Sheri Laizer | Exclusive to Ekurd.net

Encroachment on Kurdistan

Iran has secured ultimate victory over Iraq since the Coordination Framework took power in Baghdad. With each fresh agreement signed with the puppet government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani Iran has gained increasing territorial access along with military and economic sway. Strategically, Iran’s focus is also on weakening the Iraqi Kurdish north at the same time as undermining Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. In north-western Iraq, via its militia proxies, Iran is securing its passage to Syria via Sinjar where the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) are also establishing a permanent base and another in Kirkuk.

Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk all coming under the PMF

The PMF (Hashd al-Sha’abi) now occupies the former presidential complex in Basra. It has taken over the Shaheed Martyr War Memorial complex in Baghdad with a huge garrison stationed opposite near the Army Canal and Ministry of Oil. In Kirkuk, since the violent change of control over the disputed territories and the redefining of the internal boundaries effected on 16 October 2017 (overseen by the late IRGC GF commander, Qasim Soleimani) several pro-Iran Hashd groups have established a permanent presence in Kirkuk. Their mandate includes active security duty in Kirkuk airport, and infiltration of the Kirkuk Governing Council.

In August 2018, after the militias helped recover control over the internal boundaries with the KRG, Iran equipped them with short range ballistic missiles (200km-700 km range) and helped them to begin manufacture of missiles, overseen by Qasim Soleimani before his assassination of January 3, 2020 by the United States removed him from the game. Missile launchers had arrived soon after the missiles. According to reports by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) [1] and the International Crisis Group (ICG), the plants used to develop the missiles were situated in al-Zafaraniya, east of Baghdad, and Jurf al-Sakhar, north of Kerbala with an Iranian source claiming that there was also a factory in Iraqi Kurdistan. ICG stated that three sources said Iraqis had been trained in Iran as missile operators. [2] Iran has also provided them with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles, and MANPADS. [3]

Strategic PMF military headquarters going up in Shoraw, Kirkuk

The PMF is now intent upon the construction of a huge 60-hectare base in the Kurdish area of Shoraw on Highway 2. Town planning had previewed the use of the site for a public park but reportedly on July 4, 2023, a team of engineers attached to the PMF Operations Command surveyed the site for the construction of a militia military headquarters. The location was previously home to the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) Kirkuk base until the events of October 2017 drove the KDP out of Kirkuk and their base was ransacked. The Iraqi army then took it over.

Diggers and loaders are said already to be working on laying the foundations at the site ignoring local objections, thousands of which have been received by Gaylan Qadir, a Kurdish lawmaker in the Iraqi parliament. The PMF military base would also lie just a hundred or so metres from the Kirkuk headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The PUK has long standing relations with the oldest of the militias like the Badr Organisation led by Hadi al-Ameri.

The Shoraw district of Kirkuk lies immediately north of the Kurdish district of Rahim Awa and just east of the Baba Gurgur oil field and the K1 military base. Highway 2 then continues northwest to the internal border and major checkpoint between the Kurdish region and Iraq at Altun Kopru/Pirde where it dog legs to Erbil. This is the sensitive location where the Shi’a militias had tried to roll across into Erbil using US Abrams tanks during the takeover battles on the 16 October 2017.

The PMF’s new Kirkuk base will therefore be strategically positioned for extended military control in all directions.

Meanwhile, the PMF’s Iranian mentor is strenuously demanding the disarmament of the Iranian Kurdish opposition groups so long sheltering in Iraqi Kurdistan.

According to Voice of America (VOA) Kurdish service a senior Komala leader commented that the head of the Asayish met a number of the Iranian Kurdish groups to discuss Iran’s demands and told them the KRG could not protect them. VOA also quoted the KRG’s Iran representative, Nadhim Dabagh, saying that these groups must limit their activities, as Iran no longer tolerates their presence”.

This comes on the back of the drone and missile attacks on Erbil including against the opposition groups’ bases and family camps, including a strike against the PAK (Kurdistan Freedom Party) base at Pirde in January 2023.

The signing between Tehran and Baghdad of a border security agreement on March 19, 2023, fielded by Ali Shamkani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and Qasim al-Araji in Baghdad, has further empowered Iran.

