exceeding USD 1 billion in 2021, up 63 percent from a year earlier, on the back of high oil and gas prices and solid production performance. Annual operating profit climbed to USD 321 million, reversing an operating loss of USD 315 million in 2020. Strong 2021 free cash flow of USD 362 million drove a 68 percent reduction in net debt to USD 153 million at yearend. “Notwithstanding the continued impact of the pandemic, DNO became a billion-dollar company last year on the fiftieth anniversary of its founding,” said DNO’s Executive Chairman Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani. “We are as committed as ever to explore for and produce oil and gas in a commercially attractive but also socially responsible and environmentally sensitive manner,” he said, adding, “This is our business model, this is DNO’s DNA.” As previously reported, gross production at the Company’s flagship Tawke license in Kurdistan averaged 108,700 barrels of oil per day (bopd) last year, of which the Peshkabir field contributed 61,800 bopd and the Tawke field 46,900 bopd. Of the total, 81,500 bopd were net to DNO’s interest. North Sea net production averaged 12,900 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boepd), bringing the Company’s total 2021 net production to 94,500 boepd. In 2022, DNO plans an operational spend of USD 800 million across the portfolio. In Kurdistan, DNO is ramping up its drilling activities to maintain Tawke license gross production at around 105,000 bopd during the year, as well as a contribution from the operated Baeshiqa license in excess of 4,000 bopd. In December, the first phase field development plan for the license was approved by the Kurdistan Regional Government, clearing the way for a fast-track project to deliver early production from previously drilled but suspended discovery wells. Three additional Baeshiqa development wells will also be drilled this year. In the North Sea, DNO projects net production in 2022 to remain around 13,000 boepd. The Company will participate in drilling the highly anticipated Edinburgh exploration well in the UK and six additional prospects offshore Norway, aiming to build on last year’s successes with the Røver Nord exploration well and the Bergknapp appraisal well. Also in Norway, the DNO-operated Brasse project as well as the partner-operated Iris-Hades, Gjøk and Orion discovieries target 2022 project sanction, supporting the Company’s North Sea growth ambitions. The Company’s net reserves stood at 321 million barrels of oil equivalent (MMboe) of proven and probable reserves (2P) at yearend 2021 with additional contingent resources (2C) of 189 MMboe, according to preliminary numbers. DNO ASA is a Norwegian oil and gas operator focused on the Middle East and the North Sea. Founded in 1971 and listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, the Company holds stakes in onshore and offshore licenses at various stages of exploration, development, and production in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, Norway, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Ireland, and Yemen.

UAE's Dana Gas may hit 950 MMcf/d capacity in Iraq's Kurdish region before 2025

AuthorDania Saadi  EditorAdithya Ram    UAE's Dana Gas may hit a gas production capacity of 950 MMcf/d following a second train expansion at the Kurdish field of Khor Mor and the supply to local markets or beyond will depend on market needs, the company's CEO said Feb. 9. Dana Gas, which is currently expecting first gas from the first 250 MMcf/d gas train expansion by the second quarter of 2023 to add to the current 452 MMcf/d, is in talks with the Kurdistan Regional Government for a sales agreement for the second train that will add another 250 MMcf/d by late 2024 or the beginning of 2025, Patrick Allman-Ward said on a media call. "We are in discussions with the Kurdistan Regional Government for a gas sales agreement for the second 250 MMcf/d Khor Mor gas train," said Allman-Ward. "We hope those will be finalized shortly. As long as the market is there once the second train comes on stream, we should ramp up in a couple of months." Dana Gas production from Kurdistan rose 5% in 2021 to 33,800 boe/d, which includes condensate and LPG. If the KRG were to take all of the company's gas for power generation, it would be producing far too much electricity than it currently needs, which may necessitate the export of electricity or the gas itself, the CEO said. "The KRG has got a total installed generation capacity to absorb the amount of gas but would generate far too much for its requirements," said Allman-Ward. "If they take all the gas for power generation then they will need to export electricity to markets in the area or export the gas directly to other markets." Erbil-Duhok pipeline However, a potential export market is Turkey following the decision to construct a common user pipeline connecting the Kurdish capital Erbil to Duhok near the border with Turkey, he said. With the expansion of pipelines in Kurdistan, the second train gas will flow from Khor Mor to Erbil, doubling the gas export line, he added. "The good news of course with the common user pipeline and expansion being put in place and the expansion from Khor Mor to Erbil is that we will be able to put the entire volume of gas through to the common user pipeline," Allman-Ward said. "The Turks have already built gas pipelines to the border. It does not take very much additional effort to connect the whole [gas] system together. We have for years been flagging the massive resources we have available in our Khor Mor and Chemchemal fields in in the Kurdistan region and the potential for these fields to supply markets not just domestically in Kurdistan and in Iraq as a whole but also to further markets in Turkey and the European Union," he added. The semi-autonomous Kurdistan region has also previously held talks with the federal government in Baghdad on potential gas supply. Federal gas needs Federal Iraq is in dire need of domestic gas supplies because most of its production is pumped with oil and is flared, prompting Baghdad to rely on Iranian gas and electricity supply to plug power shortages. However, Iraq is receiving US waivers to continue importing Iranian energy, which has been subject to sanctions reimposed by Washington under the previous administration of Donald Trump in 2018. "We have flagged to the federal government and the ministry of oil that we have spare capacity available from our Khor Mor field to potentially supply the federal government through the Jambur pipeline, which originally was purposed for condensate export but can be repurposed for gas export," Allman-Ward said. "Discussions have taken place, but they have not concluded yet." In April 2007, Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum entered into an agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government for exclusive rights to appraise, develop, produce, market and sell petroleum and gas from the Khor Mor and Chemchemal fields in the region. The other shareholders in the Pearl consortium are OMV, MOL and RWE with a 10% stake each.    

