Draw Media

News / Iraq

Kurds suffer as Iraq, Turkey fail to restart oil flow ahead of Turkish FM's Baghdad visit

Al-Monitor Iraq and Turkey failed to agree on the resumption of oil exports via the southern Mediterranean port of Ceyhan as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan makes his first trip to Baghdad since assuming the post. News of the deadlock followed talks in Ankara Monday between Iraq’s Oil Minister Hayan Abdel-Ghani and his Turkish counterpart, Alparslan Bayraktar. Fidan arrived in Baghdad on Tuesday and held talks with his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein. He is expected to meet Wednesday with Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammed Shia al-Sudani, President Abul Latif Rashid and Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbusi as well as leaders of the Turkmen community. He is due to head to Erbil the following day and meet with the Kurdistan Regional Government's Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and President Nechirvan Barzani. Oil, water and cooperation against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) are expected to top the agenda. Ankara halted the flow on March 25 after the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ruled in favor of Iraq in an arbitration case lodged by Baghdad on the grounds that Turkey facilitated the “illegal” export of oil by the KRG between 2014 and 2018. Unnamed Iraqi officials cited by Reuters said Turkey had justified the continued closure of the pipeline on the grounds that it was not in physical order yet to accommodate the renewed flow and that storage tanks in the port of Ceyhan needed inspection for any damages resulting from the twin earthquakes that shook southern Turkey in February. It is widely acknowledged that the real reason for Turkey’s reluctance to reopen the line is Baghdad’s refusal to waive the $1.5 billion fine from the ICC and to drop a second arbitration case covering KRG sales between 2018 and 2022. Sources familiar with the negotiations who spoke on condition they not be identified said that Iraq's top ask was more water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which originate in Turkey. Water sharing has been a long-running thorn in relations between Turkey and its southern neighbors Iraq and Syria. Both blame Turkey’s construction of a host of dams since the 1970s for their increasingly acute water shortages. Turkey, which also suffers from drought, ripostes that they fail to properly manage their respective supplies. The oil pipeline carries up to 450,00 barrels of crude per day, the bulk from Iraqi Kurdish fields. For more than a month now the federal government has redirected its share of the oil — around 80,000 to 100,000 barrels per day originating in Kirkuk — to refineries in Salahaddin that lie to the south. As a result, the federal government is not affected financially by the dispute. It’s the KRG that is the worst hit, losing around $700 million per month as a result of the pause in exports. To make matters worse, Baghdad won't disburse the $1 billion allocated to the KRG under its new budget, giving it only $400 million instead. Baghdad is demanding that Erbil hand over all tax, utilities and customs revenues before releasing its full share of the budget. Regional officials familiar with the deliberations say Iran, which exerts strong influence over the Sudani government, is among the reasons that Baghdad is not agreeing to Turkey’s terms for resuming oil exports. Iran is seeking to squeeze the KRG, which hosts Iranian Kurdish guerilla groups, saying the latter should be disarmed immediately or face further attacks. At the same time, it is seeking to unravel Erbil’s strategic relations with Ankara that date back to the early 1990s, when the US-led coalition operated a no-fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan from the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey. Those ties have since deepened into a strategic military and economic alliance, making Turkey the KRG’s top trading partner and its top security partner alongside the United States. As a result, Turkey has deployed thousands of troops across the KRG, notionally to fight the PKK. For the Iraqi Kurds they serve as a buffer against potential encroachment by Iran. Baghdad has long sought their withdrawal, with such calls growing louder each time Iraqi civilians, mostly Kurds, die in Turkish airstrikes. Iraq is particularly irritated by the presence of several thousand Turkish troops in Bashiqa near Mosul that is under the federal government’s control and it would not be surprising if they were pushing for their departure as part of the oil talks. Turkish forces in Bashiqa have come under attack from Iran-backed Shiite militias, most recently in February. For their part, KRG officials will lobby Fidan to get Turkey to resume the flow of oil regardless whether it strikes a deal with Baghdad. Revenues from the oil sales were used to pay public sector salaries that total roughly $600 million per month. Payments are lagging by two months because of the lack of funds. In 2013 Turkey signed a 50-year energy deal with Erbil that set the stage for Kurdish oil sales through a purpose-built pipeline running to Ceyhan. The closure, some Iraqi officials contend, violates that deal. Indeed, should Turkey persist in its stance, Iran’s game plan may actually work. A growing number of Iraqi Kurds are beginning to question Ankara’s motives, with some advocating exporting their oil via different routes, including through the Iraqi port of Basra, to reduce dependency on Turkey. The pipeline closure will undoubtedly loom over Fidan’s trip, which is meant to lay the ground for an official visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to reciprocate Sudani’s first trip to Ankara in March. Alongside water, Turkey holds several other important cards. Around 70% of Iraqi custom revenues comes from imports via the Ibrahim Khalil border gate with Turkey. Moreover, the agreement to export Kirkuk oil will expire in July 2026, allowing Turkey to seek more favorable terms. Whether any of this will sway Baghdad remains an open question and the consensus in Erbil is that it is Tehran that will ultimately decide

Iraq switches off electronic billboards after hacker broadcasts porn to Baghdad passers-by

Iraqi authorities have switched off electronic advertising boards in Baghdad after pornographic footage was broadcast on one of the screens. A man has now been arrested by the police after the x-rated material was broadcast to passers-by in the capital, local media reported. The digital advertising boards were switched off on Sunday, according to Shafaq News, which said: “Iraqi security authorities decided to temporarily turn off screens displaying advertisements in public places in the capital, Baghdad, after they were subjected to electronic hacking and immoral clips were displayed in public.” A statement from the Iraqi Interior Ministry said the adult content was aired on a screen in Uqba bin Nafeh Square, a busy thoroughfare in central Baghdad. The statement from the ministry’s Federal Intelligence and Investigation Agency, posted on Facebook, said: “The Federal Intelligence and Investigation Agency, after obtaining judicial approvals and through field work, auditing and monitoring of surveillance cameras, was able to arrest the accused who carried out the hacking.” The statement went on to add that following “preliminary investigations,” the accused man suggested that “he had committed this immoral act due to financial problems with the owner of the company that owns the display screen.” Some, but not all, of the screens are now back in operation, CNN has confirmed. Last year, the Iraqi government announced that it planned to block porn sites, though it is not clear how effective that policy has been. Over the past year, the government has also cracked down on social media influencers. A platform called “Report” was launched this year to allow citizens to anonymously report “negative” or “immoral” content seen online. The government has nevertheless insisted that freedoms of expression are not at risk and will always be protected. Earlier this month, Iraq’s official media regulator ordered all media and social media companies operating in the Arab state not to use the term “homosexuality” and instead to say “sexual deviance.”

Upcoming Iraq-Turkey diplomacy aims for pipeline progress

Imminent ministerial-level visits to Baghdad and Ankara are likely to address major challenges to restarting Iraq’s northern exports. Iraq and Turkey are planning to trade ministerial-level diplomatic visits next week, as negotiations continue over reopening the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) that has been shut since March following an international tribunal ruling. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan will visit Baghdad and Erbil on Aug. 23 and 24, according to four Iraqi officials, while Iraqi Oil Minister Hayyan Abdulghani is scheduled to travel to Ankara "early next week," according to an Oil Ministry official.

