Draw Media
News / Kurdistan

KRG collects electricity payments through (E-Psule)

Masrour Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, inaugurated the E-Psule project in Erbil. This is a digital platform launched by the Kurdistan Regional Government to collect electricity bill payments, and later, other types of bill payments as well. According to those who developed it, the platform has been approved by the Central Bank of Iraq, is supported by the U.S. Treasury Department, and is audited by the company Deloitte. The website is scheduled to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. No additional fees or commissions will be charged for paying bills. It has also been decided that payments on this site will not be made through automatic deductions, meaning the electricity bill or any other payment will not be withdrawn automatically from your account—you must make the payment yourself. In the first phase, the following banks and digital wallets will be available: Banks Cihan Bank FIB Bank Digital wallets NAS Wallet FastPay AsiaPay Available in the first quarter of 2026 Iraqi Islamic Bank RT Bank Bank of Baghdad Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank BBAC Bank Digital wallets and operators Zain Cash

Read more

DNO increases production by 66%

Summary of DNO’s financial and operational results for 2025 Revenue: Annual revenue doubled, reaching USD 1,474 million, driven by the acquisition of Sval Energi in Norway in June. Operating cash flow: Cash generated from operations rose to USD 929 million, more than double the previous year. Profit: Operating profit increased to USD 513 million, while net profit was a loss of USD 25 million after tax and financial expenses. Total production: Production increased by 43%, reaching an average of 110,700 barrels per day, distributed as follows: North Sea: 54,800 bpd Kurdistan: 52,600 bpd West Africa: 3,300 bpd Fourth-quarter growth: Production surged in Q4, reaching 88,300 bpd in the North Sea and 58,000 bpd in Kurdistan. Kurdistan: Full production capacity was restored by year-end after mid-year reductions caused by drone attacks. Historic milestone: By the end of 2025, DNO reached a record 500 million barrels of oil produced from the Tawke license in Kurdistan (DNO holds 75% and is the operator). Shareholder returns: USD 130 million was distributed to shareholders during 2025. DNO concludes a landmark year and prepares for a volatile market in 2026 DNO ASA, the Norwegian oil and gas company, announced that its annual revenue in 2025 doubled to USD 1.474 billion, mainly due to the acquisition of Sval Energi in Norway in June. Operating cash flow more than doubled to USD 929 million, while operating profit rose to USD 513 million. Net profit stood at a loss of USD 25 million after tax and financial costs. One of the most important achievements of the year was reaching 500 million barrels of oil produced at the Tawke license in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Total net production in 2025 increased by 43% to 110,700 barrels of oil equivalent per day, the highest level in the company’s 54-year history. This production was split between: North Sea: 54,800 bpd Kurdistan: 52,600 bpd West Africa: 3,300 bpd Production accelerated in the fourth quarter, reaching 88,300 bpd in the North Sea and 58,000 bpd in Kurdistan. Kurdistan operations After a 30-month halt in investment caused by the shutdown of the export pipeline to the Mediterranean, DNO resumed drilling activities in Kurdistan. The company launched an 8-well drilling program using two rigs at the Tawke license to increase production and reserves. In January, a contract for a third rig was signed, reinforcing DNO’s position as the most active international operator in the region. To secure cash flow, DNO continues to sell oil under cash-and-carry arrangements and long-term contracts with domestic buyers at prices around USD 30 per barrel, with the aim of returning fully to export markets by year-end. North Sea operations DNO now holds interests in: 30 producing fields 4 development projects 4 additional projects expected to be sanctioned this year In January, the company was awarded 17 new licenses in Norway, operating 4 of them. Outlook for 2026 CEO Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani stated that due to geopolitical uncertainties, oil markets in 2026 will fluctuate between volatility and opportunity, but DNO is well-positioned to manage market swings. Strong cash flow from the North Sea and available credit lines allow the company to pursue attractive acquisition opportunities. Capital expenditure 2026: expected to reach USD 1.65 billion (up from USD 1.55 billion in 2025), mainly due to resumed drilling in Kurdistan. Production forecast 2026: expected to increase by 10%, reaching 150,000 bpd. Production and sales figures (Q4 2025) Operated production: Reached 87,823 boepd, up from 58,081 boepd in Q3. Kurdistan: 77,268 boepd (up 66% from Q3) North Sea: 10,555 boepd, slightly lower due to reduced output at the Trym field. Net production: Reached 149,678 boepd, distributed as: Kurdistan: 57,951 boepd North Sea: 88,271 boepd West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire): 3,456 boepd Net entitlement: 108,290 boepd Sales volume: 94,971 boepd Tawke license – Kurdistan Region of Iraq Total production Q4 2025: 77,268 bpd, up from 46,572 bpd in Q3 (+66%). Field breakdown: Tawke field: 29,095 bpd Peshkabir field: 48,173 bpd Production recovered gradually after disruptions caused by mid-2025 drone attacks. Oil exports through the Iraq–Turkey pipeline resumed in late September 2025 after being halted since March 2023. Meanwhile, DNO continues domestic sales at around USD 30 per barrel. License ownership Tawke: DNO 75% (operator), Genel Energy 25% Baeshiqa: DNO 64% operating interest (covers 80% of costs), Turkish Energy Company 16%, Kurdistan Regional Government 20%