The Losses of the KRG’s Oil Sales

Draw Media The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has sold more than one billion and 100 million barrels of oil in the past eight years but has less than 31 trillion dinars in revenue. This is at a time when the region has lost 81 trillion dinars in Iraq’s public budget due to the independent sale of oil and has also owed 45 trillion dinars.   The region's share in Iraq's budget Kurdistan Region's share of Iraq's public budget between 2014 and 2021 was 97 trillion dinars, of which only 15 trillion dinars were sent to the region, meaning 81 trillion dinars were withheld from the region's share.   First: The region's share of Iraq's public budget, (2004-2014) Before the independent economic decision, oil was sold independently by the regional government, in Iraq's public budget, as a monthly share, a large amount of money was sent from Baghdad to the region. So from 2004 till 2014, the federal government had sent 17 percent of the public budget to the region. According to sources, the money that KRG received from the Iraqi federal government, continued from 2004 to 2014, was 75 billion and 177 million dollars. According to sources, the money that KRG received from the Iraqi federal government, continued from 2004 to 2014, was 75 billion and 177 million dollars. In 2014, due to the ISIS war and the problems of forming Iraq’s central government, there was no budget law, spending power was given to the ministries, and the region's share was cut from here. According to a study published in October 2020 by the Office of Research and Investigation of the Iraqi House of Representatives, the Kurdistan Region Government received 96 trillion, 196 billion, and 503 million dinars from Baghdad, from 2005 to 2019. In return, the KRG returned only 2 trillion, 273 billion, and 430 million dinars from its income to the central government in Baghdad.   Second, the region's share of Iraq's public budget, (2014-2021) Since 2014, the situation has been changed, although the Kurdistan region's share has been determined in the 2014-2021 budget laws, the region has never received its share from the Iraqi budget. That was all due to the region's decision to follow independent economic policy, and not submit oil to the central government.  Region's share of Iraq's budget, (2014-2021) * The Iraqi government did not have a budget law in 2020. * In The first three months of 2020, 453 billion dinars were sent from Bagdad to the Kurdistan Region every month. * The first six months of 2021 passed, but the Iraqi government did not send any budget to the region. In the second six months of 2021, the Iraqi government has sent 200 billion dinars monthly as advances to the Kurdistan Region. *The Kurdistan region's share between 2014 and 2021 was 97 trillion, 540 billion, and 995 million dinars. *Only 15 trillion, 929 billion, and 533 million dinars have been sent to the Kurdistan Region. *The amount of 81 trillion, 611 billion, and 422 million dinars have been withheld from the Kurdistan region's share by the Iraqi central government.   Third, the KRG’s income of oil independently Within the framework of an independent economic policy, the Kurdistan Regional Government exported more than 1 billion and 100 million barrels of oil from 2014 to the end of 2021. The average price of a barrel of oil was 54$ in that period. In general, without any expenses and costs, the value of the amount of oil that KRG sold was more than $55 billion.   Fourth; the result of independent oil sales If we compare the income that the regional government has made through the sale of oil, with the portion of Iraq's budget that KRG lost, then: * Since 2014, the Iraqi government has withheld 81 trillion dinars, 611 billion, and 422 million dinars of Kurdistan’s share. * The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was able to export 1 billion, 103 million, and 857,335 barrels of oil within 8 years, and get 30 trillion, 863 billion 374 million, and 220,231 dinars after coasts, expenses, and selling it for a cheaper price. *The difference between independent oil sales and Iraq's general budget is 50 trillion, 748 billion, and 47 million 779,769 dinars.   Fifth: Accumulated public debt Due to the continued crises from 2014 to 2020, the Kurdistan Region has been subject to a large amount of international and local debts. The amount of these debts is more than 31 billion U.S. dollars. A large portion of the debt goes back to the Kurdistan Regional Governments' previous cabinets.  

After Oil, Erdogan Asks for the KRG's Gas

Draw Media After the oil, Erdogan asks for gas in the Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani secured his position with the region's oil. After a while of marginalization, he returned to the field and began a new deal with Erdogan. While oil has now become a major issue between the region and Baghdad. It is not clear how the gas deal will affect the region in the future. More details are in this report.   Turkey wants the gas Suddenly, he arrived in Ankara and met with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Nechirvan Barzani's visit was so sudden that even his media did not know it, and they reported it from the Turkish president’s website. The KRG's presidency website did not provide any information about the Nechirvan Barzani's meeting with Erdogan, but Erdogan told journalists on the sidelines of his visit to Ukraine, that he and Nechirvan Barzani had discussed sending natural gas from the Kurdistan Region to Turkey. Nechirvan Barzani told Erdogan, "I will do whatever I can and discuss the gas deal with the central Iraqi government."   Gas after oil Nechirvan Barzani, the engineer of the 50-year deal with Turkey to export Kurdish oil. Referring to the agreement the Kurdistan Region delivers its oil pipeline through Jihan port to Countries, such as Italy, Spain, Greece, Israel, Bulgaria, and Croatia. After oil, Nechirvan Barzani wants to send the KRG natural gas to Turkey, which is happening at a time, when European countries are afraid of facing a natural gas crisis because of the possibility of a Russian attack on Ukraine, and Russia, as the world's largest gas exporter, would stop sending gas to Europe. According to the official website of the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Kurdistan Region has 200 trillion cubic feet (5.7 trillion cubic meters) of natural gas reserves, which are 3 percent of the world's gas reserves. But this is not proven yet, as the region's proven rate of natural gas reserves is only 25 trillion cubic feet, according to U.S. energy reports. In a 2020 report, the Oil Price, Special Issue on Global Market for Crude Oil, mentions that only 10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas has been found and is being used, which is now produced within the borders of the PUK-controlled area in the Kormor oil field.   The division of gas between KDP and PUK   Natural gas reserves are divided into PUK and KDP-controlled territories, as follows: Reserves of the PUK-controlled territories • Kormor Field: 8 trillion and 200 billion cubic feet Chamchamal Field: 4 trillion and 400 billion cubic feet • Miran Field: 3 trillion and 46 billion cubic feet • Plkana Field: A trillion and 600 billion cubic feet   Reserves of the KDP-controlled territories • Bna Bawe field: 7 trillion and 100 billion cubic feet • Khormala field: 2 trillion and 260 billion cubic meters • Shekhan field: 900 billion cubic feet • Pirmam field: 880 billion cubic feet   Nechirvan Returns to the Political Activities   After 17 years of government leadership, in mid-2019, as part of a family agreement, Nechirvan Barzani left the prime minister position for Masrour Barzani, his cousin, and instead, Masoud Barzani vacated the post of the Kurdistan Region President for Nechirvan Barzani. Since he took the post of President of the Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani has been marginalized, and foreign delegations have visited Masoud Barzani as before. But on the presidency issue, When Iran tightened its pressure on the KDP, Nechirvan Barzani's role was revealed when Masoud Barzani sent him as his representative to Najaf to discuss with Muqtada Al-Sadr. After Iran, Turkey also gave Nechirvan Barzani another chance to return to the political field. Nechirvan Barzani's visit to Erdogan gave Nechirvan Barzani another chance to regain Kurdistan Region's energy case to Nechirvan Barzani.    

