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Understanding the Roots of the Younger Generations’ Despair in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Draw Media Shivan Fazil-Arab Reform Initiative People take to the streets for celebration after the controversial unconstitutional referendum for an independent state of Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (IKRG) on 25 September 2017 in Erbil, Iraq. The non-binding unconstitutional referendum were took place in areas under the control of the Kurdish Regional Government (IKRG) in northern Iraq. © Hamit Hüseyin - Anadolu Agency Following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) was for many years hailed in the west as “the other Iraq” for its relative peace and prosperity. Two decades on, however, the KRI has started to share the same governance challenges that grip the rest of the country; dashing the hopes of an entire generation that grew up and came of age under the Kurdish self-rule with little to no memory of life under the previous regime. Young people’s needs and demands for quality education and employment are repeatedly not met, and as a result, youth disenchantment is mounting. This unprecedented moment of pressure on the region’s youth is rooted in an economic slump that is frustrating the aspirations of youth, who are forced to bear the brunt of decisions they have no part in making. In addition to economic factors, youth political participation (or lack thereof) is also playing an important role. Policy-making processes are not inclusive and participatory due to the waning interest in politics and insufficient participation and inclusion of youth. Hence, socio-economic policies and plans are not in line or responsive to the needs and aspirations of a young and steadily growing population. Consequently, dissent and despair have been on the rise since the fraught 2017 independence referendum despite the authorities' efforts to constrain protests. In 2022, for the second year in a row, university students across the governorates of Sulaymaniyah and Halabja staged week-long demonstrations and boycotts demanding the government reinstate a small monthly stipend, improve housing conditions, and reduce tuition fees. In 2021, university students took to the streets demanding the restoration of monthly allowances that were cut in 2015 as part of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) austerity measures. The year before that another largely youth-led protest wave had erupted in Sulaymaniyah before it soon spread to the far-flung midsized towns where the impact of economic crises is particularly severe. The rhetoric compared to pre-referendum protests was maximalist with demonstrators calling for an end to the two-party rule political system. The demands of the 2022 and 2021 protests nevertheless brought tens of thousands of students to the streets. The fallout from the referendum which included, amongst other things, the setback in the disputed territories and diminished leverage vis-à-vis Baghdad was seen as the failure of the political elite to advance the Kurdish national ambitions. It also gave impetus for the more maximalist narrative in recent demonstrations and calls for the overhaul of the two-party rule in the KRI. The rage and rhetoric of the demonstrations, however, were also used as a pretext by the government to dismiss youth protests as illegitimate, further widening the gap between the youth and the authorities. Young people are not only expressing their frustration through street protests: steady streams are also risking their lives in the pursuit of a better life abroad. In November 2021, images of Kurdish migrants from Iraq, primarily the youth, stranded at the Belarus-Poland border grabbed the international headlines. They had taken the perilous journey due to persistent and increasing unemployment and loss of hope, despite the region’s oil riches. Therefore, the socio-economic situation that shapes the demands and aspirations of the youth is key to understanding growing disillusionment and dissent in the KRI. ‘A golden decade’ The future looked bright for the Kurds in Iraq after the turn of the millennium. They had endured genocide and the effects of crippling economic sanctions over the previous two decades. However, while the rest of Iraq drifted into chaos after a 2003 US-led invasion toppled longtime ruler Saddam Hussein, the KRI remained quiescent. It enjoyed relative peace and stability and embarked on a decade of economic boom. The Kurds who were the big winners from the regime change began to hope. The Kurdish population was promised by the ruling parties that their share of the federal budget and oil revenues from the newly developed oil wells in the region, could replace the impoverishment of the preceding decade. In 2009, the start of Kurdistan Region oil exports was declared by then President Massoud Barzani as “a historic date” and “a giant step” and promised that “this achievement will serve the interests of all Iraqis, especially the