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News / Kurdistan

(3 million 789 thousand) people are eligible to vote

Out of (3 million 789 thousand 405) people who are eligible to vote, (2 million 784 thousand 303) people have received their voting cards (73%). • More than (1 million 5 thousand 102) people have not received their voting cards, that is (27%). • That means from the beginning, 27% of citizens boycott the elections and do not participate. • Between the fifth and sixth sessions of the Kurdistan Parliament, 704,000 people will be eligible to vote. • The head of the Iraqi Independent High Election Commission (IHEC) said: • Number of eligible voters: (3 million 789 thousand 405) people • Those who have received their voting cards: (2 million 784 thousand 303) people, that is (73%) of the eligible voters. • Those who have not received their voting cards (They are not going to participating): (1 million 5 thousand 102) people. which is (27%) of the eligible voters. • In the past 15 days, 434 thousand people have received their voting cards. • Those who born in 2006 are eligible to vote: 150,000 people. • For the fifth round of elections in 2018: 3 million 85 thousand people were eligible to vote.

New Oil Law Likely To Be The End Of Iraqi Kurdistan’s Independence Dream

By Simon Watkins The New Oil Law being worked on by the government of Iraq in Baghdad may drastically reduce the independence in energy matters for Iraqi Kurdistan. The FSC ruled that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must turn over “all oil and non-oil revenues” to Baghdad The New Oil Law may have drastic consequences for Western IOCs working in the area. A series of legal rulings by Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) on 21 February underlined that the planned New Oil Law being worked on by the government of Iraq in Baghdad will be the final agent of change that will end any semblance of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. And for Western oil companies working in the region, it looks like the future has been cancelled. To begin with, the FSC ruled that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must turn over “all oil and non-oil revenues” to Baghdad. This marks the end of any debate over whether the KRG can continue to conduct oil sales independent of the Federal Government Iraq’s (FGI) State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) – it cannot. And even it managed to arrange channels to do so, it would have to hand over all the money made from the oil sales to the FGI in Baghdad anyway. This effectively returns all financial control of Iraqi Kurdistan back to Iraq’s central government. The FSC added that the FGI, in turn, would be responsible for paying the salaries of public servants in the KRG, with the amount paid to be deduced at source in Baghdad from the KRG’s share. And the KRG must provide monthly, in-depth accounts of every salary that the FGI is paying. Effectively, this is a much tougher reset of the original ‘budget payments for oil revenues’ deal agreed between the KRG and the FGI back in November 2014, as analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. The deal was that the KRG exported up to 550,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil from its own fields and Kirkuk via SOMO. In return, Baghdad would send 17 percent of the federal budget after sovereign expenses (around US$500 million at that time) per month in budget payments to the Kurds. This arrangement never functioned properly, with the KRG frequently (and rightly) accusing the FGI of underpaying budget disbursements, and the FGI frequently (and rightly) accusing the KRG of under-delivering oil revenues. The deal was then superseded by an understanding reached between the KRG and the new Iraqi federal government formed in October 2018 and centred on the 2019 national budget bill. This required the FGI to transfer sufficient funds from the budget to pay the salaries of KRG employees along with other financial compensation in exchange for the KRG handing over the export of at least 250,000 bpd of crude oil to SOMO. Again, this arrangement never worked properly either. However, things became much worse in late 2017 for two reasons. The first reason was that 25 September 2017 saw a non-binding vote on full independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. Independence had been tacitly promised to Iraqi Kurdistan by the U.S. and its allies in exchange for Kurdistan’s fearsome Peshmerga army being the West’s principal boots on the ground in the fight against the then-rampant ISIS. Over 92 percent of voters in the 2017 referendum voted in favour of independence, but shortly after the results were announced, forces from Iraq and Iran (supported as well by Turkey) moved into the Kurdish region and quelled any further moves to make independence a reality. Neither Iraq nor Iraq nor Turkey (all with sizeable Kurdish populations) could tolerate the ramifications of a broader upsurge in the Kurdish independence movement across the region. The second reason was that soon after that, Russia gained control over Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sector through three key mechanisms also analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. India’s Refining Margins Slump as It Struggles to Secure Russian Oil Moscow’s aim was not just to secure the big oil and gas reserves of Iraqi Kurdistan but, more importantly in the long term, to sow the seeds for the destruction of Kurdish