The Real Reason Russia Is Ramping Up Oil Production In Iraq

Russia is moving to gain a tighter grip on Iraqi oil production as its influence in Kurdistan is waning. Russia finally effecting a major increase in oil production from Iraq’s supergiant West Qurna 2 oil field. West Qurna 2 has estimated recoverable oil reserves of around 13 billion barrels and, like most of the big fields in Iraq. Russia took control of the oil sector of the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan (KRI) in northern Iraq in 2017 for four key reasons, as analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. First, the KRI has significant oil and gas reserves. Second, its troublesome relationship with southern Iraq, governed out of Baghdad, would allow Russia to play the role of mediator between the two parts of the country, giving it leverage over both sides. Third, this leverage could then be used to extend Russia’s grip over southern Iraq too, which has even more oil and gas reserves. And fourth, it would enable Russia to stymie any efforts by the U.S. and its allies to begin to rebuild their influence in the country. This last point found further resonance after March’s resumption of relationship agreement between Iran (Iraq’s chief regional sponsor) and Saudi Arabia, brokered by China. Specifically, a source who works closely with the European Union’s energy security apparatus exclusively told OilPrice.com at the time, Iran was told by a very high-ranking official from the Kremlin that: “By keeping the West out of energy deals in Iraq – and closer to the new Iran-Saudi axis - the end of Western hegemony in the Middle East will become the decisive chapter in the West’s final demise”. With the future of independent oil supplies from the KRI looking highly precarious, Russia is moving firmly into the last phases of its plan for Iraq, as highlighted by serious discussions over the past two weeks for it to increase its presence in the country’s oil fields. A litmus test for both sides in this respect is Russia finally effecting a major increase in oil production from Iraq’s supergiant West Qurna 2 oil field. This field – along with the supergiant Rumaila – was cited recently by Iraq’s Oil Ministry as being vital to the country’s plan to increase its oil production capacity to around 7 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2027. The entire West Qurna oil field, located 65 kilometres northwest of the southern port city of Basra, has total estimated recoverable oil reserves of 43 billion barrels – making it one of the very biggest oil fields in the world. West Qurna 2 has estimated recoverable oil reserves of around 13 billion barrels and, like most of the big fields in Iraq (and Iran, and Saudi Arabia), it benefits from the lowest lifting costs in the world – at just US$1-2 per barrel. The original development plan for the West Qurna 2 field was to produce 1.8 million bpd but this was amended in 2013 to a three-stage plan in which peak production would be 1.2 million bpd. Phase 1 would add around 120,000 barrels per day (bpd) to the early 30,000 bpd of production from the site’s Mishrif Formation. Phase 2 would add another 400,000 bpd from the full development of the Mishrif Formation. And Phase 3 would add another 650,000 bpd from the development of the deeper Yamama Formation. However, it was at the time of this transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3, scheduled to start around the middle of 2017, that the trouble started from the Russian side, which is why output from the field has barely moved in years. The genesis of the trouble was that Russia’s key corporate oil proxy in Iraq at the time, Lukoil, believed the level of remuneration it was receiving per barrel drilled was too low. It was being paid US$1.15 per barrel recovered – the lowest rate being paid to any international oil company (IOC) in Iraq at that time and dwarfed by the US$5.50 per barrel being paid to GazpromNeft to develop the Badra oil field. Making matters worse for Lukoil at that point was that it had already spent at least US$8 billion in developing West Qurna 2, and compounding this grievance was the fact that Iraq’s Oil Ministry still owed it around US$6 billion in remuneration on recovered barrels and other development payments. In August 2017, a senior source who works closely with Iran’s Petroleum Ministry exclusively told OilPrice.com at the time, Lukoil was assured that Iraq’s Oil Ministry would very quickly pay the US$6 billion that it owed the company and that a higher compensation rate per barrel would be looked into as soon as was feasible. In addition, the Oil Ministry agreed to extend Lukoil’s contract period from 20 to 25 years, so lowering the average yearly cost to the Russian firm. It was also agreed that Lukoil would invest at least US$1.5 billion in West Qurna 2 in the following 12 months with a view to raising production from the 400,000-bpd level closer to the 1.2 million bpd peak production target. However, only one month later, 93% of the people of Iraq’s semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan voted in favour of complete independence from Iraq and chaos ensued, seeing Iranian forces move into the KRI, with Russian support. Only one month after that, Russia effectively took control of the region’s oil sector, and looked to put the squeeze on the Federal Government of Iraq (FGI) run out of Baghdad. As also analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order, Russia looked to gain more favourable terms for its existing operations in the FGI region, and for new oil field development awards there, by interposing itself between the two sides in their ongoing dispute over the 2014 ‘budget disbursements-for-oil’ deal. Part of Russia’s manoeuvring at this point was doing nothing to increase production from West Qurna 2. Crucially for what followed, Lukoil knew back then that it was perfectly capable of producing at least 635,000 bpd on a sustained basis. According to the Iran source, the Russian oil firm had hit 650,000 bpd production over extended periods in August and September 2017, and its engineers had assured senior management that 635,000-bpd production was achievable on an ongoing basis with no problems. At the end of November 2017, though, Iraq’s Oil Ministry found out that Lukoil was holding out on them. It threatened to withhold all payments due to Lukoil until it began to increase production steadily up to the 635,000-bpd level that its own production tests had shown was perfectly achievable. In response, and after the withdrawal of several IOCs from Iraq, Lukoil’s senior management thought that the time was right to try again to force the Oil Ministry into honouring its previous promises to increase its per barrel compensation on the West Qurna 2 field. Lukoil added that it was not making the 18.5 percent revenue per year from the field that it had expected – only around 10 percent, in fact - and that the Oil Ministry needed to improve this, otherwise it would exit the project. Surprisingly for the Russians, the Oil Ministry’s response was to say that it was fine if Lukoil wanted to leave but that before it did so it would pay compensation in lieu of the upfront investment that it promised in 2017 and promised again in 2019, as it was not meeting the time-sensitive oil production targets that it had agreed to. From that point, the standoff remained in place, up until recently. According to the Iran source, Lukoil has increased production over the past few weeks from 400,000 bpd to around 480,000 bpd. “From this point it could be increased back above 600,000 bpd in just a few weeks, and it looks like the Russians are serious this time he added,” he said. “With the Iran-Saudi deal, the last part of Russia’s move with China to secure the whole region [Middle East] is in play,” he added. “A unified Iraq is a key element of this, as the three countries together [Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia] are the heart of the Middle East and the heart of its oil and gas reserves, so to have control over that is a huge geopolitical advantage, and one the Americans wanted as well before their plan fell apart,” he concluded. By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

The plot thickens over Iraq’s bank heist

The exposure of crookery surrounding Iraq’s tax revenues has rattled rulers, past and present Spurred by a recent exposé in The Economist’s sister publication, 1843, of the theft of $2.5bn of state funds, the Iraqi authorities have called on America, Britain and Interpol to help arrest and extradite suspects who have sought refuge abroad. Four senior men in Iraq’s previous government under Mustafa al-Kadhimi are wanted. An investigation had been launched by his government last year, but then the case was largely left to languish, despite promises of action by Muhammad al-Sudani, his successor as prime minister. Responsibility for further action seems to have been shunted onto Western and Middle Eastern governments. The accused quartet—a former finance minister, an intelligence chief, a senior adviser and a private secretary to Mr Kadhimi—have been living in Dubai, London and Washington. They strenuously deny the accusations, which they say are politically motivated...More