Read more

Iraq’s Mechanisms to Reduce the Kurdistan Region’s Share

🔻 Iraq’s budget data (2005–2025) reveal a major structural flaw that poses a serious threat to the financial stability of the Kurdistan Region. 🔹 The Kurdistan Region contributes approximately 8.7 trillion IQD annually to financing Iraq’s sovereign expenditures. 🔹 The most “shocking” figure relates to public debt: the Region is obligated to pay 1.6 trillion IQD annually, yet receives only 62.4 billion IQD in return. In other words, it pays 26 dollars for every 1 dollar it receives. 🔹 The “actual expenditure” trap – a collective punishment: Baghdad has adopted an “actual expenditure” mechanism instead of fixed allocations. This means the Region does not receive its share unless projects in central and southern Iraq are implemented. As a result, the Kurdistan Region’s budget and public-sector salaries become tied to the completion rate of projects in Basra or Anbar. Iraq’s budget data (2005–2025) expose a major structural imbalance that threatens the financial sustainability of the Kurdistan Region. This occurs through the unchecked expansion of so-called “sovereign expenditures” and the adoption of the “actual expenditure” mechanism, which together have altered the Region’s constitutional entitlements—leaving them merely numbers on paper, while in practice they are cut or reduced before ever reaching the Region. 1. “The Sovereign Cleaver.” The Kurdistan Region contributes 8.7 trillion IQD annually to Iraq’s sovereign expenditures. In 2005, these expenditures were very limited, covering only core state institutions (the Presidency, Parliament, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense). However, in the 2023–2025 budgets, sovereign expenditures expanded dramatically, reaching nearly 47.4 trillion IQD annually. This growth was not only quantitative but also qualitative, as many major budget items were reclassified under the “sovereign” label to deduct them upfront from the Kurdistan Region’s and provinces’ shares. 2. Shocking Debt Equation: Pay 26, Receive 1 The most striking figure concerns public debt. While the Region is required to pay 1.6 trillion IQD annually—representing 12.67% of Iraq’s sovereign debt service—it receives only 62.4 billion IQD from loan allocations. In simple terms, for every 1 dollar the Region receives in loans, it pays 26 dollars to service federal debt spent elsewhere in Iraq. 3. The “Actual Expenditure” Trap – Collective Financial Punishment Baghdad replaced fixed allocations with the “actual expenditure” mechanism. The Region does not receive its share unless projects in central and southern Iraq are implemented. Consequently, the Kurdistan Region’s budget and salaries are effectively tied to project execution in provinces such as Basra or Anbar. This constitutes collective financial punishment, contradicting Article 121(Third) of the Iraqi Constitution, which mandates allocations based on population and needs—not on how much federal ministries spend elsewhere. First: Sovereign Expenditures in Iraq’s Budgets (2005–2025) Comparative budget tables reveal massive increases in expenditures, especially sovereign ones, which now form a substantial portion of the budget and are deducted before revenue sharing. Analysis Sovereign expenditures increased not only in amount but also in scope. Between 2008 and 2021, 81 additional items were classified as “sovereign”: 2005–2010 (Administrative phase): Sovereign spending limited to symbols of state authority. The Region’s financial share was relatively large. 2011–2018 (Security and oil phase): Oil contract costs and export expenses were added as sovereign expenditures, reaching up to 15 trillion IQD annually. 2019–2025 (Debt and centralization phase): Debt service: Interest and installments on loans taken for projects in central and southern Iraq classified as sovereign and deducted from the Region’s share. Security forces: Budgets for the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Counter-Terrorism Service fully classified as sovereign. Major Sovereign Components Oil production/export costs: 15.8 trillion IQD annually. Public debt service (interest + principal): over 12.3 trillion IQD annually. Total estimated sovereign expenditures: 47.4 trillion IQD annually (minimum estimate). Second: The Kurdistan Region’s Share Before Deducting Sovereign Expenditures Total federal budget: ~199 trillion IQD annually. If 12.67% were applied to the total without sovereign deductions, the Region would receive ~25.2 trillion IQD annually. Actual allocated share after deductions: ~16.5 trillion IQD annually. Difference (~8.7 trillion IQD) represents the Region’s indirect contribution to sovereign expenditures. Third: Public Debt – What the Region Pays vs. What It Receives Contributions The Kurdistan Region contributes 12.67% of Iraq’s total public debt service, amounting to ~1.6 trillion IQD annually, covering debts to: World Bank IMF JICA U.S., Italian, German loans Paris Club and bond obligations What the Region Receives JICA loan for water projects: $46 million World Bank loan: $2 million Small, unspecified shares from federal loans Total received: ~$48 million (≈ 62.4 billion IQD) Net Result The Region pays 1.6 trillion IQD and receives 62 billion IQD—a 26:1 imbalance, creating an annual deficit of ~1.55 trillion IQD in the debt balance. Fourth: “Actual Expenditure” and Its Impact on the Region’s Share Baghdad adopted “actual expenditure” instead of approved allocations, undermining the Region’s financial mechanism. Definition Under Article 11(Second) of the budget law, the Region’s share is calculated based on actual federal spending, not approved budget figures. Financial and Political Impacts The Region does not receive its fixed monthly entitlement (~1.37 trillion IQD), but an amount dependent on federal ministries’ actual spending elsewhere. Any federal austerity or liquidity crisis automatically reduces the Region’s share. If a project in Basra or Anbar stalls, citizens in the Kurdistan Region lose their corresponding budget share—creating chronic financial uncertainty. For every dollar the Kurdistan Region receives to fund service projects, it pays 26 dollars to service Iraq’s federal debt—mostly spent outside the Region. This structural imbalance is a clear manifestation of systemic financial injustice embedded in Iraq’s sovereign expenditure framework.

Read more

​​​​​​​Massacres in Western Kurdistan (Rojava)

Ibrahim Sheikho, Head of the Afrin Human Rights Organization, stated: 272 Kurdish bodies were received at the Aleppo Forensic Medicine Hospital. 1,200 people were killed (martyred) in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah. More than 2,000 civilians have been displaced. 250,000 people from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah are displaced. Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah together are home to more than 500,000 residents. One Afrin family, consisting of six members, was killed together on the road from Raqqa to Hasakah. One Kobane family, consisting of nine members, was killed together on the road from Raqqa to Hasakah. In the Sabah al-Khair area, located between Raqqa and Hasakah (about 60 km from Raqqa and 100 km from Hasakah), Arab residents of the area attacked Kurdish families, killing them and burning their bodies. In Raqqa, several fighters were beheaded and humiliated, and multiple people were assaulted. In the Sabah al-Khair area, an SDF fighter was killed, and his body was burned. In Sabah al-Khair, a massacre of Kurds took place when Kurdish families fleeing Raqqa toward Hasakah were stopped, some were killed, their bodies mutilated and burned, and the perpetrators recorded and published videos themselves. In addition to the displaced from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah, more than 150,000 displaced people are currently in Hasakah and Qamishli. Some displaced people are sheltering in mosques, schools, and private homes. The situation in Kobane is extremely dire: more than 400,000 people are trapped, besieged from the south by the Syrian Army and from the north by the Turkish Army. A massacre occurred in Kobane: a family of 12 people, including children, was bombed by a Turkish aircraft. More than 3,000 people have been killed in the most recent war in Western Kurdistan. More than 2,000 people remain displaced.

