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News / Kurdistan

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State: Oil and Gas issue does need to be sorted

Draw Media U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf met with representatives of a number of media outlets. In response to Draw Medi’s question about the deepening disputes between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad on the oil and gas issues and the role of the United States on this matter, she said “There have been substantial tensions in these last months. Over the course of 20 years of watching Iraq, there are many unresolved issues and this is one of the most important one, obviously. It really does need to be sorted. Sorted in a way that provides stability of planning and participation for the American oil firms or any others and service companies. It’s quite critical to the functioning of the KRG’s fields. So, our good advice I think is best provided in private.” Leaf discussed the recent violence in Baghdad, U.S. support for Iraqi sovereignty, stability, and security, a national hydrocarbons law, and a political settlement, all based on meaningful compromise and dialogue. She strongly encouraged all Iraqis, including the people of the IKR, to vote at every opportunity, remarking that this is the best way for citizens to take control of their government. Leaf also noted an erosion of the climate in which journalists exercise their responsibility to the public, and told the media representatives that we raise this issue frequently in our meetings with government officials.    

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Religious leader or politician: What does Muqtada al-Sadr really want?

Draw Media Dana Taib Menmy-  Iraq Analysis: Muqtada al-Sadr has been an influential figure in Iraqi politics for years, vowing to withdraw from political life multiple times only to return once again. Iraq is now experiencing an ominous calm before the next expected escalation between supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Iranian-backed Shia rivals, who have been at the centre of the country's political stalemate for years. Iraq is now experiencing an ominous calm before the next expected escalation between supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Iranian-backed Shia rivals, who have been at the centre of the country's political stalemate for years. Sadr, in a tweet on 29 August, unexpectedly announced his "final" retirement from politics, causing his supporters to take to the streets in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone, as well as across central and southern Iraqi provinces.  His announcement turned the Green Zone - home to government buildings and embassies - into a battlefield, as Sadr supporters used machine guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), and Katyusha rockets in pitched battles against their rivals, including former paramilitaries of the Iran-backed Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi network and the party of former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki, a longtime foe of Sadr. "The recent violence in Iraq really demonstrated Sadr's power and ability to incite a civil war in the short-term" More than 30 people were killed and hundreds were injured. The fighting ended the next day with a call from Sadr to his fighters to cease fighting and withdraw from the area. “The violence escalated, Sadr gave 24 hours to his supporters to act without his instructions and needed to end it as it looked like the Sadrists were the outlaws attacking the state," Sajad Jiyad, a fellow at the Century International for Research and Policy, told The New Arab.  "It is possible this was a planned provocation and, in any case, he showed the power of his group and nothing more was to be gained.” During a press conference, Sadr went on to say that both those killed in the clashes and the killers "were in hell", with others speculating about whether the Shia cleric had ambitions of replacing Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Al-Sistani. RELATED The Iraq Report: Sadr at the heart of Iraq's political chaos Iraq Report The New Arab “Sadr was disappointed that his group resorted to such open violence and wanted to distance himself from it, which is why he blamed the killer and those killed for engaging in violence," Jiyad told TNA. "I think he cares very much about his image and religious legitimacy and does not want to be seen like any other political leader, which is natural as he is a cleric too.” Iraq’s political crisis is now in its 11th month after the country went to early elections on 10 October 2021 in which Muqtada al-Sadr's bloc won a majority with 73 seats. Sadr tried to form a 'national majority' government with several Sunni and Kurdish blocs, mobilising against pro-Iran Shia blocs organised under the Coordination Framework (CF). More than 30 people were killed and hundreds injured in clashes between Shia rivals last month. [Getty] Frustrated in his efforts to fulfil his promise to his supporters, however, Sadr ordered lawmakers from his bloc to resign, which all his MPs did on 12 June. The CF replaced Sadr's MPs with their own, becoming the biggest bloc in the Iraqi parliament. They vowed to form a consensus government that would include all the Sunni and Kurdish blocs. Iraqi analysts have told The New Arab that Sadr had made a mistake by withdrawing from the parliament and choosing to confront his rivals in the Iraqi streets and through his Saraya al-Salam and Al-Mahdi Army militias. Sadr, claiming to be a reformist, insists that the Iraqi parliament should be dissolved by the country’s Supreme Federal Court, and snap elections be held again. But the CF insists that the parliament should convene to elect a president, form a consensus government, amend the country’s election law, and then vote to dissolve itself. "Muqtada al-Sadr is interested in becoming the most powerful figure in Iraq, both politically and spiritually, and all of his moves are framed by his want to do so" Where is Iraq going? There are now several different scenarios for Iraq, including the possibility of snap elections, which even Iraq's President Barham Salih has voiced support for. "The trouble is that an election is actually unlikely to change anything on the ground, it could even make things worse, whilst only temporarily abating the different factions,” Shayan Talabany, an analyst at the Tony Blair Institute (TBI) focused on Iraq’s politics, told TNA. “Iraq’s last election had the lowest voter turnout in any election since 2003. With the recent violence, there are different dynamics that could play out in terms of voting. Some Iraqis could feel more encouraged to vote, which could be a source of optimism, as a large population of Iraqis would rather vote for those not currently in government,” Talabany said. RELATED The Iraq Report: Night of violence reveals grave instability Iraq Report The New Arab “Another very likely scenario is that Iraqis will be even more frustrated with the political process and not even vote, particularly if they feel that even when alternative parties do gain votes (such as in October 2021) these results are overridden by the traditional parties who are squabbling for power,” she added. “The real issue is that the political process of forming a government, the outbursts of violence, and the continuous back and forth between the different factions engaged in a power struggle have the ability to prolong the political process even further. This could quickly become very dangerous, given the ability of more regressive forces, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers, to mobilise so quickly. The recent violence in Iraq really demonstrated Sadr’s power and ability to incite a civil war in the short-term.” She also cautioned that there is a high possibility that public anger and frustration could rise and potentially explode if the country’s needs and its people’s demands are further ignored. Sadr’s withdrawal from politics has also once again raised the question of whether he wants to be Iraq’s next Shia religious Marjaeya, replacing al-Sistani. Sadr's withdrawal from politics has once again raised the question of whether he wants to be Iraq’s next Shia religious Marjaeya. [Getty] “I think Muqtada al-Sadr is interested in becoming the most powerful figure in Iraq, both politically and spiritually, and all of his moves are framed by his want to do so. On the political front, the trouble is that Iraq’s system structurally prevents a single or central concentration of power, especially since former Prime Minister Noori al-Maliki was removed. We have seen this play out since the October 2021 elections,” Talabany said. “On the religious or spiritual front: Sadr does not have the qualifications nor calibre religiously to replace al-Sistani. The danger is however that Sadr thinks he can or should achieve both these pillars of authority. What Sadr wants and what is actually feasible, at least under the current circumstances, is therefore quite different.” Regarding the scenario that the US might fully withdraw from Iraq as it did in Afghanistan last year, Talabany ruled out such a possibility, given how different the situation in both countries is. "Sadr does not have the qualifications nor calibre religiously to replace al-Sistani. The danger is, however, that Sadr thinks he can or should achieve both these pillars of authority" “It is difficult to make the argument that Iraq is the centre of international interest. I think that apart from Iraq’s current important role as a major oil exporter during times of low energy supply, there is international fatigue with Iraq,” she said.  “There is a lot of international interest in Iraq that is solely centred on Iran. It is worrying to hear the large number of voices that seem very willing to allow Iraq to regress, for the sake of countering Iran, which is itself a really impractical and narrow-sighted way of viewing the country and its relationship with its neighbours,” Talabany added. "At the same time, if Iraq wants to be taken seriously, it has to maintain its security so that it can move on and attract positive attention and not just negative attention by being a security threat – but right now that seems quite unlikely.”  