independence and its assimilation into one Iraq. It was Russia, then, that stoked mistrust and discontent between the KRG and FGI over the original 2014 ‘budget payments for oil revenues’ deal, which is largely why it never worked properly. The fault-line that Moscow used to create chaos between the two sides was handed to it by the lack of clarity over oil revenues in Iraq’s own Constitution. According to the KRG, it has authority under Articles 112 and 115 of the Constitution to manage oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region extracted from fields that were not in production in 2005 – the year that the Constitution was adopted by referendum. In addition, the KRG maintains that Article 115 states: “All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organised in a region.” As such, the KRG maintains that as relevant powers are not otherwise stipulated in the Constitution, it has the authority to sell and receive revenue from its oil and gas exports. The KRG also highlights that the Constitution provides that, should a dispute arise, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates. However, the FGI and SOMO argue that under Article 111 of the Constitution oil and gas are under the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates. Another turn for the worse for Iraqi Kurdistan came at the end of 2021 when the U.S. formerly ended its combat mission in Iraq, which effectively flung open the door for even greater economic, political, and military influence in Iraq by Iran, Russia, and China. It is in the interests of none of these three countries for the still broadly pro-U.S. Iraqi Kurdistan to exist. Moscow is happy enough to continue to work on fields in north and south Iraq, but under the administration of a centralised pro-Russian authority in Baghdad. In tandem with this, China has been building up its influence in southern Iraq, through multiple deals done in the oil and gas sector that have then been leveraged into bigger infrastructure deals across the south. The apotheosis of Beijing’s vision for China is all-encompassing ‘Iraq-China Framework Agreement’ of 2021. This in turn, was an extension in scale and scope of the ‘Oil for Reconstruction and Investment’ agreement signed by Baghdad and Beijing in September 2019, which allowed Chinese firms to invest in infrastructure projects in Iraq in exchange for oil, as also analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. Given all of this, it should not surprise anyone that on 3 August last year, the then-new Iraq Prime Minister, Mohammed Al-Sudani, clearly stated that the new unified oil law – run in every respect out of Baghdad - will govern all oil and gas production and investments in both Iraq and its semi-autonomous Kurdistan region and will constitute “a strong factor for Iraq’s unity”. Nor should it surprise anyone that a very high-ranking official from the Kremlin said recently at a meeting with senior government figures from Iran that: “By keeping the West out of energy deals in Iraq – and Baghdad closer to the new Iran-Saudi axis - the end of Western hegemony in the Middle East will become the decisive chapter in the West’s final demise,” a senior source who works closely with the European Union’s energy security apparatus exclusively told OilPrice.com. By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com New Oil Law Likely To Be The End Of Iraqi Kurdistan’s Independence Dream By Simon Watkins The New Oil Law being worked on by the government of Iraq in Baghdad may drastically reduce the independence in energy matters for Iraqi Kurdistan. The FSC ruled that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must turn over “all oil and non-oil revenues” to Baghdad. The New Oil Law may have drastic consequences for Western IOCs working in the area. Join Our Community A series of legal rulings by Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) on 21 February underlined that the planned New Oil Law being worked on by the government of Iraq in Baghdad will be the final agent of change that will end any semblance of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. And for Western oil companies working in the region, it looks like the future has been cancelled. To begin with, the FSC ruled that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must turn over “all oil and non-oil revenues” to Baghdad. This marks the end of any debate over whether the KRG can continue to conduct oil sales independent of the Federal Government Iraq’s (FGI) State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) – it cannot. And even it managed to arrange channels to do so, it would have to hand over all the money made from the oil sales to the FGI in Baghdad anyway. This effectively returns all financial control of Iraqi Kurdistan back to Iraq’s central government. The FSC added that the FGI, in turn, would be responsible for paying the salaries of public servants in the KRG, with the amount paid to be deduced at source in Baghdad from the KRG’s share. And the KRG must provide monthly, in-depth accounts of every salary that the FGI is paying. Effectively, this is a much tougher reset of the original ‘budget payments for oil revenues’ deal agreed between the KRG and the FGI back in November 2014, as analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. The deal was that the KRG exported up to 550,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil from its own fields and Kirkuk via SOMO. In return, Baghdad would send 17 percent of the