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News / Kurdistan

The UN representative visited Draw Media

To discuss the elections and freedom of expression, the UN Representative in the Kurdistan Region visited (Draw Media). Ricardo Rodriguez, head of UNAMI office to KR (Kurdistan Region), and Karwan Babakr, Head of UNAMI's Sulaimani Office, visited Darw Office in Sulaimani. The visit was to discuss the issue of elections in the Kurdistan Region and freedom of the press.

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"Iraq in no need of foreign combat forces"

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani says his country is in no need of foreign combat forces on its soil as he visits Berlin to discuss bilateral cooperation in various fields. Speaking in a joint press conference with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Friday, Sudani said “Iraqi security forces are capable of defeating terrorism.” “Iraq does not need combat forces from the international coalition,” he said. According to the prime minister, Baghdad is reviewing the size and type of remaining advisory forces that remain in the country. Some 2,500 US troops still remain inside the Arab country in what Washington describes as an “advisory” mission. US President Joe Biden and Iraq’s then-Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi declared in July 2021 that the US mission in Iraq would transition from combat to an “advisory” role by the end of that year. After the 2020 assassination of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Units, along with the region’s legendary anti-terror commander, Iranian Lieutenant General Qassem Soleimani, Iraqi lawmakers ratified a bill that required the government to end the presence of all foreign military forces led by the US.   Iraqi gas export to Germany The German official said they have discussed gas import from Iraq. “We also talked about possible gas deliveries to Germany and agreed to stay in close contact,” he said in the press conference as Berlin is seeking to diversify its energy resources. No further detail on the volume of imported gas from Iraq has been revealed yet. Speaking about the energy ties, Sudani said Iraq wants to help meet global energy needs while also stimulating its domestic economy. He added that Iraq’s gas can be delivered to Europe through Turkey. He said German companies could help Iraqi with the problem of gas flaring. Iraq continues to flare some of the gas extracted alongside crude oil because it lacks the facilities to process it into fuel for local consumption or exports. Opportunities, he maintained, have been offered to German firms to invest in Iraq’s gas industry. Iraq has also signed a deal with German company Siemens to upgrade its power grid. The deal aims to increase Iraq’s power generation by 11 gigawatts. “Iraq is already one of the countries most affected by the climate crisis, and the challenges will continue to grow in the coming years,” Scholz said, adding that Germany wants to help Iraq diversify its economy from fossil fuels and reduce its carbon footprint, including through the use of solar power and hydrogen.

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Slemani is going to run out of electricity

On 15/12/1992, Ahmad Bamarne, a member of the first round of the Kurdistan Parliament, wrote to his wife in France: "The situation in Kurdistan is very bad. There is only two or three hours of electricity. Currently, some areas of Sulaimani have only (2) hours of electricity , in (24) hours. When In 1992, three hours of electricity was given to the citizens a day, "The reason is said to be “due to injustice in the distribution of electricity” According to an official statement of the government, the monthly expenditure of electricity is (100) billion dinars, the cost of installing electricity smart meter was (300) billion dinars. About (70) billion dinars monthly expenditure on generator rent which is paid directly by the citizens and the expenditure of the Ministry of Electricity for the generators is (17) billion dinars, but still there is no electricity. From (1992 to 2022) Currently, the electricity is reduced to the lowest distribution level in the Kurdistan Region. Electricity will be provided between 6 to 8 hours in average. However,some areas in Sulaimani have only (2-4) hours of electricity. Experts and electricity officials, attributs the reason to (injustice in the distribution of electricity and ownership of Sulaimani that there is no one to defend).   Demands on electricity According to the official statements of the Ministry of Electricity, currently (3600) MW of electricity is produced in the Kurdistan Region, but the demand for electricity has increased to more than (6600) MW. While the official website of the Ministry of Electricity earlier this month announced that "615 megawatts of electricity has been increased in the ninth cabinet" and power plants are opened daily and talk about increasing the amount of electricity production, but yet the government provides only (7) hours of electricity for the citizens. Smart meters reduce electricity supply! In May this year, a delegation from the Republic of Congo visited the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG) and met with the Minister of Electricity, Kamal Mohammed. At the time, the Ministry of Electricity claimed that the smart meter project had reduced electricity waste from 49% to 39%. Kamal Mohammed is the electricity minister on KDP share in the government. He recently took over another ministry. He was appointed as acting minister of natural resources following the resignation of Kamal Atroshi. There are 1.7 million electricity customers in the Kurdistan Region, of which 1.3 million have installed smart meters, which is 73% of the total number of electricity customers.  Electricity supply has been reduced from 16 hours to 6 hours, contrary to the statements of the Ministry of Electricity, smart meters have reduced the time of electricity supply by 62%, while the cost of installing smart meters was about 300 billion dinars. Electricity income and expenditure There is a huge amount of money is spent on electricity in the Kurdistan Region, so that now more than (100) billion dinars are spent monthly for the companies that produce electricity. In addition to the cost of electricity generation, the total monthly salary expenditure of the Ministry of Electricity (17 billion 850 million dinars), in addition to the money citizens spend monthly to buy electricity from private generators. The number of electricity customers in the Kurdistan Region has increased to 1 million 776 thousand 963. If an average of (4) amps per household of electricity from private generators is calculated and the price of each ampere is calculated at (10,000) dinars, then each family spends an average of (40) thousand dinars monthly to buy electricity from private generators, the average monthly expenditure of citizens to buy electricity from private generators reaches (71 billion) dinars. Accordingly, the total cost of electricity in the Kurdistan Region, including the government's payment and the citizens' payment for generator rent, is more than (200 billion) dinars per month. This expenditure comes at a time when, according to the statistics of the Ministry of Electricity, the monthly electricity revenue is about (50 billion) dinars. Last year, the total electricity revenue was (456 billion) dinars. Currently, the government owes about 1.298 trillion dinars to citizens and the government itself owes the companies $3.883 billion.

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Last month, 38 percent of the Kurdistan Region's oil was sold to Israel

Last month, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) sold 38 percent of its oil to Israel and 10 percent to China. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) sold 12 million 255 thousand barrels of oil last month, of which 4 million 650 thousand barrels were sold to Israel, that was 38% of its oil sold in December.  Croatia bought 2.23 million barrels, about 18 percent of oil from the Kurdistan Region last month. Italy is the third largest buyer of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oil, with 1.7 million barrels, that was (14%) of the KRG oil sold in December.  Taiwan bought 2 million barrels of oil from Kurdistan Region last month China bought 1.25 million barrels of oil from Kurdistan Region last month Romania bought 650,000 barrels of oil from Kurdistan Region This table shows the details of the oil sales of the Kurdistan Region for December

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Energy Geopolitics and Conflict between Energy Basins