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Iraq and the Kurdistan Region sold 112 million barrels of oil in August

Draw Media The Iraqi government sold 101 million barrels of oil, while the Kurdistan Region sold 11 million barrels of oil in last month. In August 2022, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region both together exported more than 112 million 600 thousand barrels of oil. The Kurdistan Regional Government exported 11 million 500 thousand barrels and the Baghdad government exported 101 million 100 thousand barrels. The country exported a total of 3 million 630 thousand barrels per day. The Kurdistan region's exports were 10.2% of the total oil exports. China was the top buyer of federal oil with 33.6 million barrels, followed by India with 26.3 million barrels and the United States with 6.8 million barrels. Greece was the largest buyer of oil in the Kurdistan Region, followed by Italy with 2.29 million barrels and the UAE with 748,000 barrels.

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Kurdistan Regional Government Revenue for August

Draw Media                                                 The total revenue of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in August after excluding oil expenditures was (970 billion) dinars, while oil revenue was (1 trillion 480 billion) dinars, of which (830 billion) dinars went for expenditures and (650 billion) dinars remaining for the government. summary Non-oil revenues • Non-oil revenues for August = (287 billion) dinars (according to the latest statements of the Minister of Finance) • Coalition financial aid to the Peshmerga forces = (31 billion 500 million) dinars • Kurdistan Region's share of the Iraqi budget = (0) dinars Oil revenues (pipeline exports) • In August 2022, the Kurdistan Region exported 11 million 560 thousand barrels of oil through Turkey. • The average price of Brent oil for August is $100.45 • Because the region sells its oil at $12 less, it sells oil at an average of $88.45 So: (11 million 560 thousand) barrels X (88.45) dollars = (1 billion 22 million 482 thousand) dollars. • According to the latest Deloitte report, 56% of oil revenues go to the production companies and 44% remains for the Ministry of Natural Resources. - So: (1 billion 22 million 482 thousand) dollars X (56%) = (572 million 589 thousand 920) dollars go to the cost of the oil process. - (1 billion 22 million 482 thousand) dollars X (44%) = (449 million 892 thousand 80) dollars of revenue remaining for the KRG.

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Investment recession in the PUK controlled areas

