Winthrop Rodgers- Draw Media

The Kurdish-led administration in northeastern Syria faces a new political landscape following the fall of the Assad regime in early December. Amid so much uncertainty, there are many urgent questions about its future. These include local, national, regional, and geopolitical considerations. Finding answers is an urgent matter.
First, what can be done about the internal divisions of Syria’s Kurds? Second, what is their place in the new Syria? Third, what will Turkey and other regional powers do? Finally, will the new US administration continue or change its current policies in northeastern Syria?

Intra-Kurdish Affairs
As in many other parts of Kurdistan, Syrian Kurdish politics is factional and divisive. The desirability of forming a unified front is widely acknowledged. It would help ensure cohesive and democratic governance, present a strong position in negotiations with the new powers in Damascus, and address the demands of regional and geopolitical actors.
Nevertheless, unity has proved elusive amid disagreements between the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which adheres to the political program developed by Abdullah Öcalan, and the Kurdish National Council in Syria (ENKS), which is backed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In recent years, the US, France, and others have repeatedly tried to reconcile the two sides, but without success.
However, the logjam seems to be breaking. On January 16, Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi and KDP leader Masoud Barzani met near Erbil for talks aimed at building Kurdish unity. The landmark meeting was brokered by the US, who reportedly transported Abdi to the Kurdistan Region. Both sides acknowledged that the talks were positive. The news sparked celebrations in Qamislo and other parts of northeastern Syria and was heartily welcomed by Kurds around the world.
While this unexpected development is a positive step, it is just one part of the process. Previous agreements to manage the divisions between the Syrian Kurdish factions were not implemented. Whether this new initiative can bear fruit—and establish a unified Kurdish front in dealings with Damascus and foreign governments—will depend both on internal factors and the actions of many other groups.

The New Syria
Another urgent question is how the relatively well-established political and security structures that developed in northeastern Syria will interact with those emerging in Damascus. Strong democratic federal system is at the heart of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria’s (AANES) ideological and policy program, which stood in stark contrast to the centralism and ethnic authoritarianism espoused by the Assad regime.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the other Syrian rebel groups that are now in charge of the government in Damascus were also opposed to the Ba’athist model, but they do not share the outlook of the AANES. At this point, it seems unlikely that they will accept a federal structure that gives the Kurds the sort of autonomy found next door in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Perhaps a united Kurdish front will be strong enough to negotiate such an arrangement, but it is hardly guaranteed.
Regardless, it is essential that Syrian Kurds and other religious and ethnic minorities have legal protections that are reliably enforced. This would both address the historical violations committed against them and help to establish the harmonious foundation that Syria needs in order to flourish.
Whether Syrian Kurds find a cooperative partner in the new government in Damascus is an open question. The background and intentions of its leading factions—especially the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)—are extremely suspect. Caution is warranted, as is pragmatism.

Turkey Looms Large
Regional powers will also wield significant influence over the future of Kurds in Syria. The most important is Turkey, which has consistently opposed the establishment of a Kurdish entity on its southern border. It launched major military interventions against the SDF in 2016, 2018, and 2019 and frequently conducts airstrikes on military and civilian targets. Moreover, Ankara’s militia proxy, the SNA, has committed numerous atrocities against Kurdish civilians in places like Afrin.
In recent weeks, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his political allies have adopted a new strategy to dealing with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), allowing meetings between Öcalan, who remains imprisoned in a Turkish detention facility, and Kurdish politicians. There is cautious optimism about this effort, which could change the trajectory of Kurds across the Middle East. Indeed, it likely enabled the Barzani-Abdi meeting to take place.
However, it is equally clear that Ankara’s main policy objectives regarding Kurds in general and northeastern Syria in particular have not substantively changed. Turkish airstrikes continue and the rhetoric remains hostile. How Turkey manages the situation is perhaps the most consequential question posed here.
To a lesser extent, Iran and Russia also play a role in the future of northeastern Syria. Both were major players in the Assad era and are diminished as a consequence of his fall. Nevertheless, they continue to have regional interests and will act opportunistically. It certainly merits watching.

Trump’s Return
Finally, how will President Donald Trump handle Syria on his return to the White House? Unlike most incoming presidents, Trump has an established track record, although it is not one that is encouraging for Kurds. In 2019, he unexpectedly announced that he planned to withdraw US troops from northeastern Syria, which gave a green light to Erdogan to launch Operation Peace Spring. While he was convinced to backtrack and maintain a US military presence, it is well-known that he holds a dim view about its value.
That said, his national security team is made up of figures who are far more supportive of a robust US role in the Middle East, including presumptive Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz. Many see this as a positive sign that the new administration will maintain a US presence in northeastern Syria.
There are two important caveats to this silver lining. First, it is hardly guaranteed that Trump’s aides will be able to guide his behavior. They are there to implement his policies rather than the other way around. Moreover, they are not the only ones that Trump listens to and the president has a habit of breaking subordinates if they displease him. Rubio is a former political rival that Trump routinely disparaged as “Little Marco.” The new secretary of state has a tricky path ahead of him.
Second, observers often make the mistake of conflating support for the Kurds in the context of Washington’s geostrategic priorities with support for their political ambitions in the states where they live. Both Rubio and Waltz have good things to say about Kurds, but their focus is clearly on Iran and Islamic State (ISIS). It is worth remembering that it was the first Trump administration that opposed the 2017 independence referendum in the Kurdistan Region. Clues to how the US might respond to the new situation in Syria might be found in that episode.
Understandably, there is a great deal of optimism about Syria’s future following the collapse of the Assad regime, but there is also great uncertainty. Local, national, regional, and geopolitical considerations are at play. Syrian Kurds must navigate these rough and often contradictory waters. These next few months are critical.