Read more

Only in Sheikh Maqsoud, 2,700 People Are Displaced

Ibrahim Haftarro, Head of the Afrin Civic Assembly in Qamishli, stated: During the attack on Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah, all kinds of heavy weapons were used, even though 98% of Sheikh Maqsoud’s residents are Kurds. 2,700 Kurds have been displaced from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah, all of them Kurdish. The exact number of martyrs is not confirmed, but it is in the hundreds. 3,000 to 4,000 Kurdish families from Afrin who had settled in Tabqa and Deir Hafer were displaced again. Approximately 500,000 people were living in Sheikh Maqsoud. 150,000 displaced people are Afrin residents alone. More than 200,000 displaced persons from Kobane, Afrin, and Serekaniye are currently in Qamishli and Hasakah. In one house in Sheikh Maqsoud, 7 members of a single family were killed together, in addition to the killing of hundreds of others. In Kobane, 10 members of one family were killed together. This is because they believe Kurdish blood, homes, and lives are permissible (halal to violate). Every Afrin family has been displaced five times: In 2013, families were displaced from Aleppo to Afrin. In 2018, from Afrin to the Shahba region. In 2024, from Shahba to Tabqa. In 2026, from Tabqa to Qamishli and Derik. The fate of the people of Afrin has been repeated displacement, five times, and each time during the cold winter season. Afrin is 98% Kurdish, with a population of nearly 900,000 people or more. Afrin is under the control of Turkey-backed groups, including Hamshat and Amshat factions.  

Read more

The New Map of Western Kurdistan (Rojava)

At present, all Kurdish territory in the regions of Kobane, Hasakah, and Qamishli is under autonomous administration, except for Afrin, Serekaniye (Ras al-Ayn), and Tal Abyad (Girê Spî), which were occupied five years ago. The total area currently under the control of the Autonomous Administration / SDF (HSD) is approximately 20,000 square kilometers, out of a total 33,000 square kilometers of Western Kurdistan. At present, 7 oil and gas fields, 1,500 oil wells, and 25 gas wells remain under autonomous control. However, most villages along the borders of Western Kurdistan have undergone Arabization. Out of 1,717 villages, more than 1,000 are Arab-populated, while fewer than 700 remain Kurdish. Out of a population exceeding 4 million in Rojava, more than 2.5 million people live under autonomous administration in Hasakah, Kobane, and Qamishli, while approximately 1.5 million people live under the control of Turkey-backed groups and the Syrian government in Afrin, Sheikh Maqsoud, Serekaniye, and Tal Abyad, areas that were previously occupied. Recent Military Developments The 15-day conflict between the SDF, the Syrian Army, and armed Syrian groups reshaped the control map in Syria. As a result, the SDF lost control of all Arab-majority regions, retaining authority only in Kurdish-majority areas, with a remaining area of approximately 20,000 square kilometers. Syria’s total area is 185,180 square kilometers. Before the events in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah, territorial control was as follows: Syrian Government: 69.3% SDF: 27.8% Druze regions: 2.8% Golan Heights: 0.1% Before the conflict that began on January 6, 2026, the total SDF-controlled area was 51,961 km², distributed across the governorates of Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Aleppo. Governorate Breakdown (Before January 2026) Hasakah: 23,334 km² Raqqa: 19,616 km² Aleppo: 18,500 km² Deir ez-Zor: 33,060 km² Current Situation by Governorate 1. Hasakah Governorate Total area: 23,334 km² About 3,000 km² in the north is controlled by Turkey-backed groups. Approximately 17,000 km² remains under SDF control, including Hasakah city, Qamishli, Derik, and Amuda. 2. Raqqa Governorate Total area: 19,616 km² Previously, 11,700 km² were under SDF control, including Raqqa city and Tabqa. All of these Arab-majority areas have now been lost. 3. Deir ez-Zor Governorate Total area: 33,060 km² Previously, 14,527 km² (including the governorate center) were under SDF control. All of this Arab-majority territory has now been lost, including most oil and gas fields. 4. Aleppo Governorate Total area: 18,500 km² Previously, about 5,400 km² were under SDF control, including Kobane, Sheikh Maqsoud, Ashrafiyah, Deir Hafer, and Maskanah. Currently, only 3,250 km² remain under SDF control, mainly Kobane and its countryside. Total Area Under Autonomous Control Approximately 20,250 square kilometers Western Kurdistan (Rojava) Western Kurdistan has become fragmented. Since the 1962 census, which stripped many Kurds of citizenship, and through systematic Arabization, most villages in Rojava have become Arab-populated. According to research by Imad Abdul-Hussein Jaf, the area of Western Kurdistan exceeds 33,150 km², stretching 822 km from the Tigris River to Afrin. According to 2023 statistics, Rojava’s population is 4,518,166, including: 2,297,879 males 2,220,287 females Administratively, Rojava is divided among the governorates of Hasakah, Aleppo, and Raqqa. Districts of Western Kurdistan Afrin District – occupied by Turkey since 20 January 2018 Serekaniye District – occupied since 2019 Tal Abyad District – occupied since 2019 Kobane District – under autonomous administration Qamishli District – under autonomous administration Derik District – under autonomous administration Hasakah District – under autonomous administration Liberated vs. Occupied Areas Liberated Areas Hasakah, Qamishli, Kobane, Derik, Amuda, Tal Tamr, Ain Diwar, Tel Kocher, and surrounding towns and villages. Occupied Areas (since 2019) Afrin, Tal Abyad, Serekaniye, Sheikh Maqsoud, and Ashrafiyah. Population Distribution (2023) Afrin: 900,000 – 1,000,000 Sheikh Maqsoud & Ashrafiyah: 500,000 Kobane: 600,000 Tal Abyad & Serekaniye: 500,000 Hasakah & Qamishli: 1,800,000 Other areas: 800,000 Total population under autonomous administration: over 2.5 million. Oil and Gas Fields Under SDF Control Approximately 1,500 oil wells and 25 gas wells, including: Rumailan Oil Field Alian Oil Field Suwaydiyah Oil Field Karachok Oil Field Rumailan Gas Field Maashouq Oil Field Tal Adas Oil Field Key Fields Suwaydiyah Oil Field Production capacity: 116,000 barrels/day Wells: 685 Reserves: 8 billion barrels Rumailan Oil Field Wells: 460 Reserves: 1.3 billion barrels Production: 90,000 barrels/day Rumailan Gas Field Production: 2 million cubic meters/day Supplies power plants and households Supports Suwaydiyah gas station (the largest in the region) Karachok Oil Field Wells: 450 (200 active) Reserves: ~1 billion barrels Oil production: 45,000 barrels/day Gas production: 200–300 thousand m³/day Yusufiyah Oil Field Production: 25,000 barrels/day Wells: 22