Draw Media Bahrooz Jaafar Executive Summary Since early 2022, Russia and Iran have been enjoying rising oil and natural gas prices due to the smell of the war in Ukraine. Only one month before the Ukraine war broke out, the US secretary department sent a non-formal massage (non-paper) to each of the energy departments in Greece, Cyprus and Israel's s foreign affairs ministries, announcing that they suspend their support for Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline. This will kill Israel and Cyprus's dream to export natural gas to Europe via the Crete island in Greece! Are these conflicts more energy-related, or do they have historical and political depth? Will natural gas pipelines (the new energy geopolitics) lead to a new common regional cooperation system, or is it a source of conflict and increasing regional problems? This study, from the Mediterranean Institute for Regional Studies, attempts to understand the essence of problems by identifying three main energy basins and showing what the new regional and global energy system will look like. First: Energy security and the world's need for oil and natural gas Energy security means balancing national security with the availability of cheap natural resources to meet domestic needs. According to the US Energy Information Administration, in 1980, the world consumed 53 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, but in 2010, the world consumed 113 trillion cubic feet of natural gas{1}. In 2022, the world's demand for natural gas will reach 146.482 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, which means that the world's demand for natural gas will increase by 4.6% annually{2}. Similarly, in 2010, the world consumed 86.4 million barrels of oil per day, but in 2020, 91 million barrels of oil per day, and in 2022, the world consumed 100.80 million barrels per day{3}. The demand for natural gas and oil has increased: In the simplest terms, this means that oil and natural gas are still the world's top commodities, and millions, if not billions, of cars, planes, ships, factories, power grids, and large and medium-sized industries are still employed. Without natural gas and oil, the global economy would be largely paralyzed. It also means that although humanity has reached the last stage of great progress and innovation in its history, it has yet to find an alternative to oil and natural gas. Just as coal was hugely influential in previous centuries, and then the role became oil, today, natural gas is in the most influential days of its life. In 2022, natural gas has had the strongest impact on international relations: Second: The Caspian Basin: a new Silk Road, a new conflict, a new integration Caspian refers to the world's largest enclosed sea; Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are located in the Caspian basin. All of them have owned oil and natural gas reserves. Geographically, it lies between Europe and Asia; east of the Caucasus, West of the broad steppe of Central Asia, south of the fertile plains of Southern Russia in Eastern Europe, and north of the mountainous Iranian Plateau of Western Asia (this region is known as the heart of the world. Whoever controls it can control the world){4}. These regional factions have long sought to build an integration like the European Union. After the 2021 tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it became clear that Russia has a complete hegemony and ally in the region. 2. 1. Europe will no longer heat itself with Russian gas? However, it can be seen hydrocarbon as a common ground. However, the first third of the world's natural gas reserves are located in Asia: Russia (19.9%) of natural gas and Iran (17.1%) and Qatar (13.1%) in the Arabian Gulf. Although Qatar is a US ally and European natural gas supply, at the same time, Qatar is the Taliban and Iran's ally. By this word, (50.1%) of the world's natural gas reserves are owned by three alliance countries. Fourth is the United States (6.7%), which uses it more for domestic needs{5}. Europe consumes 540 billion cubic meters of gas annually, while Russia supplies 40 per cent of that. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline will transport Russian natural gas to Germany via Ukraine. Ukraine itself is a good beneficiary of taxes on gas pipelines{6}. On September 27, 2022, it was discovered that natural gas had leaked into the water from the North Stream 2 pipeline 70 meters underwater. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell called the incident deliberate and said the aim was to make natural gas more expensive for Europe; 2-2. Russian-Ukrainian War: Diplomacy failed to prevent war Indeed, this is not a conflict between the two ordinary countries; as we have seen, with the outbreak of the war on February 24 and February 24, 2022, the borders and sovereignty of countries, in general, have faded. This is the collision of at least two great continents, two different civilizations that have been in conflict for thousands of years. Therefore, it is still the beginning of the war, which Russia, Europe, the United States, Britain, China and Ukraine are part of; the spark has reached Taiwan and the Middle East. Is the gas pipeline alone responsible for the huge smoke that has engulfed the world, or where does the problem come from? In 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev declared the fall of the Soviet Union: 16 countries declared independence due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The world entered a different phase under the US and NATO presidencies, and Russia accepted the new system on the condition that its current hegemony and borders would be maintained. However, after 1999, the United States and Europe invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the European Club and made them members of NATO. The United States assured it would not deploy nuclear weapons in these countries, and Russia remained silent. In 2004, US President George W. Bush announced that Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia would become members of NATO. All these countries were formerly under the control of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin, therefore, understood that it should take the threat seriously. Then, in (2008) the US administration, under the direct supervision of Barack Obama and members of Bulgaria, Austria, Turkey and Romania, signed the Nabucco Pipeline project to transport natural gas from Central Asia (from the Caspian region) to Central Europe (They tried to transport gas from the region under Russia's ears without valuing Russia). In 2014, Ukrainian protesters, as media agencies showed that the United States and Europe backed them) forced President Viktor Yanukovych to flee to Moscow and turn his royal palace into a museum. They brought forward another team close to the West and have been trying to make Ukraine a member of NATO for a long time! This time, Russia considered regaining control of the Crimean peninsula. In 2014, they fought Crimea (Crimea: located north of the Black Sea and south of Ukraine, the island has a great military and material position, especially the port of Sevastopol, where most of the world's powers are clashed from here). With the occupation of Crimea, the Western power will no longer be able to receive any military assistance from the Black Sea. In addition, the threat of a NATO-Russian conflict in Crimea disrupted the Nabucco pipeline, especially when the world was busy with the war against terrorism (ISIS). The outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011 gave Russia an excuse to cross the Mediterranean Sea: This occurred from the Black Sea to the Marmara, and Russian warships reached the port of Tartus in Syria. Russia is still an important player in the Syrian conflict. The US administration has described China's economic and Russian military incursions as the biggest threat to national security. Therefore, the United States deployed long-range weapons and missiles in Romania (2016) and Poland (2020). Third: Conceptualization and theorizing: A call to securitization theory Theory in international relations helps us to understand phenomena. The securitization theory sparked in 1983 with Barry Buzan's book, "People, State, Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations". Later, Buzan and their colleague established "the Copenhagen School" as an important contribution to the science of international relations. According to this school, national security policy is not natural but carefully formulated by politicians and thinkers{7}. Here, securitization means that when an issue is labeled a "threat" and "danger", the social and political institutions must be provided for it. In other words, security issues do not come from the outside alone but must be addressed from the inside by security actors. For example, indicating "immigrants" as a threat to national security makes "immigrants" a less important issue to be directly addressed at all levels of "borders". This theory emphasizes that issues are not inherently dangerous but that when they are "securitized," they become security problems. This "security" was previously seen in a narrow context as a matter of military confrontation during the Soviet-American Cold War. Then the concept shifted to various levels such as regional security, energy security, environmental security, social security, food security, cyber security, etc. Hence, "issues" or "new phenomena" are considered security threats to culture, identity, economic status and national incomes. When US troops suddenly withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, in less than a week, the entire Afghanistan, worth (85) billion US$, weapons and military equipment fell into the hands of the Taliban{8}. This made serious questions about the US personality and gave Putin an incentive to impose an energy embargo on Europe and invade Ukraine in a cold winter. Ukraine has been under Russian rule for 200 years. For the Russians, Ukraine is an important part of Russian identity, language, geography and authenticity. From the beginning of the war, the price of oil rose from $ 60 to $ 94; the Wall Street Journal saw the price of oil reach $ 100-120, then reach the same price and more{9}. The European gas crisis and the sale of Russian gas and grain in the country's currency (Ruble) mean that Russia has done its duties successfully. Even the Biden administration has called on OPEC to increase oil production, but OPEC has ignored it from the beginning. Three allies, Russia, China, and Iran, have been prominent factors in global energy prices. On the other hand, another weakness of Europe is that they do not have a unified army; their entire military presence is considered to be NATO, which the United States dominates. Fourth: The gas pipeline in the eastern Mediterranean region Knowing the nature of the distribution of power relations about energy issues depends on recognizing the strategic energy basins and alliances in these regions. This is "energy geopolitics": In 2010, Cyprus and Israel announced that they had discovered underwater natural gas in their offshore borders. In August 2019, Cyprus, Israel and Greece signed a natural gas alliance agreement in Athens with the support of the United States. Even Frank Fannon, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Natural Resources, was present {10}. Egypt, Cyprus, Israel and Greece have established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), AS France, Italy, Spain, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Lebanon are also members of the EMGF, and former US Presidents and Secretaries of State Mike Pompeo have expressed strong support for the project. The discovery of the reserves in several major fields concerned Turkey in the southern Mediterranean. A strategic dream has been true in Southern Europe on the other side: Europe does not need Russian natural gas؛. From here on, another pipeline to Europe imports gas from Israel and Cyprus. In early 2021, the 1,900-km East-Med Pipeline has commissioned to transport Israeli and Cypriot natural gas through Greece to Italy, Macedonia, Serbia and other countries. However, this project is very controversial:  - The Cyprus issue remains pending in the region. Turkey does not recognize the Greek Cypriot state and the Turkish part of Cyprus (TRNC) remains marginalized by the international community, which has exacerbated the natural gas problem. The main heads of gas production in the eastern Mediterranean are at odds with Turkey. So, it has been the main cause of regional tension. - Russia is stationed in Syria, and Turkey does not want the northeastern regions of Syria, which contain oil and natural gas reserves, to be under the control of Kurdish forces. - The Mediterranean Sea is the crossroads between three continents: Asia, Africa and Europe (Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey). - Environmental problems, migrants, human trafficking, etc., continue in this region. - The deployment of Italian and French warships in the Mediterranean Sea to oppose Turkey's maneuvers. - US and British warships stationed in the Mediterranean basin - The project has led Israel and motivated to become a producer and exporter of natural gas (Israel: imported natural gas from Azerbaijan through Turkish territory in the 1990s and from Egypt from 2008 to 2012). In March 2021, Israel's Delek Drilling sold a 22 per cent stake in the Tamar gas field to UAE's Mubadala Petroleum for more than $1 billion {11}. - the Mediterranean, led by France in Europe and Israel in the Middle East, Britain and the United States, look forward to the oil and gas reserves in Kirkuk and the Kurdistan Region into part of the eastern faction. Therefore, in response to these steps of the West, Russian and Turkish companies are participating in all fields of oil and gas services in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 4. 1. Why did the US administration withdraw support for the East-Med pipeline project? On January 9 January 9. 