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US Secretary of State conveyed direct "threats" to Iraqi Prime Minister

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken conveyed direct "threats" to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani concerning Iran-backed armed factions in Iraq, informed political sources revealed on Saturday. "Blinken clearly and directly conveyed threats from Washington during his meeting with Al-Sudani regarding the armed groups’ future and their movements," according to the sources. Blinken emphasized that "the new US administration would work vigorously to eliminate any influence of these factions, especially after their cross-border operations targeting US bases in Syria and various targets inside Israel over the past period." "Blinken warned Al-Sudani against any military actions by these groups in Syria in the coming phase, driven by Tehran, and held the Iraqi government accountable for any actions taken by them," the sources continued, adding, "The US Secretary stressed the necessity of controlling the factions and genuinely disarming them in the coming phase, as they pose a threat to regional security, not just Iraq. Otherwise, Washington would play a role in curbing them through sanctions and specific military operations." On Friday, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken made an "unannounced" visit to Iraq, where he met with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani. According to the US Department of State, Blinken urged the Iraqi government to support the democratic transition in Syria following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad's regime, highlighting Iraq's role in enhancing its sovereignty and regional stability. The US Department of State quoted Blinken during his meeting with Al-Sudani, reaffirming Washington's commitment to "supporting Iraq's security and sovereignty," stressing the need to continue efforts to "prevent the resurgence of ISIS." He noted that the positive changes witnessed in Iraq enhance its future success prospects and emphasized the importance of Iraq and regional countries in supporting Syria to achieve a comprehensive political transition that protects minorities and ends sectarianism.

Iraq Parliament Ends Year With No Kurdistan Oil Deal

The Iraqi parliament ended this year’s session without finalizing a deal with the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan for the exports of crude oil from the northern region. According to local media, the deal was to be debated last Thursday, along with several other topics, but since then no update regarding any decision on the deal has been issued, suggesting the Iraqi parliament has delayed the final decision on the deal for January when the new parliamentary session will begin. One report by Shafaq said that the topic of Kurdish oil exports had led to a deadlock among members of parliament who could not reach an agreement about the compensation that Baghdad would owe the Kurdish government for the costs of producing and transporting the oil. The difference of opinion prompted the Kurdish parliamentarians to withdraw from the discussion, effectively ending it. One of the Kurdish members of parliament told Shafaq that the disagreement centered on the cost of oil extraction in Kurdistan. He also said that to settle the matter, “a specialized international company would visit the KRG's oil fields to assess the cost of oil extraction, in line with the budget law amendment and a political agreement between the two sides.” Deliveries of Kurdish crude oil have been suspended for over a year amid a dispute between the central government in Baghdad and Turkey over who had the power to authorize these deliveries. The impasse followed an International Chamber of Commerce ruling in March 2023. The ICC ruled in favor of Iraq, which had argued that Turkey should not allow Kurdish oil exports via the Iraq-Turkey pipeline and the Turkish port of Ceyhan without approval from the federal government of Iraq. The ruling had an impact on international oil companies operating in Kurdistan, which suspended operations until they had clarity on any changes in their terms of operation in the region. There was also a dispute between the government in Baghdad and the one in Erbil over these oil deliveries and who gets to keep the money from their sales on international markets. Most of these have been settled but the deal has yet to be finalized. By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

The cost of producing a barrel of oil in the region is $20 to $25, but in Basra it is $4 to $5

A member of the Finance Committee of the Iraqi Parliament said "The cost of producing oil in the Kurdistan Region is $20 to $25 a barrel, while the cost of oil in Basra is $4 to $5 a barrel". Muain Kazemi, a member of the Finance Committee of the Iraqi Parliament, told PUK media: "The Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have agreed to increase the cost of oil production to $16". He said, "The cost of producing a barrel of oil in the Kurdistan Region is very high, between $20 and $25, but in Basra it is between $4 and $5." "The agreement between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on the oil production of the Kurdistan Region, consists of exporting oil to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey, under the supervision of SOMO, which belongs to the Iraqi Oil Ministry," he said. He added, "In return, Iraq will pay oil production costs of $16 per barrel out of 400,000 barrels per day for the first phase, until the costs are reviewed in coordination with the Kurdistan Regional Government". He added, "The oil contracts between the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government with oil companies will be reviewed because the cost of oil production is very, very high compared to Basra oil". On November 5, the Iraqi Council of Ministers approved the resumption of oil exports from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq after 19 months of suspension.

