Iraq's oil revenues in June surpass $8 billion
🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announced July oil revenues: 🔹 Oil revenue last month reached (8 billion 1293 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (106 million 755 thousand 169) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 444 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (77.69) dollars per barrel. 🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announced June oil revenues: 🔹 Oil revenue in June reached (7 billion 115 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (100 million 59 thousand 52) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 335 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (71.11) dollars per barrel. 🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announced May oil revenues: 🔹 Oil revenue in May reached (7 billion 306 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (102 million 436 thousand 387) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 305 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (71.3) dollars per barrel. 🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announced April oil revenues: 🔹 Oil revenue in April reached (7 billion 796 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (98 million 634 thousand 947) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 288 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (79) dollars per barrel.
Read moreIndian-Made Cold Syrup Sent to Iraq Contains Poison, Test Shows
Bloomberg By Zachary Mider A cold medication made in India and sold in Iraq is tainted with toxic chemicals, a test commissioned by Bloomberg News shows, the latest in a series of alarming revelations about syrup medicines used by children around the world. A bottle of Cold Out purchased at a pharmacy in Baghdad in March contains 2.1% ethylene glycol, according to Valisure LLC, an independent US laboratory. That’s about 21 times the widely accepted limit. The compound is lethal to humans in small amounts and played a role in mass child deaths caused by Indian-made cough syrups in Gambia and Uzbekistan last year. Bloomberg shared the test results with the World Health Organization as well as Iraqi and Indian officials on July 8. The WHO told Bloomberg that it found Valisure’s test results to be “acceptable” and that it will issue an alert if the Iraqi government confirms the product was sold there. No public alert or recall has been announced yet. Saif al-Bader, a spokesman for Iraq’s health ministry, said in an interview that the ministry has “strict regulations for the import, sale and distribution of medicines.” He declined to answer specific questions about Cold Out. It’s the fifth time in a year that testing has found an Indian exporter’s drugs to contain excessive levels of ethylene glycol. In addition to the Gambia and Uzbekistan outbreaks, testing by government laboratories has identified other contaminated products in the Marshall Islands and Liberia, although there were no reported illnesses associated with those drugs. The Cold Out label indicates it was made by Fourrts (India) Pvt. Ltd., a Chennai-based manufacturer that exports medicines to more than 50 countries, including the UK, Germany and Canada. A vice president there, Bala Surendran, said that Fourrts subcontracted the manufacture of Cold Out to another Indian company, Puducherry-based Sharun Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. After Bloomberg’s inquiries, Fourrts tested a sample of Cold Out it had on hand and found it untainted, Surendran said. He said Indian regulators seized other samples from Sharun’s plant and that Fourrts hasn’t been informed of the results of those tests. Officials at the national drug agency and two local regulators either did not respond to requests for comment or said they had no information to share. Sharun executives did not respond to requests for comment. The outbreak last year in Gambia killed more than 60 children, and the one in Uzbekistan killed about 20. The incidents raised fresh questions about the quality of drug exports from India, which is the largest generic drugmaker and calls itself the ”pharmacy of the world.” The WHO said this month that a cough syrup blamed for 12 child deaths in Cameroon this year contained unsafe levels of diethylene glycol, a similar toxic compound. In that case, the medicine packaging doesn’t name a maker but bears the manufacturing license number of another Indian company. Poisoned Cough Syrup's Global Spread Cough syrups and other liquid medications found to be contaminated with toxic industrial solvents Source: World Health Organization; National Agency for Food & Drug Administration, Nigeria; Bloomberg reporting. * Label of "Naturcold" medication in Cameroon included the manufacturing license number of India's Riemann Labs. A Riemann representative confirmed the company has manufactured Naturcold syrup but did not confirm making the batch in question. Earlier this year, as part of an investigation into the global trade in unsafe drugs, Bloomberg purchased 33 samples of Indian-made syrups from pharmacies in Cambodia, Georgia, Ghana, India, Iraq and Kenya. The drugs were tested by New Haven, Connecticut-based Valisure using gas chromatography-mass spectrometry. The lab found four samples, all different brands, that contained either ethylene glycol, diethylene glycol, or both. In considering whether a drug product contains unsafe levels of ethylene glycol or diethylene glycol, the WHO uses a guideline of 0.1%. Levels above that “would be considered non-compliant and therefore a health risk,” Rutendo Kuwana, head of the organization’s substandard medicines team, said in an email. Sarah Sheppard, a WHO spokeswoman, pointed to guidance from the US Food and Drug Administration that uses the 0.1% limit for tests of raw materials used in syrup production. Valisure tested the Cold Out sample five times and found, on average, ethylene glycol content of 2.1% and diethylene glycol content of 0.25%. The diethylene glycol content is more than twice the limit. None of the other syrups with contaminants exceeded the 0.1% level. Bloomberg provided WHO and Iraqi authorities with test results and the name and location of the Baghdad pharmacy where the syrup was purchased. The WHO’s Sheppard said in an email this week that Iraq continues “to attempt to source samples to confirm (or not) whether the product is in their country and where else it could be on sale. To raise a definitive alert, WHO and the Member State would need to be satisfied that it was on sale in a particular location.” “We will issue an alert as soon as we have confirmation of the information from Iraq,” Sheppard continued. Syrup medications consist of a small amount of active ingredient suspended in a watery solution. To cause the active ingredients to dissolve, manufacturers add a solvent such as propylene glycol — a harmless, clear, sweet-tasting liquid. Ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol are chemically similar to propylene glycol but are cheaper and highly toxic, used in industrial applications such as antifreeze and brake fluid. Typically, contamination takes place when a chemical trader mislabels one of these chemicals as propylene glycol. Drug manufacturers are supposed to test propylene glycol for contamination prior to using it, but that doesn’t always happen. In response to the contamination episodes that came to light over the past year, Indian drug authorities in June began requiring the testing of cough syrups in a government lab prior to export. The packaging of the Cold Out obtained in Iraq indicates it was manufactured in January 2022. The WHO has said that it’s exploring whether a spike in prices of propylene glycol contributed to the recent contamination cases. In addition to those linked to Indian medication, an outbreak last year in Indonesia, caused by medication manufactured domestically, killed about 200 children. Propylene glycol prices tripled in China in 2020 and in India in 2021 and remained elevated for more than a year, according to ChemAnalyst, a market research firm in India. That increased the potential profit from mislabeling a cheaper solvent as propylene glycol. Valisure is known for finding dangerous chemicals in drugs and personal-care products. Its 2019 research on contamination in the blockbuster heartburn drug Zantac led to recalls and eventual market withdrawal. Valisure works with health-care companies including Kaiser Permanente to test drug products for quality. — With Zulfugar Agayev, Onur Ant, Kendall Taggart, Helena Bedwell, Zeke Faux, Debjit Chakraborty, Alexander Gilbert Campbell, Ekow Dontoh, Saritha Rai, Eltaf Najafizada, Eric Ombok, Swati Gupta, Sam Dagher, and Nayla Razzouk
Read moreIraq’s Power Problem : Implications of the New Oil-for-Gas Deal with Iran
by Bilal Wahab, Dennis Ross Baghdad hopes to avoid power cuts, political turmoil, and U.S. sanctions by striking a barter agreement with Tehran, but the deal raises many questions. On July 11, Baghdad and Tehran signed a deal that will allow Iraq to pay for the natural gas it imports from Iran with oil transfers. The deal is seemingly intended to keep Baghdad from running afoul of U.S. sanctions as it secures its electricity sector, which is still very fragile and dependent on Iran (for more on the sector’s problems, see Part 1 of this PolicyWatch). Yet it is unclear if the parties have worked out the many commercial and logistical complications that come with implementing such a plan. Why Strike a Deal Now? During peak summer season, Iraq imports 70 million cubic meters of gas per day from Iran to feed its power plants, generating around 5,000 megawatts of electricity with these supplies. This flow, coupled with direct purchases of Iranian electricity, means that Tehran accounts for 40 percent of Iraq’s power needs at a cost of $4 billion per year. Yet Iran often reduces Iraq’s gas supply, contributing to power shortages, public discontent, and political problems. Some of these cuts are driven by Iranian domestic demand, but other instances stem from Tehran’s desire to exert leverage and Baghdad’s payment delays. Iraq currently owes $12 billion for gas and power imports, and payments toward that balance have been deposited in an account at the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI). Yet Tehran cannot access this money without waivers on the various U.S. sanctions against Iranian government entities. The new barter deal enables Baghdad to sidestep this difficulty and pay with oil. One reason for seeking this deal is because Iraq has had trouble meeting Washington’s requirements for waiving sanctions. As described in Part 1, the waivers related to gas imports are partly conditioned on Baghdad showing progress toward two key goals: achieving energy independence from Iran and reducing the amount of gas it wastes through flaring associated with oil production. The Trump administration emphasized the former goal, while the Biden administration has placed additional focus on emissions from gas flaring. Baghdad is taking some steps to meet these conditions, such as signing a recent gas capture and solar power deal with TotalEnergies, developing the Basra Gas Company with Shell and Mitsubishi, and expanding the Khor Mor gas field in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), a project that involves $250 million of U.S. funding and cooperation with the Emirati-led