2022. the ministries of foreign affairs of Greece, Israel and Cyprus received a non-formal letter from the US secretary department. The letter states that the US administration will suspend its support for the East-Med gas pipeline project, which has sparked regional tensions. The additional gas reserves in the region can be utilized through electricity cables to produce and promote the joint regional project. The letter comes as the United States and Europe have been preparing for a dangerous confrontation with Russia (a month before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war). The Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Project is immensely important to the United States and the West, so it does not make any excuse for any researcher to believe that support for Europe and the United States will be suspended for this project. However, the following points should be considered: The project has been hurting Turkey for ten years. Therefore, the rumors of suspending US aid are directly related to the Ukraine crisis, a US compromise for Turkey not to get closer to Russia. If the US administration intended to end the project, it would have notified them through the embassies of the three countries in Washington. The US administration believes that the project will bring regional tension and conflict rather than peace and cooperation and has led to the neglect of Turkey in the region. Therefore, Turkey described the US announcement to suspend the EMGF as a great victory for itself. However, Turkey has received this message erroneously because they state that "every line to Europe must pass through Turkey. The United States desire the natural gas projects in the eastern Mediterranean to be in line with European environmental plans and policies. Therefore, they proposed to become an electricity and cable exchange network in the region. The European Union has decided to reduce its use of natural gas by 25 per cent by 2030 and not use it completely by 2050{12}. · The project is expensive and will not solve Europe's energy crisis entirely. Substantially, during the discovery of natural gas, energy giant companies have flocked to the eastern Mediterranean since 2010, such as Noble Energy and Exxon Mobile as the two major US companies, British Petroleum (BP), French Total, Italian Eni, Israeli Delek Drilling, German DEA. Recently, the UAE has devoted all its political, economic and diplomatic strength to the Mediterranean. The UAE has normalized relations with Israel and Turkey. In 2022, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited the UAE after 12 years of war and crisis in Syria. Are these signs a simple event and a normal regional step? Is it normal to spend $7 billion and start transporting Cypriot and Israeli natural gas to Greece and other countries in 2021? Fifth: The West and its environmental issues The European Energy Network has announced that it will reach a neutral level of environmental issues by 2050. According to this roadmap, Europe will no longer rely on oil and natural gas (neither exported nor imported). Europe and the Mediterranean countries have had stable agreements since the end of the Cold War; For example, the Barcelona Declaration of 1999: these three continents fall on the same sea; they called it the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In 2008, it was renamed the Union for the Mediterranean. According to these agreements, Europe will intervene in any country in the name of cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea, such as Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Libya, etc. Therefore, the US administration has called for the Eastern Mediterranean gas project to be conducted by European environmental policies. Establishment of a large joint power line to transport and use excess gas produced off the coast of Cyprus, Israel and Egypt with Greece, thus connecting three neighboring countries on different continents. However, it is not easy because it covers a large area of more than 1,300 miles, and again, this project will cause Turkey's objections. Legally, these waters have an UN-designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which mostly passes through Turkey. Experts believe that after the US decision in early 2022, the gas in the eastern Mediterranean will be only for the Mediterranean region, and a certain region will not be economically relevant to Europe. Investors are more likely to follow the statements of Israeli Energy Minister Karin Elharar, who said that in 2022, his office would focus on renewable energy for the production of energy, especially through wind and solar {13}. Sixth: Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Hydrocarbon potential, geographical location, political decisions The population of the Kurdistan Region has exceeded 6 million people, more than 5 million of whom live in cities. 1.4 million people receive salaries from the government, which requires 870 billion Iraqi dinars (about 750 million US dollars) monthly. The armed and security forces of the Kurdistan Region are 270,000 people{14}. However, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) claims to have between 3.7 and 5.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 45 to 60 billion barrels of oil reserves. Almost the Kurdistan Region ranks between the seventh and ninth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, with between 3% and 5% of the world's natural gas reserves{15}. The existence of hydrocarbon potential for the Kurdistan Region within the framework of the Iraqi state requires deep thinking in the regional chessboard and conflicts: How does the geopolitical aspect of the Kurdistan Region affect its natural reserves? The Kurdistan Region is directly involved in the war between Russia and NATO in the Caspian region. It is also more directly involved in the eastern Mediterranean's energy geopolitics, environment and political conflict. Russian companies are currently operating in Kurdistan Region. Iran is a Russian ally in all areas of the Kurdistan Region, while the Germans have been training the Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) since 2014. The French consider the Kurds their friends, and the US has the largest military base in the Kurdistan Region. In other words, the KRI and its natural gas are located between three different energy geopolitical basins: the Mediterranean Sea in the northwest the Qazvin (Caspian) basin in the east and northeast the Gulf region ( Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia) from the south For this reason, if the KRI does not maintain the balance, the Kurdistan energy line will bring chaos to the region. This geopolitical influence is reflected in decision-makers behavior in the Kurdistan Region; When the UAE normalized relations with Israel and Turkey in 2021, the KRG's Prime Minister Masrour Barzani will visit the UAE directly, and then the KRG's President Nechirvan Barzani will visit Turkey. In 2022, when the natural gas and fuel crisis in Europe and the United States due to the war in Ukraine, the Emir of Qatar visited the United States; following this, the Prime Minister of the KRG arrived in Doha on February 15, 2022, at the invitation of Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. As well as, during his participation in the 2022 global energy forum –Atlantic Council, the PM of the KRG pointed out that "We will also export natural gas to Baghdad, Turkey and Europe" he said Atlantic Council's Global Energy Forum in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), March 28, 2022{16}. Moreover, Our goal is to export Kurdistan's gas to Europe," said Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani at the Delphi Economic Forum in Athens in April 2022. The Islamic Republic targeted the residence of Sheikh Baz Karim Barzanji, the executive director of Kar group company, with 16 missiles. Further to remind, 60% of the Kurdistan oil pipeline is owned by Kar company, and Rosneft owns 40% of Kurdistan and its oil marketing. So, Russia and Iran will never want the Kurdistan Region's natural gas to replace Iranian gas for Iraq, nor become it facilitates for Europe. Subsequently, in June and July 2022, militia armed groups targeted the Kormor field three times (Kor Mor is the largest natural gas and LPG field in the Kurdistan Region, operated by UAE Pearl Petroleum since 2007). The Kurdistan Region can work to maintain its balance of power and neutrality; Perhaps the best scenario is for the Kurdistan Region to exercise its power and validities within the framework of the Iraqi Constitution, Articles 111, 112, 116 and 122, as well as Law No. 22 of 2005 on the Oil and Gas Law which is issued in the Kurdistan Parliament in (2007). Iraq is not a stable country. The Kurdistan Region should take every opportunity to work with the central government to pass an oil and gas law with the support of the US administration (because Iraq still needs an oil and gas law). This opportunity is also important for the Iraqi central government; instead of importing natural gas from Iran at higher market prices, or instead of demanding electricity from Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf, Kurdistan's gas should be used inside Iraq to generate electricity for central and southern provinces of Iraq: It is geographically closer, it is cheaper, it will be implemented within one country, it will lead to more political coexistence, and the Shiite militias close to Iran may not repeat the threats and shelling of the Kurdistan Region's fields. "Everywhere, the oil and gas is not only related to oil and gas in terms of chemical composition and geological dimensions, not only an economic issue but also an environmental, security, political and geopolitical issue. So, It is not an exaggeration to say, "Tell me where the pipeline is going, and I will tell you where your political destiny is going". Conclusion Finally, so-called "energy security" is generally related to the reasons for the world's high and low prices of oil and natural gas. All three main basins of the Caspian, the Gulf, and the eastern Mediterranean are direct threats to global economic and political security. The US administration's decision to withdraw their support for the EMG project in January 2022 was a tactic through an unofficial paper. This is further confirmed by signing a new deal between Israel, Egypt and the European Union in June 2022 to export gas from the eastern Mediterranean. As the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen said the EU would use Cypriot and Israeli natural gas as an alternative to Russian gas. However, the European Union and the United States will continue their environmental programs to reduce their dependence on oil and natural gas. Pressure on OPEC will continue to supply much more amount of oil. All this does not mean that by mid-2023, we will see oil prices below $70, But in 2024, we will see oil prices below $40. However, natural gas will be the main market and geopolitical conflict topic for many years. Therefore, it is better for developing oil-producing countries such as Iraq, which suffers from unnatural political conflict and violence, to take advantage of this temporary opportunity. Finally, one of the main characteristics that distinguish the Russia and Ukraine war from other world wars is that instead of only a great military, economic, financial and political impact on the two direct countries participating in the war, the war has also created great political, economic and security pressure on those indirectly involved in the war.      Click here to PDF  References {1} US. Energy Information Administration (2012) Global natural gas consumption doubled from 1980 to 2010. For more: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=5810 {2} Jazeera Net (2019) How much oil do we consume?.. Facts about black gold in the world. For more click here (Translated from Arabic to English language).    https://www.aljazeera.net › 2019 › كم... {3} Statista (2021) Daily global crude oil demand 2006-2026 – Statista {4} Mammadyarov, E (2007) "A new way for the Caspian region: cooperation and integration". Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ). P 2-8. {5} Henderson, S (2022) "Reality Check for Israel’s Natural Gas Plans", The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. {6}Reuters (2021) Explainer: Why Russian exports hold sway over European and British gas prices. See here: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/why-russian-exports-hold-sway-over-european-british-gas-prices-2021-11-03/  {7} Stritzel. H (2014) Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School. Palgrave Macmillan, London. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137307576_2 {8} The hill (2022) McCaul says US withdrawal from Afghanistan has emboldened Russia on Ukraine {9} WSJ (2022) What’s Behind Wall Street’s $100 Oil Forecast? {10} Barkey, J (2022) US pipeline withdrawal marks new chapter in Eastern Mediterranean. Ekathimerini:https: //www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1176904/us-pipeline-withdrawal-marks-new-chapter-in-eastern-mediterranean/ {11} Bloomberg (2021) UAE-Israel Ties Deepen as Mubadala Buys Gas Stake for $1 Billion . see here: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-02/uae-israel-ties-deepen-as-mubadala-buys-gas-stake-for-1-billion {12} Henderson, S (2022). (OP. Cit). {13} I24 News (2021) Energy Minister: Israel wants to focus on renewable energy: https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/politics/1639586438-energy-minister-israel-wants-to-focus-on-renewable-energy {14} Rudaw (2021) Ministry of Planning: The population of the Kurdistan Region is 6.17 million (translated from Kurdish to English language) see here: https://www.rudaw.net/arabic/kurdistan/180120214 {15} Mediterranean Institute for Regional Studies (2020) Stubborn Kurdish Petroleum Resources: Surveying Actual data and investigating the declared Numbers. Research Paper {16} Daily Sabah (2022) KRG in Iraq to start energy exports to Turkey soon: PM Barzani. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/krg-in-iraq-to-start-energy-exports-to-turkey-soon-pm-barzani

