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Iraqi Kurdistan’s House of Cards Is Collapsing

DrawMedia By Winthrop Rodgers- Foreign Policy Iraqi Kurdistan’s House of Cards Is Collapsing The region once seemed a bright spot in the disorder unleashed by U.S. regime change. Today, things look bleak. Chamchamal is a dry, dusty city with a rough-and-ready reputation. Midway between Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah in Iraq’s semiautonomous Kurdistan Region, the city—known sometimes by its nickname “Texas”—lies near significant reserves of natural gas. But locals hardly benefit from the lucrative resource buried beneath their homes. Most get by on a few hundred dollars a month, and unemployment is widespread—particularly among young people. Twenty years after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan is often held up as an island of democratic promise and economic development in an otherwise illiberal Middle East. Iraqi Kurds strongly supported the United States’ toppling of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and continue to regard it as a positive development. Iraqi Kurds have long fought Baghdad for self-determination—efforts met mostly with cruel oppression. During the genocidal Anfal campaign in the 1980s, Saddam’s army used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians. Since the 1990s, Iraqi Kurds have been close partners of the United States and other Western countries, working together to topple Saddam and then the Islamic State. While most observers agree that the Iraq War did not make Iraq more prosperous or democratic, Iraqi Kurdistan seemed a bright spot in the disorder unleashed by regime change. But today, things look bleak. The region’s political institutions are riven by partisan divisions and leaders who regularly deny citizens freedom of expression. Entrenched economic inequality and lack of opportunity are driving waves of migrants to seek a better life abroad. The day-to-day experience of most Iraqi Kurds, especially in smaller cities such as Chamchamal, is a far cry from that of the politically connected elite who live in luxury residential developments in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. This distinction is often overlooked by Western diplomats and visitors who meet regularly with party officials, business leaders, and young people educated at private universities. If the Iraq War and its aftermath have taught us anything, it is that Western relations with the region should reflect the interests of its people rather than those of its political leaders. Democracy, unity, and self-determination are deeply held ambitions of the Kurdish people—and three decades of intense foreign support have so far not helped them fully achieve these goals. As Iraqi Kurdistan faces a crisis of democratic legitimacy, the West must use its considerable leverage and capabilities to hold Iraqi Kurdish leaders accountable for corruption and human rights abuses rather than reinforcing them through unyielding military and political support. While Western governments largely ignored Saddam’s Anfal campaign in the 1980s, they were more supportive of Iraqi Kurds in the aftermath of the Gulf War, instituting a no-fly zone to protect them against aerial attacks. Kurdish self-governing institutions were established during the early 1990s. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq enabled the emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan on the world stage, free from the yoke and shadow of Saddam’s dictatorship. Established in 2005 under the new Iraqi Constitution—which was developed with extensive U.S. and foreign support—Iraqi Kurdistan has its own parliament and judiciary. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) also has a full range of ministries with significant devolved powers, and the region enjoys its own foreign relations, security forces, and military, known as the Peshmerga. Nearly all matters of governance are handled by KRG institutions rather than those in Baghdad. But in reality, power rests with the region’s two ruling parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The KDP controls Duhok and Erbil governorates—the latter of which is Iraqi Kurdistan’s capital—and the PUK dominates Sulaymaniyah. In each zone, party officials are responsible for setting policy. Party connections are viewed as key to getting a job, starting a business, and winning legal disputes. The Peshmerga and security forces in each zone have partisan affiliations, too. READ MORE U.S. Marines walk past a toppled statue of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. The Lessons Not Learned From Iraq Twenty years on, the war still shapes policy—mostly for the worse. ANALYSIS | MICHAEL HIRSH INSIDER | Iraq Must Not Squander Another Opportunity to Rebuild By Mina Al-Oraibi Iraqi children walk along a damaged road on their way back from school in Mosul, Iraq Iraq Must Not Squander Another Opportunity to Rebuild The war’s legacy is 20 years of broken hopes and dreams. This government must do better. INSIDER | MINA AL-ORAIBI A large banner is displayed on the outer wall of the Russian Embassy in Cyprus. Adam Tooze: Why Iraq’s Economy Never Recovered From the U.S. Invasion In the 1980s, it had one of the most advanced economies in the Arab world. INSIDER | CAMERON ABADI According to KRG law, “the political parties should not have armed forces,” said Niyaz Abdulla, a journalist from Erbil. But this prohibition is flagrantly ignored in practice. “When any conflict arises between political parties, there is an immediate risk of armed conflict,” she added. The partnership between the KDP and PUK has always been complicated. The PUK originated as a splinter faction of the KDP in the 1970s—a split that resulted from a mix of personal and political factors—and fought a civil war and operated separate statelets during the 1990s. During this time, the Iraqi Kurdish population suffered from the so-called “double embargo,” whereby the international community restricted trade with Saddam’s regime, which then blocked aid and investment to Iraqi Kurdistan. The KDP and PUK ostensibly agreed to set aside their decades-long rivalry following the end of Saddam’s dictatorship to unify under the new KRG. The United States was key in mediating the end of this civil war and encouraging Kurdish unity in post-Baathist Iraq. But this marriage of necessity has always yielded mixed results. The two parties’ working relationship has become increasingly dysfunctional since the last regional election in 2018, which saw the rise of a new generation of leaders less interested in pragmatism and more in factional self-interest. Farhad Mamshai, who grew up in Chamchamal and is now a doctoral candidate in planning, governance, and globalization at Virginia Tech, told Foreign Policy that while the KDP and PUK used to split power and positions evenly at the regional level, the KDP since 2018 has sought to become the undisputed power in Iraqi Kurdistan. The two parties recently have had several major disagreements, according to Mamshai, including over how to share internal revenues from border crossings and taxes, how to manage the oil and gas industry, and relations with Baghdad. These rifts have also stalled the process of reforming the Peshmerga to make it into a unified, apolitical, and modern fighting force. Unable to come to an agreement over a new electoral law, the KDP and PUK delayed regional elections scheduled for October 2022 and controversially extended the term of the Kurdistan Parliament. As of this writing, the Kurdistan Parliament has not taken up a new draft electoral law. “Failure to hold elections means a lack of legitimacy for government and parliamentary bodies. They can no longer be genuine and legitimate representatives of the people,” Mamshai said. These elite-level squabbles have real consequences, particularly as Iraqi Kurdistan experiences a prolonged financial crisis. Since 2014, the region has borne the brunt of extreme fluctuations in oil prices, budget disputes with Iraq’s federal government, the war against Islamic State, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Last year, authorities in Sulaymaniyah had difficulty paying public sector salaries, leaving angry government employees lining up outside distribution centers for cash. Several pensioners died waiting in line to collect benefit payments. The KRG and other government institutions are by far the region’s most important employer, and efforts to diversify the economy are slow-moving. A 2018 report by the International Organization for Migration estimated that 47 percent of households in Iraqi Kurdistan included at least one person working in the public sector. Three-quarters of working women are government employees. According to the International Labour Organization, average unemployment in Iraqi Kurdistan stands at almost 16 percent. But this number is much higher among young people: About a third of people age 15 to 24 are not in education, employment, or training. Women are significantly more likely to be unemployed than men among all age groups. Iraqi Kurds are limited in how they can respond to the dysfunctional KDP-PUK duopoly. Iraqi Kurdistan’s opposition parties are divided and extremely weak. The Change Movement, known under its Kurdish name Gorran, advocates for a more powerful parliament and a dismantling of the ruling duopoly and threatened to displace the PUK in Sulaymaniyah a decade ago. But Gorran is now a shell of its former self amid infighting and a decision to enter into government with the KDP and PUK. More recent upstarts, such as the New Generation Movement, offer little hard policy detail alongside populist gimmicks. Fears of electoral fraud are pervasive among voters, and opposition parties exploit these when they do poorly. Both the KDP and PUK restrict freedom of expression within their zones of control, forcibly preventing protests from taking place. Iraqi Kurdish journalists are regularly arrested or otherwise blocked from covering the news; a local watchdog catalogued at least 431 violations last year. Faced with restricted political freedoms and a lack of economic opportunity, many Iraqi Kurds feel their best option is to migrate. According to the Summit Foundation, a nongovernmental organization based in Sulaymaniyah, tens of thousands of people leave Iraqi Kurdistan each year, many heading for Europe. Tragically, many migrants from Iraqi Kurdistan have gotten stuck on the Belarus-Poland border or drowned in the English Channel. In February, the U.S. consul general in Erbil warned of “backsliding in the areas of human rights, gender-based violence, the rule of law, equal treatment for women, [and] equal opportunities for members of Kurdistan’s minority community.” The result is profound political disillusionment among Iraqi Kurds. Sherko Azad Ali was born in 2002, just before the U.S.-led invasion, and lives in Chamchamal. He said people in Iraqi Kurdistan want to work for the advancement of the region, but “most citizens hate politics and do not think about it because [the authorities] don’t even give citizens basic rights.” Ali spends his mornings studying to become a physical education teacher at a local institute and volunteers as a soccer referee in his free time. While he is excited about his career, he knows it will not be an easy road. “Most of my peers do security work or are employed with the help of an authority figure. Middle-class and poor people, even if they can find a job, can’t make a living,” Ali told Foreign Policy. “I think the people in power in this region only care about their own interests. The rich work for themselves and oppress the poor.” Iraqi Kurdistan’s democratic deficit and economic dysfunction are a result of its self-interested political leadership. These leaders are enabled by Western officials, who routinely hail their “special and strong” relationship with Erbil but rarely and only mildly publicly rebuke their partners’ abuses and poor governance. These sorts of statements conflate the interests of the region’s political leadership and those of the Iraqi Kurdish people, to the latter’s detriment. The United States and its Western partners have tremendous leverage over the KRG but seem unwilling to use it. For instance, they have put a great deal of weight behind Peshmerga reform—which the ruling parties support rhetorically but resist in practice because partisan security forces are key to their patronage networks. Washington supplies funds to pay some Peshmerga stipends and could make these conditional on reform to break the logjam. Some prominent Kurdish leaders and their business associates also have significant assets in Western countries that could be targeted to deter corruption. A lower-cost approach would be for Western diplomats to vocally and publicly call out abuses within Iraqi Kurdistan as soon as they occur—and show solidarity with front-line rights defenders such as women’s rights activists and jailed journalists. Doing so would be in Western governments’ interest: It is well established that poverty, lack of opportunity, and restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly are incubators of instability and conflict. It would also help European countries tackle some of the root causes of migration. Although Iraqi Kurdistan has been relatively more stable than other parts of Iraq since 2003, that stability is not guaranteed. Without such a change in approach, Mamshai foresees “more division and fragmentation” and “the further decline of political freedoms, democratic values, and violation of human rights principles” in Iraqi Kurdistan. This would be a grave injustice for the Iraqi Kurdish people, who have made many sacrifices in the past 20 years in the fight against dictatorship and extremism in Iraq.

