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News / Kurdistan

110 million barrels of oil were produced and sold worth $4 billion

🔹 More than 300,000 barrels of oil have been produced daily in the Kurdistan Region, of this amount, 200,000 barrels were transported to Iran and Turkey by tankers and the rest were sold in the Kurdistan Region. Monthly oil revenue is about $340 million, estimated to exceed $4 billion by the end of 2024. 🔹 If we interpret the average revenue and production of oil fields in the Kurdistan Region according to press and official information; The average daily production in the Kurdistan Region is 301 thousand 604 barrels of oil, which means 110 million barrels of oil were produced during the year. Each barrel was sold at half the price of Brent crude oil, estimated at ($35-40) per barrel.  So, the daily revenue of oil produced excluding production costs and fees, will be (11 million) dollars and in 2024 the total revenue will reach (4 billion) dollars.

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Unpaid salaries; The KRG owes more than 23 trillion dinars to salaried employees

Drw media (17) Salaries have not been paid (44) Salaries have been paid with deductions and salary arrears Both the eighth and ninth cabinets of the Kurdistan Regional Government owe more than (23) trillion dinars due to (non-payment of salaries, salary arrears, salary deductions) in the past 10 years. Last year 2023, the government did not pay the salaries of October, November, and December. This year 2024, the October salary is being distributed at the end of the year. During the past 10 years (2015-2024), the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not paid salaries on time and also, owes a large part of the salaries of the employees: Out of (120) months from (2015 -2024): - (17) salaries have not been paid in full - (34) salaries have been paid in arrears - (10) salaries have been paid with (21%) deduction. - A total of (61) months of (unpaid salaries, and arrears and deductions). That is (51%) of the salaries in the past 10 years. - Total (59) months salary paid in full. That is only (49%) of all salaries in the past 10 years. • The government owes 23 trillion dinars to Salaried employees. • The debt of salary promotion of the KRG civil servants (halted due to the KRG’s financial crisis) is about (6) trillion dinars. The total debt of the government is 29 trillion dinars.  

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Sulaimani's revenue decreased from 161 billion to 26 billion dinars

Compared to 2021, the monthly revenue of Sulaimani province has decreased from (161 billion) dinars to (26) billion dinars (the revenue which returns to the government treasury), while the monthly revenue of Bashmakh Border crossing in 2021 was (23 billion) dinars. According to the statistics of Transparency website, the revenue of Sulaimani was as follows: - December 2024: (26 billion 270 million) dinars - November 2024: (61 billion and 50 million) dinars - January 2024: (70 billion 318 million) dinars - February 2024: (95 billion 316 million) dinars - - That is, between November and December, the revenue of Sulaimani decreased by 57% • Revenue in 2024: (869 billion 755 million) dinars (so far) • Revenue in 2023: (1 trillion 173 billion 990 million) dinars • That is about (300) billion dinars less than last year • Compared to previous years: • December 2024: Sulaimani revenue was (26 billion) dinars • February 2021: Sulaimani revenue was (161 billion) dinars •  In February 2021, only the revenue of Bashmakh Border crossing was 23 billion 707 million dinars, but now the total revenue of Sulaimani (26) billion dinars. Bashmakh customs revenue in 2021: January: 22 billion 855 million dinars February: 23 billion 707 million dinars March: 22 billion and 47 million dinars April : 20 billion 977 million dinars May: 17 billion 307 million dinars

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Geopolitical Factors Behind the Resumption of Oil Exports by the Kurdistan Region

