Draw Media
News / Kurdistan

Draw: Policies of repression and violations continue, including arrests of civil society activists and journalists, and even ordinary citizens who express their opinions contrary to those of the local government and security authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan region, according to this latest periodic report by the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR). The security forces have used various means against people protesting about the poor conditions in the region. Severe resentment prevails among society as a result of rampant corruption in government facilities, deterioration of public services, delays in paying employees’ salaries, and decisions related to increasing fees and taxes on citizens. The security forces also targeted the media and prevented them from covering current events. They also beat journalists in several cities in the Kurdistan Region, including with electric batons. According to the annual report of Metro Center for Defending the Rights of Journalists, the local authorities committed 353 violations during 2021 against 260 male and female journalists in the Kurdistan region. Civil society activist and journalist imprisoned   On 26 January 2022, a member of Community Peacemaker Teams in Iraqi Kurdistan announced that 16 months after her arrest, civil society activist Nirivan Ayoub Hassan Dershi, a resident of the city of Dohuk, will be brought to court for the first hearing in her trial on 14 February 2022. She was arrested on 13 October 2020, after organising and participating in the peaceful demonstrations that took place in Dohuk Governorate and the rest of the region to demand full reforms in the region. She will be tried in accordance with Article 1 of Law No. 21 of 2003, which is related to undermining the national security of the Kurdistan Region. Dershi is a 36-year-old mother of five who was divorced by her husband after her arrest and imprisonment. Her court hearings were postponed several times and as a result she went on hunger strike six times. Press reports confirmed that she developed diabetes after entering prison.   On 09 December 2021, Kurdish newspapers and media websites published an appeal sent by journalist Kohdar Mohammed Amin Zebari from prison, in which he mentioned the poor conditions suffered by prisoners of conscience, in addition to the physical and psychological torture that detainees from the Shiladze sub-district of Amadiya district in Dohuk Governorate continuously face. He called on the international community and civil society organisations to put pressure on the Kurdistan Regional Government to release them. On 16 February 2021, the Second Criminal Court in Erbil had sentenced five activists and journalists, including Zebari, to six years in prison on charges of endangering Kurdish national security.   Clerics silenced and arrested over critical sermons   After his last sermon on 31 December 2021, the Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Affairs) in the Kurdistan Region issued a decision banning cleric Dr. Sayed Ahmed Penjwini, an imam and preacher from a mosque in Erbil, from giving sermons in the mosque due to his criticism of the security authorities and the local government in relation to their mishandling of the file of student protests and their arrest of innocent citizens. The Ministry of Awqaf also asked the Ministry of Culture in the region to prevent the publication of his sermons in the media.   On 11 December 2021, the security forces arrested a young cleric, Mullah Bukhari Sirkotki, in Zakho district of Dohuk Governorate because of his criticism of the local government regarding the mismanagement of services and the spread of corruption in the state hierarchy. Mullah Bukhari runs an association for memorisers of the Holy Qur’an and has an official permit from the authorities to carry out his work.   On 10 December 2021, the security authorities prevented a young cleric, Sheikh Radwan Brushki, from delivering religious sermons on the pulpit of a mosque in the city of Dohuk, after a decision was issued by the Directorate of Awqaf in Dohuk Governorate to ban him from giving sermons because of his criticism of the government and administration in his sermons in which he urged people to demand social justice. Political activists arrested and sentenced   On 01 December 2021, the security forces arrested political activist Hiwa Haji Agha, a fifth-year student at the Choman Private Institute in Choman District of Erbil Governorate. He is one of the cadres of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), as local reports confirmed that the reason for his arrest was his continuous criticism of the local government on his Facebook page.   On 20 December 2021, the Advocates for Prisoners of Conscience in the Kurdistan Region announced that the Court of Appeal had received the file of the preliminary ruling issued by the Second Erbil Criminal Court on 08 November 2021, which included prison sentences against two political activists among the Badinan detainees, who are residents of Dohuk Governorate. After being convicted of charges related to the national security of the Kurdistan Region, they were sentenced as follows: Shirwan Taha Cougar, imprisoned for two and a half years, and Masoud Ali Sinjari, imprisoned for three and a half years.    On 07 January 2022, a security force in the city of Sulaymaniyah arrested political activist Ghazi Kirkuki, and took him from his home to an unknown destination. Kirkuki is a leader in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and local sources say his arrest comes as a result of internal political disputes. Peaceful protesters arrested   On 07 December 2021, the security forces arrested two peaceful demonstrators, Duran Mahmoud and Arian Mustafa, after their participation in the student protests that erupted again on 06 December 2021, in front of the doors of some colleges at the University of Sulaymaniyah, demanding the implementation of the authorities’ promises to provide monthly allowances for students and improve the conditions of the internal housing departments. They were released after five days of detention.   On 07 December 2021, the security forces in the city of Dohuk arrested the young citizen Halkaft Abdulsattar Ashoyi, who was working as an employee in the Foundation of Mine Action in the city of Dohuk, and took him to an unknown destination. His work contract in this directorate, along with dozens of his colleagues, was canceled recently. They organised a protest in front of the building of this foundation, demanding that they be allowed to return to their work, and they made statements to the media against the officials who issued the decision to dismiss them.   On 16 January 2022, the security forces in Erbil arrested a young citizen, Karwan Abdulrahman, after he criticised the local government for increasing taxes for poor public services, during an interview with one of the local channels. Clips from his interview were posted on social media. He was released on 25 January 2022, after nine days in detention. Two TV channels banned from attending official press conference   On 11 January 2022, the coordinator of international recommendations in the regional government, Dindar Zebari, held a press conference, which was attended by a large number of journalists, including representatives of media institutions loyal to the regional authorities. Both Rudaw and NRT were prevented from attending the press conference in contravention of all local laws that affirm the right of journalists to practice their work without harassment. Recommendations GCHR calls on the Kurdistan Regional Government to immediately and unconditionally release all civil society activists, journalists and other prisoners of conscience whose civil and human rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly, are being violated. The authorities must fulfill their constitutional obligations not to violate public freedoms, including freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press, and to provide full protection for journalists and media professionals.