Iraq Unwilling To Resume Crude Exports From Kurdistan To Turkey

By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com The suspension of exports of KRG crude to Turkey began on March 25th. Source: Baghdad isn’t interested in resuming KRG crude exports anytime soon. Baghdad does not see an independent Kurdistan in the future of Iraq It is easy to lose sight of the wood for the trees sometimes in the complex world of global oil. And perhaps no subject in that world involves so many different intricate moving parts as the extraordinary relationship between the Federal Government of Iraq (FGI), based in Baghdad, and the government of Iraq’s northern semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan (KRG), centred in Erbil. It is only when something such as the suspension of major flows of oil from Kurdistan to Turkey occurs, as began on 25 March, that many analysts start trying to unravel what has caused it. And they find themselves entering an ‘Alice In Wonderland’ world in which anything is possible, but nothing is as it seems. It is in this world, then, a step back should be taken, to answer precisely why the suspension is in place and when it will end. Such a step back reveals clearly that the FGI – supported by Iran – does not want Iraq’s Kurdistan region to have any true autonomy. Shutting down the KRG’s ability to generate its own significant revenues through the sale of oil independently of the FGI is simply part of efforts to deny the region this independence. Sustained over a long enough period, Baghdad and Iran – and Russia and China too – believe that the Kurdistan region can rolled back into the rest of Iraq to all meaningful intents and purposes. The drive towards this reintegration was stepped up by Baghdad and Tehran dramatically stepped up their efforts to achieve this after the 2017 independence vote in Iraqi Kurdistan. It is apposite to note that the vote on independence for Iraq’s Kurdistan region only occurred through pressure from the U.S., as analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. Specifically, Washington had privately assured the Iraqi Kurds in 2014 that in exchange for their Peshmerga armed forces taking the principal combat role against a surging ISIS, they would eventually be given their own independent country. Although the 2017 independence did not automatically grant Iraqi Kurdistan its independence from Baghdad, it was seen by the U.S. as a litmus test of how such an independent Kurdistan would be received in the region. As it transpired, the 92.73 percent vote on 25 September 2017 in favour of Kurdish independence went down extremely badly with the remainder of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The key reason for this was that each of these countries had sizeable Kurdish populations themselves – Iran 9 percent, Syria 10 percent, and Turkey 18 percent - and the thought was that if the Iraqi Kurds successfully gained independence from Iraq then their own Kurdish populations might try to do the same. Consequently, the 2017 Iraq Kurdistan independence vote was immediately followed by elements of Iran’s military rolling into Iraq Kurdistan, including the prime oil-rich areas. Additionally, very senior officers from Iran’s Quds branch of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, and from its Vezarat-e Ettela'at Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran intelligence service, made it clear to several of Iraq Kurdistan’s leading politicians that it would not be in their best interests to continue to push for independence from Iraq. At the same time, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a top military adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called for a blockade on Iraq Kurdistan’s land borders. Turkish President then as now, Recep Erdogan, also threatened to invade the Iraqi Kurdish area. He added that Turkey could also cut off the oil export pipeline from Iraq to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. At that point, the region was producing around an average of 500,000-600,000 bpd of oil exports, by far the mainstay of Iraq Kurdistan’s economy. It was then that Russia stepped in, taking effective control of all of Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sector through three key means. First, it provided the KRG with US$1.5 billion in financing through forward oil sales payable in the next three to five years. Second, it took an 80 percent working interest in five potentially major oil blocks in the region. And third, it established 60 percent ownership of the vital KRG oil pipeline to Ceyhan in Turkey by dint of a commitment to invest US$1.8 billion to increase its capacity to one million barrels per day. Over and above specific oil and gas exploration and development opportunities, Russia saw an opportunity to leverage its new-found influence in Iraq Kurdistan into the rest of Iraq too. Already active in several oil fields in Iraq, it wanted to expand this presence, including into those with significant gas resources. Russia also wanted to support the already extensive influence in Iraq of one of its key allies in the region, Iran. The principal method it used as leverage was the ‘oil-for-budget disbursements’ deal done between the KRG and FGI back in 2014. By ensconcing itself first in the heart of Iraq Kurdistan and then in the key role of negotiator in the oil-for-budget disbursements deal with the FGI, Russia could ensure that the KRG was under its effective control, and that the government in Baghdad would fall into line at some point, as also analysed in depth in my new book on the new global oil market order. At the end of 2020/beginning of 2021, China stepped into Iraq to support Russia’s efforts, as also analysed in my book, using the same strategy in Baghdad as Russia had used in 2017 with the KRG. By that point, then, the 2014 oil-for-budget disbursements deal between the KRG and the FGI had ceased to function in any meaningful way. The situation was not helped by the lack of legal clarity over whether the KRG is entitled to sell its oil independently from SOMO and Baghdad. According to the KRG, it has authority under Articles 112 and 115 of the Iraq Constitution to manage oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region extracted from fields that were not in production in 2005 – the year that the Constitution was adopted by referendum. The KRG also maintains that Article 115 states: “All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organised in a region.” As such, the KRG argues that as relevant powers are not otherwise stipulated in the Constitution, it has the authority to sell and receive revenue from its oil and gas exports. However, the FGI in Baghdad and SOMO argue that under Article 111 of the Constitution oil and gas are under the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates. Consequently, they believe that all oil and gas developed across all of Iraq should be sold through official channels of the central FGI in Baghdad. The 25 March turning point for the halting of all independent oil exports from Iraq Kurdistan was the ruling by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) that Turkey is legally only allowed to purchase oil via SOMO. Consequently, Kurdish oil production dropped from around 450,000 bpd to around 20,000 bpd at most currently, according to SOMO data. The ICC also ruled that Turkey must pay the FGI around US$1.47 billion in compensation for having facilitated Iraqi Kurdish oil exports between 2014 and 2018 without the Iraqi federal government’s permission. Although Turkey expected the compensation to be much higher, a senior European Union energy security source exclusively told OilPrice.com last week, it has nonetheless sent a list of conditions to the FGI in Baghdad that needed to be met before it would consider resuming oil imports from Iraq Kurdistan. It is a very long list, including a reduction in compensation, guaranteed discounts on oil purchases, withdrawal of a second lawsuit from Baghdad still pending at the ICC, and guaranteed payments for the maintenance of the Ceyhan pipeline, among others. According to the E.U. source last week, Baghdad has no interest whatsoever in agreeing to any of Turkey’s terms. It also has no interest in Iraq Kurdistan resuming its independent oil sales either. “On the one hand, independent oil sales jeopardise the oil flows that are meant to be sent to Baghdad to sell, so there is no upside to that for the FGI,” he said. “On the other hand, Baghdad does not want the oil either, as if [Iraq] Kurdistan resumed full production it would put it [Iraq] over its OPEC+ quota,” he added. “As Baghdad does not see an independent Kurdistan in the future of Iraq, it sees the best solution as keeping the independent oil sales stopped and the Kurds financially paralysed,” he concluded. This view finds further resonance in a statement late last week from Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Al-Sudani, that Baghdad has drafted a new oil and gas law that will unify regulations in the industry in all governorates, including the Kurdistan region.

Political Reasons Behind Blocking the "Telegram" in Iraq

Iraq’s telecoms ministry recently decided to block the popular messaging app Telegram. The move comes as a response to concerns over personal data violations and national security. According to the ministry, the app does not handle users’ data well. It also claims that the block is to “preserve the integrity of users’ personal data”. Just like other social chat apps, Telegram is widely used in Iraq for chats but also as a news source. According to Reuters, the ministry claims some channels have large personal data. This includes data like address, family ties of Iraqis and so on. The ministry also claims that it asked the app to shut down “platforms that leak the data of the official state institutions and the personal data of citizens… but the company did not respond and did not interact with any of these requests”. The statement also adds “The Ministry of Communications affirms its respect for citizens’ rights to freedom of expression and communication, without prejudice to the security of the state and its institutions,” THE DECISION TO BLOCK TELEGRAM The Iraqi government’s decision to block Telegram was announced by the telecoms ministry on August 6. One of the critical concerns raised by the Iraqi government is the issue of personal data violations. Telegram, like many other chat apps, collects and stores user data. This includes personal info such as names, phone numbers, and even location data. The government fears that this data could be misused or accessed by unauthorized individuals, posing a risk to the privacy and security of its citizens. In addition to personal data violations, national security concerns played a big role in the decision to block Telegram. The Iraqi government believes that the app’s encryption features make it difficult for authorities to monitor and track potential threats. This lack of oversight could potentially be exploited by individuals or groups with malicious intent. They claim that this could pose a threat to the country’s security. TELEGRAM’S RESPONSE & EXPERTS REACTION In response to the ban, Telegram stated that all user data on its app are very safe and do not pose a risk to users. The company claims that information on its app is very safe and no one can access the data apart from the parties involved. Telegram says it will go into talks with the Iraqi government to see how its services can be restored. It called for users of the app to remain calm and that it will continue to talk with the government. Telegram said “Please remain calm, all user data are very safe and we will do all we can to return our services. We are in talks with the government”. The ban on Telegram in Iraq has been met with mixed reactions. While some users have expressed disappointment and frustration, others have welcomed the move as a necessary step to combat terrorism and protect national security. Wael Abdulal, an Iraqi tech expert, and founder of e-commerce startup Miswag and social media app Nabd have criticized the ban. He said that the ban “will be a bad impact on brands and people who rely on the app for communication”. Omar Alshaikhli, another Iraqi tech expert and founder of the social media platform Hayatech and mobile app, Tech Hub also expresses concern about the band. He states that this “will limit freedom of expression and could lead to the use of less secure chat apps”. However, Ali Al-Mawlawi, an Iraqi security expert and the head of research at the Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies have defended the ban. He claims that the ban is a “good move to tackle terrorism and protect national security”. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAN The ban on Telegram in Iraq has several implications for its citizens and the broader digital landscape in the country. Here are some key points to consider: 1. Communication: Telegram is a widely used chat app in Iraq, with millions of users relying on it for communication. The ban will disrupt the ability of people, brands, and organizations to connect and exchange data. 2. Freedom of Expression: The ban raises concerns about freedom of expression and access to info. Telegram has been a platform for open discussions and the sharing of ideas. With its absence, there is a risk of limiting the country’s diversity of voices and opinions. 3. Digital Economy: The ban may also have an impact on the digital economy in Iraq. Many brands and entrepreneurs rely on Telegram for marketing, customer support, and e-commerce. The loss of this platform could hinder their ability to reach users and conduct business. 4. Alternative Platforms: With the ban on Telegram, users may turn to alternative chat apps that are still active in Iraq. This could lead to people having to use less secure apps that have little regulation. FINAL WORDS The decision to block Telegram in Iraq is a response to concerns over personal data violations and national security. While the government aims to protect its citizens’ privacy and security, the ban has implications for communication, freedom of expression, the digital economy, and the use of alternative platforms. It remains to be seen how this decision will shape the digital landscape in Iraq and whether alternative solutions will emerge to address the concerns raised by the government.

Partial budget payment highlights divide in Baghdad-Erbil negotiations

The KRG has received 598 billion dinars under the new budget law — a fraction of its theoretical monthly entitlement. Iraq's federal government has sent a first, partial payment to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) under the recently passed budget law. The transfer of 598 billion Iraqi dinars ($460 million) was confirmed by multiple KRG officials. It is a fraction of the full budget entitlement expected by the KRG, highlighting the stark divide between Baghdad and Erbil as they negotiate how to implemenet the budget law's new provisions on oil and financial management. "We are in need of 921 billion Iraqi dinars just to pay salaries," said a KRG spokesperson. "Not only have our [full] fiancial entitlements not been released; not even adequate payments to cover [civil servant] salaries have been released."