Draw media Dr.Sarwar Abduallah/ KFuture The long-standing conflict over oil between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Baghdad has grown increasingly complex in recent years. In February 2022, the Iraqi Supreme Court invalidated the Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas law, declaring it “unconstitutional.” This legal decision escalated tensions. Subsequently, in March 2023, a Paris Arbitration Tribunal ruled in favor of Baghdad in a dispute with Turkey concerning the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline, which the KRG had been using for its oil exports. These rulings effectively halted the export of approximately 400,000 barrels of oil per day, restricting access to international markets and exacerbating the resource-related discord. During a session led by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani last month, the Council of Ministers approved a proposal to revise Article 12 of the Iraqi budget law. This article had initially set the cost of oil production at $6.90 per barrel—a rate that had been a point of contention between Erbil and Baghdad. The Iraqi government agreed to amend sections of the federal budget to allow compensation for companies operating in oil production and transportation in the Kurdistan Region, establishing a payment rate of $16 per barrel. This move could pave the way for restarting oil exports from the Kurdistan Region. While the proposal is yet to be finalized by the Iraqi parliament, its geopolitical significance is clear: resuming KRI’s oil exports could strengthen its role as a vital energy supplier in the global market. A critical question arises: why is resuming KRI’s oil exports so important for Iraq at this moment? This short piece argues that the resumption of oil exports from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is driven by a complex interplay of geopolitical considerations that extend beyond the local economy to regional and international dynamics. The Geopolitical and Economic Context While Kurdish oil exports might not significantly influence global oil prices, they represent an important energy resource for Europe. The disruption in exports has already cost the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over $20 billion in financial losses. Kurdistan’s Prime Minister, Masrour Barzani, highlighted this plight at the Middle East Peace and Security Conference in Duhok on November 24, stating: “Almost every month we lose a billion. So, it’s over $20 billion that we’ve lost as a result of the exports.” Similarly, at the MERI Forum in Erbil on October 30, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani pointed out that Iraq has suffered a loss of $15 billion since the closure of the pipeline from the Kurdistan Region, urging Baghdad to approach this issue from an economic perspective. The Iraqi budget law initially set oil extraction and transportation costs at $6 per barrel in the KRI, creating a significant obstacle to oil exports. A potential solution involves both parties securing financial stability for oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region, protecting the integrity of Kurdish oil fields, and allowing Iraq to reintroduce 400,000 to 500,000 barrels of oil back into the global market. Budget Amendments and Their Implications Earlier this month, the Iraqi government approved a proposal to amend articles in the federal budget, authorizing compensation for companies operating in the Kurdistan Region by setting the payment rate at $16 per barrel. In the meantime, Baghdad agreed to form an independent body within two months to determine cost payments. This amendment, if passed by parliament, would pave the way for the resumption of KRI’s oil exports to international markets via the Ceyhan pipeline. The prevailing situation in Iraq primarily involves service contracts, with costs in certain areas like Gayara reaching $26 to $27 per barrel. This disparity raises the question of why companies are requesting only $20 for operations in the Kurdistan Region. Regional and Global Geopolitical Dynamics The urgency to resolve the conflict over Kurdish oil has increased due to its relevance in the global energy market, particularly amid geopolitical crises. The ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict and the enduring Russia-Ukraine war have heightened instability, driving oil prices higher. These dynamics underscore the need to address the Erbil-Baghdad dispute to restore oil flows and mitigate economic and geopolitical repercussions. The limited availability of export routes for Baghdad’s oil shipments has also weakened its negotiating leverage with Turkey. The Iraqi government is exploring alternatives, including reviving dormant pipelines like the Iraq-Saudi pipeline leading to the Red Sea and initiating projects such as the Basra-Aqaba pipeline. Additionally, Baghdad, with support from Tehran and Moscow, is working to restore the Kirkuk-Baniyas oil pipeline, inactive since 1982. However, these alternatives face political and security challenges, making them long-term prospects rather than immediate solutions. Strategic Importance of Diversifying Oil Routes Iraq’s reliance on existing oil export routes exposes it to significant risks. For example, the interception of an Iraqi oil tanker by Iran in the Gulf of Oman underscores the vulnerability of current supply corridors. Developing new, secure oil export routes has become critical to addressing regional tensions and maritime security risks. Turkey’s proximity to European markets offers a strategic advantage for Iraq, particularly as Europe seeks alternatives to Russian energy amidst the conflict in Ukraine. Additionally, oil revenues, which constitute over 90% of Iraq’s budget, necessitate prioritizing the resumption of KRI’s oil exports. Utilizing Kurdistan as a corridor for exporting oil from central and southern Iraq could further enhance Iraq’s economic and political stability. The resumption of Kurdish oil exports under a revised framework represents a reconciliation between the KRG and the Iraqi federal government. By centralizing oil export agreements, Baghdad seeks to reinforce its constitutional authority while accommodating regional autonomy—critical for Iraq’s internal cohesion. As Iraq aims to boost its oil production to nearly six million barrels per day over the next five years, diversifying export routes and ensuring internal stability will be essential. The Kurdistan Region’s oil exports are a strategic asset, bolstering national revenues for Baghdad while strengthening the KRG’s semi-autonomous status. Resuming exports aligns with broader efforts to stabilize global oil supply and secure Iraq’s role as a key energy supplier amid ongoing geopolitical tensions.