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Each individual in the Kurdistan region eats 156 eggs annually

Each person in the Kurdistan Region eats an average of 156 eggs annually. 2 million 520 thousand eggs are consumed daily in the Kurdistan Region. The Kurdistan Region needs about one billion eggs annually. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Media and Information Office announced that the Kurdistan Region produces 14,000 cartons of eggs daily, exports 7,000 cartons and consumes 7,000 cartons for domestic consumption. The domestic need of the Kurdistan Region is 7,000 cartons of eggs daily, each carton contains 12 layers and each layer contains 30 eggs. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, the population of the Kurdistan Region is 5 million 884 thousand 23 people, which means that the Kurdistan Region needs 2 million 520 thousand eggs daily, 75 million 600 thousand eggs monthly, 919 million 800,000 thousand eggs annually, which means that each person in the region eats 156 eggs annually.

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Italy is the main buyer of the KRG's oil

Draw Media Italy is the main buyer of oil in the Kurdistan Region. On average, Italy buys about 40% of the Kurdistan Region's oil. In August 2021, Italy bought the most oil from the region by  (56%). Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visited in Baghdad and Erbil to discuss bilateral trade and military ties. The oil issue is considered the hottest trade relations between the Kurdistan Region and Italy, as since 2014, Italy has been the main buyer of oil exports from the Kurdistan Region.   KRG Oil Shipments in September In September 2022, 13 million 220 thousand barrels of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oil were shipped to five different countries. - 5 million 190 thousand barrels, by 39.3% were shipped by Israeli ships. - 2 million 740 thousand barrels, (20.7%) were shipped by Greek ships. - 2 million 340 thousand barrels, (17.7%) were shipped by Italian ships. - 650,000 barrels, or 4.9%, were loaded by a Romanian ship. - 600,000 barrels, or 4.5%, were loaded by a Croatian ship. - The amount of (1 million 700 thousand) barrels of oil (12.9%) is not known what country’s ships loaded the oil.   • KRG oil shipments in August In August 2022, 11 million 560 thousand barrels of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oil were shipped to four different countries. - 3 million 620 thousand barrels, 31.3% of which were shipped by Greek ships. - 3 million barrels, 26% of which were shipped by Italian ships. - 2 million 670 thousand barrels, 23.1% of which were shipped by Israeli ships. - 1 million 270 thousand barrels, 11% of which were loaded by ships (Romania). - The amount of (1 million) barrels of oil (8.7%) is not known what country’s ships loaded the oil.   • KRG oil shipments in July In July 2022, 13 million 340 thousand barrels of oil from the Kurdistan Region were shipped to six different countries. - 5 million 180 thousand barrels, 38.8% of which were shipped by Italian ships. - 2 million 20 thousand barrels, 15.1% of which were shipped by Croatian ships. - 1 million 940 thousand barrels, (14.5%) were shipped by Greek ships. - 1 million barrels, 7.5% of which were shipped by Taiwanese ships. - 1 million barrels, 7.5% of which were shipped by Singaporean ships. - 600,000 barrels, or 4.5%, were shipped by Israeli ships. - The amount of (1 million 600 thousand) barrels of oil (12%) is not known what country’s ships loaded the oil.      

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Yazidis in Iraqi Kurdistan face 'extinction,' community leaders say

As Yazidis struggle to survive in displacement camps in Iraq, one community leader continues to help women survivors of the Islamic State genocide to resettle in Europe. Draw Media, Al-monitor In a barren roadside expanse under a clear winter sky, young boys dream of being the next Messi as they kick a soccer ball around. The girls beguile visitors, cupping their thumbs and index fingers to make heart signs and sharing their hopes of becoming doctors and lawyers one day. Yet there are few such prospects for these children at the Sharya camp for Yazidis, the ethnic Kurdish minority whose men were butchered and women and girls raped and enslaved by the Islamic State (IS) when it swept across their ancestral homeland of Sinjar in 2014. Hazi, 13, says she has lived here with her six brothers and five sisters for eight years. “Life is very difficult,” she told Al-Monitor. “Our tents keep getting damaged. In summer it is like hell and in winter the tents are wet and cold."  "We are afraid Daesh will return,” chimed in Hayo, 12, using the Arabic language acronym for IS. She wants to be a dentist, she said. At least 450,000 Yazidis were displaced, not counting those who were killed or kidnapped when IS unleashed its reign of terror in August 2014. More than 300,000 of them live in urban areas or in some 15 displacement camps in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Dahuk region amid the stench of open sewage and piles of rubbish. Water is scarce. Fires triggered by electrical short circuits or propane gas bottles used for cooking sweep through the flimsy tents. With the world’s attention fixed on Ukraine, many feel abandoned. The United Nations stated in a May 2019 report that at least four individuals in the camps took their own life between January and April. Forty others had attempted or died by suicide the year before. The numbers were likely far higher but went unrecorded because they occurred outside the camps. This year a 16-year-old girl and a 19-year-old boy killed themselves at Shariya, a camp official told Al-Monitor, without giving any further details. Employment is hard to come by in a region where discrimination against the Yazidis runs deep and tribal connections and patronage are key to finding jobs. Christians and Turkmens are granted quotas in government. The Yazidis are not, on the grounds that they are ethnic Kurds, and therefore do not fit minority status even though their ancient religion for which they have been savagely persecuted as “devil worshippers” is distinct from Islam.  “The main challenge that Yazidi survivors face is that they are living in protracted displacement. Many Yazidis live in camps unable to find work. There isn’t enough access to schools and they face extreme poverty,” said a nongovernmental organization (NGO) official who declined to be identified by name because of mounting pressure from the local government. “Resources from the donor community are rapidly diminishing, so we are seeing services decrease. We are seeing NGOs funded through donors, through the UN wrapping up their programs. Services that women and children can access in the camp are severely limited now,” the official told Al-Monitor. In this bleak environment, Jan Ilhan Kizilhan, a psychologist and trauma therapist, is doggedly seeking to heal his fellow Yazidis, and above all Yazidi women and girls who were exposed to sexual violence under IS captivity. A Yazidi Kurd who emigrated to Germany from Turkey, Kizilhan is the founder and dean of the Institute for Psychology and Psychotraumatology at the University of Dahuk. Established in 2016 and the first of its kind in Iraq, the institute is training a new crop of professionals to help victims cope with their pain. “Resilience, survival, these are instincts that are passed from one generation to the next. They are transmitted genetically,” Kizilhan told Al-Monitor. “This is why after being subjected to 74 genocides my people are still here.” The team has conducted 25,000 therapy sessions since launching their services in 2017. On a recent morning, Kizilhan and a handful of European mental health experts crammed into a tent at Sharya that Mohsen, a taxi driver, his wife and four daughters and son call home. Two of the girls were held by the jihadis for five years. The oldest of the pair is now 15. “I sometimes remember what happened,” she said before lapsing into silence. “More than a hundred girls were taken from our village,” Mohsen said. Nouri Khudur, a Yazidi, is among the first graduates from Kizilhan’s program. “She was in deep depression when I first began treating her,” Khudur said of the older girl. “She was suffering from PTSD, she had flashbacks, nightmares, sharp jabs of physical pain. She was always sad,” Khudur told Al-Monitor. “My daughters are better now,” Mohsen said. Kizilhan smiled, visibly proud. The family has applied for asylum in Australia. Like thousands of Yazidis here, Mohsen sees no future for himself either in his native Sinjar or elsewhere in Iraq. “There are already 100 Yazidi families there; we want to go,” he said. Strategically wedged between Iraq and Syria, Sinjar continues to be a major flashpoint. Iranian-backed Shiite militias and a local Yazidi force known as the Shingal Resistance Units (YBS) are vying for control of the region, which the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) claims should be under its own rule. Turkey periodically rains bombs on Sinjar claiming the YBS is a front for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that has been waging an armed insurgency against the Turkish army since 1984. “Our own home was destroyed by the Turkish military. There is nothing left for us to go back to,” Moshen said. A deal struck between the central government in Baghdad and the KRG in 2020, which was meant to have resulted in the disbandment of all armed groups in Sinjar and the return of displaced Yazidis, has essentially failed, not least because the Yazidis themselves were never properly consulted. The Turkish attacks prompted as many as 50,000 Yazidis who had resettled in Sinjar to return to the camps as of August this year, Kizilhan said. Turkey is demanding the PKK pull out of Sinjar. The militants deny their presence. Turkey, in turn, is continuing its attacks sowing terror and instability. There is sympathy for the PKK among many Yazidis because they helped thousands of them to escape to the safety of Mount Sinjar as KRG peshmerga forces fled in fear of IS. The PKK helped to set up the all-Yazidi YBS force to defend their own people. But community leaders remain skeptical. “The PKK is encouraging Yazidi girls to join them,” said Dasin Farouk Beg, the emir, or prince, of the Yazidis. “We believe there are as many as 800 of them now in Qandil and the PKK won’t let them leave,” Beg told Al-Monitor. He was referring to the PKK’s stronghold near the Iranian border. Al-Monitor was unable to independently verify that claim. Unexhumed mass graves are another big obstacle. There are 800 of them across Sinjar and only 30 of them have been unearthed so far, according to Abid Shamdin. Shamdin is the executive director of Nadia’s Initiative, the NGO named after his wife Nadia Mourad, who survived IS captivity and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her advocacy work. “Many of these mass graves are left exposed and in the middle of villages, which is far too traumatizing for Yazidis to return to,” Shamdin wrote recently. “Sinjar is the ancestral homeland for the Yazidis, the very place that protected them for hundreds of years and sheltered them through so many genocides,” said Murad Ismail, founder of Sinjar Academy, an advocacy group. “But a return to a Sinjar that is unsafe or deprived of basic needs is even worse than camps,” Ismail told Al-Monitor.   Kizilhan believes that if the status quo persists, the Yazidis will have no other choice but to leave Iraq en masse. “If our people cannot return to Sinjar, our collective identity will cease to exist as it already has in Turkey. We will be extinct,” he said.  Kizilhan offers a radical solution, noting, “We need to start a debate on creating a new community outside of the Middle East. It may be our last chance.” Kizilhan already took matters into his own hands when he convinced the German government in 2015 to take in 1,100 of the worst scarred women and children. They arrived in Germany in two separate batches in early 2016. Kizilhan believes these women are going to be trailblazers of a new and empowered Yazidi community living in a democratic society where they will be seen as equals — at least before the law. Last year, the Iraqi parliament passed a Yazidi survivors’ law that provides a reparations framework for survivors of IS crimes, including women and girls who were subjected to sexual violence, as well as children who were abducted before the age of 18. These include a monthly stipend, providing a plot of land or other accommodation and educational and therapy services to survivors. The move was widely welcomed as a first and necessary step. But more than a year on, “the benefits to survivors have not materialized yet,” the NGO official said. Moreover, children who were born to Yazidi women in captivity were not addressed in the law. The issue of women who bore children with their IS captors is highly sensitive. Despite Kizilhan’s entreaties, the top spiritual leader of the Yazidis, known as Baba Sheikh, refuses to accept the children as conversion is not permitted in the Yazidi faith. Many therefore left their children behind while others, thought to be in the hundreds, remain in the violence wracked al-Hol detention camp in northeast Syria where the families of IS fighters are interned. In an interview with Al-Monitor, the guardian of Lalish, the Yazidis’ ancient temple, sounded weary as he bemoaned the exodus of his flock. Baba Chavush as he is known, said, “I am very sad that my people are leaving.” Anger crept into his voice, however, when queried about the harsh approach espoused toward the offspring of Yazidi captives. Conversion is “impossible,” Baba Chavush asserted. “Nobody should harm these children. But why are we not talking about the 3,000 Yazidi girls who are still missing?” he asked. He was alluding to the 3,000 plus Yazidi girls taken by IS who remain unaccounted for. Still, the fact that spiritual leaders agreed to embrace Yazidi girls "soiled" by their Muslim captors marks a huge shift, Kizilhan said.  Kizilhan’s new plan is to resettle Yazidi girls and there jihadi offspring in Germany. As he walked out of Mohsen’s tent his cellphone rang. He answered and within seconds his face lit up. The government in Baden-Wurttemberg that has been sponsoring his work with the Yazidis had said it would help resettle 200 more girls and their children in Germany. “This is a great day,” Kizilhan said.  