PUK Uses Gas as a Pressure Card Against KDP

Draw Media A report by Fazil Hama Raffat and Muhammed Rauf The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is putting and testing new pressure upon the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). PUK wants to fight against the “PDK oil” with natural gas and start a strong economic and political relationship with Baghdad. Now, part of the natural gas in PUK areas reaches Afghanistan from Chamchamal every day. More details in this report by “Draw”    Does PUK make a decision?  This month, the Political Bureau of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan will meet to discuss the latest PUK’s stance on its relations with the KDP. PUK asks for the implementation of administrative and financial decentralization for Sulaymaniyah Province, This project has not yet taken significant steps after a few months. PUK has given the KDP and the Prime Minister, Masrour Barzani, the last permission to make their decision. If the project doesn’t start soon, it is said that PUK will make its final decision.   PUK’s decision! PUK movements have recently increased in Iraq, Lahur Sheikh Jangi, PUK co-leader, has been in Baghdad several times and met Mustafa Kazmi, the prime minister, and other Iraqi officials. PUK wants to achieve a kind of decentralization to the territories which are under its rule through the Iraqi government. For this, PUK has brought up the gas file. There are three gas-rich areas In Iraq, the PUK-controlled area is one of the richest areas. PUK wants to use this gas to strengthen its economic and political position against the KDP-controlled areas, which is the leading oil producer in the region. According to the “Draw” report, there is an idea in the PUK that has not yet been fully outlined. The idea is to build a company called the Sulaymaniyah Gas Company. It will be joint between Sulaymaniyah province and the Iraqi oil ministry and it controls all the oil and gas fields in the PUK-controlled areas (Taq Taq, Kor Mor, Hasira, and Chia Surkh), including the fields in Kirkuk and Khanaqin borders.  "The PUK border gas can fill Iraq's internal needs and make Iraq no longer need to buy gas from Iran to operate power stations," said energy experts at the PUK. The Americans support this step and the United States has received a guarantee from U.S. energy officials on this, but such a step may make Iranians worried and angry, especially when Kurdistan’s gas will be an alternative to Iran's gas in Iraq. In addition, 45,000 barrels of oil are produced daily in the PUK-controlled area, and the PUK wants to increase its oil investment level to 72,000 barrels per day through the agreement with Baghdad. PUK wants to do all this on the condition that Baghdad separately provides salaries for employees in the Sulaymaniyah border and deal directly with Sulaymaniyah province, not through the Kurdistan Regional Government and the KDP. This could be the reason that Masrour Barzani, the head of the regional government, recently said in front of the Kurdistan Parliament that some cases cannot be touched, as they may lead to the outbreak of civil war. To hand over gas and oil to Iraq, the PUK has resorted to Article 112 of the Iraqi constitution, which says oil and gas are run jointly between the federal government, the region, and the provinces. In the PUK-controlled area in Garmian, there are two fields, Kurdamir and Topkhana, which are now escalated into conflict between the KRG and a company in the area of Sulaymaniyah (Petroleum Dynasti), the company is very close to the PUK. The Sulaymaniyah company in London Court has filed a lawsuit against Ashti Hawrami and wants to get a contract to invest in the fields, in February this year, the Court will make its final decision, and if the Kurdistan Regional Government loses this case to the Dynasty Company, it will cause greater economic and political damage to the energy sector. The two fields, apart from oil, also has natural gas, but it has not been produced yet. Those who work for the PUK, dream of having the Turkish companies invest gas in Garmian's fields and export it to Turkey after developing the fields and increasing the level of investment. It is unclear whether the Iraqi government will eventually reach such an agreement with the PUK. According to information achieved by “Draw” from some PUK officials that Mustafa Kazmi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, is in favor of this scheme, but the problem is that it is unclear whether Kazmi will stay as the Prime Minister or not, especially when Iraq is in front of a pre-election. Gas in Kurdistan Region According to the official website of the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Kurdistan Region has 200 trillion cubic feet (5.7 trillion cubic meters) of natural gas reserves, which is 3% of the world's gas reserves. But this is the reserve that has not been proven, as the region's proven natural gas reserves, according to U.S. energy reports are only 25 trillion cubic feet. The Oil Price magazine which is a specific publication about energy reported that last year only 10 trillion cubic feet were found and worked on, which is now produced in the PUK border in Kor Mor. The natural gas of the Kormor field in Chamchamal is produced by the United Arab Emirates — Dana Gas Company. The company now produces 430 million cubic feet, which was 850 tons over the past three years, showing that the UAE company has increased its investment level. The Kurdistan Region's natural gas reserves are mostly in the PUK-controlled area. Generally and geographically gas can be found in the following areas: PUK-controlled area reserve:   • Kormor Field: 8 trillion and 200 billion cubic feet Chamchamal Field: 4 trillion and 400 billion cubic feet Miran Field: 3 trillion and 46 billion cubic feet   KDP-controlled area reserve:   • Bina Bawi field: 7 trillion and 100 billion cubic feet • Khurmala: 2 trillion and 260 billion cubic meters • Palkanafield: one trillion and 600 billion cubic feet • Shekhan Field: 900 billion cubic feet • Pirmam Field: 880 billion cubic feet   The Kurdistan Region's gas is transferred to Afghanistan Generally, the Kurdistan region's natural gas is still used for local needs, meaning it is used for fuel power stations and provides household gas. What is known so far is that the Kurdistan Region's gas is not transferred to another country, but according to the information “Draw” has gained from several sources at the Bashmakh border, the company that buys the gas of the Kormor Field, is illegally exporting 7 to 10 tanks of Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) daily and the gas is taken to Afghanistan In the past few days, the Washington Institute has published a report on the Kurdistan Region's gas content. The report was about the discussion between the American and Kurdish officials on the future of gas in the region. One of the people who spoke in the meeting was Matthew Zais. He is the principal deputy assistant secretary for the Energy Department's Office of International Affairs. Matthew says: Kurdistan Region can increase the annual level of natural gas investment to 40 billion cubic meters by 2035, compared to the current level of gas investment in the region which is 5 billion cubic meters annually.  Matthew Zais has explained that co-operation in gas and electricity production may lead them to have better relationships. Kurdistan Region's capacity in the field of energy will reduce the complexity between the region and Baghdad over the annual budget. It will also improve the circumstances in the region by giving guarantees to the worldwide oil companies in the field of oil. Matthew Zais, in another part of his speech, points out that the Kurdistan Region's power grid (electricity) is essentially generated by gas and it is exported to Iraq. Exporting electric power from Kurdistan Region to Iraq is more reasonable than the other suggestion which has been proposed to solve Iraq's electric power problems, including the suggestion to link Iraq's electric power to the power grid of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or Jordan. The US official expects that, like the region's oil exports to Turkey, the region's gas pipeline to Turkey will eventually be built, but he points out that Iran is constantly trying to restrict energy development in Iraq through its hegemony. Because according to him, Iran does not want Iraq to depend on its energy and electricity abilities. In addition, Iran is using its energy in Iraq for political purposes, so Iraqi officials must find a way to get rid of this challenge.   The U.S. Consul General in Erbil, Rob Waller, said in the meeting that under the supervision of the U.S. Ministry of Energy, a recent study has been conducted on the fields in which the Kurdistan Regional Government can reform them in a way that can be rehabilitated and get benefit from them economically. One of the fields which were described in the research is the cooperation between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi Government in the electricity sector which should be renewed with the development of the gas sector. Changing the power stations that use diesel to natural gas leads to less cost and more production.  The American council states that the cooperation between KDP and PUK is an important priority in the public policy of the United States to develop the gas sector in the region. He said despite having the tensions in the region, recent protests have prompted both parties to admit that their cooperation will revitalize the region, Rob Waller said. Behrouz Aziz is a senior advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government's Minister of Natural resources, attended the Washington Institute meeting, and has mentioned the obstacles in front of the Kurdistan Region's gas field development. Aziz also said that developing Kurdistan Region's gas sector will result in the end of using generators to provide household electricity. The generators use diesel which pollutes the environment and would be harmful to public health, and the development of this sector will provide job opportunities for the residents of the region. The presence of large amounts of Sulfur in the Kurdistan Region's natural gas is one of the obstacles to the development of the Kurdistan Region's gas field, said Bahroz Aziz. He also said having a lot of sulfur in the gas has paralyzed investment in the region's gas, this is alongside some other reasons such as the danger of ISIS and the spread of The Coruna virus. despite this situation, the senior advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government's minister of natural resources is optimistic about the future of gas in the region, saying: "The region did not have the expertise and money to develop its oil sector at first, but it was able to attract international companies and achieved both. The Ministry of Natural Resources needed experience and leadership to implement the same tools in the development of gas resources.    