Draw Media # In the three years of the ninth cabinet, 206 investment projects worth $11.6 billion have been licensed. # In the KDP controlled areas (yellow zone), (136) projects with a percentage of (66%), in the PUK controlled areas (green zone), (70) projects with a percentage of (34%), received licenses. # The amount of capital invested in the yellow zone was $9.5 billion with a percentage of (82%), while in the green zone it was $2.1 billion with a percentage of  (18%). first; Investment projects in the ninth cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government According to the data of the Media and Information Office, the ninth cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government since its inauguration from (July 28, 2019 to June 27, 2022), in all sectors, especially the public service sector has carried out special investment projects. With a capital of (11 billion 629 million 355 thousand) dollars on an area of ​​(10 thousand 824) acres of land in different parts of the Kurdistan Region, most of these projects have been carried out by local investors. During this period, 206 investment projects with a capital of 11 billion 629 million 355 thousand dollars have been licensed on an area of 10 thousand 824 dunams of land in different parts of the Kurdistan Region, most of these projects have been carried out by local investors. Second; Total projects by province and autonomous administrations The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has approved 206 projects in different sectors in the ninth cabinet Erbil Province  Erbil province has received 88 projects with a capital of 8 billion 911 million 758 thousand 113 dollars and the projects have been carried out on an area of ​​4 thousand 864 dunams. Sulaimani Province Sulaimani province comes in second place with (53) projects with a capital of (1 billion 594 million 915 thousand 213) dollars on an area of ​​(1 thousand 928) dunams. Duhok Province  In Duhok province, 48 projects have been implemented with a capital of 598 million 413 thousand 798 dollars on an area of ​​2 thousand 760 dunams of land. Halabja Province In Halabja province, one project with a capital of (6 million 846 thousand) dollars on an area of ​​(7) dunams of land has been licensed. Garmian Independent Administration  In Garmian Autonomous Administration (11) projects with a capital of (391 million 992 thousand 439) dollars and on an area of ​​(1 thousand 143) dunams of land have been carried out. Independent Administration of Raperin In Raperin Autonomous Administration, five projects have been carried out at a cost of $125 million 429 thousand 481 on an area of ​​119 dunams of land. third; Total projects by zone In the ninth cabinet, 206 investment projects with a capital of 11 billion 629 million 355 thousand 44 dollars have been approved. In the yellow zone (Erbil and Duhok) (136) projects with a percentage of (66%). In the green zone (Sulaimani, Halabja, Garmian and Raperin) (70) projects a percentage of (34%) have received licenses. The amount of capital invested in the yellow zone (9 billion 510 million 171 thousand 911) by (82%), in the green zone (2 billion 119 million 183 thousand 133) dollars by (18%).    

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Oil firms seek U.S. mediation to defuse Iraq-Kurdistan tensions

Draw Media, (Reuters) Oil firms operating in Kurdistan have asked the United States to help defuse an upsurge in tension between Iraq's central government and the semi-autonomous region, according to a letter seen by Reuters and three sources. They say intervention is needed to ensure oil continues to flow from the north of Iraq to Turkey to prevent Turkey having to increase oil shipments from Iran and Russia. They also say the economy of the Kurdistan region (KRI) could be at risk of collapse if it loses oil revenues. Relations soured in February when Iraq's federal court deemed an oil and gas law regulating the oil industry in Iraqi Kurdistan was unconstitutional. Following the ruling, Iraq’s federal government, which has long opposed allowing the Kurdistan regional government (KRG) to independently export oil, has increased its efforts to control export revenues from Erbil, the capital of the KRI. Before the ruling, Dallas-based HKN Energy wrote to U.S. ambassadors in Baghdad and Ankara in January seeking mediation in a separate case dating back to 2014 concerning the Iraq-Turkey pipeline (ITP), a copy of the letter seen by Reuters shows. Baghdad claims that Turkey violated the ITP agreement by allowing KRG exports - it deems illegal – through the pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Turkey's energy ministry did not respond to a request for comment. The final hearing from the case took place in Paris in July, and the International Chamber of Commerce will issue a final decision in the coming months, Iraq's oil ministry said. Turkey's next steps remain unclear should the court rule in Iraq’s favour, an outcome considered likely, according to three sources directly involved. At least one other oil firm has engaged at senior levels with four direct and indirect stakeholder governments to encourage engagement, a representative from the company told Reuters, on condition of anonymity. Other operators in the KRI, Genel Energy (GENL.L) and Chevron, declined to comment on the arbitration case, while DNO and Gulf Keystone did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Apart from requiring Turkey to get more crude from Iran and Russia, a cessation of oil flows through the ITP, would cause the KRI's economy to collapse, HKN's letter to U.S. representatives said. Neither the KRG's ministry of natural resources nor the oil ministry in Baghdad responded to a request for comment. Already Iraq is getting less than the full benefit of high oil prices, which leapt to 14-year-highs after major oil exporter Russia invaded Ukraine in February and they remain close to $100 a barrel. The ITP has the capacity to pump up to 900,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude, roughly 1% of daily world oil demand, from state-owned oil marketer SOMO as well as the KRG. For now, it is pumping 500,000 bpd from northern Iraqi fields, which will struggle to boost production further without new investment. Analysts have said companies will withdraw from the Kurdistan region unless the environment improves. Already many foreign companies have lost interest. They first came to Kurdistan in the era of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, when the region was considered more stable and secure than the rest of Iraq. As security has deteriorated, the handful of mostly small and medium-sized firms left has also sought U.S. engagement to help deter attacks against energy infrastructure and improve security generally. The firms gave their backing to letters written from U.S. congress members to Secretary of State Antony Blinken sent in August, according to sources directly involved in the matter. They asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue. The letters urged high-level engagement with Erbil and Baghdad to safeguard the stability of the KRI’s economy and to ensure Iraq is free from Iranian interference. State Department spokesperson Ned Price said on Aug. 16 that disputes between Baghdad and Erbil were between the two sides, but the United States could encourage dialogue. The State Department summoned U.S. law firm Vinson & Elkins, which is representing Iraq’s oil ministry in Baghdad, for a briefing in Washington on the ITP dispute in July. A further two briefings are likely to take place in Baghdad and Washington, according to a source familiar with the matter. "Baghdad would certainly welcome U.S. statements to the KRG leadership that it should follow the Iraqi constitutional arrangements for the oil industry in Iraq," partner at Vinson & Elkins James Loftis said. The U.S. state department declined to comment but industry experts believe U.S. intervention is unlikely and, in any case, might not help. "The U.S. has become disengaged from Iraq over the past decade. No pressure from Washington or other governments will resolve the issues between Baghdad and the Kurds," Raad Alkadiri, managing director for energy, climate, and sustainability at Eurasia Group. A Kurdish official told Reuters in August the KRG had asked the United States to increase their defence capabilities, but said it was not hopeful as the United States' higher priority is reviving the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.