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Iran eyes UNESCO status for Persian, Kurdish horse

Despite the Kurd horse’s origin goes back to the western Iranian province of Kermanshah, it may be registered internationally because it is also bred in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, Turkey, and Syria, the Kermanshah tourism chief said on Sunday. As part of the process to include Kurd horses on the intangible world heritage list, this dossier is being prepared under the title of knowledge and skill for breeding and keeping Kurd horses, Mohammadreza Soheili added. A festival dedicated to this horse breed is scheduled to be held in the province in the near future, the official noted. The Persian, Kurdish horse constitutes a group of horses traditionally bred and used by Kurdish People who have lived and occupied today’s western provinces of Iran for several millennia. The breed originates from western Iran, where the mountainous topography and moderately cold climate have sculpted a unique horse population resistant to harsh environmental conditions. Kermanshah embraces a variety of awe-inspiring historical sites, including Taq-e Bostan and the UNESCO-registered Bisotun. Inscribed into the base of a towering cliff, Taq-e Bostan comprises extraordinary Sassanian bas-reliefs of ancient victorious kings to divide opinions. Late afternoon is the best time to visit, as the cliff turns a brilliant orange in the setting sun, which then dies poetically on the far side of the duck pond. Bisotun is a patchwork of immense yet impressive life-size carvings depicting king Darius I and several other figures. UNESCO has it that Bisotun bears outstanding testimony to the important interchange of human values in the development of monumental art and writing, reflecting ancient traditions in monumental bas-reliefs. Kermanshah was founded in the 4th century CE by Bahram IV of the Sassanid dynasty. Conquered by the Arabs in 640, it was called Qirmasin (Qirmashin). Under the Seljuk rule in the 11th century, it was the chief town of Kordestan. The Safavids (ruled 1501–1736) fortified the town, and the Qajars repulsed an attack by the Turks during Fath Ali Shah’s rule (1797–1834). Occupied by the Turkish army in 1915 during World War I, it was evacuated in 1917. The construction of a road in the 1950s over the age-old Khorasan track added considerably to the importance of the city.

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Genel Considers Impairment At Iraqi Kurdistan’s Sarta As Latest Well Flops

Draw Media, mees Iraqi Kurdistan’s crude oil production has been stuck at around 415,000 b/d since the pandemic. Once seen as the next great frontier province, the next generation of field developments are proving underwhelming amid geological setbacks. The November 2020 startup of the Sarta field in Iraqi Kurdistan marked a major milestone for the region as the first new field to enter production since 2017 (MEES, 27 November 2020). But more than two years later production has dwindled from initial levels and work on appraising new areas has flopped, leading operator Genel to this week announce an impairment review. Production at Sarta (Genel 30%op, Chevron 50%, KRG 20%) has averaged just 4,000 b/d so far this quarter, Genel said on 13 December. This is flat with Q3, but well down on the 2021 average of 5,940 b/d, never mind the 1H 2021 average of 6,490 b/d. This is not the trajectory Genel envisaged when it farmed in to the block in January 2019 (MEES, 25 January 2019), and leaves output well below the capacity of Sarta’s 20,000 b/d early processing facility (EPF). Genel also farmed in to another Chevron block in 2019, the Qara Dagh exploration license. This too has disappointed, with the partners announcing in January that drilling had been suspended after “encountering more complex geology above the target reservoir than expected” (MEES, 21 January). Kurdistan output was 418,000 b/d in Q2 according to official figures. The latest setbacks mean that the location of any major future gains beyond this are hard to discern. A new 25,000 b/d production facility at the HKN-operated Sarsang block is now online (MEES, 18 November), but more greenfield developments are required if significant sustainable gains are to be realized. Perhaps the DNO-operated Baeshiqa license (600 b/d in Q3 after September start-up) can provide good news for Erbil. SARTA SETBACKS Back in 2015, Chevron retained the Sarta block while relinquishing the neighboring Rovi asset because it saw greater potential at Sarta (MEES, 4 December 2015). In 2016, the US giant said that preliminary appraisal results were very encouraging (MEES, 9 December 2016), but after finally coming online Sarta has proven disappointing. The results are not due to a lack of investment. Genel says that of $164mn capex in 2021, $105mn was invested into Sarta and Qara Dagh. In the first half of 2022, Genel’s capex came in at $75mn, of which $27mn was for Sarta. Sarta is being produced through a three-well pilot program. The Sarta-2 well came online in March 2021, at which point Genel said production had hit 10,000 b/d. However, that wasn’t sustained and the monthly record stands at June 2021’s 8,400 b/d. Shortly after Sarta-2 came online, water ingress problems hit Sarta-3, resulting in the well being “partially plugged back to manage water ingress from the Adaiyah [reservoir] production stream (MEES, 6 August 2021).” Heading into 2022, Genel took over as operator on 1 January in line with the terms of its farm-in agreement and then-CEO Bill Higgs said “Our priority is the derisking and commercialization of Sarta,” with full year capex of $45-80mn forecast. As well as well testing of the Sarta-1D well in the pilot area, the key planned focus was on the Sarta-5 and Sarta-6 step out wells which “are designed to appraise the field away from the pilot production facility and will be key in resolving the current uncertainty over the size and shape of the Sarta field.” Sarta-1D was brought online on 8 March, but on 10 May, Genel announced poor results from the Sarta-5 well. “None of the intervals tested were able to support sustained flow of reservoir fluids, indicating that the reservoirs at this location are tight. This was identified as a critical pre-drill risk of this appraisal well,” the firm announced (MEES, 13 May). The well is located around 12km east of the pilot EPF.: FURTHER DISAPPOINTMENT Since then, the primary focus has been on the Sarta-6 well located 6km west of the pilot EPF. The results were a further blow to Genel’s hopes for the field. “Following the results of the two appraisal wells and ongoing pilot production, with field production averaging 4,000 b/d for Q4 to date, it is clear that initial field expectations are unlikely to be met, and hence Genel will be required to undertake an impairment review of the carrying value of the asset,” the firm announced. Genel put Sarta’s book value at $114.4mn for 2021. Genel says that “12 intervals were completed for individual, isolated, zonal testing.” The Lower Jurassic intervals were the primary focus, but “all flowed formation water only,” while the Middle Jurassic intervals “flowed heavy oil” of 9-11° API. In fact, oil of 9-11° API is substantially heavier, and thus lower value, than ‘heavy oil’ as normally defined (around 20-25° API): oil with an API in this range is more akin to tar than crude. It would also be unlikely to flow at normal temperatures and pressures, substantially adding to production costs. “The potential for longer term development and monetization of these heavy oil resources will be assessed as part of the joint venture’s view of future Sarta field development,” Genel says. For now, Genel’s hopes of raising output rest with a re-completion of the Sarta-3 well which is planned for this quarter.  

