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PM Barzani: Baghdad’s approach toward the KRG is unjust and oppressive

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a special Council of Ministers meeting in Erbil on Saturday to address the ongoing financial disputes between the KRG and the federal government of Iraq. KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani criticised the actions of the Iraqi federal government toward the Kurdistan Region. "We have determined that Baghdad’s approach toward the KRG is unjust and oppressive, which is unacceptable," Barzani stated. Barzani further criticized the decisions of the Federal Court, claiming they have consistently favored the federal government's interests over those of the Kurdish people.

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The oil revenue of the Kurdistan Region was previously $1.179 billion per month

According to Masrour Barzani, the Kurdistan Region's oil revenue was previously 1 billion 179 million dollars a month, or 1 trillion 700 billion dinars. KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said on his official account on (X) that "the delay in exporting oil from the Kurdistan Region has hurt Iraq’s economy as a whole—over $25 billion in lost revenue to date." If Masrour Barzani's statement is interpreted: Oil exports from the Kurdistan Region were suspended on March 25, 2023. Since then, it has been one year, 9 months, and 10 days. This means that the oil revenue of the Kurdistan Region was 25 billion dollars within one year, 9 months, and 10 days. If we divide the $25 billion by that period, it is $1.179 billion per month, or 1 trillion 768 billion dinars monthly. Although oil revenues vary according to the daily price, this interpretation is for the 25 billion dollars, for the period when oil exports were suspended, that is, from March 25, 2023, to today, as Masrour Barzani has mentioned.

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Iran executes 138 people in December 2024

At least 138 prisoners were executed in prisons across the Islamic Republic of Iran during December 2024, marking a 9.5% increase compared to November, when 126 executions were recorded. Notably, 20% of those executed were Kurds.  The Statistics and Documents Centre of the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights has confirmed the identities of 137 executed prisoners, while the identity of one prisoner is still under investigation.  The executions in December included at least 28 Kurdish prisoners, 22 Baloch prisoners, 15 Turkish prisoners, 12 Lor prisoners, and 6 Gilak prisoners. Additionally, at least nine Afghan nationals were executed last month  Six women were executed in the prisons of Ilam (2 cases), Isfahan, Zanjan, Yazd, and Sari. All six had been sentenced to death on charges of premeditated murder.  Of the 138 prisoners executed, only 3 cases were officially reported in Iranian state-affiliated media or judiciary-related outlets. Furthermore, the death sentences of 6 prisoners were carried out secretly, without notifying their families or granting them a final visit.    Classification by charges:  Drug-related offenses: 75 cases (54.5% of total executions)  Premeditated murder: 61 cases  Armed robbery: 2 cases    Separation of execution of death sentences according to provinces:  The highest number of executions in December 2024 occurred in Alborz Province with 19 cases, followed by Isfahan and Fars Provinces.  Alborz Province: 19 cases  Isfahan Province: 14 cases  Fars Province: 11 cases  Yazd and Sistan-Baluchistan Provinces: 10 cases each  Gilan Province: 9 cases  West Azerbaijan (Urmia) Province: 8 cases  South Khorasan Province: 7 cases  Razavi Khorasan and East Azerbaijan Provinces: 6 cases each  Ilam, Lorestan, Hamedan, Mazandaran, Qom, Qazvin, and Kerman Provinces: 4 cases each  Khuzestan, Markazi, and Golestan Provinces: 2 cases each  Kermanshah, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, Zanjan, and Semnan Provinces: 1 case each Source: Hengaw

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In 2024, the KRG owes 1.9 trillion IQD to the employees.

The Kurdistan Region Government (KRG) paid the salaries of 10 months in 2024 but not the salaries of November and December. In most years, KRG does not spend the final months' salaries. Since 2015, the KRG has not paid the salaries for four years as follows: 2015: Did not pay the salaries of September, October, November, and December. 2020: Did not pay the salaries of November and December. 2023: Did not pay the salaries of October, November, and December. 2024: Did not pay the salaries of November and December. The monthly salary of the KRG employees is 996 billion dinars. For the months of October, November, and December of 2024, the amount is 1 trillion 992 billion dinars, despite the fact that no month the salaries have not been paid on time. On average, salaries are paid every 40 days. From 2015 to 2024, the Kurdistan Region Government treated the salaried employees as follows: 17 Salaries have not been paid in full 44 Salaries have been paid in arrears and deductions 10 Salaries have been paid with a (21%) deduction. - A total of 61 months of unpaid salaries and arrears and deductions. That is 51% of the wages in the past 10 years. Total: (59) months salary paid in full. That is only 49% of all salaries, in the past 10 years. The KRG has several main sources of revenue: Baghdad has sent 631 billion dinars for November Domestic revenue monthly (320) billion dinars International Aid for the Peshmerga (20) billion dinars In addition to oil revenues (unknown), about 300,000 barrels of oil are produced daily and sold at $40 a barrel, which is $360 million per month.