consortium Pearl Petroleum. Iraq also launched a sixth licensing round for gas fields, changed its contract model for oil companies, initiated plans to connect its power grid with Jordan and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and tapped Siemens to squeeze more wattage from its existing turbines when Iran cut the gas supply earlier this month. Despite these laudable steps, however, Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani acknowledged on July 11 that Iraq has more to do on these fronts and will still need at least three more years to become independent of Iranian gas. Indeed, Baghdad has failed to invest substantially in exploiting its own expansive gas reserves, capturing gas wasted during oil production, developing gas pipelines, or exploring liquefaction. The sundry reasons behind this failure—from insufficient infrastructure to chronic mismanagement and corruption—have given rise to a new barter deal that has ample question marks of its own. Devil in the Details One of the most immediate questions about the oil-for-gas deal is how will the prices be set? An Iraqi official has privately indicated that the oil will be given to Iran at international prices. Yet Iran sells gas to Iraq above market prices and sells oil to China below market. In the latter case, it is willing to pay these steep transaction costs in order to facilitate its illicit oil exports. Yet it may lose even more money if it tries to reexport Iraqi oil or use it at home. The deal also includes fuel oil, however, so Tehran could make up some of the potential losses by using these supplies for domestic industrial purposes. Other questions are just as pressing: where will Iraq get the oil, and how will it be transported? One option is to truck it from the KRI, where the bulk of the region’s production of 450,000 barrels per day has been unavailable for export for months. In March, a legal dispute led Turkey to close the pipeline that brings KRI oil to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan (mostly for re-shipment to Israel). Transferring this oil to Iran could help the KRI ease some of its internal problems, solidify its connections with Baghdad, and assuage Erbil’s fears of an Iranian military incursion. In the past, a similar swap deal saw Iraq truck oil to Iranian refineries near the border. Assuming the parties can work these issues out, will the bartering arrangement prove stable? If Tehran comes to believe that Iraq is genuinely trying to wean itself off Iranian gas and power, the regime may try to sabotage that plan through a tactic it has used before: influencing Iraq’s parliament to divert budget allocations from energy projects. Periodically attacking the assets of foreign oil companies has likewise enabled Iran to deter investment and slow progress when it deems fit—a threat that Baghdad will take seriously given that its own mismanagement has already hindered investments from oil majors such as Shell and Exxon. Iraqi corruption could rear its head again as well, since transporting oil to Iran will likely involve individuals and companies tied to militias and organized crime groups. In short, Baghdad has lots of problems it must solve to make this work, and even then there is no guarantee the Biden administration will simply accept the arrangement and waive sanctions. The Iraqi government may be able to sidestep direct sanctions, but foreign oil companies will not automatically be immune—an especially worrisome prospect if Iraq aims to barter oil from the KRI, where several foreign companies operate. Alternatively, the deal may be intended as a joint Iraqi-Iranian tactic to pressure Washington on allowing Tehran to access its blocked funds. A Surprise for Washington? The oil-for-gas agreement may have caught Washington off guard—thus, even if the Biden administration is initially inclined to be supportive, it may still want (and should definitely seek) answers from Prime Minister Sudani before fully accepting the deal. This could mean striking a familiar balance between sometimes-conflicting objectives. For instance, Washington is focused on its longstanding goals of stabilizing Iraq, maximizing Baghdad’s autonomy from Iran, and closing loopholes to make it harder for Tehran to evade sanctions. In the immediate context of a summer power crisis, however, stability may require moving closer to Iran, not further away. Sudani faces a similar balancing act between conflicting realities and pressures. Although he seemingly wants to increase his political space for taking action independent of Iran, he understands that if he pushes the boundaries too far, Tehran can use its proxies inside Iraq’s armed forces and government to undermine him. More to the point, he has a genuinely urgent need for more Iranian gas, and he cannot get it for free. This may be why he apparently acted without asking Washington—he either feared a “no” answer or believed the administration would be too slow to act. Going forward, he will presumably try to use the TotalEnergies deal to show he is making a real effort to wean Iraq off Iranian gas—and simultaneously signal Washington that going cold turkey is not an option unless the Biden administration wants to see the country unravel. Sudani may also point out that he is under pressure from Iran to pay the overdue gas bill; and since Washington will not allow Tehran to draw these payments from the TBI, he had little choice but to seek a barter deal. Such arguments are credible given Iran’s previous behavior—after the Biden administration allowed Baghdad to release $2.7 billion of Iranian funds for humanitarian trade, Tehran still cut Iraq’s gas supply. Despite this proven Iranian leverage, administration officials remain reluctant to grant any more waivers for withdrawals from the TBI (earlier today, the State Department announced a new 120-day waiver allowing Baghdad to pay Tehran for electricity via non-Iraqi banks, though various restrictions may limit that route as well). Hence, the White House will likely accept the barter deal in the end, if only to avoid increased instability in Iraq during summer electricity shortages. But U.S. officials should still use their leverage to work out an agreed game plan for weaning Iraq off Iranian gas, including clear milestones and, perhaps, shorter waiver periods (e.g., back to the 60- or 30-day periods granted under the Trump administration). Yes, figuring out this timeline will be difficult. But unless the new barter arrangements are aligned with a larger strategy for increasing the Iraqi government’s freedom of action from Iran, Baghdad and its international partners will repeatedly find themselves in a crisis footing that benefits Tehran.
Read moreU.S. Bans 14 Iraqi Banks in Crackdown on Iran Dollar Trade
The US stepped up dollar restriction on Iraq last year to stem flow of currency to Iran, leading to a cash crunch and rising prices in Iraq The US has blacklisted 14 Iraqi banks from conducting dollar transactions as part of its crackdown on corruption and dollar smuggling to Iran. The ban was imposed Wednesday by the US Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, according to a Wall Street Journal report on Wednesday. The report, citing unnamed Iraqi and US officials, said the move came after Washington discovered that the banks had engaged in money laundering and fraudulent transactions, potentially with sanctioned entities that could benefit Iran. The ban is part of a wider crackdown by Washington on fraudulent US dollar transactions in Iraq. In November, the US Treasury and the Central Bank of Iraq enacted tighter restrictions on wire transfers. The US Federal Reserve also began imposing more stringent checks on the source of foreign money being used to buy dollars at Iraq’s daily currency auction. The US dollar is a de facto second currency in Iraq. The government keeps its foreign reserves at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In order to extract the funds and turn them into dinars, the Central Bank of Iraq requests dollars from the Fed, which it then sells to private banks and other financial institutions, such as currency exchanges, through a daily dollar auction. US officials believe that heavily sanctioned Iran has been manipulating the auction to obtain hard currency and that Iraqi banks and currency-exchange houses had gamed the auction, buying dollars at a fixed rate and selling them on the street at a much higher price. Last year, about $200m per day on average was being sold through the auction to private banks and companies. But that figure dropped sharply in the final two months of the year as the US stepped up its scrutiny, falling to a daily average of $56m by late December, according to data reviewed by MEE. Iraqi currency crunch The beefed-up restrictions triggered a collapse in the dinar and surging prices for imported goods, with the Iraqi government struggling to meet its obligations, including the salaries of millions of public employees, pensions, and social support. The currency crisis sparked protests across the country and the governor of the central bank resigned "because of his inability to face the crisis", an advisor to Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani previously told Middle East Eye. But US officials believed their oversight worked, reducing the illicit trade in dollars to countries like Syria and Iran, and helped them sniff out the 14 blacklisted banks. Several of the banks had already stopped conducting transactions because they were unable to meet the new requirements, officials said. Others turned to using cash cards credited with Iraqi dinars, then transporting them to nearby countries in an attempt to withdraw the funds in dollars, the officials said. Iran tensions MEE reported that late last year, the Coordination Framework, the umbrella group that makes up the largest political coalition backing the Iraqi government, held a meeting in Baghdad to discuss the rising cost of dollars. The governor of Iraq’s central bank told senior officials the US had “serious indications” of dollar-smuggling operations to neighbouring countries and named two Egyptian banks based in Dubai, where most of the dollars bought in the auction had been transferred in the period being investigated. The dollars had then been transferred on to Oman and then to Iran. According to a document seen by MEE, the central bank ordered banks and other financial institutions to stop dealing in dollars, with the banks being watched by the US, on 6 November. It was not clear whether those were the same banks US officials blacklisted on Wednesday. On Tuesday, Washington gave Iraq a waiver to pay Iran for electricity via non-Iraqi banks. Tehran had pushed for the move by cutting its natural gas exports to Iraq, forcing Baghdad to impose unpopular electricity cuts in the summer heat. Tehran and Washington had been trying to ease tensions. MEE first reported that the two were nearing a temporary deal to swap some sanctions relief for reducing Iranian uranium enrichment activities. Efforts to reach an interim nuclear deal faced a setback, however, with factions in the Iranian ruling establishment disagreeing over US demands on prisoner releases. Washington’s negotiating position was also thrust into fresh chaos after its top Iran envoy, Robert Malley, was placed on unpaid leave amid reports that he was under investigation for mishandling classified information.