Read more

Violation statistics between Metro Center and the Journalists’ Syndicate

There is a large discrepancy between the violation statistics against journalists reported by the Metro Center and the Journalists’ Syndicate. According to the Syndicate, there were (46) violations, while the Metro Center reports (315) violations. The Kurdistan Journalists’ Syndicate announced at a press conference that during the past year, there were (23) violations committed against (45) journalists and (1) media outlet, totaling (46) violations. The Metro Center in Sulaimani announced that during the past year, there were (315) violations against (252) journalists and media outlets. Diyar Mohammed, director of the Metro Center, stated that on a single day (February 9, 2025), during teachers’ protests in Degala, there were (59) violations against (36) journalists and (2) media outlets.

Read more

SDF loses 42% of its territory to the Syrian Army

Report: Drew Media Edited and translated by Karwan Khoshnaw Syrian Democratic Forces lose more than 40 percent of territory in rapid battlefield reversal The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have lost more than two-fifths of the territory they once controlled in northern and eastern Syria, following a swift series of military setbacks over the past two weeks. According to figures compiled from the ground, the SDF have lost around 21,500 square kilometres out of a total 51,961 square kilometres they previously held, a contraction of approximately 42 percent. The losses include two governorates and at least 12 cities and towns, leaving the force in control of just one governorate and three cities. The collapse in territorial control follows fighting that began in the predominantly Kurdish neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh in Aleppo and rapidly expanded eastwards, culminating in the loss of Raqqa and large parts of Deir ez-Zor, areas long regarded as the SDF’s strategic and economic backbone. Leadership response and regional dynamics The SDF’s commander-in-chief, Mazloum Abdi, said the confrontation had been imposed on his forces, arguing that the SDF had relied heavily on international backing to defend what he described as the political project of Kurdish self-administration in northern Syria. He blamed the offensive on a Turkish-led strategy, implemented through Syrian government forces and Turkish-backed armed groups, carried out with what he characterised as tacit American approval, Israeli silence, and acquiescence from several Arab states. Neither Turkey nor United States has publicly endorsed that characterisation. Shifting control across Syria Syria’s total land area is approximately 185,180 square kilometres. Before the latest fighting, control was divided broadly as follows:     •    Syrian government forces: 69.3 percent     •    SDF: 27.8 percent     •    Druze-controlled areas: 2.8 percent     •    Israeli-held Golan Heights: 0.1 percent The SDF’s territory was spread across four governorates: Hasakah, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Aleppo. Heavy losses in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor The most severe reversals have occurred in Raqqa Governorate, where SDF-held territory has shrunk from around 11,700 square kilometres to just 3,300 square kilometres, a loss of 8,400 square kilometres. The city of Raqqa and the town of Tabqa, once central to SDF control, have fallen, along with key infrastructure including dams, a power station, and energy facilities. In Deir ez-Zor Governorate, the SDF previously controlled about 14,527 square kilometres, including the provincial centre. That figure has now dropped to roughly 3,500 square kilometres, meaning a loss of more than 11,000 square kilometres. The governorate contains most of Syria’s major oil and gas fields, making the setback both militarily and economically significant. Aleppo and Hasakah: reduced but holding In Aleppo Governorate, SDF control has declined from around 5,400 square kilometres to 3,250 square kilometres, following the loss of Deir Hafir, Maskanah, and the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighbourhoods. The city of Kobane and the strategically important Tishrin Dam remain under SDF authority. By contrast, Hasakah Governorate has seen more limited changes. Although around 3,000 square kilometres in the north are controlled by Turkish-backed groups, the SDF still hold approximately 20,334 square kilometres, including Qamishli and the al-Hol camp, one of the largest detention sites for suspected Islamic State affiliates and their families. Strategic infrastructure lost Among the most consequential losses are major energy and water assets now under Syrian government control, including:     •    Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates, completed in 1973 and capable of storing 11.6 billion cubic metres of water     •    Freedom Dam (al-Thawra), built in 1981     •    Tabqa power station     •    Key oil and gas fields in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, including Conoco, al-Omar, Tanak, and Thawra Together, these facilities once generated tens of thousands of barrels of oil per day and supplied electricity and water to large parts of northern Syria. Changing loyalties on the ground Much of the territory lost by the SDF is predominantly Arab-populated. Local sources indicate that significant numbers of Arab fighters previously aligned with the SDF have defected during the fighting, switching allegiance to Syrian government forces and pro-Damascus militias. This shift has accelerated the collapse of SDF control in mixed and Arab-majority areas, exposing the limits of the group’s authority beyond its Kurdish heartlands. Uncertain future for SDF autonomy Attention is now focused on a possible agreement between Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi. Analysts warn that, if implemented in full, such a deal could lead to further territorial concessions and potentially bring an end to the SDF’s administrative autonomy, military independence, and self-governing structures. For now, the SDF remain in control of significant pockets of territory, but the scale and speed of recent losses mark one of the most serious challenges the group has faced since its rise during the war against Islamic State.  

Read more

Education Sector Data and Information

Report of the Media and Information Directorate 🔹 Currently, the education sector includes 1,827,572 students. 🔹 In 2025 alone, 8,836 students were returned to education. 🔹 22,134,074 textbooks were printed in color and high quality for the 2025–2026 academic year and distributed to students. 🔹 2,500 diaspora citizens participated in online Kurdish language learning courses, and 8,500 Kurdish books were sent to diaspora schools. 🔹 Solar power systems were installed in 32 schools:     • 25 schools supported by the Barzani Charity Foundation     • 7 schools supported by UNICEF Digitalization and Artificial Intelligence Completion of certificate translation into English and Arabic within just 6 minutes. Availability of the E-Assessment application for parents/guardians to monitor grades and evaluations of their children. Modern and Environment-Friendly Infrastructure Opening of 30 new schools and renovation/work on 30 other schools. Installation of solar energy systems in 32 schools in coordination with the Barzani Charity Foundation and UNICEF. Provision of 200 smart boards for schools at a cost of 430 million IQD. Curriculum and Textbooks Printing of more than 22 million textbooks with high quality for the 2025–2026 academic year. Implementation of scientific revisions in 22 textbooks. Kurdish Education Abroad (Diaspora) Participation of 2,500 diaspora members in online Kurdish language courses. Distribution of 8,500 Kurdish books to diaspora schools.

