A major challenge to the peace process involves the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish forces in Syria

By  Kawa Hassan

Stimson Center

Middle East & North Africa

Attempting to end the 40-year war between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Devlet Bacheli, the leader of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), issued a surprise recommendation in October 2024 to parole long-jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan — if the PKK dissolved itself and renounced violence. In response, on February 27, Ocalan called on the guerrilla movement he established in 1978 to end armed struggle and disband.

In May, the PKK held an extraordinary congress at its headquarters in Qandil in Iraqi Kurdistan and on May 12, announced its dissolvement. The congress stated that the party had “achieved its historic mission” as it brought recognition of the Kurds and promoted “a democratic solution of the Kurdish issue [in Turkey].” On July 11, some 30 PKK commanders and cadres symbolically burned their weapons at a ceremony in Iraqi Kurdistan attended by Turkish and Iraqi officials and international experts.

The success of the peace process is far from guaranteed. But if it leads to the end of violence and gradual recognition of Kurdish rights by Turkey, it could provide a wider path for conflict resolution in a region ravaged by zero-sum wars.

Multiple developments are behind this initiative. The Kurdish electorate is an increasingly important factor in internal Turkish politics. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is seeking a new term in 2028, needs Kurdish votes to strengthen his position. Meanwhile, the Israeli response to Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack is transforming the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Israeli attacks against enemies have sent shock waves across the region. Erdogan and Bacheli have strongly criticized Israel, with the latter asserting that Turkey — long a critic of Israeli policies toward the Palestinians — is the “final target” of Israel’s regional strategy. The effort to resolve the conflict with the PKK can be seen in part as an attempt to prevent Israeli exploitation of the Kurdish issue.

For its part, the PKK’s armed struggle ran its course years ago. Salim Çevik, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, told this author that Ocalan realized as early as 1993 that he could not defeat the Turkish state. Turkish military advancements including drone warfare have severely weakened PKK capacity inside Turkey. While the group retains regional influence through affiliated groups in Syria, Iran, and among the diaspora in Europe, its military impact has drastically diminished. A Kurdish analyst who is familiar with the PKK’s history and wished to remain anonymous said that the Israeli decapitation of Hamas and Hezbollah had further persuaded the PKK leadership that the era of armed struggle has ended and a new strategy is needed.

Despite these hopeful signs, the prospects of a lasting deal remain uncertain. Polls suggest that most Turks oppose releasing Ocalan or giving him a prominent role in negotiations. The two sides hold two opposing narratives regarding both the problem and its solution.

Joost Jongerden, an Associate Professor at Wageningen University who has studied the Kurdish issue in Turkey, said in an interview with the author that the Turkish state frames the problem as one of “terrorism” and “weapons” and talks of the need for a terror-free Turkey. The PKK sees the armed struggle as the outcome of the denial of political and cultural rights to Kurds, who make up about a fifth of Turkey’s population. Ocalan frames the process as an attempt to establish “peace and a democratic society.” 

Developments of the last few months show the process is moving, albeit slowly.

Özge Genç, a fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, a Qatar-based research organization, who visited Turkey recently told the author that there is significant support for the process in Ankara, particularly among high-level bureaucrats. Their view, she said, is that the ambitions of external powers to remake the region compel a fresh approach so that the Kurdish issue cannot be exploited.

According to this analysis, Ocalan, who has been jailed since 1999, is the only leader with leverage to disband the PKK.

In return, the Turkish state should enact laws that lead to the reintegration of PKK militants, said Urko Aiartza Azurtza, a senior advisor at the European Institute of Peace who attended the burning of weapons ceremony in Iraqi Kurdistan.

So far, officials have not addressed constitutional revisions that would grant Kurds cultural, linguistic, and political rights. According to Özge Genç, these issues will be dealt with in future stages, which could facilitate the disarmament process but also make it more fragile. Cengiz Çandar, a member of the pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), told the author that it will take time before these constitutional changes are adopted.