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There has never been a month in 2024 when the salary distribution took less than 40 days

2024 is coming to an end, but throughout this year, the salaries of Kurdistan region's employees have not been distributed on time. There has never been a month when the salary distribution took less than 40 days. The October salaries are now being distributed, but the fate of the salaries of November and December is still unknown.   2024 salaries were distributed as follows:   • January salaries were distributed on February 20, 2024 • February salaries were distributed on March 30, 2024 • March salaries were distributed on April 6, 2024 • April salaries were distributed May 15, 2024 • May salaries were distributed on June 11, 2024 • June salaries were distributed on July 10, 2024 • July salaries were distributed on September 3, 2024 • August salaries were distributed on October 4, 2024 • September salaries were distributed on October 18, 2024 •October salaries are now being distributed • The fate of November salaries is unknown • The fate of December salaries is unknown

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The fate of December salaries is unknown

The Iraqi Ministry of Finance has sent 761 billion and 631 billion dinars for the salaries of the months of October and November. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has started distributing the salaries of the employees of the Kurdistan Region. The Iraqi Ministry of Finance has sent 631 billion dinars as the first installment for the November salaries and it’s expected to send another amount of 128 billion dinars. If these two amounts arrive, the salary of October and November will be paid without problem, but the fate of December salaries is unknown.   KRG Revenues for October: • (761) billion dinars from Baghdad • (320) billion dinars of domestic revenue • (20) billion dinars (International coalition aid for the Peshmerga forces) • Total: (1 trillion and 101 million) dinars And (540) billion dinars oil revenue, most of which goes to Production companies.     KRG Revenues for November: • (631) billion dinars from Baghdad • (320) billion dinars of domestic revenue • (20) billion dinars (International coalition aid for the Peshmerga forces) • Total: (1 trillion and 101 million) dinars And (540) billion dinars oil revenue, most of which goes to the Production companies.

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KRG Revenue is (1 trillion and 101 billion) dinars, salaries need (995 billion) dinars

Available revenues of the KRG are (761) billion dinars of the KRG share from Baghdad, (320) billion dinars domestic revenue, (20) billion dinars from the international coalition aid. The total amount is (1 trillion and 101 billion) dinars, that is (100) billion dinars more than the salary expenditure, which is (995) billion dinars. This is in addition to the oil revenue, which is mostly for the companies, monthly (360) million dollars, or (540) billion dinars. On October 18, 2024, The Ministry of Finance of the Kurdistan Region has distributed the latest salaries (2024) which was for September salaries. As of December, the October and November salaries have not yet been distributed. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) currently needs (995) billion dinars monthly only for the salaries of employees. The Iraqi government has sent the October salaries. The amount of (761 billion) dinars has been transferred to the Erbil branch of the Central Bank. However, the Kurdistan Regional Government officials have not accepted to receive the money and they believe that another (234) billion is needed to complete the salaries. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) says Baghdad does not have any legal excuses, but Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Sudani has said that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not complied to handover customs duties with oil and non-oil revenues.   However, the KRG can cover the deficit with domestic revenue. Earlier, the finance minister said in a press conference that the monthly domestic revenue (320) billion dinars, which is more than the amount of the deficit. This is despite the oil revenues that do not return to the treasury of the Ministry of Finance of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The KRG produces about 300,000 barrels of oil daily and sells a barrel for $35-41. The total daily oil revenue is $12 million and monthly is $360 million, or 540 billion dinars. Most of the revenue goes to companies and production costs.   Kurdistan Regional Government Revenues for October:   • (761) billion dinars from Baghdad • (320) billion dinars of domestic revenue • (20) billion dinars from the international coalition aid • Total is: (1 trillion and 101 million) dinars And (540) billion dinars oil revenue, most of which goes to companies