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KDP and PUK in Sadir’s Chess Game

Draw: Dlawer Ala’Aldeen President of MERI Muqtada Al-Sadir, the Shiite Cleric Grandmaster, is playing to win; whatever the expense. In the build-up to the game, the Sunnis got their act together and seized the opportunity to become the main winners of the first round. However, the Kurds entered the fight on one leg, lost sight of the bigger picture and intensified their internal power rivalry. This has already proven costly for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and if they keep on as they started, the second round will be even dearer. Fortunately, it is not too late to minimise their losses or even end up winning future rounds. To do this, they need to take into account the complex power dynamics within not just the Shiite component of Iraq (Shiite House), but also the Shiite ‘Universe’ inside and outside Iraq. The Shiite Universe vs Shiite House Forming the Government in Baghdad follows a complex pathway from within the Shiite Universe. A winning parliamentary group within the Shiite block in Iraq will take the lead, however, the Cabinet and its overall direction are ultimately determined by a number of invisible institutions within the Shiites’ Universe. Collectively, they own the Shiite cause and have the final say. These institutions of Shiite Universe (ISU) include: Marjayia of Najaf, the other religious institutions (like Hawza), the intellectual elite and the community leaders at large. The political powers, such as the Sadrist Movement and Coordination Framework (CF), and the political elite. The political, security and intelligence institutions in Iran, their Supreme Leader, Hawza of Qum, the Lebanese Hizballah and others.  After centuries of Sunni rule, the Shiites assumed power in Iraq for the first time (after 2003). The ISU, who consider Iraq central to their existential struggle, have in effect assumed the country’s ownership. Despite their diversity of interests and internal rivalries, the ISU remained united in pursuing grand strategies and facing common threats. Their collective influence has proven more overwhelming than any number of seats that Iraqi political alliances could secure. The Shiite Universe does not tolerate complacency. The ISU have no intention of allowing an internal political group (such as the Sadrists) to stray, forge alliances with non-Shiites and loosen their grip over power. They will not allow Sunni or Kurdish groups, potentially influenced or empowered by global or regional rivals (such as the US, Turkey or the Gulf Arabs), to peel Iraq away from Iran, back into the depth of the Sunni Universe. Thus, if the ISU, particularly in Iran and Najaf, are currently acting as observers, may not remain so. They may even allow the Sadrists to form a government in partnership with the Sunnis and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). However, they have the time, the tools and the methods to make this government fail. The early indicators and on-going threats suggest that they are prepared to work systematically to undermine a Sadrist monopoly of power.  They would slow down his government’s progress, prevent reform and facilitate its collapse, paving the way for a new coalition government or snap elections. The Sadrists Approach The Sadrists are aware of these factors. They know that the Shiite Universe considers the rise and unity among the Iraqi Sunnis a potential revival of Sunni dominance, and a possible existential threat to the Shiite rule. For different reasons, they consider Kurdish dominance over Baghdad a risk as well. Many Iraqi nationalists are suspicious of the sincerity of the Kurds, particularly the KDP, in giving up their dream of independence and working for a stronger, united, Iraq. The Sadrists do not hide their mistrust of the Kurds’ agenda and would not wish to engage in a partnership that would force them to accepts Kurdish demands for what they consider to be their right. Fearing pressure from their electoral constituencies and populist rivals, they may hesitate to implement Article 140 of the Constitution, constrain the Shiite armed Popular Mobilisation Forces in the Disputed Territories, or facilitate payment of the KRI’s share of the budget. In short, the Sadrists would not wish to go reckless against the ISU and risk their political future. Hence, they insist on attracting some of the leaders within the CF. This would give them the Shiite legitimacy and Shiite majority (in government) that they desperately need. The Compromise Package During negotiations between the Sadrists and CF, three packages have been debated. The CF package, where all of CF member parties, including Nouri Al-Maliki’s, join the Cabinet. They take six ministries, retain the power of veto over the choice of the Prime Minister (PM) and Al-Maliki to become one of two Vice Presidents. So far, this package has been rejected by the Sadrists. The Sadrist package consist of inviting all the CF member parties, except for Al-Maliki’s. They take four ministries without the power of veto over the choice of PM. This has been rejected so far by the CF. The compromise package that accepts Al-Maliki as a Vice President, offers four to six ministries to CF, with or without the power of veto over the choice of PM. This package may finally be mutually accepted. There is a fourth option which is not been debated. It consists of forming a minority Shiite government in partnership with the non-Shiites, namely the KDP and the main Sunni groups.  This option is critical for the Kurds because it is the only one that would allow the KDP to join the Sadrists on their own and deny the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) the presidency or share of ministries. Otherwise, the former three packages (1-3) will enable both the CF members and the PUK to enter the government with their own demands or expectations, which would not necessarily be in line with those of the KDP. The KDP-Sadrist Partnership Apparently, the Sadrists left it to the KDP to convince the PUK to join their coalition. During the KDP-PUK joint visit to Baghdad, the Sadrists expected the PUK to sign a pre-existing (Sadrist-KDP) declaration. Seemingly, the Sadrists (and Sunni partners), are concerned about the split between the two Kurdish parties, but they are willing to do what it takes to protect their interests. It transpired that the Sadrits’ primary objective in the earlier partnership with the non-Shiites was to beat their CF rivals in securing the ‘largest faction’ status, and take the Shiite lead in forming the government. For this, they were dependent only on the Taqadum’s list (lead by M. Halbousi), therefore did not need the support of any other groups. Now the Sadrists and Sunnis have secured their goals, they may begin to think about future moves and their political consequences. If the CF and PUK end up joining the government, the Sadrists may have to seek a compromise between the KDP and PUK; particularly over the presidency. If all fails and the KDP end up withdrawing from the partnership, the Sadrists may still move on as they would not be affected. The Bigger Picture vs the Narrow Tunnel It is clear that none of the coalition partners, led by the Sadrists, were focused on the bigger picture. However, Sunni unity will inevitably serve their common cause, and the Shiite groups might finally compromise between themselves to avoid diluting their rule. Ironically, they might decide that allowing a new reformist style of governing, led by a strong-minded Shiite, may turn Iraq into a better country with stronger institutions that the Shiites could be proud of. In contrast, the rivalry among the Kurds has so far been disastrous and, if this continues, can pose an existential threat to the KRI as an entity. Previously, before and after elections, the KDP and PUK would exchange highly reassuring messages, emphasising unity both at home and in Baghdad. Unfortunately, the exact opposite has now happened. The two parties appear to have lost sight of the bigger picture and are marching down a narrow tunnel towards an even more damaging internal rivalry. Some fear this may ultimately lead to a total split in the Kurdistan Region’s administration. However, all is not lost and such scenarios are not inevitable. The KDP and PUK are accustomed to a complicated multi-level dynamic between them, often compartmentalising their various levels of engagements. Cooperating where their mutual interests are best served, whilst engaging in fierce rivalry elsewhere. It is important to re-emphasise that the Iraqi elections have brought about a new opportunity for the KRI to transform Baghdad-Erbil relations. If they address the root-causes of the issues that lie in Baghdad, they may provide the solutions for it in the future. Crucially, the international partners are keen to facilitate negotiations and to emphasise their wish to support a united and more stable Kurdistan that can act as an effective partner in Baghdad. Taken together, it is not too late for the KDP and PUK to calm this intense rivalry in Baghdad and engage in a serious and constructive negotiations for a win-win outcome. They should refocus on the bigger picture, reach a new strategic agreement and join efforts to achieve their common goals in Baghdad.

