Does Arming the PKK Extend to PJAK?
Why Is Turkey Silent on PJAK?

Analytical Report by Hemn Khoshnaw

As discussions around the dissolution and disarmament of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) gain momentum, a critical question remains unanswered: What is the future of the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK)? Notably, Turkey has maintained a conspicuous silence on this issue.

Despite being a significant actor in the Kurdish militant landscape, PJAK appears absent from the agendas of Turkish, Iranian, regional, and international stakeholders. This silence raises questions about whether the group is being deliberately overlooked or strategically sidelined.

PJAK, widely regarded as the Iranian and East Kurdistan wing of the PKK, was officially founded on April 4, 2004. The organization maintains its own armed forces under the banner of the East Kurdistan Units (YRK). These units are active in various regions of East Kurdistan (Iranian Kurdistan) as well as in the mountainous stronghold of Kandil.

Since its formation in 2004, PJAK has engaged in repeated armed confrontations with Iranian security forces, resulting in casualties on both sides. One of the most significant escalations occurred in the summer of 2011, when the Iranian military launched a large-scale offensive targeting the Kandil Mountains—an operation bolstered by artillery fire and military helicopters. The campaign led to the bombing and destruction of several villages and areas within the Kurdistan Region, drawing regional concern. The hostilities persisted until September 29, 2011, when both parties reached a negotiated agreement, culminating in the declaration of a ceasefire. While the truce has largely held, intermittent skirmishes have continued to flare between PJAK guerrillas and Iranian forces. These encounters have typically been limited in scope and characterized by sudden, small-scale clashes rather than sustained conflict.

PJAK, currently under the leadership of co-chairs Amir Karimi and Payman Viyan, remains an active member of the Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma Civakên Kurdistanê, KCK). This umbrella organization encompasses several Kurdish political parties and affiliated groups operating across the region. Like other KCK constituents, PJAK considers Abdullah Öcalan—the imprisoned leader of the PKK—as its primary ideological and political reference, or marja'i.

Following the collapse of Turkey’s Kurdish peace process on July 22, 2015, the Turkish military significantly curtailed the ability of Kurdish youth from Northern Kurdistan to join the ranks of the PKK. This shift contributed to a noticeable rise in the number of guerrilla fighters originating from Eastern Kurdistan within the PKK structure. Current estimates suggest that youth from the east now constitute approximately 35% of the overall military forces within the broader KCK framework. In this context, PJAK has evolved into a key component of the KCK’s military, political, economic, social, organizational, and diplomatic capital. Any stakeholder engaging with the Kurdish question must now take PJAK into serious consideration as an integral force within this complex landscape.

The renewed dialogue process between İmralı and the Turkish government, initiated in October 2024, centers on the dissolution and disarmament of the PKK. Yet, the deliberate strategy of withholding information—particularly concerning PJAK—casts a shadow over the transparency of the talks. This lack of clarity compels observers to interpret PJAK’s potential future role through the lens of Abdullah Öcalan’s earlier statements, as no direct disclosures have been made regarding the group’s position within the evolving negotiations.

In 2008, Abdullah Öcalan, through his legal representatives, issued a warning to the PKK leadership in Kandil concerning Iran’s apprehensions over the withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkey into the Kurdistan Region. He cautioned that Iran might attempt to undermine the process. Later, during the 2013 phase of his political engagement—often referred to as the Öcalan treatment process—he spoke more explicitly about Iran’s potential role, expressing concern that Tehran could initiate armed actions against Turkey and attribute them to the PKK, thereby sabotaging the peace efforts. To preempt such scenarios, Öcalan urged the leadership in Kandil to remain vigilant. “The only way to prevent Iran is for the PJAK to increase its forces to 40,000,” Öcalan stated. The significance of this remark lies more in its political implication than its logistical feasibility. Nevertheless, it offers a crucial lens for understanding the current, largely opaque dynamics surrounding PJAK’s role in the region.