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Family feuds among Iraq’s Kurdish leaders embolden Iran

Iraqi Kurdish leaders are at each other’s throats instead of closing ranks as Iran rains cross-border missile and drone attacks on the region and threatens a ground invasion. Draw Media, Al-Monitor Iraqi Kurdistan — With its aura of relative calm and Western-friendly vibes, Iraqi Kurdistan was for decades hailed as the other Iraq. Today, Iraqi Kurdistan is under assault. Since early this year, Iran has carried out a series of cross-border missile and drone attacks against the Kurdish region, targeting its capital, Erbil, and more recently Iranian-Kurdish militias, which Tehran blames for the mass protests that have rocked the country since the Sept. 16 death in police custody of Kurdish Iranian woman Mahsa Amini. Dozens of people including women and children have died in the strikes, which prompted at least one international carrier to temporarily halt service to Erbil. Iran is now threatening a ground invasion should the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) continue to ignore its demands to disarm and intern those groups, something Iraqi Kurdish officials say is impossible for them to do. Faced with such adversity, Kurdish leaders ought to be closing ranks. Instead, they are at each other’s throats, spinning a web of intrigue that would make Machiavelli blush. The squabbles have left the region’s estimated five million Kurds ever more disaffected as they struggle to make ends meet, with a steady stream risking their lives to get to Europe through illegal means. Bestoon Saied, a vendor in Sulaimaniyah’s main bazaar, summed up the feelings aired in multiple street interviews in three cities, telling Al-Monitor, “I don’t believe in any of the parties, none of them. They are all corrupt.” Tensions took a bloody turn when Hawkar Jaff, a senior intelligence officer, was blown up on Oct. 7 by a bomb planted in his car in Erbil. The murder prompted warnings of a return to the fratricidal war that raged between the region’s two main political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and its weaker rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in the early 1990s. “I hope it’s an aberration but I think the crisis could escalate. Hawkar’s killing could be the first domino,” said Bilal Wahab, Nathan and Esther K. Wagner fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. While such fears may sound exaggerated, there is little doubt that the crisis is among the worst and most intractable in recent years. For one, it weakens the Iraqi Kurds vis-a-vis newly appointed Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's government, with which they are tentatively hopeful of negotiating a new oil and gas law and their share of the Iraqi budget. Over the past year, Baghdad has been tightening the screws on Erbil, threatening to take oil companies operating in the Kurdish region to court. Analysts warn that leaving the disputes unresolved could give Iran greater leverage over Iraqi Kurdistan just as Turkey sets up more military bases deep inside its northern borders in its ongoing war against Kurdistan Workers Party militants. “What is possible is that the KRG might just unfold — for example, if Iran were to do a land incursion and they were welcomed by the Shia militias on the Iraqi side,” Wahab observed. “If Iranian and Turkish attacks and the threat of an Iranian land invasion were not enough to create unity of purpose ın the KRG, then what would?" The other and potentially more likely outcome is a harder division of Kurdistan between the affluent “yellow” KDP-held zone to the north, where Turkey largely prevails, and the poorer “green” PUK-held one to the south, dominated by Iran, putting a further damper on dreams of an independent Kurdistan. Bafel Talabani, the brashly candid PUK leader who grew up in south London and was trained by the French Foreign Legion and British Special Forces, hinted as much in a recent interview with Iraq Oil Report. The failure of the two sides to resolve their differences could lead to “different solutions,” he said, “all the way from amicable divorce to just the old tribal, ‘I divorce you, I divorce you, I divorce you’ three times in the mirror or whatever it is.” Officials on both sides say only American mediation can end their quarrels, just as it did in the mid-1990s. But Iraq has slipped down the list of US priorities and even further since Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine. Alina Romanowski, the US ambassador to Baghdad, has been urging the sides for calm but little beyond. Some 30 years since the Kurds established their fledgling state under US protection, the Kurdistan Region remains separated by checkpoints manned by armed Peshmerga affiliated with the respective parties. “It’s like entering another country, it’s so embarrassing. It’s like there is no one Kurdistan,” said Mustafa, who is studying nursing in Sulaimaniyah. The KDP and the PUK have “armies and weapons, you can’t change them through votes. In the last election [in 2019] my family, my friends, nobody voted. What’s the use?” he sighed. With its uneven surfaces, poor signage and unexpected bends, the road connecting Erbil to Sulaimaniyah remains practically unchanged from when this correspondent first traveled on it some 30 years ago. The contrast with the gleaming highways connecting the main cities in the KDP-held area speaks volumes about the inequities between the sides. Then, as today, the differences between the two parties were spurred by a fight for money and power. Most of the money remains concentrated in KDP hands. This is because the area’s main source of income, oil, is pumped through a pipeline that runs to Turkey through KDP-controlled territory, generating some $500 million that is used to pay public workers’ salaries. The PUK has long insisted that it is being denied its fair share. Blurring lines In the past, the lines separating Iraq’s Kurdish adversaries were straightforward: The KDP led by Masoud Barzani versus the PUK led by the late Jalal Talabani, who went on to become modern Iraq’s first president. Today, the configuration of assorted antagonists is harder to decipher, with the Barzanis and the Talabanis locked in bitter power struggles not just against each other but among themselves, primarily over succession. On the Barzani side, the president of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the KDP leader’s nephew and son-in-law, Nechirvan, is immersed in a turf war with the former’s eldest son, Masrour. The simmering rivalry burst into the open — though it is only ever discussed in private — when Masrour succeeded Nechirvan as the KRG’s prime minister in 2019. (Insiders from both parties interviewed for this article refused to be identified by name in order to speak freely.) Masrour has since been chipping away at the influence of Nechirvan, replacing numerous government figures with loyalists. Opinion on the 53-year-old politician is divided. A close observer of the Barzanis said, “Masrour operates on trust first and capacity later. He is replacing Nechirvan’s patronage network with his own.” “He is a more effective chief executive officer than this place has ever seen,” countered a source with insider knowledge of the reforms Masrour has embarked on since taking office. Western consultancies have been enlisted to build capacity and rationalize expenditures, improve efficiency and transparency through, among other things, the digitalization of services, banking reform and better procurement practices. Their impact is beginning to be felt, albeit slowly. However corruption remains rife and opportunities for small and medium businesses are few and far between. Yet, “Taxes on the rich and family businesses are up, public expenditure is down and sham contracts have been nixed,” the insider source told Al-Monitor. Those paying higher taxes are said to include Barzani-owned entities. Masrour further consolidated his hold during the KDP’s most recent congress in early November, when he was elevated to the number-two spot he now shares with Nechirvan. Several members of his own circle were appointed to the party’s executive, known as the political bureau, some say at Nechirvan’s expense. “Kak Masrour came on top of this. He solidified his position,” said a KDP source who also declined to be identified. Others say Masoud Barzani ensured that his son did not grab all the power to avert further conflict within the party. Nechirvan, whose mother was from Sulaimaniyah, the PUK’s stronghold, was long seen as a bridge between the rival regions as well as an easygoing and efficient partner for Western and regional governments and businesses. “Everybody loves Nechirvan,” said a Western diplomat speaking anonymously to Al-Monitor. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is among his biggest fans.  Masrour, who was educated in the United States and is often described as the brightest among the Barzani brothers, is seen as inflexible and prickly. (Few know that in private settings, Masrour loves to crack jokes.) Those attributes are said to have put him at odds with Bafel and his brother, Qubad, the deputy prime minister and a close Nechirvan ally who is similarly diplomatic and accommodating. “There is no rational analysis for why these tensions inside the KRG are rising,” noted Wahab. “It is primarily because these are people who don’t get along. This is a rivalry between two princes, Masrour and Bafel, neither of whom is used to compromise. Bafel is not the sort of malleable creature people thought he’d be,” Wahab added. Poisoned chalice Even before the pair began facing off, initially over who should become Iraq’s next president, a position reserved for the Kurds, Bafel cleared his own path to uncontested power over the PUK last November. Aided by Nechirvan, he ousted his cousin Lahur as co-chair of the party and fired his intelligence chiefs in a bloodless coup.   The Lahur camp insists that Jaff, who defected to the KDP following Lahur’s ejection, was murdered under Bafel’s orders. KRG authorities, ostensibly with Masrour’s blessing, issued arrest warrants for PUK counterintelligence officers said to be involved in the crime, fueling further tensions between the sides. Bafel denies any involvement and has accused Lahur of seeking to kill him by getting his men to lace his orange juice with Dioxin, a heart medication. “They wanted it to look like a drug overdose,” a senior PUK source told Al-Monitor. Lahur told Al-Monitor in a recent interview that he made no such attempt. Enter Azhi Amin, the savvy former head of the external relations unit of PUK intelligence called the Zanyari, which used to be overseen by Lahur. In the wake of Lahur’s overthrow Amin was promoted to become Zanyari’s boss only to be fired seven months later. During an interview, his first ever with any journalist, Amin said, “For a few months Bafel was under pressure by a neighboring country to remove me from power and he finally did.” Though he won’t say so openly he was probably referring to Iran, with which Bafel is said to enjoy close ties. When Iraqi government forces and Iran-backed Shiite militias wrested control of Kirkuk from Kurdish forces in the wake of the KDP-engineered referendum on Kurdish independence in 2017, many pointed fingers at Bafel. “For the past 20 years, I have worked with Western countries, including the United States, to decrease the hegemony of Iran in the Kurdish region and Iraq,” Amin told Al-Monitor over tea in one of his villas in Erbil. Its floors were covered with exquisite Iranian carpets. “We have captured dozens if not hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officers and agents who have tried to destabilize the Kurdish region.” “Prime Minister Masrour Barzani wants to establish a united government that rules the whole region equally. However, there are some mafia groups in Sulaimaniyah who oppose this process,” Amin added. In an interview with Al-Monitor in Erbil, Qubad stoutly rebuffed Amin’s claims. “Azhi was a good operative but he wasn’t a good head of Zanyari. He was chaotic and very combustible. He also started to militarize the service, which was against its mandate as an intelligence organization.” The “final straw,” Qubad added, “was him conflating his personal and business interests with issues related to land and properties owned by the agency.” As his relations with the Talabani brothers went south, Amin effectively defected to the KDP, allegedly bringing sensitive information with him. Amin flatly denies the claim. “I am professional intelligence; my priority is protecting intelligence and my sources,” he told Al-Monitor. High noon in Erbil In October, PUK security forces raided the homes of his four wives and mother in Sulaimaniyah. Amin is then said to have then threatened Qubad and his family in a phone call. Amin denies this as well. “I said to him that Kurdistan cannot be a Switzerland for either you or for me,” he told Al-Monitor. He did not elaborate. On Oct. 25, Darbaz Rasool, the son of a leading PUK figure, gathered his men around Qubad’s villa on the outskirts of Erbil fearing an attack by Amin on the younger Talabani’s wife and two children. Amin arrived at the scene with a few of his own men. He says it was to assure them he meant no harm. It was an inflection point. Qubad stopped attending cabinet meetings. Pressed to respond as to why, Talabani would only say, “I don’t want to address this publicly. This is an issue I’ve raised internally and I will deal with it one way or another internally.” Qubad is said to be expecting a telephone call from Masrour over the affair. “The fact that neither the prime minister nor the interior minister ever contacted Qubad after threats were made against him by Azhi Amin has left him disappointed and angry,” a PUK source close to Qubad said. Another grievance is revenue sharing. Bafel told Iraq Oil Report that “for some strange reason, instead of [like] every other country in the world — where all the border money, all the tax money goes into a pot and then it’s divided — that’s not what’s happening here.” Talabani added, “You don’t expect Birmingham to look after Birmingham, and everybody else puts their money together. … Unfortunately, it’s beginning to look, frankly, like a financial sanction.” Qubad and Bafel are also said to be angered at how the investigation of Jaff’s killing is being conducted, especially over the warrants issued for the PUK security officials’ arrests. Qubad insists he is “not difficult to work with,” and most people familiar with him concur. He told Al-Monitor, “In the last cabinet Nechirvan had my back, and I had his. We survived so many crises together. We were a team back then.” As for his brother, Qubad said, “Bafel is very strategic and very smart. He doesn’t get enough credit for it. He’s got a temper, though. What Bafel doesn’t tolerate is someone strong-arming him.” Bafel recently thwarted the KRG’s plans to build new gas pipelines by preventing the Iraqi Kurdish KAR Group, which got the contract to build them and is known to be close to the KDP, from accessing territory in the PUK zone. The pipelines are planned to eventually carry gas to Turkey and onward for export to Europe. Bafel contended that KAR was “given” the contract and not “awarded" it. Just how far the sides push things is anybody’s guess. Mohammed A. Salih, a Kurdish affairs analyst, contended, “Despite the heated rhetoric, there is a willingness on both sides to contain the tensions and prevent them from getting out of control.” “There is also much at stake for both parties, most importantly their survival as powerful actors with large business interests,” he said. With general elections expected to be held by September 2023 at the latest, the sides can ill afford to further alienate the public by paralyzing the government in ways that make daily life even harder. “The power balance in Kurdistan is also tied to broader geopolitical realities and equations, and this means certain power boundaries will not be easily disturbed," Salih told Al-Monitor. That is certainly how the older generation of Barzanis and Talabanis would have seen things. In any event, it will take more than a phone call to sort out the mess.