Read moreUS issues new 120-day waiver letting Iraq pay Iran for electricity
(Reuters) The United States on Tuesday moved to let Iraq pay Iran for electricity via non-Iraqi banks, a U.S. official said, a step Washington hopes may keep Tehran from forcing unpopular power cuts during the sweltering Iraqi summer. Secretary of State Antony Blinken signed a 120-day national security waiver allowing Iraq - heavily dependent on Iranian electricity - to deposit such payments into non-Iraqi banks in third countries instead of into restricted accounts in Iraq, said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity. Monies put into the non-Iraqi accounts, like those deposited into Iraqi banks, will also be restricted, still requiring U.S. permission for Iran to get access to them and only for spending on humanitarian goods. Tehran has in the past pushed Baghdad to secure U.S. permission to release such funds by cutting Iranian natural gas exports to Iraq, limiting Iraq's ability to generate power and forcing deeply unpopular electricity cuts. The latest waiver was expanded to permit payments to banks outside Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government, apparently in the hopes that this might transfer some of the pressure that Iran has exerted on Baghdad to other countries. "We have to help the Iraqis with this perennial pressure from the Iranians to access the money," said the U.S. official. "The Iraqis have requested, and now we have agreed, to expand the waiver," said the U.S. official, saying this might help ensure better compliance with the U.S. requirement that any disbursements be for humanitarian purposes. "It also helps the Iraqis, at least somewhat, to have an argument to make (to Iran) that they are not in control of the money that they have paid (into non-Iraqi accounts)," he added. It is not clear, however, whether Iran might ease up on Iraq as a result. Tehran could decide it has greater leverage over Iraq than over other nations and continue to exert pressure. Iran's mission to the United Nations did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Iran is under extensive U.S. economic sanctions reimposed in 2018 after then-U.S. President Donald Trump abandoned the nuclear deal that Tehran struck with major powers Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States in 2015. Trump believed his policy of "maximum pressure" on Iran would force it to accept more stringent restrictions to its nuclear program, which the United States, European powers and Israel fear may be designed to obtain a nuclear weapon. Iran has long denied such ambitions. As a result of Trump's withdrawal from the deal and U.S. President Joe Biden's failure to revive it, Iran could make the fissile material for one bomb in 12 days or so, according to U.S. estimates, down from a year when the accord was in force.
Read moreIraq: Draft laws threaten rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly
The Iraqi government has re-introduced two draft laws to the Parliament which, if passed, would severely curtail the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly of the people of Iraq, Amnesty International and INSM Foundation for Digital Rights in Iraq said today. The reintroduction of these draft laws coincides with a spate of prosecutions targeting people who are critical of government figures, as well as a Ministry of Interior-led campaign to crack down on “indecent content” online. Between January and June this year, the authorities prosecuted at least 20 individuals over the peaceful exercise of their human right to free expression. Six people were sentenced to prison terms but have since been released. “The Iraqi authorities’ latest attempt to repress free expression reveals their blatant disregard for the extraordinary sacrifices made by Iraqis during the 2019 uprising to secure their freedoms. The Iraqi government should immediately withdraw these repressive draft laws and parliament should not pass any laws that would unduly restrict the human rights of Iraqis,” said Bissan Fakih, Amnesty International’s Regional Campaigner for Iraq and Yemen. The Iraqi government should immediately withdraw these repressive draft laws and parliament should not pass any laws that would unduly restrict the human rights of Iraqis Bissan Fakih, Amnesty International’s Regional Campaigner for Iraq and Yemen “The people of Iraq have a right to criticize their leaders and religious figures, and to protest peacefully without fear of imprisonment and heavy fines. These rights are especially important at a time when the Iraqi people are seeking to hold government officials accountable for allegations of systemic corruption and human rights violations.” The proposed draft Law on Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Assembly would give the Iraqi authorities the cover of a democratically adopted law to arbitrarily prosecute anyone who makes public comments that violate “public morals” or “public order”. Under the proposed draft Law on Cybercrimes, meanwhile, those posting online content that is deemed to undermine the vaguely defined “country’s supreme economic, political, military, or security interests” could face a sentence of up to life imprisonment and a fine of up to 50 million Iraqi Dinars (around $38,000 USD). In meetings with Amnesty International in Baghdad in May, human rights defenders and activists expressed alarm that the drafts would empower the authorities to further suppress peaceful dissent. The proposed reforms are causing deep concern due to the recent spate of freedom of expression prosecutions. Journalist Haidar al-Hamdani is being tried pursuant to a criminal defamation complaint filed against him by the governor of Basra, who Al-Hamdani had accused of corruption in a video posted to Facebook where he has more than one million followers. “I am no longer able to make fun of a party, or the state, or a public figure … or the state of the roads, water, schools, or bridges. Why? Because it all belongs to the [political] parties Iraqi comedian One Iraqi comedian prosecuted by an Iraqi court during the “indecent content” campaign told Amnesty International: “I am no longer able to make fun of a party, or the state, or a public figure … or the state of the roads, water, schools, or bridges. Why? Because it all belongs to the [political] parties”. Curtailing freedom of expression and peaceful assembly On 9 May 2023, Parliament held its second reading of the proposed Law on Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Assembly and Mohammed al-Halbousi, the speaker of Parliament, may call for a general vote on the law at any time. Amendments to both draft laws are being privately discussed by lawmakers, according to individuals who have been involved in discussions and have seen proposed new language in the drafts. Yet these amendments have not been made public, and it is unclear whether the drafts will be shared with members of the public ahead of a possible vote. Hayder Hamzoz, Executive Director of INSM, said: “It is unacceptable that in Iraq today we are suffering from a lack of access to information on draft laws under consideration by parliament. Access to information is an inherent human right and it is one of the keys to the rule of law, to empower citizens and enable them to engage effectively in political life and the fight against corruption.” It is unacceptable that in Iraq today we are suffering from a lack of access to information on draft laws under consideration by parliament. Access to information is an inherent human right Haidar Hamzoz, executive director of INSM Foundation for Digital Rights in Iraq The draft law prohibits the undermining of “religions, religious beliefs, sects”. Those caught “publicly insulting a ritual or a symbol or a person who constitutes an object of sanctification, worship or reverence to a religious sect” face up to 10 years imprisonment and a fine of up to 10,000,000 Iraqi Dinars ($7,600 USD). As religious figures play a prominent role in Iraq’s major political parties, banning criticism of them would severely limit people’s exercise of their right to freedom of expression. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), when a state party imposes restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself. The relation between right and restriction and between norm and exception must not be reversed. The draft law also allows the authorities to ban public gatherings unless prior permission is obtained from the authorities at least five days in advance. It does not state what criteria the Iraqi authorities would apply in approving or prohibiting protests, in effect giving them the power to ban all protests. In its authoritative interpretation of ICCPR Article 21 on freedom of assembly, the UN Human Rights Committee has stressed in its General Comment no. 37 that “having to apply for permission from the authorities undercuts the idea that peaceful assembly is a basic right” and that “where authorization regimes persist… they must in practice function as a system of notification, with authorization being granted as a matter of course, in the absence of compelling reasons to do otherwise.” Protesters in Iraq already face repression at the hands of security agencies and this risk is heightened anytime the authorities deem a protest to be “unauthorized,” since they regularly resort to the use of force to disperse such protests. Amnesty International has previously documented how, during the 2019 nationwide anti-government protests, at least 600 protesters were killed and thousands more injured after security forces resorted to the use of lethal force. Policing online freedom of expression The government re-introduced the draft Law on Cybercrimes to Parliament in November 2022. Under the vaguely worded proposed law, anyone found guilty of “inflaming sectarian tensions or strife” or “undermining the country’s independence, unity, and safety, or its supreme economic, political, military, or security interests” could face a sentence of up to life imprisonment and a fine of up to 50 million Iraqi Dinars (around $38,000 USD). “In April 2023, the Iraqi government reaffirmed its promise to Amnesty International to guarantee public freedoms, yet their actions in Parliament do not match up,” said Bissan Fakih, Regional Campaigner at Amnesty International.
