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News / Kurdistan

KDP and PUK Together Got 23% of the Votes of All Kurdistan 

Draw Media: 🔻 In Erbil 26%, Sulaymaniyah 12%, Duhok 35% of all population voted for KDP and PUK 🔻 In Erbil 75%, Sulaymaniyah 88%, Duhok 65% of all population did not vote for KDP and PUK The number of the votes of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in the last Iraqi election on October 10, 2021, in the three Kurdistan provinces.  🔻 Erbil province: 🔹 the registered voters: 1,238,379 🔹 KDP votes 262,800 - percentage: 21%  🔹 PUK votes 65,862 - percentage: 5% 🔹 KDP and PUK votes 328,662 - percentage: 26% 🔹 Boycott and others vote: 909,717 - percentage: 74% 🔻 Sulaymaniyah province: 🔹 the registered voters: 1,425,705 🔹 KDP votes 54,891 - percentage: 4%  🔹 PUK votes 123,814 - percentage:8% 🔹 KDP and PUK votes 178,705 - percentage: 12% 🔹 Boycott and others vote: 1,247,000 - percentage: 88% 🔻 Duhok province: 🔹 the registered voters: 822,703 🔹 KDP votes 261,543 - percentage: 32%  🔹 PUK votes 25,040 - percentage: 3% 🔹 KDP and PUK votes 286,583 - percentage: 35% 🔹 Boycott and others vote: 536,120 - percentage: 65% Overall votes of PUK and KDP in the three Provinces: 🔹 the registered voters: 3,486,884 🔹 KDP votes 579,234 - percentage: 16%  🔹 PUK votes 214,716 - percentage: 6% 🔹 KDP and PUK votes 793,950 - percentage: 23% 🔹 Boycott and others vote: 2,692,936 - percentage: 77%   The Source of the numbers: Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)  

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The Americans Did Not Want Mam Jalal to Be President Again

Draw Media: In Masoud Barzani’s book “For History” After 2005, election laws were amended in such a way, which was resulted in decreasing the Kurdistan region seats. So far, an Iraqi census has not been held because of different reasons, even though it was decided to be held. Many times, we have given up on our rights and participated in the political process on the Americans' promises. But did not keep their promises. The sovereign post of the president was for Kurds, In the first presidential term after falling the previous regime, Mam Jalal became the president. For the second term in 2010, the Americans did not want Kurds to retake the post. In 2010, Ayad Allawi was the biggest winner of the election, but the USA and Iran did not let him become the prime minister because of various excuses. The Americans were trying to choose a Sunni character for the president and the Parliaments speaker for Kurds. When the Americans discussed this matter with me, I asked them: Do you mean that you want to remove Mam Jalal or to take back the presidency post from Kurd at all? They said: We mean both! I replied: The presidency is for Kurds, and Mam Jalal must become president again, and it cannot be like that both prime minister and president for Arabs. That was how Jalal Talabani became the president for the second term. Many times, the Americans were not on the right path in reading the Iraqi's political equations, and if they would make any mistakes every time the Kurds had to pay the price and give up on their rights. During the referendum, we saw that the biggest reason for the Americans to oppose the referendum was because they thought the referendum would make Abadi, the prime minister weak. If the referendum would not be held Abadi would be strong and would kick Iran out of the Iraqis political game. The Americans were not right in that perspective. And they wanted for the sake of a person, the Kurds surrender their rights. Page 50-51 from the book (For History) Written by Masoud Barzani   

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Commercial Salt Is Being Sold as Normal Salt to Eat 

draw: From the KRG crossing borders, a special type of commercial salt is being imported for commercial use but later sent to the market as a normal salt for people to use in their daily foods.   Every day 15 to 20 tracks import salt from Pshta and Tawela crossing the border into Kurdistan without paying taxes. This salt in the Customs Tariff is identified as Commercial salt, "not for eating". Based on Draw Media investigations, this salt which is being imported as commercial salt, later in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil will be packaged and sale it in the market for eating. To make the process of importing the salt easier for some businessmen without paying taxes, the Customs Tariff of the salt has been changed. Originally there were three different types of salt in the Customs Tariff. (Salt for eating, salt not appropriate for eating and commercial salt), but in the customs tariff, they were changed to only two types and both commercial salt with the salt not good for eating were combined to make customs discounts.  Currently, in the KRG customs tariff, the salts have been divided into two categories; commercial salt and salt for eating. The first category, the commercial salt, has been exempted from customs duties, the exemptions will not be applied for subjects that use for eating. This means this salt is being imported as a non-food subject, but later will be sent to the market for eating. Commercial salt which is exempted from customs duties is used in several industrial sectors like oil and tanning animal skins. When this salt arrives in the Kurdistan region will be distributed to several factories in Sluaymanyah, Sayd Sadiq, and Erbil. These factories package the salt and send it to market. Draw Media has been informed that a custom inspection team in Sulaymaniyah has sent samples of this salt for inspection in a hospital, and none of them passed the inspection test. The results show that the salt is not appropriate for eating, yet the customs and border authorities do not want to prevent this illegal importation which puts public health at risk. The health sources mention that this salt is not for eating because making serious problems for human health. By importing this type of salt illegally, KRG is losing approximately 360 million IQD every month, for a group of businessmen backed by the major parties.

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Qaani; from Permam to Dabashan

Draw Media: Esmail Qaani, commander of the Iranian Quds Force and the successor to Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, who has a significant influence on Iraqi politics and regional policies, met yesterday with Masoud Barzani, the President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Permam. The same-day afternoon, he arrived at Dabashan in Sulaymaniyah to meet Bafel Talabani, the Co-president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Based on the information that Draw Media received from several sources inside the two parties, Qaani told both sides to not hurry in forming the new Iraqi government and try to remain impartial towards the local problems of the Shia groups. Qaani has told the PUK leaders in Dabashan, that they have to go to Baghdad with the KDP together and get into the negotiations next Iraqi government formation. Regarding the PUK local conflicts, the sources mentioned that Qaani has told the PUK leaders that the security of the province is essential for them, and they do not accept any gun violence. Currently, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan have two different delegations to Baghdad for talking to the Iraqi parties.   The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) delegation is led by Hoshiar Zebari, the political bureau member of the party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) delegation to Baghdad is led by Khalid Shwani, the Leadership council member of PUK.  