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Draw Media Receives NED Grants for Media Projects

Draw Media Draw Media is pleased to announce that we have been able to achieve NED grants for media projects. Each year the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) makes direct grants to hundreds of non-governmental organizations worldwide, working to advance democratic goals and strengthen democratic institutions. Draw Media will utilize this support to develop its website in (Kurdish, Arabic, English). NED is a non-governmental organization in the United States, located in Washington, D.C. that was founded in 1983 for promoting democracy in other countries. NED dedicated 25 thousand dollars for supporting Draw Media for one year, from February 2, 2022, to January 31, 2023 By receiving this grant, as Draw Media, we are pleased that we have proved to be a (free, independent, neutral) media. Which is approved now by an international organization as NED. The Financial support for Draw Media by National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is being conducted transparently like all other institutions in Iraq, which have received the grant.  Draw Media will also be observed by National Endowment for Democracy (NED) for transparency as a media organization. Which helps Draw to work more professionally based on international standards. Draw Media was founded by a group of journalists and promised readers to work impartially, and for this reason, DRAW has faced a lot of financial crises since its establishment. In the beginning, the websites had no offices, and the journalists worked online from home. In addition, it was unable to develop its journalism work as necessary. After receiving financial support from the National Endowment for Democracy, Draw Media takes its work to a whole new level and benefits from NED’s financial and moral support to develop its website and publish news and investigative reports in both Arabic and English. By receiving this financial support, Draw Media will dedicate a part of its work to covering and monitoring the oil sector in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq towards having transparency in this sector.

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Will the 2018 Presidential Election Scenario Be Repeated?

Neaz Mustafa, Draw Media The statistics show that the 2018 scenario cannot be repeated, and Masoud Barzani would be the winner over Bafel Talabani this time. If the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) loses the Presidency post, there would be a big question on the PUK’s participation in the new government cabinet in Iraq. Barzani and Talabani’s discussion on President’s Candidates was not fruitful. PUK insists on Barham Salih, and PDK on Hoshyar Zebari to be their candidates for the next Iraqi president. More Details are in this report by Draw Media. Barzani Wants the President in any Circumstances!  PUK and PDK have not reached an agreement on a candidate for the next Iraqi president both sides have their candidates, which was noticed at today’s meeting between Talabani and Barzani. The three main leadership positions in the Iraqi government are divided among Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. Whereas Kurds get the presidency, Shiites get the premiership, and Sunnis get the parliamentary speaker. Among Kurds, the PUK has held on to the presidency position since 2005. The KDP and PUK for years abided by a strategic agreement, where the PUK would get the Iraqi president of their choice, and the KDP in return would get the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region. Until 2018, When Masoud Barzani stepped down as President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), he wanted to get back the Iraqi presidency position from PUK. The KDP and for the first time, put forth Fuad Hussein against Barham Salih for the position.  Will the 2018 Scenario Be Repeated? Today the political situation in Bagdad is the same as four years ago. There is no official agreement between the KDP and the PUK over the Iraqi presidency. Both parties have their candidates for the position. But the election results show that this time Barzani would win the competition and he would be able to get revenge for the 2018 incidents. The MPs have to elect a new president by February 8. The president will later assign the candidate of the biggest parliamentary alliance to form a new government.  In 2018, Bafel Talabani won the position from Barzani. When Barham Salih, Talabani’s Candidate, won by 219 votes over Fuad Hussain, Barzani’s Candidate, by 22 votes. But repeating the same scenario in 2022 is kind of impossible because the situation has been changed now. KDP and Barzani have returned to Bagdad with more power. Before the Oct 10 of 2021’s election, Barzani has signed an agreement with Muqtada Sadr. And now Sadr is the biggest winner of the election and he would form the new government. Above that, Barzani has established a strong relationship with the Suni blocks. How Barzani would win the presidency competition?  On the 9th of January, in the first meeting of the fifth round of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, the KDP showed its power. In that meeting, a new political alliance in Iraq has been presented for the first time between (Sadr, Barzani, Al-Halbousi). This alliance has 180 seats out of 329 parliament seats. On the other side, the Coordination Framework alliance has 70 seats.  The PUK is one of the political parties that got 18 seats in the October 2021 elections and is looking forward to getting the presidency position as its portion, depending on the previous political agreements between the Iraqi parties. But yet the party does not have a solid agreement Neither with Muqtada Sadr nor with the Coordination Framework alliance.  In addition, the PUK did not vote for Muhamad Al-Halbousi for the parliament presidency which angered the Sunnis. But by being away from the Shiite conflict, PUK might achieve the satisfaction of Iran. If the situation continues as it is, in the second parliament meeting, the (Sadr + Halbousi) alliance would vote for (Hoshyar Zebari) the KDP Candidate for the Iraqi presidency.