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Seventy days after elections, formation of government is uncertain

Seventy days have passed since the Kurdistan parliamentary elections, and the prospects for forming a government are unclear. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) met in Pirmam on November 17. They agreed to prepare a joint program for forming the tenth cabinet as soon as possible. According to the information obtained by Draw Media, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) wants to form the government in the same form as now. The PUK currently has a negotiating committee and has prepared several scenarios. PUK demands the post of prime minister to get the post of president. (Draw) has learned that the PUK rejects the post of speaker of parliament and does not want Qubad Talabani to take the deputy post, but he wants to get a high position. None of the parties that won the October 20, 2024 elections could secure 50+1 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament, which is 100 seats, 95 general seats, and 5 final seats. - Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 39 seats - Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (23) seats - New Generation Movement, 15 seats - Kurdistan Islamic Union, 7 seats - National Position Movement: 4 seats - Justice Group, 3 seats - People's Front, 2 seats - Gorran Movement, 1 seat - Kurdistan Alliance, 1 seat

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Sulaimani's revenue has decreased by about 300 billion dinars

According to the data of the "Transparency" website, the revenue of the Sulaimani region in 2024 was (897) billion dinars, and the revenue of the Sulaimani region in 2023 was (1 trillion and 173 billion) dinars. Which means Sulaimani's revenue has decreased by about 300 billion dinars. According to the data of the "Transparency" website, this year's revenue of the provinces (Sulaimani and Halabja) and the autonomous administrations (Garmyan and Raperin) until today was 897 billion and 403 million dinars, 84% of which was in cash, 11% in cheque, and 5% in (Maqsa) clearance revenue. According to the data, last year's revenue of the provinces (Sulaimani and Halabja) and the autonomous administrations (Garmyan and Raperin) was 1 trillion, 173 billion, and 990 million dinars. Since the difference is more than 276 billion dinars, the revenue of the Sulaimani region decreased by 24%, which is related to the fact that part of the revenue from customs and border crossings does not return to the government treasury and smuggling of goods has increased. Compared to 2021, the revenue of the Sulaimani region for one month decreased from 161 billion dinars to 53 billion dinars (the revenue returns to the government treasury), while the revenue of only one month in the 2021 Bashmakh border crossing was 23 billion dinars. According to the statistics on the "Transparency" website, the revenue of Sulaimani was as follows: December 2024: 53 billion, 166 million dinars November 2024: 61 billion, 50 million dinars January 2024: 70 billion, 318 million dinars February 2024: 95 billion, 316 million dinars

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 Iraqi Ministry of Finance: 10 trillion and 901 billion IQD have been sent to the KRG in 10 months

According to the reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Finance from the beginning of the year to the end of October 2024, the Ministry has funded more than 10 trillion and 901 billion dinars to the Kurdistan Regional Government, so that; 🔹 About 7 trillion and 688 billion dinars have been sent for the salaries of employees (71% of the expenditures) 🔹 More than 251 billion and 699 million dinars have been sent to the field of services. (2% of the expenditures) 🔹 More than 285 billion and 143 million dinars have been sent to the field of goods. (3% of the expenditures) 🔹 More than 130 billion and 825 million dinars have been sent for the maintenance of assets. (1% of the expenditures) 🔹 More than 485 billion and 831 million dinars have been sent for grants, aid, and other expenditures. (4% of the expenditures) 🔹 More than 1 trillion 973 billion and 246 million dinars have been sent for social welfare. (18% of the expenditures) 🔹 More than 86 billion and 648 million dinars have been sent for investment expenditures. (1% of the expenditures)

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Syrian Kurds Need a No-Fly Zone