Iraq to activate $27 billion deal with TotalEnergies

The Iraqi Minister of Oil, Hayan Abdul-Ghani, said on Sunday that the talks Iraq is holding with the giant French energy company, TotalEnergies, to resolve the outstanding points in a delayed deal worth 27 billion USD, reached advanced stages. “We are close to conclude the contract,” Abdel-Ghani said at an energy conference. The agreement, which Baghdad hopes will contribute to reviving foreign investment in the country, was signed in 2021 to allow TotalEnergies to build four oil, gas and renewable energy projects with initial investments of 10 billion USD in southern Iraq over 25 years. However, disagreements between Iraqi politicians over the terms of the agreement hindered its implementation. Sources said that Iraq’s request for a 40 percent stake in the project is a major point of contention, as TotalEnergies wants a majority stake, Reuters reported. In response to a question about whether the issue of Iraq’s share in the project has been resolved, Abdul-Ghani said that the time is not appropriate to discuss the matter, adding that the announcement of the shares will take place when an agreement is reached. Abdul-Ghani also mentioned that Iraq is committed to maintaining an oil production rate of 220,000 barrels per day, in line with the quota set by the latest agreement of the OPEC+ alliance to cut production. The Iraqi minister added that Iraq is ready to increase its production if the OPEC+ alliance decides to do so.