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The production of the oil fields (Tawke, Taq Taq, Sarta) has declined

Draw Media According to the latest report of the Turkish company "Genel Energy", in all the oil fields in the Kurdistan Region in which the company has a share, the level of oil production decreased in the first half of 2022 compared to the first half of 2021; # Daily oil production from the Tawke field decreased by 4.2%. # Daily oil production in Taq Taq field (33.8%) decreased. # Daily oil production from the Sarta field (31.6%) fell. # The Qara Dagh field, which the Turkish company owns 40% of the shares, has not yet reached to the production level. Genel Energy in the Kurdistan Regional Government oil fields The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has contracts with Turkish company Genel Energy for each of the fields (Tauke, Taq Taq, Sarta and Qara Dagh). According to the latest report of Genel Energy for the first half of 2022, the total daily production of the three fields (Tawke, Taq Taq and Sarta) declined, so that in the first half of this year, the average daily production was (116 thousand 930) barrels of crude oil. While the average production of the three fields in the first half of 2021 was 124,710 barrels per day. Accordingly, the daily production level of the fields (Tauke, Taq Taq and Sarta) in the first half of 2022 compared to the first half of 2021, the amount of (7 thousand 780) barrels of oil per day decreased by (6.7%) The details of each farm separately, the information is as follows; First; Tawke Farm Norway's DNO and Turkey's Genel Energy are shareholders in the Tawki field. DNO owns 75% of the shares and Genel Energy owns 25%. The Tauke contract area is located in Duhok province. According to the latest report of Genel Energy, the average daily production of the Tawke field in the first half of 2022 was (106 thousand 700) barrels per day. The share of "Gennel Energy" during the period was (26 thousand 680) barrels per day as it owns (25%) of the shares. According to the report, the production of the contract area in the first half of 2021 was (111 thousand 140) barrels per day, the company's share was (27 thousand 780) barrels per day. Accordingly, the overall daily production level of the contract area in the first half of 2022 compared to the first half of 2021, the amount of (4 thousand 440) barrels of oil per day decreased by (4.2%) Second; Taq Taq oil field The field is located in Taq Taq area of Koya district, ​​951 square kilometers. The shares of the field are divided between Adax Petroleum (36%), Turkish Genel Energy (44%) and (KIPCO) has (20%) of the shares. According to the latest report of Genel Energy, the average daily production of the Taq Taq field in the first half of 2022 was 4,850 barrels per day. The Genel Energy's share in the field in the first half of 2022 was 2,130 barrels per day, as it owns 44% of the shares. According to the report, the production of the contract area in the first half of 2021 was (6,490) barrels per day, so the company's share was (2,860) barrels per day. Accordingly, the overall daily production level of the contract area in the first half of 2022 compared to the first half of 2021, the amount of (1,640) barrels per day of oil decreased by (33.8%) Third; Sarta oil field The Sarta field is located in Erbil province. The US company Chevron has a 50% of its shares, Genel Energy has a 30% and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has a 20% of its shares. According to the latest report of Genel Energy, the average daily production of the Sarta field in the first half of 2022 was 5,380 barrels per day. The Genel Energy's share in the field in the first half of 2022 was 1,610 barrels per day, as it owns 30% of the shares. According to the report, the production of the contract area in the first half of 2021 was 7,800 barrels per day, the company's share was 2,120 barrels per day. Accordingly, the level of daily production in the contract area in the first half of 2022 compared to the first half of 2021, the amount of (1,700) barrels per day of oil decreased by (31.6%) Fourth; Qara Dagh oil field It is located in Sulaimani province in Qara Dagh district, east of Sagrma Mountain and west of Sirwan River to Derbandikhan. The area of ​​this block is (846) square kilometers. Previously, 80% of the shares were given to Exxon Mobile and 20% remained to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). However, after the withdrawal of the US company (40%) of the shares were sold to the Turkish company "Genel Energy" However, the field has not yet reached to the production level and the Turkish company continues to work in it.

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One in twelve Syrian Kurds in KRI’s Dohuk are stateless