Iraq’s Census: Fears fuel Tensions in Kirkuk

Kirkuk, an oil-rich governorate at the center of longstanding territorial and political disputes between Iraq's central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), is once again a focal point of tensions as calls to delay the upcoming national census grow louder. Local political actors are concerned that the census could shift the delicate balance of power in the region, with many viewing it as a potential tool to reshape the demographic landscape. While the census is seen as essential for national planning, critics argue that the timing is inappropriate in a region as contested as Kirkuk. Political and ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, have voiced concerns that the census may be used to undermine their claims or bolster those of their rivals. Ministry of Planning: Census to Proceed Despite these concerns, Iraq’s Ministry of Planning announced that it will move forward with the nationwide census, including in Kirkuk. On Monday, Abdul Zahra al-Hindawi, the Ministry’s spokesperson, expressed surprise at the calls for delay, emphasizing that the census is not politically motivated but purely intended for economic and developmental purposes. "The Ministry of Planning is committed to conducting the census across all Iraqi governorates, including Kirkuk," al-Hindawi told Shafaq News Agency. "We’ve made significant progress since the start of the data collection on September 1, and the census will continue as scheduled." Al-Hindawi stressed that the census is a necessary step to address Iraq’s rapid population growth, which exceeded 43 million by the end of last year. "Iraq is witnessing a population increase of more than one million people annually. The census will help determine the actual needs of each governorate in terms of health, education, housing, and services," he added. Economic and Developmental Focus The Ministry has sought to distance the census from any political connotations, framing it as a purely administrative exercise aimed at ensuring a fair distribution of resources based on population size. "The census is an economic and developmental tool, not a political one. It will provide data essential for future planning, including the equitable distribution of wealth across Iraq’s governorates," al-Hindawi said. He further reassured all communities in Kirkuk, including Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, that the census is a neutral endeavor aimed at benefiting everyone equally. "The census is designed to identify developmental gaps, and its results will be used to enhance services for all Iraqis," he noted. However, these assurances have done little to assuage the concerns of many in Kirkuk, particularly Kurdish leaders who view the census as a potential flashpoint in the ongoing struggle over the governorate’s political status. Kurdish Concerns: Article 140 and Demographic Displacement Among the most vocal critics of the census is Mohammad Kamal, head of the third branch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Kirkuk. In a press conference last week, Kamal acknowledged the importance of preparations for the census but called for a postponement in Kirkuk until the implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. "The preparations for the census are necessary, but the situation in Kirkuk is different from the rest of Iraq," Kamal said. "The governorate is not ready for this process, and many displaced Kurds have yet to return." Kamal’s reference to Article 140 highlights the underlying political issues that make the census so contentious in Kirkuk. Article 140 is a constitutional provision that outlines the steps needed to resolve territorial disputes in areas like Kirkuk, which are claimed by both Baghdad and the KRG. The article mandates a three-step process: normalization, a census, and a referendum. These steps were supposed to be completed by December 31, 2007, but have remained largely unfulfilled, leaving Kirkuk’s political status unresolved. Historical Context: Article 140 and Kirkuk’s Disputed Status At the heart of Kurdish demands is the implementation of Article 140, which many view as essential to addressing the demographic changes imposed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. During the 1980s, Saddam forcibly displaced thousands of Kurds from Kirkuk and replaced them with Arabs in an attempt to change the ethnic balance in the region. Kamal noted that in 1988, the Ba'ath regime destroyed over 4,500 Kurdish villages, relocating their inhabitants to the Kurdistan Region. "Many of these displaced residents are still living in the Kurdistan Region, and conducting a census without accounting for this historical injustice would distort the results," he warned. For Kurdish leaders, addressing the legacy of forced displacement and implementing Article 140 are prerequisites to any meaningful census in Kirkuk. They argue that moving forward with the census before resolving these issues could lead to skewed results, exacerbating tensions in an already volatile region. Sinjar: Concerns Over IDP Return Before the Census Similar concerns are being raised in other parts of Iraq, particularly in the Sinjar district of Nineveh, where many internally displaced persons (IDPs) have yet to return following years of conflict. Mohammad Ahrees, a member of the Nineveh Council, emphasized the importance of ensuring the return of displaced residents before the census is conducted. "The situation in Sinjar is improving, with progress being made in security and service projects," Ahrees said. "However, the return of displaced persons is crucial before the census takes place. This will allow for an accurate assessment of the population, which is essential for determining the needs of the region." Ahrees underscored that the census will play a key role in documenting population and housing data, which in turn will help the central government allocate resources to areas based on their real needs. "The return of displaced residents to their areas will ensure that the census reflects the true demographic makeup of Sinjar and helps guide future development projects," he added. Broader Implications: Political Power and Resource Distribution The stakes for the census are high, not just in Kirkuk but across Iraq. The census will be the first comprehensive population count since 1987 when Saddam Hussein’s regime conducted the last nationwide census. A subsequent census was held in 1997 but excluded the Kurdistan Region, leaving Iraq without accurate population data for decades. Since 2003, the KRG has pushed for Kirkuk to be incorporated into its territory, a move that Baghdad has resisted. The census will be pivotal in determining whether the Kurds constitute the largest ethnic bloc in Kirkuk, potentially strengthening their claim to the governorate. For Iraq as a whole, the census is necessary for determining the population within the Kurdistan Region, which will influence its share of national revenue, currently set at around 12%. The census will also have remarkable implications for resource distribution, particularly oil revenue, which remains a key source of tension between Baghdad and Erbil. Hopes and Fears: Political Manipulation and Demographic Shifts Despite the Ministry of Planning’s assurances, fears of political manipulation continue to loom over the census. Ethnic groups in disputed territories like Kirkuk are wary that the results could shift the balance of power in ways that either bolster or undermine their political aspirations. The Kurds, in particular, fear that the census could fail to account for the displaced population, thereby skewing the results in favor of Arab and Turkmen groups. On the other hand, Arab and Turkmen leaders have expressed concerns that the census could solidify Kurdish claims to Kirkuk, further complicating efforts to resolve the region’s disputed status. For Iraq, a country still recovering from decades of conflict and ethnic violence, the census represents both an opportunity and a risk. If conducted fairly, it could provide much-needed clarity and help guide future development efforts. But if mishandled, it could deepen existing divisions and fuel further tensions. As Iraq moves forward with the census, the eyes of the nation will be on Kirkuk, where the results could have far-reaching implications for the future of the governorate and the country as a whole.