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In 2024, the KRG has sold (110 million 880 thousand) barrels of oil

 "Only in 2024 the KRG has sold (110 million 880 thousand) barrels of oil, but returned revenue  to the treasury of the Kurdistan Regional Government is zero", Ali Hama Saleh, leader of the Halwest (Stance) Movement, said in a press conference.  Ali Hama Saleh also said that "throughout 2024, exactly (110 million 880 thousand) barrels of oil were sold by the KRG, Is it reasonable for the Ministry of Finance to have zero dollars?". According to Ali Hama Saleh:  * If we divide this figure  (110 million 880 thousand barrels of oil) by each citizen of the Kurdistan Region, (22) barrels of oil have been produced for each citizen. * if only (5) dollars remains per barrel, government can pay the salary of December.  • There are refineries that have made a profit of $390 million this year, but the government has made zero profit. • The oil is sold at $250-260 per tonne in the market in Erbil, Its revenue goes to a private bank. It is reasonable for an oil company to earn $17-18 per barrel, but the Kurdish people earn zero dollars. So what is the wisdom of extracting oil? • 75% of Kurdistan's oil production goes to Turkey, whether it is the companies of Kar, Lanas and others. Some of them have agreed with groups in south of Iraq to take Kurdistan's oil to Basra and sell it there.

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KRG Demands Federal Government Deliver Overdue Salaries

The issue of funding salaries for employees in the Kurdistan Region remains unresolved, while most Kurdish families are facing difficult circumstances due to the delay in salary payments, MP announced, on Wednesday. The member of the Finance Committee in the Iraqi Parliament, Jamal Kocher said that, "Most families in the Kurdistan Region rely on salaries, and unfortunately, this issue remains unresolved fundamentally, despite the Federal Court's ruling." He added that Baghdad disbursed salaries for October earlier this month, but funding for November has yet to be released, noting that “the issue requires serious action from decision-makers to end the crisis and ensure timely salary disbursements.” The KRG announced in a statement that "the KRG continues its efforts with the federal government to provide financial entitlements for employees, and it is awaiting the transfer of salaries for October, November, and December at the earliest opportunity." The regional government’s council also called on the federal government in Baghdad to find a permanent solution to the salary deficit issue in its next session, which will be held in Baghdad on Thursday, in accordance with the powers granted to it and under Article 60 of the Iraqi Public Budget Law.  

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Draw Media poll, after the selection process

Do you think the tenth cabinet will be formed soon? The poll department of Draw media Organization conducted a poll after the election process, to get people's opinion on the election process and the formation of the tenth cabinet, here we publish a part of the poll. Introduction • This poll was conducted by the survey department (Draw Media Organization) from 20-28 Novermbe, 2024. • The poll was conducted face to face with people in the provinces of Sulaimani, Halabja and the autonomous administrations of Garmian and Raperin. Poll Summary: • 46% believe that the elections were clean and free from fraud. • 29% believe that the elections were designed and fraudulent • 40% believe that the tenth cabinet will not be formed soon. • (30%) believe that the tenth cabinet will be formed soon. • 29% prefer all forces to participate in the tenth cabinet. • 19% prefer the tenth cabinet to be formed only by the PUK and KDP. • (10%) think it is important for the NGM to participate in the tenth cabinet. • (2%) prefer the KDP to form the tenth cabinet without the PUK.