Another dimension that reveals how both the Turkish state and Abdullah Öcalan perceive PJAK lies in the broader international context. The ongoing war in Ukraine, developments in Syria and Lebanon, Israel’s involvement in regional affairs, India’s tensions with Pakistan, and the strategic maneuvers of the U.S. administration all influence the shaping of PJAK’s fate and future agenda. This complex geopolitical landscape presents Turkey with a chance to elevate its regional role. However, when assessed through a comparative lens, the balance tilts more toward “anti-opportunities” than actual advantages for Ankara. These counter-opportunities have increasingly positioned Turkey at odds with many of its NATO allies, intensifying geopolitical pressure on multiple fronts.

Within the framework of ongoing dialogue between Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish state, there appears to be consensus regarding the strategic strength and influence the PKK has amassed within the broader Middle Eastern balance of power. Iran—Turkey’s long-standing regional and historical rival—represents a critical geopolitical arena where the PKK holds significant political, military, social, and diplomatic leverage. In recent years, Iranian and Turkish interests have visibly clashed in the South Caucasus, particularly in the context of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. The current regional and international conditions surrounding Iran offer Turkey a strategic opening to consolidate and expand its influence—potentially at Iran’s expense—amid shifting alliances and renewed regional rivalries. Against this backdrop, the agreement between Öcalan and Turkey carries an unmistakable Iranian dimension. This aspect, in turn, is among the driving factors pulling Turkey into renewed negotiations with both Öcalan and the PKK leadership.

Between 2011 and 2025, amid a series of overlapping regional crises, key actors involved in the Syrian conflict sought to exploit the shifting dynamics in Libya to recalibrate their strategic agendas in Syria. Developments in Libya consistently reverberated across the Syrian landscape, influencing decision-making and battlefield outcomes. Today, it has become increasingly apparent that Turkey aims to draw on the lessons learned from over a decade of entanglement in Syria. Leveraging its accumulated experience, Ankara appears intent on avoiding the strategic missteps it encountered during the Syrian crisis as it navigates the unfolding challenges related to Iran. In recent years, amid the ongoing Syrian conflict, the Kurdish population has emerged as a pivotal force in shaping the country’s power dynamics. Turkey’s persistent interference in Syria’s internal affairs—coupled with its antagonistic stance toward the Kurds—has effectively kept Syrian Kurds beyond the scope of Ankara’s strategic influence. Previously, during the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, the Kurds secured a significant foothold that caught Turkey off guard and recalibrated regional power equations. Simultaneously, the unwavering push by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to drive change within Iran has compelled Turkey to formulate its own contingency strategies for potential developments across its eastern neighbor’s borders.

These various factors have led Turkey to prioritize the urgent formulation of its agenda regarding Iran. This sense of urgency may explain the swift actions taken by Turkish leaders to convene the PKK congress, where they decided to initiate the process of dissolution and disarmament. It has become increasingly clear to Ankara that its strategic objectives in Iran cannot be realized without engaging in cooperation with PJAK.

Why does Turkey need PJAK?

 In 2015, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and other Kurdish factions attempted to reclaim their influence in East Kurdistan through the Rasan campaign, aiming to curb PJAK’s military and popular expansion. The Keleshin highland pastures incident that year was part of a covert operation orchestrated by the Turkish state as part of the Rasan campaign. Media outlets linked to the KDPI, and to a lesser extent Komala ahmetkeshan, later confirmed Turkey’s involvement in the campaign. However, the failure of the campaign, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the eastern Kurdish parties, prompted Turkey to reconsider its strategy and turn to a more viable alternative—PJAK. Around this time, Israel also sent a subtle message to Iran's Kurdish factions, signaling that significant changes were imminent in Iran that summer. Israel implied that the Kurdish role in these changes would be both influential and decisive.

What does Turkey want from PJAK?

While the PKK has yet to convene a congress to dissolve and disarm, it is evident that the process has reached a standstill. The reasons behind this impasse remain unclear. However, it is apparent that Kandil remains resolute in its position: if Abdullah Öcalan is not permitted to preside over the congress, no steps will be taken toward disbandment or disarmament.