Iraq's oil revenues in June surpass $8 billion

🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announced July oil revenues: 🔹 Oil revenue last month reached (8 billion 1293 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (106 million 755 thousand 169) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 444 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (77.69) dollars per barrel. 🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announced June oil revenues: 🔹 Oil revenue in June reached (7 billion 115 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (100 million 59 thousand 52) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 335 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (71.11) dollars per barrel. 🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announced May oil revenues: 🔹 Oil revenue in May reached (7 billion 306 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (102 million 436 thousand 387) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 305 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (71.3) dollars per barrel. 🔻Iraqi Oil Ministry announced April oil revenues: 🔹 Oil revenue in April reached (7 billion 796 million) dollars. 🔹 The amount of oil exports (98 million 634 thousand 947) barrels. 🔹 The average daily oil exports were 3 million 288 thousand barrels. 🔹 The average price has reached more than (79) dollars per barrel.

Indian-Made Cold Syrup Sent to Iraq Contains Poison, Test Shows

Bloomberg By Zachary Mider A cold medication made in India and sold in Iraq is tainted with toxic chemicals, a test commissioned by Bloomberg News shows, the latest in a series of alarming revelations about syrup medicines used by children around the world. A bottle of Cold Out purchased at a pharmacy in Baghdad in March contains 2.1% ethylene glycol, according to Valisure LLC, an independent US laboratory. That’s about 21 times the widely accepted limit. The compound is lethal to humans in small amounts and played a role in mass child deaths caused by Indian-made cough syrups in Gambia and Uzbekistan last year. Bloomberg shared the test results with the World Health Organization as well as Iraqi and Indian officials on July 8. The WHO told Bloomberg that it found Valisure’s test results to be “acceptable” and that it will issue an alert if the Iraqi government confirms the product was sold there. No public alert or recall has been announced yet. Saif al-Bader, a spokesman for Iraq’s health ministry, said in an interview that the ministry has “strict regulations for the import, sale and distribution of medicines.” He declined to answer specific questions about Cold Out. It’s the fifth time in a year that testing has found an Indian exporter’s drugs to contain excessive levels of ethylene glycol. In addition to the Gambia and Uzbekistan outbreaks, testing by government laboratories has identified other contaminated products in the Marshall Islands and Liberia, although there were no reported illnesses associated with those drugs. The Cold Out label indicates it was made by Fourrts (India) Pvt. Ltd., a Chennai-based manufacturer that exports medicines to more than 50 countries, including the UK, Germany and Canada. A vice president there, Bala Surendran, said that Fourrts subcontracted the manufacture of Cold Out to another Indian company, Puducherry-based Sharun Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. After Bloomberg’s inquiries, Fourrts tested a sample of Cold Out it had on hand and found it untainted, Surendran said. He said Indian regulators seized other samples from Sharun’s plant and that Fourrts hasn’t been informed of the results of those tests. Officials at the national drug agency and two local regulators either did not respond to requests for comment or said they had no information to share. Sharun executives did not respond to requests for comment. The outbreak last year in Gambia killed more than 60 children, and the one in Uzbekistan killed about 20. The incidents raised fresh questions about the quality of drug exports from India, which is the largest generic drugmaker and calls itself the ”pharmacy of the world.” The WHO said this month that a cough syrup blamed for 12 child deaths in Cameroon this year contained unsafe levels of diethylene glycol, a similar toxic compound. In that case, the medicine packaging doesn’t name a maker but bears the manufacturing license number of another Indian company. Poisoned Cough Syrup's Global Spread Cough syrups and other liquid medications found to be contaminated with toxic industrial solvents Source: World Health Organization; National Agency for Food & Drug Administration, Nigeria; Bloomberg reporting. * Label of "Naturcold" medication in Cameroon included the manufacturing license number of India's Riemann Labs. A Riemann representative confirmed the company has manufactured Naturcold syrup but did not confirm making the batch in question. Earlier this year, as part of an investigation into the global trade in unsafe drugs, Bloomberg purchased 33 samples of Indian-made syrups from pharmacies in Cambodia, Georgia, Ghana, India, Iraq and Kenya. The drugs were tested by New Haven, Connecticut-based Valisure using gas chromatography-mass spectrometry. The lab found four samples, all different brands, that contained either ethylene glycol, diethylene glycol, or both. In considering whether a drug product contains unsafe levels of ethylene glycol or diethylene glycol, the WHO uses a guideline of 0.1%. Levels above that “would be considered non-compliant and therefore a health risk,” Rutendo Kuwana, head of the organization’s substandard medicines team, said in an email. Sarah Sheppard, a WHO spokeswoman, pointed to guidance from the US Food and Drug Administration that uses the 0.1% limit for tests of raw materials used in syrup production. Valisure tested the Cold Out sample five times and found, on average, ethylene glycol content of 2.1% and diethylene glycol content of 0.25%. The diethylene glycol content is more than twice the limit. None of the other syrups with contaminants exceeded the 0.1% level. Bloomberg provided WHO and Iraqi authorities with test results and the name and location of the Baghdad pharmacy where the syrup was purchased. The WHO’s Sheppard said in an email this week that Iraq continues “to attempt to source samples to confirm (or not) whether the product is in their country and where else it could be on sale. To raise a definitive alert, WHO and the Member State would need to be satisfied that it was on sale in a particular location.” “We will issue an alert as soon as we have confirmation of the information from Iraq,” Sheppard continued. Syrup medications consist of a small amount of active ingredient suspended in a watery solution. To cause the active ingredients to dissolve, manufacturers add a solvent such as propylene glycol — a harmless, clear, sweet-tasting liquid. Ethylene glycol and diethylene glycol are chemically similar to propylene glycol but are cheaper and highly toxic, used in industrial applications such as antifreeze and brake fluid. Typically, contamination takes place when a chemical trader mislabels one of these chemicals as propylene glycol. Drug manufacturers are supposed to test propylene glycol for contamination prior to using it, but that doesn’t always happen. In response to the contamination episodes that came to light over the past year, Indian drug authorities in June began requiring the testing of cough syrups in a government lab prior to export. The packaging of the Cold Out obtained in Iraq indicates it was manufactured in January 2022. The WHO has said that it’s exploring whether a spike in prices of propylene glycol contributed to the recent contamination cases. In addition to those linked to Indian medication, an outbreak last year in Indonesia, caused by medication manufactured domestically, killed about 200 children. Propylene glycol prices tripled in China in 2020 and in India in 2021 and remained elevated for more than a year, according to ChemAnalyst, a market research firm in India. That increased the potential profit from mislabeling a cheaper solvent as propylene glycol. Valisure is known for finding dangerous chemicals in drugs and personal-care products. Its 2019 research on contamination in the blockbuster heartburn drug Zantac led to recalls and eventual market withdrawal. Valisure works with health-care companies including Kaiser Permanente to test drug products for quality. — With Zulfugar Agayev, Onur Ant, Kendall Taggart, Helena Bedwell, Zeke Faux, Debjit Chakraborty, Alexander Gilbert Campbell, Ekow Dontoh, Saritha Rai, Eltaf Najafizada, Eric Ombok, Swati Gupta, Sam Dagher, and Nayla Razzouk