Oil Minister: Currently Iraq has 145 billion barrels of oil and 160 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves

The Minister of Oil, Hayan Abdul-Ghani, announced, on Monday, an increase in the efficiency of generation units to more than 65% for combined cycles. Deputy PM for Energy Affairs and Minister of Oil, Hayan Abdul-Ghani, held a meeting with the US side in the presence of the US Assistant Secretary of State, the Director of the Institute, the President of the US Chamber of Commerce, and several companies, during his visit to the Baker Institute, Houston, according to a statement by the ministry. Abdul-Ghani stressed the "depth of cooperation with the US side. 20 years of cooperation and partnership in various fields such as oil, energy, agriculture, trade, business, and at the governmental and investment levels for both sides," stressing "the importance of exchanging visions and ideas, as well as reviewing joint opportunities in the interest of both countries." "The Iraqi delegation includes an elite group of specialists and decision-makers in technical, oil and investment affairs; for a new round of growth rounds for the previously drawn frameworks as to open new areas of cooperation and partnership between the two parties," he noted. He explained that "the Ministry of Oil is very interested in cooperating with US and Western European companies that wish to visit Iraq and will receive great attention from the Iraqi side. In return, the Iraqi side will work to send high-level delegations to visit the US, after invitations are extended by solid companies; to discuss the proposed projects to reach levels of strategic partnership that serve the common interests of all parties." "Iraq is in an advanced position in the energy industry at the global and regional levels, which comes from its oil reserves that exceed 145 billion barrels of explored oil, with a production capacity of more than five million barrels of oil. It comes with a confirmed gas reserve of more than 130 trillion standard cubic feet and an expected reserve to reach more than 160 trillion cubic feet. This makes it a major and influential player at the regional and global levels," he pointed out. The Minister of Oil highlighted "The ministry's implementation of gas investment projects that have given clear progress in gas investment from various fields. The percentage of invested gas did not exceed 51% of associated gas in 2022, as this percentage increased to more than 65% in the current year. This came from the implementation of many projects related to gas investment through cooperation with international companies and national efforts. Gas flaring will be completely stopped by the end of 2028 so that Iraq will be one of the countries that contribute greatly to reducing thermal emissions and benefiting from this energy as well as employing it towards generating electricity and various industries." "In the refining sector, we are proud that we have recently added refining capacities exceeding 360 thousand barrels per day in the Karbala and North refineries and the fourth unit in the Basra refinery, in addition to supporting units distributed in other locations to suffice the country with a wide range of products that were included in the import basket. Rather, the ministry is in the process of exporting some of them, especially gas oil,” he added.