Kuwait Agility wins $1.65bln in Korek Telecom arbitration

The case relates to allegations of fraud and corruption by Korek Telecom and its shareholder Barzani Kuwaiti logistics company Agility said the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has awarded damages of $1.65 billion in an arbitration case between its subsidiary Iraq Telecom Ltd. (IT) and its affiliate, International Holdings Limited (TH), and Korek Telecom Limited and Sirwan Saber Mustafa Barzani. The case relates to allegations of fraud and corruption by Korek Telecom Co. and its controlling shareholder, Sirwan Saber Mustafa Barzani, with a view to unlawfully causing the expropriation of IT’s and IH’s $810 million investment in Korek Telecom, Agility, which has been doing business in Iraq for over 20 years, said in a statement on Tuesday. The ICC said that Korek and Barzani are jointly and severally liable for the award, which is final and binding. Tarek Sultan, Agility’s Vice Chairman commented: "We hope that this outcome brings resolution and closure to the issue and that the respondents will now honor their obligations in a manner commensurate with that of businesses operating in countries that respect the rule of law.” Meanwhile, in a statement sent via their communications consultancy Hawthorn Advisors, Korek said they are disappointed by these findings. "Mr Barzani and Korek firmly deny the allegations against them and are considering all options, including whether to seek to set aside the Award. "This is not the end of the matter, and the company vigorously rejects any allegation that it set out to deceive IT (the joint venture formed by Agility and Orange).”

Nineveh Plains Christians Defend Against the Babiliyoun Militia

Draw Media, The Washington Institute An Iran-backed militia run by a notorious human rights abuser was kicked out of a Christian town after it tried to replace local police leaders. On March 11, 2023, protests broke out in the Iraqi town of Baghdeda (aka Qaraqosh) in the Hamdaniya district of the Nineveh Plains, with the local Christian population rebuffing an attempted takeover by the militia Kataib Babiliyoun (KB), the 50th Brigade of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The proximate cause of the clash was an effort by KB commander Osama al-Kildani, brother of the U.S.-designated human rights abuser Rayan al-Kildani, to take command of a base belonging to the Emergency Response Unit of the Nineveh Plains Protection Units (NPU), an approximately 500-strong Christian regiment made up of local men. Acting with the backing of Archbishop Younan Hanno and all the other top Christian leaders in the Nineveh Plains, local citizens gathered at the Bishopric of the Syriac Catholic Church in Baghdeda and marched against the KB convoy, forcing them out of the town. Public anger toward the militia has steadily grown on account of its longstanding involvement in the corrupt shakedown of locals at checkpoints, its harassment of women, and its attempts to replace local officials with KB loyalists. These abuses formed the basis of a U.S. designation of the brigade's founder, Rayan al-Kildani, on July 18, 2019. Despite the Christian facade provided by the Kildani family and some unit commanders, KB is not the Christian brigade it portrays itself to be. It is manned almost exclusively by non-Christians, mostly Shia Muslims from southern Iraq. Using financial support from Iran and an election campaign centered on vote-buying, KB's political branch, the Babylon Movement, was able to double its national parliamentary representation in the 2021 polls and now controls four of the five seats reserved for Christians. Christian antipathy toward KB has been building ever since Iraqi forces liberated the area from the Islamic State in 2017. At the time, KB personnel were proven to have looted Christian artifacts from the Mar Behnam Monastery, spurring the prime minister to expel the militia from the entire Hamdaniya district. Yet KB retained control over the heavily Christian Tal Kayf district. Following the 2021 election, KB once again sought to expand its military presence in Hamdaniya, where the NPU was reorganized into a sub-unit of the brigade that year against the wishes of NPU personnel. Aiming to exploit international inattention, KB has been preparing a wider move against the NPU and recently engaged in a public spat with Patriarch of the Chaldean Catholic Church, Cardinal Louis Raphael Sako. Bolstered by strong solidarity among the Christian community and the leading bishops of the Nineveh Plains, the NPU submitted a petition on March 13 to be removed from the KB brigade's order of battle and restored to its prior status: as a Tribal Mobilization Force under the Nineveh Operations Command. Yet during the March 14 separation negotiations at the PMF provincial office in Mosul, seven members of the NPU delegation were seized under charges of insulting the PMF and sent to Baghdad. Although they were released two days later, this is unlikely to be the last retaliatory action by Kataib Babiliyoun