Iraq’s Power Problem : Implications of the New Oil-for-Gas Deal with Iran

by Bilal Wahab, Dennis Ross Baghdad hopes to avoid power cuts, political turmoil, and U.S. sanctions by striking a barter agreement with Tehran, but the deal raises many questions. On July 11, Baghdad and Tehran signed a deal that will allow Iraq to pay for the natural gas it imports from Iran with oil transfers. The deal is seemingly intended to keep Baghdad from running afoul of U.S. sanctions as it secures its electricity sector, which is still very fragile and dependent on Iran (for more on the sector’s problems, see Part 1 of this PolicyWatch). Yet it is unclear if the parties have worked out the many commercial and logistical complications that come with implementing such a plan. Why Strike a Deal Now? During peak summer season, Iraq imports 70 million cubic meters of gas per day from Iran to feed its power plants, generating around 5,000 megawatts of electricity with these supplies. This flow, coupled with direct purchases of Iranian electricity, means that Tehran accounts for 40 percent of Iraq’s power needs at a cost of $4 billion per year. Yet Iran often reduces Iraq’s gas supply, contributing to power shortages, public discontent, and political problems. Some of these cuts are driven by Iranian domestic demand, but other instances stem from Tehran’s desire to exert leverage and Baghdad’s payment delays. Iraq currently owes $12 billion for gas and power imports, and payments toward that balance have been deposited in an account at the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI). Yet Tehran cannot access this money without waivers on the various U.S. sanctions against Iranian government entities. The new barter deal enables Baghdad to sidestep this difficulty and pay with oil. One reason for seeking this deal is because Iraq has had trouble meeting Washington’s requirements for waiving sanctions. As described in Part 1, the waivers related to gas imports are partly conditioned on Baghdad showing progress toward two key goals: achieving energy independence from Iran and reducing the amount of gas it wastes through flaring associated with oil production. The Trump administration emphasized the former goal, while the Biden administration has placed additional focus on emissions from gas flaring. Baghdad is taking some steps to meet these conditions, such as signing a recent gas capture and solar power deal with TotalEnergies, developing the Basra Gas Company with Shell and Mitsubishi, and expanding the Khor Mor gas field in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), a project that involves $250 million of U.S. funding and cooperation with the Emirati-led consortium Pearl Petroleum. Iraq also launched a sixth licensing round for gas fields, changed its contract model for oil companies, initiated plans to connect its power grid with Jordan and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and tapped Siemens to squeeze more wattage from its existing turbines when Iran cut the gas supply earlier this month. Despite these laudable steps, however, Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani acknowledged on July 11 that Iraq has more to do on these fronts and will still need at least three more years to become independent of Iranian gas. Indeed, Baghdad has failed to invest substantially in exploiting its own expansive gas reserves, capturing gas wasted during oil production, developing gas pipelines, or exploring liquefaction. The sundry reasons behind this failure—from insufficient infrastructure to chronic mismanagement and corruption—have given rise to a new barter deal that has ample question marks of its own. Devil in the Details One of the most immediate questions about the oil-for-gas deal is how will the prices be set? An Iraqi official has privately indicated that the oil will be given to Iran at international prices. Yet Iran sells gas to Iraq above market prices and sells oil to China below market. In the latter case, it is willing to pay these steep transaction costs in order to facilitate its illicit oil exports. Yet it may lose even more money if it tries to reexport Iraqi oil or use it at home. The deal also includes fuel oil, however, so Tehran could make up some of the potential losses by using these supplies for domestic industrial purposes. Other questions are just as pressing: where will Iraq get the oil, and how will it be transported? One option is to truck it from the KRI, where the bulk of the region’s production of 450,000 barrels per day has been unavailable for export for months. In March, a legal dispute led Turkey to close the pipeline that brings KRI oil to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan (mostly for re-shipment to Israel). Transferring this oil to Iran could help the KRI ease some of its internal problems, solidify its connections with Baghdad, and assuage Erbil’s fears of an Iranian military incursion. In the past, a similar swap deal saw Iraq truck oil to Iranian refineries near the border. Assuming the parties can work these issues out, will the bartering arrangement prove stable? If Tehran comes to believe that Iraq is genuinely trying to wean itself off Iranian gas and power, the regime may try to sabotage that plan through a tactic it has used before: influencing Iraq’s parliament to divert budget allocations from energy projects. Periodically attacking the assets of foreign oil companies has likewise enabled Iran to deter investment and slow progress when it deems fit—a threat that Baghdad will take seriously given that its own mismanagement has already hindered investments from oil majors such as Shell and Exxon. Iraqi corruption could rear its head again as well, since transporting oil to Iran will likely involve individuals and companies tied to militias and organized crime groups. In short, Baghdad has lots of problems it must solve to make this work, and even then there is no guarantee the Biden administration will simply accept the arrangement and waive sanctions. The Iraqi government may be able to sidestep direct sanctions, but foreign oil companies will not automatically be immune—an especially worrisome prospect if Iraq aims to barter oil from the KRI, where several foreign companies operate. Alternatively, the deal may be intended as a joint Iraqi-Iranian tactic to pressure Washington on allowing Tehran to access its blocked funds. A Surprise for Washington? The oil-for-gas agreement may have caught Washington off guard—thus, even if the Biden administration is initially inclined to be supportive, it may still want (and should definitely seek) answers from Prime Minister Sudani before fully accepting the deal. This could mean striking a familiar balance between sometimes-conflicting objectives. For instance, Washington is focused on its longstanding goals of stabilizing Iraq, maximizing Baghdad’s autonomy from Iran, and closing loopholes to make it harder for Tehran to evade sanctions. In the immediate context of a summer power crisis, however, stability may require moving closer to Iran, not further away. Sudani faces a similar balancing act between conflicting realities and pressures. Although he seemingly wants to increase his political space for taking action independent of Iran, he understands that if he pushes the boundaries too far, Tehran can use its proxies inside Iraq’s armed forces and government to undermine him. More to the point, he has a genuinely urgent need for more Iranian gas, and he cannot get it for free. This may be why he apparently acted without asking Washington—he either feared a “no” answer or believed the administration would be too slow to act. Going forward, he will presumably try to use the TotalEnergies deal to show he is making a real effort to wean Iraq off Iranian gas—and simultaneously signal Washington that going cold turkey is not an option unless the Biden administration wants to see the country unravel. Sudani may also point out that he is under pressure from Iran to pay the overdue gas bill; and since Washington will not allow Tehran to draw these payments from the TBI, he had little choice but to seek a barter deal. Such arguments are credible given Iran’s previous behavior—after the Biden administration allowed Baghdad to release $2.7 billion of Iranian funds for humanitarian trade, Tehran still cut Iraq’s gas supply. Despite this proven Iranian leverage, administration officials remain reluctant to grant any more waivers for withdrawals from the TBI (earlier today, the State Department announced a new 120-day waiver allowing Baghdad to pay Tehran for electricity via non-Iraqi banks, though various restrictions may limit that route as well). Hence, the White House will likely accept the barter deal in the end, if only to avoid increased instability in Iraq during summer electricity shortages. But U.S. officials should still use their leverage to work out an agreed game plan for weaning Iraq off Iranian gas, including clear milestones and, perhaps, shorter waiver periods (e.g., back to the 60- or 30-day periods granted under the Trump administration). Yes, figuring out this timeline will be difficult. But unless the new barter arrangements are aligned with a larger strategy for increasing the Iraqi government’s freedom of action from Iran, Baghdad and its international partners will repeatedly find themselves in a crisis footing that benefits Tehran.

U.S. Bans 14 Iraqi Banks in Crackdown on Iran Dollar Trade

The US stepped up dollar restriction on Iraq last year to stem flow of currency to Iran, leading to a cash crunch and rising prices in Iraq The US has blacklisted 14 Iraqi banks from conducting dollar transactions as part of its crackdown on corruption and dollar smuggling to Iran. The ban was imposed Wednesday by the US Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, according to a Wall Street Journal report on Wednesday. The report, citing unnamed Iraqi and US officials, said the move came after Washington discovered that the banks had engaged in money laundering and fraudulent transactions, potentially with sanctioned entities that could benefit Iran. The ban is part of a wider crackdown by Washington on fraudulent US dollar transactions in Iraq. In November, the US Treasury and the Central Bank of Iraq enacted tighter restrictions on wire transfers. The US Federal Reserve also began imposing more stringent checks on the source of foreign money being used to buy dollars at Iraq’s daily currency auction. The US dollar is a de facto second currency in Iraq. The government keeps its foreign reserves at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In order to extract the funds and turn them into dinars, the Central Bank of Iraq requests dollars from the Fed, which it then sells to private banks and other financial institutions, such as currency exchanges, through a daily dollar auction. US officials believe that heavily sanctioned Iran has been manipulating the auction to obtain hard currency and that Iraqi banks and currency-exchange houses had gamed the auction, buying dollars at a fixed rate and selling them on the street at a much higher price. Last year, about $200m per day on average was being sold through the auction to private banks and companies. But that figure dropped sharply in the final two months of the year as the US stepped up its scrutiny, falling to a daily average of $56m by late December, according to data reviewed by MEE. Iraqi currency crunch The beefed-up restrictions triggered a collapse in the dinar and surging prices for imported goods, with the Iraqi government struggling to meet its obligations, including the salaries of millions of public employees, pensions, and social support. The currency crisis sparked protests across the country and the governor of the central bank resigned "because of his inability to face the crisis", an advisor to Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani previously told Middle East Eye. But US officials believed their oversight worked, reducing the illicit trade in dollars to countries like Syria and Iran, and helped them sniff out the 14 blacklisted banks. Several of the banks had already stopped conducting transactions because they were unable to meet the new requirements, officials said. Others turned to using cash cards credited with Iraqi dinars, then transporting them to nearby countries in an attempt to withdraw the funds in dollars, the officials said. Iran tensions MEE reported that late last year, the Coordination Framework, the umbrella group that makes up the largest political coalition backing the Iraqi government, held a meeting in Baghdad to discuss the rising cost of dollars. The governor of Iraq’s central bank told senior officials the US had “serious indications” of dollar-smuggling operations to neighbouring countries and named two Egyptian banks based in Dubai, where most of the dollars bought in the auction had been transferred in the period being investigated. The dollars had then been transferred on to Oman and then to Iran. According to a document seen by MEE, the central bank ordered banks and other financial institutions to stop dealing in dollars, with the banks being watched by the US, on 6 November. It was not clear whether those were the same banks US officials blacklisted on Wednesday. On Tuesday, Washington gave Iraq a waiver to pay Iran for electricity via non-Iraqi banks. Tehran had pushed for the move by cutting its natural gas exports to Iraq, forcing Baghdad to impose unpopular electricity cuts in the summer heat. Tehran and Washington had been trying to ease tensions. MEE first reported that the two were nearing a temporary deal to swap some sanctions relief for reducing Iranian uranium enrichment activities. Efforts to reach an interim nuclear deal faced a setback, however, with factions in the Iranian ruling establishment disagreeing over US demands on prisoner releases. Washington’s negotiating position was also thrust into fresh chaos after its top Iran envoy, Robert Malley, was placed on unpaid leave amid reports that he was under investigation for mishandling classified information.