Independent Oil Policy Caused the Loss of 100 Trillion Dinars

Draw Media In 2014, the Kurdistan Regional Government decided to sell oil independently, which was called an "independent economy", and since then, the government and the people of the region have suffered more than 100 trillion dinars of economic damage. How? Before the independent economic decision, the region's share in the Iraqi general budget was a trillion and 200 billion dinars which were sent to the region monthly. In 2013, a year before the region decided on its independent economy, 15 trillion and 338 billion dinars were sent from Baghdad to the region, meaning that every month that year, a trillion and 278 billion dinars had been sent to the Kurdistan Region by Baghdad. But in late 2013, when the regional government decided to sell oil independently, Baghdad stopped the region's budget in early 2014. At the time, the Regional Government stated that KRG would increase the level of oil exports to one million barrels per month. According to a report by the Iraqi Parliament's research department, the Kurdistan Region has sold oil from 2014 to 2019 for 40 billion and 703 million dollars, meaning 47 trillion and 961 billion dinars, but during that time Kurdistan Regional Government has lost more than 62 trillion dinars in its Iraqi budget, how? • From 2014 to 2019, the region's share in Iraq’s general budget was 75 trillion, 514 billion and 843 million dinars, but only 13 trillion and 370 billion and 533 million dinars were sent to Kurdistan Region and (62 trillion, 171 billion, and 310 million) dinars were cut off because KRG did not deliver the oil to Baghdad. It means that the Regional Government has sold oil worth 47 trillion dinars in the five years, but it has lost 62 trillion dinars in its support in the Iraqi budget project. This is when the regional government did not owe money before the independent economic process. But after the announcement of the independent economic process in 2014 until now, 2019, the number of debts has reached 27 billion, 549 million, and 958 million dollars, which is 40 trillion dinars. The amount of salary savings of the public servants is 8 billion and 966 million dollars, which is 13 trillion Iraqi dinars.  It means that the independent economic policy let KRG’s debt reach 40 trillion dinars. On the other hand, due to oil and gas transactions, the regional government has lost more than 2 trillion and 500 billion dinars in courts against the oil and gas companies: On July 2, 2015, Dana Gas Company won $1.980 million against the Regional Government at the London court. • On February 14, 2017, Dana Gas Company won 121 million dollars from the Regional Government in London court for the second time. The money that the regional government has lost to Dana Gas Company will be 2 billion and 101 million dollars, which is (2 trillion and 500 billion dinars)  in Iraqi dinars. The economic damage that has been caused by the oil policy to the Kurdistan Region is more than 100 trillion dinars, as follows: • Baghdad has cut 62 trillion dinars of the region's support in Iraq’s budget for not handing over oil. • From 2014 to 2019, the Regional Government ‘S debt reaches 40 trillion dinars. • (2 trillion and 500 billion) dinars were the value of the cases that the Regional Government has lost in courts against the oil and gas companies.  

