.jpg)
Eleven trillion dinars for salaries
In the tables of the Iraqi budget: (20) trillion dinars have been allocated for the expenditures of the Kurdistan region _ (11 trillion 576 billion) dinars for salaries _ Monthly (964) billion dinars for the salaries of employees According to the tables published by the Iraqi government submitted to the parliament to approve the share of the Kurdistan Region in the 2024 budget: Total expenditure: (20 trillion 910 billion 463 million 950 thousand) dinars: - Salary expenditure: (9 trillion 556 billion 348 million) dinars - Social welfare salaries: (2 trillion 20 billion 173 million) dinars - Total salaries of the Kurdistan Region: (11 trillion 576 billion 521 million) dinars - Monthly: (964 billion 710 million) dinars - Total operating budget: (14 trillion 840 billion 223 million 778) dinars - Loan amount: (1 billion 116 million) dinars - Investment expenditure: (4 trillion 954 billion 240 million 172 thousand) dinars.
Read more.jpg)
The Kurdistan Region President to set a new date for the elections
The Independent High Electoral Commission is expected to ask the Kurdistan Region President to set a new date for the sixth session of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections. KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani's complaint against the commission members in the Federal Court has postponed the date of elections, which was scheddueled for the June 10. On Tuesday, Iraq's Supreme Federal Court upheld the Supreme Judicial Council's decision to allocate five seats to minorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan region. The court also rejected a plea by Masrour Barzani, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), contesting the seat distributions. The President of the Kurdistan region, Nechirvan Barzani, is expected to announce a new election date soon in coordination with the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). In a step aimed at facilitating the elections, Iraq's parliament extended IHEC's mandate on Wednesday, which would expire on 7 July, for another six months. According to the information obtained by (Draw) in the next few days, the members of the Electoral Commission will meet and ask the Kurdistan Region's President to set a new date for the sixth session of the Kurdistan Parliament. According to the information the Kurdistan Region's President to determine the fifth decree for the sixth session of the Kurdistan Parliament elections, which will be between (15/9 to 15/10) this year. So far, the Kurdistan Region's President has issued four presidential decrees to hold the sixth session of the Kurdistan Parliament.
Read more
Iraq Human Rights Report 2023
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The human rights situation worsened during the year due to increased federal and Kurdistan Regional Government restrictions on fundamental freedoms and civic space. There were intermittent attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and its affiliated cells; sporadic fighting between the Iraqi Security Forces and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in remote areas; Turkish military operations against Kurdistan Workers Party bases in Iraq; the presence of militias not fully under the control of the government, including Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces units; and sectarian, ethnic, and financially motivated violence. Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment by government officials; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for offenses allegedly committed by an individual; serious abuses in a conflict, including attacks resulting in civilian deaths and harm; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests and prosecutions against journalists, censorship, and existence of criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on freedom of movement, including forced returns of internally displaced persons to locations where they faced threats to their lives and freedom; refoulement of refugees to a country where they would face torture or persecution, including serious harm such as a threat to life or freedom or other mistreatment that would constitute a separate human rights abuse; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic violence and other forms of such violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of ethnic minority groups, internally displaced persons, and returnee populations; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and the existence of the worst forms of child labor. The government took some steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses. The government investigated and prosecuted allegations of ISIS atrocities and other abuses and, in some instances, reported the convictions of suspected ISIS members under the counterterrorism law. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person A. ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE AND OTHER UNLAWFUL OR POLITICALLY MOTIVATED KILLINGS There were several reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings. On September 25, militias from the Iran-aligned and government-affiliated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) allegedly shot and killed a popular TikTok gay personality and makeup artist Noor Alsaffar in Baghdad. Prior to the shooting, Alsaffar faced online abuse and harassment regarding sexuality and gender. The government took incremental steps to bring to justice those responsible for extrajudicial killings. For example, on June 25, the Dhi Qar Criminal Court issued a life sentence for Lieutenant Colonel Omar Nazar of the Ministry of Interior Emergency Response Division for suppressing demonstrations in 2019 that led to at least 25 deaths and injured 200 others. Extrajudicial killings by unidentified gunmen and politically motivated violence occurred frequently throughout the country. Three senior officials were killed in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) in July. Police reported that Mohammed Mirza Sinda, a former senior intelligence official linked to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), was killed when his car exploded in the city of Zakho in Duhok Province. The Kurdistan Region Security Council declared the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) responsible for the killing; however, representatives of the People’s Defense Forces, the PKK-armed wing, denied PKK’s involvement. On July 7, militants shot and killed two members of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, based in the north, and wounded another in Sulaymaniya. In May, Karwan Gaznay, a Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) politician, stated he survived an attempt on his life. Nongovernmental militias and ISIS affiliates engaged in killings. Human rights organizations reported that Iran-aligned PMF militia groups engaged in killing, kidnapping, and extortion throughout the country, particularly in ethnically and religiously mixed provinces. Human rights activists, particularly those who criticized politicians and militia groups, said they faced harassment. On May 25, human rights activist Omar Adil al-Qasisi survived an attempt to kill him in Diyala after an armed group severely attacked and beat him. On January 1, ISIS killed two persons it had kidnapped in Kirkuk in 2021. An investigation remained underway at the end of the year. B. DISAPPEARANCE There were reports of disappearances perpetrated by or on behalf of government authorities, including Federal Police and PMF units. In April and September, the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances urged the government to address the needs and rights of victims, including incorporating enforced disappearances as a separate offense in national legislation to aid in prosecution, establishing a comprehensive search and investigation strategy, and ensuring all detainees were registered. The Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights stated that nearly 12,000 Iraqi families had submitted reports of missing persons between 2017 and 2023, emphasizing that the actual total number was likely much higher. On August 30, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported receiving 994 tracing requests for missing persons during the first half of the year. The fate and whereabouts of 171 persons were determined and five persons were reunited with their families abroad. In June, Amnesty International urged authorities to take concrete action to determine the whereabouts of at least 643 men and boys who were forcibly disappeared in June 2016 by PMF units during operations to retake Fallujah from ISIS. Amnesty International noted that no units had been held accountable for the disappearances. C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, AND OTHER RELATED ABUSES The federal constitution prohibited torture and forced confessions, and there were credible reports that government officials employed them. The law did not provide the legal framework and procedural safeguards to prevent torture. Torture in jails, detention facilities, and prisons was often hidden from effective legal oversight. The law did not define what types of conduct constituted torture and gave judges full discretion to determine whether a defendant’s confession was admissible, often without regard for the way it was obtained. Courts routinely accepted forced confessions as evidence, which in some ISIS-related counterterrorism cases was the only evidence considered. Numerous reports from local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) indicated government officials employed torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Federal Police, the PMF, and certain units of the KRG Asayish internal security services operated without accountability. The KRG, however, took significant steps to uphold the rule of law in its security apparatus, such as training more than 400 Peshmerga officers and employees in human rights, gender sensitivity, and civilian protection. There were credible reports government forces, including Federal Police, the National Security Service (NSS), and the PMF, abused and tortured individuals – particularly Sunni Arabs – during arrest and pretrial detention and after conviction. Former prisoners, detainees, and international human rights organizations documented cases of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in detention facilities run by the Ministry of Interior and, to a lesser extent, by the Ministry of Defense. According to government forensics officials, some victims showed signs of extensive beatings, including bone fractures. Local NGOs reported deaths at pretrial detention facilities, deportation prisons, and prisons due to the continuation of systemic torture and the poor conditions in detention centers. In May, the former head of the anti-corruption “Committee 29” General Abu Ragheef was arrested and detained following an “explicit directive” from the interior minister amid allegations of corruption and inhuman practices. Beginning in 2021, detainees disclosed to officials allegations of torture by Committee 29 to obtain confessions. In June, the prime minister approved the recommendations of a special investigative committee to hand over the investigative documents of Committee 29 to the judiciary to ensure accountability. Qassim Hamoud Mansour, a government official arrested by the committee, died in the hospital; pictures reviewed by journalists showed evidence of blunt force trauma to Mansour’s head and his teeth having been knocked out. Medical records and photographs reportedly corroborated injuries other detainees allegedly sustained while in custody. Torture methods detailed by press and corroborated by human rights observers included beatings with metal poles and electric shocks to detainees’ genitalia. In August, Human Rights Watch reported deaths occurred on a weekly basis inside government prisons as a result of torture, beatings, or malnutrition, especially al-Hout prison in Dhi Qar Province and al-Rusafa central prison and al-Hilla prison. Prisons also recorded incidents of suicide, and parliamentarians warned of “systemic torture” in prisons. Nazila Maroufian, an Iranian Kurdish journalist, claimed she was tortured for 13 days in January in Sulaymaniyah prison. The Head of the NGO Strategic Center for Human Rights, Fadel al-Gharawi, noted in November 2022 that the Prime Minister’s Office had created a committee to receive complaints of torture in prisons. No information was publicly available regarding the committee’s work or the number of complaints it had received at year’s end. In August, the Ministry of Justice announced an investigation into a video clip posted on social media purporting to show a prisoner who was tortured to death inside the Taji central prison north of Baghdad. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison and detention center conditions were harsh and occasionally life threatening due to food shortages, gross overcrowding, physical abuse, inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care, and the threat of communicable illnesses. Abusive Physical Conditions: The number of alleged ISIS members detained by the government exacerbated systemic overcrowding in government-run prisons. The Iraqi Correctional Service, part of the Ministry of Justice, administered 29 facilities in the country. The Justice, Defense, and Interior Ministries operated 24 detention facilities. The Counter Terrorism Service also ran at least one pretrial detention facility. In April, the Ministry of Justice confirmed that government prisons were at 300 percent of capacity. The Ministry of Justice announced the dismissal of the director of Rusafa prison after acknowledging the prison was at 400 percent capacity. Members of the Council of Representatives (COR) Human Rights Committee denounced the situation in women’s prisons as a human rights violation, noting the majority of inmates came from ISIS-related families. According to the Ministry of Justice, authorities detained children up to age 12 with mothers alleged to have an ISIS affiliation. By some reports, 100 children were in detention with their mothers during the year. Reports alleged an estimated 60 adult inmates died. In May, at least 400 women in a high-security prison in Baghdad went on a hunger strike to protest their convictions as members of ISIS after allegedly unfair trials and to highlight poor prison conditions. Amnesty International reported courts imposed long prison terms and death sentences in ISIS-linked cases “following convictions based primarily on torture-tainted confessions.” Human Rights Watch reported 13 prisoners were executed on December 25 in Nasiriyah prison. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), most of the men were convicted of terrorism and executed without transparency, advance notice, and the inability to call their families or lawyers. HRW cited this as the first “mass execution” since the practice was largely halted under the previous government in 2020. In September, Musab al-Alusi, a fellow at the Gulf International Forum, reported authorities kept inmates in detention for long periods before their sentences were issued, and security guards exposed detainees to various types of torture. He added that militias, political parties, tribal factions, and other factions maintained dozens of “secret detention facilities” where they practiced systemic torture. In July, the Ministry of Justice acknowledged the spread of diseases in prisons due to overcrowding and stated it would coordinate with the Ministry of Health to improve the health conditions of prisoners. The ministry explained “the health situation inside prisons” was “one of the most prominent obstacles facing the ministry’s work,” as “diseases have spread among inmates” as a result of overcrowding. International and local human rights groups reported authorities in numerous instances denied family visits to detainees and convicts. In many cases, the families of inmates had to pay large bribes to visit their relatives in person. Guards allegedly demanded bribes or beat detainees when detainees asked to call their relatives or legal counsel. Across the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), there were six correctional centers, three for detained men and three for detained women and juveniles. The centers designated for women and juveniles held both pretrial detainees and prisoners, while pretrial detained men were held at police station detention facilities throughout the IKR. The total number of detainees incarcerated exceeded the designated capacity across all facilities by 157 percent. According to KRG officials, the prison population was 4,922, of whom 181 were juveniles. In some detention centers and police-run jails, KRG authorities occasionally held juveniles in the same cells as adults, as in the IKR the minimum age for legal responsibility was 11. The Independent Human Rights Commission Kurdistan Region, an independent commission under the KRG parliament, reported IKR correctional centers suffered from long-term problems of overcrowding, inadequate water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities, use of violence during preliminary detention, and outdated infrastructure at women’s and juvenile centers. The limited medical staff was unable to provide adequate medical services to all prisoners. Administration: The federal government and the KRG reported they took steps to address allegations of mistreatment in government-administered prison and detention facilities, but the extent of these steps was not known. KRG officials reported detention facilities in the IKR were monitored by the ICRC and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and that detainees could report cases of torture through the prison administration, the public prosecutor, or human rights organizations. Despite concerns being raised, authorities ignored physical signs of torture, and the complaints procedures appeared to be neither fair nor effective. Many detainees chose not to report mistreatment due to a lack of trust in authorities or fear of reprisals. Independent Monitoring: Federal Corrections Service prisons allowed regular visits by independent nongovernmental observers. The Ministry of Justice reported 68 visits to adult correctional facilities and 23 visits to juvenile correctional facilities. The Gulf International Forum stated the Ministry of Justice not only prevented human rights organizations from visiting prisons but also refused to reveal the conditions of prisoners. D. ARBITRARY ARREST OR DETENTION The federal constitution and laws prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. Despite such protections, there were numerous reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions, predominantly of Sunni Arabs, including internally displaced persons (IDPs). Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees The law prohibited the arrest or detention of individuals without the order of a judge or court unless law enforcement caught the perpetrator in the act of the criminal offense. The law also prohibited any entity other than legally competent authorities from detaining any person. Local human rights activists, however, reported PMF units sometimes detained persons without warrant. The law required authorities to register the detainee’s name, place of detention, reason for detention, and legal basis for arrest within 24 hours of the detention, a period that could be extended to a maximum of 72 hours in most cases. For offenses punishable by death, authorities could legally detain the defendant as long as necessary to complete the judicial process. The Ministry of Interior was responsible for managing and updating these registers. The law required the Defense and Interior Ministries, as well as the NSS, to establish guidelines for commanders in battlefield situations to register detainees’ details in the central register. Local media and human rights groups reported authorities arrested suspects in security sweeps without warrants, particularly under the antiterrorism law, and frequently held such detainees for prolonged periods without charge or registration. The government periodically released detainees, usually after concluding it lacked sufficient evidence for the courts to convict them, but many others remained in detention pending review of other outstanding charges. The law allowed release on bond for criminal (but not security) detainees. Authorities rarely released detainees on bail. The law provided for judges to appoint free counsel for the indigent. Attorneys appointed to represent detainees frequently complained of insufficient access to their clients that hampered adequate attorney-client consultation. In many cases, detainees could not meet their attorneys before their scheduled trial date. Arbitrary Arrest: There were numerous reports of arbitrary arrest or unlawful detention by government forces, including by ISF, NSS, PMF, and Asayish security forces. There were no reliable statistics available regarding the total number of such acts or the length of detentions. Authorities reportedly often failed to notify family members of the arrest or location of detention, resulting in incommunicado detention if not enforced disappearance. Humanitarian organizations also reported that, in many instances, federal authorities did not inform detainees of the reasons for their detention or the charges against them. Many reports of arbitrary or unlawful detention involved suspected members or supporters of ISIS and their associates and family members. Human rights organizations, activists, and journalists reported frequently that KRG authorities arbitrarily detained journalists, activists, and protesters. Those detained maintained they were not informed of the charges against them and were eventually released without charge, with some reporting mistreatment during detention. In August, KRG Asayish intelligence agents arrested journalist Islam Kashani in Zakho after Kashani criticized the KRG’s alleged corruption and mismanagement of public salaries. He was released two days later, but according to local media reports, authorities did not present a warrant for Kashani’s arrest even though they raided his home after his detention. Pretrial Detention: The law authorized the Ministries of Justice, Defense, Interior, and Labor and Social Affairs to hold pretrial detainees. The security services, which reported directly to the Prime Minister’s Office, could also hold pretrial detainees for a brief period in limited circumstances. Lengthy pretrial detentions were a systemic problem and frequently equaled or exceeded the maximum penalty for the alleged crime without due process or judicial review, particularly for those accused of having ties to ISIS. In September, the Gulf International Forum stated some detainees remained in custody for months or years before rulings were issued, while others remained in detention without charges ever being brought against them. According to observers, the state and individuals brought charges against 28,000 detainees, while 29,000 others were still awaiting charges. According to NGOs, the high number of pretrial detentions was the result of a serious backlog in court hearings, which resulted from several factors, including the large number of detainees, undocumented detentions, slow processing of criminal investigations, an insufficient number of judges and trained judicial personnel, authorities’ inability or reluctance to use bail or other conditions of release, a lack of information sharing, bribery, and corruption. Lengthy pretrial detentions were particularly common in areas liberated from ISIS, where the large number of ISIS-related detainees and use of makeshift facilities led to significant overcrowding and inadequate services. There were reports of detention beyond judicial release dates and unlawful releases. Authorities reportedly held numerous detainees without trial for months or years after arrest, particularly those detained under the antiterrorism law. Authorities sometimes held detainees incommunicado or without access to defense counsel, presentation before a judge, or arraignment on formal charges within the legally mandated period. Prison and detention center authorities also sometimes delayed the release of exonerated detainees or inmates due to lack of prisoner registration or other bureaucratic problems, or extorted bribes from prisoners prior to their release at the end of their sentences. In September, local media reported the stories of six former detainees who spoke of abuse and lengthy pretrial detention in prisons run by the Ministry of Justice, citing that some detainees were forced to pay bribes to receive a trial date and avoid up to three years in pretrial detention. NGOs reported KRG authorities held detainees for extensive periods in pretrial detention. KRG officials noted prosecutors and defense attorneys frequently encountered obstacles in carrying out their work and trials were unnecessarily delayed for administrative reasons. According to the IHRCKR, some detainees remained in KRG internal security service facilities for extended periods even after court orders were issued for their release. Lawyers provided by an international NGO continued to have access to and provide representation to allegedly ISIS-affiliated juveniles who lacked a court-appointed attorney and all unrepresented juveniles in the IKR. E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, but certain articles of law restricted judicial independence and impartiality. The Federal Supreme Court ruled on matters related to federalism and the federal constitution, and a separate Higher Judicial Council managed and supervised the court system, including disciplinary matters. Corruption or intimidation reportedly influenced some judges in criminal cases at the trial level and on appeal at the Court of Cassation. Numerous threats and killings by sectarian, tribal, violent extremist, and criminal elements impaired judicial independence, as judges, lawyers, and their family members frequently faced death threats and attacks. In April, the bar association reported a lawyer was threatened and attacked by the defendants in a lawsuit he had filed. The association stated the attack was part of an increasing trend of attacks against lawyers, ranging between five and 10 per month around the country. The Kurdistan Judicial Council was legally, financially, and administratively independent from the KRG Ministry of Justice, but KRG senior leaders reportedly influenced politically sensitive cases. The IKR’s strongest political parties, KDP and the PUK, also reportedly influenced judicial appointments and rulings. Both local and international human rights organizations asserted judges frequently failed to investigate credible allegations that security forces tortured terrorism suspects and often convicted defendants based solely on coerced confessions. Trial Procedures The federal constitution and law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but the judiciary did not enforce this right for all defendants. Some government officials and international organizations including UNAMI reported trial proceedings fell short of international standards. By law, accused persons had the right to presumption of innocence until proven guilty. International NGOs indicated that judges in ISIS-related cases, however, sometimes reportedly presumed defendants’ guilt based on presence or geographic proximity to ISIS activities, or on a spousal or familial relationship to another defendant. The law required detainees to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them and of their right to a fair, timely, and public trial. Nonetheless, officials routinely failed to inform defendants promptly or in detail of the charges against them. Trials were public, except in some national security cases. Numerous defendants experienced undue delays in reaching trial. The law granted defendants the right to be present at their trial and the right to a privately retained or court-appointed counsel at public expense, if needed. Defendants frequently did not have adequate time or facilities to prepare a defense. Insufficient access to defense attorneys was a serious defect in investigative, trial, and appellate proceedings. This scenario was typical in counterterrorism courts, where judicial officials reportedly sought to complete convictions and sentencing for thousands of suspected ISIS members quickly, including through mass trials. Defendants also had the right under law to the free assistance of an interpreter, if needed. The qualifications of interpreters varied greatly. Some foreign missions provided interpreters to their citizen defendants. When no interpreter was available, judges reportedly postponed proceedings and sent the foreign defendants back to detention. Investigative judges assembled evidence and determined whether matters should be referred to a trial panel. Three judge trial panels reviewed the investigative file, held trials, and adjudicated guilt or innocence. Legally, those accused could not be compelled to testify or confess guilt. Nevertheless, defendants and their attorneys were not always granted access to evidence, or government officials demanded a bribe in exchange for access to the case files. In numerous cases, judges reportedly relied on forced or coerced confessions as the primary or sole source of evidence in convictions, without the corroboration of forensic evidence or independent witness testimony. The law provided for retrials of detainees convicted due to forced or coerced confessions or evidence provided by secret informants, but local organizations reported authorities implemented the law selectively. As of March, Sherwan Sherwani and Guhdar Zebari – two of the “Badinan” detainees, a reference to the area in Duhok Province where Asayish forces and KDP intelligence service Parastin officers arrested dozens of activists, journalists, and protesters in 2020 – remained in prison. Sherwani and Zebari were due for release during the year, but their prison terms were extended after additional charges were levied immediately prior to their scheduled release date. In July, KRG Asayish security forces arrested journalist Omed Baroshki in Duhok after Baroshki held a press conference to criticize the extended sentence issued to Sherwani while calling for protests against the decision. Political Prisoners and Detainees There were reports of political prisoners and detainees. It was difficult to assess individual claims due to lack of government transparency, prevalence of corruption in arrest procedures, slow case processing, and extremely limited access to detainees, especially those held in counterterrorism, intelligence, and military facilities. The government did not consider any incarcerated persons to be political prisoners and declared that all incarcerated persons had violated criminal statutes. Political opponents of the government, however, alleged the government imprisoned individuals for political activities or beliefs under the pretense of criminal charges ranging from corruption to terrorism and murder. Local NGOs reported journalists and political activists faced arrests and harassment throughout the year for statements critical of the government, Iran, and militias. F. TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION Several activists from the 2019 Tishreen movement who lived in exile in foreign countries reported receiving regular threats to their own and their families’ safety, including warnings they would be harmed if they returned to Iraq. Some of the activists moved abroad due to criminal lawsuits they believed were aimed at preventing them from exercising their right of free expression and in retaliation for leading antigovernment protests. G. PROPERTY SEIZURE AND RESTITUTION The federal constitution and law prohibited the expropriation of property, except for the public benefit and in return for just compensation. Home and property confiscations declined during the year, especially property seized from religious or ethnic minority groups or suspected ISIS members. In May, regional news outlets reported extensive commercial property seizures in central Baghdad by Iran-aligned militias Asai’b Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hizballah, and the Badr Organization by threat and intimidation via their affiliated PMF units against property owners. In August, the prime minister directed the Ministry of Interior to open an investigation into these reports of unlawful property seizure. H. ARBITRARY OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE The federal constitution and law prohibited such actions, but there were numerous reports the government failed to respect these prohibitions. Government forces often entered homes without judicial or other appropriate authorization. Authorities reportedly detained spouses and other family members of fugitives – mostly Sunni Arabs wanted on terrorism charges – to compel the fugitives to surrender. I. CONFLICT-RELATED ABUSES Conflict-related abuses stemmed from intermittent attacks by ISIS and its affiliated cells; sporadic fighting between the ISF and ISIS in remote areas; the presence of militias not fully under the control of the government, including certain PMF units; continued conflict between Türkiye and the PKK; and sectarian, ethnic, and financially motivated violence. ISIS carried out sporadic attacks on civilians, often in Shia communities. The government issued multiple formal complaints regarding Turkish incursions into the country’s sovereign territory. Killings: Iraq Body Count, an independent NGO that records civilian deaths in the country, reported 398 civilians killed due to internal conflict through August. There were reports of civilian deaths due to Turkish military operations in the country’s north. In April, media reported two Kurdish civilians were killed in Turkish airstrikes in Duhok. In August, media reported one civilian was killed and one civilian was injured from a Turkish drone strike in Duhok, and four civilians were killed, and one civilian was injured during Turkish airstrikes in Sulaymaniya. In September, media reported security forces confirmed one civilian died and another civilian was injured from a Turkish drone airstrike against alleged PKK targets in the Sangaser subdistrict of Sulaymaniya Province. Despite its territorial defeat in the country, ISIS remained a major perpetrator of atrocities and other abuses. The remaining fighters operated from sleeper cells and strike teams that carried out sniper attacks, ambushes, kidnappings, and killings against security forces and community leaders. These abuses were particularly evident in Anbar, Diyala, and Kirkuk Provinces. On March 26, ISIS claimed responsibility for killing one soldier and injuring another during an attack in Anbar in the west of the country. On June 11, the Ministry of Defense announced an ISIS attack in Kirkuk killed two officers and injured three soldiers. On September 8, ISIS attacked an army checkpoint in northeastern part of the country, injuring a soldier. On November 30, ISIS exploded a roadside bomb and opened fire in a gun attack that killed 11 civilians and wounded rescuers and bystanders in the eastern province of Diyala. Abductions: There were frequent reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of government forces, including the ISF and the PMF, as well as non-PMF militias and criminal groups. On August 3, the president of the IKR confirmed that 2,644 (1,244 women and 1,402 men) of the 6,417 Yezidis kidnapped by ISIS in 2014 remained missing. Members of other minority populations were also victims of human rights abuses committed by ISIS forces. On March 21, journalist, researcher, and human rights activist Elizabeth Tsurkov, a dual Russian-Israeli citizen, disappeared after leaving her Baghdad apartment to conduct research for her dissertation. At years end, no one had heard from her since her disappearance, but a video circulated on WhatsApp in November with Tsurkov “confessing” to promoting Shia-Shia conflict and the Tishreen movement in coordination with “Mossad and the CIA.” Various sources, including a press release from the Israeli Prime Minister’s office accused Kata’ib Hizballah of kidnapping her. Other Conflict-related Abuse: Throughout the year, conflict disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands of persons throughout the country, particularly in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa Provinces. Government forces, including the ISF and PMF, established or maintained roadblocks that reportedly impeded the flow of humanitarian assistance to communities in need, particularly in areas such as the Ninewa Plain and Sinjar in Ninewa Province, where the KRG and central government disputed administrative boundaries. In September, the UN Security Council approved a one-year extension of the mandate of the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL, which was originally established in 2017 to support domestic efforts to hold ISIS accountable for actions that could amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide by collecting, storing, and preserving evidence. Tribal conflicts continued and involved the use of unlicensed weapons, although security authorities confiscated such weapons. The Ministry of Interior, through its Directorate of Tribal Affairs, resolved more than 2,400 tribal conflicts and seized more than 45,000 unlicensed weapons after increased security operations to counter the escalation in violence. The UN’s annual Children and Armed Conflict Report, released on July 5, verified that in 2022 there were 202 grave violations against 173 children (125 boys, 48 girls), including eight children who were victims of multiple violations. By the end of December 2022, “936 children (927 boys, 9 girls) remained in detention on national security-related charges, including for their actual or alleged association with armed groups, primarily Da’esh” (ISIS). Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING FOR MEMBERS OF THE PRESS AND OTHER MEDIA The federal constitution protected freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, albeit with restrictions on expression that authorities assessed violated public order and morality or that expressed support for the banned Ba’ath Party. Media and social activists faced various forms of pressure and intimidation from authorities, making self-censorship the primary limitation on freedom of expression, due to a credible fear of reprisals by the government, political parties, ethnic and sectarian forces, militias, terrorist and violent extremist groups, or criminal gangs. Advocates of freedom of expression stated that because the law did not specifically define what acts violated public order and morality, authorities could use the vagueness of the law to stifle protected expression. Freedom of Expression: Individuals were not able to criticize the government publicly or privately without fear of reprisal. Paramilitary militias harassed activists and new reform-oriented political movements online and in person, including through online disinformation, bot attacks, and threats or use of physical violence to silence them and halt their activities. In August, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk expressed concern during an official visit to the country that a series of actions taken by those in power – for example, bringing criminal defamation suits against journalists and civil society actors – had created a “chilling effect” on freedom of expression, particularly for environmental defenders. Legal harassment by radical Islamic parties and Iran-aligned militia groups using malicious lawsuits against activists, human rights defenders (HRDs), and journalists limited freedom of expression and civic engagement. Civil society organizations reported an unprecedented level of legal harassment, principally via false accusations of criminal activity and vague punishment for “dissent” or “slander” following public comments and criticism of government actors. Sometimes referred to as malicious, fraudulent, or nuisance lawsuits, these legal actions tended to cite obscure articles of law and rely on extremely broad legal interpretations. Many cases of malicious lawsuits did not reach the public domain due to the victims’ fear of retaliation or further harm. The government increasingly targeted social media users. The Ministry of Interior established new social media rules in January, launching a platform allowing individuals to denounce or report any content “that violates public morals, contains negative and indecent messages, and undermines social stability.” According to Amnesty International, between January and June authorities prosecuted at least 20 individuals regarding the peaceful exercise of freedom of expression. Security Forces, mostly those under the Ministry of Interior, within the NSS, or from the PMF, in addition to KRG forces (primarily Asayish), arrested and detained protesters and activists critical of the central government and of the KRG, respectively, according to statements by government officials, NGO representatives, and press reports. On February 13, the Iraqi Human Rights Observatory stated authorities arrested social media users arbitrarily for posting “low-quality content.” Authorities reportedly treated these detainees as if they were involved in “terrorist” acts that inflicted damages on public institutions or led to the loss of public funds. Political parties in the IKR, namely the PUK and the KDP, prioritized access to the outlets they or their members owned or controlled. IKR-based outlets without strong political or financial backers reported difficulty accessing information or reporting venues. Violence and Harassment: Journalists continued to face threats, intimidation, and attacks by militia or security forces. The Press Freedom Advocacy Association recorded 345 cases of abuses of journalists nationwide as of the end of May, with the majority of cases in Baghdad and Erbil. Government forces occasionally prevented journalists from reporting, citing security reasons. Some media organizations reported arrests and harassment of journalists, as well as government efforts to prevent them from covering politically sensitive topics, including security matters, corruption, and government failure to provide adequate services. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) counted nearly 20 arrests of journalists in the IKR during the year. The Erbil-based Organization of Reporters for Rights and Development reported that during the first six months of the year, there were 49 violations committed against 99 IKR-based journalists and social media bloggers. RSF highlighted the surge in abuses against members of the press in the KRG, where several journalists were arbitrarily arrested and, when their release dates approached, found themselves charged with additional crimes leading to extended jail terms. Throughout the country there were reports of beatings, detentions, and death threats against media workers, particularly toward journalists working for opposition-affiliated and nonpartisan outlets. In August, a journalist from Halabja reported receiving death threats from individuals he believed to be from Iranian intelligence due to his reporting on the country’s interference in the region’s politics. In September, a journalist from Duhok reported he received death threats due to his reports on government corruption in the city. Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The law prohibited producing, importing, publishing, or possessing written material, drawings, photographs, or films that violate public integrity or decency. The penalties included fines and imprisonment. Fear of violent retaliation for publishing facts or opinions critical of political factions inhibited free expression. Federal government and, to a lesser extent, KRG oversight and censorship sometimes interfered with media operations, at times resulting in the closure of media outlets, restrictions on reporting, denial of access to public information, and interference with internet service. Some KRG courts applied the more stringent Iraqi criminal code in lawsuits involving journalists rather than local KRG law, which provided greater protection for freedom of expression and forbade the detention of journalists. By year’s end, the KRG had not implemented a freedom of information law originally passed in 2013. Journalists and press freedom advocates claimed the judiciary was not impartial in press freedom cases or in lawsuits against the KRG for failure to provide information. In January, an Erbil appeals court rejected lawsuits filed by Pereagraf News against the KRG prime minister and IKR president over their refusal to turn over public budget information. On May 22, the KRG Ministry of Culture and Youth released a directive outlining new media regulations in the IKR. The directive tightened licensing procedures for IKR-based media outlets, increased license fees, and authorized the ministry to monitor published content and restrict the material outlets could broadcast. This was the first time the ministry asserted control over what individuals in the IKR could say on social media. Local media were active and expressed a variety of views, largely reflecting media outlet owners’ political viewpoints. Media also self-censored to comply with government restrictions against “violating public order” and because of fear of reprisal by political figures and parties, militias, terrorist groups, criminal organizations, government officials, and private individuals. Political parties strongly influenced or controlled outright most of the several hundred daily and weekly print publications, as well as dozens of radio and television stations, social media platforms, and social media influencers. Libel/Slander Laws: The law criminalized libel, slander, blasphemy, and defamation, including insulting government leaders. The judiciary, militias, and government officials used arrest warrants in defamation cases to intimidate, silence, and, in some instances, apparently to “flush out” activists and journalists from hiding. Human rights organizations recommended the government revise the law, which they stated was used to silence dissent and calls for reform. On March 25, Mohammed Na’naa was arrested and then released on bail in a defamation case filed in October 2022 by the prime minister. Na’naa was awaiting trial at the end of the year. On May 30, the Misdemeanor Court in Mosul acquitted human rights defender and journalist Yasser al-Hamdani of charges of slander and defamation against a government official in connection with his work fighting corruption. IKR-based journalists broadly reported fears of being arrested or detained for defamation if they critically reported on powerful actors. In September, media outlets reported a Halabja court sentenced the head of the IKR NGO Halwest Organization, which monitored and evaluated public-sector performance, to six months in prison for defamation after the organization reported on corruption in the Halabja General Directorate for Health. National Security: Paramilitary militias in the PMF frequently threatened members of Sunni and minority communities with terrorism charges to silence their dissent, especially in areas where the militias had taken over local land and economic activities and blocked the return of Sunni IDPs. Nongovernmental Impact: Nongovernmental and quasi-governmental actors, including militias outside of state control, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations, threatened journalists with violence for reporting on sensitive subjects. Internet Freedom The government restricted or disrupted access to the internet and censored online content, and there were credible reports the government monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority. Government restrictions on access to the internet were overt, and the government declared it had full legal authority for its monitoring of private online communications. Despite restrictions, political figures and activists used the internet to criticize politicians, organize demonstrations, and campaign for candidates through social media platforms. Militias used bots and disinformation campaigns to attack and defame activists, independent elections candidates, and the electoral commission. According to Freedom House, federal government and KRG authorities disrupted internet access during protests and used vaguely worded laws to criminalize some online activities. Civil society organizations reported government and militia forces monitored their activists’ social media pages, and the activists faced harassment or criminal charges based on their social media activity. In the IKR, some independent journalists said groups affiliated with the main political parties falsely flagged their posts to Facebook administrators as copyrighted content in attempts to block their dissemination of information. Some media outlets reported facing cyberattacks, including distributed denial of service attacks, after publishing stories on government corruption, which they alleged were state sponsored given their timing and sophistication. B. FREEDOMS OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION The government occasionally limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly The federal constitution provided for freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration “regulated by law,” and the government generally respected this right. Regulations required protest organizers to request permission seven days in advance of a demonstration and submit detailed information regarding the applicants, the reason for the protest, and participants. The regulations prohibited all “slogans, signs, printed materials, or drawings” involving “sectarianism, racism, or segregation” of citizens. The regulations also prohibited anything that would violate the constitution or law; encourage violence, hatred, or killing; or prove insulting to Islam, “honor, morals, religion, holy groups, or Iraqi entities in general.” Authorities generally issued permits in accordance with the regulations. There were no examples in the IKR of violence against protesters. Many protests, including spontaneous demonstrations, proceeded even when authorities did not grant permission, with demonstrators arguing the constitution required them only to notify the government, not ask for permission. Because authorities typically provided only verbal responses to requests to demonstrate, it was difficult to document the government’s record of granting or rejecting protest permits. On September 2, the ISF used live ammunition to disperse a Kurdish crowd protesting to reopen a highway that PMF members had closed to prevent the KDP from returning to its headquarters in Kirkuk. The ISF killed four Kurdish protesters, injured dozens more, and arrested 30 who were later released after Kurdish parties lobbied for their release. The prime minister pledged those responsible for the violence would be held accountable and condemned the violent altercations. As of year’s end, the results of the government’s investigation had not been made public and no one involved had been charged with a crime. Freedom of Association The federal constitution provided for the right to form and join associations and political parties, with some legislated exceptions, including prohibitions against expressing support for the Ba’ath Party, “Zionist principles,” or Israel. Within those parameters, the government generally respected this right. NGOs registered with the federal Department of NGOs (DNGO) in Baghdad were required also to register with the KRG DNGO to operate in the IKR, and KRG-registered NGOs had to register with the federal DNGO to operate outside the IKR. In August the KRG DNGO announced it had made several changes to its registration and license renewal procedures following complaints by NGOs that they were extremely cumbersome. NGOs reported, however, there were no noticeable improvements following the announcement. According to NGO reports, authorities could dictate the internal structure of NGOs and sometimes even an organization’s choice of name. One NGO’s representative reported the DNGO in Baghdad took six months to process the group’s registration and approve its name. DNGO officials reportedly told the NGO the country was “enjoying democracy and human rights” and questioned the “need and benefit” of registering an organization focused on those matters. Other NGOs reported similar difficulties, particularly if the name of their organization pertained to human rights or democracy, with some registrations taking longer than one year. C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/. D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT The federal constitution and law mostly provided for the freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. The government inconsistently enforced these rights. Law and custom generally failed to respect the freedom of movement for women. In addition, authorities routinely restricted movements of displaced persons throughout the country. In-country Movement: The law permitted security forces to restrict internal movement and take other necessary security and military measures in response to security threats and attacks. There were numerous reports government forces, including the ISF and PMF, selectively enforced regulations, including for ethnosectarian reasons and criminal extortion, requiring residency permits to limit entry of persons into areas under their control. Multiple international NGOs reported PMF units prevented civilians, including Sunni Arabs and members of ethnic and religious minority groups, from returning to their homes after government forces ousted ISIS. In September, PMF forces established and maintained roadblocks between Kirkuk and Erbil to prevent the opening of the headquarters of the KDP in Kirkuk and prevented citizens from freely moving within the territory. KRG authorities restricted movements in certain areas for nonresidents. Both residents and nonresidents were required to register with the local Asayish office. Citizens of all ethnosectarian backgrounds, including Kurds, crossing into the IKR from central or southern regions had to cross through checkpoints and undergo personal and vehicle inspection. The federal government imposed similar restrictions on IDPs from Ninewa Province and the disputed areas. In an August poll by Draw Media of 910 Arab Iraqis, 83 percent reported having had “bad” or “very bad” experiences at IKR security checkpoints. Law and custom generally failed to respect the freedom of movement for women. A woman could lose her right to spousal maintenance if she “unjustly” refused her husband’s request to move into his home, left his home without permission and “without a legitimate reason,” or refused to travel with him “without a legitimate excuse.” IKR law provided that men could also be held accountable for failing in their spousal responsibilities, such as abandoning the marital home. Additionally, women required permission of a male relative to obtain a civil status identification document, which was required for access to public services, food assistance, health care, employment, education, and housing. Authorities routinely restricted movements of displaced persons throughout the country. Sunni Arab households displaced in 2017 into the East Mosul camps were prevented from returning to their areas of origin due to a lack of civil documentation; insufficient coordination among federal government, KRG, and local authorities to remove legal obstacles and rebuild destroyed housing; and lack of acceptance by local communities. In addition, many parts of the country liberated from ISIS control, including Mosul and the Sinjar region, continued to experience movement restrictions due to excessive numbers of PMF checkpoints, ISF shakedowns, and other government and paramilitary actions related to smuggling. Due to the federal government’s lack of interagency coordination, local authorities often failed to recognize returnees’ security permits and did not comply with the central government’s orders to facilitate dignified returns. Foreign Travel: The government required exit permits for minors younger than 18 leaving the country, but the requirement was not routinely enforced. E. PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNHCR estimated more than 297,000 refugees resided in the country, including more than 268,000 Syrian refugees. The country was not a state party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. The status and treatment of refugees were administered under the Political Refugee Act No. 51 of 1971, which only recognized political and so-called military refugees, and fell short of providing effective protection or rights to all refugees and asylum seekers. The federal government did not grant residency to asylum seekers. Within the IKR, refugees and asylum seekers could obtain residency permits, although the procedure varied by province. The federal government acknowledged that lack of protection and assistance to refugees, returnees, and asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern, was troubling, but it took no steps to improve the situation. Access to Asylum: Although the law recognized political and so-called military refugees, the federal government did not grant this status to Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. Rather, it considered Syrian refugees to be “displaced from border areas of Syria and received for humanitarian reasons.” The KRG, however, recognized the status of Syrians as asylum seekers, and nearly 99 percent of Syrian refugees in the country lived in the IKR. Approximately 64 percent of Syrians resided in urban settings and the remainder in the IKR’s 10 refugee camps. The process for seeking asylum lacked procedural safeguards, including no effective right of appeal, and access was largely nationality-based with gaps for highly vulnerable groups, including members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons (LGBTQI+) community and members of certain minority groups and nationalities. For example, the IKR did not allow Afghan nationals seeking asylum to register for refugee status, citing concerns such a move would result in a large influx of Afghan asylum seekers. Refoulement: On July 16, the government deported three Syrian Kurds following their arrests on charges of violating residency regulations. Media at the time reported the presence of 33 additional Syrian refugees detained in Baghdad for violating residency regulations and at risk of deportation. Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Refugees reported frequent sexual harassment, both in camps and cities in the IKR. Local NGOs reported cases in which camp management staff subjected refugees to various forms of abuse and intimidation. Freedom of Movement: Syrian refugees continued to face restrictions on residence and movement outside the IKR. KRG authorities stated IDPs and refugees had freedom of internal movement in the IKR. There was an established practice that enabled short-term visits to Syria for a limited number of reasons, upon approval of the KRG. Employment: Federal and KRG authorities did not generally restrict the right of refugees and asylum seekers to work in the private sector if they had official status, but the lack of an agreement between the federal government and the IKR on the status of refugees made it difficult for them to access employment or travel between the two areas. Palestinian refugees registered with the Ministry of Interior’s Permanent Committee on Refugee Affairs (PC-MOI) were issued a PC-MOI card that allowed them to access public services including public education, health facilities, and food rations through the Iraqi Public Distribution System. The validity of the PC-MOI card depended on when the refugee arrived in Iraq; those who arrived in 1948 received a five-year card and those who arrived in 1967 or subsequently received a three-year card. In the IKR, Palestinian refugees were allowed to work in the private sector and renew their humanitarian residency permits. Syrian refugees residing inside and outside of refugee camps were able to obtain and renew IKR-issued residency and work permits. Federal government authorities required refugees to register with the PC-MOI. UNHCR continued to caution refugees that they risked arrest, detention, or deportation when traveling outside the IKR with KRG-issued humanitarian permits or traveling into the IKR with PC-MOI documents. F. STATUS AND TREATMENT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) The federal constitution and national policy on displacement addressed IDP rights, but very few laws specifically pertained to the rights of IDPs. According to the International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix, as of August 31, there were an estimated 1.14 million persons internally displaced, with 166,360 residing in 25 IDP camps. The federal government, KRG, UN agencies, and local and international NGOs provided protection and other assistance to IDPs. As part of the transition away from a UN-led humanitarian response, the United Nations began handing over coordination and service provision for IDP populations to federal and KRG authorities. NGO reporting indicated, however, that the deactivation of the UN humanitarian cluster system on December 31, 2022, resulted in significant service gaps for the IDP population, with government officials unwilling or unable to fill these roles. The federal government abruptly closed IDP camps and cleared informal settlements, resulting in secondary displacement and increased vulnerability for the former residents. In some areas, violence, insecurity, and long-standing political, tribal, and ethnosectarian tensions hampered progress on national reconciliation and political reform, complicating the protection environment for IDPs. Thousands of families faced secondary displacement due to economic and security concerns. Forced displacements strained the capacity of local authorities in areas with higher concentrations of IDPs. Climate-induced displacement also affected areas of return across the country. Families returning to their place of origin often grappled with the destruction of their homes, a lack of access to services, and limited employment prospects. Many returnees were concerned by the prevalence of PMF groups or remnants of ISIS, and in Sinjar, militias aligned with the PKK. While thousands had returned to Sinjar, hundreds of thousands remained displaced. Displaced families, especially those with perceived ties to ISIS, including victims and survivors of ISIS crimes, were often unable to obtain or replace vital civil status documents, without which they were unable to find work, go to school, or move freely. In some cases, this led to secondary displacement or a return to IDP camps. Government assistance focused in part on financial grants to returnees, but payments were sporadic, and there was a large backlog in responding to applications. Local authorities continued to apply government compensation laws in a discriminatory manner and excluded families with perceived ISIS affiliations. Many families, especially in Ninewa, applied for but had not yet received the monetary compensation due to them by law because the COR did not pass a federal budget until June. Authorities prevented some families with perceived ISIS affiliations from applying for monetary compensation, leaving many IDPs without the resources to begin rebuilding their lives. All citizens were eligible to receive food under the Public Distribution System (PDS), but authorities implemented the PDS sporadically and irregularly, with limited access in areas that were among the last to be liberated. Authorities did not distribute all commodities each month, and not all IDPs could access the PDS in each province. There were reports of IDPs losing access and entitlement to PDS distributions and other services due to requirements that citizens redeem PDS rations or other services only at their registered place of residence. According to UNHCR, the government decided midyear to allow all IDPs living in camps in the IKR to enroll in the Social Safety Net poverty reduction program. Local authorities often determined whether IDPs would have access to local services. KRG officials asserted all IDPs and refugees in the IKR benefited from access to public services and infrastructure (such as drinking water, electricity, education, health care, roads, and irrigation systems) on an equal basis with the local population, which they stated reflected the KRG’s commitment to safeguarding human rights and human dignity under pressing circumstances. Almost one million of the country’s IDPs and refugees resided in the IKR, with approximately 30 percent living in camps and 70 percent outside camps, according to the KRG’s Joint Crisis Coordination Center. KRG officials committed not to close those camps until the IDPs returned to their area of origin voluntarily. Forty percent of IDPs throughout the IKR were Sunni Arabs, 30 percent were Yezidis, 13 percent were Kurds (of several religious affiliations), 7 percent were Christians, and the remainder were members of other religious minority groups, according to KRG figures. Many Christian IDPs refused to return to the town of Tal Kayf, citing fear of the PMF 50th Brigade that occupied it and the presence of the Tesferat detention center and court, which the ICRC reported possibly held women and minors suspected of being ISIS family members. Only a very small number of the country’s population of 400,000 to 500,000 Yezidis had returned to their homes, with Sinjar having an estimated return rate of 35 percent, including non-Yezidis. Many chose to stay in camps, citing a lack of reconstruction plans or public services, as well as insecurity. There was little progress in implementing the comprehensive Sinjar Agreement between the federal government and the KRG, which included expanded reconstruction efforts to support voluntary returns of Yezidis still displaced in the IKR and abroad. Some Sinjari communities, including Yezidis from Sinjar, did not support the agreement because authorities had not included them in the negotiations. For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center at https://www.internal-displacement.org . G. STATELESS PERSONS The country contributed to statelessness, including through discrimination against women in nationality laws. Stateless persons faced significant challenges in accessing their most basic rights, including access to education, employment opportunities, and medical care. Others remained at risk of being stateless across the country due to administrative and socioeconomic barriers in accessing or registering civil documentation such as for births, marriages, or deaths. UNHCR and NGOs provided advocacy, legal awareness raising, and civil documentation support to persons at risk of statelessness. Displaced children who lacked civil documentation faced exclusion from local communities, including being barred from attending school, denied access to health care, and deprived of basic rights. Many of these children were born under ISIS rule and were issued birth certificates considered invalid by the government. They faced extreme difficulties in obtaining civil documentation due to perceived ISIS affiliation. This was even more difficult for children of women heads of households, who were unable to obtain birth certificates for their children without their husband present or a certificate of their husband’s death. These women and children were stigmatized because of their association with ISIS, leaving them at heightened risk of suicide, retaliation, and sexual exploitation. Although some communities took steps to absolve women of perceived guilt associated with sexual exploitation by ISIS fighters, “honor” killings remained a risk. Communities generally did not accept children fathered by ISIS fighters. Absent a consistent, countrywide plan to document children of Iraqi mothers and ISIS fathers, those children were at risk of statelessness. The Yezidi community welcomed back more willingly Yezidi women who had survived ISIS captivity, but not children fathered through rape by ISIS fighters. The Yezidi community frequently forced women to give up such children to orphanages, despite the lack of a legal adoption system, under threat of expulsion from the community. Women who chose to keep their children faced the threat of ostracization from their community and “honor” killings. International NGOs provided shelter referrals to some Yezidi women and, in some cases, assisted mothers in finding homes for forcibly abandoned children. Those children who did not receive assistance were left without parents, identification, a documented country of birth, and a settled nationality. The law for survivors of the ISIS genocide did not include specific provisions related to the status of, or benefits for, ISIS-born children and their mothers, especially children born of sexual violence. Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process The federal constitution and laws provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage. ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: In December, the Independent High Electoral Commission conducted provincial elections in the 15 provinces of the central and southern regions. Citizens largely accepted the results as legitimate despite reports of alleged corruption, including vote buying, intimidation, and violations in the electoral process. Political Parties and Political Participation: Political parties and coalition blocs tended to organize along either religious or ethnic lines, although some parties crossed sectarian lines. Membership in some political parties conferred special privileges and advantages in employment and education. Election observers called corruption the leading obstacle to establishing an official political party and recounted that many had to pay bribes to electoral officials to ensure approval of their application. The stated fees for establishing and registering an official political party were $30,000, but election observers reported that after paying necessary bribes, the real cost could come to double that amount. The process could take up to one year depending upon how swiftly bribes were paid and whether more established political figures lent support to the party. Other observers reported difficulties registering parties, particularly those attempting to register independent, civil, and secular parties. Some described encountering multiple barriers to registering their parties that appeared to have been newly enacted specifically to hinder these parties’ registration. Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: No law limited participation of women or members of minority groups in the political process, and they did participate. The federal constitution mandated that women constitute 25 percent of parliamentary and provincial council membership. Women candidates comprised 29 percent of overall candidates, and women held a record 97 seats in parliament, including 54 that did not rely on the quota. Nonetheless, political discussions often reportedly marginalized women members of parliament. The Iraqi Women’s Network confirmed many customs, coupled with legislative barriers, inhibited the active participation of women in public life, especially in politics. Anecdotally, politicians, observers, and civil society representatives reported some women members of parliament had no autonomy when it came to speaking or expressing opinions publicly and were required to seek guidance or approval from the male leaders in their parties. In the COR, only two political blocs were led by women. In some rural areas, women were required to have a man escort to cast a ballot at a voting station. Of the 329 seats in parliament, the law reserved nine seats for members of minority groups: five for Christians from Baghdad, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Duhok Provinces; one for Yezidis; one for Sabean-Mandaeans; one for Shabak; and one for Faili Kurds in Wasit Province. Five additional minority candidates held seats in parliament above the quota allotments, including three Yezidis and two Kaka’i. The KRG employed a quota system to protect the rights of women and members of ethnic and religious minority groups in the IKR. The KRG reserved 30 percent of IKP and provincial council membership for women. The law reserved 11 seats for members of minority groups along ethnic, rather than religious lines: five for predominantly Christian Chaldo-Assyrians, five for Turkmen, and one for Armenians. It did not reserve seats for self-described groups whom the KRG considered ethnically Kurdish or Arab, such as Yezidis, Shabak, Sabean-Mandaeans, Kaka’i, and Faili Kurds. Major political parties partnered with, or in some cases created, affiliated minority group political parties in both the federal and IKR elections and encouraged other nonminority citizens to vote for their allied minority candidates for quota seats. Minority religious leaders and minority community activists complained this process disenfranchised them, and they advocated for electoral reform to limit voting for minority quota seats to voters of the relevant minority, as well as for additional quota seats in COR and the IKP. Section 4. Corruption in Government The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the laws effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption. The law allowed some individuals convicted of corruption to receive amnesty upon repaying money obtained through corruption, effectively allowing them to keep any profits derived from the stolen funds. Corruption: Corruption remained a significant obstacle to effective governance at all institutional levels, including in the IKR. Bribery, money laundering, nepotism, and misappropriation of public funds were common at all levels and across all branches of government. Family, tribal, and sectarian considerations significantly influenced government decisions at all levels and across all branches of government. Federal and KRG officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. In March, the UNAMI Special Representative stated in a briefing to the UN Security Council that corruption was a core feature of the political economy and that reform efforts had been actively undermined or obstructed. She added that the past 20 years had been “a very tough road” but the new government had shown resolve to tackle several pressing issues. Anticorruption efforts were hampered by a lack of agreement concerning institutional roles, political will, political influence, lack of transparency, and unclear governing legislation and regulatory processes. The existence of armed militias, which were directly involved in corruption and provided protection for corrupt officials, made serious and sustainable anticorruption efforts difficult to enforce. Although anticorruption institutions collaborated with civil society groups, they saw limited results. Media and NGOs attempted to expose corruption independently, but their capacity was limited. Anticorruption, law enforcement, and judicial officials, as well as members of civil society and media, faced threats, intimidation, and abuse in their efforts to combat corrupt practices. In July, the government filed charges against 14 persons, including prominent security officials from a 2020 anti-corruption campaign, for human rights violations including the torture of detainees. In August, the Supreme Judicial Council issued arrest warrants for former Finance Minister Ali Allawi and three close associates of former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi for their involvement in a tax fraud scheme deemed the “heist of the century,” in which $2.5 billion was stolen in less than one year from the Tax Commission. On August 6, Integrity Commission chief Judge Haider Hanoun sought Interpol Red Notices to locate and provisionally arrest those involved for the purpose of extradition from a number of countries, including Türkiye, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The KRG maintained its own Committee to Investigate Corruption, which reported it registered 799 official corruption complaints between January and July. During this period, the committee sent 134 cases to the courts for further investigation and prosecution. For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes. Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights International human rights organizations and NGOs expressed concern regarding an increasing trend of the DNGO effectively shutting down NGOs by not renewing or providing licenses to operate, increasing the wait time for registration procedures, and requesting arbitrary changes such as changing bylaws or the organization’s name. NGOs also reported the DNGO sent warning letters claiming NGOs had violated public morals and Islamic law and requesting them either to close or sign a pledge to commit to respecting public morals. Human rights and NGO workers increasingly experienced unofficial threats and harassment. Government officials were somewhat cooperative with their work of monitoring and investigating human rights conditions and cases, but they were not often responsive to inquiries. There were multiple reports of authorities harassing, threatening, and arresting international and local aid workers based on false accusations of terrorism. NGOs faced capacity-related problems, did not have regular access to government officials, and, as a result, were not able to provide significant protections against failures in governance and human rights abuses. Domestic NGOs’ lack of sustainable sources of funding hindered the sector’s long-term development. While the law forbade NGOs from engaging in political activity, political parties or sects originated, funded, or substantially influenced many domestic NGOs. The DNGO continued to require NGOs receive prior approval before conducting any surveys or questionnaires in the country. NGOs were prevented from operating in certain sectors. NGOs registered in Erbil could not operate outside the IKR and KRG-controlled disputed areas without additional permits from Baghdad (see section 2.b.). All NGOs, according to the law, were required to register with the DNGO, and in many cases, provincial councils required additional local approval to allow NGOs to implement their activities. Additionally, NGOs registered with the federal government were not allowed to work in the IKR without registration and a permit from the KRG DNGO. The IKR had an active community of mostly Kurdish NGOs, many with close ties to and funding from political parties. The KRG DNGO announced in August it had made several changes to its registration and license renewal procedures following complaints by NGOs that its administrative process was extremely cumbersome. A number of NGOs reported, however, that there were no noticeable improvements following the announcement. In August, a prominent NGO reported being unfairly sued by the KRG DNGO after ending its relationship with its Kurdish attorney, who the organization believed was engaging in corrupt practices and was associated with the DNGO. Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: In February, the IOHR stated activists and HRDs expressed fears that government crackdowns and arrests were part of a wide-scale campaign targeting dissent with authorities. In August, an HRD told the United Nations Commission on Human Rights representative in the country that it “should not be dangerous to share data and raise awareness of human rights and climate change problems.” HRW stated HRDs faced threats, harassment, and arbitrary detention by government officials and armed groups. Several activists suffered physical attacks threatening their lives. On February 16, Jassim al-Asadi, a well-known advocate for naming the marshes in the south a UNESCO World Heritage site, was released after being abducted by an unidentified armed group, held for more than two weeks, and tortured for saying that Türkiye and Iran were withholding water needed to keep the marshes alive. Government agencies reportedly detained and prosecuted other environmental activists to silence and threaten them. The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The government and the KRG sometimes restricted the access of UNAMI and other international organizations to sensitive locations, such as Ministry of Interior-run detention facilities holding detainees suspected of terrorism. Government Human Rights Bodies: The law provided for the Independent High Commission for Human Rights’ financial and administrative independence and assigned it broad authority to investigate complaints of human rights abuses, initiate lawsuits related to violations of human rights law, and conduct assessments of detention centers and prisons. Some observers reported the commissioners’ individual and partisan political agendas largely stalled the commission’s work, thereby limiting its independence and effectiveness. Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses WOMEN Rape and Domestic Violence: Federal law criminalized rape and sexual assault of women, men, and children but did not specifically mention spousal rape. The law permitted a sentence not exceeding 15 years but applied life imprisonment if a rape victim died as a result of the assault. The rape provisions of the law did not define “consent,” leaving the term up to judicial interpretation. The law required authorities to drop a rape or sexual assault case if the perpetrator married the survivor, with a provision protecting against divorce within the first three years of marriage. Men could “discipline” their wives and children “within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom,” and reduced sentences for violence or killing were applicable if the perpetrator had “honorable motives” or if the perpetrator caught his wife or woman relative in the act of adultery. The Ministry of Interior maintained 16 family protection units in separate buildings at police stations around the country designed to resolve domestic disputes and establish safe refuges for victims of sexual or gender-based violence. These units reportedly prioritized family reconciliation and lacked the capacity to support survivors. NGOs stated survivors of domestic violence feared approaching the family protection units because they suspected police would inform their families of their testimony. Some tribal leaders in the south reportedly banned their members from seeking redress through police family protection units, claiming domestic abuse was a family matter. The family protection units in most locations did not operate shelters. NGOs reported women survivors of domestic violence were reluctant to report crimes to the mostly men officers of the family protection units. Harassment of legal personnel who sought to pursue domestic violence cases under laws criminalizing assault, as well as a lack of trained police and judicial personnel, further hampered efforts to prosecute perpetrators. A UN survey found that nearly 75 percent of women did not report domestic violence as a crime due to fear of retribution and cultural normalization of domestic violence. In the absence of federal legislation to combat domestic violence, various government ministries attempted to address the issue on an ad hoc basis. KRG law criminalized domestic violence, including physical and psychological abuse, threats of violence, and spousal rape. The KRG maintained a special police force to investigate cases of gender-based violence and a family reconciliation committee within the judicial system, but local NGOs reported these programs were not effective. Two privately operated shelters and four KRG Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs-operated shelters provided some protection and assistance for women survivors of gender-based violence and human trafficking. Space was limited, and NGOs reported psychological and therapeutic services were poor. NGOs played a key role in providing services, including legal aid, to survivors of domestic violence, who often received no assistance from the government. Instead of using legal remedies, authorities frequently mediated between women and their families so that the women could return to their homes. Other than marrying or returning to their families, which often resulted in further victimization by the family or community, there were few options for women accommodated at shelters. The central government and KRG also struggled to address the physical and mental trauma endured by women who lived under ISIS rule. The KRG maintained a genocide center in Duhok for treatment, support, and rehabilitation for women who survived ISIS captivity, including investigating and documenting rapes, and provided health and psychological services within camps. Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): Federal Iraq and IKR law prohibited the practice of FGM/C. NGOs reported the practice of FGM/C continued to decline in the IKR. NGOs attributed the reduction in FGM/C to the criminalization of the practice and sustained public outreach activities by civil society groups. FGM/C was not commonly reported in federal Iraq. Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: Federal law permitted “honor” as a lawful defense in violence against women, whereas in the IKR the law prohibited “honor” as a mitigating circumstance. “Honor” killings remained a serious problem throughout the country. A provision of the law limited the sentence for murder to three years in prison if a man killed his wife or a woman dependent due to suspicion the victim committed adultery or engaged in sex outside of marriage. UNAMI reported several hundred women died each year from “honor” killings. Some families reportedly arranged “honor” killings to appear as suicides. Accurate statistics surrounding honor killings were not publicly available. In January and February, widespread protests erupted in Diwaniyah Province in response to lenient sentencing for the “honor” killing of Tiba al-Ali, whose father was convicted of strangling her. Women’s rights groups demanded justice and stronger legislation to protect women and girls from gender-based violence. UNAMI and Amnesty International condemned the “horrific” killing, saying “The Iraqi penal code still treats leniently so called ‘hon[or] crimes’ comprising violent acts such as assault and even murder.” The KRG Ministry of Interior’s Directorate General of Combating Violence against Women confirmed 30 “honor” killing cases in the IKR during the year. There were reports women and girls were sexually exploited through so-called temporary, or pleasure, marriages, under which a man gave the family of the girl or woman dowry money in exchange for permission to “marry” her for a specified period. Young women, widowed or orphaned by ISIS, were especially vulnerable to this type of exploitation. In similar cases, NGOs reported some families opted to marry off their underage daughters in exchange for dowry money, believing the marriage was genuine, only to have the girl returned to them months later, sometimes pregnant. Government officials and international and local NGOs also reported the traditional practice of nahwa, where a cousin, uncle, or other male relative of any woman could forbid or terminate her marriage to someone outside the family, remained a problem, particularly in southern provinces. Discrimination: Although the federal constitution provided for equality between men and women, the law did not provide women the same legal status and rights as men, and women faced discrimination in employment and occupations. Criminal, family, religious, personal status, labor, and inheritance laws discriminated against women. Women experienced discrimination in such areas as marriage, divorce, child custody, employment, pay, owning or managing businesses or property, education, the judicial process, and housing. In court, a woman’s testimony equaled half that of a man’s in some cases and was equal in other cases. The law generally permitted women to initiate divorce proceedings against their spouses but did not entitle a divorced woman to alimony other than child support or, in some cases, two years’ financial maintenance. In other cases, the woman had to return all or part of her dowry or otherwise pay a sum of money to the husband. By law the father was the guardian of the children, but a court could grant a divorced mother custody of her children until age 10, extendable up to age 15, at which time the children could choose with which parent they wished to live. All 18 recognized religious groups had their own personal status courts responsible for handling marriage, divorce, and inheritance matters. Discrimination toward women on personal status matters varied depending on the religious group. The government’s interpretation of sharia was the basis of inheritance law for all citizens except members of recognized religious minority groups. In all communities, male heirs had to provide financial support to female relatives who inherited less. If they did not, the women had the right to sue. The law provided women and men equal rights in owning or managing land or other property, but cultural and religious norms impeded women’s property rights, especially in rural areas. Law and custom generally did not respect freedom of movement for women. The law prevented a woman from applying for a passport without the consent of her male guardian or a legal representative. Without the consent of a male relative, women could not obtain the civil status identification document required for access to public services, food assistance, health care, employment, education, and housing. NGOs reported cases in which courts changed the registration of Yezidi women to Muslim against their will because of their forced marriage to ISIS fighters. The KRG provided some additional legal protections to women, maintaining a High Council for Women and Development and a Women’s Rights Monitoring Board to enforce the law and prevent and respond to discrimination, but it applied such protections inconsistently. Other KRG laws mirrored federal family law, and women faced discrimination. KRG law allowed women to set as a prenuptial condition the right to divorce their husbands beyond the limited circumstances allowed by federal law, and the law provided a divorced wife up to five years’ alimony in addition to child support. The law did not prohibit discrimination based on age, sexual orientation, or gender identity. The law allowed employers to terminate workers’ contracts when they reached retirement age, which was lower by five years for women. Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities. Various methods of contraception were widely available, including in the IKR; however, women in urban areas generally had greater access than those in rural parts of the country. A married woman could not be prescribed or use contraception without the consent of her husband. Unmarried single women were unable to obtain birth control. Divorced or widowed women did not have the same restrictions. Activists privately described reproductive rights as a sensitive religious issue. The threat of violence by extremist religious groups prevented almost all intervention of civil society organizations on behalf of reproductive rights. Due to general insecurity in the country and attendant economic difficulties, many women received inadequate medical care. In the IKR, the KRG Ministry of Health reported survivors of sexual violence received treatment from provincial health departments and emergency rooms. Judges, however, rarely considered forensic evidence that was collected. The government stated it provided full services for survivors of sexual violence and rape in all provinces because the law required that survivors receive full health care and treatment. NGOs reported, however, these services were poor and limited to certain urban areas. Emergency contraceptives were available as part of the clinical management of rape through government services and in private clinics, although advocates who worked with survivors reported many barriers, including bureaucracy, document requirements, and social stigma, to women accessing those contraceptives, as well as significant gaps in service delivery. SYSTEMIC RACIAL OR ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION The federal constitution held all citizens equal before the law without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, nationality, or origin. It prohibited any entity or program that adopted, incited, facilitated, glorified, promoted, or justified racism or ethnic cleansing. IKR law forbade “religious, or political, media speech individually or collectively, directly or indirectly that brought hate and violence, terror, exclusion, and marginalization based on national, ethnic, or religious or linguistic claims.” Government forces, particularly certain PMF groups, targeted members of ethnic and religious minority groups, as did the remaining active ISIS fighters. Some government forces, including PMF units, forcibly displaced individuals due to perceived ISIS affiliation or for ethnosectarian reasons. Many residents of African descent, some stateless, lived in extreme poverty with high rates of illiteracy and unemployment. They were not represented in politics, and they said discrimination kept them from obtaining government employment. Members of the community also struggled to obtain restitution for lands seized from them during the Iran-Iraq war. The law gave migrant Arab workers the same status as citizens but did not provide the same rights for non-Arab migrant workers, who faced stricter residency and work visa requirements. Nearly 80 percent of persons of African descent were reportedly unemployed. They were not represented in politics, held no senior government positions, and reported discrimination kept them from obtaining government employment. There were many reports regarding migrant workers from African and Asian countries being subjected to extreme violence, exploited in commercial sex, and subjected to sexual exploitation and abuse. Workers found to be residing and working illegally were often deported. Stateless persons faced discrimination in employment and lacked job security. Many stateless persons were not able to register for identity cards, which prevented them from obtaining public-sector employment. CHILDREN Birth Registration: Failure to register births resulted in the denial of public services such as education, food, and health care. Single women and widows often had problems registering their children, although in most cases authorities provided birth certificates after registration of the birth through the Ministries of Health and Interior; such registration was reportedly a lengthy and at times complicated process. Humanitarian organizations reported the widespread problem of children born to ISIS members or in ISIS-held territory failing to receive a government-issued birth certificate. As a result, an estimated 12,000 displaced children lacked civil documentation, including birth certificates. Education: Primary education was compulsory for citizen children for the first six years of schooling and until age 15 throughout Iraq and the IKR. Public state education was provided free; however, equal access to education for girls was a problem, particularly in rural and insecure areas. Child Abuse: Although the federal constitution prohibited “all forms of violence and abuse in the family,” federal law did not specifically prohibit domestic violence but rather allowed men to discipline their wives and children “within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom.” The law provided protections for children who were victims of domestic violence or were in shelters, state houses, and orphanages, including access to health care and education. Violence against children was reportedly a significant problem, but up-to-date, reliable statistics on its extent were not available. The government did not enforce the law effectively. IKR law criminalized domestic violence, including physical and psychological abuse and threats of violence. The KRG implemented the law, but local NGOs reported these programs were not effective at combating child abuse. The KRG’s Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs, Education, and Culture and Youth operated a toll-free hotline to report violations against, or seek advice regarding, children’s rights. Activists reported sexual abuse and assault by relatives was widespread and that some victims did not report crimes due to fear of retribution by family members. Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum age of marriage was 18, but the law allowed a judge to permit children as young as 15 to marry if fitness and physical capacity were established and the guardian did not present a reasonable objection. The law criminalized forced marriage but did not automatically void forced marriages that were consummated. The government reportedly made few efforts to enforce the law. Traditional early and forced marriages of girls, including so-called temporary marriages, occurred throughout the country. UNHCR reported the continued prevalence of early marriage due to conflict and economic instability, since many families arranged for girls to marry cousins or into polygamous households. Others gave their daughters as child brides to armed groups to ensure safety, access to public services, or livelihood opportunities for the entire family. In September, the federal judiciary reported an average of 6,973 divorce cases per month, primarily due to early marriages. In the IKR, the legal minimum age of marriage was 18, but KRG law allowed a judge to permit a child as young as 16 to marry if the individual was entering into the marriage voluntarily and had permission from a legal guardian. KRG law criminalized forced marriage and suspended, but did not automatically void, forced marriages that were consummated. According to the KRG High Council for Women and Development, refugees and IDPs in the IKR engaged in child marriage and polygamy at a higher rate than other IKR residents. Some Kurdish men crossed over into other areas of the country to acquire a child bride, since the federal laws were not as strict. Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited commercial sexual exploitation, sale, the offering or procuring of commercial sex and practices related to child pornography. Child sex trafficking was a problem, as were so-called temporary marriages, particularly in the IDP population. The minimum age of consensual sex was 18. Because the age of legal criminal responsibility was nine in the areas administered by the federal government and 11 in the IKR, authorities often treated sexually exploited children as criminals instead of victims. No information was available regarding the effectiveness of government enforcement. ANTISEMITISM A very small number of Jewish citizens lived in Baghdad. The law criminalized any activities promoting normalization of relations with Israel, and this applied to all citizens, officials, entities, and companies, including foreigners. The law prohibited Jews from joining the military or holding jobs in the public sector. Antisemitic rhetoric erupted during the Gaza conflict that began October 7 after Hamas’ attack on Israel. Harassment of Jews by militia groups occurred. In July, the Iraqi Fencing Federation withdrew some of its players from the World Fencing Championship after they were placed in a group with Israeli competitors. The withdrawal was to show solidarity with Palestinians and reject normalization of relations with Israel. In September, the country’s Olympic Committee criticized weightlifter Haider Hussein Ali for taking part in the world championship alongside a competitor from Israel. According to unofficial 2023 statistics from the KRG Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, there were as few as 100 to 250 Jewish individuals in the IKR. The KRG did not apply the federal government’s anti-Zionist laws and relied on a separate IKR law, which provided protections for the rights of members of religious minority groups, including Jews. The Jewish community did not worship in public due to fears of retribution, discrimination, or violence by extremist actors. The KRG Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs dedicated one of its seven departments to Jewish affairs. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/. ORGAN HARVESTING The government took steps to combat the illegal trade and trafficking in human organs. For example, in March, the Federal Intelligence and Investigation Agency reported the arrest of four persons suspected of human organ trafficking in Salah al-Din Province. Press reported kidneys were the country’s most trafficked organs, with individuals who voluntarily sold their kidneys earning $10,000. While it was illegal to sell organs, organ “donors” were compensated with a monetary “gift” from the organ recipient. ACTS OF VIOLENCE, CRIMINALIZATION, AND OTHER ABUSES BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRESSION, OR SEX CHARACTERISTICS Criminalization: The penal code criminalized extramarital relations and did not permit same-sex marriage, effectively prohibiting all same-sex relations. Adults convicted of having consensual extramarital sex, including sodomy (defined under the law as anal sex between two men), with another adult could be sentenced to up to seven years in prison, but convictions were rare due to the high evidentiary standard (they had to be caught in the act) and societal norms of keeping quiet concerning such matters. Further, the law prohibited any “immodest act” in public and provided for imprisonment up to six months for “any person who threatened others by doing things that damage[d] the public honor.” NGOs IraQueer and Outright reported this statute could be used against LGBTQI+ persons or could be interpreted by the public as criminalizing LGBTQI+ persons, because the meanings of “immodest act” and “public honor” were not clear. There were no cases of the “immodest act” provision being used to target LGBTQI+ persons. In August, HRW and other NGOs criticized a bill introduced by an independent member of parliament that would amend the law to criminalize both same-sex relations and any expression of transgender identity, imposing the death penalty for same-sex conduct and imprisonment for transgender expression. HRW described the bill as part of a high-profile “weaponization of anti-LGBTQ rhetoric and legislation to mobilize a largely uninformed public against a marginalized group” as a state strategy. Between January and June, the Ministry of Interior led a campaign to crack down on “indecent content” online, prosecuting at least 20 persons, including YouTubers and TikTokers. In July, the Presidency of the Cassation Court in Erbil affirmed the Sulaymaniya Preliminary Court’s May 31 judgment to dissolve Rasan Organization due to “its activities in the field of homosexuality.” Rasan was one of the only human rights organizations involved in vocally supporting the rights of LGBTQI+ individuals in the IKR. In September, the KRG Prosecutor General’s Office ordered the arrest of two transgender makeup artists in Erbil after they posted images of themselves on Instagram wearing women’s clothing and cosmetics. After being detained in jail for five days, they were released and ordered to undergo a medical exam to determine their gender. On August 8, the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission prohibited the use of the terms “gender” and “homosexuality” by traditional and social media companies operating in the country and on mobile applications licensed by the commission. The commission directed media and telecommunication companies to replace the term “homosexuality” with “sexual deviance.” Violence and Harassment: Despite repeated threats, violence, and killings of LGBTQI+ individuals, the government failed to identify, arrest, or prosecute attackers or to protect targeted individuals. Some political parties sought to justify these attacks, and investigators often refused to follow proper investigation procedures, or even investigate at all. LGBTQI+ individuals reported they could not live openly without fear of violence at the hands of family members, acquaintances, or strangers. Amnesty International noted political parties increasingly undermined LGBTQI+ rights, frequently burning rainbow flags and making claims blaming homosexuality for the spread of disease. In February, HRW reported on the use of online platforms such as social media and same-sex dating applications to identify LGBTQI+ individuals and target such individuals both online and offline. Armed groups extorted LGBTQI+ individuals on social media and dating applications under the guise of a fake LGBTQI+ user account, threatening to report them to the authorities or out them online if they did not pay a certain sum of money. According to NGOs, targeted LGBTQI+ individuals lived in constant fear of harassment or being killed by armed groups and reported being forced to change their residence, delete social media accounts, and change their telephone numbers. The report noted that security forces increasingly used digital targeting tactics to target LGBTQI+ individuals based on their online activity on social media and enable their arrest and prosecution. Once detained, individuals were often tortured and subject to other mistreatment, including sexual harassment. Discrimination: According to NGOs, persons who experienced severe discrimination, torture, physical injury, and the threat of death based on real or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics had no recourse to challenge those actions via courts or government institutions. Women’s rights NGOs in the IKR reported pressure from the KRG Directorate of NGOs during the license renewal process to certify they did not work on LGBTQI+ matters. There were no legal protections for sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. In September, NGO experts reported the issuance of arrest warrants against staff of the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq for sheltering individuals facing death threats from their families, and the federal DNGO targeted the organization by filing a lawsuit against it. Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: IraQueer reported it was impossible for transgender persons to legally obtain gender affirmation surgery or hormone replacement therapy. Transgender persons, including those accessing surgery or hormonal treatment outside the country, faced barriers in obtaining legal documents that reflected their gender identity. Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no reports of forced or involuntary so-called conversion therapy or of medically unnecessary and irreversible “normalization” surgeries performed on children or on nonconsenting adult intersex persons. Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: HRW assessed that several articles of the law could be used to restrict LGBTQI+ individuals’ freedoms of expression, association, and assembly. For example, the law prescribed imprisonment of up to seven years for promoting any “movement” that sought to “change the fundamental principles of the constitution or the basic laws of society.” HRW reported the law’s prohibition on disseminating any information or idea that among other things, “disturbs the public peace,” could be used to target LGBTQI+ activists or any individuals who demonstrated in support of LGBTQI+ rights or publicly used LGBTQI+ slogans. The law called for up to two years’ imprisonment for producing, distributing, importing, publishing, displaying, obtaining, or translating books, other written material, or media that violated public integrity or decency. Singing or broadcasting obscene or indecent songs or statements in a public place was punishable by up to one year in prison. PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES Persons with disabilities had limited access to education, employment, health services, information, communications, buildings, transportation, the judicial system, or other state services. The government did not provide information and communication in accessible formats. The government did not fully implement a law mandating access for persons with disabilities to buildings and to educational and work settings. The COR Committee on Labor and Social Affairs stated there was deliberate negligence on the part of the government in addressing the needs of persons with disabilities. Persons with disabilities continued to face difficulties in accessing health, education, and employment services. Disability rights activists noted the number of persons with disabilities was increasing due to faulty policies, wars, acts of terrorism, insufficient traffic laws, land mines, and poor health care. The Ministry of Labor led the Independent Commission for the Care of People with Disabilities, which evaluated applications for disability-related government services. The Ministry of Labor operated several institutions for children and young adults with disabilities. The ministry provided loan programs for persons with disabilities to pay for vocational training. The federal constitution stated the government should provide for the social and health security of persons with disabilities, including through protection against discrimination and provision of housing and special programs of care and rehabilitation. Nonetheless, the law did not prohibit discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, or mental disabilities. There was a 5 percent public-sector employment quota for persons with disabilities, but employment discrimination persisted. Mental health support for prisoners with mental disabilities did not exist. The Ministry of Health provided medical care, benefits, and rehabilitation, when available, for persons with disabilities, who could also receive benefits from other agencies, including the Prime Minister’s Office. The KRG deputy minister of labor and social affairs led the Independent Commission for Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region, which included protection of rights for those with disabilities. KRG law prescribed greater protections for individuals with disabilities. The law required that 5 percent of employees at public-sector institutions and 3 percent of employees at private institutions should be persons with disabilities. The KRG provided a 100,000 dinar ($69) monthly stipend to government employees with disabilities and a 150,000 dinar ($103) stipend to unemployed individuals with disabilities. A lack of funds led to less than full implementation of the law. Disability rights advocates in the IKR continued to report the KRG’s disability protections lacked implementation, including the 5 percent employment requirement. Lack of accessibility remained a problem with more than 98 percent of public buildings, parks, and transportation lacking adequate facilities to assist persons with disabilities in the region. Disability advocates reported employment was low among members of the community, and many youths with mental and physical disabilities lacked access to educational opportunities. Persons with disabilities in the IKR frequently held protests and sit-ins to call on the KRG to improve their financial and living conditions. Disability unions stated they were discriminated against in terms of employment and that the social security payments they received from the government were not enough, especially as many had medical expenses. Persons with disabilities in the IKR reported societal discrimination, bullying, and sexual harassment, including from teachers. OTHER SOCIETAL VIOLENCE OR DISCRIMINATION The country’s population included Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Shabak, as well as members of ethnic and religious minority groups, including Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenians, Yezidis, Sabean-Mandaeans, Baha’is, Kaka’is, and a very small number of Jews. The country also had a small Roma (Dom) community, as well as an estimated 1.5 to two million citizens of African descent who resided primarily in Basrah and adjoining provinces. Because religion, politics, and ethnicity were closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents of discrimination as based solely on ethnic or religious identity. The law did not permit some religious groups, including those of the Baha’i, Zoroastrian, and Kaka’i faiths, to register under their professed religions, which, although recognized in the IKR, remained unrecognized and illegal under federal law. The law also forbade Muslims to convert to another religion. In the IKR, this law was rarely enforced, and individuals were generally allowed to convert to other religious faiths without KRG interference. Outside the IKR, restrictions on freedom of religion as well as violence against and harassment of members of minority groups committed by the ISF remained widespread, according to religious leaders and representatives of NGOs. See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/. Section 7. Worker Rights A. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING The federal constitution stated citizens had the right to form and join unions and professional associations. The labor law, however, prohibited the formation of unions independent of the government-controlled General Federation of Iraqi Workers and in workplaces with fewer than 50 workers. The labor law did not apply to public-sector employees. The law also considered individuals employed by state-owned enterprises (which made up approximately 10 percent of the workforce) as public-sector employees. Private-sector employees in worksites employing more than 50 workers could form workers committees, subdivisions of unions with limited rights, but most private-sector businesses employed fewer than 50 workers. The labor law did not prohibit antiunion discrimination or provide reinstatement for workers fired for union activity. The law did not explicitly prohibit interference in union activity. The law allowed workers to select representatives for collective bargaining, even if they were not members of a union, and afforded workers the right to have more than one union in a workplace. The law did not explicitly protect the right to engage in collective bargaining or the right to strike in the private sector but set out regulations governing the exercise of these rights. Civil servants and essential service workers were prohibited from engaging in strikes. Collective bargaining negotiations were subject to a 30-day time limit, after which the government had authority to intervene and impose a settlement. Collective bargaining agreements did not necessarily apply to all workers in the bargaining unit. The law required striking workers to provide advance notification, and to go forward they had to submit to compulsory conciliation, binding arbitration, or both in courts appointed by the Ministry of Labor. The law did not protect workers from dismissal or retaliation for participating in strikes. The government sometimes violated private-sector employees’ collective bargaining rights. Some unions were able to play a supportive role in labor disputes. Unions had the right to demand government arbitration. Labor courts had the authority to consider labor law violations and disputes, but no information was available concerning enforcement, including whether procedures were prompt or efficient or whether penalties were commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights, such as discrimination. Strikers and union leaders reported government officials threatened and harassed them. In August, a new Social Security Law for Private Sector Workers introduced reforms to the social security system for private-sector workers. The law expanded the legal coverage of the social security system, covering all workers, including informal workers, the self-employed, and contributing family workers. The law also expanded the range of entitlements to include maternity and unemployment benefits for the first time. The law provided health insurance obtained from public, cooperative, and private providers. The KRG effectively enforced laws protecting the freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike for workers. The KRG’s Ministry of Labor led the KRG’s engagement on labor rights. KRG labor laws were based on federal labor law. There were more than 15 unions, associations, and syndicates in the IKR. All heads of unions and syndicates were men, but board members included women. Each union had a separate women’s committee for women workers’ affairs. The women’s committees were reportedly supported by local NGOs to support gender equality and advance women’s union leadership in the IKR. The Kurdistan Confederation of Workers was an umbrella organization that coordinated among these groups. B. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/. C. PROHIBITION OF CHILD LABOR AND MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ . D. DISCRIMINATION (SEE SECTION 6) E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK Wage and Hour Laws: The national minimum wage, set by federal labor law, was above the poverty line. Most employees worked for the government. The law limited the standard workday to eight hours, with one or more rest periods totaling 30 minutes to one hour, and the standard workweek to 48 hours. The law permitted up to four hours of overtime work per day and required premium pay for overtime work. For industrial work, overtime could not exceed one hour per day. Violations of the law were common in the entertainment, construction, and industrial sectors. Occupational Safety and Health: The government set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards that were appropriate for the main industries. The law stated that employers should reduce daily working hours for hazardous or exhausting work. The law provided workers the right to remove themselves from a situation endangering health and safety without prejudice to their employment but did not extend this right to civil servants or migrant workers, who together made up the majority of the country’s workforce. The inadequate legal and regulatory framework, combined with the country’s high level of violence and insecurity, high unemployment, large informal sector, and lack of meaningful work standards, resulted in substandard conditions for many workers. Workplace injuries occurred frequently, especially among manual laborers, but no data were available on the specific number of industrial accidents that resulted in death or serious injury. In September, the Civil Defense Directorate announced recording 7,000 businesses violating safety conditions, including restaurants, hotels, and wedding halls. The campaign started due to the Quaraqosh fire in Ninewa Province, where more than 119 persons were killed and more than 90 injured in a wedding hall that lacked safety measures. The latest information for on-the-job injuries showed that in 2022 there were 522 work injuries in the governmental sector, and 4,011 work injuries in private sector, mostly in services and construction sectors. The KRG followed OSH requirements outlined in federal labor law. Labor courts in the IKR settled disputes between employees and employers, including those not covered by labor legislation. Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, or OSH laws or impose penalties on violators. The Ministry of Labor had jurisdiction over matters concerning wages, hours, and OSH. The government did not effectively enforce regulations governing wages or working conditions. The ministry’s OSH staff worked throughout the country. It was unclear whether legal responsibility for identifying unsafe situations lay with OSH experts or with the workers. Penalties for violations were not commensurate with those for similar crimes such as fraud or negligence. A July 2022 national labor force survey conducted with the support of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the first of its kind in a decade, found that approximately 55 percent of total employment was in the informal sector and the number of persons with informal jobs almost 67 percent of the total employment. The ILO estimated a majority of workers in the country’s private sector, who constituted 40 to 50 percent of the workforce, worked for informal-sector entities. The ILO noted private-sector workers, most of whom were employed informally, did not receive adequate workplace protections and benefits, and often were paid lower average wages than their public sector counterparts. The ILO found that refugees and asylum seekers worked predominately in the informal sector, where they were exposed to poor work conditions, because they faced systemic barriers to formal employment. Bureaucratic requirements varied from province to province, and sometimes on a case-by-case basis, making it difficult for many refugees to meet the legal requirements to access formal employment. A lack of oversight and monitoring of employment contracts left foreign and migrant workers vulnerable to exploitative working conditions and abusive treatment.
Read more
Five quota seats will be allocated for the minorities
2 for Erbil, 2 for Sulaimani and 1 for Duhok Jumana al-Ghalai, the spokesperson for the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) told Draw Media that the commission will allocate the five quota seats of the Kurdistan parliament for the minorities: The seats will be distributed among the provinces as follows: 🔹 2 seats for Erbil province (one Turkmen and one Christian). 🔹 Two seats for Sulaimani province (one Turkmen and one Christian). 🔹 One seat for Duhok province (one Armenian Christian).
Read more
The population census will be conducted in the Kurdistan region
The Executive Director General of the General Census in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq announced that a high committee will be formed in all provinces, administrations, districts, and sub-districts and will visit every household on November 20 this year. Mahmood Osman, Executive Director of the General Census in the Kurdistan Region, said: The census will be conducted at the end of this year and preparations have begun, within two months to collect complete information on all buildings, houses, and residences and 120,000 employees in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region will participate in the process. He added that the necessary budget has been provided for the conduct of the general census, the first time the census process in Iraq will be conducted electronically, the results will be announced soon after the process. He added that the formation of high census committees in all provinces, independent administrations, districts, and sub-districts, in preparation for the process, citizens should be informed, because the general census has a direct relationship with citizens, and citizens benefit from the census because it will be the criterion for the delivery of all services.