Draw Media Michael Rubin - Middle East Forum Observer   Like many more recent U.S. presidents, George H.W. Bush was prone to promises and rhetoric with little thought about the impact of his words. So it was when, on February 15, 1991, Bush, riding high from Kuwait’s liberation, called upon the Iraqi people to “take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.” Iraqi Kurds and Shi’ites listened. On March 4, 1991, Kurds in the town of Ranya rose up against Saddam’s tyranny. Within 15 days, the peshmerga controlled Iraqi Kurdistan’s major towns and cities. While Bush rhetorically encouraged the Iraqis to press for their freedom, he also sought to hasten the U.S. exit from Iraq itself, while some within his State Department sought a hastened return to normality. Accordingly, U.S. forces released their Republican Guard prisoners of war, just in time for Saddam to rally to put down the Kurdish and Shi’ite rebellions. As Saddam’s helicopter gunships began attacking Kurdish villages, and with his chemical weapons a recent memory, millions of Kurds began trekking across snowy mountain passes to cross into Turkey. The last thing the Turkish government wanted was more Kurds inside Turkey, and so President Turgat Özal suggested the idea to create a “safe haven” in northern Iraq. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 678 and 688 provided a legal foundation. Özal allowed U.S., British, and French jets to use Turkish air bases to patrol a “no-fly zone” in Iraqi airspace above the 36th parallel, and U.S. forces also secured a 36-square-mile safe haven centered around the Iraqi Kurdish town of Zakho. As Kurds poured into the safe haven, American forces expanded it to 9,300 square miles, roughly the size of New Hampshire. [Erdoğan] believes his God-given mission is to eradicate the Kurds just as the late Ottoman officials, after whom he models himself, decimated the Armenians. History rhymes, even if it does not repeat. President Joe Biden, like the elder Bush, could encourage rebellions he had no intention of backing. The State Department, meanwhile, is willing to rush reconciliation. The Biden administration’s decision to lift the bounty on Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani) normalizes him just as he and Turkey’s current Islamist government announce their goal to eradicate the Kurdish self-government in northeastern Syria. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s offer to take over guard duty at Al-Hol prison camp, where thousands of Islamic State fighters and their families remain under guard, is risible, the equivalent of an arsonist offering to guard the gasoline depot and match factory. The situation would be worse, however, as the thousands of Islamic State fighters would spread out not only across Syria and the Middle East, but also into Europe—with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan happily extorting concessions from weak European and NATO leaders in exchange for promises not to turn on the spigot of illegal immigration. Erdoğan is no Özal. He sees the West as weak and, while Özal sought acceptance of Turkey’s Kurds and Islamists, Erdoğan looks at the world as a zero-sum game: He believes his God-given mission is to eradicate the Kurds just as the late Ottoman officials, after whom he models himself, decimated the Armenians. Nor, unlike in 1991, do the Syrian Kurds have anywhere to go. To flee into Turkey would be the equivalent of digging their own mass graves. Iraqi Kurdistan is no option. Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party is today less a Kurdish nationalist party than a party of jash [collaborators] whose leaders—Masoud, Masrour, Waysi, and Areen Barzani—have sold Kurdish nationalism for personal profit. Their vision of Iraqi Kurdistan is essentially a duplicate of Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, an occupied zone and money laundering hub pretending to be a functioning state. Simply speaking, a Turkish move into “Rojava,” as the Syrian Kurds often call their region, would both stain Biden’s legacy and guarantee failure to the Trump administration’s goals of expanding the Abraham Accords, ending terror, and protecting Israel’s security. It is time, therefore, to borrow a page from Özal’s playbook and establish a no-fly zone and safe haven stretching from Afrin to Semalka and from Qamishli to Deir ez-Zour. Turkey would not cooperate, and Erdoğan would not acquiesce, but the United States does not need Turkey’s air bases nor Erdoğan’s permission given the Özal precedent. The goal will be humanitarian. Erdoğan talks about diplomacy, so who is he to argue? His Syrian proxies, frankly, may welcome the excuse not to be pushed into a devastating conflict with non-threatening Kurds when other groups in southern Syria have yet to accept Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s dominance. It would be in Jordan’s interest to prevent an Islamist, anti-Hashemite, and pro-Hamas regime like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham from advancing to its borders. The U.S. military can supply the safe haven by land from Jordan, because much of the desert region between the two is lightly inhabited and easily secured. It would be in Jordan’s interest to prevent an Islamist, anti-Hashemite, and pro-Hamas regime like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham from advancing to its borders. Israel can prove its rhetoric sincere by allowing the use of its air bases and perhaps even its own pilots. Saudi Arabia, which quietly has established relations with Syrian Kurds, due to the Kingdom’s own concerns about Erdogan’s expansionism and his ideological aggression, might also participate from its air bases, as could European powers Iraqi Kurds, too, may not like the political competition their co-ethnicists in Syria represent, but if they want the security of U.S. forces in Erbil, it simply may be the price they must pay. Masrour Barzani dreams of his own fiefdom but apparently has not paid U.S. taxes over the 21 years since he acquired his U.S. green card. As much as he blusters on his own television channel, he acts like a lamb in his Washington meetings for fear of antagonizing those Americans whom he has not bought. Likewise, Erdoğan talks like a bully, but it is one thing for his military to bomb lightly armed Kurds and Armenians who have no air defense; it is quite another for him to move against neighbors or modern air forces. There can be no delay. Whether Biden-era National Security Council aid Brett McGurk, Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Leaf, or likely Trump team members Joel Rayburn or Morgan Ortagus, it is time to set up a no-fly zone and tell Turkey “No more” to its expansionism, ethnic cleansing, and support for radical Islamism.  