Controversy surrounds Iraq's Basra-Aqaba oil pipeline project

Iraq’s plan to diversify its oil export routes through the Basra-Aqaba pipeline is facing political resistance, primarily from Shia factions concerned about security and proximity to Israel. The 1,700-kilometer pipeline, intended to transport up to three million barrels of oil per day, aims to reduce Iraq's reliance on the Strait of Hormuz and mitigate regional risks. Critics argue that exporting via Aqaba in Jordan could increase costs and potentially expose Iraqi oil to Israeli access. Legal challenges to block the pipeline have so far been unsuccessful, with the Iraqi Federal Court dismissing a lawsuit against the project. The Iraqi federal government has allocated 6.4 trillion dinars from the 2024 budget to advance the pipeline, with revised project costs estimated at $8.5 billion. Despite its strategic potential, the pipeline remains a contentious issue amid Iraq's broader struggle to secure its oil exports while balancing internal political opposition and external pressures. As the country navigates these complexities, the outcome of the Basra-Aqaba pipeline project will significantly impact Iraq’s economic future and regional standing.

Iraq’s Watergate and the Fallout for U.S. Relations

Washington Institute by Michael Knights On August 28, news began to emerge from investigative reporting about a widespread political surveillance campaign involving the office of Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. The scale of the effort was so extensive that even Iraqi politicians and citizens—who are thoroughly used to corruption and scandal by now—were shocked by the case. For the United States, the scandal is yet another glaring indicator that Iraq is not as stable as it is sometimes presented to be, nor is its current government the reliable security and intelligence partner Washington needs. Who Wiretapped Who? The original reporting on the scandal has quickly been piled onto by other major Arab news outlets and Iraq’s notoriously leaky officials and political class. The seismic reverberations in Baghdad—including numerous emergency meetings by political factions—suggest that there is a lot of fire behind the visible smoke. The following points seem clear so far: Almost all of Iraq’s senior political figures were targeted for hacking or surveillance on their communication devices, including: Supreme Judicial Council head Judge Faeq Zaidan Former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and his son-in-law and commercial fixer, Yasser Abdul Sukhail al-Maliki Hadi al-Ameri, the head of two major Iran-backed political entities: the Coordination Framework and the Badr Organization Acting speaker of parliament and Badr affiliate Muhsin al-Mandalawi Former speaker of parliament Mohammed al-Halbousi (one of many Sunni Arab politicians targeted) Former prime minister Haider al-Abadi Humam Hamoudi, head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Ahmed Fatlawy, advisor to Hikma party chief Ammar al-Hakim (among numerous other political party figures targeted) Various figures in the president’s office Various officials in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Noticeably absent from the list so far are Sudani’s closest supporter, Qais al-Khazali, and senior members of his militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). Both Khazali and his militia have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities. The eavesdropping cell was based in the prime minister’s office and operated by a range of figures close to Sudani: Abdul Karim al-Sudani, the prime minister’s military secretary and a tribal relative Khalid al-Yaqoubi, Sudani’s security advisor Mohammed Johi, the cell leader and deputy director-general for administrative affairs in the prime minister’s office (Johi has confessed to the crime, and his electronic devices have been analyzed) Ahmed al-Sudani, another relative of the prime minister and acting head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) Eleven signals intelligence technicians from the INIS Technical Directorate’s Department of Eavesdropping Various officers at the National Security Service (NSS) and the Interior Ministry’s Federal Information and Investigations Agency (FIIA) Johi and others involved in the eavesdropping used INIS property, equipment, and vehicles to carry out the scheme, authorized by Ahmed al-Sudani. In addition, NSS personnel were seconded to Johi’s cell by the agency’s chief, Abu Ali al-Basri (aka Abdul Karim Abed Fadel Hussein), an effective pursuer of Sunni terrorists but also the Coordination Framework’s top witch-hunter against political adversaries. On September 3, the prime minister’s personal photographer was arrested in relation to the scheme. The eavesdropping cell attempted to entrap and develop compromising materials on various political figures, including