federal budget after sovereign expenses (around US$500 million at that time) per month in budget payments to the Kurds. This arrangement never functioned properly, with the KRG frequently (and rightly) accusing the FGI of underpaying budget disbursements, and the FGI frequently (and rightly) accusing the KRG of under-delivering oil revenues. The deal was then superseded by an understanding reached between the KRG and the new Iraqi federal government formed in October 2018 and centred on the 2019 national budget bill. This required the FGI to transfer sufficient funds from the budget to pay the salaries of KRG employees along with other financial compensation in exchange for the KRG handing over the export of at least 250,000 bpd of crude oil to SOMO. Again, this arrangement never worked properly either. However, things became much worse in late 2017 for two reasons. The first reason was that 25 September 2017 saw a non-binding vote on full independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. Independence had been tacitly promised to Iraqi Kurdistan by the U.S. and its allies in exchange for Kurdistan’s fearsome Peshmerga army being the West’s principal boots on the ground in the fight against the then-rampant ISIS. Over 92 percent of voters in the 2017 referendum voted in favour of independence, but shortly after the results were announced, forces from Iraq and Iran (supported as well by Turkey) moved into the Kurdish region and quelled any further moves to make independence a reality. Neither Iraq nor Iraq nor Turkey (all with sizeable Kurdish populations) could tolerate the ramifications of a broader upsurge in the Kurdish independence movement across the region. The second reason was that soon after that, Russia gained control over Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sector through three key mechanisms also analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. India’s Refining Margins Slump as It Struggles to Secure Russian Oil Moscow’s aim was not just to secure the big oil and gas reserves of Iraqi Kurdistan but, more importantly in the long term, to sow the seeds for the destruction of Kurdish independence and its assimilation into one Iraq. It was Russia, then, that stoked mistrust and discontent between the KRG and FGI over the original 2014 ‘budget payments for oil revenues’ deal, which is largely why it never worked properly. The fault-line that Moscow used to create chaos between the two sides was handed to it by the lack of clarity over oil revenues in Iraq’s own Constitution. According to the KRG, it has authority under Articles 112 and 115 of the Constitution to manage oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region extracted from fields that were not in production in 2005 – the year that the Constitution was adopted by referendum. In addition, the KRG maintains that Article 115 states: “All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organised in a region.” As such, the KRG maintains that as relevant powers are not otherwise stipulated in the Constitution, it has the authority to sell and receive revenue from its oil and gas exports. The KRG also highlights that the Constitution provides that, should a dispute arise, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates. However, the FGI and SOMO argue that under Article 111 of the Constitution oil and gas are under the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates. Another turn for the worse for Iraqi Kurdistan came at the end of 2021 when the U.S. formerly ended its combat mission in Iraq, which effectively flung open the door for even greater economic, political, and military influence in Iraq by Iran, Russia, and China. It is in the interests of none of these three countries for the still broadly pro-U.S. Iraqi Kurdistan to exist. Moscow is happy enough to continue to work on fields in north and south Iraq, but under the administration of a centralised pro-Russian authority in Baghdad. In tandem with this, China has been building up its influence in southern Iraq, through multiple deals done in the oil and gas sector that have then been leveraged into bigger infrastructure deals across the south. The apotheosis of Beijing’s vision for China is all-encompassing ‘Iraq-China Framework Agreement’ of 2021. This in turn, was an extension in scale and scope of the ‘Oil for Reconstruction and Investment’ agreement signed by Baghdad and Beijing in September 2019, which allowed Chinese firms to invest in infrastructure projects in Iraq in exchange for oil, as also analysed in full in my new book on the new global oil market order. Given all of this, it should not surprise anyone that on 3 August last year, the then-new Iraq Prime Minister, Mohammed Al-Sudani, clearly stated that the new unified oil law – run in every respect out of Baghdad - will govern all oil and gas production and investments in both Iraq and its semi-autonomous Kurdistan region and will constitute “a strong factor for Iraq’s unity”. Nor should it surprise anyone that a very high-ranking official from the Kremlin said recently at a meeting with senior government figures from Iran that: “By keeping the West out of energy deals in Iraq – and Baghdad closer to the new Iran-Saudi axis - the end of Western hegemony in the Middle East will become the decisive chapter in the West’s final demise,” a senior source who works closely with the European Union’s energy security apparatus exclusively told OilPrice.com. By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