'You don’t solve issues by running away,' says Iraq's KRG PM

Masrour Barzani, in an exclusive interview with Al-Monitor, discusses the dispute with the rival PUK party; relations with the US and Iraq; China; and the KRG’s ambitious economic reform and climate policies. Masrour Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG), says that political and economic disputes should be resolved within the KRG Council of Ministers, not by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) ministers boycotting the government. “I hope they will eventually come back to the government,” said Barzani, who is a deputy president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), in an exclusive and wide-ranging interview with Al-Monitor at his office in Salahuddin. “They [the PUK ministers] have sworn an oath before the parliament, before the people of Kurdistan,” he said. “You don’t solve issues by running away, by not shouldering responsibility.” The KDP and the PUK, as well as the Gorran (Change) Party, form a coalition government in the Kurdistan Region. The KDP holds 45 seats in the Kurdistan Regional parliament; the PUK holds 21, and Gorran 12 in the 111 seat chamber. The PUK has boycotted KRG Council of Ministers meetings since October 2022. The real reason for the impasse, said Barzani, is the murder of Hawker Abdullah Rasoul, a former PUK intelligence officer, in Erbil last year. “The PUK has not been cooperative,” in the case, he noted, and to shift focus away from the assassination, “they are exaggerating other problems, like financial and power-sharing issues. These have always existed.” “Rather than mixing all the issues together, they need to focus on solving the political and financial issues through the Council of Ministers and let the courts and legal system handle the murder case,” he added. “I have officially asked the PUK, during the Cabinet of Ministers meetings, to return to the government,” said Barzani. “So, I hope they come back to the government and discuss whatever concerns they have. We can solve any issues through dialogue in the council’s meetings. There is no other way.” 'Nothing should be at the expense of delaying elections' The schism has a sense of urgency because parliamentary elections, which had been scheduled for last year, have been postponed, a delay which could, over time, undercut the legality of KRG political institutions, as the prime minister’s father, KDP President Masoud Barzani, told Al-Monitor in an exclusive interview earlier this week. “For all political parties, whatever their problems are, they have to look at different ways of settling their issues, but nothing should be at the expense of delaying the elections,” the prime minister said. “The elections must happen this year.” The US should take credit for the Kurdistan Region’s success The Kurdistan Region has been a close partner of the United States before, during, and after, the US war to overthrow former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Barzani’s personal and professional ties with the United States run deep. He is an honors graduate of the American University in Washington, where he established the Barzani Scholar-in-Residence program. As general director of the Protection and Intelligence Agency, and later as chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council, overseeing security, military intelligence and existing intelligence services, he worked closely with American counterparts in the fight against terrorism, including and especially the Islamic State (IS) after 2014. “We want better relations, more engagement, more investment. The Kurds and the US share common values and principles. We are a natural ally and hoped for more support,” Barzani said, speaking about current ties with the United States. “The US should be promoting and take credit for all the success of the Kurdistan Region due to their direct and positive engagement,” he noted. “The Kurdistan Region should be used as an example of the positive role that the US can play in the region. Without their direct engagement over the past 30 years, we would not have all you see today. It’s an economic success story.” “The US did a great job liberating Iraq from tyranny and the brutal dictatorship,” he said. “But over the years, the influence of US engagement has declined. In its absence, other actors have filled the vacuum, which has not been helpful.” “We want the US to consider Kurdistan as a strong, credible ally, and recognize us as a friend that shares the same values and principles,” said Barzani. “We are regularly paying a heavy price for that friendship. We need more support: politically, economically and security.” “There are great opportunities in the Kurdistan Region for more US investment,” he added. “We are rich in natural resources and human resources. Potential for growth is beneficial to both the Kurdish people and US companies.” 'China is looking at the entire Middle East' Regarding the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian agreement, Barzani said that “any initiative to ease tensions in the region is welcomed. We support any initiatives to bring peace and dialogue to resolve issues.” “China is looking at the entire Middle East, and expanding their influence in many countries in the region. Their proposals and their promises to deliver is very tempting. Here [in the Kurdistan Region], they have made some proposals and there are some discussions about doing some projects.” 'Positive atmosphere' in talks with Baghdad Barzani noted a “positive atmosphere” regarding talks that led this week to the Iraq Council of Ministers submitting a budget to the Federal Council of Representatives, or parliament, which includes a 12.6% allocation for the Kurdistan Region. “There has been great improvement on the budget negotiations,” said Barzani. “It’s not exactly what we wanted, but I think it's a workable budget.” Iraq had been operating without a budget since 2021, and under an emergency food security law since last year.   ‘The whole country will benefit from it,” said Barzani. “We have already expressed our support to this budget. I hope that parliament will pass it as is. This will be the beginning of a much more constructive relationship, not only between the KRG and Baghdad, but also between Baghdad and other provinces, and to start a new economic revitalization.” Barzani noted that the "positive atmosphere” in the budget talks could facilitate progress toward a long elusive national oil law, noting that many of the problems of the past were “politically motivated.” “There were some drafts in the past, but they were never passed by the parliament,” he said. For Barzani and the KRG, the key is that a national hydrocarbon law reflects the Kurdistan Region’s rights in the Iraqi Constitution. “We have said many times that we will work with the federal government to implement the constitution as written. The hydrocarbon law must be consistent with the Kurdistan Region's rights in the constitution,” said Barzani. “Preserving our rights will be our priority. I think there is a way forward to find a solution that’s workable for both Baghdad and Erbil.” 'You have to deal with the root causes of terrorism' Barzani said that the security situation in the Kurdistan Region, and throughout Iraq, “is better than before, and that’s a good step. Cooperation is important.” Iraq had been ravaged by terrorist groups following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, where al-Qaeda took hold and later IS overran more than half the country in 2014. Barzani cited “a much better relationship” between Iraqi Kurdish and federal Iraqi security forces, including joint operations against IS, for improvement in security. He also said that the threat of terrorism in Iraq and elsewhere remains. “You have to deal with the root causes of terrorism,” said Barzani, “and unfortunately, I think those have not been properly addressed.” Those root causes include poverty, injustice and inequality. People need proper government services and a decent life, Barzani explained. “If the government provides for its people, cares for its people, listens to its people, engages with its people, there is less tendency for people to collaborate with terrorist organizations,” he said. “You also have to fight the ideology of terrorists by introducing a more moderate ideology that gives people incentives and hope for a brighter future.” “Otherwise this will be a never ending cycle,” Barzani added. An aggressive reform agenda “My Cabinet has embarked on an ambitious and aggressive reform program and creating more transparency in government spending, procurement and banking,” said Barzani. “We are diversifying our economy, focusing on expanding our agricultural products, industry and tourism. We are reforming our education and health sectors, and digitalizing government services for our citizens. We have built a state-of-the-art data center, connecting all the projects electronically in a short period of time. We want to be a fully digital government by 2025,” he said. As a sign of this diversification, the Kurdistan Region has expanded agricultural exports. The #Hanar project is sending organic Kurdish pomegranates abroad, which arrived in the Gulf this month. These are the first ever agricultural exports from the Kurdistan Region. Kurdish pomegranates, for which Kurdistan is famous, are now available in four new markets via some of the biggest retailers in the region, opening up new trade opportunities in the Gulf, and creating hundreds of jobs in the Kurdistan Region. The KRG plans to expand this initiative to export other agricultural products including honey, apples and grapes in the near future. A sign of the KRG’s digitization initiative is an electronic payment system for government employees to be completed in two years. Another project is to engage more banks that meet standards for both the US Treasury Department and the Central Bank of Iraq to transform a cash economy to a more transparent electronic banking system. In addition, the KRG has instituted an online visa system and electronic accounts and records for all public and private schools, to be easily accessed by parents. Taking action on climate change Climate change is also central to KRG economic, energy and foreign investment strategy. “We realize the impact of climate change on our region, and we are taking action,” said Barzani. “In Kurdistan, we have done so much that many people don’t know about. It’s an important story to share.” “We are investing in hydropower, clean energy and solar energy. We are looking at alternative energy, not just fossil fuels,” he noted. Barzani discussed plans to build small, medium and relatively large dams to better manage and preserve river waters. “I think engagement in this field, helping us build this infrastructure, build dams to preserve our water resources, will eventually pay off in the long run,” he said. The Kurdistan Region is also ahead of the curve on captured flared gas, a major polluter and contributor to climate change. “We are the first place in Iraq to capture flared gas. Rather than continue to waste it, we want to transform into energy," said Barzani. “And we have a very aggressive program, talking to all the International Oil Companies and other partners about reducing flared gas emissions.”