Kurds.” The new access to oil wealth, which had previously been inhibited by international sanctions and locked up under the control of the Ba’ath regime, began to fund sprawling gated communities, shopping malls, and private schools in the region’s largest cities, widening the income gaps between the different social classes. The political leadership’s aspirations to turn the regional capital, Erbil, into the “next Dubai” seemed to be fast becoming a reality. People, young and old, believed the promise. However, the adopted economic model was at the expense of the policy considerations and development priorities of the future generations. The KRG provided free education and healthcare, subsidies for fuel, and jobs in the public sector – offering employment in exchange for loyalty and acquiescence. It extended loans to support private enterprises and housing mortgages to its citizens. The public sector became the single largest employer to absorb the tens of thousands of young graduates entering the job market annually. New jobs were increasingly created in the public sector rather than the private which was still quite small. Living conditions improved at a rapid pace. The economy grew considerably thanks to oil rents and public investment. The government’s annual budget increased from $2.5 billion in 2005 to $13 billion in 2013. The outcomes of this economic model, in the short run, were low and declining inequality, low poverty, and to some extent, shared prosperity. In the long run, however, funding the salaries of this bloated and inefficient public sector has become a real burden and a challenge given oil price fluctuations. These developments ushered in and greatly shaped the current social contract between the rulers and the ruled, where the political elite defined politics based on Kurdish identity and nationalism, or Kurdayeti. It was in this context that a frail and fragmented social contract was put in place, shortsightedly focusing on the provision of universal education and health as well as visible welfare interventions and employment without ensuring the sustainability of this model. A fundamentally broken social contract Several aspects of this social contract have begun to fray since 2015. First, because of economic recession, owing to the war with the so-called Islamic State, plummeting oil prices (between 2014-2016 and again in 2020), and to protracted revenue-sharing disputes with the federal government of Iraq. The public sector could no longer absorb the thousands of young people entering the job market each year. The KRG since 2013, which last had a budget law, slashed public spending which included salary cuts and a hiring freeze, and, in doing so, delivered a major blow to an entire generation that expects employment and benefits. They believed that if they obtained a university education that they would find a job; instead, they were suddenly faced with the prospect of competing for elusive opportunities of employment. The long-standing skill mismatch has not prepared them with the skills suited for the job market. Youth unemployment and idleness have soared – the total rate of people aged 15-24 who are not involved in education, employment, or training is 30% (20% for males and 40% for females). The overwhelming sense is that most employment opportunities are based on one’s political and social connections rather than merit. Second, the lagging growth in the private sector is also connected to the nature of the region’s political economy. The rapid development of some sectors such as the natural resources and real estate sectors at the expense of the more productive and labor-intensive sectors, a phenomenon that is known as the Dutch disease, has weakened the region’s economy and inhibited the growth of others such as manufacturing and agriculture. Relatedly, politically connected conglomerates benefit from generous rents and deals that undermine competition, entrepreneurship, and job creation. The most lucrative sectors, such as the real estate, telecommunications, and oil and gas tend to be dominated by companies that are owned by or connected to the ruling parties. The private sector growth has remained insufficient to absorb the surplus labor. In addition to the aversion to work in the highly unregulated private sector where the pay remains low despite the long hours. Worse still, like the rest of Iraq, the KRI has not escaped what is called the “resource curse”: it has ended up with less economic growth, less democracy, and less social equality, not despite the abundance of natural resources but because of them. Third, nearly a decade of austerity has precipitated the rapid decline in the provision of basic services – especially healthcare and education. These sectors are not only vital in people’s daily lives but are also, along with the security services, the most important public sector employers, especially for women’s labor force participation. The government still provides basic education and healthcare, but the quality of these services has