members of parliament, judicial officials, intelligence officers, and female family members of important persons. The Ruin of INIS The surveillance scandal—which will likely bubble all the way through to the next government formation period after the October 2025 election—should come as no surprise given past warnings about the ruinous politicization of Iraq’s best intelligence agency, INIS, since early 2023, when Sudani placed his relative, Ahmed, in acting control of the organization. The CIA first built INIS from salvaged parts of Iraq’s pre-2003 intelligence agencies, then vetted and trained its personnel for twenty years. While the country’s numerous other intelligence agencies became deeply penetrated by Iran-backed militants, INIS remained a bastion of relative trustworthiness for the United States and other Western governments. This is why it was among the very few Iraqi entities entrusted with sensitive U.S. signals intelligence, equipment, and training. Yet all of this changed when Sudani became prime minister. Since 2022, Sudani’s government has purged many key U.S.-trusted INIS officers and replaced them with agents from Iran-backed militias. The new INIS counterintelligence director appointed in early 2023—whose job is to prevent penetration of the agency—is Faisal Ghazi al-Lami, a nephew of PMF chairman Faleh al-Fayyad and a long-term protege of Abu Ala al-Walai. Fayyad and Walai have been designated by the U.S. government for human rights abuses and terrorist activities, respectively. Moreover, the INIS director of surveillance is Wissam al-Mihyawi, another Fayyad nominee. The NSS—which was previously on the mend after years of terrorist infiltration—has also backslid since 2023, when Basri was given the keys to the agency. Top posts such as deputy director, director of operations, and head of Baghdad security operations were given to AAH officials. The current scandal only reinforces the degree to which Iraq’s most important and technically proficient intelligence agencies are sinking into the mire of Iran-backed militias and corrupt politicians. U.S. Policy Options The surveillance scandal should be an eye-opening moment for Western policymakers, on several counts. First, Washington should not try to paper over the damage that has been done to Sudani’s premiership. For years, U.S. officials have avoided acknowledging Sudani’s very close ties to AAH, a designated terrorist organization. The leader of such a group—Qais al-Khazali, himself a designated terrorist—should not be permitted to puppeteer Iraq’s government and, by extension, its relations with the United States. If new evidence emerges indicating that Sudani had direct knowledge of the eavesdropping campaign, Washington may need to adjust its attitude toward the prime minister more generally, in part because malign actors could easily use such evidence to gain power over him. The United States should not be more committed to Sudani’s political survival than his own sponsor, Khazali, who seems angered that such a scandal has emerged out of operational security errors made by a cell in the prime minister’s office. On August 31, Iran deployed a delegation to Baghdad in an attempt to shush the scandal, underlining the need for Washington to do just the opposite. Second, the United States should greatly restrict intelligence cooperation with INIS, NSS, and other agencies until they remove malign political appointees from their senior ranks, especially pro-militia and pro-Iran figures. After Sudani became prime minister, Washington turned a blind eye to his government’s disturbing appointments in the intelligence sector. Various factions will surely try to use the current scandal to inject a new crop of bad actors into senior intelligence roles. The United States must use its leverage as Iraq’s key counterterrorism partner to ensure that the government does not merely swap “bad” for “equally bad or worse” when cleaning up the scandal and appointing new officials to INIS, NSS, and FIIA. Third, Washington should broadly review its attitude toward Iraqi officials in sectors as diverse as the Counter Terrorism Service, airport authorities, port authorities, and key ministries (e.g., Finance, Interior, Oil, Transport, and even Higher Education, whose minister is a member of a U.S.-designated terrorist group yet moves freely around Western capitals). These and other agencies have been deeply penetrated in the same manner as INIS—a trend that began before 2022 but has greatly accelerated since then due to the Coordination Framework’s domination of Iraq’s executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The main lesson for U.S. officials is that the character and political will of Iraqi prime ministers is the most important factor in deciding the extent of this Iran-backed state capture, and thus the severity of potential damage to U.S.-Iraq relations.