Read moreIraq Under The ‘Resistance’ Muqawama Militias
Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to Ekurd.net Encroachment on Kurdistan Iran has secured ultimate victory over Iraq since the Coordination Framework took power in Baghdad. With each fresh agreement signed with the puppet government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani Iran has gained increasing territorial access along with military and economic sway. Strategically, Iran’s focus is also on weakening the Iraqi Kurdish north at the same time as undermining Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. In north-western Iraq, via its militia proxies, Iran is securing its passage to Syria via Sinjar where the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) are also establishing a permanent base and another in Kirkuk. Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk all coming under the PMF The PMF (Hashd al-Sha’abi) now occupies the former presidential complex in Basra. It has taken over the Shaheed Martyr War Memorial complex in Baghdad with a huge garrison stationed opposite near the Army Canal and Ministry of Oil. In Kirkuk, since the violent change of control over the disputed territories and the redefining of the internal boundaries effected on 16 October 2017 (overseen by the late IRGC GF commander, Qasim Soleimani) several pro-Iran Hashd groups have established a permanent presence in Kirkuk. Their mandate includes active security duty in Kirkuk airport, and infiltration of the Kirkuk Governing Council. In August 2018, after the militias helped recover control over the internal boundaries with the KRG, Iran equipped them with short range ballistic missiles (200km-700 km range) and helped them to begin manufacture of missiles, overseen by Qasim Soleimani before his assassination of January 3, 2020 by the United States removed him from the game. Missile launchers had arrived soon after the missiles. According to reports by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) [1] and the International Crisis Group (ICG), the plants used to develop the missiles were situated in al-Zafaraniya, east of Baghdad, and Jurf al-Sakhar, north of Kerbala with an Iranian source claiming that there was also a factory in Iraqi Kurdistan. ICG stated that three sources said Iraqis had been trained in Iran as missile operators. [2] Iran has also provided them with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles, and MANPADS. [3] Strategic PMF military headquarters going up in Shoraw, Kirkuk The PMF is now intent upon the construction of a huge 60-hectare base in the Kurdish area of Shoraw on Highway 2. Town planning had previewed the use of the site for a public park but reportedly on July 4, 2023, a team of engineers attached to the PMF Operations Command surveyed the site for the construction of a militia military headquarters. The location was previously home to the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) Kirkuk base until the events of October 2017 drove the KDP out of Kirkuk and their base was ransacked. The Iraqi army then took it over. Diggers and loaders are said already to be working on laying the foundations at the site ignoring local objections, thousands of which have been received by Gaylan Qadir, a Kurdish lawmaker in the Iraqi parliament. The PMF military base would also lie just a hundred or so metres from the Kirkuk headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The PUK has long standing relations with the oldest of the militias like the Badr Organisation led by Hadi al-Ameri. The Shoraw district of Kirkuk lies immediately north of the Kurdish district of Rahim Awa and just east of the Baba Gurgur oil field and the K1 military base. Highway 2 then continues northwest to the internal border and major checkpoint between the Kurdish region and Iraq at Altun Kopru/Pirde where it dog legs to Erbil. This is the sensitive location where the Shi’a militias had tried to roll across into Erbil using US Abrams tanks during the takeover battles on the 16 October 2017. The PMF’s new Kirkuk base will therefore be strategically positioned for extended military control in all directions. Meanwhile, the PMF’s Iranian mentor is strenuously demanding the disarmament of the Iranian Kurdish opposition groups so long sheltering in Iraqi Kurdistan. According to Voice of America (VOA) Kurdish service a senior Komala leader commented that the head of the Asayish met a number of the Iranian Kurdish groups to discuss Iran’s demands and told them the KRG could not protect them. VOA also quoted the KRG’s Iran representative, Nadhim Dabagh, saying that these groups must limit their activities, as Iran no longer tolerates their presence”. This comes on the back of the drone and missile attacks on Erbil including against the opposition groups’ bases and family camps, including a strike against the PAK (Kurdistan Freedom Party) base at Pirde in January 2023. The signing between Tehran and Baghdad of a border security agreement on March 19, 2023, fielded by Ali Shamkani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and Qasim al-Araji in Baghdad, has further empowered Iran. Al-Araji had a follow-up meeting with Ali Akbar Ahmadian, his newly elected Iranian counterpart, [4] the KDP’s Minister of Interior, Rebar Ahmed, and the PUK’s head of Asayish, Hiwa Ahmed, whereby steps to disarming the Iranian Kurdish opposition and even potentially containing them in UNHCR-managed refugee camps were discussed, according to a Draw Media report at the time…[5] According to Iran state media, Ali Shamkani also said that this agreement would “have a decisive impact on reducing and managing the unwanted security challenges between the two states, which are caused due to the mischief of anti-Islamic establishment elements residing in Iraq’s Kurdistan region.” On November 29, 2022, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Iraq’s puppet prime minister, Mohammed al-Sudani in Tehran in the presence of Iranian prime minister, Ebrahim Reisi, how efforts to undermine Iran’s security were still happening in parts of Iraq. He added that one of vital things that are needed in order for Iraq to reach its true position is the solidarity and unity between the country’s internal groups. Another requirement for this progress is the maximum use of young, motivated Iraqi forces.” Khamenei also pointed out that there are “enemies who do not wish to see Iraq’s progress” saying, “Of course, some are hostile to Iraq’s progress. They may not express their enmity openly, but they do not respect Mr. al-Sudani’s government. You need to stand up firmly to the enemy’s plans by relying on the people and on the young, motivated forces who successfully countered the vast, deadly risk of the Daesh.” [6] That is an oblique reference to the PMF. The Supreme Leader went on to say that “the only solution is for the Iraqi central government to extend its authority to those areas as well…Iraq’s security is Iran’s security, in the same way that Iran’s security also has an effect on the security of Iraq”. [7] Tehran and Baghdad’s co-operation goes far beyond the terms of the security agreement. Plans exist to subjugate the Kurdistan region of Iraq economically and militarily. The Iran-backed militias have a serious role to play in implementing these plans. In the November meeting al-Sudani also honored the memory of Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhendis as ‘martyrs as “another example of the togetherness of the two nations.” Also, emphasizing his government’s determination to implement t the agreements and further expand their relations he said, “The security of Iran and Iraq are intertwined, and in accordance with the constitution, we will not allow anyone to use Iraqi soil to undermine this security.” [8] This includes Kurds of both Iraq and Iran, the Western powers that brought about regime change twenty years ago, and Israel. Ali Khameni had stressed “Of course, our view on the security of Iraq is that if any party intends to disrupt the country’s security, we will stand up firmly in front of any party seeking to undermine Iraq’s security.” [9] One the very same day his words were being followed in practice with further drone and missile attacks on the north. [10] The attacks came as mass demonstrations continued in protest against the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini and the hijab laws in Iran. The Tasnim news agency affiliated with the IRGC had said “In today’s operation, the base of a separatist terrorist group near Kirkuk, known as the Free Kurdistan Party, was targeted by missiles and kamikaze drones. Since November 14, the Revolutionary Guard had launched a new round of attacks against “separatist terrorists” in response to the group’s alleged anti-security actions in Iranian cities bordering Iraq. [11] Earlier, in September, some fourteen people had been killed around Erbil and Sulaimaniya with some 50 others injured. [12] That is Iranian ‘security’ at the expense of that of Kurdistan. Iranian state media reported the latest missiles in the arsenal of the country’s satellite-oriented missile system, the Fath 360 and Shahed-136 suicide drones such as have been exported from Iran to Russia for the ongoing war in Ukraine. As the militias have also now been equipped with medium range missiles inside Iraq, Kurdistan can be easily reached, not less by the simple rocket launchers moved to the outskirts of Erbil. Back in March 2022, such attacks had claimed to be focused on the Israeli presence in Erbil. [13] As part of Iran’s agreement with the al-Sudani Coordination Framework government, Iran gets to dictate the targets and the timing. The PMF’s new headquarters in Kirkuk can be seen as part of the border security agreement. Independent Iraqi news outlet Nas News reported that an Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry delegation traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan to follow up on the status of the border security agreement signed between Iraq and Iran. [14] The militias have also attacked Kurdistan’s oil and gas sector. Spokesman claims the current suspension of oil transport from the region owes to ‘technical difficulties’. These measures could soon bankrupt the Kurdistan region’s corrupt rulers. [15] Old friends are pulling out. The blocking of Kurdistan’s oil exports had already cost the region losses of 2 billion dollars by June 2023 Erdogan’s Turkey stopped Iraq’s exports of 450,000 barrels per day through the pipeline that extends from Kurdistan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on March 25, 2023, after an arbitration decision issued by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) obliged Turkey to repay Baghdad $1.5 billion in compensation for damages caused by the KRG’s independent export of oil without