declined. Protests and strikes against unpaid salaries, along with the lack of teaching and medical staff, have further deteriorated public service provision. The COVID-19 pandemic, which compelled hospitalization and homeschooling, barred many from a meaningful learning experience and exposed the substandard condition of the vital health and education sectors. People are forced to resort to private hospitals/clinics and schools for better healthcare and a more meaningful learning experience. Moreover, poor public service provision has created a lucrative market for private education and healthcare. This has forced people to pay for the same services to which they are already entitled in order to get them in better quality. For instance, the aspiring middle class is driven to send their kids to private schools and universities to learn skills in the hope of increasing their competitive advantages in an increasingly tight job market. The outcome has been a growing sense of social inequality and injustice, which is acutely felt by young people who bear the brunt of its consequences. All of these factors have contributed to rising dissatisfaction with the government to the point that street protests are a regular occurrence, albeit limited to the eastern part of the region. Recent protests have also become increasingly violent because of the authorities’ securitization of public space and growing intolerance of dissent. The unspoken deal at the heart of Kurdish politics in Iraq has been that the ruling parties control the political space but, in return, they deliver a better life. However, the austerity policies pursued since 2015 have reversed the improvements in living standards. Moreover, the region’s economic development model adopted in the preceding decade has made many people feel left out and with elusive prospects of social upward mobility. It has also contributed to rising public dissatisfaction and disenchantment with politics, while the region’s population is ever more disaffected and struggling to make ends meet amid soaring inflation and a cost-of-living crisis. The way forward The highlighted trajectory points to a clear indication that the current situation is unsustainable and requires a course correction. Renegotiating or redrawing the social contract has become a necessity to realign the relationship between the government and society and the obligations each has to the other. The public sector should be reformed to ensure the provision of the basic services that the government is expected to deliver. This is central to meeting citizens’ expectations of the government and enabling the emergence of a more balanced and durable social pact. The reimagined social contract must protect the most vulnerable such as the low-income earners and stimulate human capital development. A major challenge is to overcome inter-party squabbles that compound the region’s governance issues and to address patronage and nepotism. There are some promising developments as socio-economic concerns have become catalysts triggering the surge in entrepreneurship and activism, which indicates that the new generation is willing to break away from the patronage system. It is also embracing a citizenship model that is more inclusive and allows greater rights and responsibilities for citizens. They have formed new platforms, ideas, and dreams to push for a more just and prosperous future. These positive signs, however, are highly constrained by the system in which they operate and represent glimmers of hope rather than broad rays of progress. Across the board, talents can be found waiting to be tapped, entrepreneurial flair ready to be unleashed, and young people impatient to be given their chance. They are being held back by the region’s broken economy and broken politics. They also lack opportunities to engage with the political process and thus often turn to other non-political means to articulate their demands and express their dissatisfaction. There is also a growing fatigue with the region’s two ruling parties in charge since the inception of the region in 1991. The record low turnout in recent elections is an indication that they have lost faith in bringing about change in the status quo through conventional means. Abstaining is also a political decision. It is, therefore, imperative to address the waning interest in politics and facilitate youth engagement and participation in the political process. To be sure, while the KRI’s ruling parties hold the federal government in Baghdad responsible for the economic slump, the younger generations anticipate jobs, services, and opportunities, not from the Government of Iraq, but from their own rulers in the semi-autonomous region, who presided over its rise and prosperity, but have signally failed to ensure its fair and equitable distribution. Indifference and failure to heed the demands and frustrations of the young population will likely lead to more resentment that could bring the kind of unrest that other parts of Iraq have faced in recent years.