One in twelve Syrian refugees living in Dohuk, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), are stateless, the Norwegian Refugee Council has revealed. A survey of nearly 1,300 Syrian refugee households in the Dohuk governorate of KRI suggests there are close to 7,000 stateless Syrians out of nearly 86,000, or 8 per cent of the total number of Syrian refugees in Dohuk. “Not only have many Syrian Kurds in KRI been living in displacement for over a decade, but their struggle is compounded by the fact that they remain stateless and on paper belong nowhere,” said James Munn, NRC’s Country Director in Iraq. Kurds from Syria were stripped of their nationality as a result of a one-day census in 1962. Those who possessed ID documents but could not meet residency requirements in Syria became foreigners or ‘ajanib,’ while those who could not provide any documents were to be known as ‘maktoumeen’, or unregistered. Both ‘ajanib’ and ‘maktoumeen’ have passed on their status to the following generations. In addition to being denied citizenship in their country, stateless Syrian Kurds have for generations faced a long list of restrictions such as not being able to own land, obtain a marriage certificate, enrol in school, vote, or get a job. NRC’s survey also found that more than a quarter intend to travel beyond KRI, which means they are most likely to face additional barriers claiming asylum. 94 per cent of ‘maktoumeen’ and ‘ajanib’ reported that they do not intend to return to Syria in the future. “We have spoken to people who told us their families have to suffer with their stateless status. They do not know where they will go with no home, rights, or nationality,” said Munn. Ahmed, a Syrian Kurd from Qamishli who arrived in KRI in 2013 with his wife and four children, told NRC, “We are still living in camps and our children can’t properly attend school... We also don’t have many opportunities for jobs, but it is the same for Syrian citizens here [in Dohuk] too. We just want to get an ID for any country for the future of our children.” In KRI, stateless Syrian Kurds can access legal residency and humanitarian aid. However, this does not change their stateless status, nor the barriers to durable solutions that statelessness poses. NRC is calling on the Kurdistan Regional Government, the Government of Iraq, and the Government of Syria to provide clear mechanisms and safe pathways to access services and obtain documentation. Notes to editors: In August 2022, NRC surveyed 1,281 households across Dohuk governorate to understand the scope of statelessness amongst Syrian Kurds displaced in KRI. Key informant interviews were conducted with ajanib and maktoumeen Syrian Kurds in the Dohuk governorate of KRI in Domiz I, II and Bardarash camps and outside of camps in Dohuk city. Of all households surveyed, 5.3 percent reported that they are maktoumeen, and 2.3 percent reported that they are ajanib who have either obtained Syrian citizenship since 2011 or still not obtained citizenship. Of respondents who indicated that they are ajanib, 72 percent indicated that they had not applied for citizenship despite qualifying for it under the 2011 law. Sixty-seven percent of those who have not obtained citizenship stated that the primary reason was that they fled Syria before they were able to apply for citizenship. Fourteen percent indicated they did not feel they could safely return to initiate the process, while another 14 percent stated they did not know how to apply for citizenship. Lastly, 5 percent indicated that cost was the main barrier.

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Bafel Talabani elected PUK president

Bafel Jala Talabani was elected as the sole president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) on Sunday by the leadership council members in Sulaimani, the party announced officially. The leadership council of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) revoked the co-presidential party system and elected Bafel Jalal Talabani as the President of the party. In the meantime, the PUK leadership council adopted a new bylaw for the party despite approving PUK forum recommendations that took place in May by the members of the council. The new changes embraced were formulated in the PUK Forum held in May 2022 in Sulaimani province, where members of the party convened to discuss the new political strategy. The internal conflict of the party came when the sensitive PUK-affiliated security agencies were taken control by Bafel Talabani, ousting the former co-leader Lahur Sheikh Jangi. He was sacked later in the party.  

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New report reveals civilian victims of Turkey’s cross-border attacks in Iraq Kurdistan

On 20 July 2022 an attack was recorded in the village of Parakhe, near Zakho (Duhok province). The attack saw 9 civilians killed and 24 wounded. This kind of attack by Turkey, which targets civilians, has been taking place for seven years in northern Iraq, and have killed a minimum of 98 civilians, also causing thousands of displaced persons. These are the main findings of a new report published today, 23rd August 2022.  The research, by the international civil society coalition End Cross Border Bombing Campaign (ECBBC), lays out for the first time and in meticulous detail the civilian impact of an often-underreported aggression.  Since 2015 Turkish forces have launched more than 4,000 aerial, artillery, and ground attacks within the borders of Iraq, of which 1,600 were registered in 2021 alone, the report documents. Not solely have these operations fueled insecurity and instability in the area, but they disproportionately impact the lives of civilians living in the region, as the report points out.  Among the key findings of the report are: Turkish military actions have killed between 98 and 123 civilians and in at least 88 incidents since 2015.  Those incidents involving civilian harm have been on the rise, at least 40 incidents have taken place in the 2020-2021.  More than 55 civilian farmers and livestock owners were killed or wounded by Turkish forces while farming or tending their livestock.  13% of those killed are women, with 87% men In addition, at least six children were killed in the attacks, with a further 14 injured. An estimated 500 villages have been abandoned during the same period. “Every story mentioned in this report matters, and we should not wait longer to document more stories. Instead, we all together as human beings must seek and take action for peace for the Iraqi people. Only together can we work to not let the tragedy of history repeat itself on this land,” states Mohammed Salah with Community Peacemaker Teams, an ECBBC member organization. “There has been much discussion of the disastrous US-led invasion of Iraq, but this is in many ways the forgotten invasion of Iraq.” he added. Diverse mosaic The region of Iraqi Kurdistan and the governorate of Nineveh are home to a diverse mosaic of communities, many of whom live in mountain villages and practice agro-pastoral activities for a living. For many, airstrikes pose a tangible and all-too-frequent risk to their sustenance and even to their own life. An unknown yet significant number of families have been forced to leave their home as a result of the destruction caused by the bombings, or in fear for their lives, and relocate to neighboring cities or IDPs camps where no basic service or infrastructure is present. Under the justification of fighting militants from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), for more than thirty years Turkey’s aerial forces have carried out cross-border military operations within the borders of Iraq. Ankara has faced few consequences for these aggressions, and in recent years according to local sources more than 60 Turkish military bases and outposts have been built inside Iraqi territory – from which operations are frequently launched with devastating effects. Since 2015 the Turkish military has launched a number of named campaigns that have involved operations further and further into Iraqi territory. The most recent of these, Operation Claw Lock, was launched earlier in 2022 and has seen Turkish forces operating established only 40 kilometers from major Iraqi Kurdish cities, including Erbil – the de-facto capital of the semi-autonomous region.  The ECBBC report does not only detail the incidents and provides numbers of killed and wounded civilians but also analyzes the circumstances of all incidents and presents the identities of 155 of the victims. The collection of the data has been done primarily by interviews with survivors of the attacks and their relatives and community members, by interviews with local government representatives and analysis, as well as cross-checking of publicly available media and social media publications.   The databases on incidents and casualties, along with other findings of the present report represent a valuable and unique record of the civilian harm caused by Turkish military incursions within the borders of Iraq, and sheds light on the extent and seriousness of the crimes which such operations produce. There exists a serious gap between the extent of the Turkish operations and their civilian harm, which goes far beyond individual death and injuries, and its documentation. The civilian impacts of Turkish operations remain underreported. Civilians lack channels of reporting the harm and receiving necessary support. We believe that this report will bridge some of this concerning divide. The Campaign appeals to the international civil society and organizations to help individuate and encourage the parties involved in the conflict to find a peaceful solution to the current situation in the best interest of the civilians who are paying the highest price for the belligerent/bellicist policies adopted by the state actors involved. End Cross Border Bombing is a campaign born two years ago and it’s an international collation of local and international that have the aim to advocate and creating awareness on the topic of bombardments in the region of Iraq. The collation is composed by: Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative, Community Peacemaker Teams, Iraq Body Count, CODEPINK, NOVACT, Un Ponte Per, Solidarity with Kurdistan/Solkurd,  To read the full report, click here.  