permission from the federal government in Baghdad between 2014 and 2018. The more than 100 days halt has cost the KRG more than $2 billion, a figure that Reuters reported. While the KRG economy shrinks the PMF’s budget gets a huge boost from al-Sudani. The KRG is being forced to accept just 12.67 percent of the budget of 153 billion dollars approved by the new government early in June. [16] The PMF’s budget by contrast is now close to that of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense Personnel. [17] The militia umbrella is closely modelled on the IRGC that originally trained many of its brigades. The 2023 budget share is said to be 2.8 billion dollars, a 600 million increase on the 2021 budget to double their personnel and their expenses despite ISIS being effectively crushed. Of the official 67 battalions 43 are said to be directly accountable and loyal to Iran. Al Sudani’s government is seeing through a budget increase for 238,000 militia fighters to be registered on its payroll. The KRG’s share is tiny in comparison. The so-called resistance government (Muqwama) like that of Hezbollah in Lebanon has serious control over the state’s finances. The Washington Institute’s Michael Knights noted: The force’s budget is also growing, albeit not as fast as its membership. From $2.16 billion in the 2021 budget, it will rise to $2.6 billion in the 2023-2025 budget, a 23% increase. [18] What are all these men under arms to focus their energy upon with ISIS routed? PMF Chairman, Faleh al-Fayed, has also announced a Service and Retirement Law for the PMF’s registered personnel enabling them to take pensions in the long term. Knights observed: In al-Fayed’s May 25 remarks: ‘’PMF fighters will be called Jihadist under the new law…PMF will be one of the state’s institutions that doesn’t lose its Jihadist description or its religious background.’’ Another interpretation is that the PMF wants a separate and more privileged status than other security forces in its service and retirement regulations, similar to how it has developed a separate military justice system to screen its members from external accountability.”19 Al-Fayyadh is linked with serious human rights abuses committed against protestors during the peak of the Tishreen revolt and on January 8, 2021, was made subject to US sanctions. [20] Iran’s anti-Israel policy implemented in Iraq Relations with Israel have also been prohibited and at the beginning of Ramadan this year coinciding with Kurdish New Year on 21 March, a Russian-Israeli researcher was kidnapped from Karada in Baghdad. Elizabeth Tsurkov is still being held but the Iraqi government has made no coherent or useful statements about her whereabouts. [21] Some reports claim she was taken by Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) [22] yet others by an Iranian agent. Israel is blaming Iran. Sharq al-Awsat suggests she is a bargaining chip for an IRGC operative detained by Israel, Shahbazi Abbasailo in June. [23] Al Sudani’s government spokesman, Basim al-Awadi, made the same sort of weak announcement on al-Ahd, a PMF platform with satellite TV, controlled by Asa’ib ahl al-Haq and based in Karada [24], as was made over the heist of 2.5. billion dollars from an Iraqi tax office by state agents. That investigation has also yielded little. Opponents of the CF have been named in four recent arrest warrants, all of whom are outside Iraq and include corruption critic former Finance Minister Ali al-Allawi, Raed Jouhi, Ahmad Najati and Mushrik Abbas. It appears convenient political scapegoating rather than anything else. [25] Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s government had tried to rein in the militias and are now paying the price. [26] Al-Sudani’s Iran puppet government has now tried to send al-Kadhimi’s anti-corruption committee, “Committee 29” to stand trial for human rights abuses. Al Kadhimi tweeted in response that it was a witch-hunt against the former administration he had led including in bullet point 3 the following rebuttal: “The recent allegations for arrest warrants are selectively focused on close members of the Kadhimi government and office officials who uncovered the wrongdoing. Yet, they are made to be scapegoats with no evidence of involvement or wrongdoing in order to distract attention away from actual culprits.” Muhandis General Company: the equivalent of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbia owned by the IRGC Meanwhile, the PMF has been assisted by al-Sudani’s government to finally launch the Muhandis General Company named after Abu Mahdi al-Muhendes. Knights observed in the paper concerning the expansion of the PMF and its budget: Abbas al-Zamili, the head of the Badr Organization’s parliamentary bloc, revealed on May 22 that 400 billion Iraqi dinar ($305 million) had been “added to the investment budget of the PMF’’ for use by its new Muhandis General Company…. A day later, government spokesperson Basim al-Awadi announced that the Council of Ministers had voted to authorize a 1.5 billion dinar ($1.2 million) “Secret Expenses for PMF” fund—a privilege previously extended to just one organization, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service.” [27] In the model of the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbia or Khorb, the Muhandis General Company will obtain privileged access to state contracts, equipment and land. Mustafa al-Kadhimi had reportedly been offered a second term in office if he agreed to authorise the PMF owned construction component but he refused. Mohammed al-Sudani got the job and soon rolled over. [28] In April al-Sudani also gave PMF chair al-Fayyadh authority to set up a PMF allied brigade in Sinjar. [29] 1 https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-proxy-irans-growing-footprint-middle-east 2 https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-usisrael-trigger-list/flashpoints/iraq 3 https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-proxy-irans-growing-footprint-middle-east 4 https://english.khamenei.ir/news/9793/Appointment-of-Mr-Ahmadian-as-Leader-s-representative-in-Iran-s 5 https://nrtenglish.com/2023/06/14/live-salaries-delayed-as-krg-oil-losses-reach-2b/ 6 https://english.khamenei.ir/news/9325/Iran-is-standing-up-firmly-to-safeguard-Iraq-s-security 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, Khamenei.ir 9 Ibid. 10 https://www.iranintl.com/en/202211229465 11 Ibid 12 https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/28092022 13 https://www.newarab.com/analysis/whats-behind-irans-missile-strikes-erbil 14 https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-17-2023#_ednbfa3e2d8df781a536a233cf08260bff54 15 https://www.zawya.com/en/projects/oil-and-gas/attacks-on-major-iraqi-gasfield-drive-out-us-contractors-uo4rnw5b 16 https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq/2-billion-losses-inflicted-on-iraqi-kurdistan-due-oil-exports-halt/ 17 https://www.mei.edu/blog/monday-briefing-iraq-passes-massive-controversial-budget-bill 18 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/extraordinary-popular-mobilization-force-expansion-numbers 19 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/extraordinary-popular-mobilization-force-expansion-numbers 20 Al-Fayyadh was part of a crisis cell comprised primarily of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militia leaders formed in late 2019 to suppress the Iraqi protests with the support of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Other cell members included militia leaders (of AAH) Qais al-Khazali and Hussein Falah al-Lami and the late Qasim Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhendis. Until July 2020, al-Fayyadh was the Iraqi PM’s National Security Advisor. See full text athttps://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1231 21 https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/1688722904-iraqi-government-investigating-case-of-israeli-russian-elizabeth-tsurkov 22 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/militia-propagandists-comment-tsurkov-kidnapping 23 https://fr.timesofisrael.com/liran-serait-responsable-de-lenlevement-delizabeth-tsurkov-media/ 24 See details at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-al-ahd-satellite-television 25 https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/iraq/2023/03/04/iraq-issues-arrest-warrants-over-25bn-heist-of-the-century/ 26 https://twitter.com/MAKadhimi/status/1632118147833528323…. 27 (See. Figures 3 and 4). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/extraordinary-popular-mobilization-force-expansion-numbers 28 “Land grants have now begun to flow to the company without a clear legal mechanism. As the parcels far outstrip the requirements of real projects—for example, Iraq’s largest dairy farm involves no more than 36,000 donums, not 2 million—muqawama leaders seem to have identified tree planting as a supposed justification for transferring a staggering 9 percent of al-Muthanna province’s entire land mass. Yet the area chosen does not make much sense for such a project: it lacks sufficient water for the mass growing of palm and jojoba trees, and far more viable options exist between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Tellingly, however, the area in question is strategically located on the border with Saudi Arabia. In 2021-22, Iraqi militias launched drones into Saudi territory and the United Arab Emirates from this area.” https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muhandis-company-iraqs-khatam-al-anbia 29 https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-17-2023#_ednbfa3e2d8df781a536a233cf08260bff52
Read moreIraqi oil in the first half of 2023
Lower prices have brought Federal Iraq’s oil export revenues down for the first half of this year, despite Baghdad keeping export levels relatively flat. Lower gas prices have enabled Iraq to boost sales of its high-sulfur Basrah crudes to Europe. Federal Iraq’s crude oil export revenues over the first half of 2023 came in at $44.37bn, down sharply on the same period in 2022 when prices skyrocketed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prices have dropped markedly since late 2022, and revenues for 2023 as a whole look set to come in well below last year’s record $115bn. Overall export volumes have also dropped modestly year-on-year, but the 11,000 b/d fall to 3.291mn b/d was a much less important factor than the $28.17/B reduction in realized oil prices from $102.72/B to $74.55/B. All exports since late-March have been seaborne cargoes from Iraq’s southern Basra terminals due to the continued shutdown of Kurdistan’s pipeline to Turkey’s Ceyhan export terminal, which typically carried up to 100,000 b/d of exports from federal oil marketer Somo in addition to around 400,000 b/d of independently-marketed ‘Kurdish’ crude.