The Rise and Fall of Kurdish Power in Iraq

washingtoninstitute- by Bilal Wahab Despite thirty years of landmark achievements, the KRG’s endless quest for economic independence has only entrenched its internal divisions and kleptocracy while shifting its dependency—from Iraq to Turkey, and from foreign aid to oil revenues. If the 1991 Gulf War led to the birth of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the US invasion in 2003 propelled it into the future. At the start of the invasion, Iraqi Kurdistan served as the northern front of the war, elevating the status of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The destruction of President Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime buttressed Kurdish rights and enabled their political and economic power to grow. Compared to the violence and sectarian strife that befell the rest of the country under the US-led occupation, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was held up by the US pundit class as a “safe haven” and “island of decency”—a narrative the KRG encouraged with a public relations campaign describing Kurdistan as “the Other Iraq.” 2003 brought with it a unity of purpose among Iraq’s Kurdish parties. They capitalized on their longstanding relationship with the United States and Britain, the primary enforcers of the no-fly zone following the first Gulf War and the two major proponents of regime change in 2003. Although differences persisted, Kurdish parties spoke in unison in Baghdad, particularly in the early years following the invasion. They worked to enshrine their new powers and rights into Iraq’s 2005 constitution, which recognized Kurdistan as an official region and granted the KRG power to govern largely independently of Baghdad. Kurdish parties also fully supported the 2005 parliamentary elections. As a result of these efforts, they gained a significant influence within the Iraqi state. Kurdish members of parliament form a significant block that often makes or breaks governments and legislation. In the muhassasa system—the informal but persistent practice of ethno-sectarian division of top jobs—Iraq has only had Kurdish presidents since 2006. Ethnic Kurds have on occasion served as deputy parliament speakers and led key ministries such as finance and foreign affairs. But working within the state apparatus has confused the Kurdish role in Baghdad. On the one hand, the KRG has sought the greatest possible share of the state’s powers and revenues. On the other, given historical Kurdish fears of a strong central government, they have also invested in their ability to secede, exemplified by the referendum for independence in 2017. Today, Iraqi Kurdistan faces external challenges, most notably a legal and financial squeeze by Baghdad’s federal government and threats of Iranian and Turkish attacks. The real threat to the KRG is not external, however. Thirty years after its founding and 20 years on from the US invasion, the KRG—as if going through a mid-life crisis—lacks a clear vision for its future. Amid the threat of losing relevance, it stares at implosion due to economic uncertainties, chronic internal divisions and weak institutions. Finding Wealth Kurds in Iraq have long based their struggle for self-rule on their grievances as a persecuted ethnic minority. Kurdish rulers gained legitimacy by standing up for Kurdish rights. Following the first Gulf War and the 1992 elections, however, such revolutionary credit gave way to democratic legitimacy. The elections gave birth to the KRG and brought two parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to formal political power. Since then, each of the two major Kurdish parties has remained inextricably associated with a family—the Talabani family lead the PUK, and the Barzani family the KDP (their second and third generations, respectively, are currently at the helm of power). The civil war in Iraqi Kurdistan between 1994 and 1998 discredited both parties, dividing the region into two single-party fiefdoms that persist until today. Meanwhile, over the course of the past two decades, as a new generation of each ruling family took on the mantle of leadership, their legitimacy has lacked both revolutionary and democratic standing. Economic development emerged as an alternative. Indeed, between 2004 and 2014, the KRG translated post-invasion opportunities into an economic boom. A construction frenzy in this period caused the capital city of Erbil to more than double in size. The KRG says it has rebuilt 65 percent of rural Kurdistan that was destroyed during the Anfal campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1988. Two of Iraq’s three national cell phone companies are headquartered in Kurdistan, and the region is also home to a slew of hotels, gated communities and private schools, including two American-style universities. By 2005, the KRG had built two international airports, in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, unshackling the landlocked region. Foreign visitors could obtain visas upon arrival, a policy that the Iraqi government did not adopt until 2021. Mass public hiring decreased unemployment, although foreign laborers filled much of the skills gap. Furthermore, a 2006 investment law, which offered investors perks such as land ownership, tax holidays and profit repatriation, helped the KRG attract significant local and foreign capital. Today, there are over 3,000 foreign companies registered in the region. On