Turkish and Syrian Peace Processes are Intertwined  

A major challenge to the current process involves the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Kurdish forces in Syria, within a post-Assad Syrian state. According to Salim Çevik, the Turkish and Syrian peace processes are so intertwined that they will succeed or collapse together.

Recently the PKK moved an undisclosed number of fighters from Turkey to Iraqi Kurdistan. According to Özge Genç, this was a PKK confidence-building measure meant to reassure Turkish public opinion and to enable the Turkish state to justify passing a law allowing the return of PKK militants and changes in the penal code supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration into Turkish society.

Mohammed Amin Penjweni, a veteran Iraqi Kurdish politician who is close to the PKK leadership, told this author that he is cautiously optimistic because Bacheli, who fiercely opposed previous initiatives, started this process.

Parliament members from the MHP, Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and DEM attended a landmark meeting with Ocalan on November 24 where, according to a report by the pro-Kurdish website Mesopotamia, Ocalan reiterated the centrality of a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue and the importance of a March 10 agreement between the SDF and Damascus that calls for the integration of SDF-controlled entities into Syrian state institutions, recognizes Kurds as an integral part of Syrian society for the first time, and authorizes the return of displaced people including Kurds to their places of origin. He also reportedly said there would be no integration of the SDF into a new Syrian army without democracy.

In an interview with WelatTV, a Kurdish expert said Mazlum Abdi, the SDF commander, and Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of foreign relations of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the SDF’s political wing, will meet Ocalan in January to reach an agreement that will complement the March 10 understanding. Turkey would then release Ocalan into house arrest and pass new laws enshrining Kurdish rights and amnesty for PKK members. The author could not verify this information. However, last month Abdi expressed his willingness to visit Turkey and meet Ocalan in order to help implement the March agreement. Highlighting the link between the situation in Northeast Syria and the peace process in Turkey, he said that a ceasefire between the SDF and the Turkish army was holding thanks to the negotiations between Turkey and Ocalan. An expert in Northeast Syria who wished to remain anonymous said that Abdi and Ahmad had already had a video call with Ocalan under the supervision of Turkish authorities, but no details were available about what was discussed.

Despite being in prison for decades, Ocalan remains a charismatic leader, and Turkey has a unique opportunity to reach a historic agreement with the PKK while Ocalan, 77, is alive. If the process is successful, history will remember Ocalan for both founding and disbanding the PKK, substituting armed struggle with soft power through engagement in democratic, peaceful politics.

A recent Reuters report gained access to the transcript of a video call between Ocalan and PKK leaders in Iraqi Kurdistan in May. PKK commanders reportedly voiced suspicions about the seriousness of the Turkish government to implement reforms but acknowledged Ocalan’s leadership and agreed to disarm.

Some analysts view Ocalan’s decision to disband the PKK as a recognition that he and his comrades “threw their lives away in vain.” But for many Kurds who are tired of decades of war and destruction, the PKK action reflects Kurdish success and agency in pushing Turkey to accept Kurdish reality.

More than 40,000 people have died in the war between Turkey and the PKK. The war also led to hundreds of deaths and destruction of environment and livelihoods in Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurds in Iraq hope a successful peace process will lead to the end of fighting between the Turkish Army and the PKK so they can start reconstruction and development of the destroyed territories. However, if the PKK leaves Qandil, it remains unclear who would control this strategic mountain and whether it will become the object of a power struggle between rival Iraqi Kurdish parties.

Syrian Kurds emphasize the need for self-protection against Islamist factions in the post-Assad army as well as the uncertain future of Syria’s transition and the lack of constitutional guarantees of Kurdish rights and the nature of Kurdish integration into the Syrian state. Due to these factors, Ocalan reportedly told Kurdish politicians that the future of Syrian Kurdistan is a red line for him. Shocked by the massacres of Alawites in coastal areas in March and in the southern province of Suwayada, as well as sectarian incitement against Kurds, even some Syrian Kurdish opponents of the SDF have rejected calls for the organization to disarm, according to a Syrian Kurd who is critical of the PKK and SDF and asked to remain anonymous.