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25Million IQD would be Spent Monthly for Each Iraq MPs

Draw: Each Iraqi parliament member receives 25 million Iraqi dinars (more than 17,000 US dollars) each month for their salary, staff, and accommodations. The money that transfers to their bank account will be as bellow: • The overall salary of an MP member for a month would be 7 million 400 thousand IQD. 5 million IQD is their nominal salary, and they would receive two million 400 thousand IQD as their allocations. Three million IQD would be for accommodations and the rents of each MP member. • 15 million 200 thousand IQD would be transferred to each member’s bank account for a staff of 16 persons. That includes the bodyguard, Secretary, and media manager for each of them. The salary of each staff member would reach 950 thousand IQD. The MP members are not restricted from spending the money. They are free to decide how to distribute the amount they receive for their staff. Some parliament members would not pay out the money to the staff members, except a small amount. In return, they will let them be free of work or not work for them at all. • The average money which spends for each MP member is 25 million 200 thousand Iraqi dinars (more than 17,000 US dollars) with some other benefits. •            The Iraqi parliament has 329 members. The average of money they receive would be 8 billion 290 million IQD •            After four years of parliament service, those who have served government for 15 years and 45 years old and above would be retired as MP members.

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Cowboy Drugstore... Traces of a kleptocrat from Iraq to Delaware to Miami