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Bashmakh Border crossing revenue decreased by 40%

Draw Media The customs revenue of Bashmakh Border crossing has decreased by 40% compared to last month. The revenue of the Border crossing was more than 14 billion dinars in July and this month it has decreased by 53% to 8 billion dinars. According to the investigations of (Draw Media) this month's revenue of Bashmakh, which is one of the main revenue sources of Sulaimani, until today has reached (8 billion dinars), and it is expected to be reach to (9) billion dinars at the end of this month. The financial experts of the region believe that the decrease in revenue of Bashmakh border crossing is due to the following reasons: • Poor management of in Bashmakh border crossing compared to the other border crossings, especially Haji Omeran. • Lack of plans on how to increase revenue at the Bashmakh border crossing, compared to other gates by the authorities of Sulaimani. • Lifting customs duties on some goods at Iraqi border crossings, which has led traders to turn to these crossings. Taking several months of Bashmakh revenue shows how much revenue has decreased. Bashmakh customs revenue in 2021: January: 22 billion 855 million dinars February: 23 billion 707 million dinars March: 22 billion and 47 million dinars April: 20 billion 977 million dinars May: 17 billion 307 million dinars   Bashmakh customs revenue in 2022: January: 10 billion 538 million dinars February: 15 billion and 140 million dinars March: 17 billion 238 million dinars April:  N/A May: N/A June: 12 billion dinars July: 14 billion dinars August: 8 billion dinars, until today.   between July and August, the revenue decreased by 40%.   Comparison: Bashmakh Revenue January (2021 – 2022) January 2021: 22 billion 855 million dinars January 2022: 10 billion 538 million dinars Decrease: 12 billion 317 million dinars Decreased by: 54%

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DNO Reports Strong Second Quarter Results, Ups Tawke License Guidance

Draw Media According to the financial statistics of the Norwegian company (DNO) that has a contract with the Kurdistan Regional Government in the fields of (Tawke, Fishkhabur and Bashiqa) in the second quarter of 2022; It recorded its highest profit since 2018 with revenue of $361 million. #The company has increased the production capacity of the Taukei field by more than 2,600 barrels per day. # The company expects production from the Tawke contract area to increase from 107,000 barrels per day to 109,000 barrels per day by the end of the year. # For the first time, the company has reached production of about 150 barrels per day in the Bashqa field. Here is the full text of the DNO report Oslo, 11 August 2022 – DNO ASA, the Norwegian oil and gas operator, today reported strong second quarter operational and financial results powered by high oil and gas prices and by solid production in its operated flagship Kurdistan Tawke license. Spurred by quarterly revenue of USD 361 million and free cash flow of USD 167 million, the Company reduced debt and exited the quarter in a positive net cash position for the first time since 2018. “DNO is committed to put its capital to work in its core competency and capture new opportunities created as peers and even some of the largest European companies scale back spending and focus instead on harvesting,” said Executive Chairman Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani. “We believe in the oil and gas business and in our responsibility to all stakeholders, including host governments who want to capitalize on current prices and consumers who now call for more production, not less,” he added. Operational cash flow totaled USD 341 million, including USD 50 million towards arrears built up by Kurdistan from non-payment of certain 2019 and 2020 Tawke invoices. These arrears, which stood at USD 259 million at yearend 2020, were reduced to USD 87 million as of 30 June 2022, excluding interest. The Company’s operational spend in the second quarter totaled USD 198 million in line with the USD 800 million projection for the year. During the quarter, operational spend of USD 81 million in Kurdistan was divided between the Tawke license (USD 66 million) and the Baeshiqa license (USD 15 million); operational spend in the North Sea stood at USD 117 million. Operating profit dropped to USD 81 million from USD 236 million in the previous quarter due to asset impairments of USD 127 million primarily related to the Ula area in the North Sea and expensed exploration of USD 48 million. The Company reduced its interest-bearing debt through a USD 200 million bond redemption and exited the quarter with cash deposits of USD 801 million. With USD 671 million in bond and reserves-based lending debt, net cash stood at USD 129 million. Gross production at the Tawke license averaged 106,900 barrels of oil per day (bopd) during the second quarter, of which Peshkabir contributed 62,300 bopd and Tawke 44,600 bopd, the latter representing the first quarterly production increase since 2015 at this legacy field as new wells are drilled, workovers conducted on existing ones and gas injection continued. Of total Kurdistan production, 80,400 bopd were net to DNO’s interest. North Sea net production averaged 11,600 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boepd), bringing the Company’s total quarterly net production to 92,000 boepd. In the second quarter, four new production wells were brought onstream in the Tawke license with three at Tawke and one at Peshkabir. Together with wells drilled in the first quarter, natural field decline has been arrested and reversed, including at Tawke, raising the Company’s full-year projection to 107,000-109,000 bopd. Following government approvals, DNO commenced trucking of production in mid-June from the Zartik-1 discovery well in the operated Baeshiqa license for export at an average rate of 600 bopd. Production from the well has been choked back as the Company targets zones with lower gas-to-oil ratios to avoid flaring. Development of the license continues with the drilling of Zartik-2 and Zartik-3, to be followed by Baeshiqa-3 in the fourth quarter.   In the North Sea, operated Brasse field development progressed into front end engineering and design ahead of planned project sanction by yearend 2022. The Company remains an active North Sea explorer with three more exploration wells to be drilled this year in addition to the four already drilled in the first half of 2022, one of which, Kveikje (DNO 29 percent), is considered a likely commercial discovery, as previously reported. An earnings call with DNO executive management will be held today at 11:00 am (CET). A link to the call is available on the Company’s homepage www.dno.no.   Key figures   Q2 2022 Q1 2022 Full Year 2021 Gross operated production (boepd) 107,178 106,465       108,713 Net production (boepd)    91,937    92,548         94,477 Revenues (USD million)       361        339          1,004 Operating profit/-loss (USD million)         81        236             321 Net profit/-loss (USD million)         72        140             204 Free cash flow (USD million)       167        152             362 Net debt (USD million)      -129          27             153        