Read moreHow Iraq's calm became a deadly threat for one pro-Iran leader
Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba is accused of orchestrating an attack on US forces in Syria. The price may be its leader's life Middle East Eye On 20 January, three suicide drones targeted al-Tanf, a military base in southeastern Syria hosting US forces. The attack didn't cause significant losses: the troops there shot down two of the drones, while the third exploded after colliding with a building belonging to an allied Syrian rebel group, US forces said at the time. Two days later, an unknown armed group called "the Inheritors" claimed responsibility. Its statement, published by websites linked to Iranian-backed armed factions, was adorned with a green title that read "Islamic Resistance in Iraq - Formation of the Inheritors". "No one can ever stop our operations," the group said, dating the statement as the same day the operation was carried out. "We warned a lot against complacency and kneeling before the American occupation in the region, and whoever does not hear our voice calling for the removal of the occupier will kneel before the bullets of our guns," the statement said. Two weeks later, US President Joe Biden made a phone call to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. During the call, Sudani's media office said, Biden affirmed "his unwavering support for a stable, secure and sovereign Iraq" and expressed his backing for the prime minister's government. But on that call, Biden also relayed his administration's "displeasure" with "attacks carried out by armed Iraqi groups" targeting US forces in Syria, Iraqi officials told Middle East Eye. Sudani's readout of the call actually touched on that point, saying the two leaders agreed that "Iraq should not be used as a springboard to attack" its neighbours or forces belonging to the US-led coalition against the Islamic State group. Biden "gently" reminded Sudani that his administration "widely supports his government, but this support is neither free nor open", a close associate of Sudani told MEE. Sudani "must take advantage of his proximity to the armed Iraqi factions to rein them in to ensure continued American support. This is exactly what the content of that call was", the associate, who is also a Shia political leader, told MEE. American soldier carries Javelin missile launchers in the countryside of Deir Ezzor in northeastern Syria, 8 December 2021 (AP) Sudani then raised the issue at a meeting of the leaders of the Coordination Framework, the Shia political alliance backing Sudani that includes the Iranian-backed armed factions in Iraq. "The meeting agreed to avoid embarrassing Sudani and not clash with the Americans at that time," a Coordination Framework leader told MEE. "It suits their interests, and the decision was not challenged by any of the Coordination Framework leaders, although some of them preferred to remain silent." An attack breaks the calm In the following weeks, attacks against US forces in Syria did not stop, but they did decrease significantly. That may have been because everyone was preoccupied with the devastating earthquake that struck southern Turkey and northern Syria in February, killing more than 50,000 people. A landmark agreement signed by Iran and Saudi Arabia in Beijing in March to resume diplomatic relations also seemed to calm the region. Yet while most Iraqi armed factions, affiliated with Iran or otherwise, busied themselves with funnelling earthquake aid to parts of northern Syria, one instead launched an attack in the country's northeast. On 23 March, an armed drone attacked a maintenance facility at a US military base near Hasakah, northeastern Syria. The attack killed a US contractor and wounded another, the Pentagon said. Five American soldiers were also wounded. Believing the drone was of Iranian origin, Washington responded hours later with a series of strikes on headquarters and weapons depots belonging to Iran-backed groups in the countryside of eastern Syria's Deir Ezzor, al-Mayadeen and Albu Kamal. At least 11 pro-Iranian fighters were killed in those strikes, local sources said. Two days later, an unknown group calling itself the "Ghaliboun Brigade" claimed responsibility. Unlike "the Inheritors", it did not reveal any direct links with Iraqi armed factions, nor was its statement widely circulated on their media platforms, as is customary. The very few Telegram channels that published it made sure that it was accompanied by the phrase "a faction calling itself Liwa al-Ghaliboun claims the operation". Unusually, both Kataeb Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the two fiercest Iraqi armed factions operating in Syria over the past decade, hastened to declare their innocence. Sudani, for his part, "sought to calm the situation" and gave guarantees to the Americans and armed factions that he hoped would deescalate the situation, "fearing things would get out of control", one of his advisers told MEE. "Although the operation was successful and the planning and implementation was high level, most of the factions' leaders denied their connection to it and some of them kept silent," a leader of one of the armed groups said. "The operation represented a violation of the truce announced by the factions months ago, and caused great embarrassment to Sudani and the government. He had to intervene quickly and stop the snowball rolling before what he and his allied faction leaders had built over the past year collapsed." Yet the matter did not end there. In mid-April, one of the heads of an armed faction received a warning from a Kurdish leader. According to a Shia leader involved in the events, the Kurdish leader said the Americans had infiltrated several Iraqi armed factions and were planning to target their leaders, warehouses and secret headquarters in the southern governorates of Wasit and Dhi Qar "if the attacks on the coalition forces in Syria continue". Anxiety grew and disputes began to surface among the heads of the factions because of "the leader who deviated from the consensus and acted without taking into account the interests of all", the Shia leader said. The chiefs of these factions began their own enquiries, and received a torrent of messages from sources close to US authorities that act as a backchannel between the two sides. They confirmed the "seriousness of the matter", and included new details, including the name of the faction the US blamed for the attack. It was the Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba. The faction's leader, Akram al-Kaabi, "will be terminated wherever he is", armed groups were warned. Confirming their fears further, Iran asked Kaabi to "reconsider his security measures", a Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba leader told MEE. Al-Nujaba, the leader said, was defiantly adhering to the ideals of the resistance movement when other factions seemed to turn their back on the struggle. "Kaabi is the only one who has remained true to his principles, and al-Nujaba is currently alone in the field. The rest of the factions no longer represent a real threat to the Americans," the al-Nujaba leader said. "Treason always comes from within because of the conflict of interests, so the Americans succeeded in penetrating our organisations. We know that America will not enter into open war with anyone now, but it will not hesitate to carry out an assassination." Middle East Eye has asked the US embassy in Baghdad for comment. Isolate and neutralise Ever since influential Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr quit politics and ordered his MPs to leave parliament a year ago, the Coordination Framework has dominated Iraq and its politics in an unprecedented way. Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali played a pivotal role in naming Sudani as prime minister and forming his cabinet. Kataeb Hezbollah MPs, meanwhile, have successfully acted as a lobby in parliament, easing through several items of the budget that were opposed by Kurdish and Sunni parties. After taking power via Sudani's government, the Iranian-backed factions decided to stop targeting US interests and forces "to give an opportunity to form a government that works to provide services", as Khazali put it. When Khazali addressed his followers on television to mark Eid al-Adha last month, he called this "one of the most important decisions that helped form the current government". Over the past year, Asaib Ahl al-Haq's influence has grown exponentially, while Khazali has behaved as a kind of guardian to Sudani's government. It's a dynamic that is now antagonising his comrades in other factions and frightening political partners, who have begun to feel that Khazali has turned into a "train that can run over anyone who gets in his way", as a commander of an Iranian-backed faction described him to MEE. "Khazali considers this government to be his government. His decisions are at the forefront within the Coordination Framework now," the commander said. "As for the rest, they cannot keep up with the speed of Khazali's rise or his influence. Everyone feels that Khazali would give him up if necessary, or crush him on his way to achieving goals." Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, gestures after casting his vote in the parliamentary election, in Iraq in 2021 (Reuters) Though the media performances of Khazali and other Asaib leaders adds to this picture, three of Sudani's advisers were keen to downplay the faction's dominance. It is a "portrait drawn and promoted" by Asaib leaders to "win the loyalty of senior officials and officers in various government institutions", they said. "Khazali has a political project and seeks to integrate his group more into the political scene, so he backs the government and works to engage more in its activities," one adviser told MEE. "Asaib Ahl al-Haq is more organised and institutional than the rest of the factions, and this accelerates the process of their integration into the political scene, which raises the concern of the rest." However, the advisers said Khazali had become a "destination" for ambassadors and diplomats, including from the European Union, who are posing for photos with him. "Khazali plays an essential role in the current political and security stability," another adviser said. And by actively discouraging actions that may destabilise security, factions and figures that want to remain aggressive are weakened and exposed, the adviser added. Western diplomats told MEE that having the Iranian-backed armed factions in power has severely limited their illicit and disruptive activities. The number of attacks targeting US-led coalition forces in Iraq and Syria since June last year has decreased significantly, they added. Though Khazali has attributed this to the "temporary truce", his comrades in other factions see the matter from another angle. "Most of the factions have changed their tactics and no longer represent a real threat to the Americans," a leader of one told MEE. "They have become people of power, and power needs to engage in settlements and make concessions to preserve it. Whatever will happen, they will do nothing but issue statements of denunciation and threats here and there to save face." The next fight is priority Last month, a conference was held in Tehran by the Coordination Committee of the Islamic Armed Resistance. It was attended by the heads of all Iranian-backed armed factions and their representatives, gathering delegates from across the Middle East in support of the Palestinian cause. The Iraqi delegation was headed by Hadi al-Amiri, leader of the Badr Organisation, the oldest armed Shia faction backed by Iran and a key figure in the ruling coalition. The conference was routine, but it provided an opportunity to meet leaders of other Middle Eastern armed factions, and the Iranians overseeing issues in Iraq, as well as mobilise support for Palestinian resistance in Gaza. The conference's work lasted for two days, though nothing in particular attracted attention. "The meetings were routine, and the conversations all focused on the recent events in Jenin," a Coordination Framework leader familiar with the details told MEE. The surprise was that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei personally attended the meetings that were held with every delegation on the sidelines of the conference. "The outcomes of the meetings were good," the Framework leader said. Khamenei told the delegations they must support stability in Iraq and abide by the Coordination Framework's decisions. They must also, he added, put pressure on the Iraqi government "so it does not go too far towards the West and become a hostage in their hands". A member of the Iranian Basij paramilitary force holds an Iraqi flag while standing guard next to a flag of the Hashd al-Shaabi Iraqi paramilitaries during a rally in Tehran in April (Reuters) The Iranians believe they have limited the US presence in Iraq and Syria, and are keen the armed factions take no action that could provide Washington with a reason to return in large numbers, the Framework leader said. "There is a sharp turning point in the region, especially after the Iranian-Saudi agreement. The Iranians do not trust that the Iraqi armed factions fully understand the recent changes in the region and that they will behave well, so the master [Khamenei] personally intervened to stress the importance of the matter," he added. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US has sought to settle issues in the Middle East to focus on its competition with China and maintaining global oil supplies while putting pressure on Moscow. This gave Iran an opportunity to be part of the process of deconfliction in the region. "The position of the Iranians is not exclusively linked to the changes inside Iraq or the agreement with Saudi Arabia. It is linked to what is happening in the region as a whole," Elie Abu Aoun, non-resident senior fellow at the Religion and Security Council in Rome, told MEE. "All the arenas in the region, including Libya, Yemen and Lebanon, are heading towards settlement and appeasement. The Iranians want to be part of this settlement as part of preparation for their next front with Israel," he added. "They do not want to open this front before the other fronts are settled, or at least calmed down. There is a change in tactics. Any unnecessary battles must stop now because the real battle is with Israel."
Read moreIraq: Sudani shakes up intelligence and security services in political power move
Middle East Eye Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has announced a major shakeup of the country’s security and intelligence services, appointing an influential spymaster ostracised by his predecessor as the head of national security. Officials in Baghdad told Middle East Eye that the changes unveiled on Wednesday were intended to consolidate Sudani’s grip on power and to exclude a number of officials and employees suspected of involvement in corruption under the previous government. One of the main – and most prominent - beneficiaries of the reshuffle is Abdul Karim Abd Fadhil, also known as Abu Ali al-Basri, who was named by Sudani to lead the Iraqi National Security Service (INSS). Basri replaces Hamid al-Shatri, who was appointed by Sudani’s predecessor as prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Basri is the former head of the Falcon Cell, an elite and secretive intelligence unit, and has been nicknamed “the master of spies” by former colleagues. Bottom of Form He was dismissed from that role in January 2021 by Kadhimi on charges of “dealing with foreign intelligence”. Basri denied those charges in comments to MEE at the time. Sources within the Ministerial Council for National Security told MEE then that he had been excluded by Kadhimi because of his closeness to the leaders of Iranian-backed armed factions. In a statement announcing the new appointments, Major General Yahya Rasool, Sudani’s spokesperson, said: “This step [was taken] after an extensive study to enhance security and stability in various regions of the country and for the requirements of the public interest." The shakeup "aims to inject new blood and give an opportunity to other leaders to manage the security file to raise the efficiency of the security institutions' performance," Rasool added. But the return of Basri, and other senior appointments, suggest additional factors are also in play, according to MEE’s sources. In addition to Basri, changes within the INSS included the appointment of new security and administrative directors, and new director generals of the Baghdad security department and governorates security department. In another prominent appointment, Sudani named Waqqas Muhammad Hussein al-Hadithi as deputy head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). Hadithi is considered to be an associate of the parliamentary speaker, Muhammad al-Halbousi, sources told MEE. Another senior appointee, Ali Shamran Khazal, the new director general of the INSS’s Governorates Security Department, is seen as an ally of former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, sources said. 'Partisan quotas' Both appointments appear in line with the requirements of Iraq’s power-sharing political system, in which positions in state departments, ministries, and independent bodies are shared between parties based on the number of parliamentary seats they hold - unless they choose to go into opposition. Security officials told MEE that most of the appointees were chosen on the basis of "partisan quotas". "Some of those assigned are qualified and have been promoted. This cannot be denied, but the selection of all was subject to political quotas," a senior INSS official told MEE. “Most of the appointees are either close to Maliki, Halbousi, or the prime minister. No one in Iraq is named to occupy these positions solely for his competence or for career progression.” On the other hand, one of the most prominent figures removed from his role is Majid Ali Hussein, the former deputy head of the intelligence service who was moved to the National Security Advisory, a body that advises the Ministerial Council for National Security and coordinates national security policies. Hussein, like Shatri and some others removed from their positions, had been appointed under Kadhimi. The sweeping security and intelligence shakeup was preceded by administrative changes affecting several high-ranking officials in independent public bodies. On Tuesday, Sudani issued an order to remove Rafel Yassin as head of the Federal Board of Supreme Audit (FBSA), Iraq’s public spending watchdog. Yassin was replaced by Ammar Subhi al-Mashhadani. No reason was given for Yassin’s dismissal. Last year, the FBSA came under scrutiny over the so-called "theft of the century" plot, in which billions of dollars in tax deposit funds were stolen via dozens of fake cheques cashed by a state-owned bank. According to a report by the Iraqi finance ministry seen by MEE, the thefts occurred after the FBSA had been removed from a key role in auditing tax refund requests. Sources familiar with the investigations told MEE that Yassin is suspected of involvement in that theft. Yassin has not commented on the matter. MEE contacted the FBSA after details of the plot were exposed, but sources told MEE that no one would comment while investigations were ongoing. Yassin’s replacement by Mashhadani fits with the pattern of appointments according to political quotas, because Yassin is associated with Maliki while Mashhadani is allied to Halbousi. Replaced or dismissed One of Sudani’s advisors confirmed to MEE that most of the changes are politically motivated, but said that some are punitive. “Some of the changes aim to achieve political balance, and they are part of the political agreements that produced the current government," the advisor said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Some are punitively motivated. As long as we cannot hold some of the senior officials accountable because of their political affiliations, then at least we will get rid of them." Sudani's allies and critics agree that he is in the process of building his own governmental power base. To his supporters, he has worked shrewdly and quietly, taking advantage of circumstances and opportunities as they arise to strengthen his control over various ministries and departments without arousing the wrath of his partners or opponents. "The biggest challenge Sudani faces is how to dismantle the deep state. We have thousands of senior officials and officers who are associated with political parties. This is a serious problem that we have been dealing with calmly,” the advisor said. “Hundreds of directors, deputy ministers, and security commanders have to be replaced or dismissed, either for their incompetence or for their involvement in corruption cases. “[There are] those that are well protected by their political and armed factions associations, and this is what we call the deep state. “This state has to be undermined. This is what Sudani has been doing for a while, and it will last for a while to come.”