Al-Araji had a follow-up meeting with Ali Akbar Ahmadian, his newly elected Iranian counterpart, [4] the KDP’s Minister of Interior, Rebar Ahmed, and the PUK’s head of Asayish, Hiwa Ahmed, whereby steps to disarming the Iranian Kurdish opposition and even potentially containing them in UNHCR-managed refugee camps were discussed, according to a Draw Media report at the time…[5]

According to Iran state media, Ali Shamkani also said that this agreement would “have a decisive impact on reducing and managing the unwanted security challenges between the two states, which are caused due to the mischief of anti-Islamic establishment elements residing in Iraq’s Kurdistan region.”

On November 29, 2022, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Iraq’s puppet prime minister, Mohammed al-Sudani in Tehran in the presence of Iranian prime minister, Ebrahim Reisi, how efforts to undermine Iran’s security were still happening in parts of Iraq. He added that one of vital things that are needed in order for Iraq to reach its true position is the solidarity and unity between the country’s internal groups. Another requirement for this progress is the maximum use of young, motivated Iraqi forces.”

Khamenei also pointed out that there are “enemies who do not wish to see Iraq’s progress” saying, “Of course, some are hostile to Iraq’s progress. They may not express their enmity openly, but they do not respect Mr. al-Sudani’s government. You need to stand up firmly to the enemy’s plans by relying on the people and on the young, motivated forces who successfully countered the vast, deadly risk of the Daesh.” [6]

That is an oblique reference to the PMF.

The Supreme Leader went on to say that “the only solution is for the Iraqi central government to extend its authority to those areas as well…Iraq’s security is Iran’s security, in the same way that Iran’s security also has an effect on the security of Iraq”. [7]

Tehran and Baghdad’s co-operation goes far beyond the terms of the security agreement. Plans exist to subjugate the Kurdistan region of Iraq economically and militarily. The Iran-backed militias have a serious role to play in implementing these plans.

In the November meeting al-Sudani also honored the memory of Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhendis as ‘martyrs as “another example of the togetherness of the two nations.” Also, emphasizing his government’s determination to implement t the agreements and further expand their relations he said, “The security of Iran and Iraq are intertwined, and in accordance with the constitution, we will not allow anyone to use Iraqi soil to undermine this security.” [8]

This includes Kurds of both Iraq and Iran, the Western powers that brought about regime change twenty years ago, and Israel. Ali Khameni had stressed “Of course, our view on the security of Iraq is that if any party intends to disrupt the country’s security, we will stand up firmly in front of any party seeking to undermine Iraq’s security.” [9]

One the very same day his words were being followed in practice with further drone and missile attacks on the north. [10] The attacks came as mass demonstrations continued in protest against the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini and the hijab laws in Iran. The Tasnim news agency affiliated with the IRGC had said “In today’s operation, the base of a separatist terrorist group near Kirkuk, known as the Free Kurdistan Party, was targeted by missiles and kamikaze drones. Since November 14, the Revolutionary Guard had launched a new round of attacks against “separatist terrorists” in response to the group’s alleged anti-security actions in Iranian cities bordering Iraq. [11] Earlier, in September, some fourteen people had been killed around Erbil and Sulaimaniya with some 50 others injured. [12]

That is Iranian ‘security’ at the expense of that of Kurdistan. Iranian state media reported the latest missiles in the arsenal of the country’s satellite-oriented missile system, the Fath 360 and Shahed-136 suicide drones such as have been exported from Iran to Russia for the ongoing war in Ukraine.

As the militias have also now been equipped with medium range missiles inside Iraq, Kurdistan can be easily reached, not less by the simple rocket launchers moved to the outskirts of Erbil. Back in March 2022, such attacks had claimed to be focused on the Israeli presence in Erbil. [13]

As part of Iran’s agreement with the al-Sudani Coordination Framework government, Iran gets to dictate the targets and the timing. The PMF’s new headquarters in Kirkuk can be seen as part of the border security agreement. Independent Iraqi news outlet Nas News reported that an Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry delegation traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan to follow up on the status of the border security agreement signed between Iraq and Iran. [14]

The militias have also attacked Kurdistan’s oil and gas sector. Spokesman claims the current suspension of oil transport from the region owes to ‘technical difficulties’. These measures could soon bankrupt the Kurdistan region’s corrupt rulers. [15] Old friends are pulling out.