Read more.jpg)
KRG shares first list of Know Your Customer (KYC) data with the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI)
The Kurdistan Regional Government on Thursday shared the first batch of Know Your Customer (KYC) data for 368 public sector employees with the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI), in line with the KRG’s ongoing efforts to digitalize its payroll under the MyAccount initiative. The KRG will continue to share data of employees who select TBI from the seven participating banks in the project based on the process approved by the Central Bank of Iraq. The KYC data will be shared on a weekly basis. The KRG looks forward to receiving a clear schedule from TBI on account opening and card delivery, as well as a response to the KRG’s Request for Information (RFI) submitted on 29 April 2024 that remains unanswered. This information is critical to determining the bank’s readiness and capacity to meet the needs of the customers of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. We hope that TBI will promptly create the bank accounts. Ministry of Finance and Economy
Read more.jpg)
“High Commissioner” Leaves Iraq
Draw Media The "High Commissioner" or "al-Khatun," as the Shiites call her, will leave Iraq at the end of this month. She is a Dutch woman who lacked any background about the Iraqi society but fell deep into the country’s deep challenges and complicated relations between the United Nations and Iraq. She is now spending the last days of her life in Iraq and plans to visit Tehran a second time. She does not want to repeat Iraq's mistakes and wants to normalize relations with Iran before taking up her new post in Lebanon, understanding that she will achieve nothing in Lebanon without Iran. The al-Khatun is called Jeanine Plasschaert who once said to the Kurdish leaders "Do not take today's autonomy for granted. In order to sustain it, unity will prove essential.” Plasschaert is Finished Jeanine Plasschaert read out her latest report to the Security Council this evening and will leave Iraq later this month. Ms. Plasschaert is the seventh UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. She took office in August 2018, following the end of the war against ISIS and the Kurdistan Region's independence referendum, two events that complicated the security and political situation. Since her inauguration, Iraq has seen another major political event. In October 2019, a wave of demonstrations against poor services began in Iraq’s southern provinces; these demonstrations later grew wider and demanded the removal of the ruling class after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This led to the resignation of the then-premier Adil Abdulmahdi, and this was the first time a prime minister had been forced to resign under street pressure since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. Plasschaert was one of those who quickly joined the protests against the ruling class in Baghdad, went to Baghdad’s Tahrir Square and rode a Tuk Tuk, a symbol of protests, visited Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf wearing a veil and announced her support for the protesters and reforms in Iraq. It was a Shiite popular demonstration, later called Tishreen. Since then, Plasschaert’s role in Iraq has increased, and she started presenting roadmaps to the government and parliament to overcome the situation. Her maneuvers made some political parties worrisome. And they claimed that her movements were beyond the authority assigned to her by the UNAMI mandate in Iraq. Some Iraqis went further and compared Plasschaert’s power to Gertrude Bell (Oriental Secretary for High Commissioner of Iraq Sir Percy Cox in 1920s), a woman who had great powers in Iraq and whose reports and opinions were valued by the British and Iraqi political leaders, ministers, and officers. She was called al-Khatun" (a Lady of the Court) and all [Iraqi leaders] wished to meet her once because she had ‘absolute power’ and was able to do anything for them. Plasschaert is the second Dutch to be appointed as the UN SRSG to Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. From 2009-2011, Ad Melkert, who was also Dutch, served as the UN SRSG in Iraq. Eruption of Concern Against Plasschaert The Tishreen protests forced Iraqi political parties to hold early parliamentary elections in October 2021. From the beginning of electoral preparations, Plasschaert began to interfere. The Shiite parties close to Iran soon accused her of playing a role in amending the electoral law in a way that was to their detriment. On October 10, 2021, early elections were held. For the first time, independent candidates were eligible to run outside the traditional parties. The electoral outcome created a huge rift in the Shiite house in Iraq; Moqtada al-Sadr was the biggest winner, and Iran-affiliated parties close (Noursi al-Maliki, Hadi Amiri, Qais al-Khazaali, Falih al-Fayyad, and other Hashd al-Shaabi groups) suffered a historic defeat, and they were disgruntled with the results and took to the streets to protest. In late November 2021, the Fatah Alliance and the most prominent loser of the election, Hadi al-Amiri, poured his cup of anger on Plasschaert, saying that “Iraq has not and will not accept any High Commissioner and she must abide by her specific duties." The defeated Shiite parties said they had submitted hundreds of fraud evidence to Plasschaert, who promised to report the it to the UN Security Council, she said the election was clean when she spoke to the Council. From Enmity to Friendship with Iran According to information obtained by Draw from sources in Baghdad, Plasschaert plans to visit Tehran next week. This is her second visit to Tehran after her last visit on 30 July of last year. Plasschaert’s visit comes as her tenure as Iraq SRSG is in the very final days before 31 May. According to Draw investigations, Plasschaert is looking to take over the post of UN Secretary-General's special envoy to Lebanon after completing her mission in Iraq. To fully achiever her goal, she first needs to normalize relations with Iran considering that Iran has a strong hegemony in the Lebanon through Hezbollah. The SRSG’s upcoming visit to Tehran is believed to be an entirely private matter rather than a visit in her current capacity as an SRSG for Iraq. Kurds and Plasschaert After the resignation of Adil Abdulmahdi and the inauguration of Mustafa al-Kadhimi as prime minister, Plaschardt was back in motion, this time preparing a bigger project for Iraq, which was the “confederation” project. In July 2020, Plasschaert stepped up her political moves. Informed sources indicated at that time that said that the United Nations, in coordination with the Iraqi presidency and government, had prepared a "comprehensive" roadmap to resolve the outstanding issues between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region. Plasschaert was trying to turn Iraq from a federal country into a confederal one. Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) leader Massoud Barzani was one of those who supported the project, but the idea of confederation was soon rejected by the Iraqi parties and the attempt ended in failure. Some reports announced that SRSG Plasschaert had said in meetings that her project was being supported the world powers, especially the United States. This and other political moves led Iraqi Shiites to become more suspicious of Plasschaert, accusing her of not acting "impartially," especially when it came to relations between Baghdad and Erbil. Now that she is spending her last days in Iraq, Plasschaert has not yet given up the Kurdistan Region. These days, she is portrayed as a close friend of President Nechirvan Barzani. Draw has learned that al-Khatun advocates postponing the Kurdistan Region’s long-overdue elections as a solution to reconcile the two ruling parties of PUK and KDP. The PUK is concerned about her intentions and the party sees it as a direct support of KDP’s policies towards postponing the election. In addition, Plasschaert has reportedly sent letter to the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to allocate five seats to the minority components in the Kurdistan Region’s parliament. In 2021, she said in a speech to the leaders of the Kurdistan Region’s political parties that “a friend is the one who makes you cry…do not take today’s autonomy for granted. In order to sustain it, unity will prove essential.” It turned out that a year after Plasschaert’s speech, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court overturned the KRG's oil and gas law and obliged Erbil to hand over its oil and gas to Baghdad. The same Court later issued a series of decisions against the Kurdistan Region, including ruling that the extension to the term of the Kurdistan Parliament was “unconstitutional,” dissolving Kurdistan Region’s provincial Councils, and lastly hitting the region’s electoral law. The FSC’s wave of decisions culminated in the suspension of oil exports to Turkey on March 25, 2023, which cost the region nearly 80 percent of its revenues, redirecting Kurdistan Region’s dream of independence to standing in front of Baghdad door. Plasschaert Kills UNAMI UNAMI is a special political mission established in 2003 by UN Security Council as per Resolution 1500 at the request of the then Iraqi government after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, and its mission expanded since 2007, according to the Security Council’s resolution 1770. UNAMI's mission in Iraq is to provide advice, support and assistance to the Iraqi government and people to strengthen comprehensive political dialogue, assist in the electoral process and facilitate dialogue between Iraq and its neighbors, as well as strengthen the human rights situation and reform in Iraqi courts and the judicial system. The mission was also tasked with working with government partners and civil society in Iraq. UNAMI currently has about 648 staff in Iraq, of whom 251 are international staff and 397 are local staff The meetings are held for political affairs and peacebuilding. It administratively functions under the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Sudani sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General last month calling for the mandate of UNAMI to end by December 31, 2025. Furthermore, the Iraqi prime minister has determined in the letter how UNAMI will work until the end of next year and cuts the mission off from any political work, saying it should only complete its work in the areas of “economic reform, service delivery, sustainable development, climate change and other development sectors). UNAMI's work in Iraq is fundamentally a political task and it provides reports UN the Security Council. Shiites appear to be very upset at Plasschaert seeing that premier Sudani has not even listened to the substance of the report prepared by the Independent Strategic Review Team led by Volker Persis last year, in which the majority of Iraqi parties supported staying of UNAMI; Kurds and Sunnis, including some Shiite parties, clearly supported UNAMI’s continuance. Nevertheless, it seems that premier Sudani did not listen to the views of these parties when he wrote to the UN Secretary-General. Now that the issue is at a critical juncture given Security Council’s fast-approaching talks on UNAMI’s future, the Kurds and Sunnis have chosen silence, fearing deterioration of their relations with the Shiite ruling parties and existence of other domestic issues that need to be addressed. Some familiar with UNAMI affairs in Baghdad told Draw that Plasschaert wishes to end UNAMI’s existence after her departure from Iraq and may not care what happens to the mission following her leave. But the UN Secretary-General António Guterres thinks otherwise. He met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein in Manama, Bahrain, yesterday and urged the continuity of UNAMI. Minister Hussein thanked Guterres for his “candid request” and promised to convey his request to the Iraqi government. At any event, Plasschaert’s policies during his tenure in Iraq appear to have increased protests against UNAMI by political parties. Those familiar with the SRSG’s work say that Plasschaert had no UN experience when she took office in Iraq, and that she had only military, but not a diplomatic background with no knowledge about the Iraqi society. She often exceeded the limits of her duty, which sparked a wave of discontent against herself and the UNAMI. She also allegedly acted authoritarianly and did not consult UNAMI team; even her deputy, Claudio Cordon, who was left little role to play. In case UNAMI stays in Iraq, the United Nations may need to send someone to Iraq who can normalize the post-Plasschaert crises. For civil society organizations and those who support the upholding of human rights, UNAMI's withdrawal from Iraq will have a hugely adverse impact given that UNAMI regularly submits its reports on the human rights situation in Iraq to the Security Council.
Read more.jpg)
U.S. Energy Official, PM Barzani Discuss Restoring Kurdish Oil Exports
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffrey Pyatt on May 16 visited the Kurdistan Region and was welcomed by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani. “We discussed advancing energy sector collaboration, opportunities to invest in clean and renewable energy projects, and plans to improve the electricity sector for Iraq and the Kurdistan Region,” Prime Minister Barzani said in a statement. After the meeting, they visited the Mass Global power plant in Pirdawood and the Khurmala power and refinery facilities operated by Kar Group in Erbil. In a press briefing, they emphasized the importance of advancing the energy sector in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, particularly by adopting clean energy solutions, protecting the environment, and limiting air pollution. Prime Minister Barzani thanked the U.S. for its support in advancing the energy sector in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. Assistant Secretary Pyatt reaffirmed his country's support for a strong and prosperous Kurdistan Region within a federal Iraq. He commended the region's energy industry's progress, highlighting its alignment with global standards and likening this region to Oklahoma.
Read more
APIKUR: "We are ready to resume oil exports through Turkey"
APIKUR welcomes the visit of Ambassador Geoffrey R. Pyatt, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources, to Iraq as another strong signal about the imperative for governmental leaders in Baghdad and Erbil to follow-through with their stated goal of restoring oil exports through the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline. We understand that Ambassador Pyatt’s meetings with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia Al-Sudani and Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani are a continuation of recent discussions held in Washington, DC and the Munich Security Conference. As the Iraq Ministry of Oil recently completed two oil field licensing rounds, APIKUR notes there is already underutilized oil production and export capacity from Kurdistan Region that will help Iraq immediately achieve its short-term and long-term export goals. APIKUR member companies reiterate that they are prepared to resume exports, contingent upon reaching agreements which provide for payment surety for past and future exports and preservation of commercial and economic terms. This resumption will benefit all Iraqi citizens and our stakeholders. “Ambassador Pyatt’s visits to both, Baghdad and Erbil underscore the importance of immediate and cooperative action by all stakeholders to restore exports through the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline,” said Myles B. Caggins III, spokesman, Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan. “APIKUR’s member companies remain eager to resolve the export impasse and would welcome an invitation to participate in the process.”
Read more
Gulf Keystone announces its earnings for 2024
Gulf Keystone Petroleum Ltd on Monday said sales were solid in 2024, as the company also unveiled a USD10 million share buyback programme, intended to close a perceived discount to its share price. The oil and gas producer, which operates in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, said that local sales of crude from its Shaikan field have been robust in the year so far. In the year to May 11, sales averaged around 37,000 barrels per day, peaking monthly at 44,100 barrels in March. Sales in May have averaged 48,300 barrels per day, following a slowdown in April due to the temporary impact of Eid celebrations on truck availability. Gulf Keystone said that realised prices have improved to USD27 per barrel from USD25 per barrel, "reflecting continued strong local market demand". Subject to sales demand remaining at current levels, Gulf Keystone estimates its gross production potential at between 45,000 and 48,000 barrels per day, following recent optimisations to its well performance. GKP also announced a new share buyback programme, arguing that its share price represents "a significant discount to the intrinsic value of the Shaikan field and does not adequately reflect the near-term free cash flow generation potential from local sales". The company will repurchase shares worth up to USD10 million. The programme, which commenced on Monday, is scheduled to run until the earlier of Gulf Keystone's annual general meeting on June 16 or when the maximum dollar amount has been reached. Gulf Keystone said it will consider cash dividends and additional share buybacks, depending on the operating environment and its own liquidity position. Chief Executive Officer Jon Harris said: "While we remain focused on retaining sufficient liquidity in the current operating environment and ensuring we are able to unlock significant potential value from the restart of Kurdistan exports, we recognise the importance of distributing excess cash to shareholders." Gulf Keystone shares were up 8.1% at 129.44 pence each in London on Monday afternoon. Source: Alliance News
Read more
The Teachers Building a New Labor Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan
Facing late and partial payment, teachers in Iraqi Kurdistan launched the longest strike in the region’s history. WINTHROP RODGERS On a bright Sunday morning last October, marching teachers filled the streets of Sulaymaniyah, the city in the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Most wore button-downs and blouses, as if they had only just stepped away from the chalkboard. They eyeballed a couple boisterous teenagers along the protest route with the practiced look of censure that comes with their profession. But the edge of their dignified demeanor was fraying with evident frustration. Their message was clear: pay us our salaries or we will continue our strike. The teachers had walked off the job a month earlier to protest the government’s failure to pay them in-full and on-time. Their strike would continue for the next four months. It constituted the longest sustained labor action by public servants in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region in recent memory. It also marked a major show of power by a workforce that is deeply angry with governance by the two ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). “The situation is very serious, which is why we decided to do something,” Saman Tahir Ali, a protest organizer, said in a recent interview. “How can we pay the rent if we don’t receive our salaries?” Ali is a member of the Dissenting Teachers’ Council, which was established in 2014 and coordinates strikes and protests. It is not an official labor union, but is part of a new kind of politics in the Kurdistan Region that is developing outside of institutions dominated by the ruling parties. “Our Council has its mandate from the street, from the demonstrations,” Ali said. “Our Council represents the desire of the teachers and expresses what they are fighting for.” Concerns over Governance The Kurdistan Region enjoys a high-level of autonomy within Iraq. It has its own government, known as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). With about 1.2 million civil servants, the public sector is by far the most important employer. The education ministry employs more than 160,000 people, a large number of whom are public school teachers. Most Kurds support these institutions as an important expression of Kurdish self-governance, which was secured after decades of struggle against the government in Baghdad. However, many have deep concerns about the quality of governance that they offer. The KDP and the PUK dominated the KRG’s institutions, and both have used their influence to establish pervasive patronage networks throughout the public sector. For decades, this has been accepted as part of an implicit social contract, where the parties provide employment in return for political support. However, this bargain has steadily unraveled since 2014 with the KRG struggling to pay public servants in-full and on-time because of low oil prices and budget disputes with Iraq’s federal government in Baghdad. To deal with its cash flow problems, the KRG instituted a number of unpopular austerity programs, including withholding portions of monthly salaries, freezing hiring and promotions, and offering insecure contracts to teachers. Since July 2019, when the current cabinet took office, the KRG has only paid 37 monthly salaries in-full, or about 63%t of the time. Many of these payments came late. In May 2020, when public servants received their salary for classes taught in January, one especially cheeky teacher from Koya showed up wearing a winter coat and gloves to collect his money despite it being 97 degrees outside. “We Teach Children” As the new school year approached in September 2023, the KRG was three months behind paying its workers. In response, the teachers announced a strike that would ultimately last until February. Previously, the longest such strike had lasted 52 days. Their main demands included direct salary payments from the federal government, which is generally regarded as a more reliable paymaster, and the resumption of promotions. Due to the size and importance of their sector, the teachers’ message carried significant weight and created space to call for substantive reforms to governance in the Kurdistan Region. “We teach children …we have to call for the right things. Teachers are important in society. Every progress in society is made by education. And, of course, education is led by teachers,” Hevi Azad, a high school English teacher in Sulaymaniyah, said at a protest last October. During the strike, tens of thousands of teachers staged weekly protests in Sulaymaniyah city and smaller towns in rural areas. In posters and chants, they took aim at the KRG minister of education and local officials. They brought their children and student groups organized to support them. As the marches wound their way through the city, shopkeepers would bring out water and bystanders waved to people they knew from their neighborhoods. The strikes even caught the attention of the UK parliament, breaking above the usual focus on oil and security that usually dominates conversations about the Kurdistan Region in foreign capitals. “The government hasn’t given us our rights, our salaries, and our promotions,” said Azad. “Our country is rich. We have so much oil. So why didn’t they give us [our salary]? They don’t have a right reason.” She added, “They do this because they want everyone to be under the control of their parties.” Risks of Protesting Eventually, the federal government in Baghdad stepped in to transfer salary payments and the teachers returned to the classrooms in late February. However, they maintained pressure on the ruling parties by holding protests even after ending the strike. During the strike, the teachers faced a number of challenges. First, the labor action was only permitted to take place in areas controlled by the PUK. While teachers in the KDP-controlled Erbil and Duhok governorates face the same problems as those in Sulaymaniyah, they risk arrest if they try to organize protests. The KDP has a well-earned reputation for cracking down on public displays of dissent in areas it controls. The PUK tends to be more tolerant of protests, but also has its red lines. Several teachers were arrested when they tried of hold a protest near where the party leadership has its headquarters. Importantly, the teachers were only sporadically joined by civil servants at other ministries, including after the main strike had ended. This lack of coordination showed the degree of control retained by the parties over large parts of the public sector. This is a major limiting factor, but one that organizers see as solvable. “A Different Movement” “We are at the initial stages of our political life here. We have not had groups that can lead these movements in the Kurdistan Region,” Osman Gulpi, another member of the Dissenting Teachers Council. “Now you see that there is a different movement … This is a different sort of civil organizing. It is not only the political parties that are controlling the people, but these types of groups can have influence as well,” he added. The strike may have ended, but Gulpi insists that the teachers will go back out into the streets if the promises made by the federal government and the KRG are not implemented. That is a real possibility. Both the KRG and Iraq’s federal government have made promises to public servants in the Kurdistan Region, but have gone back on their word before. While both Erbil and Baghdad say they want to keep their political conflicts away from the livelihoods and welfare of the people, it is difficult to ensure in practice. As a result, both governments are very much on probation as far as the teachers are concerned — and next time public servants will have a battle-tested organization they can build upon. The establishment of viable, sustainable power centers within civil society and outside of the party system represents a major development for Kurdish democracy. Labor is a potential source of energy to drive this dynamic. “We believe that we are an alternative for this corrupt system,” Ali said. “It can be a new model for politics in Iraqi Kurdistan that the teachers and the workers are the center of this power, not the political parties.” Source: Inkstick Media
Read more.jpg)
ShaMaran Reports First Quarter 2024 Results
Garrett Soden, President and CEO of ShaMaran, commented: “The Sarsang and Atrush blocks performed well in Q1 2024 with the highest quarterly EBITDAX1 since we started selling to the local market last year. We continue to focus on optimizing cash flow with our operating partners while looking to reach a commercial solution on the restart of exports through the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline. The timing of the pipeline reopening remains uncertain, but the relevant parties are working to resolve outstanding issues following the recent diplomacy between leaders of Kurdistan, Iraq and Türkiye. In the meantime, we look forward to closing the Atrush transaction with TAQA and HKN.” Corporate Highlights: The closure of the Iraq-Türkiye (“ITP”) pipeline since March 25, 2023, continues to have a material impact on ShaMaran’s operations and financial results. The Company is actively engaging with the relevant parties to resume pipeline exports; ShaMaran generated $18.3 million in operating cash flow during the quarter from local sales, matching Q1 2023 operating cash flow (the last quarter prior to the ITP shutdown); The Q1 EBITDAX of $14.2 million is higher than the combined EBITDAX of the business in the previous three quarters since the ITP shutdown, further highlighting the Company’s progress in generating strong cash flow through local sales; and Both Sarsang and Atrush delivered the highest quarterly production since the ITP shutdown, and we expect to increase production in both assets during the remainder of the year. EBITDAX is a non-IFRS financial measure. Refer to the MD&A for more information. In Q1 2024, average gross daily oil production from Atrush and Sarsang combined was 57,400 bopd (66,800 bopd in Q1 2023), 14% lower than Q1 2023, while lifting costs were 42% lower than Q1 2023, primarily due to the continued focus on savings since the ITP closure; Q1 2024 oil sales to the Kurdistan local market averaged a net oil price of $36.49/bbl ($60.53/bbl in Q1 2023) and generated revenues to the Company of $22.6 million, 48% lower revenue than Q1 2023, mainly due to the lower net oil price in the local sales market; ShaMaran generated $17.5 million of free cash flow before debt service2 in Q1 2024 ($6.7 million in Q1 2023) as tight cost and capital expenditure controls helped optimize cash flow during the quarter; At March 31, 2024, the Company had cash of $71.6 million (including restricted cash of $25.3 million) and gross debt of $270.6 million (including the $255 million bond and $15.6 million related-party loan). Net debt3 was $193.1 million (including $5.9 million in ShaMaran 2025 bonds held by the Company); and At May 7, 2024, the Company had cash of $80.9 million (including restricted cash of $25.3 million) and gross debt of $270.6 million (including the $255 million bond and $15.6 million related-party loan). Net debt was $183.8 million (including $5.9 million in ShaMaran 2025 bonds held by the Company). ShaMaran plans to publish its financial statements for the six months ending June 30, 2024, on August 8, 2024. Except as otherwise indicated, all currency amounts indicated as “$” in this news release are expressed in United States dollars. About ShaMaran Petroleum Corp. ShaMaran is a Canadian independent oil and gas company focused on the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The Company indirectly holds an 18% working interest (22.5% paying interest) in the Sarsang Block, and, subject to closing the previously announced transaction, will increase its indirect 27.6% working interest in the Atrush Block to 50%. The Company is listed in Toronto on the TSX Venture Exchange and in Stockholm on Nasdaq First North Growth Market (ticker “SNM”). ShaMaran is part of the Lundin Group of Companies. SOURCE ShaMaran Petroleum Corp.