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Syrian Kurdish commander says Russia opposes further Turkish land grabs

DRAW: Amberin Zaman - al-monitor NORTHEAST SYRIA — Turkey has resumed its threats of yet another large military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces, the United States’ top ally in the fight against the Islamic State. Unlike in October 2019 when Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan got the go-ahead from then-President Donald Trump to invade a large chunk of the Syrian Kurdish region, Turkey is facing resistance from the international community. However, as his poll numbers drop, Erdogan is growing increasingly reckless and could yet strike. Whether he does or not, thousands of Syrian Kurds live in constant fear of a Turkish attack that will cause further bloodshed and misery as they struggle with the impact of the worst drought in decades and the COVID-19 pandemic. Many continue to flee the region illegally in search of a better life. Dire economic conditions and instability offer succor to the Islamic State as it seeks to regain a foothold. Mazlum Kobane, the commander in chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, is seeking to steer what remains the most stable and freest part of the country through these turbulent times under the protection of the United States. The Biden administration has pledged to keep its forces in Syria through its current term. But the recent debacle in Afghanistan has sown doubts, and there is growing recognition that the Syrian Kurds need to cut a deal with Damascus and only Russia can help them get one. But can Russia, which allowed Turkey to invade the majority Kurdish enclave of Afrin in 2018, be trusted to act in good faith? Al-Monitor sat down with Kobane, also known as Mazlum Abdi, at a military base in northeast Syria to talk about the challenges he and his people face. The 53-year-old looked fit and relaxed in dark blue combat fatigues worn by local counterterrorism forces. He chose his words carefully. Kobane clearly does not want to provoke Turkey, Russia or the Syrian government. Al-Monitor: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is making fresh threats to launch another military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria, and daily there is speculation in the media as to where and when yet another Turkish invasion might occur. Do you believe that Erdogan will follow on his threats? He’s certainly always done so in the past. Mazlum Kobane: Erdogan has always sought the support of international actors before embarking on a military intervention here. He’s made threats and continues to make threats. He insists he will intervene and will continue to insist. In doing so he is looking to prepare the ground for an operation. However, the existing situation in northeast Syria is different now. The balances have shifted. In the past instances, there were no binding agreements between Turkey and the international powers. Neither prior to the [October 2019] attack on Serekaniye [Ras al-Ain] or the [January 2018] attack against Afrin. But now there are two agreements in place: the agreement between Erdogan and Vladimir Putin that was signed in Sochi, and the agreement that was signed between the United States and Turkey in Ankara [in the wake of Turkey’s October 2019 Operation Peace Spring against the Syrian Democratic Forces]. In my view, unless Turkey gets the approval of either Russia or the United States, Erdogan cannot take such a step. And as far as I am aware there is no such approval. Al-Monitor: Have Russia and the United States provided you with such guarantees? Mazlum Kobane: Yes. The United States has given us such assurances. They were relayed to us officially. The United States said they were opposed to, and would not accept, any attack by Turkey against us. The US officials we spoke to also recalled the existing congressional sanctions against Turkey [over its acquisition of Russian S-400 missiles]. They informed us that during the last meeting between Erdogan and President Joe Biden [on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Rome] that Erdogan was told that the United States would not accept any attack against us. The Russians also told us that they had not made any deals with Turkey. They did say though that Turkish-backed [Syrian National Army] forces might attack us rather than the Turkish military per se. They actually gave us a date. They were supposed to attack us today [Nov. 5] but nothing happened. Al-Monitor: Where were they supposed to attack? Mazlum Kobane: In the Tell Rifaat, Serekaniye [Ras al-Ain] and Girespi [Tell Abyad] areas. Like I said, a Turkish attack does not seem likely in the current circumstances. Besides, the Russians told us that they had told the Turks that they would not accept an attack against us. However, they are unable to determine what Turkish-backed forces might do. They said they would not accept an attack by them either. But it remains to be seen what will happen in practice, on the ground. Al-Monitor: Are you saying they are not standing as firmly against Turkey as the Americans are? Mazlum Kobane: No not at all. This is a very critical point and requires proper clarification. The Russians said there was no question of them allowing Turkey to attack but that Turkish-supported rebel groups might attack us without Turkey’s authorization. But we believe that the Turkish-supported rebels would never initiate any attack unless Turkey were directly involved. Al-Monitor: You said the balances in the northeast have shifted. This is also true in Turkey where Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party, the AKP, are rapidly losing ground. Do you not believe that Erdogan might carry out an operation against you regardless of the factors you outlined so as to distract attention from economic woes and perhaps even as an excuse to delay elections that are due in 2023? Mazlum Kobane: My view is that obviously he should not resort to such action. But we are talking about Erdogan after all. He might just intervene against us so as to bolster his own position domestically. Therefore, we do take his threats seriously and we are taking all necessary measures with that that scenario in mind. We are acting as if a Turkish operation against us will be carried out. Al-Monitor: In the meantime, something rather significant occurred in Turkey. The main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, the CHP, launched a dialogue with the Kurds and, as witnessed during the 2019 municipal elections, forged a de facto alliance with them. Last month, the CHP sent a level delegation to Iraqi Kurdistan—a first. And more recently it voted against the government’s motion in the parliament to authorize the deployment of Turkish forces in Syria and Iraq for a further two years. That’s another first. Mazlum Kobane: It’s true that they opposed this bill for the first time. The consensus around Erdogan is fading. The alliance between the AKP and the far-right Nationalist Movement Party is also weakening. These factors combined with the resistance displayed by international powers against a Turkish operation will have emboldened the CHP. At the same time, the CHP is investing in the coming elections. Al-Monitor: You mean it’s trying to woo the Kurds? Mazlum Kobane: Yes, but in any event it’s a positive signal and an important step. And if the CHP is acting in this way this suggests that Turkey’s internal balances are shifting. And this gives us hope. Al-Monitor: Would you like to invite a CHP delegation to Rojava? Mazlum Kobane: Why not? It would be a positive thing. Al-Monitor: Economic conditions in Rojava are getting harder by the day. On the one hand, there are the embargos imposed by Turkey and sanctions imposed by the United States on the Assad regime. On the other hand, there is the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the most severe droughts in decades and Turkey’s continued suppression of water along with its threats of an attack. Can these factors give the Islamic State a new lease of life? Mazlum Kobane: DAESH [the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State] is active all across Syria. And these unfavorable economic conditions are impacting our struggle against DAESH. Its ability to regain ground is increasingly linked to economic conditions in Syria. There are way too many unemployed people. There is widespread poverty. All such factors diminish the authority of our administration. DAESH takes advantage of this. Therefore, the international coalition forces and all powers fighting against terrorism must take immediate steps to address the economic situation here. Bolstering the economy has become one of the pillars of combatting terrorism. We as the Syrian Democratic Forces say this openly. If we are to fight DAESH effectively we need to prioritize the economy. Al-Monitor: Oil is a critical source of revenue for this region. The Biden administration, however, did not extend the Trump era waiver for the US oil company Delta Crescent to develop and market your oil. Mazlum Kobane: Our demands are not limited to oil. Our demand is that the whole of North and East Syria be exempted from the United States’ Caesar sanctions. A formal decision is required in this regard. Anyone who wants do to business here, to contribute to the economy here, should be allowed to do so. Al-Monitor: And how has the Biden administration responded? Mazlum Kobane: They have been positive so far. Al-Monitor: Then why is nothing happening? Mazlum Kobane: We are waiting for them to fulfill their promises … Al-Monitor: It’s no secret that the Biden administration wants you to come to an agreement with the regime through Russian mediation. There are many rumors floating around in this regard. For instance, there were claims in the media that Aldar Xelil [the co-presidency council member of the ruling Democratic Unity Party] traveled to Damascus recently and delivered warm messages to the regime. What’s happening? Mazlum Kobane: So far nobody has gone to Damascus for any kind of negotiations. And so far there have been no serious negotiations with Damascus. There have been some contacts but none of those meetings evolved into negotiations. Al-Monitor: Why not? Mazlum Kobane: Damascus is not ready for this. However much they claim that there will be no return to the pre-2011 era their mentality remains unchanged. They need to be pressured. Plus, there’s an issue of trust, particularly for Damascus. Al-Monitor: Are they telling you to sever your ties with the United States? Mazlum Kobane: Not exactly. They are telling us, “We do not want a state within a state. We do not want an army within an army.” We have no such demands. Our project is autonomy and we are implementing it at this time. However, they want guarantees from us with regard to the aforementioned concerns. Severing our ties with the Americans is not their precondition. Their precondition is Syria’s indivisible unity. Preserving its flag, its borders, its president. Their sovereignty. We are ready to offer guarantees on all these points. But they should be prepared to negotiate with us for our autonomy. Al-Monitor: Would that include the Arab majority areas as well? Mazlum Kobane: The Arabs have their demands too. There is a problem in their areas too. We did not seize those areas from the regime. Those areas rose up against the regime, then al-Qaeda and DAESH took over. We wrested those areas from DAESH. Damascus needs to enter negotiations with those areas as well. Al-Monitor: Are the Russians sincere in their mediations efforts? Or do they simply want you to capitulate so they can get the lion’s share of the oil pie from the regime as some claim? Mazlum Kobane: We have good relations with Russia. For the past two years, we have cooperated on the ground