Iraq's Oil Exports Surpass 108 Million Barrels in July

Iraq's oil exportation reached a significant milestone in July, with a total output of 108.5 million barrels, according to the latest figures released by the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) on Thursday. The Iraqi Oil Ministry detailed the exportation breakdown, stating that crude oil exportation and production in central and southern Iraq amounted to 106.1 million barrels in July. Meanwhile, the Qayara Oil Field contributed 2.4 million barrels to the total output during the same month. This exportation figure highlights the continued growth of Iraq's oil sector, despite ongoing challenges and fluctuations in the global oil market.

Iraq's oil revenue was about 59 trillion dinars in first half of 2024

Iraq's Ministry of Finance revealed on Tuesday that the total revenue in the federal budget for the first six months of the year surpassed 65 trillion dinars, with oil continuing to be the primary source of Iraq's public budget. The financial tables indicated that "total revenue for the first half of the year reached 65,921,901,657,850 dinars (about 50.5 billion USD). Additionally, the total amount of loans was 15,954,981,637,865 dinars. According to data released from January to July 2024, oil represented 89% of the revenues, with a total of 58,803,897,993 thousand dinars, while non-oil revenues were 7,118,703,763 thousand dinars. Economic expert Mohamed Al-Hassani told Shafaq News that "without genuine and serious activation of the private sector and implementing deep structural reforms across the economy—including reducing the state's role and dominance, eliminating rentier practices, and modernizing and integrating it into the global economy—there is no immediate solution to prevent a likely economic collapse." He added that "if spending levels continue as they are without significant changes, within a few years at most, the state will be unable to meet its expenses and will face the risk of bankruptcy and economic collapse." In March 2021, the Prime Minister's financial advisor, Muzhar Mohammed Saleh, stated that the persistence of a rentier economy is attributed to past wars, economic sanctions, and ongoing political conflicts, which have dispersed economic resources.

Iraq exports over 618 million barrels of oil in the first half of 2024

The Iraqi Ministry of Oil revealed on Saturday that the country’s exports of crude oil surpassed 600 million barrels in the first half of 2024. According to official figures, Iraq’s total oil exports reached 618,044,445 barrels in the first six months of the year, with an average monthly export of 103,007,407 barrels and a daily estimate of 3,433,000 barrels, Shafaq News reported. This represents an increase of 3.77 percent compared to the same period in 2023. According to the Iraqi Oil Ministry, 611,952,117 barrels of crude oil were shipped from the port of Basra and the central areas, 3,999,417 barrels from the Qayyarah oilfield, and 2,133,111 barrels to Jordan. Through ports on the Arabian Gulf, Iraq exports around 65 percent of its crude oil to Asian markets, such as China and India, and ships the remaining 20 percent to Europe and 15 percent to the United States. The Iraqi Ministry of Oil said in mid-July that Iraq is committed to the voluntary output reduction set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The Iraqi ministry confirmed Iraq’s commitment to OPEC’s voluntary reductions and compensation for any surplus production since the beginning of 2024. The Iraqi Oil Ministry added that it will adhere to a production level of four million barrels per day for the month of July and the coming months. OPEC+ said in May that Iraq and Kazakhstan, two members of the coalition, agreed to compensate for excess oil production by further reducing their oil output until the end of 2024. In April, the two countries decided to submit plans on how they would achieve full compliance. OPEC+ said earlier that Iraq exceeded its quota by pumping 602,000 barrels per day in total in the first three months of 2024, while Kazakhstan exceeded its quota by pumping 389,000 barrels per day. The plans shared by both countries show in detail that the entire overproduction will be fully compensated for by the end of this year, according to OPEC+.