'No pretext to delay' Iraqi Kurdistan parliament elections, says Masoud Barzani

In an exclusive interview with Al-Monitor at his headquarters in Salahuddin, in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), saw no reason to further delay Kurdistan's parliamentary elections, and expressed hope that a "positive atmosphere" surrounding recent talks between the Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on the budget could be conducive for talks on a long elusive oil law. “I wouldn’t say the budget decision is 100% to our liking, but I believe it is a positive step forward,” said Barzani, who served as president of the Kurdistan Region from 2005 to 2017. The legendary Kurdish leader also discussed relations with the United States; the China-brokered agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia; relations with Iran; the Arab rapprochement with Syria; and the situation of Kurdish communities in Iraq and throughout the region. Barzani’s influence remains hugely impactful in both Kurdish and federal Iraqi politics. The KDP is the dominant party in Iraqi Kurdistan, holding 45 seats in the Kurdistan Regional parliament. The rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) holds 21, with other, smaller parties filling out the remaining seats in the 111-member chamber. The KDP is also a member of the Coalition Framework, the political alliance that forms the current Iraqi government. The KDP holds 31 seats in Iraq's Council of Representatives, or parliament, the third-largest bloc in the 329-member body behind the Iraqi Sunni Progress party (Takadum) (39 seats) and the State of Law Coalition of Shiite parties (38 seats). 'Positive atmosphere' on budget could be conducive for oil talks On Monday, Iraq’s Council of Ministers approved a budget bill for 2023-25, which is now referred to the Iraqi Council of Representatives for ratification. Iraq had been operating without a budget since 2021, and under an emergency food security law since last year. The Kurdistan Region’s share of the Iraqi budget under the proposed legislation is 12.6%, according to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who met with Barzani in Salahuddin on Tuesday. “This issue has been used unjustly against the Kurdistan Region in the past,” said Barzani, referring to a long-standing dispute over what percentage of Iraqi government revenues would be allotted to the Kurdistan Region. “I wouldn’t say the budget decision is 100% to our liking, but I believe it is a positive step forward," he said. Barzani was hopeful that a "positive atmosphere" surrounding the budget talks could possibly mean good news for a long elusive oil law. “Since 2007, the Kurdistan Regional Government has been ready to have that law legislated in parliament,” he said. “Successive governments in Baghdad have until now been backtracking on that, and it hasn’t yet reached a conclusion. But with the current positive atmosphere, I believe this will be conducive to passage of [the oil law] and other pending legislative issues.” 'No pretext to delay' Kurdistan parliamentary elections The tensions between the KDP and the PUK includes a stalemate on elections for a new parliament, which were supposed to have taken place last year. “An election is a must,” said Barzani, “it has to take place, there is no other choice, otherwise the government institutions will lose their legality.” Barzani said he was hopeful following a meeting between the parties in the parliament on Monday to discuss the issue. “There is no other choice, and there is no pretext or reason to delay,” said Barzani. “If any political party wants to create obstacles to elections, they will be isolating themselves. Elections will take place.” US priorities change, but region still viewed with importance Barzani noted that current US priorities may have changed, with China and Ukraine at the top of the national security agenda, but “that doesn’t mean the US is taking things lightly” in Iraq and the Middle East. “You can’t compare current conditions to those of previous eras,” said Barzani, “but the US still views the region with importance.” The Kurdish leader noted that US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin — "a good friend of ours” — visited Iraq last week. Austin, said Barzani, “emphasized that the US is attaching importance to the region and continuing relations and contacts with the players,” adding that “the threat of ISIS [Islamic State] is a continuous one.” China-brokered Iran-Saudi agreement welcome Barzani welcomed the agreement brokered by China between Iran and Saudi Arabia, saying, “Naturally we would like to see an end to tension between regional states. Iran and Saudi Arabia are two important countries in the region.” “Maybe it’s too early to pass judgment, and to say much on it, but at least any efforts to reduce tension is welcome,” said Barzani. Regarding China’s role, Barzani said, “They have been working quietly to fill some of the gaps that are being left behind.” “Hopefully the agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a sign that Iran is moving away from the language of intimidation and threat, and toward dialogue and diplomacy, to accommodate the views of others and to settle issues through common understanding,” Barzani said. Kurdistan region not part of 'score settling' with Iran Asked about the Iranian missile attacks on the Kurdistan Region last year, Barzani said, “[They] were totally unjustified, and the accusations were baseless.” Iran accused the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and the Government of Iraq, of not preventing armed Iranian Kurdish opposition groups from launching attacks in Iran during the protests following the death in custody of Mahsa Amini for a hijab violation in September 2022. “Some of the institutions in Iran — in order to cover their own failures in the country — were trying to find an external scapegoat,” said Barzani. “Iran is a neighbor, we do not want to have any tension with them, and we want to have as normal relations as possible,” he added. “We are not part of the skirmishes or settling scores [with Iran],” said Barzani. “We cannot allow our territory to be a base to threaten the security of our neighbors.” Syria needs end to cycle of violence Barzani welcomed the steps by Arab states to reengage Syria. “Since 2011, Syria has witnessed a chaotic situation, with killings, displacement, refugees and mass destruction,” said Barzani. "But there hasn’t been any indication of what may come next,” referring to efforts and hopes for regime change for the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. “Who’s going to be the alternative?” asked Barzani. “There are no clear answers, and no clarity in policies, for the future of Syria.” With the Arab rapprochement, “there could be some stability to the country and at least end the cycle of violence and return to a degree of normality,” he said. States need to recognize Kurdish rights and identities Barzani reflected on the situation of the Kurdish people not just in Iraq, but throughout the region. “The Kurds are one nation, that has to be said,” noted Barzani, who is the son of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, widely revered as the primary political and military leader of the Kurdish movement until his death in 1979. Barzani recounted how the Western powers, after World War I, gave and then retracted self-determination to the Kurds, with the Kurdish people ending up divided among a number of states. “There has been continuous oppression and injustice against the Kurds,” Barzani added, “leading to killings, wars and conflict. But the Kurds managed to survive.” “The lesson should be, for oppressive governments, that there will be no solution through oppression and violence,” said Barzani. “The answer instead lies in pragmatism, finding common ground and using nonviolent means.” The experience of the Kurds in Iraq, where the Kurdistan Region is an autonomous government within the state, may not apply directly to other states, Barzani observed. “Each Kurdish region has its characteristics, status and circumstances within the countries they live,” added Barzani. “We therefore cannot say that the model in Iraq can be a template, or blueprint for Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iran. Solutions have to be found in those countries.” “All of the states should move away from the policies of oppression, suppression and denial, and the Kurdish groups or movements should not take to violence,” the Iraqi Kurdish leader said. “There has to be common ground for dialogue to find a solution so that the Kurds in those countries can enjoy their democratic rights and identities.”