within the framework of the [Sochi] agreement. This problem cannot be solved without Russia. I believe Russia could be more proactive and apply more pressure on the regime. Al-Monitor: Why aren’t they? Mazlum Kobane: We are asking them the same question. Al-Monitor: Where does Iran figure in this picture? Iran is after all an important player in Syria and, like Turkey, resists any political concessions for the Kurds. Don’t they need to be a part of the solution as well? Mazlum Kobane: Russia is here at the formal invitation of the government in Damascus. In my view, Russia’s role is the determining role. And I believe that Russia will come round to our way of seeing things. They have no other choice. Al-Monitor: But Russia also has a relationship with Turkey. It needs to keep Turkey on an even keel particularly in Idlib. And as you well know there’s a lot of talk of Turkey making concessions to Russia on Idlib in exchange for Russian concessions concerning you. Mazlum Kobane: I don’t believe that’s possible any longer. That’s the difference today. Russia does not want more of Syria’s territory to be occupied by Turkey. In fact, that is what the Russians told us they had told Turkey. Al-Monitor: There are other recent developments that can affect your future. Various Arab governments, notably Egypt and the Arab Emirates, are seeking to bring back Syria within the Arab League and to restore the legitimacy of the Assad regime. It looks like Assad’s not going away. Would you agree? Mazlum Kobane: Yes, I agree. Al-Monitor: Doesn’t that concern you? Mazlum Kobane: It doesn’t matter to us whether Assad goes or stays. It may be so for others. What matters to us is that there be a solution for our region and for Syria as a whole. If that solution is to be reached with Assad, so be it. We are not against that, and for the past 10 years that’s pretty much been our position. We are prepared to sit down with whoever is ready for a solution. Within this context, the United States’ existing sanctions on Syria should be leveraged for a solution to the Syrian problem. Everyone knows that Assad is not going to fall. Al-Monitor: Does the United States have a strategy for Syria or for this region? We know it is working on one but nothing has been announced so far. Mazlum Kobane: It does not have a cohesive plan. At any rate, not one that they’ve shared with us thus far. They have ad hoc policies. For now, its combatting DAESH. But our principle demand is that the United States leverage its presence here to achieve a resolution of the Syrian problem and that they remain here until such time. Unless a solution is found for the whole of Syria, the problems of this region will remain unresolved. We are a part of Syria after all. There can be no resolution without Damascus. This area cannot survive alone in the absence of a countrywide solution. Al-Monitor: Where can an agreement be reached? In Geneva, Astana? Mazlum Kobane: These platforms are losing their credibility. Everyone has lost faith in these processes. I don’t believe we’ll get anywhere through them either. However, if America and Russia and indeed the Arab countries commit themselves to brokering an agreement between our administration and the regime, and if an agreement is reached within certain parameters, this could facilitate a solution, serve as a template for the rest of the country. If no progress has been achieved through the existing platforms over the past 10 years, we say, “Come, let’s try a new way.” Al-Monitor: And what of Idlib? Mazlum Kobane: I believe that if a solution is brokered for our region, Idlib will be solved as well. Al-Monitor: Will Turkey withdraw from Syria? Mazlum Kobane: Should the peoples of Syria, its government and the international stakeholders reach a consensus, Turkey will be forced to withdraw. And should the Erdogan government lose power in Turkey, that will definitely facilitate this. The international powers and the US-led coalition need to interact with our administration here on multiple levels. For now, relations are limited to the military arena. The activities of this administration, be they social, economic, running the prisons and so on, all of these are part and parcel of combatting terrorism. In other words, the Syrian Democratic Forces are not solely responsible for combatting terrorism. It is therefore imperative that [the international community] works to help empower the autonomous administration, its political wing and the economy. The international community needs to make a political shift in this direction. At the end of the day, the people here are evaluating the overall performance of this administration and not just its military performance. The big wars are over. Our main demand is that these countries recognize our administration. Al-Monitor: Won’t that escalate tensions between you and the regime? Mazlum Kobane: The regime is not accepting any of our demands anyway. They reject the presence of the coalition forces here. Therefore, it’s really not a problem for us. The bottom line is that the stronger we are politically and militarily, the stronger our hand will be when negotiating with the regime. We are focused on a solution. So we see no contradiction [between our demand for recognition and our desire for an agreement with the regime]. Al-Monitor: Actually, the United States did dip its toes into the political sphere when it mentored talks between the Democratic Unity Party and the Kurdish National Council linked opposition parties. But the talks are frozen. Why? Mazlum Kobane: Let us say the talks have been paused. We are waiting for [US deputy envoy for Syria] David [Brownstein] to return. When the American representative returns, the talks will resume. We had some technical issues. Travel was interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Then problems emerged in southern [Iraqi] Kurdistan between the KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq] and the PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party]. Clashes erupted between them. This affected Rojava. But I believe that Turkey is opposed to these talks and it makes its opposition to them clear. Some other forces want to attach conditions to our talks with the Kurdistan National Council. Al-Monitor: Are you referring to the KDP? Mazlum Kobane: Yes, I am referring to the KDP. Al-Monitor: What are the KDP’s conditions? Mazlum Kobane: To be honest, I don’t really understand what they are. Kurdistan’s national unity is a strategic matter for us. We shall do our utmost to this end and will insist on achieving this unity no matter the obstacles and despite Turkish resistance. Al-Monitor: Can you hold elections here without sealing an agreement with the Kurdistan National Congress? We know you are planning to hold municipal elections in the near future. Mazlum Kobane: We shall invite the Kurdistan National Congress to conclude an agreement with us. And if we manage to do this that would obviously be a good thing. But we cannot wait forever. We need to hold elections in this region, including in the Arab majority areas. Our goal is to hold elections in the first quarter of 2022. We can no longer put them off. We liberated these areas from DAESH. There were security problems there for a long while, particularly in Deir ez-Zor. So the conditions for an election did not exist. But we can no longer continue with this structure. The local people need to choose their own leaders, their own administration. This is of utmost importance to us. When we liberated these areas, we the Syrian Democratic Forces made a promise. We said, “We will let you run your own affairs.” Holding elections is important for the autonomous administration’s legitimacy as well. Al-Monitor: There are a lot of complaints about corruption in this area these days. We know this is a matter of personal concern for you. Mazlum Kobane: It is true that corruption has become an issue and that the people are unhappy about it. We are continuing with our investigations into corruption claims. We prepared various reports with the help of our security forces. We have made some progress. Al-Monitor: Has anyone been arrested? Mazlum Kobane: Tens of people including people within the administration. People who stole public property. Al-Monitor: This administration continues to be inspired by the ideology of Abdullah Ocalan. Right? Mazlum Kobane: Yes, that’s the general situation. Al-Monitor: One of the main tenets of Ocalan’s ideology is preserving the environment. Yet this area is overflowing with litter and waste. Were Ocalan to see this he would undoubtedly be very angry. Couldn’t you be doing more to address this problem? Mazlum Kobane: This is a serious shortcoming. This is true. That is why we set aside funds to address this problem in our 2022 municipal budget. In the old days people used to show greater care; they would clean the area around their homes and collect their rubbish. There was such a culture. But the war took a lot from us. Everyone was focused on the war and the environment was no longer a priority. We have local communes, neighborhood organizations. They will work together with the municipalities to solve this problem. Al-Monitor: To be fair you are also faced with a huge COVID-19 problem. Health officials I spoke to here complain that the United Nations is not doing enough to help and they don’t seem to care. Mazlum Kobane: There is an injustice. There is an allocation of vaccines for this region. The vaccines are meant to come via Damascus and the Yaroubiyah crossing in Iraq. But Damascus did not send us the vaccines. Only a few. And Damascus refused to let the vaccines be delivered via Yaroubiyah even though the UN had struck an agreement for this. The international community did not apply enough pressure on Damascus. We do know that the Americans tried. However, the only aid corridor [outside the regime’s control] is via Bab al-Hawa between Turkey and Idlib. Al-Monitor: Did you get COVID-19? Mazlum Kobane: No. Al-Monitor: I met with the prince of the Yazidis, Dasin Farouk Beg, in Erbil. He told me, “If you see General Mazlum, please tell him to rescue our girls from al-Hol camp.” Mazlum Kobane: Till this day, we have done what we can to help. We have been very sensitive to the Yazidis’ plight from the very start. We rescued more families, children, women and girls than any others. But DAESH continues to strike fear in their hearts and this prevents them from coming forward and identifying themselves in the camps. It is also because they have borne children by DAESH and they don’t want to leave their children behind. Yazidi society does not accept those children. It’s a social and religious problem. However, I do not believe that there are that many Yazidis here now. Our female security personnel continue with their investigations at the camps. We have a Yazidi House that deals exclusively with their affairs. I hereby invite the prince via al-Monitor. If he comes to the camp this will have a positive impact. Al-Monitor: There has recently been a lot of speculation about your status in several news organizations and on social media. It is claimed that you have been relieved of your duties. Who am I interviewing now? Am I interviewing the commander in chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces? Mazlum Kobane: Do you have the slightest doubt? We pay no attention to such speculations and don’t deem them to be worthy of a response. In a few days, the Syrian Democratic Forces’ military council will be convening. The requisite messages will be delivered then. Al-Monitor: So you remain the commander in chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces? Correct? Mazlum Kobane: Yes. Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/11/syria-kurdish-commander-assured-washington-turkey-wont-invade-again#ixzz7Bxl84a4Z