Read moreIsraeli researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov disappears in Baghdad: Iraq source
The prominent Israeli commentator on the foreign-led war on Syria was allegedly kidnapped on 26 March in Iraq's capital The Cradle Elizabeth Tsurkov, a prominent Israeli researcher and writer on Syrian affairs, disappeared this past March in Baghdad during a visit to Iraq, The Cradle has learned. Her whereabouts are currently unknown. Tsurkov, a former Israeli soldier, became well known for her reporting and commentary during the US-led war against Syria that began in 2011. An active user of Twitter, Tsurkov has not posted to the social media site since March 21. Despite this abrupt silence, no reports have previously emerged in the western press citing her possible disappearance. Tsurkov is currently listed as a non-resident fellow at the Washington, DC based Newlines Institute. The Cradle contacted Newlines for comment on Tsurkov’s disappearance but did not receive a response. Tsurkov was first rumored to have disappeared while in the southern Iraqi city of Basra. However, information obtained by The Cradle indicates that "she was kidnapped from a house in the Karrada neighborhood of Baghdad on 26 March." However, senior Iraqi security sources told The Cradle that Tsurkov's kidnappers "were dressed in official Iraqi security service uniforms." Since then, no information about her whereabouts or who may be holding her has emerged. In the first days after her abduction, news spread in the Iraqi capital about "the kidnapping of a Russian woman, who holds American citizenship,” in a possible reference to Tsurkov. An Iraqi source says Tsurkov is not a US citizen, but holds dual Israeli-Russian citizenship. The early report in Iraq also claimed that the unnamed woman - who may or may not have been Tsurkov - was kidnapped by an Iranian citizen who was arrested by Iraqi security forces. Iraqi official sources have denied to The Cradle the allegation that an Iranian was detained over this matter. Tsurkov entered Iraq on a Russian passport, according to high-ranking Iraqi security sources, and first visited the Kurdistan region of Iraq, before moving on to Baghdad. But the Russian embassy in Baghdad told The Cradle in an email that it has "no evidence about the individual mentioned in your request neither about her nationality nor her story in Iraq." Iraq's Interior Minister Lieutenant General Abdul Amir al-Shammari was contacted for comment on Tsurkov's disappearance, but did not respond to the request. Iraqi security officials usually authorized to make public statements also refused to comment on the matter. Tsurkov, who speaks English, Hebrew, Russian, and Arabic, is well known to observers of the 2011 US-led covert war on Syria. Her reporting relied on her close personal contacts with opposition activists and commanders of foreign-backed extremist groups fighting against the Syrian government, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front, later known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Tsurkov's commentary on Syria has promoted regime change and parroted US and Israeli propaganda about the conflict, portraying foreign-backed extremist groups as "moderate rebels." Tsurkov dismissed claims of Israel's direct support for the Syrian insurgency and efforts to topple the Syrian government, despite admissions from Israeli officials that they wished to topple Bashar al-Assad’s government from the beginning of the war in 2011, as reported by the Jerusalem Post, and admissions that the Israeli army was supporting the Nusra Front, as reported by the Wall Street Journal. Tsurkov took this stance despite admissions by opposition activists that the Israeli air force was actively bombing the Syrian army on behalf of the Nusra Front. But once Israeli support for the Nusra Front and other groups became widely known, Tsurkov wrote her own report detailing Israeli activity in this regard. Tsurkov regularly justifies the Israeli attacks on Syrian territory, while defending the legitimacy of the US sanctions on Syria. Her current employer, the Newlines Institute, was founded by Ahmed Alwani, who was vice president of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), which has links to the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood began partnering with neoconservatives from the George W. Bush Administration to plan for regime change in Syria. As reported previously, the leadership of Newlines Institute includes former US State Department officials, US military advisors, and intelligence professionals. acknowledges her service in the Israeli army during its war on Lebanon in 2006.
Read moreIDC Completes 86 Oil Wells in the First Half of 2023
The Iraqi Drilling Company (IDC) drilled and repaired 86 oil wells in the first half of this year. Engineer Khalid Hamza Abbas, Director General of the Iraqi Drilling Company, said that in the first half of this year, the company's technical and engineering teams were able to drill 34 oil wells and carry out repairs in 52 other wells. The works are being completed in 10 projects by national oil companies and foreign companies operating in Iraq, divided into fields in northern, central and southern Iraq. "Our company has completed the drilling of MJ-152 oil well to a depth of 3079 meters, as part of a contract with Basra Oil Company to drill 43 wells in the Majnoon field in collaboration with Halliburton to provide oil services," he said. He said the drilling process is carried out through the latest drilling equipment (IDC - 56) with a capacity of (2000) horsepower.
Read more"Oil production will be increased to more than (5) million barrels per day"
Draw Media 🔹The Oil, Gas and Natural Resources Committee of the Iraqi Parliament, said: The government plans to increase oil production to more than five million per day. 🔹Zainab Juma, a member of the committee told the Iraqi News Agency: The Oil and Gas Committee, supports the government's steps to increase oil and gas production, by inviting international companies. 🔹Emphasize on providing a favorable environment for investment and providing protection and facilitation for oil and gas investment companies. 🔹Since the beginning of this year, about (54%) of Iraqi oil has been sent to India, China and South Korea, in addition to oil exports to Singapore, Netherlands, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, United States, Italy and France.
Read moreIraq's oil revenue in June was $7.1 billion
🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announces June oil revenues: 🔹 Last month's oil revenue reached (7 billion 115 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (100 million 59 thousand 52) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 335 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (71.11) dollars per barrel. 🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announced May oil revenues: 🔹 Oil revenue last month reached (7 billion 306 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (102 million 436 thousand 387) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 305 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (71.3) dollars per barrel. 🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announced April oil revenues: 🔹 Oil revenue last month reached (7 billion 796 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (98 million 634 thousand 947) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 288 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (79) dollars per barrel.
Read morePrime Minister's directives on the press facilitation package come into force
The Prime Minister's Office directed all ministries and governorates, and all entities and bodies not associated with ministries, to implement the package of facilities for press work, announced by Prime Minister Mohamed Shia Al-Sudani yesterday. It is noteworthy that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani directed the issuance of a package of measures and directives that must be implemented in support of Iraqi journalists and media institutions, on the occasion of the 154th National Day of the Iraqi press. The Prime Minister's Media Office said in a statement received by the Iraqi News Agency (INA) that "the Prime Minister directed all ministries, governorates and bodies not associated with a ministry to overcome obstacles and provide the necessary facilities for press and media cadres who have an official license from the Media and Communications Commission, in line with the law." The Prime Minister also directed the concerned authorities to "provide media institutions with Internet service at subsidized prices, as well as to reconsider the financial transfers of the media with regard to (satellites) for media channels and offices, in order to serve the media reality in Iraq, in accordance with the Central Bank of Iraq Law and instructions for controlling external transfer." In order to facilitate the procedures for the movement of press and media cadres who have an official license, the Prime Minister directed all checkpoints and security detachments stationed between all governorates to "implement this," instructing to "provide the necessary facilities and deal more smoothly for the passage of cadres of journalists and employees of media offices and their special equipment at Iraqi airports, as well as facilitating the granting of entry visas to journalists working in media offices and channels and facilitating their residency procedures in Iraq, based on the Foreigners' Residence Law No. (76) of 2017." In the field of continuous support, the Prime Minister directed, according to the statement, to "facilitate the completion of social security transactions for press cadres working in various media institutions," directing to "reconsider the fees of water and electricity imposed on media channels and offices, as well as generator fuel wages."
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