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(130) Cases of human rights violations have been recorded in East Kurdistan

Draw Media According to the report of Hangaw Human Rights Organization, 130 cases of human rights violations have been registered in East Kurdistan, including seven smugglers killed by security forces and seven executions. According to the statistics of Hangaw Human Rights Center, at least 130 cases of human rights violations have been registered in Kurdistan during the month of July (Kolbar) smugglers (47 cases) In the past month, 47 (Kolbars) smugglers, carry goods across the Iran-Iraq border, have been killed in Kurdistan, seven of them got shot directly by Iranian armed forces. Of the 40 injured Kolbars, 30 were killed by Iranian armed forces, four by landmine explosions and six by natural disasters. Executions and deaths in prison (7 cases) In July this year, at least seven Kurdish prisoners from Kermanshah, Sawlawa, Dewlan, Bijar, Tikab, Shirvan and Chardaul were executed, which two of them were women. Six of them were sentenced on charges of premeditated murder and one on charges of drug trafficking. 9 civilians killed and injured in mine explosions At least six citizens have been seriously injured in landmine explosions in the cities of Bana and Mehran in the past month. Meanwhile, two brothers, aged 9 and 12, named Matin Rashidi and Mahdi Rashidi, were shot dead by Iranian armed forces and a citizen from Mehran city of Ilam province was wounded. Arrests and sentences (60 cases) According to Hangaw, at least 53 Kurdish citizens, including three women and five boys under the age of 18, have been arrested by Iranian security agencies on charges of political and civil activities in the past month. Seven Kurdish activists all were sentenced to 19 years and six months in prison on charges of political activity. Labor (7 cases) During this period, at least two workers from Bokan, Sanaa, Mahabad died in work accidents.

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The “Full Barzani”: How Diplomatic Meetings with the Barzani Family Are Shaping Iraqi Kurdish Politics