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The Partie’s Valley… From Nawzang Tents to the Headquarters in Sulaymaniyah

DRAW: Nearly four decades ago, Khoury Nawzang was called "The Partie's Valley” each Kurdish party had a tent in the valley. Today, Sulaymaniyah is going to be like the “The Parties Valley.” Instead, the tents, this time they are constructing new buildings as their offices. Among the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Change movement, and other desperate people from the political situation, there are attempts of establishing several new parties. While the last election, only 27% of the city voted for the party's candidates.  There is more information in this report regarding the new wave of political movements. The Partie’s Valley At the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, when Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian political and religious leader, announced “Jihad” against Kurds, the borders between south and east of Kurdistan became a shelter for gathering the Kurdish opposition parties from east, south, and even north of Kurdistan. The area was called the parties valley while they all had set up tents near each other. This valley belongs to the south of Kurdistan, which PUK had authority in that area. Mam Jalal Talabani, late Iraq, and PUK president had invited all his friends from Iraqi opposition to this valley.  The parties which had tents in that valley were: + The Iraqi Communist Party + Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party + Sheik Izzadin Party + Revolutionary Group Of Kurdistan (Komala) + Democratic party of Kurdistan-Iran + Chrikay Fedaei,  +Ranjbaran + Alay Rzgary (north of Kurdistan),  and with some other Iraqis opposition parties. Will Sulaymaniyah become the partie’s valley? After separating Nawshirwan Mustafa from the PUK and establishing the Change Movement in 2009, Sulaymaniyah is going to be like the partie’s valley. The number of political parties in the province is increasing continuously.  Following the establishment of the Change Movement in 2009, Some other parties have established since then.  +Tavgari Azadi, a political movement that belongs to PKK. + New Generation: established by a businessman Shaswar Abdul Wahid in 2018. + Coalition for Democracy and Justice: established by Barham Salih after he left the PUK. The same year he abandoned his new party and went back to the PUK + National Coalition, the remaining from Barham Salih's party, established in 2018 by Aram Qadir, former leader from an Islamic party, which is now called Justice Group. +The National Reform Movement: it was established in 2019 by a group of leaders who isolated from the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party. These days Sulaymaniyah has the pain of delivering several new political parties. Perhaps none of the existing parties have been able to satisfy the people. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the authority in this district, has been in a deep internal conflict for four months. Lately, the political bureau approved the co-president Bafel Talabani's decision to expel Lahur Sheik Janji, the other co-president, from the party. This decision has left no other choices for Sheik Jngi other than to create a new political movement outside of PUK. Why Sulaymaniyah? What has attracted these trends for building new political parties in Sulaymaniyah is the broad opposition voices in the area. That means the other exciting parties were not able to bring people together under one umbrella.  In the last Iraqi election, the voter turnout was 42% percent in Sulaymaniyah. Approximately 600 thousand people voted out of 1 million 425 thousand registered voters. From this number, only 390 thousand voters voted for the party's candidates, which means only 27% of voters voted for the parties.  