In the event that a congress is held and a decision is made to renounce armed struggle, not all guerrilla fighters are expected to disarm—at least not until the peace process is fully realized. It remains difficult to compel all fighters to lay down arms and transition into legal political work. As such, there must be a mechanism or platform to absorb and accommodate them, and the most viable platform appears to be PJAK. However, such a transition will not occur automatically. The agreement between Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish state must be comprehensive. Any forces relocated under the PJAK umbrella must not function as anti-Turkish elements. Turkey is counting on PJAK. Moreover, positioning PJAK in this role would serve to block the Kurdish movement from falling into Israel's sphere of influence should a political transformation occur in Iran. Through this plan, Turkey aims to secure leverage over the Kurdish file in Iran—an objective that can only be realized if PJAK is incorporated into the framework of the Öcalan–Turkey agreement. It appears that Turkey has detected Israel’s subtle message to Kurdish factions in East Kurdistan and, in response, is determined not to repeat the Syrian scenario by allowing Kurds to emerge as an adversarial force in Iran. In a telephone interview with a Kurdish journalist in Turkey closely following the resolution process, I asked about the state’s vision for PJAK. “Turkey expects PJAK to play a role similar to that of the so-called Syrian National Army militias—but within Iran,” the journalist said.

Iran Will Not Remain Passive

Since 2008, Iranian authorities have viewed the peace process between Turkey and the PKK with increasing alarm, fearing its potential geopolitical repercussions for Iran. These concerns intensified in 2013, when PKK guerrilla forces began withdrawing from North Kurdistan toward the Iranian border areas—a shift Tehran perceived as a direct threat. That summer, Iran held a series of high-level meetings with senior figures from the PKK, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). During the meetings, Iranian officials voiced their apprehension over the growing concentration of guerrilla forces near their frontier and questioned the implications of a possible Öcalan-Turkey agreement. “If Öcalan strikes a deal with Turkey, is there anyone who can stop PJAK?” Iranian representatives asked pointedly. The discussions turned tense, with friction between Iranian officials and representatives from Kandil surfacing clearly. Iran’s perceived threat from PJAK is not a superficial one, but rather rooted in a longstanding geopolitical rivalry between Tehran and Ankara. In this strategic context, if a figure like Öcalan—known for his pragmatic maneuvering—were to wield control over PJAK, it could potentially smooth the path for a comprehensive agreement with Turkey.

As a dominant regional power, Iran has clearly grasped Turkey's strategic intentions. The election of Massoud Pezeshkian's government appears to be a calculated response to anticipated regional and international maneuvers involving Kurdish dynamics. Shortly after the peace treatment process between Öcalan and Turkey resumed, Pezeshkian’s administration made a symbolic yet significant move: it called on parliament to implement Article 15 of the Iranian constitution, which allows for education in unofficial languages. Although the initial bill failed to secure enough parliamentary support, Pezeshkian and his allies remain committed. They are now working on revising the bill's language with the intention of resubmitting it for a new vote. On March 4, 2025, government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mahajerani announced that a draft law had been submitted to grant official recognition to non-Persian languages.This push reflects more than just a domestic policy shift. Pezeshkian’s efforts aim to prevent Iran from becoming isolated in the region as the only country clashing with its Kurdish population. Strategically, it is an attempt to neutralize the Kurdish card and prevent it from falling into the hands of regional rivals such as Turkey—or even outside powers like Israel.

If the disarmament of the PKK moves forward alongside constitutional reforms in Turkey over the next three to four years, the role and strategic importance of the PJAK (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan) is poised to expand more than ever before. However, the current sluggish pace of the process raises serious doubts about the PKK fully severing its ties with Iran.

With the resumption of the peace dialogue between Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish state, it is now almost inevitable that Iran and the PKK leadership in Qandil will engage in renewed talks. Such dialogue would serve a dual purpose: easing Iran’s security concerns and enabling the PKK to position itself pragmatically for the shifting political dynamics ahead.

Turkey’s evolving strategy toward PJAK remains tightly bound to the position of the PKK leadership in Kandil. Any rupture in relations between Kandil and Tehran would effectively signal a strategic gamble by the PKK—placing all its leverage in Ankara’s hands, a move that appears untenable under current conditions. Without robust legal and political guarantees from Turkey, it is unlikely the PKK would risk activating PJAK in a way that compromises its Iranian front, potentially triggering new crises and undermining its broader regional standing.