The election campaign will last a month

The Kurdistan Region will be divided into four constituencies (Sulaimani 38 seats, Erbil 34 seats, Duhok 25 seats, Halabja 3 seats) 🔹Heman Tahsin, Director of the Office of Political Organizations and Parties, in the Iraqi Independent High Election Commission said: from March 12, the registration of candidates will begin for the Kurdistan parliamentary elections, and the election campaign will last a month. 🔹 According to the official of the commission, who spoke to Kurdsat News, they have begun preparations for the parliamentary elections, the elections will be according to the Iraqi voter registration. 🔹The Kurdistan Region will be divided into four constituencies, the constituencies will be determined according to the population of the provinces, the separation of votes will be similar to Iraq as follows: • Erbil: 34 seats • Sulaimani: 38 seats • Duhok: 25 seats • Halabja: 3 seats 🔹 (600) thousand voting cards have been sent to polling stations in the cities of the Kurdistan Region. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has set June 10 as the date for the sixth session of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections.

Marriages and divorce rate in the Kurdistan region

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Judicial Council has released the statistics for 2023, according to the statistics: • The highest number of marriages was in Sulaimani province with (20 thousand 427) cases, which is (39%) of all the region. • The highest number of second marriages was allowed in Erbil province with 34 cases. • The highest number of divorces was in Erbil province with 5,857 cases, which is (33%) of all the region. 🔻Marriage: 🔹 Erbil: (17,543) 🔹 Sulaimani: (20,427) 🔹 Duhok: (12.499) 🔹 Garmian: (2.618) Total: (53,087) 🔻Divorce: 🔹 Erbil: (5,857) divorce rate (33%) 🔹 Sulaimani: (5,438) divorce rate (37%) 🔹 Duhok: (2,164) divorce rate (17%) 🔹 Garmian: (853) divorce rate (33%) Total: (14,312) The divorce rate in the Kurdistan Region is 27%

Iraqi officials' statements about the resumption of oil exports are incorrect

APIKUR denies claims by Government of Iraq (GoI) officials that an agreement has been reached among the GoI, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and international oil companies (IOCs) to resume oil exports through the Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline (ITP). APIKUR’s member companies would welcome the reopening of ITP. Regrettably, to date, we have not even seen any proposals from GoI or KRG for the agreements that would be required to do so. Recently there have been several unfounded media statements by senior GoI officials that a deal has been reached for IOCs to resume exports through the ITP. We do not understand the motivation for such misinformation but note that Iraq is reportedly losing $1 billion for each month that ITP remains closed. APIKUR, also, notes that meetings were held in Baghdad on January 7-9, 2024, between representatives of the GoI, the KRG, and IOCs — including representatives of several APIKUR member companies. But, thus far, there has been no concrete progress towards that end presented to the members of APIKUR. APIKUR member companies stand ready to meet again with GoI and KRG officials to swiftly resolve the issues to the benefit of all.

Production of oil fields in the Kurdistan Region

🔻 Daily production of oil fields (after and before) suspension of oil exports 🔹 In March (2023), (14) oil fields were in production and an average of (453 thousand 232) barrels of oil were produced per day. Currently, seven oil fields in the Kurdistan Region produce 294,150 barrels of oil per day, which is 65% of the pre-suspension capacity. 🔹 Producing companies sell oil at an average of about (35) dollars per barrel. 🔹 Daily revenue from the sale of (294 thousand 150) barrels of oil is $10 million 295 thousand 250 dollars, when the average price of a barrel of oil at 35 dollars. The total monthly revenue from oil sales reaches about (309 million) US dollars, but the revenue does not go back to the Ministry of Finance. 🔹 Both companies (Kar and Lanaz) have been the largest buyers and main beneficiaries of oil in the region and some of the products have been bought by businessmen close to political parties. Part of the production initially (50%) and then (65%) was given to the Kurdistan Regional Governmentand and KRG has sent some of it to Baghdad and the fate of others is unknown.