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Kurdistan Parliament failed to elect its leadership due to lack of quorum

 On Monday, the first session of the sixth term of Kurdistan Region’s Parliament began with the participation of 97 out of 100 elected candidates. Acting under the guidance of the eldest member, the Parliament opened nominations for the leadership roles, with several political blocs presenting their candidates for the three positions.  For the Parliament leadership, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has nominated Vala Fareed and Halgurd Sheikh Najib. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has put forward Shalaw Kosrat Rasool and Miran Mohammed. Additionally, the New Generation Movement nominated Kurdawan Jamal. However, due to the absence of a number of lawmakers, the session could not meet the legal quorum, leading to its temporary suspension. The parliamentary elections held last October resulted in (a total of 100): - Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): 39 seats - Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): 23 seats - New Generation Movement: 15 seats - Kurdistan Islamic Union: 7 seats - Halwest Movement: 4 seats - Kurdistan Justice Group: 3 seats - People's Front: 2 seats - Change Movement (Gorran): 1 seat - Kurdistan Regional Alliance: 1 seat - Component Quota: 5 seats

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U.S. Ambassador to Iraq: We encourage full implementation of the IKR press law and access to information law

The outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski participated in an interview with IKR media outlets including Draw Media, to discuss U.S. priorities for strengthening the bilateral relationship with Iraq. During the interview, Romanowski discussed the importance of a swift government formation now that the elections in the Kurdistan Region have been successfully conducted. Responding to Draw Media's question, regarding the U.S. view on the media freedom landscape and continued press violations in the KRI, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq insisted that they are proud to support the role of a free and independent press in the IKR and encourage full implementation of the IKR press law and access to information law.  

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Turkey Links Terrorism to Kurdish Ethnic Cleansing