Netherlands Ambassador to Iraq visited Draw Media

Draw Media The Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherland, Hans Sandee and a team of the Netherlands Embassy visited Draw Media. The Ambassador of the Netherland said: “I was very pleased to visit Draw Media Organization today to discuss the issue of freedom of expression and the role of independent media.” Regarding the election in the Kurdistan region The Ambassador said, “It’s important that the general elections will take place, if it takes place, it's only one thing that definitely I can encourage”.

British Ambassador and British Consul General visited Draw Media

Draw Media British Ambassador to Iraq, Mark Bryson-Richardson, British Consul General, in Erbil, Rosy Cave, and the British Consulate team visited Draw Media. In an interview with Draw Media, the British Ambassador said: “It’s been an honor on arriving in Sulaymaniyah to come straight here to Draw media organization to hear about the valuable work you do”. Regarding the negotiations between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad, he said the important thing is that there is progress in the negotiations and both sides are still continuing their talks. The British Ambassador also discussed the current negotiations between the Kurdish parties about the Kurdistan elections and he said: “We have made it clear that the election is a crucial part of democracy and we have been following the conversation closely about that.” The British ambassador added that, “Some agreements have been reached, so I am hoping to see elections will take place soon.”

The quota seats…Point of Election Conflict

Draw Media Religious and ethnic minorities quota seats have become the main problem facing the parties for the sixth session of the Kurdistan Parliament. Some are in favor of distributing the quota seats among the provinces. Others believe that the minorities’ representation in Parliament do not express their opinions and are monopolized by the political parties. The total number of votes obtained by the minorities in the first round of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections was (11 thousand 971) votes. In the last parliamentary elections, their total votes increased to 23 thousand 165 votes. The share of the minorities in the Kurdistan Parliament is one of the points of contention between the political parties and some call it the "The Knotty Spot of the elections." Some parties believe that the quota seats are monopolized by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and in parliament, the representatives of the minorities decide in their interests. Therefore, some parties are in favor of dividing the quota seats among the constituencies, so that a Turkmen seat for Kfri district and a Christian seat for Sulaymaniyah province. In Iraq, 2.3% of the seats in the House of Representatives are reserved for some communities. But others have not been given any political opportunities. In the Kurdistan Region, 10% of the seats in parliament are allocated to the communities. These figures do not fully reflect the rights of minorities, since the voices of minorities are rising from time to time, they say that those appointed in parliament do not represent the communities. This is despite the fact that the Yazidis and Kakais, who are largely residents of the Kurdistan Region, have no representation in the Kurdistan Parliament. According to Article 36 of the Kurdistan Parliamentary Election Law No.1 of 1992, amended: First, five seats will be allocated to the Chaldeans, Syrians and Assyrians. Second, five seats will be allocated to the Turkmen. Third, one seat will be allocated to Armenians. Now the main point of disagreement between the political parties, especially the PUK, the opposition and the independents Now the main point of disagreement between the political parties, especially the PUK, the opposition and the independents against the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is the distribution of community seats and voter registration for communities.