KRG Oil Sales and Revenues in 2021

Draw Media In 2021, the Kurdistan Regional Government exported more than 151 million barrels of oil. According to the data collected, the average price of oil was more than 70 dollars in the world's markets. According to that, the Kurdistan Regional Government crude oil exports in 2021 had a value of more than 10 billion 670 million dollars. But after subtracting the costs and considering the KRG oil price, which is 10 dollars cheaper than the world markets, only $3 billion and $870 million in revenue remains.   Brent oil prices in 2021 According to the Economy Country website, the price of Brent oil in the world markets for 2021 was 70.68 US dollars. As of October 2021, the highest was recorded, which was 83.54 dollars, and the lowest oil price of the year was in January 2021, which was 54.77 dollars.   KRG Oil Sales and Revenues in 2021 The Kurdistan Regional Government exported 151,211,000 barrels of oil to the world markets through the Turkish port of Jayhan in 2021. The KRG's oil revenues before subtracting expenses and based on the oil price of the global market: According to data collected, the Kurdistan Regional Government had the highest oil revenues in September 2021, with 13,090,000 barrels of oil exported, this month the oil price was 74.49 dollars.  If The region's oil was not sold at a cheaper price, and without subtracting oil costs, its total value would be 1 billion, 35 million, and 411 thousand dollars. The lowest income was recorded in January 2021, when 12,800,000 barrels were exported, and the total price of oil in that month was 54.77 dollars. According to which oil revenues in that month were 701,056,000 US dollars. Regarding the region's total oil sales and revenues in 2021, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exported 151,211,000 barrels of oil, when the average oil price per year was 70.68 US dollars. The oil exported by the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2021 without any cost and based on the world market is (10 billion, 670 million, 453 thousand and 860 dollars)   KRG Oil Sales and Revenues (After subtracting the costs and selling at lower prices in the global market) On June 28, 2021, in a joint meeting with the Kurdistan parliament, (Kamal Atrushi, Minister of Natural Resources, announced that 58% of oil revenues would be given to the oil companies and the oil production costs. As he mentioned, 20% are the cost of extracting oil, 14% are Companies’ expenses, and 6% is the transportation, what remains is debt compensation. Even though the region's oil is constantly sold for 10 dollars less than the world’s markets. So, the revenue remains for the KRG in the sale of 151, 211, barrels of oil are (3 billion and 870 million 24,521 US dollars).   the KRG’S oil customers in 2021 In 2021, the region's oil was loaded from the Turkish port of Jayhan by 12 countries. The largest loading by Italian ships, which was 56,081,000 barrels of oil, by %37.1 of the KRG exported oil. The lowest amount of cargo was Polish and Bulgarian ships, with 600,000 barrels which were only 0.4 percent of the KRG exported oil.  