Diary Marif  My narrative arises from personal experiences, depicting the sense of insecurity under Turkish drones. I illustrate numerous instances where the Turkish government’s actions instilled panic and caused civilian casualties in Iraq and Syrian Kurdistan, often rationalized as their fight against terrorism. This pattern reveals Turkey’s agenda to eliminate the Kurdish population, a part of a long history marked by blatant crimes against the Kurds. I request that everyone vociferously oppose Turkey’s aggressive actions. The strength of the Kurds is crucial; if they are destroyed, extremist groups such as ISIS gain power, endangering global safety. To safeguard the world, you must ensure the safety of the Kurds.   In early December 2023, my friends and I camped in Penjween, an Iraqi-Kurdish town near the Iranian border. As we began our day, we saw a Turkish drone hovering above us. A surge of fear gripped me instantly, knowing the devastating impact these drones have had on innocent civilians miles away from Turkey’s borders. Throughout the day, the looming presence of the drone cast a shadow of anxiety over me until our safe return home. My experience is just one among countless Kurdish stories in Iraq and Syria, where these drones have become a haunting presence, bringing fear and uncertainty to our daily lives. A few weeks later, on December 25, 2023, when I returned to Canada, Turkish drones caused the deaths of 10 civilians and destroyed facilities in northeastern Syria, an area predominantly inhabited by the Kurds. In Iraq, two journalists were recently killed near my family’s home in Said Sadiq when a Turkish drone struck their vehicle. These attacks are part of a broader series of assaults in August and September 2024, which have increasingly targeted civilians. The Turkish government upholds its policy of targeting Kurdish populations in Syria and Iraq under the name of fighting terror, where Kurds have established semi-autonomous administrative regions.  Since 1991, the Kurdish region in Iraq has been granted a level of self-governance, allowing Kurds to oversee their internal affairs including security, education, and economic development while maintaining their connection to the broader Iraqi nation. In Syria, a similar semi-autonomous setup emerged during the Syrian Civil War in 2012, predominantly in the northern regions where Kurds reside. Here, Kurdish forces such as the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) have established an administration with limited autonomy. However, this autonomous Kurdish region is not officially recognized by the Syrian government. According to multiple sources, Turkish forces have conducted over 6,500 airstrikes, primarily in Kurdish areas of Syria and Iraq since 2016. As a result, thousands of civilians have been killed or wounded as these attacks have escalated in frequency and expanded deeper into Iraq and Syria in recent years. The Turkish regime has justified these assaults to the global community, claiming they target the Kurdistan Workers Party, (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan: PKK), which has been in conflict with Turkey since the 1980s, resulting in the deaths of more than 40,000 individuals, civilians included, on both sides. The relationship between Turkey and the PKK has been characterized by conflict and tension for decades. The PKK, established in 1978, initiated an armed insurgency against the Turkish government in 1984, seeking to advance Kurdish rights and autonomy. Designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the PKK has been the target of numerous military operations conducted by the Turkish government within its borders and in northern Iraq, where the PKK has established bases. Despite intermittent ceasefires and attempts at peace talks, the conflict has persisted, leading to ongoing violence and instability in the region. However, the most recent Turkish attacks have targeted civilian sites where the PKK is not present, resulting in largely civilian casualties. The data suggest that Turkey employs drones that do not solely target the PKK. Rather than combating specific threats, Turkey appears to use drone interventions to dismantle broader aspects of Kurdish political and military movements, potentially leading to ethnic, cultural, and environmental cleansing, which are supported by the following facts. Since 2018, the Turkish military has invaded several Syrian Kurdish cities and continuously threatens to invade others, which Turkey justifies by arguing that they need to create a “safe zone” in northern Syria to serve as a buffer against the ongoing Syrian war. Also, President Donald Trump withdrew US troops from along the Turkey-Syria border, providing Turkey with an opportunity to seize its  “safe zone.”  Turkey invaded a large zone in Iraqi Kurdistan and built around 40 military bases. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria reported instances of Turkish-backed forces engaging in sexual violence against both women and men, along with the recruitment of children into the military. In Iraqi Kurdistan alone, 158 villages have been evacuated due to attacks, with an additional 600 villages at risk of evacuation. The natural environment in Iraqi Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdistan is also being degraded by cutting down trees to build roads for the Turkish military and selling the felled trees illegally for economic gain. The drones and airstrikes have also targeted oil facilities, healthcare centers, and critical infrastructure in Syrian Kurdistan. This has resulted in a 50% drop in electricity production, as reported by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. The crimes committed by the Turkish government against the Kurds are just a glimpse into a vast sea of injustices carried out under the guise of fighting the PKK. To understand the logic of current Turkish politics towards the Kurds, it is helpful to go back to the historic background of Kurdish life since the early 20th century.   Kurdish YPG Fighters. Photo @Wikimedia Commons   The Young Turks, a diverse coalition active from 1889 to 1918, initiated a revolutionary movement focused on advocating Turkish nationalism aimed at reclaiming historically connected territories. They promoted a pan-Turkic ideology centred around regions sharing Turkic cultural ties, to control the Kurdish region. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 that divided the region was seen as a challenge by the Young Turks to Anglo-Franco powers. Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), known as the founding father of modern Turkey after its establishment in 1923, implemented policies geared towards forging a unified Turkish nation-state with a strong emphasis on Turkish identity. The 1924 Turkish constitution emphasized the singular identity of the Turkish nation and strictly forbid the use of languages or identities other than Turkish which was harshly imposed on minority groups, particularly Kurds. This repression led many Kurds to link the Turkish state and the concept of Turkish identity with the brutal suppression they endured. The Kurds were targeted by a nationalist agenda aiming to assimilate Kurds, forcibly disconnecting them from their heritage and culture. İsmet İnönü (1884 – 1973), Turkey’s second president (1938 – 1950), outlined this nationalist stance by emphasizing the dominance of the Turkish majority and advocating for the enforced Turkification of all inhabitants, expressing a willingness to eliminate those who resisted. The process of assimilating continued to be enforced in the following decades. The era between the foundation of the republic from 1923 to the early 1990s was the period of “Denial” by Turkish governments, which refers to the denial of the existence of Kurds and called for the policies of assimilation and oppression as “civilizing missions”. For many decades, the Kurdish language, culture, folklore, and names were prohibited. The terms “Kurds,” “Kurdistan,” and “Kurdish” were outlawed, with the government insisting on labelling Kurds as “Mountain Turks,” claiming that their language had merely deviated from Turkish over time. The Kurds are also called “Barbarians,” and “lack of culture.” In the 1990s, Turgut Özal (1927 – 1993), who served as President (1989 – 1993), made efforts to improve the situation of Kurds in Turkey. Before he passed away, Özal pursued policies aimed at easing restrictions on Kurdish cultural expression and language rights. In the 1990s, the Kurds experienced some improvements known as the “Period of recognition.” However, instead of assimilation, Kurds were often seen as distinct from Turkish identity, facing racial stereotypes based on physical traits and cultural perceptions that represented them as violent, crude and hypersexual. In the 2000s, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government introduced reforms towards Kurds, aiming to address long-standing issues. The AKP initiated policies for greater cultural rights and recognition of the Kurdish identity. Erdogan’s Turkey has grown into an enterprising regional interventionist power. By employing global economic integration, soft power, and fostering a peaceful environment, Ahmet Davutoglu, the Chief Adviser to Prime Minister Erdogan, articulated the ‘Zero Problems with the Neighbours’ policy, one of the four key principles of the AKP government’s foreign policy. This approach, rooted in modified neo-Ottomanism, sought to establish Turkey as a leader in the Middle East and strengthen its eligibility for EU membership. Erdogan’s new approach aimed to influence neighbouring countries using Turkish schools, television series, and culture. Additionally, Ankara’s foreign policy relied on contracts with Turkish companies abroad and trade agreements. However, these methods didn’t meet Erdogan’s goal of controlling Kurdistan. The 2015 and 2016, Erdogan’s political strategies with an emphasis on nationalism and security concerns led to a hardline approach against Kurdish movements, often prioritizing a singular national narrative over minority rights. ​​This was due to the pressure he faced from nationalist groups who wanted a tougher stance against the Kurds. Additionally, Erdogan was scared of strengthening Syrian Kurds and the tensions between the PKK and the Turkish state heightened again. Erdogan dreams of going back to the Ottoman Empire and he regularly describes himself as the “Grandchild” of the Ottomans. Turkey reverting to an Ottoman-like state would require a level of harshness and control akin to what Erdogan is prepared to implement. His regime was actively engaged with its pan-Islamic and nationalistic ambitions in eliminating the most “disloyal” segments of the Kurdish population. Within Turkey, Kurds including lawyers, politicians, singers, activists, and students face relentless detentions and imprisonment under the accusation that they are PKK members. Moreover, a troubling wave of hate crimes perpetrated by ultra-nationalists against Kurds has emerged, fueled by Erdogan’s rhetoric and the support of his allies and his announcement that “Turkey does not face a Kurdish issue.” Erdogan exhibits an aversion towards Kurds, even extending to concerns about the growth of the Kurdish population. In a video, he encourages Turkish families to have more children, Erdogan asserts, “The PKK [families] has 5, 10, 15 children,” while simultaneously accusing millions of Kurdish citizens of terrorism. The contradiction lies in the fact that the PKK members are restricted from having children due to the organization’s prohibition on marriage and any sexual relationships among its fighters. Similar to the former Turkish authorities, Erdogan thought the Kurds were the main problem for his hegemony. His assault on Kurds spanning beyond Turkey’s borders has been ongoing. The new assaults violate the principles of warfare, breach international regulations, safeguarding human rights and disregarding the sovereignty of other nations. According to International humanitarian law, “The parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives”. In the eyes of the governing elite and many ordinary people not only the rebellious Kurds are the enemy, but all Kurds are potential enemies. This perspective underscores the Turkish regime’s inclination towards what appears to be an ethnic cleansing agenda targeting the entire Kurdish population. The Kurds fear global indifference towards Turkey’s brutality. Turkey’s neglect of ISIS activities has contributed to this group’s strength. Immediate de-escalation is crucial to prioritize the mission of defeating ISIS and ensuring the safety and security of personnel dedicated to this cause. Attacks on Syrian Kurds by Turkey bolster ISIS, other factions, and the Assad regime, while also amplifying Iranian and Russian influences in Syria. Targeting and subjugating Kurds across Iraq, Syria, and Turkey further destabilizes the region and politically weakens it. Only a peace process can solve the problems, but without the Kurd reconciliation in the Middle East peace will not come to pass. The airstrikes in Syria caused another wave of panic and threat among civilians, and also threatened the safety of the U.S. and Coalition forces who work in Syria with Kurdish partners to defeat ISIS and maintain custody of more than ten thousand ISIS detainees. What remains to be said is Turkey’s aggressive actions against Kurdish populations in Syria and Iraq, using drones and airstrikes under the pretext of fighting terrorism. Erdogan’s policies, rooted in nationalism and historical animosity, perpetuated violence and oppression against Kurds both within Turkey and beyond its borders. The international community’s awareness and intervention are crucial to prevent further civilian casualties and ensure the safety and rights of the Kurdish people. __________________________________________________ Diary Marif, is a Canadian Kurdish writer and freelance journalist born in Iraq. He earned a master’s degree in history from Pune University, India, in 2013. Since 2018, Marif has focused on hybrid memoirs, drawing from his experiences as a war child. He has contributed to three book chapters and writes for a range of national and international media outlets, including New Canadian Media, Rabble, Toronto Star, WordCityLit, Washington Institute, The Canadian Encyclopedia, The Markaz Review, DrawMedia, and others. In 2022, he received an Honorable Mention for the Susan Crean Award for Nonfiction