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110 million barrels of oil were produced and sold worth $4 billion

🔹 More than 300,000 barrels of oil have been produced daily in the Kurdistan Region, of this amount, 200,000 barrels were transported to Iran and Turkey by tankers and the rest were sold in the Kurdistan Region. Monthly oil revenue is about $340 million, estimated to exceed $4 billion by the end of 2024. 🔹 If we interpret the average revenue and production of oil fields in the Kurdistan Region according to press and official information; The average daily production in the Kurdistan Region is 301 thousand 604 barrels of oil, which means 110 million barrels of oil were produced during the year. Each barrel was sold at half the price of Brent crude oil, estimated at ($35-40) per barrel.  So, the daily revenue of oil produced excluding production costs and fees, will be (11 million) dollars and in 2024 the total revenue will reach (4 billion) dollars.

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Unpaid salaries; The KRG owes more than 23 trillion dinars to salaried employees

Drw media (17) Salaries have not been paid (44) Salaries have been paid with deductions and salary arrears Both the eighth and ninth cabinets of the Kurdistan Regional Government owe more than (23) trillion dinars due to (non-payment of salaries, salary arrears, salary deductions) in the past 10 years. Last year 2023, the government did not pay the salaries of October, November, and December. This year 2024, the October salary is being distributed at the end of the year. During the past 10 years (2015-2024), the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not paid salaries on time and also, owes a large part of the salaries of the employees: Out of (120) months from (2015 -2024): - (17) salaries have not been paid in full - (34) salaries have been paid in arrears - (10) salaries have been paid with (21%) deduction. - A total of (61) months of (unpaid salaries, and arrears and deductions). That is (51%) of the salaries in the past 10 years. - Total (59) months salary paid in full. That is only (49%) of all salaries in the past 10 years. • The government owes 23 trillion dinars to Salaried employees. • The debt of salary promotion of the KRG civil servants (halted due to the KRG’s financial crisis) is about (6) trillion dinars. The total debt of the government is 29 trillion dinars.  

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Sulaimani's revenue decreased from 161 billion to 26 billion dinars

Compared to 2021, the monthly revenue of Sulaimani province has decreased from (161 billion) dinars to (26) billion dinars (the revenue which returns to the government treasury), while the monthly revenue of Bashmakh Border crossing in 2021 was (23 billion) dinars. According to the statistics of Transparency website, the revenue of Sulaimani was as follows: - December 2024: (26 billion 270 million) dinars - November 2024: (61 billion and 50 million) dinars - January 2024: (70 billion 318 million) dinars - February 2024: (95 billion 316 million) dinars - - That is, between November and December, the revenue of Sulaimani decreased by 57% • Revenue in 2024: (869 billion 755 million) dinars (so far) • Revenue in 2023: (1 trillion 173 billion 990 million) dinars • That is about (300) billion dinars less than last year • Compared to previous years: • December 2024: Sulaimani revenue was (26 billion) dinars • February 2021: Sulaimani revenue was (161 billion) dinars •  In February 2021, only the revenue of Bashmakh Border crossing was 23 billion 707 million dinars, but now the total revenue of Sulaimani (26) billion dinars. Bashmakh customs revenue in 2021: January: 22 billion 855 million dinars February: 23 billion 707 million dinars March: 22 billion and 47 million dinars April : 20 billion 977 million dinars May: 17 billion 307 million dinars

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Geopolitical Factors Behind the Resumption of Oil Exports by the Kurdistan Region