Should the situation in Northeast Syria deteriorate into a new war, Kurds throughout the region are likely to mobilize, increasing instability and producing new waves of refugees as well as dooming the PKK-Turkey talks. The killing of three Americans on December 13 in central Syria by an ISIS gunman could increase pressure on the Trump administration to withdraw its small force from Syria, further threatening the Kurds and the U.S. partnership with the SDF. At the same time, the U.S. is the only power with strong relations with and leverage over Turkey, the new Syrian government, and the SDF.

Given the Jihadi Salafi roots of the new rulers of Syria and the secular nature of Kurdish society, Syrian Kurds are well suited to partner with other minority communities who share their vision of a united, decentralized, non-sectarian Syrian state.  However, regional and international players appear to support consolidation of the interim Syrian government despite its lack of a truly inclusive national dialogue. These actors appear more concerned with blunting Iranian influence, repatriating Syrian refugees, and gaining reconstruction contracts. However, the only way to reunite the country is through decentralization — or violent repression. Therefore, regional and international actors should exert pressure on the interim government to initiate a meaningful, inclusive dialogue, including with Syrian Kurds. This way, Kurdish soft power could play a historic role in building an inclusive, post-Assad Syrian state.

Kurdish Paradox: Remarkable Resilience, Destructive Disunity

Over the past hundred years, Kurds — the world’s largest ethnic group without its own nation-state — have shown remarkable resilience in resisting repression and even genocide. But deep divisions have prevented the emergence of a common vision and led to internecine fights among Kurdish political parties in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. 

Iraqi Kurdistan held parliamentary elections in October 2024, but the two main parties have yet to form a government due to disagreements over cabinet posts. Drone and missile attacks against critical oil and gas infrastructure by Iran and Iranian proxies have further exposed the vulnerability of the Kurdistan region in Iraq and weakened the power of the regional government vis-à-vis Baghdad.

The Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga played a key role in the fight against ISIS 10 years ago but lack of political will in the two ruling parties to unify their forces damages the soft power and agency of Iraqi Kurds.

During the Syrian civil war, Kurdish forces performed an existential role in protecting their areas from the Assad regime, Islamist opposition groups, and ISIS. While the Kurdish-led autonomous administration shares power in relation to local services, meaningful decision making also remains in SDF hands, as Rana Khalaf, a fellow with the Center for Syria Studies at the University of St. Andrews, told the author.

Ocalan’s decision to disband the PKK is a once in a century opportunity to bring peace to Turkey and address the Kurdish question. However, success is far from guaranteed.

As sub-state actors, Kurds can capitalize on the opportunities generated by post-October 7 dynamics to advance their rights and contribute to regional stability and security. The events that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 are a case in point. The US-led operation liberated Kuwait and obliterated the Iraqi army. Kurds rose up against Saddam Hussein and saw their uprising initially crushed, but international outcry over the suffering of Kurdish refugees led to Western humanitarian intervention and ultimately the establishment of no-fly zone and Kurdish self-governance.  

The Syrian uprising of 2011 and the war against ISIS were also watershed events. Thanks to the PKK’s military experience and networks in Kurdish-majority areas in Syria, Kurdish forces supported by the U.S. proved to be an organized and disciplined force that fought and helped defeat ISIS.

Given the geopolitical importance of various parts of Kurdistan, Kurdish political and social agency could be a force for regional stability and security. But to have this impact, Kurdish administrations in Iraq and Syria need to provide a peaceful and inclusive governance model for themselves and other communities.

Kurdish leaders have a historic responsibility to develop and implement a pragmatic strategy that strikes a delicate balance between maximalist demands and a step-by-step solution of the Kurdish question in the countries where 30-40 million Kurds live, and the U.S., Europe, and regional states have a strategic interest in supporting the peace process in Turkey and helping to find common ground between Damascus and the SDF on the implementation of the March 10 agreement.