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Kurdistan Parliamentary Election, From One Electoral Circle to Multi-Circles

Neaz Mustafa, Draw Media Kurdistan Parliament discussing the upcoming election procedures, the Parliamentary Factions have to inform the Presidency of the Kurdistan Parliament about their opinion regarding the election system, by the 18th of this month. It has been for two years; the legal period came to an end. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is asking to replace the commission. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Change Movement, Kurdistan Islamic Union, and Justice Group are against the change. The voter's record has not been renewed. There are calls for changing the election mechanism from one electoral circle to multi-circles and, amending the election law.  Get more information from this report by Draw Media. Parliament asking for the Parties Opinion The 2022 Kurdistan Parliament elections, 6th term, will be held on Friday, September 30, 2022. Last week, the presidency of the Kurdistan parliament held a meeting with the parliamentary fractions to discuss the election procedures because they have to reach the final decision regarding the election at least six months ahead of the process. According to the information that Draw has received, the Presidency of the Kurdistan Parliament asked the fraction presidents to submit their opinions regarding the election law, no later than November 18, 2021. The parties’ suggestions for the election Based on the Draw Media investigations, the parties have not made their final decisions, but they have presented some initial viewpoints.  Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) KDP is with conducting the election on time in considering the PUK local situation and the sharp downturn of the Change Movement in the last election.  KDP is looking forward to securing approximately 50 seats in the next parliament election. Also, they are trying to reestablish the High Elections and Referendum Commission based on the current seat numbers in parliament. If this request would be executed, the KDP would control the vast majority of the commission in their favor. Based on that suggestion, KDP would secure 4 out of 9 seats of the High Elections and Referendum Commission, and they could make all the decisive decisions for their benefit. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Due to its internal conflicts, PUK would like to delay the election, but they have not announced this officially. Initially, they ought to change the election system from one electoral circle to multi circles, which means each province would have an independent electoral circle. Regarding the Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission, PUK is against the KDP suggestion for renewing the commission based on the current seat number in parliament. Currently, two out of nine commission members belong to PUK. Change Movement The movement already submitted their viewpoint to the parliament presidency and asked for a closed list and multi-circle election. About The Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission fate, Change Movement is agreed with PUK which they demand to keep the commission structure without making any changes. In the case of restructuring commission, as PUK asked for, the Change movement would lose one of its seats. Currently, the change movement has two seats in the commission. Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) KIU is demanding a semi-open election with multi electoral circles.  KIU also demanded to renew the voter's record. Regarding The Commission destiny, KIU has the same opinion as the Change Movement and PUK, which they request to keep the commission structure as its current one. KIU has one commission seat out of nine members. New Generation Movement This movement has announced its perspective for the general public regarding the election, asking for "conducting the election on its legal time, September 30, 2022.  Since they do not have any representatives in the commission, New Generation Movement demands an independent electoral commission away from the political fractions and work under the supervision of the United Nations. Kurdistan Justice Group Justice Group votes and seats have declined in the last Iraqi parliamentary election. Regarding the justice group attitude for the sixth term of the Kurdistan parliament election, Omar Gulpy a member of the Justice group parliament fraction told Draw Media, “Justice group demanding the election to be on time.  Also, they want to amend the election law and change the electoral circles from one circle to multi circles.  He added that "the amendment should let the ethnic and religious components reach parliament with their votes, not with the other party votes that they have authority in the region. The Justice group also does not support the ideas for changing the commission, but they want a clean voter's record out of the dead and fraud names. The group only has one seat in the high electoral commission. About The Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission The Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission in Kurdistan is one of the commissions that belong to the Kurdistan parliament, which was made by law NO. 4 which was passed on July 23, 2014, by parliament. The commission has started up 7 years ago. During this period, the commission has conducted only two missions:  First: managing the Kurdistan Region independence referendum on September 25, 2017. Since it was a national referendum, there was not a lot of conflict or disagreement about the results. Second: Managing the Kurdistan parliament process on September 30, 2018. That was the first practical experience of conducting an election for the commission. The results brought a lot of disagreements. Particularly PUK, change Movement, KIU mentioned that the election was not clean and there was a big fraud going on in the election.

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The Kurdistan Parliament, since its establishment 

Draw: The Kurdistan Parliament since its establishment in 1992, has passed 385 legislations. But the fifth term of this parliament has enacted the lowest number of legislations.  In the first term, there was an average of 13 laws per year, the second term 17 laws, the third term 18 laws, the fourth term 6, and in the current parliament term, only 5 laws have been issued.  In this report, Draw Media compares the number of the laws that have been passed in the Kurdistan parliament during five terms, 1992-2021. The first term of Kurdistan Parliament May 19, 1992, until January 30, 2005 Even though this term was the longest one, because of the civil war conflicts the national election was postponed, and this term was continued for 13 years. Regarding legislation, this term has issued the highest number of legislations per year, compared to all other terms. despite the continued war, there was not a single year of the first term passed without passing a law. For example, here are the number of the legislation they passed each year.  1992 / 16  1993 / 21 1994 / 4 1995 / 1 1996 / 4 1997 / 14 1998 / 9 1999 / 18 2000 / 19 2001 / 19 2002 / 16 2003 / 7 2004 / 25  Overall is 173 laws with an average of 13.3 laws per year. The Second term of Kurdistan Parliament January 31, 2005, until July 25, 2009 This term was continued for four years and a half. During that period, they have passed 89 laws. 2005 / 2 2006 / 20 2007 / 39 2008 / 18 2009 / 10  An average of 17.8 laws per year. The Third term of Kurdistan Parliament July 25, 2009, until September 21, 2013 This term was continued for four years. It is recognized as the most active term of Kurdistan parliament, based on the number of legislations they have issued:  2010 / 17 2011 / 22 2012 / 17 2013 / 19 Overall is 75 laws have been issued with an average of 18.8 laws per year. The fourth term of Kurdistan Parliament September 21, 2013, until September 30, 2019 Even though this term was facing a big challenge because of the (presidential law) disagreement between the parties, the parliament door was closed for almost two years. In 2016, for the first time in parliament history, there was not a single law issued in that year. But the rest of the years there was several laws have been issued: 2014 / 9 2015 / 9 2016 / 0 2017 / 4 2018 / 11 Overall is 33 laws have been issued with an average of 6.6 laws per year. The fifth term of Kurdistan Parliament September 9, 2019, until now Although this term is not over yet, and almost one year left of time legally. But yet they have passed the lowes number of legislation of all time. 2019 / 5 2020 / 5 2021 /  6 Overall, 15 laws have been issued, with an average of five laws per year.  