Draw media Dr.Sarwar Abduallah/ KFuture The long-standing conflict over oil between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Baghdad has grown increasingly complex in recent years. In February 2022, the Iraqi Supreme Court invalidated the Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas law, declaring it “unconstitutional.” This legal decision escalated tensions. Subsequently, in March 2023, a Paris Arbitration Tribunal ruled in favor of Baghdad in a dispute with Turkey concerning the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline, which the KRG had been using for its oil exports. These rulings effectively halted the export of approximately 400,000 barrels of oil per day, restricting access to international markets and exacerbating the resource-related discord. During a session led by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani last month, the Council of Ministers approved a proposal to revise Article 12 of the Iraqi budget law. This article had initially set the cost of oil production at $6.90 per barrel—a rate that had been a point of contention between Erbil and Baghdad. The Iraqi government agreed to amend sections of the federal budget to allow compensation for companies operating in oil production and transportation in the Kurdistan Region, establishing a payment rate of $16 per barrel. This move could pave the way for restarting oil exports from the Kurdistan Region. While the proposal is yet to be finalized by the Iraqi parliament, its geopolitical significance is clear: resuming KRI’s oil exports could strengthen its role as a vital energy supplier in the global market. A critical question arises: why is resuming KRI’s oil exports so important for Iraq at this moment? This short piece argues that the resumption of oil exports from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is driven by a complex interplay of geopolitical considerations that extend beyond the local economy to regional and international dynamics. The Geopolitical and Economic Context While Kurdish oil exports might not significantly influence global oil prices, they represent an important energy resource for Europe. The disruption in exports has already cost the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over $20 billion in financial losses. Kurdistan’s Prime Minister, Masrour Barzani, highlighted this plight at the Middle East Peace and Security Conference in Duhok on November 24, stating: “Almost every month we lose a billion. So, it’s over $20 billion that we’ve lost as a result of the exports.” Similarly, at the MERI Forum in Erbil on October 30, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani pointed out that Iraq has suffered a loss of $15 billion since the closure of the pipeline from the Kurdistan Region, urging Baghdad to approach this issue from an economic perspective. The Iraqi budget law initially set oil extraction and transportation costs at $6 per barrel in the KRI, creating a significant obstacle to oil exports. A potential solution involves both parties securing financial stability for oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region, protecting the integrity of Kurdish oil fields, and allowing Iraq to reintroduce 400,000 to 500,000 barrels of oil back into the global market. Budget Amendments and Their Implications Earlier this month, the Iraqi government approved a proposal to amend articles in the federal budget, authorizing compensation for companies operating in the Kurdistan Region by setting the payment rate at $16 per barrel. In the meantime, Baghdad agreed to form an independent body within two months to determine cost payments. This amendment, if passed by parliament, would pave the way for the resumption of KRI’s oil exports to international markets via the Ceyhan pipeline. The prevailing situation in Iraq primarily involves service contracts, with costs in certain areas like Gayara reaching $26 to $27 per barrel. This disparity raises the question of why companies are requesting only $20 for operations in the Kurdistan Region. Regional and Global Geopolitical Dynamics The urgency to resolve the conflict over Kurdish oil has increased due to its relevance in the global energy market, particularly amid geopolitical crises. The ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict and the enduring Russia-Ukraine war have heightened instability, driving oil prices higher. These dynamics underscore the need to address the Erbil-Baghdad dispute to restore oil flows and mitigate economic and geopolitical repercussions. The limited availability of export routes for Baghdad’s oil shipments has also weakened its negotiating leverage with Turkey. The Iraqi government is exploring alternatives, including reviving dormant pipelines like the Iraq-Saudi pipeline leading to the Red Sea and initiating projects such as the Basra-Aqaba pipeline. Additionally, Baghdad, with support from Tehran and Moscow, is working to restore the Kirkuk-Baniyas oil pipeline, inactive since 1982. However, these alternatives face political and security challenges, making them long-term prospects rather than immediate solutions. Strategic Importance of Diversifying Oil Routes Iraq’s reliance on existing oil export routes exposes it to significant risks. For example, the interception of an Iraqi oil tanker by Iran in the Gulf of Oman underscores the vulnerability of current supply corridors. Developing new, secure oil export routes has become critical to addressing regional tensions and maritime security risks. Turkey’s proximity to European markets offers a strategic advantage for Iraq, particularly as Europe seeks alternatives to Russian energy amidst the conflict in Ukraine. Additionally, oil revenues, which constitute over 90% of Iraq’s budget, necessitate prioritizing the resumption of KRI’s oil exports. Utilizing Kurdistan as a corridor for exporting oil from central and southern Iraq could further enhance Iraq’s economic and political stability. The resumption of Kurdish oil exports under a revised framework represents a reconciliation between the KRG and the Iraqi federal government. By centralizing oil export agreements, Baghdad seeks to reinforce its constitutional authority while accommodating regional autonomy—critical for Iraq’s internal cohesion. As Iraq aims to boost its oil production to nearly six million barrels per day over the next five years, diversifying export routes and ensuring internal stability will be essential. The Kurdistan Region’s oil exports are a strategic asset, bolstering national revenues for Baghdad while strengthening the KRG’s semi-autonomous status. Resuming exports aligns with broader efforts to stabilize global oil supply and secure Iraq’s role as a key energy supplier amid ongoing geopolitical tensions.