The blocking of Kurdistan’s oil exports had already cost the region losses of 2 billion dollars by June 2023

Erdogan’s Turkey stopped Iraq’s exports of 450,000 barrels per day through the pipeline that extends from Kurdistan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on March 25, 2023, after an arbitration decision issued by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) obliged Turkey to repay Baghdad $1.5 billion in compensation for damages caused by the KRG’s independent export of oil without permission from the federal government in Baghdad between 2014 and 2018. The more than 100 days halt has cost the KRG more than $2 billion, a figure that Reuters reported. While the KRG economy shrinks the PMF’s budget gets a huge boost from al-Sudani. The KRG is being forced to accept just 12.67 percent of the budget of 153 billion dollars approved by the new government early in June. [16]

The PMF’s budget by contrast is now close to that of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense Personnel. [17] The militia umbrella is closely modelled on the IRGC that originally trained many of its brigades. The 2023 budget share is said to be 2.8 billion dollars, a 600 million increase on the 2021 budget to double their personnel and their expenses despite ISIS being effectively crushed. Of the official 67 battalions 43 are said to be directly accountable and loyal to Iran.

Al Sudani’s government is seeing through a budget increase for 238,000 militia fighters to be registered on its payroll. The KRG’s share is tiny in comparison.

The so-called resistance government (Muqwama) like that of Hezbollah in Lebanon has serious control over the state’s finances. The Washington Institute’s Michael Knights noted: The force’s budget is also growing, albeit not as fast as its membership. From $2.16 billion in the 2021 budget, it will rise to $2.6 billion in the 2023-2025 budget, a 23% increase. [18]

What are all these men under arms to focus their energy upon with ISIS routed? PMF Chairman, Faleh al-Fayed, has also announced a Service and Retirement Law for the PMF’s registered personnel enabling them to take pensions in the long term. Knights observed: In al-Fayed’s May 25 remarks: ‘’PMF fighters will be called Jihadist under the new law…PMF will be one of the state’s institutions that doesn’t lose its Jihadist description or its religious background.’’ Another interpretation is that the PMF wants a separate and more privileged status than other security forces in its service and retirement regulations, similar to how it has developed a separate military justice system to screen its members from external accountability.”19

Al-Fayyadh is linked with serious human rights abuses committed against protestors during the peak of the Tishreen revolt and on January 8, 2021, was made subject to US sanctions. [20]

Iran’s anti-Israel policy implemented in Iraq

Relations with Israel have also been prohibited and at the beginning of Ramadan this year coinciding with Kurdish New Year on 21 March, a Russian-Israeli researcher was kidnapped from Karada in Baghdad. Elizabeth Tsurkov is still being held but the Iraqi government has made no coherent or useful statements about her whereabouts. [21] Some reports claim she was taken by Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) [22] yet others by an Iranian agent. Israel is blaming Iran. Sharq al-Awsat suggests she is a bargaining chip for an IRGC operative detained by Israel, Shahbazi Abbasailo in June. [23]

Al Sudani’s government spokesman, Basim al-Awadi, made the same sort of weak announcement on al-Ahd, a PMF platform with satellite TV, controlled by Asa’ib ahl al-Haq and based in Karada [24], as was made over the heist of 2.5. billion dollars from an Iraqi tax office by state agents. That investigation has also yielded little. Opponents of the CF have been named in four recent arrest warrants, all of whom are outside Iraq and include corruption critic former Finance Minister Ali al-Allawi, Raed Jouhi, Ahmad Najati and Mushrik Abbas. It appears convenient political scapegoating rather than anything else. [25] Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s government had tried to rein in the militias and are now paying the price. [26]

Al-Sudani’s Iran puppet government has now tried to send al-Kadhimi’s anti-corruption committee, “Committee 29” to stand trial for human rights abuses. Al Kadhimi tweeted in response that it was a witch-hunt against the former administration he had led including in bullet point 3 the following rebuttal: “The recent allegations for arrest warrants are selectively focused on close members of the Kadhimi government and office officials who uncovered the wrongdoing. Yet, they are made to be scapegoats with no evidence of involvement or wrongdoing in order to distract attention away from actual culprits.”