the diplomatic front, the KRG hosts 42 consulates and maintains 14 representation offices around the world. Making the most of its geographic location and security, Iraqi Kurdistan has become an important regional trade route and destination. Turkey, whose only land border with Iraq goes through the Kurdistan region, is the KRG’s largest trading partner. In 2017, the volume of trade between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan was $2.5 billion, representing nearly one third of Ankara’s overall trade with Iraq. Similarly, one third of Iraq’s imports from Iran—an estimated $2.4 billion a year—are to Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, 50 percent of Iran’s exports to Iraq pass through border crossings controlled by the KRG. From Foreign Aid to Oil Federalism The federal system proposed in the 2005 constitution granted the KRG a significant role in managing the oil and gas resources of the region. These provisions served as a safeguard: Should the new Iraq fail, it would be possible for an economically independent Kurdistan to take the next step toward statehood, the penultimate nationalist dream. The constitution envisioned a system of petro-federalism, in which the federal Iraqi government and the KRG would share responsibility over oil policy and revenue. But in the years since its ratification, the Iraqi parliament has consistently failed to pass a national hydrocarbon law that would regulate the energy sector and define these joint roles. Acting proactively, the Kurdish parliament passed its own natural resources law in 2007 and started inking some 55 contracts with international oil companies. While the federal government maintained that this law was unconstitutional and the oil contracts illegal, the KRG pushed ahead. It adopted production-sharing contracts, an industry favorite, which allowed international oil companies a stake in the region’s petroleum assets. This “smaller, faster, lighter” approach, as Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani put it in a 2012 interview with the author interview, helped jumpstart the Kurdish energy industry. Small firms, or wildcatters, came first, but Big Oil soon followed. In 2011 and 2012 ExxonMobil and Chevron each signed exploration contracts with the KRG, materially boosting the legal standing of its energy industry. The KRG asked for neither permission nor forgiveness from Baghdad, an approach that in many ways paid off. By mid-2022, the KRG was producing nearly 450,000 barrels of oil per day, most of it exported via the region’s independent pipeline through Turkey. In the second quarter of 2022 alone, Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sales earned $3.77 billion in gross revenues. While only 41 percent of these revenues made it into KRG coffers (the rest was dedicated to paying the oil sector’s costs as well as servicing its debts) the KRG still reaped $1.57 billion. As for natural gas, the KRG’s marketed natural gas production stood at about 5.3 billion cubic meters per year in 2021. The payoffs, however, have come with a cost. The federal government’s claim on Kurdish oil has forced the KRG to sell at a political risk discount. Furthermore, disputes between Erbil and Baghdad over oil and customs revenues boiled over in 2014, leading Baghdad to cut off the KRG’s share of the national budget. In 2022, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court formally ruled that the KRG’s natural resource law was unconstitutional and its oil contracts and exports illegal. The Iraqi government had also sued Turkey in international arbitration courts over allowing the KRG to use the Iraq-Turkey pipeline without Baghdad’s approval. At the time of writing, the court favored Iraq’s position, compelling Turkey to halt the KRG’s oil exports. The future of the KRG’s independent energy industry remains uncertain. Intent on more independence from Baghdad, the KRG has grown dependent on other entities and factors beyond its control, including global oil prices, the dollar-dinar exchange rate and Turkey, through which its pipeline passes. The vulnerabilities of this system started to show in 2014, when the expansion of ISIS caused international oil companies to either withdraw or suspend planned developments. The KRG made up for the losses by taking over Kirkuk’s oil fields following the Iraqi army’s retreat, which doubled the KRG’s crude exports to 550,000 barrels per day. But these gains were hampered by falling oil prices. Per barrel, oil prices fell from a peak of $115 in June 2014 to $70 in December and to $35 by February 2016. Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani described the KRG’s dire financial situation at the time as an “economic tsunami.” A telling manifestation of lost confidence in the KRG has been a renewed wave of migration to Europe. As a result of these factors, among others, by 2021 the KRG faced a debt of $31.6 billion. Internal Divisions and Institutional Weakness In recent years, fissures have cropped up among Iraqi Kurdistan’s ruling families, who have grown in prominence as the region’s political parties have weakened. After PUK founder Jalal Talabani passed away in 2017 his eldest son and nephew together took the reins of the party as co-presidents. In 2021, a feud broke out between the cousins, Bafel and Lahur Talabani, and the former ousted the latter. Meanwhile, on the Barzani side a power struggle is brewing between two Barzani cousins, which has the