Draw: Policies of repression and violations continue, including arrests of civil society activists and journalists, and even ordinary citizens who express their opinions contrary to those of the local government and security authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan region, according to this latest periodic report by the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR). The security forces have used various means against people protesting about the poor conditions in the region. Severe resentment prevails among society as a result of rampant corruption in government facilities, deterioration of public services, delays in paying employees’ salaries, and decisions related to increasing fees and taxes on citizens. The security forces also targeted the media and prevented them from covering current events. They also beat journalists in several cities in the Kurdistan Region, including with electric batons. According to the annual report of Metro Center for Defending the Rights of Journalists, the local authorities committed 353 violations during 2021 against 260 male and female journalists in the Kurdistan region. Civil society activist and journalist imprisoned   On 26 January 2022, a member of Community Peacemaker Teams in Iraqi Kurdistan announced that 16 months after her arrest, civil society activist Nirivan Ayoub Hassan Dershi, a resident of the city of Dohuk, will be brought to court for the first hearing in her trial on 14 February 2022. She was arrested on 13 October 2020, after organising and participating in the peaceful demonstrations that took place in Dohuk Governorate and the rest of the region to demand full reforms in the region. She will be tried in accordance with Article 1 of Law No. 21 of 2003, which is related to undermining the national security of the Kurdistan Region. Dershi is a 36-year-old mother of five who was divorced by her husband after her arrest and imprisonment. Her court hearings were postponed several times and as a result she went on hunger strike six times. Press reports confirmed that she developed diabetes after entering prison.   On 09 December 2021, Kurdish newspapers and media websites published an appeal sent by journalist Kohdar Mohammed Amin Zebari from prison, in which he mentioned the poor conditions suffered by prisoners of conscience, in addition to the physical and psychological torture that detainees from the Shiladze sub-district of Amadiya district in Dohuk Governorate continuously face. He called on the international community and civil society organisations to put pressure on the Kurdistan Regional Government to release them. On 16 February 2021, the Second Criminal Court in Erbil had sentenced five activists and journalists, including Zebari, to six years in prison on charges of endangering Kurdish national security.   Clerics silenced and arrested over critical sermons   After his last sermon on 31 December 2021, the Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Affairs) in the Kurdistan Region issued a decision banning cleric Dr. Sayed Ahmed Penjwini, an imam and preacher from a mosque in Erbil, from giving sermons in the mosque due to his criticism of the security authorities and the local government in relation to their mishandling of the file of student protests and their arrest of innocent citizens. The Ministry of Awqaf also asked the Ministry of Culture in the region to prevent the publication of his sermons in the media.   On 11 December 2021, the security forces arrested a young cleric, Mullah Bukhari Sirkotki, in Zakho district of Dohuk Governorate because of his criticism of the local government regarding the mismanagement of services and the spread of corruption in the state hierarchy. Mullah Bukhari runs an association for memorisers of the Holy Qur’an and has an official permit from the authorities to carry out his work.   On 10 December 2021, the security authorities prevented a young cleric, Sheikh Radwan Brushki, from delivering religious sermons on the pulpit of a mosque in the city of Dohuk, after a decision was issued by the Directorate of Awqaf in Dohuk Governorate to ban him from giving sermons because of his criticism of the government and administration in his sermons in which he urged people to demand social justice. Political activists arrested and sentenced   On 01 December 2021, the security forces arrested political activist Hiwa Haji Agha, a fifth-year student at the Choman Private Institute in Choman District of Erbil Governorate. He is one of the cadres of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), as local reports confirmed that the reason for his arrest was his continuous criticism of the local government on his Facebook page.   On 20 December 2021, the Advocates for Prisoners of Conscience in the Kurdistan Region announced that the Court of Appeal had received the file of the preliminary ruling issued by the Second Erbil Criminal Court on 08 November 2021, which included prison sentences against two political activists among the Badinan detainees, who are residents of Dohuk Governorate. After being convicted of charges related to the national security of the Kurdistan Region, they were sentenced as follows: Shirwan Taha Cougar, imprisoned for two and a half years, and Masoud Ali Sinjari, imprisoned for three and a half years.    On 07 January 2022, a security force in the city of Sulaymaniyah arrested political activist Ghazi Kirkuki, and took him from his home to an unknown destination. Kirkuki is a leader in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and local sources say his arrest comes as a result of internal political disputes. Peaceful protesters arrested   On 07 December 2021, the security forces arrested two peaceful demonstrators, Duran Mahmoud and Arian Mustafa, after their participation in the student protests that erupted again on 06 December 2021, in front of the doors of some colleges at the University of Sulaymaniyah, demanding the implementation of the authorities’ promises to provide monthly allowances for students and improve the conditions of the internal housing departments. They were released after five days of detention.   On 07 December 2021, the security forces in the city of Dohuk arrested the young citizen Halkaft Abdulsattar Ashoyi, who was working as an employee in the Foundation of Mine Action in the city of Dohuk, and took him to an unknown destination. His work contract in this directorate, along with dozens of his colleagues, was canceled recently. They organised a protest in front of the building of this foundation, demanding that they be allowed to return to their work, and they made statements to the media against the officials who issued the decision to dismiss them.   On 16 January 2022, the security forces in Erbil arrested a young citizen, Karwan Abdulrahman, after he criticised the local government for increasing taxes for poor public services, during an interview with one of the local channels. Clips from his interview were posted on social media. He was released on 25 January 2022, after nine days in detention. Two TV channels banned from attending official press conference   On 11 January 2022, the coordinator of international recommendations in the regional government, Dindar Zebari, held a press conference, which was attended by a large number of journalists, including representatives of media institutions loyal to the regional authorities. Both Rudaw and NRT were prevented from attending the press conference in contravention of all local laws that affirm the right of journalists to practice their work without harassment. Recommendations GCHR calls on the Kurdistan Regional Government to immediately and unconditionally release all civil society activists, journalists and other prisoners of conscience whose civil and human rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly, are being violated. The authorities must fulfill their constitutional obligations not to violate public freedoms, including freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press, and to provide full protection for journalists and media professionals.