Draw BY ZACK KOPPLIN - THE AMERICAN PROSPECT A few blocks from the water, in the heart of Miami’s glitzy South Beach, is a drugstore not like the others. Tourists buying sunscreen and straw hats from the CVS on Washington Avenue are financing a Middle Eastern kleptocrat. The plexiglass building housing the roughly 12,000-square-foot pharmacy is worth $18.3 million and, because of favorable rent terms negotiated with CVS, should generate significant profit for its landlord. In 2019, based on Miami property records, local press credited a Virginia-based real estate company, KLNB, with purchasing the building. But the Virginia firm’s inclusion in the property registrar was a diversion. “KLNB is not the owner of this property and had no involvement in the transaction,” a company representative said. The actual purchase was made by an anonymous Delaware shell company. Buried in incorporation documents for this Delaware company’s Florida branch is the name of the building’s real owner: Masrour Barzani, the prime minister of Iraqi Kurdistan. More from Zack Kopplin A semi-independent region in Iraq’s north, Kurdistan is a hereditary monarchy in all but name and has been dominated by the Barzani family for decades. The Kurdish prime minister has abused his power to attack, torture, and kill his critics, including Saudi-style assassinations of journalists. While he previously served as the region’s intelligence chief, Barzani had a local university student, Zardasht Osman, tortured and killed for publishing a satirical poem about the social advancement that would come with marrying one of the prime minister’s sisters. The Kurdish prime minister is not a benign pharmacy operator. But because of America’s underappreciated role as an enabler of corporate secrecy, if not for a clerical error, South Beach residents would have no idea about the Washington Avenue CVS. No one knows the extent of the illicit wealth hidden inside the United States. Corporate secrecy laws, maintained by states like Delaware, keep it that way. But tracing the Barzani family’s investments, like this Miami pharmacy, explains why America has become an appealing destination for dirty money. THROUGH OIL AND CORRUPTION, the Barzanis, whose agents did not respond to requests for comment, have amassed enormous amounts of wealth. For example, a real estate investment in Kurdistan, owned by a company secretly connected to one of the prime minister’s brothers, has been valued at $1.27 billion. Like other despots, the Barzanis turned to secrecy havens, the kind of places exposed by the Panama and Pandora Papers, to conceal their money. Secrecy havens are jurisdictions that don’t require public disclosure of the names of the owners and shareholders of companies housed within their borders. This enables all sorts of financial crimes, from tax evasion to money laundering and facilitating bribery. But, unlike the king of Jordan and Argentina’s former president, whose secret companies got busted in previous offshore leaks, Barzani assets and business deals were not exposed in the Panama and Pandora Papers. They’ve only been caught in one major leak, a database of Dubai property records, obtained by the nonprofit Center for Advanced Defense Studies, which contains details about the Barzanis’ assets in the uber-expensive Burj Khalifa complex and one of the city’s artificial islands, Palm Jumeirah, along with the family’s connections to United Arab Emirates royalty. Keep this site free and open for all to read... SUPPORT THE PROSPECT This is because instead of Cayman Island beaches, the Barzanis opted for an office building in Delaware owned by the CT Corporation, an American branch of a Dutch company, Wolters Kluwer, that specializes in creating anonymous companies. Though less picturesque, America’s corporate secrecy regime is virtually equivalent to what is offered by any Caribbean island. In many states, rather than disclosing real ownership, wealthy individuals can hire agents and representatives to put their names and addresses on corporate paperwork instead, or aren’t required to supply ownership information at all. A network of accountants, law firms, and consultants, like Wolters Kluwer, will set up and manage these secret companies for anyone who can pay. The Barzanis have enough secret property, which also includes mansions in California and Virginia, that they’ve now been caught hiding money in America four times. Collectively, the family has paid over $75 million for these four properties alone. These investments likely represent only a small fraction of the family’s secret wealth in the United States. None of these properties were discovered through a Panama Papers–style leak. Instead, all four properties, which had proxy owners and expensive law firms to protect them, were only unmasked because their agents made small slipups. Tracing the Barzani family investments explains why America has become an appealing destination for dirty money. In the case of the CVS, it was a Pennsylvania-based law firm, Cozen O’Connor, that appears to have exposed their own secret client. Over two months, beginning in December 2018, the law firm opened three Florida companies and a Delaware company all named after the pharmacy’s Washington Avenue address. The paperwork for the Florida companies included the Kurdish prime minister’s name and signature, along with that of one of his other brothers, Muksi Barzani. Those names were not meant to become public and, shortly after the pharmacy’s purchase, the law firm removed them from the companies. The Barzanis were replaced with one of Cozen O’Connor’s own lawyers, Matthew Weinstein. It wasn’t a perfect solution, but this legal triage was highly effective. You won’t find their names in popular corporation research databases, and it was enough to fool local journalists. The CVS deal also highlights how far corporate lawyers will go to defend their wealthy dictator clients. When called for comment, Weinstein categorically denied that the Barzanis owned the building or were clients of Cozen O’Connor. Instead, he said the corporate documents held by the Florida secretary of state were incorrect. (Later, in response to follow-up questions, Weinstein denied saying any of the things that he had previously said. “If you choose to write an article about the Barzani family, your characterization of my response to you must be ‘Mr. Weinstein would not comment on these matters,’” he wrote in an email.) His statements were all over the place, but Weinstein’s core claim, that the Florida secretary of state’s records were wrong, is implausible. The names of the Kurdish prime minister and his relatives don’t just randomly end up all over incorporation documents for multiple Florida companies for no reason. “The name is a significant piece of the corporate registry,” said Robert Appleton, a former senior prosecutor for the Department of Justice. These documents were prepared by Cozen O’Connor and many were signed by Weinstein personally. Submitting falsified documents to the Florida corporate registrar is a felony, but that’s essentially what Weinstein claimed his law firm had done, in a last-ditch attempt to conceal the identity of his clients. Obviously, the Barzanis do not tolerate errors, but it was a similar mistake that exposed their Virginia mansion. It was purchased in 2010, by an anonymous Virginia company put together by a local law firm. For years, Kurdistan watchers had speculated the property belonged to Masrour Barzani, but documentary evidence didn’t emerge until someone accidentally allowed the registration for the Virginia company to lapse. Its reinstatement paperwork was signed by the chairman of Ster Group, a Kurdish conglomerate. According to State Department cables published by WikiLeaks, Ster Group is owned by members of the Barzani family. Expand NAM Y. HUH/AP PHOTO The Miami CVS deal would not have been traced to the Barzani family were it not for an error by a Pennsylvania law firm. The Barzanis don’t just use American corporate secrecy to hide their blood money. They’re even exploiting it to defraud the United States government. Both of their California mansions were connected to a conspiracy to defraud the Pentagon. Purchased in 2018, by anonymous Delaware and Virginia companies, through representatives of another small Virginia law firm, these mansions were one of the largest real estate purchases in Beverly Hills history. The scheme was only exposed when Variety’s real estate vertical discovered the name of a Barzani family employee, Haval Dosky, on paperwork associated with the properties. Dosky was a middleman in a scheme where fuel purchases to supply American bases in Kurdistan were steered to the Barzanis’ preferred military contractors, who charged the Pentagon significantly above market prices. It’s quite possible proceeds from those deals were what financed these mansions. All of this raises the question: How many hidden properties do the Barzanis, and other autocrats, have inside the United States? Corporate lawyers make mistakes, but not every time and probably not even often. Most journalistic investigations into anonymous shell companies and secret real estate purchases end in failure. Even in the process of reporting this piece, I was unable to obtain ownership records to validate another probable Barzani property in California. The lawyers behind that company made no errors and kept it fully anonymous. As long as states like Delaware maintain corporate secrecy laws, journalistic investigations into corruption will continue to dead-end. Delaware officials recently defended the status quo to the Prospect, with one former judge saying “there’s a reason it’s called the Panama papers and not the Delaware papers.” But the main distinction between Panama and Delaware is that there hasn’t been a Delaware whistleblower, yet. IN JANUARY, CONGRESS PASSED the Corporate Transparency Act, which requires companies to file the names of their real owners with the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), with some major exceptions. There’s already evidence this approach isn’t enough. Providing law enforcement access to ownership records is a step in the right direction, but still inadequate. This ties the ability to effectively investigate corporate malfeasance to the priorities, resources, and legal handicaps of the Department of Justice. Federal investigators will probably be far more effective at catching terrorist financiers and drug smugglers, but anyone who doesn’t threaten national security, like the Barzanis, who are close American military allies, will likely be far less of a priority. Another major leak of files from FinCEN showed that agency did little to stop financial crimes despite receiving evidence of hundreds of thousands of suspicious transactions from banks. There’s no evidence things will be different in corporate transparency investigations. A public beneficial ownership registry is the only adequate reform, but even that approach has vulnerabilities. One often illegal service provided by companies in the secrecy industry is nominee ownership. This means that the company provides a fake owner, not just a lawyer or agent, to sign corporate paperwork. The real owner is protected by legal documents, like undated letters of resignation signed by the fake owner and a power of attorney that lets them dictate corporate decisions, all while remaining hidden from the public and law enforcement. Corporate secrecy is going to remain a problem as long as people like the Barzanis have money to hide. The only real solution for it, in America, is a leak of the Delaware papers by a whistleblower. Employees of law firms, like Cozen O’Connor, and corporate service companies, like Wolters Kluwer, should take the internal databases of their kleptocrat clients and the names of their secret businesses and make them public. Corporate whistleblower laws are an imperfect patchwork of protections, and any whistleblower brave enough to expose America’s criminal financial secrecy regime will face serious risks and potential retaliation for their act of civil disobedience. But we need those employees to stand up. They’re the only ones with the power to really bring down this system.    

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Channel disaster: Kurdish woman is first victim identified