potential to disrupt not only the cohesion of the KDP but the entire regional government. These internecine struggles reflect broader institutional weaknesses and democratic regression in the Kurdistan region. As an example, KRG institutions were brittle and completely unprepared to weather the “economic tsunami” that began in 2014. The last time the KRG parliament had passed a budget was in 2012. The public sector had swelled uncontrollably, crowding out private sector jobs. By 2017, the KRG was the largest employer in Kurdistan, employing half of the labor force, roughly 1.4 million people, to the tune of $750 million a month. Corruption and inefficiency have marred public sector employment, with thousands of ghost employees, double dippers and undeserved pensioners, while the budding private sector owes its existence to holding companies owned or controlled by members of Kurdistan’s ruling families. To avoid showing its hand to Baghdad, the KRG energy industry has become increasingly opaque and unaccountable. The Peshmerga enjoy influence and prestige and have continued to garner significant public and political support, especially during their partnership with the US-led anti-ISIS coalition, but the cavernous political rift between the PUK and KDP has decreased the Kurdistan region’s value to the United States as a partner and diminished Kurdish leverage in Baghdad. There is no accurate accounting available, but the number of Peshmerga fighters is estimated to range between 160,000 to double that number. Prime Minister Masrour Barzani admitted that the Peshmerga forces have more generals among their ranks than either the US or Chinese military. Ever since the war against ISIS, the United States has provided stipends and training to Peshmerga units in exchange for the promise that the Peshmerga will be unified under the command of the KRG rather than its ruling parties. But the KDP and PUK refuse to surrender control of their respective units—a stance that Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces have cited in their own snubbing of national authority. Overall, the KRG’s reputation for valuing democracy and human rights has eroded in the years since 2003. Due to civil war and internal divisions in the 1990s, the region’s second parliamentary elections were not held until 2005, 13 years after the first election. Subsequent elections have taken place only following significant delays. Electoral victory and power are increasingly out of sync in the region. When the unarmed opposition party, Gorran, came in second in the 2009 elections, ahead of the PUK, the two ruling parties did not allow Gorran to share in power. Although President Masoud Barzani’s term ended in 2015, he only left office in 2017, effectively shutting down the Kurdish parliament for two years in order to extend his tenure. No wonder turnout has been steadily declining at Kurdish elections. The KRG’s Future Despite a persistent narrative of grievances and victimhood, Iraqi Kurds have exercised significant power and agency during the past three decades. KRG leaders continue to seek more power and autonomy, but to what end? Although they rebounded after decades of war, genocide and neglect, post-invasion Kurdish politics has not managed to shake off chronic internal divisions. The region’s most advanced institutions that could potentially support an independent Kurdistan remain its economy and Peshmerga forces. While the KRG has wielded economic policy to shift toward political independence, they have yet to produce a viable economic model. Indeed, despite 30 years of successfully managing a regional economy, the endless quest for economic independence has only ended up shifting dependency from Iraq to Turkey or from foreign aid to oil revenues. The ad hoc economic policy that has slowly emerged, like a Polaroid photo, over the past two decades displays traits of socialism, free markets and kleptocracy. Access to power and wealth, meanwhile, remains anchored to politics, not to economic activity. The 2017 independence referendum, called for by then-President Barzani, tested the Kurdistan region’s military and economic assets. Neither the international community nor the KRG’s neighbors could stomach redrawing the borders of the Middle East, and the KRG was not ready to withstand the economic and political costs of its push to secede from Iraq. The referendum and its aftermath cost the KRG the gains it had made following the ISIS invasion of 2014, including Kirkuk and its oilfields, which were reclaimed by Iraqi military and Popular Mobilization Forces after an armed encounter with the Peshmerga. Most damaging, however, was the clarity it bestowed on a hitherto ambiguous question: Can the KRG become an independent state? As Kurdish divisions deepen and security in the rest of Iraq improves, the balance of power that once favored the KRG is shifting in Baghdad’s favor. Since the referendum, KRG leaders disagree on visions for their position within Iraq and on plans to save their embattled energy sector. Should the Kurdish economy remain hinged on foreign aid, oil and budget transfers from Baghdad, or can it build a robust economy through reform and diversification? These are among the questions raised over the past 20 years. Whether and how they are answered will determine the Kurdistan Region’s future. Bilal Wahab is the Wagner Fellow at The Washington Institute. This article was originally published on the MERIP website.