Iraqi Minorities condemn media attack on minorities in Kurdistan

The Metro Center for Journalists' Rights and Advocacy in Kurdistan Region spoke out, on Wednesday, against what it labeled as a media onslaught on minorities in the region following the recent decision by the Federal Court regarding minority representation in the regional parliament. Director of Metro Center, Diyari Mohammed, emphasized, "We've witnessed unjust attacks on minorities, who are integral parts of our country, especially after the Federal Court's ruling. These campaigns have undermined the rights of minorities. We at the Metro Center firmly reject these media attacks and urge all citizens to refrain from engaging in harmful rhetoric that affects the minority communities." Last week, the Federal Supreme Court, made several rulings on the Kurdistan Parliament's election law and declared the Kurdistan Region parliament's 11 minority seats "unconstitutional". It said the parliament has only 100 members, not 111 as before. The Alliance of Iraqi Minorities Network expressed disappointment over the abolition of the minority quota, viewing it as “a setback in efforts to ensure minority participation in elections.” Israa Al-Faily, representing the Alliance of Iraqi Minorities Network, highlighted concerns over the Federal Court's decision to eliminate the provision guaranteeing minority quota seats in the Kurdistan parliament elections. She stated, "Removing the quota is a concerning step backward in efforts to protect and empower minorities in decision-making processes." Al-Faily stressed the importance of safeguarding the rights of minority groups, citing international agreements and conventions that Iraq has ratified. She noted, “ensuring minority rights contributes to political and social stability and fosters inclusive decision-making and public participation, aligning with global practices.” She added, “The Alliance of Iraqi Minorities Network has tirelessly advocated for minority rights and worked to expand representation beyond a select few groups. Despite challenges posed by political conflicts, the network has strived to enhance mechanisms for minority inclusion in public affairs.” Al-Faily concluded by underscoring the need for “upholding minority representation in the Kurdistan Region parliament and beyond,” emphasizing that “it is not just a minority issue but a fundamental aspect of democracy and human rights.” She called on political parties to prioritize the protection of minority rights and to promote fair and inclusive representation for all communities. Last week, the Federal Supreme Court, made several rulings on the Kurdistan Parliament's election law and declared the Kurdistan Region parliament's 11 minority seats "unconstitutional". It said the parliament has only 100 members, not 111 as before. Noteworthy, the Kurdish election law, enacted in 1992 and revised in 2013, was challenged in the Iraqi federal court for being unconstitutional. The court consolidated the cases because of their similarity. The law allocated 11 out of 111 seats in the legislature for minorities: five for Turkmen, with Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, and Armenians each having one seat. The federal court replaced the Independent High Electoral and Referendum Commission of the Kurdistan Region with Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to manage the Region's elections, following its ruling that the parliament's term extension was unconstitutional. IHEC will supervise the elections until a new parliament establishes its own regional commission.

Turkey refuses to resume oil exports without Baghdad's consent

🔹The Oil, Gas and Natural Resources Committee of the Iraqi Parliament, revealed that the contracts signed by the Kurdistan Region with oil companies, are one of the most obvious obstacles to the resumption of oil exports. 🔹Adnan Jabri, a member of the committee said: The reason for not resuming Kurdistan oil exports is due to technical problems, not political problems. 🔹Turkey has refused to export oil without Baghdad's consent. 🔹The parliamentarian told "Maaluma" website that the Turkish side has closed the oil export pipelines to avoid international sanctions, including the decision of the Paris international court of arbitration. 🔹The federal government has not reached a specific agrement with the Kurdistan Regional Government, on the resumption of oil exports. 🔹One of the other obstacles is the economic style that the Kurdistan Regional Government has implemented in contracts with oil extraction and export companies and the difference with the system of the national marketing company "SOMO" 🔹The contracts signed by the Kurdistan Region with foreign oil companies are one of the most obvious obstacles to the resumption of oil to the Turkish port.