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A report by Darw Media received the Human Rights Journalism Award

A Draw Media investigative report entitled (A pearl in the mud of life.. Moemin killed his mother during prayer and ended his own life too), which was prepared by journalist Fazel Hamarafat, received the Human Rights Journalism Award. Human Rights Journalism Competition organized annually by Radio Deng with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).  

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An assassination, a feud and the fight for power in Iraq's Kurdistan

(Reuters, Draw Media The marriage of convenience between Iraqi Kurdistan's political dynasties is on the rocks. While the dominant Barzani and Talabani clans have long been at loggerheads over power and resources in a region rich in oil and gas, power-sharing governments have largely kept a lid on mistrust since the two sides fought a civil war in the 1990s. But the lingering acrimony has spilled into the open with a vengeance since a rare assassination in the city of Erbil, and the fallout is putting the uneasy alliance through one of its stiffest tests since the war, diplomats and analysts say. On Oct. 7, shortly after Hawker Abdullah Rasoul set off in an SUV from his home on a leafy street in Erbil, a bomb ripped through the car, killing him and wounding four family members. Rasoul was an intelligence officer, and a defector. After nearly two decades with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), a party dominated by the Talabani family, he moved to Erbil this year and switched sides, three security sources and a Kurdish source told Reuters. When he was killed, Rasoul, 41, was helping the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the party ruled by the Barzani family that he had been keeping tabs on for years, the sources said. The brazen assassination was captured by security cameras and the KDP released a 27-minute video about the killing, pointing the finger of blame firmly at the PUK. The PUK has strongly denied the accusations, saying they are politically driven, but the killing has triggered a series of incidents that have strained the power-sharing arrangement. Political relations have deteriorated to the point where PUK ministers have boycotted meetings of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), long a symbol of peaceful power-sharing. Some PUK officials say privately that without compromise on a range of issues, the party might eventually break away and form its own administration in its Sulaimaniya stronghold. The antagonism is also complicating a project to expand one of the biggest gasfields in Iraq, which is in PUK territory, damaging the region's hopes of starting exports to Europe and earning much-needed revenue. The rifts are a source of alarm to Western countries, and especially the United States. It has backed both factions, most recently in the fight against Islamic State. Washington is worried about the spreading influence of Iran, which has long-standing ties to the PUK and has stepped up missile attacks on Iranian Kurdish dissidents in northern Iraq in recent weeks. A U.S. official told Reuters that Washington was extremely concerned about the recent tensions between the PUK and KDP. "What we try to explain to our partners up here is that we don't want unity for unity's sake, we need you guys to be able to cooperate with each other on certain discreet issues that are in our interest, but also in your interest," the official said. After Rasoul's death, the KDP-dominated Regional Security Council accused a PUK security agency of the killing. It detained six men it identified as operatives involved and issued arrest warrants for another four senior PUK security officials, according to security council statement a week after the attack. PUK officials reached out to the government shortly after the assassination to help with the investigation, but they did not receive a response and have had no access to the findings, a senior PUK official said. Neither the security council, the government nor a spokesperson for the PUK responded to questions for this story. Long-simmering mistrust between the two sides had already deepened this year due to a wave of defections from PUK security agencies. The senior PUK official told Reuters there had been eight. He said the PUK believed its former head of intelligence, Salman Amin, who defected earlier this year, had been encouraging people to switch sides. Amin has been another bone of contention. Following his move to Erbil, Kurdish Prime Minister Masrour Barzani gave him a senior security role, further enraging the PUK, the senior party official said. Reuters was unable to reach Amin for comment. Barzani's office did not respond to requests for comment. While analysts say a return to full-blown civil war is unlikely, a tense standoff between armed security personnel in Erbil last month underlined the risk of escalation. With relations deteriorating, PUK forces raided Amin's home in Sulaimaniya on Oct. 24, four PUK members and a Kurdish official said. Three of the sources said the PUK was looking for sensitive documents Amin had taken from its intelligence office and weapons. In a tit-for-tat move, about 100 security men commanded by Amin approached the house of Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani in Erbil the next day and threatened to raid it, the PUK sources and the official said. Three of the sources said Kurdish President Nechrivan Barzani had to intervene to defuse the situation. "It could've easily turned ugly," the senior PUK official said. Then, on Nov. 9, PUK leader Bafel Talabani flew to Erbil accompanied by Qubad, dozens of security personnel, and one of the men wanted for Rasoul's killing, in a move seen as being deliberately provocative, according to a Kurdish source. The group was unable to leave the airport until the president intervened again, the source said. The stakes are high for the Kurds, who were big winners from the downfall of Saddam Hussein. They deepened their autonomy, attracted foreign investment in oil and gas, and secured a slice of power in Baghdad, where the president must be a Kurd. But despite their oil riches, the region suffers from high unemployment and chronic public services, encouraging many people to try to emigrate to Europe. Attacks by neighbouring Turkey and Iran on Kurdish militants there have underlined the limited control Iraqi Kurds have over their frontiers. Analysts say the rivalry is also weakening the influence Kurds have within Iraq's federal centre in Baghdad. That's complicating disputes over the ownership of oil and gas assets, as well as allocations from the federal budget. "It affects social peace, it affects stability ... and it affects the overall economic situation in terms of market and business confidence," said Shivan Fazil at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "(The rift) is more about wasted opportunities and how these tensions distract the KRG from addressing the governance issues and meeting the needs of its population, and hence exacerbating grievances," Fazil said. Set against the current backdrop of political strife among Iraqi Shi'ites, the fragile government in the north adds to a picture of a country still wracked by instability two decades after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. And Baghdad is watching events in Kurdistan closely. An Iraqi state security source said the PUK and KDP were being led by hawks and that their power struggle was at "a very critical stage". Ties between the two groups have been strained in the past, notably in 2017 when the Kurds held a referendum that won overwhelming support for independence from Baghdad, only to backfire when Iraqi forces seized swathes of Kurdish territory. The PUK and KDP traded blame, particularly over the loss of the city of Kirkuk, which has one of Iraq's oldest and biggest oilfields. This year, the two sides were locked in a dispute over who should become Iraq's president. The federal post finally went to KDP-backed Abdul Latif Rashid in October, rather than the PUK's candidate, Barham Salih. Mike Fleet, an Iraq analyst, said the KDP no longer felt it needed to abide by past power-sharing agreements. "These two parties can't play ball with each other, they have less say and less of a voice because they don't have a united voice in Baghdad anymore," he said. "A lot of the impact of that is on the people who rely on the current system to get paid, and salaries aren't, so quality of life is becoming more difficult, especially in Sulaimaniya," he said, referring to the PUK's stronghold. Analysts say the KDP is seeking to assert itself at a time when the PUK has been weakened a leadership feud, financial pressures and delayed salary payments. The PUK has long complained that the regional administration in Erbil does not distribute revenues equally, accusing the KDP of favouring its areas. "Why should we tolerate this?" said one of the PUK officials. "We have a list of demands, and I still have hope that we won't get to a separation, but we won't have a choice if they don't deliver."  