by Winthrop Rodgers For high-ranking officials visiting the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, there is a well-established expectation that they will meet separately with three political figures from the same family and party: Masoud, Nechirvan, and Masrour Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). This ritual reveal some of the dynamics at play regarding domestic politics and diplomatic practices in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (KRI) and the country writ large. However outside officials themselves might see it, this protocol reinforces top-down family rule in the KRI and principally serves the KDP’s own political interests. Domestic instances can also be important signals when tea-leaf reading on the government formation underway in Iraq. For foreign diplomats, it is an unwritten but strongly understood rule that visiting heads of government, cabinet ministers, and ambassadors will request to meet with KDP leader Masoud Barzani, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani during trips through Erbil, sometimes just a few hours total after a more lengthy visit to Baghdad. These meetings reflect how power is kept close within the family in the KRI: Masoud is Masrour’s father and Nechirvan’s uncle, making the latter two first cousins. Nechirvan is Masrour’s direct predecessor as prime minister and successor to Masoud as president. In a nod to the U.S. political concept of the “Full Ginsburg,” I have dubbed the protocol exhibition of meeting all three politicians in one go the “Full Barzani.” It’s quite a regular occurrence; I’ve documented at least 31 instances of this phenomenon since April 12–approximately one every eleven days. Moreover, this list is non-exhaustive and only includes instances that are publicly acknowledged by the KRG on social media or KDP-affiliated media channels. Private and sensitive meetings are obviously not included, and the KRG and KDP are selective about what meetings with what countries they choose to reveal and highlight. The occasions for the meetings vary; some are one-off affairs, like when Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde came through Erbil last November during an Iraq trip, or courtesy calls for new or departing ambassadors, such as the arrival tour for France’s new ambassador to Iraq Eric Chevallier in September. Other officials repeat this cycle regularly, like UN Special Representative for Iraq Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert or US Ambassador Matthew Tueller, who has pulled a “Full Barzani” at least nine times since February 2020. Foreign visitors from all corners engage in this practice. Former UK Ambassador Stephen Hickey did a “full Barzani” at least five times during his tenure, highlighting the UK government’s apparent desire for close ties with the KDP. Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov completed a set in December, during which Prime Minister Masrour Barzani “reaffirmed the historic friendship between our peoples and more cooperation.” Then Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif did a "Full Barzani" last April. German, Australian, Saudi, Canadian, Italian, and European Union officials have completed their own in the past year, while numerous others have met with two out of three Barzanis. Still more engage with all three over a longer period of time. Pope Francis managed the rare feat of getting all three Barzanis in the same room together during his historic visit in March 2021, an exception to the usual protocol dictating separate meetings for each. For diplomats, the meetings are arranged through the KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations and the offices of the three men. Failure to make a request to meet with all “Three B’s,” as they are colloquially known, would raise question marks and be perceived as a slight by the KDP. Even so, the arrangement is a highly unusual one. While the KRI has some powers to engage with foreign governments outlined in Article 121 of the Iraqi constitution, it is uncommon for such narrow, personal, and partisan protocol arrangements to exist for diplomats at a sub-national level or to be so rigorously expected. Visitors can get angry tellings-off from KRG officials if they deviate from the KDP-approved programming. Domestically, Iraqi government and party officials also engage in the practice. For instance, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi met all three Barzanis following the Erbil missile attack in March. Iraqi President Barham Salih has had at least two rounds since last April, including one in November as he sought reelection in the face of a KDP challenge. Other visits yield their significance in retrospect: notably, Sadrist official Nassar al-Rubaiee’s “Full Barzani” last June  prefaced the attempt to form a “national majority government” between the Sadrists, KDP, and Sunni blocs following the federal elections in October. With government formation ongoing, it is worthwhile to keep an eye on who pays call on the KDP leadership in Erbil. Of course, the KDP is hardly the only political party in the Kurdistan Region. KRG Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani of the Sulaymaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is occasionally included in meetings with the prime minister, while his brother—PUK leader Bafel Talabani—might get his own face-to-face with visitors. Nevertheless, the KDP is by far the biggest game in town during official meetings in Erbil. Spare a thought also for the KRI’s opposition parties or independents, for whom there is little time or attention amid a packed schedule of Barzani meetings. One must be content to imagine what officials and diplomats might gain from a more diverse range of perspectives and contacts. There are likewise no women represented in the top ranks of the KDP, so their voices are effectively excluded from these high-level discussions—which ought to include the dangerous rise in femicides in the KRI. It is also worth reflecting on what this practice means for the state of the KDP itself. The act of meeting separately with each Barzani is reflective of the KDP’s tribal, patriarchal, and factional character and serves as a way of balancing egos. In the internal hierarchy of the party, Masoud ranks highest while his son and nephew defer to him during combined affairs. Meeting Masrour or Nechirvan by themselves allows them to speak in service of their own political interests.   However, there are also extreme political and personal differences within the KDP bubbling beneath the surface and at play in the insistence on separation. A particularly combustible rivalry is developing between Nechirvan and Masrour (the latter backed by Masoud), which has the potential to explode at a future date. The pettiness of this factionalism was ludicrously on display at this year’s Munich Security Conference, when Masrour and Nechirvan led separate delegations and even met some of the same people in different meetings. While tracking “Full Barzani” meetings may also be instructive for casual political analysis, the substantive impact of this insistence on separate meetings is more insidious. It is clear that KDP’s purpose in enforcing this protocol is to reinforce a perception about the Barzani family’s centrality in Kurdish and Iraqi politics to the exclusion of all others. Moreover, these meetings help strengthen the power of Masoud, Nechirvan, and Masrour both within the party and in the broader political field. Officials who acquiesce to this arrangement are legitimizing and playing into these implicit messages, even if this is not their intent. Ask many ordinary citizens in the KRI to describe their political leaders—both KDP and PUK—and they will call them “mafias.” Anti-democratic signals are flashing bright red: voter turnout is down; young people and middle-class families are leaving in droves for Europe; journalists and activists are arrested and jailed on trumped up charges; the KRG is not paying public servants. It is up to outside officials to decide how to manage those dynamics and perceptions about how they engage with the Kurdistan Region’s political leadership: whether it is business as usual or time for a new approach.

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Escaping From Duopoly Rule

How a Two-party System Drives Iraqi Kurdish Migration En Masse? byMera Jasm Bakr In mid-2021 the EU experienced an influx of several tens of thousands of immigrants, primarily from Iraqi Kurdistan. Belarusian authorities fueled the situation by increasing the number of flights from the Middle East and issuing Belarusian visas. Some European countries have described the crisis as “hybrid warfare” waged by Belarus against the EU. But what made Iraqi Kurds seek a better life abroad? Mera Jasm Bakr analyzes the drivers for the emigration from Iraqi Kurdistan.   Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) appeared to be a thriving region in the north of the country, even called the "other Iraq" by many. The region experienced considerable economic and infrastructural development after the collapse of the Baath regime, in contrast to the central and southern provinces plagued by economic and security crises. However, when throngs of migrants appeared at the border between Belarus and Poland in November 2021, it came as a surprise to many that the majority of the migrants stranded at the border were Iraqi Kurds. What drove the Iraqi Kurds to migrate en masse? The duopoly rule of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), since the formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 1992, has created a political status quo that has caused widespread disillusionment and has left citizens with little to no hope for economic and political reforms. Importantly, the two parties' patronage-based economy is no longer able to absorb the majority of its supporters into the labor force. Amidst the absence of any meaningful political and economic reforms, as well as a growing population on the margins of the KDP-PUK client network, Iraqi Kurdish migration to Europe will continue to surge. Click here to read the report in full.

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