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Lahur Sheikh Jangi Expelled From PUK

DRAW: Lahur Sheikh Jangi Talabani, former Co-President of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and three others have been expelled from the party by their Co-President Bafel Talabani.  In a statement which was released today November 2, Bafel Talabani announced that Lahur Sheikh Jangi Talabani, former Co-President of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has been expelled from the party because he has violated the bylaw of PUK or the action rules of the Leadership Committee. Earlier today, prior to Bafel Talabani's statement, Lahur Jangi released a statement criticizing the direction of the party and calling for a resolution to the power struggle with his co-president, Bafel Talabani.

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Sulaymaniyah Revenue Before and AFter, July 8

Draw: Compared to prior July 8 incidents, tensions between the Talabani brothers and Sheikh Jangi erupted into public view, the border crossing revenue in Sulaymaniyah reduced by 19%, and tax revenue reduced by 13%. It has been for a few days, reducing the border crossing revenue in Sulaymaniyah became a political matter once again. Kurdistan Region finance minister Awat Sheikh Janab says, "We have cash flow shortage in Sulaymaniyah Province. In Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, Garmyan, and Raparing administration, Tax revenue is not collected as needed, which is the consequence of running payroll late.” Before July 8, and rising tensions between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leaders (the ruling party in Sulaymaniyah), PDK leaders in Erbil had reiterated that PUK does not return the Sulaymaniyah revenue to the government treasury.  That time their fight was with Lahur Sheikh Jangi, the Co-President of the PUK. They would say he is the one who is preventing the tax collection by the government. But now, things have been changed, Lahur Sheikh Jangi does not have power anymore among his party. The crossing border in the province is controlled by Qubad Talabani and Bafel Talabani, the sons of the late former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.  Revenue, Before and after July 8 According to the General Directorate of Taxes and Real Estate, tax and Government incomes revenue without custom revenue was 657.14 billion IQD in 10 months of this year, which was collected as mentioned below:  Erbil: 343.9 billion IQD, which is 52% of all taxes and real estate revenue.  Sulaymaniyah: 164.9 billion IQD, which is 25% of all taxes and real estate revenue. Duhok: 148.16 billion IQD, that is 23% of all taxes and real estate revenue.  In July, tensions between the Talabani brothers and Sheikh Jangi erupted. Co-President Lahur Sheikh Jangi stepped down from his position.  The average government income in that month was 68.1 billion IQD and Sulaymaniyah's revenue was 18.2 billion IQD, which was 27% of all the government revenue in July. However, in October, three months after July 8 incidents, the overall tax revenue in the Kurdistan region was 63.84 billion IQD, only13.35 billion IQD of that was from Sulaymaniyah, which is 21% of all KRG tax revenue. That indicates, compared to before July 8 Sulaymaniyah's revenue reduced by 6%. Tax revenue list in Sulaymaniyah before and after July 8 June: 16.47 billion IQD July: 18.2 billion IQD August: 14.79 billion IQD September: 17.76 billion IQD October: 13.35 billion IQD Custom revenue in Sulaymaniyah before and after July 8 According to Draw Media investigations, Custom revenue of the border crossing points within the PUK authority areas has declined since July 8. Bashmax Border Crossing Revenue January:        22.8 billion IQD March:          22.47 billion IQD September:  17.1 billion IQD October:       18.7 billion IQD Compared to January, Bashmax Border Crossing Revenue declined by 19% in October. Parwez Xan Border Crossing Revenue January:        22.79 billion IQD March:          21.6 billion IQD September:  16 billion IQD October:       14 billion IQD Compared to January, Parwez Xan Border Crossing Revenue declined by 39% in October. Because of the Truck driver strikes, the commercial movement has been stopped at the Parwez Xan border crossing. .  

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20Thousand Teachers put pressure on the government

DRAW: Teachers who are teaching at schools without having an official contract with the government start to protest and strike. They are asking the government to hire them officially. In Kurdistan's reign of Iraq, there are 20 thousand unemployed teachers, who are teaching without a contract. Making a contract with this group of teachers will increase 4 billion dinars for the expense budget on government. Who are these teachers without a contract? How much is their salary? How does the government handle this problem? Draw Media provides more information in this report.   Government Facing a New Dissatisfaction    Approximately there are 20 thousand Unemployed teachers in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. It has been for a few days they have started protests and strikes asking the government to hire them officially and make a contract with them. In May of this year, this group of teachers had another protest asking for their payment, which was late for 5months. Unemployed teachers are going to be a new challenge for the new government cabinet which include (KDP, PUK, CHANGE MOVEMENT) Who is an unemployed teacher? Last year KRG decided to change 6,000 temporary contracts to permanent teachers. Before they get hired, they had been working for years as temporary teachers without having a fixed salary. Since 2013, the hiring process in the public sector has been stopped because of the financial crisis, but the need of the education ministry for teachers obligated them to hire a big number of teachers temporarily without having a fixed salary. That was because of: _ Increasing numbers of students and schools. _Many of the previous teachers got retired. To fill out those gaps ministry of education hired temporary teachers. Based on the data that Draw Media has received; in 2019 there were 17,500 temporary teachers in the schools, but the number increased to 20,000 by 2021. The number of all teachers according to the ministry of education are 120 thousands, which means the temporary teachers are 20% of all teachers in the ministry of education.  Most of the schools all over Kurdistan have temporary teachers. Even in some schools except the principal, all of the teachers are temporary. For example: In Sayd Sadiq Town, there are 1,200 permanent teachers with 490 temporary teachers. This means 40% of all of the Teachers in this Town are not hired permanently.   How much is the salary of the temporary teachers? In the previous years, the temporary teachers were paid based on the number of hours they teach. Each teacher who had a Diploma degree would get 3000 dinars and for a bachelor's degree, they spend 4000 dinars. Based on this fixed salary, now the expense of all the temporary teachers is 5 billion and 500 million dinars. If the government decides to hire these 20 thousand teachers permanently, then the salary of those who have a diploma will be 450 bachelors will be 500 thousand dinars. And that would be 9 billion and 500 million dinars. This means the government needs 4 billion more to pay their salary. With this extra, would the government decide to change their contract from temporary to permanent?

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Kurds and Sunni Don’t Want to Take a Risk by Making Agreement with a Shia Group. 