Why the United States should stop supporting the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga

Diary Marif/ culturico The United States has planned to unify the Kurdish forces of Peshmerga, providing more financial aid and weaponizing them in order to defeat IS and other extremist groups. But the senior military men and politicians keep aside the weapons and aid for themselves and do not give them to the Peshmerga forces who are on the front lines fighting IS. Instead, they use weapons to repress the Kurdish protestors who ask for their basic rights and freedom of expression. In early August, the Kurdistan Region’s Minister of Peshmerga Affairs, Shoresh Ismail, met with U.S. officials in Washington DC and promised to follow through on reforms aimed at unifying the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Peshmerga militias are the main forces of the KRG in Iraq, but they are not controlled by the KRG. Rather, they are governed by political parties. This issue of divided loyalty affects the KRG’s national strategies to protect Kurdistan and defeat extremist groups. For example, a few days after Ismail’s promising visit with U.S. officials, Mohammed Haji Mahmoud, the leader of the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, illegally held a military parade for his militia without censure from the KRG. The militia may be under Ismail’s command, but the troops clearly listen to Mahmood, not the minister. Accentuating this general discord even further, Ismail returned from his visit with U.S. officials to brief not the KRG parliament, president, or prime minister, but rather the former President, Masoud Barzani, who has no official position or responsibilities in the current government. The KRG’s lack of control over the Peshmerga is proving a problem for U.S. partners. The U.S. has been in a partnership with KRG in Iraq to defeat the Islamic State (IS) and other terrorist groups. The separation of the forces, however, has negative consequences for U.S. plans. The U.S. also wants the Peshmerga to cooperate with the Iraqi army to set up robust security in the country. Mahmoud’s illegal parade and Ismail’s meeting with Barzani reveal an obvious, disappointing reality: the unification of the Peshmerga is just not happening, and any U.S. financial or political support for it instead goes into the pockets of the political parties’ militias, putting the lives of ordinary people at risk. Why is Unification Failing? The U.S. proposal of integrating and unifying the Peshmerga forces is not a new agenda. When the KRG formed in 1992, it bridged several political parties, including the two major ones: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by former Iraqi president Jalal Talabani. Right away, these parties undertook a plan to abolish their partisan militias and set up a single national force to protect the region and its people (1). Although straightforward in theory, the plan caused chaos on the ground, and a bloody, four-year civil war broke out in which thousands of the Peshmerga were tortured, wounded, and killed. One dire consequence of the civil war was that the Peshmerga forces of the parties were not able to trust each other (2). To this day, they are still traumatized by the civil war years. Therefore, unification has not worked. During the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. high officers proposed to Talabani and Barzani to unify their forces under one national commander. Although Talabani and Barzani accepted the proposal, they hesitated to follow it, as each party thought that losing its militia would have a negative impact on its political hegemony and that losing control of its forces would affect their interests. But in 2010, both parties tried again and consequently integrated fourteen brigades, though this integration was only of about 40,000 Peshmerga fighters and over 120,000 troops remain in unintegrated KDP and PUK units. The process of integration was then halted again for two main reasons. Firstly, U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 meant less attention from the U.S. on integration; secondly, both parties were in a contest to win the fame of their militia against IS. The desire to unify the Peshmerga became more concrete in 2014 when IS began assaulting Iraq. At the time, Barzani was President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). As commander-in-chief of all Peshmerga forces, he granted the Peshmerga minister, Mustafa Said Qadir, six months to carry out the necessary reforms in order to unify the forces against IS. Even though Barzani was the most powerful man in Kurdistan, his demand for reform has gone unanswered for the last eight years. Barzani’s demands have no power in the PUK-controlled zone, and his stubborn desire for the Peshmerga to stay under the control of his own party