US issues new 120-day waiver letting Iraq pay Iran for electricity

(Reuters) The United States on Tuesday moved to let Iraq pay Iran for electricity via non-Iraqi banks, a U.S. official said, a step Washington hopes may keep Tehran from forcing unpopular power cuts during the sweltering Iraqi summer. Secretary of State Antony Blinken signed a 120-day national security waiver allowing Iraq - heavily dependent on Iranian electricity - to deposit such payments into non-Iraqi banks in third countries instead of into restricted accounts in Iraq, said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity. Monies put into the non-Iraqi accounts, like those deposited into Iraqi banks, will also be restricted, still requiring U.S. permission for Iran to get access to them and only for spending on humanitarian goods. Tehran has in the past pushed Baghdad to secure U.S. permission to release such funds by cutting Iranian natural gas exports to Iraq, limiting Iraq's ability to generate power and forcing deeply unpopular electricity cuts. The latest waiver was expanded to permit payments to banks outside Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government, apparently in the hopes that this might transfer some of the pressure that Iran has exerted on Baghdad to other countries. "We have to help the Iraqis with this perennial pressure from the Iranians to access the money," said the U.S. official. "The Iraqis have requested, and now we have agreed, to expand the waiver," said the U.S. official, saying this might help ensure better compliance with the U.S. requirement that any disbursements be for humanitarian purposes. "It also helps the Iraqis, at least somewhat, to have an argument to make (to Iran) that they are not in control of the money that they have paid (into non-Iraqi accounts)," he added. It is not clear, however, whether Iran might ease up on Iraq as a result. Tehran could decide it has greater leverage over Iraq than over other nations and continue to exert pressure. Iran's mission to the United Nations did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Iran is under extensive U.S. economic sanctions reimposed in 2018 after then-U.S. President Donald Trump abandoned the nuclear deal that Tehran struck with major powers Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States in 2015. Trump believed his policy of "maximum pressure" on Iran would force it to accept more stringent restrictions to its nuclear program, which the United States, European powers and Israel fear may be designed to obtain a nuclear weapon. Iran has long denied such ambitions. As a result of Trump's withdrawal from the deal and U.S. President Joe Biden's failure to revive it, Iran could make the fissile material for one bomb in 12 days or so, according to U.S. estimates, down from a year when the accord was in force.

Iraq: Draft laws threaten rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly

The Iraqi government has re-introduced two draft laws to the Parliament which, if passed, would severely curtail the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly of the people of Iraq, Amnesty International and INSM Foundation for Digital Rights in Iraq said today. The reintroduction of these draft laws coincides with a spate of prosecutions targeting people who are critical of government figures, as well as a Ministry of Interior-led campaign to crack down on “indecent content” online. Between January and June this year, the authorities prosecuted at least 20 individuals over the peaceful exercise of their human right to free expression. Six people were sentenced to prison terms but have since been released. “The Iraqi authorities’ latest attempt to repress free expression reveals their blatant disregard for the extraordinary sacrifices made by Iraqis during the 2019 uprising to secure their freedoms. The Iraqi government should immediately withdraw these repressive draft laws and parliament should not pass any laws that would unduly restrict the human rights of Iraqis,” said Bissan Fakih, Amnesty International’s Regional Campaigner for Iraq and Yemen. The Iraqi government should immediately withdraw these repressive draft laws and parliament should not pass any laws that would unduly restrict the human rights of Iraqis Bissan Fakih, Amnesty International’s Regional Campaigner for Iraq and Yemen “The people of Iraq have a right to criticize their leaders and religious figures, and to protest peacefully without fear of imprisonment and heavy fines. These rights are especially important at a time when the Iraqi people are seeking to hold government officials accountable for allegations of systemic corruption and human rights violations.” The proposed draft Law on Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Assembly would give the Iraqi authorities the cover of a democratically adopted law to arbitrarily prosecute anyone who makes public comments that violate “public morals” or “public order”. Under the proposed draft Law on Cybercrimes, meanwhile, those posting online content that is deemed to undermine the vaguely defined “country’s supreme economic, political, military, or security interests” could face a sentence of up to life imprisonment and a fine of up to 50 million Iraqi Dinars (around $38,000 USD). In meetings with Amnesty International in Baghdad in May, human rights defenders and activists expressed alarm that the drafts would empower the authorities to further suppress peaceful dissent. The proposed reforms are causing deep concern due to the recent spate of freedom of expression prosecutions. Journalist Haidar al-Hamdani is being tried pursuant to a criminal defamation complaint filed against him by the governor of Basra, who Al-Hamdani had accused of corruption in a video posted to Facebook where he has more than one million followers. “I am no longer able to make fun of a party, or the state, or a public figure … or the state of the roads, water, schools, or bridges. Why? Because it all belongs to the [political] parties Iraqi comedian One Iraqi comedian prosecuted by an Iraqi court during the “indecent content” campaign told Amnesty International: “I am no longer able to make fun of a party, or the state, or a public figure … or the state of the roads, water, schools, or bridges. Why? Because it all belongs to the [political] parties”. Curtailing freedom of expression and peaceful assembly On 9 May 2023, Parliament held its second reading of the proposed Law on Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Assembly and Mohammed al-Halbousi, the speaker of Parliament, may call for a general vote on the law at any time. Amendments to both draft laws are being privately discussed by lawmakers, according to individuals who have been involved in discussions and have seen proposed new language in the drafts. Yet these amendments have not been made public, and it is unclear whether the drafts will be shared with members of the public ahead of a possible vote. Hayder Hamzoz, Executive Director of INSM, said: “It is unacceptable that in Iraq today we are suffering from a lack of access to information on draft laws under consideration by parliament. Access to information is an inherent human right and it is one of the keys to the rule of law, to empower citizens and enable them to engage effectively in political life and the fight against corruption.” It is unacceptable that in Iraq today we are suffering from a lack of access to information on draft laws under consideration by parliament. Access to information is an inherent human right Haidar Hamzoz, executive director of INSM Foundation for Digital Rights in Iraq The draft law prohibits the undermining of “religions, religious beliefs, sects”. Those caught “publicly insulting a ritual or a symbol or a person who constitutes an object of sanctification, worship or reverence to a religious sect” face up to 10 years imprisonment and a fine of up to 10,000,000 Iraqi Dinars ($7,600 USD). As religious figures play a prominent role in Iraq’s major political parties, banning criticism of them would severely limit people’s exercise of their right to freedom of expression. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), when a state party imposes restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself. The relation between right and restriction and between norm and exception must not be reversed. The draft law also allows the authorities to ban public gatherings unless prior permission is obtained from the authorities at least five days in advance. It does not state what criteria the Iraqi authorities would apply in approving or prohibiting protests, in effect giving them the power to ban all protests. In its authoritative interpretation of ICCPR Article 21 on freedom of assembly, the UN Human Rights Committee has stressed in its General Comment no. 37 that “having to apply for permission from the authorities undercuts the idea that peaceful assembly is a basic right” and that “where authorization regimes persist… they must in practice function as a system of notification, with authorization being granted as a matter of course, in the absence of compelling reasons to do otherwise.” Protesters in Iraq already face repression at the hands of security agencies and this risk is heightened anytime the authorities deem a protest to be “unauthorized,” since they regularly resort to the use of force to disperse such protests. Amnesty International has previously documented how, during the 2019 nationwide anti-government protests, at least 600 protesters were killed and thousands more injured after security forces resorted to the use of lethal force. Policing online freedom of expression The government re-introduced the draft Law on Cybercrimes to Parliament in November 2022. Under the vaguely worded proposed law, anyone found guilty of “inflaming sectarian tensions or strife” or “undermining the country’s independence, unity, and safety, or its supreme economic, political, military, or security interests” could face a sentence of up to life imprisonment and a fine of up to 50 million Iraqi Dinars (around $38,000 USD). “In April 2023, the Iraqi government reaffirmed its promise to Amnesty International to guarantee public freedoms, yet their actions in Parliament do not match up,” said Bissan Fakih, Regional Campaigner at Amnesty International.