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There has never been a month in 2024 when the salary distribution took less than 40 days

2024 is coming to an end, but throughout this year, the salaries of Kurdistan region's employees have not been distributed on time. There has never been a month when the salary distribution took less than 40 days. The October salaries are now being distributed, but the fate of the salaries of November and December is still unknown.   2024 salaries were distributed as follows:   • January salaries were distributed on February 20, 2024 • February salaries were distributed on March 30, 2024 • March salaries were distributed on April 6, 2024 • April salaries were distributed May 15, 2024 • May salaries were distributed on June 11, 2024 • June salaries were distributed on July 10, 2024 • July salaries were distributed on September 3, 2024 • August salaries were distributed on October 4, 2024 • September salaries were distributed on October 18, 2024 •October salaries are now being distributed • The fate of November salaries is unknown • The fate of December salaries is unknown

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The fate of December salaries is unknown

The Iraqi Ministry of Finance has sent 761 billion and 631 billion dinars for the salaries of the months of October and November. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has started distributing the salaries of the employees of the Kurdistan Region. The Iraqi Ministry of Finance has sent 631 billion dinars as the first installment for the November salaries and it’s expected to send another amount of 128 billion dinars. If these two amounts arrive, the salary of October and November will be paid without problem, but the fate of December salaries is unknown.   KRG Revenues for October: • (761) billion dinars from Baghdad • (320) billion dinars of domestic revenue • (20) billion dinars (International coalition aid for the Peshmerga forces) • Total: (1 trillion and 101 million) dinars And (540) billion dinars oil revenue, most of which goes to Production companies.     KRG Revenues for November: • (631) billion dinars from Baghdad • (320) billion dinars of domestic revenue • (20) billion dinars (International coalition aid for the Peshmerga forces) • Total: (1 trillion and 101 million) dinars And (540) billion dinars oil revenue, most of which goes to the Production companies.

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KRG Revenue is (1 trillion and 101 billion) dinars, salaries need (995 billion) dinars

Available revenues of the KRG are (761) billion dinars of the KRG share from Baghdad, (320) billion dinars domestic revenue, (20) billion dinars from the international coalition aid. The total amount is (1 trillion and 101 billion) dinars, that is (100) billion dinars more than the salary expenditure, which is (995) billion dinars. This is in addition to the oil revenue, which is mostly for the companies, monthly (360) million dollars, or (540) billion dinars. On October 18, 2024, The Ministry of Finance of the Kurdistan Region has distributed the latest salaries (2024) which was for September salaries. As of December, the October and November salaries have not yet been distributed. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) currently needs (995) billion dinars monthly only for the salaries of employees. The Iraqi government has sent the October salaries. The amount of (761 billion) dinars has been transferred to the Erbil branch of the Central Bank. However, the Kurdistan Regional Government officials have not accepted to receive the money and they believe that another (234) billion is needed to complete the salaries. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) says Baghdad does not have any legal excuses, but Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Sudani has said that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not complied to handover customs duties with oil and non-oil revenues.   However, the KRG can cover the deficit with domestic revenue. Earlier, the finance minister said in a press conference that the monthly domestic revenue (320) billion dinars, which is more than the amount of the deficit. This is despite the oil revenues that do not return to the treasury of the Ministry of Finance of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The KRG produces about 300,000 barrels of oil daily and sells a barrel for $35-41. The total daily oil revenue is $12 million and monthly is $360 million, or 540 billion dinars. Most of the revenue goes to companies and production costs.   Kurdistan Regional Government Revenues for October:   • (761) billion dinars from Baghdad • (320) billion dinars of domestic revenue • (20) billion dinars from the international coalition aid • Total is: (1 trillion and 101 million) dinars And (540) billion dinars oil revenue, most of which goes to companies

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