(BP) returns to Kirkuk

A new memorandum of understanding signals a new phase in BP's decade-long pursuit of a deal to rehabilitate major oil fields in Kirkuk. Iraq has signed a memorandum of understanding with BP that could lead to the rehabilitation and development of four fields in Kirkuk. BP CEO Murray Auchincloss traveled to Baghdad for a signing ceremomy Thursday with Oil Minister Hayyan Abdulghani, which was attended by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, according to a statement from the prime minister's office.

Amid ‘politicization’ claims, Iraq prepares for first census after Saddam

Amwaj Media The story: Iraq is gearing up for its first general population census in 27 years, due to take place on Nov. 20. However, claims that the initiative will fall victim to partisan wrangling have dogged its planning stages. Meanwhile, supporters of the campaign have defended the economic focus of the census questionnaire, claiming that the data will be invaluable to rebuilding Iraq’s battered public services—particularly amid its ongoing development boom. The coverage: At the core of the controversy is Baghdad’s decision not to include both “sect” and “ethnicity” in the questionnaire, leading to charges that the census has been politicized by Iraq’s political establishment. Iraqi journalist Yahya Al-Kubaisi claimed that Shiite political parties have sought to suppress data which may challenge commonly cited demographic estimates of Iraq's Shiite Muslim majority. Kubaisi further asserted that population figures produced by Iraqi and international organizations are “not just numbers,” but rather “demographic narratives” claimed to be objective for political purposes. Political analyst Basil Al-Kadhimi similarly argued that the campaign will primarily serve political factions in Iraq’s governorates. The analyst further asserted that these parties will exploit population data to “claim the largest share of the spoils” from Baghdad. Another Iraqi analyst charged on Twitter/X that the “fictitious estimates” of Iraq’s religious and ethnic makeup were officially established by former head of the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority Paul Bremer (2003–4)—commonly argued to have helped shape Iraq’s ethno-sectarian political apportionment system. Iraqi officials have defended the integrity of the census, with one asserting that the process is far removed from any “political wrangling,” including “partisanship, sectarianism, ethnicity, or religion.” An official from the Ministry of Planning reported that the census would include “all segments of society,” with questions based on housing status, education, health, work, and access to services. The census was praised by one journalist on Twitter/X, noting that the economic focus of the census will aid the government as it rapidly expands its services, particularly amid Iraq’s current development boom. The context/analysis: The census was first announced by Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani in 2023 as part of a five-year national development plan. The campaign will be carried out by Iraq’s Ministry of Planning, and will be given logistical support by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Amid the criticisms, the Ministry of Planning has touted its use of modern equipment, including specialized tablets designed for the purpose. A two-day pilot scheme took place in May in the Kurdistan region, and was broadly hailed as successful, with a claimed 98% participation rate. Iraq’s last census was taken in 1997 under the rule of former leader Saddam Hussein (1979–2023), finding that Iraq’s population stood at approximately 22M. However, the campaign excluded the Kurdistan region as it had fallen out of Baghdad’s control following the 1990-91 Gulf War. Prior tallies produced under the Ba’ath Party have always excluded “sect,” although religion and ethnicity were included. Later attempts after the 2003 US-led invasion have hit several roadblocks. A 2009 campaign collapsed when census-takers were killed by gunmen, and a further attempt in 2020 was stymied by the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. A ruling to exclude “ethnicity” in the poll was issued by Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court earlier this year, and follows a 2020 agreement between Iraq’s Shiite and Kurdish political parties. The UNFPA later agreed to the removal as a “technical measure.” When the poll was announced, observers had high hopes that it could contribute to the resolution of lingering Ba’ath-era political disputes, many of which involve conflict over relative ethnic population numbers. Disputes include the “Arabization” of Kirkuk and its surroundings, a disputed region claimed by both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and home to Arab, Turkmen, and Kurdish populations. Article 140 of Iraq’s constitution sets out a roadmap for a resolution to the Kirkuk impasse, clauses of which include a census—one that would presumably include ethnicity. The article’s terms have as yet not been tackled by political factions. The future: The success of the pilot scheme bodes well for the general population census. However, it is unlikely that the results will satisfy observers who hope the move will resolve Iraq’s hot-button demographic disputes. Iraqi economist Ali Abdul Kazim told local media that such information is “essential” to government policy and planning. However, another observer expressed doubt over the census’s economic value given the “rampant financial and administrative corruption” in Iraq. Regardless of the outcome, accusations of political meddling could undermine trust in the census results, particularly if deemed by the public or bureaucracy to be unreliable. Furthermore, while Baghdad has touted the data as critical for Iraq’s development, it is unclear precisely how it will be utilized by policymakers. Furthermore, with “ethnicity” excluded from the census, observers will likely begin to question whether the term could be used in any census to settle the disputes over multi-ethnic Kirkuk.