Iraq Under The ‘Resistance’ Muqawama Militias

Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to Ekurd.net Encroachment on Kurdistan Iran has secured ultimate victory over Iraq since the Coordination Framework took power in Baghdad. With each fresh agreement signed with the puppet government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani Iran has gained increasing territorial access along with military and economic sway. Strategically, Iran’s focus is also on weakening the Iraqi Kurdish north at the same time as undermining Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. In north-western Iraq, via its militia proxies, Iran is securing its passage to Syria via Sinjar where the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) are also establishing a permanent base and another in Kirkuk. Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk all coming under the PMF The PMF (Hashd al-Sha’abi) now occupies the former presidential complex in Basra. It has taken over the Shaheed Martyr War Memorial complex in Baghdad with a huge garrison stationed opposite near the Army Canal and Ministry of Oil. In Kirkuk, since the violent change of control over the disputed territories and the redefining of the internal boundaries effected on 16 October 2017 (overseen by the late IRGC GF commander, Qasim Soleimani) several pro-Iran Hashd groups have established a permanent presence in Kirkuk. Their mandate includes active security duty in Kirkuk airport, and infiltration of the Kirkuk Governing Council. In August 2018, after the militias helped recover control over the internal boundaries with the KRG, Iran equipped them with short range ballistic missiles (200km-700 km range) and helped them to begin manufacture of missiles, overseen by Qasim Soleimani before his assassination of January 3, 2020 by the United States removed him from the game. Missile launchers had arrived soon after the missiles. According to reports by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) [1] and the International Crisis Group (ICG), the plants used to develop the missiles were situated in al-Zafaraniya, east of Baghdad, and Jurf al-Sakhar, north of Kerbala with an Iranian source claiming that there was also a factory in Iraqi Kurdistan. ICG stated that three sources said Iraqis had been trained in Iran as missile operators. [2] Iran has also provided them with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles, and MANPADS. [3] Strategic PMF military headquarters going up in Shoraw, Kirkuk The PMF is now intent upon the construction of a huge 60-hectare base in the Kurdish area of Shoraw on Highway 2. Town planning had previewed the use of the site for a public park but reportedly on July 4, 2023, a team of engineers attached to the PMF Operations Command surveyed the site for the construction of a militia military headquarters. The location was previously home to the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) Kirkuk base until the events of October 2017 drove the KDP out of Kirkuk and their base was ransacked. The Iraqi army then took it over. Diggers and loaders are said already to be working on laying the foundations at the site ignoring local objections, thousands of which have been received by Gaylan Qadir, a Kurdish lawmaker in the Iraqi parliament. The PMF military base would also lie just a hundred or so metres from the Kirkuk headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The PUK has long standing relations with the oldest of the militias like the Badr Organisation led by Hadi al-Ameri. The Shoraw district of Kirkuk lies immediately north of the Kurdish district of Rahim Awa and just east of the Baba Gurgur oil field and the K1 military base. Highway 2 then continues northwest to the internal border and major checkpoint between the Kurdish region and Iraq at Altun Kopru/Pirde where it dog legs to Erbil. This is the sensitive location where the Shi’a militias had tried to roll across into Erbil using US Abrams tanks during the takeover battles on the 16 October 2017. The PMF’s new Kirkuk base will therefore be strategically positioned for extended military control in all directions. Meanwhile, the PMF’s Iranian mentor is strenuously demanding the disarmament of the Iranian Kurdish opposition groups so long sheltering in Iraqi Kurdistan. According to Voice of America (VOA) Kurdish service a senior Komala leader commented that the head of the Asayish met a number of the Iranian Kurdish groups to discuss Iran’s demands and told them the KRG could not protect them. VOA also quoted the KRG’s Iran representative, Nadhim Dabagh, saying that these groups must limit their activities, as Iran no longer tolerates their presence”. This comes on the back of the drone and missile attacks on Erbil including against the opposition groups’ bases and family camps, including a strike against the PAK (Kurdistan Freedom Party) base at Pirde in January 2023. The signing between Tehran and Baghdad of a border security agreement on March 19, 2023, fielded by Ali Shamkani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and Qasim al-Araji in Baghdad, has further empowered Iran. Al-Araji had a follow-up meeting with Ali Akbar Ahmadian, his newly elected Iranian counterpart, [4] the KDP’s Minister of Interior, Rebar Ahmed, and the PUK’s head of Asayish, Hiwa Ahmed, whereby steps to disarming the Iranian Kurdish opposition and even potentially containing them in UNHCR-managed refugee camps were discussed, according to a Draw Media report at the time…[5] According to Iran state media, Ali Shamkani also said that this agreement would “have a decisive impact on reducing and managing the unwanted security challenges between the two states, which are caused due to the mischief of anti-Islamic establishment elements residing in Iraq’s Kurdistan region.” On November 29, 2022, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Iraq’s puppet prime minister, Mohammed al-Sudani in Tehran in the presence of Iranian prime minister, Ebrahim Reisi, how efforts to undermine Iran’s security were still happening in parts of Iraq. He added that one of vital things that are needed in order for Iraq to reach its true position is the solidarity and unity between the country’s internal groups. Another requirement for this progress is the maximum use of young, motivated Iraqi forces.” Khamenei also pointed out that there are “enemies who do not wish to see Iraq’s progress” saying, “Of course, some are hostile to Iraq’s progress. They may not express their enmity openly, but they do not respect Mr. al-Sudani’s government. You need to stand up firmly to the enemy’s plans by relying on the people and on the young, motivated forces who successfully countered the vast, deadly risk of the Daesh.” [6] That is an oblique reference to the PMF. The Supreme Leader went on to say that “the only solution is for the Iraqi central government to extend its authority to those areas as well…Iraq’s security is Iran’s security, in the same way that Iran’s security also has an effect on the security of Iraq”. [7] Tehran and Baghdad’s co-operation goes far beyond the terms of the security agreement. Plans exist to subjugate the Kurdistan region of Iraq economically and militarily. The Iran-backed militias have a serious role to play in implementing these plans. In the November meeting al-Sudani also honored the memory of Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhendis as ‘martyrs as “another example of the togetherness of the two nations.” Also, emphasizing his government’s determination to implement t the agreements and further expand their relations he said, “The security of Iran and Iraq are intertwined, and in accordance with the constitution, we will not allow anyone to use Iraqi soil to undermine this security.” [8] This includes Kurds of both Iraq and Iran, the Western powers that brought about regime change twenty years ago, and Israel. Ali Khameni had stressed “Of course, our view on the security of Iraq is that if any party intends to disrupt the country’s security, we will stand up firmly in front of any party seeking to undermine Iraq’s security.” [9] One the very same day his words were being followed in practice with further drone and missile attacks on the north. [10] The attacks came as mass demonstrations continued in protest against the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini and the hijab laws in Iran. The Tasnim news agency affiliated with the IRGC had said “In today’s operation, the base of a separatist terrorist group near Kirkuk, known as the Free Kurdistan Party, was targeted by missiles and kamikaze drones. Since November 14, the Revolutionary Guard had launched a new round of attacks against “separatist terrorists” in response to the group’s alleged anti-security actions in Iranian cities bordering Iraq. [11] Earlier, in September, some fourteen people had been killed around Erbil and Sulaimaniya with some 50 others injured. [12] That is Iranian ‘security’ at the expense of that of Kurdistan. Iranian state media reported the latest missiles in the arsenal of the country’s satellite-oriented missile system, the Fath 360 and Shahed-136 suicide drones such as have been exported from Iran to Russia for the ongoing war in Ukraine. As the militias have also now been equipped with medium range missiles inside Iraq, Kurdistan can be easily reached, not less by the simple rocket launchers moved to the outskirts of Erbil. Back in March 2022, such attacks had claimed to be focused on the Israeli presence in Erbil. [13] As part of Iran’s agreement with the al-Sudani Coordination Framework government, Iran gets to dictate the targets and the timing. The PMF’s new headquarters in Kirkuk can be seen as part of the border security agreement. Independent Iraqi news outlet Nas News reported that an Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry delegation traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan to follow up on the status of the border security agreement signed between Iraq and Iran. [14] The militias have also attacked Kurdistan’s oil and gas sector. Spokesman claims the current suspension of oil transport from the region owes to ‘technical difficulties’. These measures could soon bankrupt