Kurdistan gas and diversification

On the journey from Dubai to Erbil by plane and Dohuk by road for the MEPS Forum, the energy, environmental, and economic challenges of Iraq and the Kurdistan region are written in the landscape. Gas flares around Basra, Kirkuk, and Dohuk mark the site of major oil fields. Harnessing that natural gas productively is the first step to a cleaner and more diversified national economy. The participants at the MEPS Forum discussion on energy included students from the American University of Kurdistan in Dohuk and elsewhere in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and from the rest of the country. They were keenly interested in the role of oil and gas in their national economy, the implications for the future of Iraq, and the “resource curse.” Without revisiting the extensive literature on the “resource curse,” its reality, and manifestations, it is undeniable that Iraq displays several of the classic signs associated with high dependence on petroleum exports. Oil makes up 99% of Iraq’s exports. The government sector is heavily overstaffed, often in patronage-based and unproductive roles; corruption, rent-seeking, and the ethno-sectarian and partisan allocation of political and civil service positions are endemic. A truly independent private sector barely exists. Non-oil activities, such as agriculture and industry, have been neglected. At the same time, sectors that in some petro-states are well-funded and effective, such as electricity, public education, and health care, are also in very poor shape. Kurdistan Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, interviewed at the MEPS Forum by Karen Young, senior research scholar at Columbia’s Center on Global Energy Policy, recognized these problems: “Iraq and Kurdistan Region shouldn't only rely on oil and gas.” He pointed to diversification in agriculture, tourism, and other sectors. The KRI already attracts a reasonable level of tourism from the rest of Iraq and from Iran. Iraq faces other problems that are not caused by its petroleum dependence, but which its ineffective government struggles to solve: a legacy of violent conflict and insurgency, the lack of a state monopoly over paramilitary groups, interference and intervention by its neighbors (mostly Iran, but also Turkey), water shortages, and land degradation. The KRI is in many ways better off than the rest of Iraq, with better infrastructure and greater safety and security. Nevertheless, it displays many of these symptoms in microcosm. It suffers from several other problems beyond those of Iraq as a whole. It does not have its own currency and cannot issue sovereign debt. As a landlocked entity, it is dependent on problematic neighbors — war-torn Syria, sanctioned Iran, federal Iraq, and Turkey — for imports and exports. The legality of its own hydrocarbon sector and exports have been a topic of debate and dispute ever since the ratification of the 2005 constitution. In February 2022, the federal Supreme Court, in a ruling widely seen as politicized, declared that the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) own oil and gas law of 2007 was unconstitutional. Apart from the KRG’s own oil sales — which are under episodic legal pressure from Baghdad — it relies on transfers from the federal budget, which are often late or entirely absent, unpredictable in size, and subject to political wrangling. It has 1.3 million public servants from a population of about 6.3 million. It has accumulated debts variously quoted at $17-31 billion, to public employees in unpaid salaries, oil traders and producers, electricity companies, Iraqi banks, and others. Mr. Barzani remarked that the KRG was assembling a team to go to Baghdad and “settle all outstanding issues” with the new federal government formed in October. He complained of “illegal actions” taken by the government, and said they should work together to write a new national hydrocarbon law, which has been a perennial sore point since a draft in May 2007, followed by two further drafts in 2011, none of which were ever approved. The KRI is also damaged by an increasingly deep and bitter division between the two leading parties — the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) based in Erbil in the north, to which Mr. Barzani belongs and which dominates the government and the oil sector, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Sulaymaniyah in the south of the KRI. Most of the KRI’s major gas fields are located in areas controlled by the PUK. Although the two parties have exercised a fairly constructive duopoly over the KRG since 2003, and worked together to promote Kurdish interests in the federal authorities in Baghdad, their relationship has deteriorated as the PUK has gradually declined in power and influence. Regional elections due in October 2022 have been delayed for a year, and activists and observers complain of a worsening situation for democracy and independent media. The issue of diversification is difficult but urgent, given increasingly tight global climate policies, the advances of non-fossil technologies, and the limited lifespan of the KRI’s oil resources. Iraq as a whole has a ratio of oil reserves to production of almost 100 years, and could make substantial new finds with additional exploration. It will be one of the world’s leading oil producers out to mid-century and beyond, when the world is supposed to be nearing net-zero greenhouse gas emissions to meet its climate goals. But within this, the KRI produces about 400,000-450,000 barrels per day of oil, that is, about a tenth of the national total. Its fields are smaller and more geologically challenging than those in southern Iraq and there have been almost no sizeable discoveries in recent years. It is therefore faced much more imminently with the challenge of diversifying its economy, exports, and government budget revenues. Using natural gas productively is an essential first step in that diversification. It might sound paradoxical, given that many hydrocarbon-dependent countries group the fossil fuels together, and seek to move into renewables, hydrogen, and other new energy systems. But Iraq is at the stage its Gulf neighbors were in the 1970s; it has to walk before it can run. Iraq produces about 3 billion cubic feet per day of associated gas — the gas dissolved in oil that bubbles out when the oil comes to surface. Only about half of this is captured and used productively, mostly for electricity generation. The rest is burnt off, damaging the health of neighboring communities with air pollution, and releasing the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide and methane. Yet at the same time, Iraq suffers from chronic power deficits and shortages of gas that oblige it to burn oil for power — cutting its export earnings — and to buy expensive and unreliable gas from neighboring Iran. Peak power demand in “federal” (non-KRI) Iraq is estimated at more than 34 gigawatts (GW), but the country struggles to generate more than 20 GW, and much of this disappears in an antiquated grid. Only the KRI produces significant quantities of non-associated gas — that is, gas extracted independently of oil. The Khor Mor field in the south of the region provides gas to power plants and is currently being expanded. Several other major fields have not been developed yet. The KRI does not suffer as badly from flaring as federal Iraq, but several oil fields are still not connected to processing facilities and pipelines. In January 2022, power equipment company Aggreko announced completion of a project to use flared gas from the Sarqala field in southern Kurdistan to generate 165 megawatts (MW) of electricity. The KRI’s priority is to ensure reliable power generation and then the supply of gas to industry. A pipeline is under construction from Erbil to Dohuk that would bring Khor Mor gas to the under-utilized power plant there, which relies on expensive diesel. However, a number of rocket attacks on Khor Mor, probably intended by Iran-linked groups to pressure the Kurds during the period of government formation in Baghdad, and the KDP-PUK dispute, have held up the project. The development of the region’s gas sector has also suffered from long delays in approving field developments, apparently arbitrary regulatory decisions from the Ministry of Natural Resources, lengthy waits for payment to international oil companies, the lack of infrastructure to gather associated gas, and legal disputes with companies such as the Pearl Petroleum consortium (which operates Khor Mor) and Genel Energy (which held the contracts for the large Miran and Bina Bawi gas fields). These fields contain “sour” gas, that is, gas with a high content of toxic, corrosive hydrogen sulfide. The KRG would need to secure a large, technically-skilled partner to play its intended role of processing and selling such gas resources. And at the moment, the region has no systematic gas market, from which companies can buy and sell with transparent prices and conditions. After satisfying domestic demand, the development of Khor Mor and other fields could give the KRI a gas surplus by the mid to late 2020s. This makes it one of the few regions adjacent to Europe that could supply significant additional quantities of gas by pipeline, helping to replace Russian supplies (Algeria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Azerbaijan are the others, but all face various constraints when it comes to politics or resource availability). Gas from the KRI could go to federal Iraq, helping ease its chronic gas and power deficit and reliance on Iran; it could fuel the region’s under-utilized power plants and so facilitate electricity sales to federal Iraq; or it could go to Turkey and, via Turkey’s pipeline network, to south-eastern Europe and Italy. Once the Khor Mor-Erbil-Dohuk connection is complete, it is only about another 70 kilometers to the Turkish border, and a short distance beyond to the Turkish gas grid. Exports of about 5 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year by 2030, and ultimately about 15 bcm annually, are feasible. This would be a helpful if not huge contribution compared to the 155 bcm supplied by Russia to Europe last year. At recent crude prices, the KRG earns about $10-12 billion per year from oil exports. It might bring in about $2-4 billion annually from large-scale gas exports, after the cost of pipeline tariffs to get to markets in Turkey and beyond — a useful complement to oil, but not transformational. The gas would be important beyond the immediate financial impact, though. It would create a long-lived revenue stream to help replace an eventual — and perhaps imminent — decline in oil output. The domestic use of gas would build the local economy, offering opportunities in areas such as oil refining, cement, ceramics, glass, food processing, and other local industries. More reliable and cleaner electricity would save government and private funds spent on diesel, and improve business and living conditions. Electricity provision is not just a question of gas: The KRI has potential to rehabilitate its hydroelectric dams, and to install more solar power. And becoming a significant gas supplier to Turkey and Europe would heighten the KRI’s geopolitical importance. Given the legal battles, and an ongoing arbitration case between Baghdad and Turkey over use of the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline, gas exports would almost certainly require both Erbil-Baghdad and Erbil-Sulaymaniyah accords. Those are very thorny political disputes. Outside mediation by the U.S. and EU is likely essential. Both these governments have internal policy barriers to funding fossil fuel projects, but they should recognize the unique circumstances and strategic importance of the Iraqi-Kurdish gas and power sector. Robin M. Mills is CEO of Qamar Energy, and author of The Myth of the Oil Crisis.