Marriage and divorce in Iraq

According to the Supreme Judicial Council, 4,779 divorces were registered in June this year. The Supreme Judicial Council issued statistics on the number of marriages and divorces in Iraq for the month of June, which witnessed a relative decrease in the number of divorces compared to last May, but it remained at a high level, approaching five thousand divorces. The statistics published by the judiciary on Sunday indicated that twenty-three thousand, three hundred and twenty-four, marriages were registered, compared to four thousand, seven hundred and seventy-nine divorces during the month of last June. Basra and Al-Karkh Governorate in Baghdad topped the statistics of divorce cases with nine hundred and forty-seven cases each, while Rusafa topped the marriage cases with three thousand nine hundred and seventy-six cases. The number of divorce cases increased during the first half of this year to thirty-six thousand nine hundred and eighty-one cases, according to statistics from the Supreme Judicial Council.

Iraq will sell Kirkuk oil to Jordan at $16 less than the price of Brent crude

Iraq has agreed to extend the crude oil processing agreement with Jordan until June 26, 2025, according to Jordan's Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Saleh al-Kharabsheh. Under the terms of this agreement, Iraq will sell Kirkuk oil to Jordan at $16 less than the price of Brent crude, with Jordan importing up to 15,000 barrels of oil per day by tanker. Minister al-Kharabsheh highlighted that the extension of the memorandum, originally signed on April 5, 2023, stipulates that Jordan's oil imports from Iraq will meet 10 percent of its domestic needs. This agreement aims to enhance economic cooperation between the two countries, improve the land route between Jordan and Iraq, and create more job opportunities. Jordan imports Kirkuk oil, which is of lower quality and price compared to Iraqi oil from the south and Brent crude. Despite the lower quality, Jordan benefits from the discounted price and covers the transportation costs. The continuation of this agreement underscores the mutual economic interests of both nations and is expected to further strengthen their bilateral relations.

25% of Iraq's population lives below the poverty line

Over ten million Iraqis are living below the poverty line, according to the Strategic Center for Human Rights in Iraq (SCHR). The center's vice president, Hazem Al-Rudaini, stated that despite significant government efforts in sectors such as infrastructure and housing, critical issues like poverty and limited job opportunities in the private sector persist, impacting the daily lives of Iraqi citizens. "According to data from the Ministry of Planning, approximately 25% of Iraq's population lives below the poverty line, which translates to over ten million people out of a total population of 43 million." He noted that while the Ministry of Labor, through the Social Welfare Department, provides monthly salaries to two million families, over one million additional families are deserving of welfare. However, the 2024 budget lacks new allocations for the social protection network. Al-Rudaini further revealed that there are more than 1.65 million registered unemployed individuals, urging the government to address poverty and unemployment by developing a strategic five-year plan focused on supporting national industries and agriculture and reducing the importation of agricultural and industrial products. He emphasized the need to monitor foreign labor, which has flooded the Iraqi market and reduced job opportunities for Iraqis. "There are close to one million foreign workers, with only around 40,000 officially registered with work permits, according to data from the Ministry of Labor." Additionally, he called for the reinstatement of vocational high schools in agriculture, industry, and commerce, which were discontinued after 2003. Notably, years of conflict have significantly impacted the well-being of many families in Iraq, with financial hardships now threatening their food security and overall welfare. According to the Planning Ministry, Iraq has 4,000 slums that house around 3.06 million people.