Read more

Attacks targeting the Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods

Draw Media Foreign Relations Department – Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria 07 January 2026   Locations: The Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood enjoys a unique strategic location in the northern part of the city of Aleppo, as it lies atop an elevated hill that grants it wide oversight of the city and both banks of the Quweiq River. The neighborhood is bordered to the east by the railway line that connects to Turkish territory, and to the south by the Christian cemeteries and the French military cemetery. As for the Ashrafieh neighborhood, it is located directly southwest of Sheikh Maqsoud, forming an urban extension of it. Together, the two neighborhoods overlook the Lairamoun industrial area and the Castello Road to the north and west, in addition to the Youth Housing neighborhood, which gives them significant military importance due to the geographical elevation and control over vital axes within the city. The elevated location of Sheikh Maqsoud is considered a decisive factor in the dynamics of the conflict, as it provides a tactical advantage for surveillance and control over the surrounding areas. This advantage has made the two neighborhoods frequent targets of attacks, and at the same time a stronghold for the residents’ self-defense, with the Ashrafieh neighborhood serving as a complementary area that reinforces this strategic importance. Armed Factions Attacking the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh Neighborhoods: The military factions affiliated with Turkey and operating under the authority of the Ministry of Defense of the Syrian Interim Government in Damascus are carrying out attacks on the two neighborhoods using all types of heavy weapons (heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, mortars, artillery, tanks, and drones). Meanwhile, the two neighborhoods are devoid of any military presence, with only Internal Security Forces present to ensure security and stability within the neighborhoods. Armed Factions Attacking the Two Neighborhoods: • The 60th Division, formed of hardline elements formerly affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). It is led by Awad al-Jassem, known as “Abu Qutayba al-Manbiji,” one of the prominent commanders within HTS. The deputy commander of the division is Mudar Najjar, a senior figure among the factions active in northern Aleppo, most recently the Sham Front, and originally from the city of Mare’. • The 76th Division, formed from the Turkey-backed Hamzat faction, led by Saif al-Din Boulad, known as “Abu Bakr,” who is listed under U.S. sanctions. By the end of 2025, the United Kingdom also imposed sanctions on this faction and its leader. • The 72nd Division, which includes fighters from several Turkey-backed factions, and is led by a former commander in Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham known as “Khattab al-Albani.” • The 80th Division, led by Khaled al-Omar, a defected officer who commanded several factions during the Syrian crisis, the most recent of which was within the Syrian National Army. Violations: The Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods are subjected to systematic violations by armed factions affiliated with the Transitional Government, including repeated shelling, a suffocating siege, and attacks on civilians. These violations exacerbate the humanitarian situation and create an environment of fear and instability. The Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods have been subjected to repeated bombardment with mortars, heavy machine guns, drones, artillery, and tanks since 22 December 2025. These attacks have been described as “war crimes” by human rights organizations. • On 22 December 2025, a joint checkpoint of the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) and the General Security Forces at Sheihan Roundabout in the city of Aleppo was subjected to an armed attack carried out by factions affiliated with the Ministry of Defense of the Interim Government. This was followed by heavy-weapons attacks on both neighborhoods, resulting in the deaths of five people and injuries to 23 civilians with varying degrees of severity. The two neighborhoods also experienced a complete cutoff of water, electricity, and internet services, in addition to a shortage of diesel fuel. Armed factions continue to prevent the entry of food supplies, while simultaneously restricting the entry and exit of residents to and from the two neighborhoods. • On 28 December 2025, armed factions affiliated with the Ministry of Defense of the Interim Government abducted two university students from the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods while they were returning home after their university classes. • On the evening of 6 January 2026, factions affiliated with the Interim Government launched a large-scale attack on the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods in Aleppo. These neighborhoods are home to more than 500,000 residents (approximately 55,000 Kurdish families, in addition to Kurdish displaced persons who were forced to leave the Afrin area, which is controlled by Turkey-backed factions). The attacks began with targeting some civilians by the Ministry of Defense-affiliated forces using suicide drones, initially injuring three civilians severely. This was followed by a campaign of indiscriminate shelling aimed at neighborhoods inhabited by unarmed civilians. The 60th Division deployed a convoy of tanks and armored vehicles in an attempt to forcibly enter the neighborhoods. This was accompanied by the forcible removal of civilians from surrounding areas of the Kurdish neighborhoods to position snipers and deploy tanks within those neighborhoods—a dangerous escalation that threatens civilian safety and turns the residential area into a military zone. Alongside the arrival of military reinforcements, a heavy bombardment campaign was launched in which the Interim Government’s Ministry of Defense forces used all types of heavy weapons (tanks, heavy artillery, Grad and Katyusha rocket launchers, mortars, and Dushka machine guns of all kinds), in addition to suicide drones and high-destruction weapons. This resulted in the killing of four civilians—including two women and a child—and injuries to 35 others, including children. Dozens of homes and civilian buildings were also severely damaged due to the impact of shells and rockets. Subsequently, after intensive efforts to halt the clashes and return to dialogue, the Kurdish neighborhoods experienced a cautious calm, accompanied by a preliminary agreement for a ceasefire. However, the factions resumed violent attacks on the three neighborhoods shortly thereafter. Amid the ongoing attacks and the imposed siege, the two neighborhoods continue to face a serious humanitarian disaster. Ambulance teams and medical staff are unable to move to evacuate the injured. There is also a shortage of doctors across all specialties, and armed factions are preventing doctors from outside the neighborhoods from entering.  