Visa-Free Entry to Kurdistan Region for Citizens of 53 Nations

In a recent move by the Kurdistan Regional Government's Ministry of Interior, citizens from 53 countries have been granted the ability to enter the Kurdistan Region without a pre-arranged visa. Under this new policy, eligible travellers simply need to present their passports at any border entry point, where they will be issued an electronic visa, allowing them immediate access to the region. The countries included in this visa exemption are: Albania, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Vatican City, the Netherlands, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Applicants must ensure their passports are valid for at least 6 months to be eligible for entry. Department of Media and Information

One million 440 thousand people have not received their voter cards

Out of the 3 million 789 thousand eligible voters, 2 million 350 thousand people have received their voting cards (62%), while more than 1 million 439 thousand people have not received their voting cards (38%). That means 38% of citizens already decided to boycott the elections and will not participate. Between the fifth and sixth sessions of the Kurdistan Parliament, 704,000 voter have increased and will be eligible to vote. The Iraqi Independent High Election Commission (IHEC) has extended the deadline for renewing the biometric voter registration in the Kurdistan Region until the end of this month. Jumana Ghulai, spokesperson of the Iraqi Independent High Election Commission (IHEC), told Kurdsat News: • Number of eligible voters: 3 million 789 thousand people • Those who have received their voter cards: 2 million 350 thousand people (62%) • Those who have not received their voting cards (not participating): 1 million 439 thousand people (38%) • Those born in 2006 are eligible to vote: 150 thousand • Eligible to vote for the fifth round of elections in 2018: 3 million 85 thousand people • Eligible to vote in the sixth round of elections in 2024: 3 million 789 thousand people • 704,000 voter have increased between 2018 to 2024 and will be eligible to vote.

Journalist Gohdar Zebari released from prison

Bashdar Hassan, the lawyer of Badinan prisoners, announced the release of Guhdar Zebari. Guhdar Zebari and four other activists and journalists were sentenced to six years in prison by the Erbil Criminal Court on October 16, 2021 on charges of espionage, attempted coup and chaos. In February 2022, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) issued a decree reducing the sentence of Guhdar and his friends to 60%, except for Sherwan Sherwani, whose sentence was reduced by 50%. According to the decision of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Zebari was supposed to be released on March 16, 2023, but was later sentenced to seven months in prison by the Erbil Court of Appeal on charges of "changing the license plate of his car. Gohdar Mohammed Abdulhamid known as Gohdar Zebari • He was born in 1991 in Hashtaka village of Dinarta in Akre district • From 2011-2015 he was a presenter and director at Radio Payam in Akre • Later he prepared articles and reports for Bashur and Shaida magazines • From 2012 to 2015 he was a reporter for Sepeda Tv • In 2014, went to Kobani as Sepeda reporter • 2015-2019 he was an NRT reporter • Since 2018, he has been the representative of Metro Center in Akre

APIKUR calls for US to put Baghdad ‘on notice’ over ‘politically motivated’ exports halt

The Association of Petroleum Industry in the Kurdistan Region (APIKUR) has urged the US to pressure Baghdad to resume oil exports from the region via Turkey at the Munich Security Conference. “We need immediate Congressional action to put Government of Iraq leadership on notice that they must implement a full budget for Iraq’s Kurdistan Region and get the oil flowing through the Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline,” APIKUR spokesman Myles Caggins told INSIGHT today. The two-day conference, presents an opportunity to tell Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shiaa Al-Sudani “to promptly resolve the oil and budgetary issues if he expects to get more U.S. financial assistance”, Caggins warned. Meanwhile, APIKUR called for US action on the “politically-driven blockade” in a letter addressed to Senate whip and chair of the Justice Committee Senator Dick Durbin dated 12 February. It urges him to raise this “critical issue” with Iraqi and Kurdistan Region leaders during the conference and “pressure” the Iraqi government to “promptly take the steps required to reopen the Iraqi-Türkiye pipeline”, implement an amended federal budget law and provide international oil companies with surety of payment for exports. “The continued closure is effectively a politically-driven oil blockade that directly harms U.S. interests and investments,” it says, putting the cost of the exports halt at “an estimated $1 billion monthly—while [Iraq is] continuing to receive tax dollars from the U.S.”. Highlighting the damage to US companies and investment, the letter also suggests that “conditions on future US assistance to Iraq must be considered if Iraq continues to economically strangle the Kurdistan Region and U.S. oil investments, production and export”. Iraqi Oil Minister Hayan Abdul-Ghani told reporters earlier this week that negotiations between his ministry and international oil companies (IOCs) on resuming crude exports via the Turkish port at Ceyhan were “on the right track” and that he expected agreements would be reached in the near future. Exports were suspended after Paris-based arbitration over the Iraq-Turkey pipeline issued a decision last March. Ankara says it is ready for exports to resume.