DRAW Asharq Al-Awsat The power conflict between the Sadr bloc, led by Muqtada Sadr, and The Shia Coordination Framework, led by a number of the prominent Shia leaders, hit the second week, but there is no hope in solving the dispute.  Last week, on Friday prayer, it was expected that the Grand Ayatollah and the Shia leader from Najaf declare their opinion about the political conflict between the Shia groups and announce a roadmap for both sides. Yet, there was no indication regarding that matter. The quietness of the Shia leaders from Najaf was described as dissatisfaction with the situation. The election results were unexpected, which sparked the Shia conflicts. The dispute has reached a point that the Shia Coordination Framework would attempt to Kick Muqtada Sadr out of the game by agreeing with Kurds and Sunni to form the biggest bloc in Parliament.  Yet Sadr, the biggest winner of the election who won 73 seats, tries to hang on to an institution that gives him the right to form the new government as the biggest winner. Kurds and Sunni, still waiting to see the end of the conflict between the Shia blocs. That made them not take a risk on making agreements with any of the Shia blocs at the expense of the other side, without considering the achievements that they would get.

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Barham Salih Seeks Second Term

Neaz Mustafa, Draw Media Repeating the 2018 scenario is not possible. Among the party and outside, Barham Salih will not have strong support anymore. After the referendum, he became the president. Although, Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP (his opponent) is strong now and returns to the political game in Bagdad strongly. His party members are furious with him. They say he was aware of the election frauds, but he did nothing to inform his party members. The president between KDP and PUK KDP, the fourth-biggest winner of the Iraqi election, after projecting the preliminary results, KDP focuses on three different suggestions regarding the president position. First, the presidency position is the portion of Kurds, and it is not yet clear for whom it will be. That is a clear message for PUK, to not be confident about getting the position again. Second, it’s been for a few days, KDP leaders are focusing on obtaining the Kirkuk governor without mentioning the presidency. KDP wants to secure the Kirkuk governor position for themselves by giving the presidency to the PUK. Third, by putting pressure on PUK (for the presidency position), KDP tries to drive PUK to renew the strategic agreement or sign a new accord between them. Especially after the current changes following 8 June inside PUK, which is to KDP benefit. The struggle for the presidency was significant because it appeared to break a tacit accord between the KDP and PUK, under which the former holds the Iraqi Kurdish presidency and the latter the Iraqi national presidency. However, the KDP insisted its candidate be put forward because it had more seats in the federal parliament. Will the 2018 Scenario be Repeated? Even though the strategic agreement between KDP and PUK for dividing the senior positions in the local and central government is already dead yet, PUK insists that the Iraqi presidency is their portion. The Iraqi presidency has long been controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party. Out of agreement with KDP and the other Kurdish parties, PUK settled the presidency office to its advantage in 2018. In the current situation, Could PUK could carry out the same action? The changes that happened since 2018 show that PUK could not repeat the same scenario, and Barham Salih does not have that big chance waiting for him. Barham Salih had a strong ability to play with the conflicting sides, especially USA and Iran. His games are almost clear for both sides of the poles now. Especially, after that his cell phone was observed by an Israelian Program. Also, there was a rumor that his cell phone was stolen during a visit to Qatar. Allegedly, these events reveal Barham Salih's secret and private relations.   Barham Salih’s Chance Barham Salih still insists on remaining on his chair for the second term. A chair that following the fall of Saddam Husain, only Jalal Talabani a historical leader of PUK, could stay on it for two terms. According to the Draw Media information, among members of the PUK Political Bureau and Leadership Committee, there is dissatisfaction against Barham Salih. They believe Barham Salih with Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, Prime minister, and Mohamed Al-Halbousi Speaker of the Council of Representatives of Iraq, already had information regarding the election fraud tactics, but he did not inform his party members about it. On the other side, depending on the Draw Media knowledge, Iran has a decisive role in determining the Iraqi high-ranked positions, yet they support Barham Salih to retake the position, and also, they have no problem with an alternative if PUK and KDP agree on that. The presidency Candidates According to Draw Media information, the Iranian told KDP, even though they have won more seats still, the Iraqi presidency is decided for PUK, but they can have their comment on PUK candidates. After receiving the message from Iran, KDP is not likely to fight for the presidency anymore, yet they will not give up easily without letting PUK pay the price. Determining the Kirkuk governor to their advantage to let Masrur Barzani cabinet have full authority on the entire Kurdish territory from all over Kurdistan.  

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After Iraqi elections, Iraq's Kurdistan region is in the spotlight - analysis

DRAW  By SETH J. FRANTZMAN  - Jerusalem Post Kurdish parties won considerable gains with a large number of seats in Iraq's parliament, but low turnout has meant that it appears many are cynical or apathetic about what might come next.     An official works at a polling station during the parliamentary election, in Baghdad, Iraq, October 10, 2021 (photo credit: REUTERS/THAIER AL-SUDANI) Advertisement The Kurdistan Democratic Party came in either third or fourth place in Iraq’s recent elections, if the vote tally remains consistent over the next days. That will give it around 32-33 seats, meaning it will play a key role in coalition politics of the next Iraqi government. Other Kurdish parties also received seats, including the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) with 16 seats.   “So far there are no official agreements on such matter. Hoshyar Zebari has been appointed as the negotiator for the KDP. There have been understandings before the elections, but the KDP does not do agreements with any side against another,” Showan Mohammed, head of the KDP office in Baghdad, told Rudaw, a news channel.   For the Kurds this is important. However, low turnout has meant that it appears many are cynical or apathetic about what might come next. This is because the Kurdish region has suffered some setbacks. Despite an impressive economy, security and relative stability, the region has been under pressure from Iran and Turkey in recent years. Turkey has built military bases in the Kurdish autonomous region, claiming to be fighting “terrorists” which Turkey alleges are present there. Iran also has carried out attacks against Iranian Kurdish dissidents who live in northern Iraq.  Another problem is the divisions in Kurdish society. While Erbil and Dohuk generally vote strongly for the KDP, the governorate of Sulimaniyah is dominated by PUK. While many countries have regional political voting patterns, the Kurdish region has historic divisions that date back to a civil war in the 1990s. This means that neighboring countries and other parties in Iraq tend to try to play Kurds off against one another. For instance, internal divisions undermined Kurdish resolve in 2017 to hold onto Kirkuk. A conspiracy by pro-Iranian militias and pressure by Qasem Soleimani helped create a fiasco in which Kirkuk, which had been controlled by Kurdish forces, was abandoned under the weight of Baghdad’s pressure and Iran. Similarly, an independence referendum in 2017 found the Kurdish region at odds with the US and others.  Things have changed a bit in recent years. The US has moved most of its forces to the Kurdish region because of safety concerns. This came after 2019 tensions between the US and Iran and US president Donald Trump’s bizarre decision to twice try to leave Syria and claims he would use Iraq to “watch Iran.” Iraq rejected that use and Iraq’s pro-Iran parties want the US to leave. But those parties suffered dismally in the elections, most probably because they massacred Iraqis during the 2019 protests. Muqtada al-Sadr once against holds the keys to power in Baghdad. He appears amenable to a small US presence. He might also work with Kurdish parties to secure a coalition.   A poster of Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in the Sadr City district of Baghdad, Iraq June 21, 2021. (credit: REUTERS/AHMED SAAD/FILE PHOTO) According to Rudaw, PUK co-chair Bafel Talabani on election day told media that they look to keep the presidency and their candidate is Barham Salih, who will be serving a second term if he is approved. While Bafel played a controversial role in the 2017 Kirkuk events, he has now risen to seemingly push his cousin Lahur Talibani out of power in Sulimaniyah. This wouldn’t matter that much except Lahur played a key role in relations with Kurds in Syria and also it means the PUK, already suffering in low vote turnout, is more divided.  Iranian media interviewed a member of the Kurdistan Islamic Union this week and affirmed that the low turnout appears to mean many are tired of the corruption in Iraq and pessimistic about the future. This is good news for Iran because it can use this to infiltrate a divided and weak Iraq. Iran, unlike the Saddam regime or the regimes of Assad and Turkey, has never sought to erase the Kurds or genocide them. But Iran’s close relationship with Kurds in Iraq doesn’t mean it has the best interests of the autonomous region at heart. It wants the region divided.   Tasnim reports that “regarding the effects of the Iraqi parliamentary elections on the upcoming parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region, the member of the Islamic Union in the Kurdistan Regional Parliament said ‘The Iraqi elections were seen, there may be changes in the regional parliamentary elections, but the essence of the matter in this region remains the same and the crises will continue.’” The interview went on to note “corruption in Kurdistan region irreparable blows to national unity in the two ruling parties of the Kurdistan Region will continue to compete for party privileges and high positions in Baghdad, and the issue of uniting the Kurdish currents is not achievable, and this will affect the problems of the region and the central government.” For Iran, which saw a weakening of support for its militia-based Fatah Alliance in Baghdad, the Kurdish parties may be a welcome source of potential work for Tehran. This is because Iran sees them as potential allies in the broader context, despite the existence of Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Erbil and despite the close ties between KDP and the US.  