Read more

The prison sentence of Shaswar Abdulwahid is coming to an end

Draw: By counting the periods of detention, Shaswar Abdulwahid’s prison sentence will end on the 29th of this month, and there is a possibility of his release. Shaswar Abdulwahid, the leader of the New Generation Movement, was sentenced on 2/9/2025 by the Sulaimani Court, based on a complaint filed by Shadi Nawzad, to five months in prison. Since then, he has been held at the Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration Centre in Sulaymanyah.  According to the judge’s decision, all periods of Shaswar Abdulwahid’s detention must be counted during both the investigation and trial stages. Therefore, before the court ruling, he had already been detained (under custody) for an additional 35 days. From 15/5 to 29/5/2019, he was detained for 14 days at the Sulaimani Asayish Investigation Court. From 12/8/2025 until the court ruling on 2/9/2025, he was detained for 21 days. Together, these two detention periods amount to 35 days. Thus, adding five months and 35 days from 2/9/2025 results in the end date being 29/12/2025. However, if only this year’s detention period (21 days) is counted, then his release date would be 13/1/2026. According to follow-ups by Draw, there is a possibility that no other complaint against Shaswar Abdulwahid will proceed and that the court will not issue another ruling. This is because his court hearing was scheduled for the 16th of this month, but was postponed. Therefore, it is expected that Shaswar Abdulwahid will be released, possibly under conditions such as restrictions on movement or strict monitoring and supervision. At present, the New Generation Movement has 15 members in the Kurdistan Parliament and 3 successful candidates for the Iraqi Parliament.

Read more

A Vote Against All: How Spoiled Ballots Became a Political Voice in Iraqi Kurdistan

By Winthrop Rodgers When Iraqi voters went to the polls on November 11 to elect a new parliament, some voters made a pragmatic calculation to support a party that could offer them patronage or employment. Others turned to political ideology, ethno-sectarian identity, or tribal affiliation to guide their choice. Despite better-than-expected turnout, millions stayed at home in protest or out of apathy. In the Kurdistan Region, hundreds of thousands resorted to deliberately spoiling their ballots to vent the deep frustrations that have come to define the political landscape there. This tactic has become an established part of the political scene in recent years, but is under-explored in comparison with debates about voter turnout. “I spoiled my ballot because I am tired of the corruption in the local parties and their complete lack of real change,” said one public school teacher in Sulaymaniyah, who spoke on condition of anonymity. According to an analysis of data from the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), independent outlet Draw Media reported that there were 290,205 invalid ballots across the three constituencies in the Kurdistan Region — amounting to just over 9% of the total votes cast. Sulaymaniyah province had the highest rate with 137,611 invalid ballots, or about 18.54% of that constituency’s total vote, followed by Erbil province with 116,900 ballots, 14.60%, and Duhok province with a comparatively smaller 34,694 ballots, 5.55%. Even though spoiled ballots represented a higher percentage of the total in the previous election in 2021, 15.9%, their absolute number actually increased by nearly 34,334 in 2025. Spoiled ballots came in different shapes. Some people subtly marked two or more parties on the ballot, while others wrote out political messages. Humorously, at least two voters indicated that they were supporting Argentine football superstar Lionel Messi this cycle. Ballot spoiling appears to be a phenomenon particular to the Kurdistan Region. While nearly one in every ten ballots in the Kurdistan Region — and almost one in five in Sulaymaniyah — were invalid, the rate in federal areas of Iraq was far lower. According to IHEC, Maysan province had the third-highest rate of invalid votes after Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, with 6.03%. Only two other federal provinces — Karbala and Diyala — cracked 5%. Mega-populous Baghdad was the only other constituency to have more than 100,000 invalid ballots. For global comparison, just 1.2% of ballots were rejected or invalid in the 2024 U.S. presidential elections. Meanwhile, in Ireland’s recent presidential election there was a public campaign to encourage voters to spoil their ballots led by figures on the political right. In the end, around 12.9% of ballots were spoiled, 10 times more than in the previous cycle. This comparative data suggests that the number of invalid ballots in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil are the result of deliberate action, rather than accidents by careless or clueless voters. This sense was also felt by local analysts and journalists. “I think most of these disregarded votes [were] canceled on purpose by people, by the voters themselves,” said Iraqi pollster Munqith Dagher. Reasons for spoiling a ballot? Observers identified several reasons behind spoiled ballots in the particular context of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. The first reason is to stage a dignified, if private, protest against the lack of viable political options. “I marked the ballot in a way that clearly made it invalid, a deliberate sign of rejection,” the teacher said. “For me to vote for a party next time, they would need to show genuine accountability, transparency, and real action against corruption — not just promises.” Second, some voters want to defy political pressure, but in a safe and protected way. Throughout the country, political parties exert tremendous influence through patronage, often by dispensing employment or government benefits. Voters who benefit are expected to repay their patrons on election day. One obvious and important sector is the security forces, which employ hundreds of thousands of potential voters and are disciplined and monitored institutions that often have close ties with political parties. In federal areas, this includes the military, police, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and tribal militias, while the Peshmerga and Asayish are the most relevant units in the Kurdistan Region. The security forces have their own special voting day, which fell on November 9 this cycle. Ostensibly, this frees them up to ensure security during general voting. However, it also gives their political patrons a chance to monitor who votes loyally and who does not. In the Kurdistan Region, it is widely believed that members of the security forces are encouraged to photograph their ballots, despite a ban on mobile phones in the voting booth, in order to prove how they voted. Anecdotally, some who do not authentically support the party that controls their unit spoil their ballot after taking the clean photo. “Many invalid votes likely resulted from the special voting of security forces, who were threatened or pressured to vote for the two major parties,” explained Neaz Naif Mustafa, a journalist at Draw Media. Several members of the security forces in the Kurdistan Region were approached while reporting this piece, but they either said that they cast valid votes or declined to answer questions out of sensitivity for their jobs. A third reason has to do with Iraq’s electoral procedures. Some minority religious and ethnic groups have quota seats in parliament, but controversially the lists are open, so any voter, regardless of identity, can cast a ballot. Some political parties like the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and PMF factions run organized campaigns to encourage their supporters, particularly those casting ballots during the special vote, to vote in these races and ensure that their proxies win. Mustafa suggested that some of these voters “unintentionally select both their party list and a quota candidate, which automatically invalidates the vote.” Fourth, some voters remain concerned that their voting cards will be used to commit electoral fraud. One public servant, also speaking on condition of anonymity, said that by casting a spoiled ballot they had ensured that no party would steal their vote. “I truly do not trust this whole electronic system. I do not trust the electoral commission,” they said. In recent cycles, a number of biometric safeguards were put in place to prevent parties from stealing votes or packing ballot boxes, including thumbprint and facial recognition scans that are linked to a person’s voter card. Nevertheless, the persistent fears about electoral fraud reflect how widespread rigging was in past cycles and the negative effect that fraud has on voter psychology. Poisoned water, spoiled ballots However, the most common reason for spoiling a ballot is frustration with the lack of options at the ballot box. Many voters, including a large portion of those who stayed home, do not believe that the political parties will improve their lives. A second public school teacher said they spoiled their vote because “none of the parties had my trust. The experiences of recent years have proved this.” In particular they cited the decade-long salary crisis, the ineffectiveness of parliament, and the poor viability of independent candidates as reasons for their political disappointment. “I marked the names of several parties and candidates, so as not to leave my voting card unsealed lest it be forged,” the second teacher explained, citing additional fears about fraud. The rate of spoiling ballots often reflects local conditions. In places where voters are frustrated, it can make its presence dramatically visible. Spoiling is less common in constituencies where voters are more content or their behavior is heavily regulated by social and political forces. Draw Media identified one section of Darbandikhan, a town in Sulaymaniyah province, where invalid ballots “won” the second largest vote total compared with actual political parties. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which runs the political machine in the province, received 3,346 votes, or about 25% of the total cast, followed by 2,685 invalid ballots, or about 20%. The relatively new opposition party, Halwest, came in third with 2,221 votes. No other party received more than 1,500 votes in that section. Darbandikhan used to be a stronghold of the opposition Gorran (Change) Movement in the late 2000s and early 2010s, but voters progressively soured on the party after it joined the cabinet of the regional government. Gorran decided not to run this cycle after losing supporters and splintering into two factions. A particular sources of anger among Darbandikahn’s residents is poor water quality. The town sits downstream of Sulaymaniyah city and major industrial sites. As a result, untreated sewage and toxic chemicals have collected in the nearby reservoir and allegedly contributed to high cancer rates among locals. The PUK has repeatedly promised to build a water treatment plant, but the project remains incomplete. Residents staged a month-long sit-in and general strike in March 2023 to voice their anger over the issue to no avail. Disappointed with the failure of the opposition and forced to endure a disgusting and dangerous public health crisis by the local ruling party, voters apparently decided to spoil their ballots. “The leaders of political parties should be concerned about this,” said Dagher. Duhok province, where the 5.55% rate of invalid ballots was noticeably lower than elsewhere in the Kurdistan Region, potentially offers a counterexample. In recent years, the KDP has spent considerable time and money attempting to improve public services. Along with the economy, potholes and blackouts are among the most common complaints from voters. By actually fulfilling past campaign promises, the KDP may have won over some voters who would otherwise have been tempted to spoil their ballots. Voter behavior in Duhok is also guided by several hierarchical influences that discourage dissent, however private it may be. First, the KDP is not shy about punishing those who challenge its power. It has put dozens of journalists and activists behind bars in recent years, including an episode infamously known as the Badinan trials. Second, Duhok is also a strongly tribal part of the Kurdistan Region and members often follow the guidance of their tribal leader at the ballot box. Nevertheless, the nearly 300,000 invalid ballots in the Kurdistan Region provides a dire warning for ruling and opposition parties alike. This phenomenon may be less visible than a low turnout rate, but it strongly indicates dissatisfaction with the political options before voters and a willingness to take a stand. “I chose to cast a ballot instead of staying home because not voting can be dismissed, but a spoiled ballot shows I was present and still refused to support any of them,” the first teacher concluded. Winthrop Rodgers is a Chatham House associate fellow and journalist who focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.