KDP and PUK in Sadir’s Chess Game

Draw: Dlawer Ala’Aldeen President of MERI Muqtada Al-Sadir, the Shiite Cleric Grandmaster, is playing to win; whatever the expense. In the build-up to the game, the Sunnis got their act together and seized the opportunity to become the main winners of the first round. However, the Kurds entered the fight on one leg, lost sight of the bigger picture and intensified their internal power rivalry. This has already proven costly for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and if they keep on as they started, the second round will be even dearer. Fortunately, it is not too late to minimise their losses or even end up winning future rounds. To do this, they need to take into account the complex power dynamics within not just the Shiite component of Iraq (Shiite House), but also the Shiite ‘Universe’ inside and outside Iraq. The Shiite Universe vs Shiite House Forming the Government in Baghdad follows a complex pathway from within the Shiite Universe. A winning parliamentary group within the Shiite block in Iraq will take the lead, however, the Cabinet and its overall direction are ultimately determined by a number of invisible institutions within the Shiites’ Universe. Collectively, they own the Shiite cause and have the final say. These institutions of Shiite Universe (ISU) include: Marjayia of Najaf, the other religious institutions (like Hawza), the intellectual elite and the community leaders at large. The political powers, such as the Sadrist Movement and Coordination Framework (CF), and the political elite. The political, security and intelligence institutions in Iran, their Supreme Leader, Hawza of Qum, the Lebanese Hizballah and others.  After centuries of Sunni rule, the Shiites assumed power in Iraq for the first time (after 2003). The ISU, who consider Iraq central to their existential struggle, have in effect assumed the country’s ownership. Despite their diversity of interests and internal rivalries, the ISU remained united in pursuing grand strategies and facing common threats. Their collective influence has proven more overwhelming than any number of seats that Iraqi political alliances could secure. The Shiite Universe does not tolerate complacency. The ISU have no intention of allowing an internal political group (such as the Sadrists) to stray, forge alliances with non-Shiites and loosen their grip over power. They will not allow Sunni or Kurdish groups, potentially influenced or empowered by global or regional rivals (such as the US, Turkey or the Gulf Arabs), to peel Iraq away from Iran, back into the depth of the Sunni Universe. Thus, if the ISU, particularly in Iran and Najaf, are currently acting as observers, may not remain so. They may even allow the Sadrists to form a government in partnership with the Sunnis and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). However, they have the time, the tools and the methods to make this government fail. The early indicators and on-going threats suggest that they are prepared to work systematically to undermine a Sadrist monopoly of power.  They would slow down his government’s progress, prevent reform and facilitate its collapse, paving the way for a new coalition government or snap elections. The Sadrists Approach The Sadrists are aware of these factors. They know that the Shiite Universe considers the rise and unity among the Iraqi Sunnis a potential revival of Sunni dominance, and a possible existential threat to the Shiite rule. For different reasons, they consider Kurdish dominance over Baghdad a risk as well. Many Iraqi nationalists are suspicious of the sincerity of the Kurds, particularly the KDP, in giving up their dream of independence and working for a stronger, united, Iraq. The Sadrists do not hide their mistrust of the Kurds’ agenda and would not wish to engage in a partnership that would force them to accepts Kurdish demands for what they consider to be their right. Fearing pressure from their electoral constituencies and populist rivals, they may hesitate to implement Article 140 of the Constitution, constrain the Shiite armed Popular Mobilisation Forces in the Disputed Territories, or facilitate payment of the KRI’s share of the budget. In short, the Sadrists would not wish to go reckless against the ISU and risk their political future. Hence, they insist on attracting some of the leaders within the CF. This would give them the Shiite legitimacy and Shiite majority (in government) that they desperately need. The Compromise Package During negotiations between the Sadrists and CF, three packages have been debated. The CF package, where all of CF member parties, including Nouri Al-Maliki’s, join the Cabinet. They take six ministries, retain the power of veto over the choice of the Prime Minister (PM) and Al-Maliki to become one of two Vice Presidents. So far, this package has been rejected by the Sadrists. The Sadrist package consist of inviting all the CF member parties, except for Al-Maliki’s. They take four ministries without the power of veto over the choice of PM. This has been rejected so far by the CF. The compromise package that accepts Al-Maliki as a Vice President, offers four to six ministries to CF, with or without the power of veto over the choice of PM. This package may finally be mutually accepted. There is a fourth option which is not been debated. It consists of forming a minority Shiite government in partnership with the non-Shiites, namely the KDP and the main Sunni groups.  This option is critical for the Kurds because it is the only one that would allow the KDP to join the Sadrists on their own and deny the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) the presidency or share of ministries. Otherwise, the former three packages (1-3) will enable both the CF members and the PUK to enter the government with their own demands or expectations, which would not necessarily be in line with those of the KDP. The KDP-Sadrist Partnership Apparently, the Sadrists left it to the KDP to convince the PUK to join their coalition. During the KDP-PUK joint visit to Baghdad, the Sadrists expected the PUK to sign a pre-existing (Sadrist-KDP) declaration. Seemingly, the Sadrists (and Sunni partners), are concerned about the split between the two Kurdish parties, but they are willing to do what it takes to protect their interests. It transpired that the Sadrits’ primary objective in the earlier partnership with the non-Shiites was to beat their CF rivals in securing the ‘largest faction’ status, and take the Shiite lead in forming the government. For this, they were dependent only on the Taqadum’s list (lead by M. Halbousi), therefore did not need the support of any other groups. Now the Sadrists and Sunnis have secured their goals, they may begin to think about future moves and their political consequences. If the CF and PUK end up joining the government, the Sadrists may have to seek a compromise between the KDP and PUK; particularly over the presidency. If all fails and the KDP end up withdrawing from the partnership, the Sadrists may still move on as they would not be affected. The Bigger Picture vs the Narrow Tunnel It is clear that none of the coalition partners, led by the Sadrists, were focused on the bigger picture. However, Sunni unity will inevitably serve their common cause, and the Shiite groups might finally compromise between themselves to avoid diluting their rule. Ironically, they might decide that allowing a new reformist style of governing, led by a strong-minded Shiite, may turn Iraq into a better country with stronger institutions that the Shiites could be proud of. In contrast, the rivalry among the Kurds has so far been disastrous and, if this continues, can pose an existential threat to the KRI as an entity. Previously, before and after elections, the KDP and PUK would exchange highly reassuring messages, emphasising unity both at home and in Baghdad. Unfortunately, the exact opposite has now happened. The two parties appear to have lost sight of the bigger picture and are marching down a narrow tunnel towards an even more damaging internal rivalry. Some fear this may ultimately lead to a total split in the Kurdistan Region’s administration. However, all is not lost and such scenarios are not inevitable. The KDP and PUK are accustomed to a complicated multi-level dynamic between them, often compartmentalising their various levels of engagements. Cooperating where their mutual interests are best served, whilst engaging in fierce rivalry elsewhere. It is important to re-emphasise that the Iraqi elections have brought about a new opportunity for the KRI to transform Baghdad-Erbil relations. If they address the root-causes of the issues that lie in Baghdad, they may provide the solutions for it in the future. Crucially, the international partners are keen to facilitate negotiations and to emphasise their wish to support a united and more stable Kurdistan that can act as an effective partner in Baghdad. Taken together, it is not too late for the KDP and PUK to calm this intense rivalry in Baghdad and engage in a serious and constructive negotiations for a win-win outcome. They should refocus on the bigger picture, reach a new strategic agreement and join efforts to achieve their common goals in Baghdad.