Draw: A 24-year-old Kurdish woman from northern Iraq has become the first victim of this week's mass drowning in the Channel to be identified. Maryam Nuri Mohamed Amin was one of 27 people who died while attempting to cross to Britain on Wednesday. Her fiancé, who lives in the UK, told the BBC she was messaging him as the group's dinghy started deflating. She tried to reassure him that they would be rescued. But help came too late, and she and 17 men, six other women - one of whom was pregnant - and three children died after their inflatable boat sank into the sea off the northern French coast. There were only two survivors - an Iraqi and a Somali. The disaster marked the biggest loss of life by drowning in the Channel in many years. Her fiancé said Maryam, nicknamed Baran, had been on the boat with a female relative. He had not known beforehand about the attempted Channel crossing and said Maryam's arrival in the UK was supposed to be a surprise. They were messaging each other on Snapchat just before the dinghy began to lose air, he said. Maryam told him that the boat was deflating and that they were trying to get the water out of it. He said she had been trying to reassure him in her last message, and give him hope that the authorities were on their way to rescue them. What's being done to stop Channel crossings? Why do migrants leave France for the UK? The migrant debate can't escape European politics Reports from Calais say the two survivors of Wednesday's sinking have been discharged from hospital and are due to be questioned about how many people were on the boat. Maryam's uncle confirmed to the BBC that she was one of the people who drowned in the English Channel. He said the family heard the news from two people who were with her, and the family were waiting for her body to be flown back to Iraq. On Friday night her father, family and friends gathered at their home in northern Iraq to share their grief and remember her. Maryam's best friend Imann Hassan said that her friend was "very humble" and had "a very big heart". "When she left Kurdistan she was very happy, she couldn't believe that she was going to meet her husband," Ms Hassan told the BBC on Friday night. "At her engagement party she was telling me: 'I will buy a house and live nearby you ... we are going to live together.'" Ms Hassan said that she wanted to send a message to the world "that no one deserves to die likes this". "She tried to live a better life, she chose the UK, but she died."

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KRG's Oil Between Two Octobers

Draw Media: KRG's oil income has increased by %59 between October 2020 and Oct 2021. In Oct 2020, when the oil price rate was ($40), KRG has sold its oil for ($503,508,000), but in Oct 2021, the oil price rate was (83$), and the KRG has sold its oil for ($987,921,818)   Oct 2020   In October 2020, The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exported (13,320,000) barrels of oil to (Italy, Greece, Croatia, Singapore, Egypt), while the price of one barrel of Brent oil was nearly ($ 40.19), which means KRG's oil income was ($503,508,000) in that month. In Oct 2020, the price of one USD was (1180) Iraqi dinar in the Central Bank of Iraq. According to this, KRG has received (625,999,440,000) IQD from oil.   Oct 2021   In October 2021, The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exported (11,825,734) barrels of oil to (Italy, Greece, Croatia, Israel, Spain). In October, the price of one barrel of Brent oil was nearly ($83.54), which means that KRG's value of sold oil was ($987,921,818). In Oct 2021, the price of one USD was (1450) Iraqi dinar in the Central Bank of Iraq. According to this, KRG has sold out oil for the value of (1,432,486,636,622)ID.   Comparison between Oct 2020 and Oct 2021   First: The amount of exported oil   -KRG in Oct 2020 has exported the amount of (13,320,000) barrels of oil, but in Oct 2021, KRG has exported (11,825,734) barrels of oil.  This means (1,494,266) barrels have decreased and its 13% decrease of exportations.   Second: Oil income   - In Oct 2020, the rate of oil price was ($40.19), and KRG has sold its oil for ($503,508,000). - In Oct 2021, the rate of oil price was ($83.54), and KRG has sold its oil for ($987,921,818). - According to this comparison, the oil income has been increased by (%49) and increased ($484,413,818) in Oct 2021. This amount is much more when we exchange it to Iraqi Dinar because from Oct 2020, the value of ($1) was (ID1180) while in Oct 2021, the value of ($1) increased to (ID1450).   - In Oct 2020, The KRG has sold its oil for the value ($503,508,000). If we time it by (ID1180), the oil incomes equal (594, 139,440,000)IQD. - In Oct 2021, The KRG has sold its oil for the value ($987,921,818). If we time it by (ID1450), the oil income equals (1,432,486,636,622)IQD. Based on that, the oil income (%59) has increased in Oct 2021, which is (ID838,347,196,622).   

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Why Iraqi Kurds Are Fleeing Their Peaceful Homeland

draw: By Bobby Ghosh - Bloomberg The situation on the Belarus-Poland border is terrible. But that hasn’t stopped migrants from one of the more stable parts of the Mideast from trying their luck. For many Americans and Europeans, news that thousands of Iraqi Kurds are among the refugees stranded on the border between Belarus and Poland might have come as a surprise. After all, the Kurdish region of Iraq was supposed to be the one part of that blighted country that had, with substantial Western assistance, escaped the wider tragedy that has played out since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. That many Iraqi Kurds are now seeking instead to escape from the region shows the extent to which hopes for economic and political opportunity in the post-Saddam Hussein era have evaporated. Things had seemed headed in a different direction. In the years after the U.S. invasion, while the central and southern portions of Iraq descended into sectarian bloodletting, the northern provinces under the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government experienced an economic boom. Blessed with oil wealth, boasting a predictable political environment that was largely free of violence, the region drew investors from around the world. Hotels, malls and residential towers went up in double-quick time, earning Kurdish cities comparisons with Dubai. More democratic progress seemed in the offing. The contrast with the rest of the country came into even sharper relief in 2014, when the Islamic State stormed into Iraq. As Iraqi military units in the heart of the country crumpled under the onslaught, Kurdish forces, backed by American air power, repelled the terrorists from the gates of Erbil, the Kurdish regional capital.  Stable and secure, the Kurds has remained insulated from the calamities that turned millions of their neighbors elsewhere in Iraq and across the border in war-ravaged Syria and sanctions-stifled Iran into refugees. Indeed, the Iraqi Kurdistan became host to those fleeing violence next door. On the surface, not a great deal has changed. Iraqi Kurdistan remains relatively peaceful, by the admittedly low standards of its neighborhood. The economic outlook from Erbil isn’t nearly as bleak as from Baghdad, much less from Damascus or Tehran. As refugees en route to Europe exchange stories about the horrors they have escaped, the Iraqi Kurds aren’t likely to get much sympathy from, say, their Afghan and Syrian peers. But if they aren’t fleeing a Taliban-like oppressor or a genocidal dictator like Bashar al-Assad, the Iraqi Kurds are frustrated by the failure of their leaders to redeem the promise of 2003. The economy, overdependent on oil exports, never recovered from the fall of crude prices in 2014. It is too soon to tell if the recent rebound will last long enough to change the outlook. Unemployment has forced many Kurds to leave cities and turn to agriculture.   The democratic dividend, meanwhile, has been paltry. In the absence of political reform, a duopoly of clans dominates political life. The government in Erbil has grown more authoritarian, jailing dissenters and muzzling the media. Anti-government protests late last year didn’t make a dent in endemic corruption.