The U.S. Consulate welcomes the KRG Ministry of Culture’s decision to cancel media directive No. 1

U.S. consulate general in Erbil announced that they welcome the KRG Ministry of Culture’s decision to cancel media directive No. 1, 2023 passed in May 2023, which would have introduced new security vetting requirements for online journalists which the U.S. consulate said that they believe “it would have chilled media freedom.” The U.S. consulate in Erbil also said: This decision to cancel the directive reflects the KRG’s responsiveness to concerns raised by the international community as well as local efforts to improve media freedoms. We are committed to working with our local and international partners to continue to improve and promote media freedom and responsible media.

A United States Court warns Masrour Barzani

"Complaint has been filed" He must respond or give an explanation to the court within 21 days United States District Court for the District of Columbia has issued a notice to Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, asking him to respond to the request within 21 days. The warning is a complaint filed by the Kurdistan Victims Fund against Masrour Barzani and a number of other officials.

Minister of Culture and Youth canceled the directive

Following a wave of protests, the Minister of Culture and Youth has finally canceled a directive that had handed the government over the criteria for media content. The (KRG) Minister of Culture and Youth Hama Hama Saeed has officially repealed the directive number (1) of 2023 on (regulation of media work in the Kurdistan Region). In the middle of last year, the directive sparked a wave of protests from journalists and writers against Masrour Barzani's cabinet, which, along with the decline in livelihoods and services, took measures to restrict freedom of the press. Some of the criticism was directed at the PUK, as the minister of culture belongs to the PUK. Dr. Saman Fawzi, a university professor and expert in media law, pointed out the weaknesses in the guidelines of the Ministry of Culture and said, "The directive contains many dangerous points for journalists and media outlets. It is not even useful for amendment, so it should be rejected". Weaknesses of the Ministry of Culture's guidelines: • Because there is no parliament to pass a law to regulate the work of the media, the government has taken the opportunity to issue this guideline. • However, there must be an independent committee to issue these guidelines, not belonging to the government. • In the guidelines, the title is one thing, and the content is something else. There are many problems in terms of form. There are ethical issues, but they are treated as laws in this guideline, which is a problem. • According to Article 9, this directive does not cover the field of journalism and journalists, but why later does it define journalists? We do not understand what it means. • Licensing issue: France has not had a journalism license for more than 100 years. Kurdistan was the last place that denied the license in the journalism law. But now the directive says the license is under the authority of the Ministry of Culture, but after the approval of the Ministry of Interior, which it creates many problems. • There are many taxes and fees: In Article 7, the satellite (40) million dinars, Television (20) million, Fees of broadcasting companies (30) million dinars, This is a blow to the free media that cannot afford that amount. • Article 4, paragraph 4, deals with defamation, insult and harassment. Nobody knows what they mean by annoying? These concepts carry different interpretations. • Article 4, paragraph 17 states that the criteria for media content are issued by the Media and Information Office of the Kurdistan Regional Government. That is, the government tells the media what to do and what to publish. • Article 11 states that a board of representatives of the Ministry of Interior, Culture and the Media and Information department shall be formed to implement this directive. That is, the government itself implements the guidelines on journalists. • In Article 13, paragraph, discusses the closure of electronic publishing tools and social media pages. This is a very severe punishment, It is like an execution for journalism. • Article 12, paragraph 12, states that the disclosure of government documents is not authorized for publication, that is, no government documents should be published in the future, all those documents related to the corruption cases in the government should not be published. • In the guidelines of the Ministry of Culture, the treatment for shadow media, those whose background is unknown and the character behind it is unknown, insults and attacks this and that, is not addressed, which it should have had a solution to those issues. • Between rejecting, canceling and amending this guideline of the Ministry of Culture, I am in favor of rejecting it completely because you do not know where to change it.