Read more

Several people intend to nominate themselves for the post of President of the Republic of Iraq

Although the sixth parliamentary term of Iraq has not yet held its first session, the main political components of Iraq have still not agreed on distributing the sovereign posts. The Shiite blocs have not settled on a candidate for prime minister, the Sunni blocs are divided over the candidate for speaker of parliament, and the Kurds—especially the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—are engaged in ongoing disputes over the post of President of the Republic. The Federal Supreme Judicial Council has set the timetable for electing the presidencies, stating that after the 14th of this month, the Iraqi parliament must hold its first session within 15 days to elect the speaker of parliament and his deputies. However, as in previous terms, if the parties do not agree on the posts, the first parliamentary session may be held and then left open until the parties reach an agreement on the candidates. According to Article (72) of the Iraqi Constitution, after the first session and the election of the parliamentary presidency, the Council of Representatives must, within (30 days), elect a new President of the Republic by a two-thirds majority—meaning (220 votes) out of the total (329 seats). If no presidential candidate receives a two-thirds majority in the first round of voting, then, according to Article 70 of the Constitution, in the second round, the candidate who receives the highest number of votes will become President of the Republic. Since 2005 until now, the post of President of the Republic has, as a political convention, been held by the Kurds, and within the Kurdish house by the PUK. However, this is the second presidential term in which the KDP says that while the post is the Kurds’ right, it is not necessarily the PUK’s exclusive right, and therefore it will nominate its own candidate. At the meeting of the KDP Central Committee, two delegations were formed: one for forming the Kurdistan Regional Government and another for forming the Iraqi federal government. In other words, the KDP is focusing on Baghdad’s sovereign posts and believes it is the strongest force in Kurdistan and holds the majority of Kurdish seats. Meanwhile, in recent days, the PUK has sent a delegation to Baghdad, hoping that the presidency will remain with it as before. At present, the Iraqi presidency is disputed on one hand between the PUK and the KDP, and on the other hand, several individuals are eyeing the post. Bafel Talabani: So far, Bafel Talabani has not officially announced his candidacy for the presidency, but his name has been discussed in political circles. The focus of criticism is that he does not speak Arabic, although this is not a legal or constitutional requirement for presidential candidates. According to follow-ups, Bafel Talabani holds a bachelor’s degree and has no issue in that regard. For this reason, he does not want to enter a political battle unless he is fully confident that he will be the consensus candidate and win. According to follow-ups, the opinions of Iraqi leaders and political factions were sought; some of them did not support him, while others said that the post belongs to the Kurds and that an agreement should be reached with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Requirements for a presidential candidate (He must be born in Iraq and to an Iraqi mother and father, be at least 40 years old, possess full legal competence, have a good reputation and sufficient experience, and must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude) — Article (68) of the Constitution. If Bafel Talabani does not run, the name being discussed and expected is Nizar Amidi to become the PUK’s official candidate for the post of President of the Republic. He spent nearly 10 years working alongside Mam Jalal in the presidency, and is currently a member of the PUK Political Bureau and head of its Political Bureau office in Baghdad. Latif Rashid, the President of the Republic of Iraq, intends to run for a second term. The names of several veteran and newer PUK leaders are also being mentioned for the post. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which has formed a negotiation delegation for Iraq’s sovereign posts, is also eyeing the position. It is possible that if the PUK relinquishes certain posts in the Kurdistan Region, the KDP may, in return, step back from the post of President of the Republic of Iraq. The KDP’s potential candidates are Dr. Fuad Hussein, Rebar Ahmed, and Fazel Mirani. Resolving the presidency between the PUK and the KDP depends on several scenarios: If the KDP and PUK reach an agreement on the posts, it is expected that the KDP will agree to give the presidency to the PUK. In that case, both parties would support a single candidate—a PUK candidate approved by the KDP. If they fail to reach an agreement, the KDP will nominate its own independent candidate and lobby Iraqi political forces, similar to 2018 when Fuad Hussein was the KDP candidate against Barham Salih, and Barham Salih ultimately won. In 2021, Hoshyar Zebari was nominated but later disqualified by a Federal Court decision; the KDP then nominated Rebar Ahmed, before withdrawing him in favor of Latif Rashid and against Barham Salih. If no agreement is reached, the KDP may support a candidate from outside its party—meaning a PUK candidate, but unofficially, against the PUK’s official candidate.