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In Erbil … The Votes of the All Parties 36% and Boycotts 64%

Draw Media:  All Party Votes in Erbil In the last Iraqi Parliament Election 36% of Erbil registered voters voted for the parties and 64% boycotted the election or burned their vote. The Parties Vote in Erbil according the last statement by Iraqis High Electoral Commission.  🔻 Erbil province: 🔹 the registered voters:        1,238,379 🔹 Democratic Party                262,800 - percentage: 21%  🔹 New Generation             79,245 - percentage: 6%  🔹 Patriotic Union                      65,862 - percentage: 5% 🔹 Justice Group                  19,517 – Percentage 2% 🔹 Change Movement          4,245 – Percentage %0.4 🔹 Islamic Union                    3,990 - Percentage %0.3 🔹 Socialist Democratic          2,167 - Percentage %0.2 🔹 Independent Candidates   2,284 - Percentage % 0.2 🔹 Kurdistan Toilers' Party      327 - Percentage %0.02 All Parties Together              440,437 - Percentage %36   Boycott and others                    797,942 - percentage: 64%

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Tory minister Nadhim Zahawi has been able to keep his total second job earnings hidden

Draw Media:  mirror EXCLUSIVE: Zahawi banked £1.3million from an oil company, which included a final £285,000 “settlement payment” after he first became a Government minister in 2018 Tory minister Nadhim Zahawi has been able to keep his total second job earnings hidden Tory minister Nadhim Zahawi banked £1.3million from an oil company while working as an MP, but he has been able to keep his total second job earnings hidden due to a Parliamentary loophole. Mr Zahawi’s total earnings from Gulf Keystone Petroleum included a final £285,000 “settlement payment” after he first became a Government minister in 2018. Mr Zahawi was co-chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Kurdistan in 2015 when he landed the job with Gulf Keystone, which has an oil field in Kurdistan and which paid him more than £1,000 an hour. His Gulf Keystone income was declared in his register of interests, but his total second job earnings are not known thanks to Parliamentary rules allowing him to advise companies through Zahawi & Zahawi Ltd, a consultancy he set up with his wife. Mr Zahawi did not respond to a request for comment. But Sir Alistair Graham, a former Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, said: “This could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to get around the rules so that he doesn’t have to admit the scale of his earnings in a consultant capacity. Mr Zahawi made a mint from the oil firm (  Image:  PA) “The important thing to stress is that MPs have their personal responsibility to ensure that they comply not only with the letter but the spirit of the code of conduct. “Constituents have a right to know how much time and money he is taking separate to his political work.” Alex Runswick, of Transparency International UK, said: “Any new controls on MPs’ second jobs need to focus on potential conflicts of ­interests, not just the hours worked or additional earnings. “Any company owned by an MP risks becoming a shell behind which the extent of the work and these conflicts remain hidden.” Our probe comes after the outcries over Owen Paterson’s lobbying, and Sir Geoffrey Cox’s taxpayer-funded rental home and £1million-a-year legal work. Masoud Barzani was President of Kurdistan from 2005 to 2017 (  Image:  AFP via Getty Images) The Mirror’s investigation has revealed how Mr Zahawi made a fortune in the murky world of business and politics in Kurdistan. Within months of becoming an MP in 2010, Mr Zahawi became the vice-chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Kurdistan, taking five free trips to the region from 2011 to 2015. The secretariat to the group was funded by Gulf Keystone, the operator of the Shaikan oil field in the ­Kurdistan region of Iraq. Mr Zahawi was a guest speaker at a conference sponsored by Gulf Keystone and a second oil firm, Afren, in the Kurdistan capital Erbil in November 2011. The two firms soon had Zahawi & Zahawi Ltd on the payroll. Under Boris Johnson, Mr Zahawi served as Business Secretary and then Vaccines Minister, before his appointment as Education Secretary (  Image:  POOL/AFP via Getty Images) Mr Zahawi’s father Hareth Zahawi’s firm Iraqi Project and Building ­Development was already involved in construction projects in Kurdistan. One source told the Mirror IPBD also had a monthly contract with Afren. The Mirror has found an archived page from the IPBD website which stated it had a joint venture with Sirwan Barzani, the nephew of Masoud Barzani, who was President of Kurdistan from 2005 to 2017. Sirwan Barzani has been accused in US court documents of corruption at his Iraqi telecoms company, but denies the “baseless” claims. Nadhim Zahawi’s register of interests shows Zahawi & Zahawi Ltd advised IPBD from 2011 to 2019. It is not known how much the role paid and there is no suggestion Mr Zahawi or his father knew of any corruption. Zahawi & Zahawi Ltd was an adviser to Afren from 2012 to 2015, according to the register of members’ interests, but it is not known how much the role paid. Mr Zahawi quit Afren after the Serious Fraud Office began a bribery investigation, which led to two Afren executives being jailed for fraud and money laundering. Mr Zahawi went on to receive almost £300,000 in “bonus payments” from Gulf Keystone (  There is no suggestion Mr Zahawi was invloved in wrongdoing. When he stopped advising Afren in 2015 he became Chief Strategy Officer at Gulf Keystone, initially earning £20,126 and later £29,643 for eight to 21 hours a month, which he declared. Just weeks after taking the appointment, the Kurdish oil ministry agreed to begin huge payments to Gulf Keystone as part of an existing oil deal. High Court papers reported by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project allege that Gulf Keystone secured the oil field, prior to Mr Zahawi’s involvement, through a corrupt deal with Kurdish politicians. The claims are denied. Mr Zahawi went on to receive almost £300,000 in “bonus payments” from Gulf Keystone before he left in December 2017. He was then paid an additional £105,000 for “salary in lieu of notice” along with a £285,000 “settlement payment”. This last payment was made in May 2018, four months after he was appointed a junior minister at the Department for Education by then-Prime Minister Theresa May.  