Read more.jpg)
Iraqi Kurdistan’s Ethnic Minorities Are Under Attack
A power struggle between Baghdad and Erbil is targeting the country’s most vulnerable. By Winthrop Rodgers, a journalist and analyst based in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq. Since it gained semi-autonomous status in 1992, Iraqi Kurdistan has largely charted its own course, separate from the federal government in Baghdad. But in recent months, increasingly organized federal authorities have attempted to impose greater control over the region. And ethnic and religious minorities are caught in the middle. Since the start of the year, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court has eliminated seats in the Kurdistan Parliament that had been reserved for Christians, Turkmens, and Armenians. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration also announced that remaining camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Kurdistan Region, which house tens of thousands of Yazidis and Sunni Arabs, must close by the end of July. The Kurdistan Region’s image on the world stage has long been one of exception; Kurdish leaders have carefully cultivated a reputation that, “whereas in the rest of Iraq and the Middle East, minorities are prosecuted for being Yazidi or Christian … in the Kurdistan Region, they are protected, they are given a shelter,” said Shivan Fazil, a researcher at the Institute of Regional and International Studies, housed within the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani. On Easter last year, the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cited a “culture of coexistence and unity between the different communities.” The frequently invoked line is a central plank of the KRG’s pitch for political support and economic development aid to foreign partners and donors, including the United States. The situation on the ground was never as rosy as Kurdish officials claimed, however. The KRG “might claim coexistence, brotherhood, and peaceful living together, but none of this is true,” said Toma Khoshaba, an official with the Assyrian political party Sons of Mesopotamia. “We still feel a lot of bias and prejudice.” Christian communities, for example, regularly complain that their land is taken without compensation. Last year, Yazidis were subjected to attacks and abuse online after baseless rumors circulated on social media that a mosque had been burned in Sinjar. Now, Baghdad’s steps to dismantle vehicles for minority representation and protection could imperil the KRG’s global stature—and leave minorities in the Kurdistan Region even more vulnerable to discrimination. These communities are caught in the middle of a larger shift in Iraq’s federal system that empowers Baghdad at the expense of the KRG in Erbil. WHEN THE KURDISTAN PARLIAMENT was set up in 1992, it included five seats specifically for Christians. In 2009, the body added five additional spots for Turkmens and one for Armenians. The 11 seats for minorities—out of 111 total in the last parliament—enabled the KRG to claim that its institutions reflected its diverse constituency. In recent years, however, the reserved seats became more and more controversial. Critics alleged that the representatives acted as de facto representatives of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which has been accused of being increasingly undemocratic. By subsuming state institutions under party authority, the KDP has co-opted some legislators within the minority communities and allegedly gamed the electoral system to ensure loyalists win the reserved seats. Minority communities also complained that open voting lists allowed KDP-affiliated security forces and KDP supporters to dilute authentic minority participation. Some activists, like Khoshaba, feel that voting on these lists should have been legally restricted to members of the minority communities rather than to all voters. Many felt that the MPs failed to stand up for the interests of their communities once elected. The Kurdistan Region’s other parties argued that the system provided the KDP with an unfair advantage in parliament by giving the party an 11-seat head start. Seeking to capture some of those positions for itself, the KDP’s rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in May 2023 filed a lawsuit in Baghdad challenging the Kurdistan Region’s electoral law. This intra-Kurdish division gave the authorities in Baghdad an opening to exploit. In a bombshell Feb. 21 ruling that went beyond what the PUK sought, the Federal Supreme Court abolished the seats entirely. It did not outline a specific logic in its decision. While opponents of the KDP celebrated the decision, Christian and Turkmen parties felt as if they had lost, even if they harbored complicated views about how the reserved seats worked in practice. “By eliminating the reserved seats, they are eliminating our ethnic rights and our votes,” Khoshaba told Foreign Policy. He had hoped the court would reform the system rather than scrap it. The KDP reacted furiously to the court’s decision, writing on X that the verdict violated “the principles of federalism and the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Iraqi constitution.” But many consider the KDP’s protests political because the party so clearly benefited from the minority representation system. “We are not even able to select a cleaner to work in our schools because the KDP selects them. The Kurdish authorities must select them. We do not have the right to select a mukhtar for any of our villages or in any Assyrian area because they are always selected by the KDP and the Kurds,” Khoshaba said. “We want to have authority. We want to be in a real partnership and not just to live and be safe and practice out religion.” The Kurdistan Parliament could still pass a new, better electoral law to ensure authentic minority representation in the future, Fazil told Foreign Policy. “If they genuinely care about representation of those minorities, they can still salvage something,” he said. Instead, the KDP chose to boycott new regional legislative elections slated for June 10 in reaction to the court’s decision. Baghdad is playing a bigger game. The court’s ruling is consistent with a pattern of decisions by Iraq’s federal government that undermine the Kurdistan Region’s ability to manage its own political and economic affairs—and instead boost the fortunes of the country’s ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, which came to power in 2022 after the election of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani. It is made up of a range of Shiite parties, many with strong ties to Iran. While the Coordination Framework includes many major parties, some important factions like the Sadrists are not present in the current cabinet. Both the KDP and PUK have ministerial posts, but their presence is the result of Iraq’s sectarian power-sharing system rather than a reflection of their ability to drive policy. Reducing Erbil’s ability to govern its own affairs is key to rebalancing federal power toward Baghdad and centralizing decision-making across all of Iraq. Minority communities are also significantly affected by Sudani’s order to close the remaining IDP camps in the Kurdistan Region, most of which were established in the 2010s. In January, Iraq’s Ministry of Displacement and Migration set a deadline of July 30 for the facilities to cease operations. Baghdad is also providing monetary incentives to tempt displaced families to go back to their homes in federal-controlled territory. Fazil said that the government’s campaign to close the camps is partially an effort to move past a period defined by the Islamic State, but there is a clear political dimension to the decision as well. IDPs are a rich source of votes at election time, with the next round of federal parliamentary polls expected in 2025. The closure policy will likely push many IDPs back into disputed territories where they can be integrated into political patronage networks. Most IDPs are vulnerable and can be threatened or incentivized into voting a certain way. When they are located in the Kurdistan Region, the KDP can exert greater influence over IDPs’ voting behavior than if they returned to the disputed areas. ASAAD BARJAS WAS A TEENAGER when the Islamic State attacked his hometown in the Yazidi district of Sinjar in August 2014. He and his family escaped the militant group and have lived in the Kabarto IDP camp in the Kurdistan Region’s Duhok governorate for the last nine years. Life is hard in the camp and, like many others, Barjas hopes to return to Sinjar. But his village of Tel Azer lacks basic services, adequate housing, and jobs. In January, there were an estimated 161,000 IDPs living in the 22 camps currently operating in areas controlled by the KRG, according to statistics published by the International Organization for Migration. It is not clear from publicly available data how many of those in the camps are members of minority groups, but it is likely to be a high proportion given the IDPs’ places of origin. Almost 90 percent of those living in the camps are originally from Nineveh governorate, which includes diverse areas like Sinjar, Mosul, and the Nineveh Plains. Shabaks, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Yazidis, Kurds, Sunni and Shiite Arabs, Kaka’is, and Turkmens all call this area home. “I think this is a political decision. If they really want people to return to their homes—it’s been 10 years—they could have done something about that earlier,” Barjas said. “This decision is not well-studied. It’s not right. It’s not the right time, and we don’t see it as something logical to do.” International humanitarian actors and foreign governments are closely watching the camps’ impending closures. As part of a shift from emergency humanitarian assistance to development, they are also in the process of shifting programming for IDPs to the federal government and the KRG, who will be primarily responsible for providing services to this population once they leave the camps. Nevertheless, the question of what will happen to the IDPs and where they will go looms large. The KRG’s Joint Crisis Coordination Centre, the local department in charge of the camps in the Kurdistan Region, did not return a request for comment. Since November 2023, three camps have shut down in Sulaymaniyah governorate, which is run by the PUK. The most recent to close was the Tazade camp on March 19. But so far, no camps have ceased operations in areas where the KDP is in charge. Those facilities host 94 percent of the IDPs currently living in the Kurdistan Region’s camps. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration has filed a lawsuit to force the KRG to act. “The federal government is pressuring the KRG, and the decision to push the IDPs to return is part of a broader campaign to reduce the KRG’s authority,” Fazil said. But it is minority groups that will suffer amid this escalating conflict between Iraq’s federal government and the Kurdistan Region. “As long as this minority-majority mindset continues, we are going to be continuously persecuted,” Khoshaba said. “We will not have a bright future here and everyone will leave.” Source: Foreign Policy
Read more
Dana Gas resumes normal gas production at Khor Mor field
On Friday, UAE’s "Dana Gas" announced the resumption of production at the "Khor Mor" field in the Kurdistan Region to its normal levels after being targeted by a drone attack. The company stated, "The production capacity of the facility now exceeds 500 million standard cubic feet of gas, 1,100 metric tons of liquefied petroleum gas, and 15,000 barrels of condensate." It added that "the resumption of production operations comes in response to measures taken by the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), in addition to further solid commitments aimed at enhancing security levels and significantly strengthening defenses at Khor Mor." On Thursday, Kurdistan’s Prime Minister Masrour Barzani emphasized that targeting the economic infrastructure of the Region harms all Iraqi citizens, stressing the need to halt such attacks. This came during his meeting with Federal Minister of Electricity Ziyad Ali Fahdel, where they discussed ongoing projects, and reforms in the electricity sector, emphasizing the importance of continuing coordination between KRG and Baghdad to improve and develop the power system overall. Barzani addressed the recent terrorist attack targeting the Khor Mor gas field, emphasizing that “targeting the economic infrastructure of the Region harms all Iraqi citizens,” and that “it is imperative to stop these attacks and prevent their recurrence.” He also reiterated the Region's readiness for cooperation and coordination with the federal government to enhance energy infrastructure, which can only be achieved through the official institutions and channels of KRG. For his part, the Iraqi Minister of Electricity praised the coordination and good relations between the federal and regional ministries, contributing to providing the best services to citizens, which is a common goal for both sides. Notably, in addition to the recent attack, the Khor Mor oil field, located in the Chamchamal district of al-Sulaymaniyah within the Kurdistan Region, has been the target of several attacks. In January, a drone strike temporarily halted production, causing power shortages in the northern Kurdistan region. No party claimed responsibility for the targeting. The Pearl Consortium operates the field, led by Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum, with partners including OMV of Austria, MOL of Hungary, and RWE. Production at Khor Mor began in 2008, supplying gas to power stations in Chamchamal, Bazian, and Erbil, making the Kurdish region a pioneer in using gas for electricity in Iraq. By 2018, production surged by 50%, reaching 452 million standard cubic feet per day from 305 million standard cfd by the end of 2021. Additionally, the field produced 15,000 barrels per day of condensate and over 1,000 tons of liquefied petroleum gas. So far, all the gas from the field has been utilized for domestic power generation, fueling over 80% of Kurdistan's electricity needs in Iraq.
Read more
Postponement of Kurdistan parliamentary elections has been settled
🔻Nechirvan Barzani told the Iraqi parties that the KDP's decision to boycott the election is the final decision 🔻KDP will participate in the elections on condition that the decisions of the Federal Court are annulled 🔹Nechirvan Barzani's visit to Baghdad, has opened the blind knot of postponing the Kurdistan parliamentary elections for the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Barzani has been able to convince the majority of Iraqi parties to postpone the elections. 🔹A prominent source from the coordinationframework said: Barzani told Iraqi political and government leaders, thatThe KDP's decision not to participate in the elections is the final decision and will not back down.
Read more
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)