KRG oil sales, revenues and expenditures between 2021-2022

The oil process in the Kurdistan region in (2022) compared to (2021), according to Deloitte data: • The amount of oil delivered by pipeline decreased by 5%. • The average price of a barrel of oil delivered to customers through pipelines has increased by 43%. • Oil revenues from pipelines increased by 36%. • The total revenue from the sale of oil in both pipelines and domestic has increased by 36%. • The total oil revenue returned to the region has increased by 44%. • The total oil expenditure of the region has increased by 30%. • The total fees for loading, transportation and expenditure of oil exported from the region (32%) decreased. • The average price of 1 barrel of oil sold in the region through pipelines has increased by 43%. • Cheap oil sales in the Kurdistan Region have increased by 41% for the average barrel of oil sold through pipelines. • Accordingly, the amount of oil sold domestically decreased by 7%. • The total value of crude oil and condensate sold domestically increased by (3%).

“Tortured him with electricity and inserted Pepsi bottle in his private parts”

Draw Media "Human Rights Organizations and Human Rights Commission in Parliament are silent" They tortured my son for three nights and three days. “tortured him with electricity, and they inserted Pepsi bottle in his private parts”, Mohammed's father told the media in front of the Erbil court. Mohammed's father said, “My son was sentenced to two years and six months in prison on suspicion of joining ISIS.” He added that, "My son is not a Muslim, has never prayed in his life. I will not go to the mosque myself. We are Marxists.” His brother said: “If you torture a 19-year-old child, for three nights and three days, torture him with electricity, insert bottle in his private parts, break his shoulder, how can he not say that he is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? Mohammed's father talked about the beginning of the story and said that one day they went to Malekian resort. Then the security director of Topzawa called and asked him to bring his son to testify. Later they handed him over to the anti-terrorism agency. The lawyer of the Sentenced prisoners, who is also the father of one of the seven youths sentenced, called the decision of the Erbil court unfair and said there was no evidence, but the judge decided on the basis that they wanted to join ISIS. So far, human rights organizations, the Human Rights Commission, the Human Rights Committee of the Parliament, are silent about how the detainees should be treated in this way.

British minister of state meets with a group of Kurdish journalists

The British Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs met with a group of journalists and NGO’S in Erbil to discuss freedom of expression and women's issues. Lord Tariq Ahmed, British Minister of State for Middle East, Africa, South Asia and the United Nations affairs at the British Foreign Office with Mark Bryson Richardson, British Ambassador to Iraq and Rosie Cave, British Consul General in the Kurdistan Region met with representatives of the media (Metro, Darw, Paragraf) and representatives of women journalists, listened to the journalists on the situation of freedom of expression and violations against journalists and women.

The Kurdistan Regional Government owes $3.348 billion to oil companies

Draw Media In (2022) the Kurdistan Regional Government has paid back $ 1 billion and 115 million to the oil companies, which due to falling oil prices and the coronavirus could not be paid on time. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has repaid $331.104 million in loans to the companies in the first three months of last year, including $206.4 million to oil producing companies and $125 million to Turkish Companies. In the second quarter of last year, $422.465 million was repaid to oil companies in the Kurdistan Region, while in the third quarter, $194.220 million was repaid. In the last three months of last year, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has repaid $167 million and 478 thousand debts to oil companies. In addition to repaying the debts of both Turkish energy company and Turkish Petroleum Company The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) repaid $990.267 million to the other oil companies last year. Last year, an average of 9 percent of the oil sales were paid back to previous debts of the companies, which currently (KRG) owes $3.348 billion to oil companies.

The oil values in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region in 2022

Draw Media Based on Deloitte reports, compared to the data of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the measures of SOMO, the value of oil in (Iraq and the Kurdistan Region) and the (KRG oil through SOMO) in 2022 is as follows; 🔹 The average cost of a barrel of oil in the Kurdistan Region was more than (45.93) dollars and in Iraq (13.38) dollars, in other words (54%) of the revenue of every barrel of oil went to the cost of the process and in Iraq only (14%) was the cost of the process. 🔹 If the Kurdistan Region had sold oil at the price and cost of SOMO, then instead of (39.06) dollars per barrel, (82.16) dollars would remain, that is, instead of returning 5 billion and 709 million dollars to the government treasury, (11 billion) dollars would return to the government treasury. First, compare the oil prices of the Kurdistan Region and Iraq in According to the analysis, the Iraqi government in 2022, through the Iraqi Oil Marketing Company (SOMO) sold an average of $ 95.54 per barrel, the total value of oil sold was (115 billion 466 million 245 thousand) dollars. According to Duraid Abdullah, researcher and expert; “Foreign Oil Companies have 20% share out of 70% of the exported Iraq’s oil. "Iraq spent $16.1 billion last year on oil production," he said. According to this analysis, the return rate of Iraqi oil revenue was 86% and 14% went to the cost of oil processing. In other words, an average of $82.16 per barrel of oil sold returned to the Iraqi treasury and $13.38 was spent per barrel. But that is not true for the Kurdistan Region! According to Deloitte, the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2022, through the Kurdistan oil pipeline, sold an average of $ 84.99 per barrel and the total value of oil sold and delivered to foreign buyers (through the pipeline except domestic) was (12 billion 331 million 417 thousand 848) dollars and (90 million 843 thousand 46) dollars from domestic oil sales, but only (5 billion 709 million 704 thousand 87) dollars were put on revenue and the KRG General Treasury (Ministries of Finance and Natural Resources). Accordingly, the return rate of oil revenue was 46% and 54% went to the expenditure of the oil process. In other words, only $39.06 per barrel of oil sold in the Kurdistan region returned to the general treasury and $45.93 was spent per barrel of oil for the production process.