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The Biggest Loser of Iraq’s Election Could Be Iran

DRAW foreignpolicy On Sunday, Iraq held its fifth national elections since the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003, with the national parliament’s 329 seats at stake. While final results have yet to be announced, the biggest losers appear to be pro-Iranian militant groups, which have already said they’ll reject the outcome and have issued veiled and not-so-veiled threats of violence. Another loser of the election is Iraq’s struggling democracy itself. Believing their system to be manipulated, about 60 percent of eligible voters stayed away from the polls. That hasn’t kept the government and election monitors from touting the vote as a success—it went relatively smoothly, there were no incidents of violence, and most voters had easy access to polling stations. Electronic voting and biometric registration cards had been introduced with the promise of eliminating the kind of fraud that undermined the last elections in 2018. However, the Iraqi government and Independent High Electoral Commission promised to deliver the results within 24 hours of the polls closing, which would have been Monday night. Instead, the results of only 10 provinces were announced on Monday, with Baghdad and eight other provinces still trickling in. When the electoral commission made the initial results public online, its website crashed as Iraqis rushed to see the results. A delay in electronic vote counting meant that some boxes had to be counted manually without external monitors, further undermining Iraqis’ trust. The mood remains tense. Rumors that Iran and its proxies would tamper with the results were fed by the news that Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Tehran’s point person for Iraq, had arrived in Baghdad. Iran has every reason to be dissatisfied with the poor showing of its proxies in the election. In Iraq, key pro-Iranian figures have called the election illegitimate. Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of the Fatah coalition, which likely lost several parliamentary seats, threatened to reject the results. Prominent militia leader Abu Ali al-Askari, who is also known as Hussein Mounes and leads the pro-Iranian Kataib Hezbollah, issued a not-so-veiled threat of force against the Independent High Electoral Commission. Kataib Hezbollah failed to win a single seat in parliament. You can support Foreign Policy by becoming a subscriber. SUBSCRIBE TODAY Pending final results, the most powerful political force in the next parliament will be the Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose Sadr bloc is projected to have won at least 73 seats in parliament, a double-digit increase in seats. As the head of the party with the most seats, Sadr will name who will form the next government—but, lacking a majority, he will have to form a coalition. Claiming victory after the initial results were announced on Monday, Sadr gave a televised speech focused on reform and the fight against corruption. He said his party’s victory was “a win over militias.” In a signal to the United States and other powers, he also said foreign embassies will be welcome to operate in Iraq as long as they don’t interfere in its internal affairs. In another important signal, he suggested he will seek to rein the militias. “From now on, arms will be limited to sole state control,” he said. This consolidation of the Iraqi government’s power could lead to violent clashes, particularly if the militias see their influence declining. With some militias already suggesting they will not accept the election results, the country’s path forward could be decided by how the Iraqi security forces and other political parties react to such threats of post-election violence. A failure to limit the ability of militias to strike would undermine not only the electoral process but also Iraq’s security infrastructure and governance. While the coming days and weeks will be tense when it comes to the militias, the question of who will form the next Iraqi government is central to the country’s direction. Jockeying from different groups will continue behind closed doors as different factions try to secure their interests. Sadr is expected to form a coalition with the Kurdish parliamentary block and Taqaddum, the biggest Arab Sunni party in parliament, led by the current speaker of parliament, Mohammed al-Halbousi. Together, these three groups likely will not control a majority of seats, so other partners will be needed. One important outcome of this election is the emergence of a class of independent candidates who won seats in parliament by campaigning directly to Iraqis, made possible by reforms of the electoral law. The Imtidad movement—led by Alaa al-Rikabi, a pharmacist who gained prominence during the October 2019 protests—appears to have secured 10 seats. It will have to decide whether to join the government coalition—and risk being tainted by the political process—or remain pure but powerless as a vocal part of the opposition. If Sadr is unable to agree with his future parliamentary allies on a new prime minister, the consensus candidate could well be the current one, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who is on good terms with Sadr, Halbousi, and the Kurds. Should coalition talks get bogged down and drag on for months, this would be the likely scenario. There are two other key positions to be filled by the new coalition: the Iraqi president and the speaker of parliament. Halbousi is expected to remain speaker, while the Kurds must overcome their own internal divisions to decide on a presidential candidate, who would then be endorsed by the coalition’s majority in parliament. This division among Iraq’s main ethnic and religious groups does not just reflect the three main members of the likely coalition but has been an informal arrangement—unlike Lebanon’s institutionalized system of sectarian power-sharing. By precedent, a Shiite becomes prime minister, a Sunni Arab heads parliament, and a Kurd takes the presidency. Yet it is exactly this kind of horse-trading to gain influence that many Iraqi voters resent in their current political system, where power rarely translates into better service delivery or an improved handling of the many crises in Iraq. Furthermore, this crude ethnic and sectarian division among Iraq’s political elites alienates secular and nationalist Iraqis.

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