Draw Media Receives NED Grants for Media Projects

Draw Media Draw Media is pleased to announce that we have been able to achieve NED grants for media projects. Each year the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) makes direct grants to hundreds of non-governmental organizations worldwide, working to advance democratic goals and strengthen democratic institutions. Draw Media will utilize this support to develop its website in (Kurdish, Arabic, English). NED is a non-governmental organization in the United States, located in Washington, D.C. that was founded in 1983 for promoting democracy in other countries. NED dedicated 25 thousand dollars for supporting Draw Media for one year, from February 2, 2022, to January 31, 2023 By receiving this grant, as Draw Media, we are pleased that we have proved to be a (free, independent, neutral) media. Which is approved now by an international organization as NED. The Financial support for Draw Media by National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is being conducted transparently like all other institutions in Iraq, which have received the grant.  Draw Media will also be observed by National Endowment for Democracy (NED) for transparency as a media organization. Which helps Draw to work more professionally based on international standards. Draw Media was founded by a group of journalists and promised readers to work impartially, and for this reason, DRAW has faced a lot of financial crises since its establishment. In the beginning, the websites had no offices, and the journalists worked online from home. In addition, it was unable to develop its journalism work as necessary. After receiving financial support from the National Endowment for Democracy, Draw Media takes its work to a whole new level and benefits from NED’s financial and moral support to develop its website and publish news and investigative reports in both Arabic and English. By receiving this financial support, Draw Media will dedicate a part of its work to covering and monitoring the oil sector in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq towards having transparency in this sector.

Will the 2018 Presidential Election Scenario Be Repeated?

Neaz Mustafa, Draw Media The statistics show that the 2018 scenario cannot be repeated, and Masoud Barzani would be the winner over Bafel Talabani this time. If the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) loses the Presidency post, there would be a big question on the PUK’s participation in the new government cabinet in Iraq. Barzani and Talabani’s discussion on President’s Candidates was not fruitful. PUK insists on Barham Salih, and PDK on Hoshyar Zebari to be their candidates for the next Iraqi president. More Details are in this report by Draw Media. Barzani Wants the President in any Circumstances!  PUK and PDK have not reached an agreement on a candidate for the next Iraqi president both sides have their candidates, which was noticed at today’s meeting between Talabani and Barzani. The three main leadership positions in the Iraqi government are divided among Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. Whereas Kurds get the presidency, Shiites get the premiership, and Sunnis get the parliamentary speaker. Among Kurds, the PUK has held on to the presidency position since 2005. The KDP and PUK for years abided by a strategic agreement, where the PUK would get the Iraqi president of their choice, and the KDP in return would get the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region. Until 2018, When Masoud Barzani stepped down as President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), he wanted to get back the Iraqi presidency position from PUK. The KDP and for the first time, put forth Fuad Hussein against Barham Salih for the position.  Will the 2018 Scenario Be Repeated? Today the political situation in Bagdad is the same as four years ago. There is no official agreement between the KDP and the PUK over the Iraqi presidency. Both parties have their candidates for the position. But the election results show that this time Barzani would win the competition and he would be able to get revenge for the 2018 incidents. The MPs have to elect a new president by February 8. The president will later assign the candidate of the biggest parliamentary alliance to form a new government.  In 2018, Bafel Talabani won the position from Barzani. When Barham Salih, Talabani’s Candidate, won by 219 votes over Fuad Hussain, Barzani’s Candidate, by 22 votes. But repeating the same scenario in 2022 is kind of impossible because the situation has been changed now. KDP and Barzani have returned to Bagdad with more power. Before the Oct 10 of 2021’s election, Barzani has signed an agreement with Muqtada Sadr. And now Sadr is the biggest winner of the election and he would form the new government. Above that, Barzani has established a strong relationship with the Suni blocks. How Barzani would win the presidency competition?  On the 9th of January, in the first meeting of the fifth round of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, the KDP showed its power. In that meeting, a new political alliance in Iraq has been presented for the first time between (Sadr, Barzani, Al-Halbousi). This alliance has 180 seats out of 329 parliament seats. On the other side, the Coordination Framework alliance has 70 seats.  The PUK is one of the political parties that got 18 seats in the October 2021 elections and is looking forward to getting the presidency position as its portion, depending on the previous political agreements between the Iraqi parties. But yet the party does not have a solid agreement Neither with Muqtada Sadr nor with the Coordination Framework alliance.  In addition, the PUK did not vote for Muhamad Al-Halbousi for the parliament presidency which angered the Sunnis. But by being away from the Shiite conflict, PUK might achieve the satisfaction of Iran. If the situation continues as it is, in the second parliament meeting, the (Sadr + Halbousi) alliance would vote for (Hoshyar Zebari) the KDP Candidate for the Iraqi presidency.

25Million IQD would be Spent Monthly for Each Iraq MPs

Draw: Each Iraqi parliament member receives 25 million Iraqi dinars (more than 17,000 US dollars) each month for their salary, staff, and accommodations. The money that transfers to their bank account will be as bellow: • The overall salary of an MP member for a month would be 7 million 400 thousand IQD. 5 million IQD is their nominal salary, and they would receive two million 400 thousand IQD as their allocations. Three million IQD would be for accommodations and the rents of each MP member. • 15 million 200 thousand IQD would be transferred to each member’s bank account for a staff of 16 persons. That includes the bodyguard, Secretary, and media manager for each of them. The salary of each staff member would reach 950 thousand IQD. The MP members are not restricted from spending the money. They are free to decide how to distribute the amount they receive for their staff. Some parliament members would not pay out the money to the staff members, except a small amount. In return, they will let them be free of work or not work for them at all. • The average money which spends for each MP member is 25 million 200 thousand Iraqi dinars (more than 17,000 US dollars) with some other benefits. •            The Iraqi parliament has 329 members. The average of money they receive would be 8 billion 290 million IQD •            After four years of parliament service, those who have served government for 15 years and 45 years old and above would be retired as MP members.