Read more

Details of the PUK–KDP Meeting

No agreement was reached at the meeting between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Pirman, and no discussion took place regarding posts, ranks, or power-sharing. The meeting was not positive and returned to square one. There is a possibility that a new negotiating delegation may be formed. A source present at the KDP–PUK meeting in Pirman revealed details of the meeting to (Draw), stating that the talks did not witness any new progress and that no type of agreement was reached on positions or issues. It can be said that the meeting was not successful and that matters reverted to the starting point. The source explained that at the beginning of the meeting, the PUK delegation posed a question to the KDP delegation: should the talks resume from where they stopped before the elections, or should they start from a different point? The KDP delegation clearly informed the PUK delegation that what was discussed before the elections is one thing, and now, after the elections, it is another matter; therefore, talks must restart from a different point. Consequently, the PUK delegation told the KDP delegation that they do not consider it appropriate to continue in this manner at this stage and that they would return to their Political Bureau to decide whether this delegation should continue or be changed. This is because what the KDP delegation is seeking differs from what had previously been agreed upon, meaning that the talks have returned to point zero. The meeting lasted a short time and then concluded, with both the KDP and PUK delegations returning to their respective party Political Bureaus to make decisions. The source told (Draw) that during the meeting, there was no discussion whatsoever about any Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) posts. The KDP delegation was of the view that, at this stage, talks should be devoted to forming the KRG and resolving that issue, and only after forming the regional government should discussions take place regarding Baghdad positions. However, the PUK delegation informed the KDP delegation that both issues are close in timing and should be discussed together as a single package. Currently, Shiite and Sunni forces are establishing their own posts; therefore, the Kurds must also prepare themselves and intensify talks to resolve the issue of the presidency of the republic and finalize that post. The PUK believes it deserves, based on merit, the positions of President of the Kurdistan Region and the Presidency of the Republic of Iraq. Therefore, an agreement must be reached on a PUK candidate. In other words, the PUK favored treating both issues as one package, while the KDP favored first settling the Kurdistan Region and KRG posts, and then addressing Baghdad. During the meeting, the KDP delegation in particular conveyed strong criticisms and complaints to the PUK delegation, especially questioning why the PUK did not accept the KDP’s proposals for forming the government, why they delayed the pre-election agreement, and why they still do not want to resolve this issue now. The PUK delegation reiterated to the KDP delegation that posts and issues must be treated as one package and discussed and resolved together. More than a year and one month have passed since the sixth-term Kurdistan Region parliamentary elections were held. In the post-election negotiations, the KDP and PUK reached an agreement on the government’s “program,” but failed to reach an agreement on how to distribute positions. In the most recent elections, out of a total of 100 parliamentary seats, the KDP won 39 seats, and the PUK won 23 seats, ranking first and second respectively, while the New Generation Movement came third with 15 seats.

Read more

Distribution of the Population of the Kurdistan Region by Administrative Units

Based on statistics from Iraq’s Ministry of Planning for the general population census within the borders of the Kurdistan Region provinces (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok) for 2024: The total population of the Kurdistan Region is 6,519,129. Of these, 2,841,634 people (43.59%) live in the central districts of the provincial capitals (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok), while 3,677,495 people (56.41%) live within the administrative boundaries of districts, subdistricts, and villages. At the district level, Zakho district in Duhok Governorate has the highest population (398,876), while Mawat district in Sulaymaniyah Governorate has the lowest (3,843). The population of Erbil Governorate is 2,517,534. Of these, 1,288,538 (51.2%) live in the central district, and 1,228,996 (48.8%) live in other districts, subdistricts, and villages. Bnaslawa district has the highest share (12.5%), while Sidsakan district has the lowest (0.76%). The population of Sulaymaniyah Governorate is 2,401,724. Of these, 1,056,067 (44%) live in the central district, and 1,345,657 (56%) live in other administrative areas. Kalar district has the highest share (8.9%), while Mawat district has the lowest (0.16%). The population of Duhok Governorate is 1,599,871. Of these, 497,029 (31.1%) live in the central district, and 1,102,842 (68.9%) live in other districts, subdistricts, and villages. Zakho district has the highest share (24.9%), while Batifa district, with 19,000 residents (1.2%), has the lowest. The tables below clarify the numerical and percentage distribution of the population across the administrative units of the Kurdistan Region’s provinces (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok).

Read more

All Contents are reserved by Draw media.
Developed by Smarthand