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Bafel Talabani: I prevented the gas pipeline from being laid

The PUK leader discusses deteriorating political rivalries within Kurdistan and their impact on both gas development and impending negotiations with Baghdad over oil rights. Iraq Oil Report, Draw Media Few individuals are as important to the development of the Kurdistan region's gas sector as Bafel Talabani, the president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls the territory in Sulaimaniya province where the most prolific fields lie. Talabani is also a central actor in the ongoing struggle between the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), its longtime rival and nominal partner in the Kurdistan region's governance. Their deteriorating relationship has left the regional government hamstrung as it navigates renewed tensions with Baghdad that threaten its ability to continue independently managing its oil and gas sector. In an interview with Iraq Oil Report at the Baghdad residence of his late father, former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader criticized the KDP for withholding funding from Sulaimaniya. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is currently “very politicized,” he said — “a de facto twin administration, because Suli is expected to fund Suli.” One casualty of this antagonistic atmosphere has been the KRG's plans to build new gas pipelines to bring additional feedstock to power plants in both PUK and KDP-controlled territory — a network that could also be used to facilitate future exports to Turkey. After the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) awarded the contract to the Iraqi-Kurdish company KAR Group, which is close to the KDP, security forces controlled by the PUK prevented the company from accessing key territory, effectively putting the project on ice. Talabani confirmed he is personally opposed to the project, arguing the contract was granted KAR Group with “no process” and “no tender.” “Kar Group was not awarded [the contract]. Kar Group was given it,” he said. “It is an insult to the people of Kurdistan and Iraq for these things to happen.” Talabani said he wants to be involved in strategic decision-making about the energy sector but claimed the KDP has frozen its political rivals out of the process. Absent a viable partner in Erbil, he suggested, cooperation with Baghdad looks increasingly attractive. “I do not understand the unwillingness to work with Baghdad,” he said. "Basra is 1,000 times richer than the entirety of Kurdistan. Just Basra. And if the prime minister came to me and said, ‘Hey, Bafel, put your little teapot on this table, and you can be a part of the huge table, including Basra’ — to me, that sounds like a bloody good deal."

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We’re America’s most loyal ally in Syria. Don’t forget us.

Draw Media  washingtonpost-By Mazloum Abdi Mazloum Abdi is the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces. In 2014, the world learned about my hometown, Kobane, and my people, the Syrian Kurds, when we dealt the Islamic State its first major defeat in partnership with the United States and the Global Coalition. The alliances we forged there led to the end of the ISIS caliphate in 2019. Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates Today, Kobane is again under threat — and all the gains of those partnerships are also in danger. This time, the threat comes not from Islamic State terror, but from a U.S. ally and a member of NATO. For more than a week, the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has rained bombs down on our cities, killing civilians, destroying critical civilian infrastructure and targeting the Syrian Democratic Forces working to keep ISIS down. For the people of our region, the military defeat of the Islamic State was never our only goal. At every step of our fight against the terror group on the battlefield, we took steps to crush the ideology behind it by building a system based on inclusion, pluralism and equality. In Raqqa, for example, where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi once ruled over ISIS territory, Syrian women are now prominent leaders.   In 2015, we established the Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition of Kurds, Arabs and Assyrians committed to defeating the Islamic State. In every city we liberated, our people built local administrations that, for the first time in Syria, represented all ethnicities and religions and gave women equal power. We’ve been criticized at times for falling short of the West’s democratic standards. Our system is not perfect: We had to build it while at war for our existence and under a crushing economic blockade. But in terms of the quality of governance and security we have been able to provide, we have outdone every other authority in Syria — and none of it would have been possible without the victory at Kobane and the international support for our resistance that it brought. Now the Turkish offensive against our region is putting all of that under renewed threat.   One strike in the border city of Derik, home to Kurds, Yazidis and Christians, killed more than 10 civilians. Another targeted the base near the city of Hasakah, where I work with the United States to plan operations against ISIS, striking just hundreds of meters from U.S. forces. I believe it was an attempt on my life: Turkey has assassinated several of my colleagues in the SDF and our administration this year. Adding to the terror and chaos of the bombing campaign, Erdogan continues to threaten a ground invasion of our territory. We know what the consequences of such an attack will be, because Turkey has done this twice before. The Turkish invasions of Afrin in 2018 and Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad in 2019 displaced hundreds of thousands of people and disrupted the global fight against the Islamic State. After years of Turkish rule, these regions are now infamous for chaos, instability, infighting and the presence of extremists.   Where our administration once protected ethnic coexistence, religious freedom and women’s rights, Turkish forces and Turkey-backed militias commit unspeakable abuses against ethnic and religious minorities and women with impunity. Under our administration, Afrin was the only part of northwest Syria untouched by radical Islamists. Since the area has come under Turkish control, groups affiliated with al-Qaeda operate freely on its territory. This summer, a U.S. drone strike killed Maher al-Agal, a top ISIS leader, there. Turkey is not threatening our people and the security and stability for which we have sacrificed so much because of anything we have done. As a pretext for war, Erdogan has accused our forces of involvement in a deadly bombing in Istanbul. Let me make it clear: We deplore and condemn this act of terror, reject all accusations of involvement and again offer our condolences to the victims. We reiterate our call for an investigation and are ready to assist if one takes place.   We ask no one to fight for us. My people are still here because we have resisted alone countless times before. If we must, we will resist again. What we ask is for the world to be with us in a more difficult task: peace. We believe that the roots of the conflicts that have brought so much pain and suffering to our region are political. There is no inherent hatred between Kurds and Turks: Turkish leaders have made the political choice to see Kurds as a security threat and deny us our fundamental democratic rights. In the past, Erdogan has negotiated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to end the armed conflict between the group and the Turkish state and resolve the Kurdish question by peaceful means. When those talks were taking place, we lived in peace with our Turkish neighbors. If they were to restart, we would be able to do so again.   And when our region was under threat in 2019, the PKK offered, in this very newspaper, to sit down and seek a political solution. The call went unanswered, and Turkey invaded and occupied two of our cities just months later. Had the international community stood firmly against a Turkish invasion and spoken up for peace, things may have gone very differently. Though no one can turn back time, we can learn from the tragedies of the past. We declare that we are ready to play a helpful role in restarting these talks and reaching the peace that we seek. We call on the international community to immediately take concrete steps to prevent a Turkish invasion and to promote a political solution to the Kurdish conflict based on democracy, coexistence and equal rights. The existence of our people and the security of the region depend on it.  

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