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In Sulaymaniyah… The Votes of the All Parties 27% and Boycotts 73%

Draw Media:  In the last Iraqi Parliament Election 27% of Sulaymaniyah registers voters voted for the parties and 73 percent boycotted the election or burned their vote. The Parties Vote in Sulaymaniyah according the last statement by Iraqis High Electoral Commission.  🔹 All Registered Voters: 1,425,705 🔹 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan:    123,814        %8.7 🔹 New Generation Movement    106,318        %7.5 🔹Kurdistan Democratic Party      54,891          %3.9 🔹 Kurdistan Justice Group           44,639          %3.1 🔹 Kurdistan Islamic Union           22,876        %1.6 🔹 Change Movement                   17,846          %1.3 🔹 Independent Candidates         12,100       %0.9 🔹 Socialist Democratic Party       2,517    %0.2 🔹 All Parties Together                385,001    %27 🔹 Boycott and Burned votes     1,040,704     %73

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KDP and PUK Together Got 23% of the Votes of All Kurdistan 

Draw Media: 🔻 In Erbil 26%, Sulaymaniyah 12%, Duhok 35% of all population voted for KDP and PUK 🔻 In Erbil 75%, Sulaymaniyah 88%, Duhok 65% of all population did not vote for KDP and PUK The number of the votes of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in the last Iraqi election on October 10, 2021, in the three Kurdistan provinces.  🔻 Erbil province: 🔹 the registered voters: 1,238,379 🔹 KDP votes 262,800 - percentage: 21%  🔹 PUK votes 65,862 - percentage: 5% 🔹 KDP and PUK votes 328,662 - percentage: 26% 🔹 Boycott and others vote: 909,717 - percentage: 74% 🔻 Sulaymaniyah province: 🔹 the registered voters: 1,425,705 🔹 KDP votes 54,891 - percentage: 4%  🔹 PUK votes 123,814 - percentage:8% 🔹 KDP and PUK votes 178,705 - percentage: 12% 🔹 Boycott and others vote: 1,247,000 - percentage: 88% 🔻 Duhok province: 🔹 the registered voters: 822,703 🔹 KDP votes 261,543 - percentage: 32%  🔹 PUK votes 25,040 - percentage: 3% 🔹 KDP and PUK votes 286,583 - percentage: 35% 🔹 Boycott and others vote: 536,120 - percentage: 65% Overall votes of PUK and KDP in the three Provinces: 🔹 the registered voters: 3,486,884 🔹 KDP votes 579,234 - percentage: 16%  🔹 PUK votes 214,716 - percentage: 6% 🔹 KDP and PUK votes 793,950 - percentage: 23% 🔹 Boycott and others vote: 2,692,936 - percentage: 77%   The Source of the numbers: Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)  

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The Americans Did Not Want Mam Jalal to Be President Again

Draw Media: In Masoud Barzani’s book “For History” After 2005, election laws were amended in such a way, which was resulted in decreasing the Kurdistan region seats. So far, an Iraqi census has not been held because of different reasons, even though it was decided to be held. Many times, we have given up on our rights and participated in the political process on the Americans' promises. But did not keep their promises. The sovereign post of the president was for Kurds, In the first presidential term after falling the previous regime, Mam Jalal became the president. For the second term in 2010, the Americans did not want Kurds to retake the post. In 2010, Ayad Allawi was the biggest winner of the election, but the USA and Iran did not let him become the prime minister because of various excuses. The Americans were trying to choose a Sunni character for the president and the Parliaments speaker for Kurds. When the Americans discussed this matter with me, I asked them: Do you mean that you want to remove Mam Jalal or to take back the presidency post from Kurd at all? They said: We mean both! I replied: The presidency is for Kurds, and Mam Jalal must become president again, and it cannot be like that both prime minister and president for Arabs. That was how Jalal Talabani became the president for the second term. Many times, the Americans were not on the right path in reading the Iraqi's political equations, and if they would make any mistakes every time the Kurds had to pay the price and give up on their rights. During the referendum, we saw that the biggest reason for the Americans to oppose the referendum was because they thought the referendum would make Abadi, the prime minister weak. If the referendum would not be held Abadi would be strong and would kick Iran out of the Iraqis political game. The Americans were not right in that perspective. And they wanted for the sake of a person, the Kurds surrender their rights. Page 50-51 from the book (For History) Written by Masoud Barzani   

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Commercial Salt Is Being Sold as Normal Salt to Eat 

draw: From the KRG crossing borders, a special type of commercial salt is being imported for commercial use but later sent to the market as a normal salt for people to use in their daily foods.   Every day 15 to 20 tracks import salt from Pshta and Tawela crossing the border into Kurdistan without paying taxes. This salt in the Customs Tariff is identified as Commercial salt, "not for eating". Based on Draw Media investigations, this salt which is being imported as commercial salt, later in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil will be packaged and sale it in the market for eating. To make the process of importing the salt easier for some businessmen without paying taxes, the Customs Tariff of the salt has been changed. Originally there were three different types of salt in the Customs Tariff. (Salt for eating, salt not appropriate for eating and commercial salt), but in the customs tariff, they were changed to only two types and both commercial salt with the salt not good for eating were combined to make customs discounts.  Currently, in the KRG customs tariff, the salts have been divided into two categories; commercial salt and salt for eating. The first category, the commercial salt, has been exempted from customs duties, the exemptions will not be applied for subjects that use for eating. This means this salt is being imported as a non-food subject, but later will be sent to the market for eating. Commercial salt which is exempted from customs duties is used in several industrial sectors like oil and tanning animal skins. When this salt arrives in the Kurdistan region will be distributed to several factories in Sluaymanyah, Sayd Sadiq, and Erbil. These factories package the salt and send it to market. Draw Media has been informed that a custom inspection team in Sulaymaniyah has sent samples of this salt for inspection in a hospital, and none of them passed the inspection test. The results show that the salt is not appropriate for eating, yet the customs and border authorities do not want to prevent this illegal importation which puts public health at risk. The health sources mention that this salt is not for eating because making serious problems for human health. By importing this type of salt illegally, KRG is losing approximately 360 million IQD every month, for a group of businessmen backed by the major parties.

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