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General Population Census

Draw Media General Population Census ,Scientific research to predict the population of Iraq and analysis of census data from 1884 to 1997   Abstract According to the official data published by the Iraqi Statistical Agency, the census was conducted every 10 years. According to available sources during the Ottoman rule, in 1884 the population of Iraq was 1,400,000 people, but first official census of Iraq was conducted in 1920. Population of Iraq according to this census was (2,849,282) people. The last official census in 1997, excluding the three governorates of the Kurdistan Region (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok), the population of Iraq was 22,046,244 people. Our aim in this study is to is to present a scientific presentation of past censuses conducted in Iraq with predict the population of Iraq for the 2024 census and the population in 2027 and show the effect of culture and time on population growth, based on statistics from 1884 to 1997 using the 'Exponential Trend' model to forecast the Iraq's population forecasted population for 2027 approximately will be 48,960,820 as well as 'impact Culture', which represents population growth by culture, resulted in 138,239 people per million people, and slope, which represents population growth over time, resulted in 16,342 people per million people. Keywords: Iraq, Census, Forecasting  

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APIKUR Welcomes Iraq Budget Law Amendments

 The Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) on Thursday expressed optimism over the Iraqi Parliament's proposal to amend Article 12 of the Budget Law, viewing it as a possible path to restarting the Kurdistan Region’s oil exports through the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP). In a statement, APIKUR member companies praised the proposal, noting that the amendments address long-standing industry requests for favorable commercial terms and secure payment mechanisms for both historical and future exports. APIKUR underscored that these guarantees are crucial for ongoing collaboration and the Region’s economic stability. "We are prepared for constructive discussions with both the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to finalize necessary agreements," APIKUR stated, emphasizing the importance of clarifying certain provisions within the law to facilitate oil exports through the ITP. APIKUR also aligned with statements from Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani and Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, both of whom have highlighted the mutual economic benefits of resuming exports. APIKUR noted that a timely agreement would bolster revenue flows and strengthen Iraq's energy sector. Restoring oil exports through the ITP is a priority, promising economic gains for both Iraq and Kurdistan as officials work towards resolving essential export framework issues.

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