the Kurdistan region’s corrupt rulers. [15] Old friends are pulling out. The blocking of Kurdistan’s oil exports had already cost the region losses of 2 billion dollars by June 2023 Erdogan’s Turkey stopped Iraq’s exports of 450,000 barrels per day through the pipeline that extends from Kurdistan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on March 25, 2023, after an arbitration decision issued by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) obliged Turkey to repay Baghdad $1.5 billion in compensation for damages caused by the KRG’s independent export of oil without permission from the federal government in Baghdad between 2014 and 2018. The more than 100 days halt has cost the KRG more than $2 billion, a figure that Reuters reported. While the KRG economy shrinks the PMF’s budget gets a huge boost from al-Sudani. The KRG is being forced to accept just 12.67 percent of the budget of 153 billion dollars approved by the new government early in June. [16] The PMF’s budget by contrast is now close to that of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense Personnel. [17] The militia umbrella is closely modelled on the IRGC that originally trained many of its brigades. The 2023 budget share is said to be 2.8 billion dollars, a 600 million increase on the 2021 budget to double their personnel and their expenses despite ISIS being effectively crushed. Of the official 67 battalions 43 are said to be directly accountable and loyal to Iran. Al Sudani’s government is seeing through a budget increase for 238,000 militia fighters to be registered on its payroll. The KRG’s share is tiny in comparison. The so-called resistance government (Muqwama) like that of Hezbollah in Lebanon has serious control over the state’s finances. The Washington Institute’s Michael Knights noted: The force’s budget is also growing, albeit not as fast as its membership. From $2.16 billion in the 2021 budget, it will rise to $2.6 billion in the 2023-2025 budget, a 23% increase. [18] What are all these men under arms to focus their energy upon with ISIS routed? PMF Chairman, Faleh al-Fayed, has also announced a Service and Retirement Law for the PMF’s registered personnel enabling them to take pensions in the long term. Knights observed: In al-Fayed’s May 25 remarks: ‘’PMF fighters will be called Jihadist under the new law…PMF will be one of the state’s institutions that doesn’t lose its Jihadist description or its religious background.’’ Another interpretation is that the PMF wants a separate and more privileged status than other security forces in its service and retirement regulations, similar to how it has developed a separate military justice system to screen its members from external accountability.”19 Al-Fayyadh is linked with serious human rights abuses committed against protestors during the peak of the Tishreen revolt and on January 8, 2021, was made subject to US sanctions. [20] Iran’s anti-Israel policy implemented in Iraq Relations with Israel have also been prohibited and at the beginning of Ramadan this year coinciding with Kurdish New Year on 21 March, a Russian-Israeli researcher was kidnapped from Karada in Baghdad. Elizabeth Tsurkov is still being held but the Iraqi government has made no coherent or useful statements about her whereabouts. [21] Some reports claim she was taken by Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) [22] yet others by an Iranian agent. Israel is blaming Iran. Sharq al-Awsat suggests she is a bargaining chip for an IRGC operative detained by Israel, Shahbazi Abbasailo in June. [23] Al Sudani’s government spokesman, Basim al-Awadi, made the same sort of weak announcement on al-Ahd, a PMF platform with satellite TV, controlled by Asa’ib ahl al-Haq and based in Karada [24], as was made over the heist of 2.5. billion dollars from an Iraqi tax office by state agents. That investigation has also yielded little. Opponents of the CF have been named in four recent arrest warrants, all of whom are outside Iraq and include corruption critic former Finance Minister Ali al-Allawi, Raed Jouhi, Ahmad Najati and Mushrik Abbas. It appears convenient political scapegoating rather than anything else. [25] Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s government had tried to rein in the militias and are now paying the price. [26] Al-Sudani’s Iran puppet government has now tried to send al-Kadhimi’s anti-corruption committee, “Committee 29” to stand trial for human rights abuses. Al Kadhimi tweeted in response that it was a witch-hunt against the former administration he had led including in bullet point 3 the following rebuttal: “The recent allegations for arrest warrants are selectively focused on close members of the Kadhimi government and office officials who uncovered the wrongdoing. Yet, they are made to be scapegoats with no evidence of involvement or wrongdoing in order to distract attention away from actual culprits.” Muhandis General Company: the equivalent of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbia owned by the IRGC Meanwhile, the PMF has been assisted by al-Sudani’s government to finally launch the Muhandis General Company named after Abu Mahdi al-Muhendes. Knights observed in the paper concerning the expansion of the PMF and its budget: Abbas al-Zamili, the head of the Badr Organization’s parliamentary bloc, revealed on May 22 that 400 billion Iraqi dinar ($305 million) had been “added to the investment budget of the PMF’’ for use by its new Muhandis General Company…. A day later, government spokesperson Basim al-Awadi announced that the Council of Ministers had voted to authorize a 1.5 billion dinar ($1.2 million) “Secret Expenses for PMF” fund—a privilege previously extended to just one organization, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service.” [27] In the model of the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbia or Khorb, the Muhandis General Company will obtain privileged access to state contracts, equipment and land. Mustafa al-Kadhimi had reportedly been offered a second term in office if he agreed to authorise the PMF owned construction component but he refused. Mohammed al-Sudani got the job and soon rolled over. [28] In April al-Sudani also gave PMF chair al-Fayyadh authority to set up a PMF allied brigade in Sinjar. [29] 1 https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-proxy-irans-growing-footprint-middle-east 2 https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-usisrael-trigger-list/flashpoints/iraq 3 https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-proxy-irans-growing-footprint-middle-east 4 https://english.khamenei.ir/news/9793/Appointment-of-Mr-Ahmadian-as-Leader-s-representative-in-Iran-s 5 https://nrtenglish.com/2023/06/14/live-salaries-delayed-as-krg-oil-losses-reach-2b/ 6 https://english.khamenei.ir/news/9325/Iran-is-standing-up-firmly-to-safeguard-Iraq-s-security 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, Khamenei.ir 9 Ibid. 10 https://www.iranintl.com/en/202211229465 11 Ibid 12 https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/28092022 13 https://www.newarab.com/analysis/whats-behind-irans-missile-strikes-erbil 14 https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-17-2023#_ednbfa3e2d8df781a536a233cf08260bff54 15 https://www.zawya.com/en/projects/oil-and-gas/attacks-on-major-iraqi-gasfield-drive-out-us-contractors-uo4rnw5b 16 https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq/2-billion-losses-inflicted-on-iraqi-kurdistan-due-oil-exports-halt/ 17 https://www.mei.edu/blog/monday-briefing-iraq-passes-massive-controversial-budget-bill 18 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/extraordinary-popular-mobilization-force-expansion-numbers 19 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/extraordinary-popular-mobilization-force-expansion-numbers 20 Al-Fayyadh was part of a crisis cell comprised primarily of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militia leaders formed in late 2019 to suppress the Iraqi protests with the support of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Other cell members included militia leaders (of AAH) Qais al-Khazali and Hussein Falah al-Lami and the late Qasim Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhendis. Until July 2020, al-Fayyadh was the Iraqi PM’s National Security Advisor. See full text athttps://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1231 21 https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/1688722904-iraqi-government-investigating-case-of-israeli-russian-elizabeth-tsurkov 22 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/militia-propagandists-comment-tsurkov-kidnapping 23 https://fr.timesofisrael.com/liran-serait-responsable-de-lenlevement-delizabeth-tsurkov-media/ 24 See details at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-al-ahd-satellite-television 25 https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/iraq/2023/03/04/iraq-issues-arrest-warrants-over-25bn-heist-of-the-century/ 26 https://twitter.com/MAKadhimi/status/1632118147833528323…. 27 (See. Figures 3 and 4). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/extraordinary-popular-mobilization-force-expansion-numbers 28 “Land grants have now begun to flow to the company without a clear legal mechanism. As the parcels far outstrip the requirements of real projects—for example, Iraq’s largest dairy farm involves no more than 36,000 donums, not 2 million—muqawama leaders seem to have identified tree planting as a supposed justification for transferring a staggering 9 percent of al-Muthanna province’s entire land mass. Yet the area chosen does not make much sense for such a project: it lacks sufficient water for the mass growing of palm and jojoba trees, and far more viable options exist between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Tellingly, however, the area in question is strategically located on the border with Saudi Arabia. In 2021-22, Iraqi militias launched drones into Saudi territory and the United Arab Emirates from this area.” https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muhandis-company-iraqs-khatam-al-anbia 29 https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-17-2023#_ednbfa3e2d8df781a536a233cf08260bff52