Muhandis General Company: the equivalent of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbia owned by the IRGC

Meanwhile, the PMF has been assisted by al-Sudani’s government to finally launch the Muhandis General Company named after Abu Mahdi al-Muhendes. Knights observed in the paper concerning the expansion of the PMF and its budget: Abbas al-Zamili, the head of the Badr Organization’s parliamentary bloc, revealed on May 22 that 400 billion Iraqi dinar ($305 million) had been “added to the investment budget of the PMF’’ for use by its new Muhandis General Company…. A day later, government spokesperson Basim al-Awadi announced that the Council of Ministers had voted to authorize a 1.5 billion dinar ($1.2 million) “Secret Expenses for PMF” fund—a privilege previously extended to just one organization, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service.” [27]

In the model of the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbia or Khorb, the Muhandis General Company will obtain privileged access to state contracts, equipment and land. Mustafa al-Kadhimi had reportedly been offered a second term in office if he agreed to authorise the PMF owned construction component but he refused.

Mohammed al-Sudani got the job and soon rolled over. [28] In April al-Sudani also gave PMF chair al-Fayyadh authority to set up a PMF allied brigade in Sinjar. [29]

1 https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-proxy-irans-growing-footprint-middle-east
2 https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-usisrael-trigger-list/flashpoints/iraq
3 https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-proxy-irans-growing-footprint-middle-east
4 https://english.khamenei.ir/news/9793/Appointment-of-Mr-Ahmadian-as-Leader-s-representative-in-Iran-s
5 https://nrtenglish.com/2023/06/14/live-salaries-delayed-as-krg-oil-losses-reach-2b/
6 https://english.khamenei.ir/news/9325/Iran-is-standing-up-firmly-to-safeguard-Iraq-s-security
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid, Khamenei.ir
9 Ibid.
10 https://www.iranintl.com/en/202211229465
11 Ibid
12 https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/28092022
13 https://www.newarab.com/analysis/whats-behind-irans-missile-strikes-erbil
14 https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-17-2023#_ednbfa3e2d8df781a536a233cf08260bff54
15 https://www.zawya.com/en/projects/oil-and-gas/attacks-on-major-iraqi-gasfield-drive-out-us-contractors-uo4rnw5b
16 https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq/2-billion-losses-inflicted-on-iraqi-kurdistan-due-oil-exports-halt/
17 https://www.mei.edu/blog/monday-briefing-iraq-passes-massive-controversial-budget-bill
18 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/extraordinary-popular-mobilization-force-expansion-numbers
19 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/extraordinary-popular-mobilization-force-expansion-numbers
20 Al-Fayyadh was part of a crisis cell comprised primarily of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militia leaders formed in late 2019 to suppress the Iraqi protests with the support of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Other cell members included militia leaders (of AAH) Qais al-Khazali and Hussein Falah al-Lami and the late Qasim Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhendis. Until July 2020, al-Fayyadh was the Iraqi PM’s National Security Advisor. See full text athttps://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1231
21 https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/1688722904-iraqi-government-investigating-case-of-israeli-russian-elizabeth-tsurkov
22 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/militia-propagandists-comment-tsurkov-kidnapping
23 https://fr.timesofisrael.com/liran-serait-responsable-de-lenlevement-delizabeth-tsurkov-media/
24 See details at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-al-ahd-satellite-television
25 https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/iraq/2023/03/04/iraq-issues-arrest-warrants-over-25bn-heist-of-the-century/
26 https://twitter.com/MAKadhimi/status/1632118147833528323….
27 (See. Figures 3 and 4). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/extraordinary-popular-mobilization-force-expansion-numbers
28 “Land grants have now begun to flow to the company without a clear legal mechanism. As the parcels far outstrip the requirements of real projects—for example, Iraq’s largest dairy farm involves no more than 36,000 donums, not 2 million—muqawama leaders seem to have identified tree planting as a supposed justification for transferring a staggering 9 percent of al-Muthanna province’s entire land mass. Yet the area chosen does not make much sense for such a project: it lacks sufficient water for the mass growing of palm and jojoba trees, and far more viable options exist between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Tellingly, however, the area in question is strategically located on the border with Saudi Arabia. In 2021-22, Iraqi militias launched drones into Saudi territory and the United Arab Emirates from this area.” https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muhandis-company-iraqs-khatam-al-anbia
29 https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-17-2023#_ednbfa3e2d8df781a536a233cf08260bff52