led to significant disruption and further division in the PUK zone and elsewhere. Although nominally united under one government, the bitter divisions between the KDP and PUK are just as deep-seated and intense now as they were when the PUK separated from the KDP in 1975. Having each established their own militias to protect their interests, the parties spent decades killing one another in the 1980s and during the civil war of the 1990s—a reality that cannot be easily undone. The wounds of past conflicts are still present in today’s parties, and any sign of friction nowadays is met with threats and the fear of another civil war. With such deeply-entrenched attitudes, Peshmerga forces simply do not listen to the Minister of Peshmerga Affairs and are instead loyal to political party leaders, protecting the interests of their party and competing against other parties. In return, the political parties incentivize the Peshmerga with monthly payslips and threaten them with firing or kidnapping if they refuse to act as protection to party leaders and their families. Even the fourteen brigades—consisting of around 40,000 Peshmerga fighters—that were nominally integrated in 2010 remained party-focused. In 2017, these brigades were once again separated as party tensions ran high during the Independence Referendum for the Kurdistan Region. The PUK troops withdrew from the disputed territories between Baghdad and Kurdistan and Iraqi forces replaced them. The KDP accused the PUK of collaborating with the Iraqi army and betraying the Kurdish cause, as the KDP knew the PUK and Iran had a secret agreement. The KDP claimed that Iran wanted Kurdistan not to be an independent country and forced the PUK not to support the referendum any longer. Although the 14 brigades remain officially integrated, they were called on and controlled by party leaders, not the ministry of Peshmerga. Since then, the process of Peshmerga reform stopped and the relationships between parties has continuously deteriorated. Making the situation worse, senior Peshmerga commanders and politicians of both parties know exactly what is at stake if unification were to occur. These authorities have been the sole beneficiaries of their own protection brigades, corrupt practices, and party dynamics, and they are not so willing to give up their power, especially to other parties. As a case in point, a senior PUK commander allegedly ordered an attack on the headquarters of the Gorran Movement in Sulaimaniyah in 2018 after the Gorran Party complained about vote violations and the results of the KRG elections. Clearly, any deviation from the divisive norm is a threat to party officials. Kurdish forces of Peshmerga. Photo @Levi Meir Clancy for Unsplash. Where Does the Aid Go U.S. support for the Peshmerga forces goes back to the 1970s, when the Peshmerga fought against the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein and the U.S. supported them in order to deter Saddam from falling into an alliance with the Soviet Union. In 1991, the U.S. and its allies played a major role in establishing and enforcing a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. They supported the Peshmerga to serve as a local fighting force to stabilize the area after Saddam’s regime was overthrown. In recent years, the U.S. and its allies have provided financial aid, arms, and training to the Peshmerga forces in the name of countering IS. But U.S. support has not actually gone to the low-level Peshmerga soldiers who fight IS forces on the frontlines. Instead, senior party officers and high-level Peshmergas—individuals who have never faced IS—receive the funds and guns. I talked to two Peshmerga soldiers for this project, one from the PUK and one from the KDP. Neither soldier has seen any U.S. ammunition or weapons on the frontline, and instead, they fight with their own guns and bullets. The Peshmergas do not get any money back for these expenditures, despite the fact that they cost an arm and leg. When asked, the Peshmergas revealed that most U.S. guns go to senior commanders and their personal guards, who have never fought IS. These guns are used to shoot and kill the civilian protesters who request basic rights in the KRG, or for the protection of tribes—not for eliminating the IS threat. In addition, a portion of guns also goes to the bodyguards of some political and military seniors who look after their farms and gardens in suburban areas. At the same time, a number of guns provided by the U.S. are sold on the market illegally, at times even going to IS forces that are able to pay. Several members of the KRG parliament and journalists have verified that senior Peshmergas have traded weapons with IS. Nevertheless, these officers have not been charged. The United States Needs to Take Action The U.S.-Kurdish military action against Saddam Hussein’s regime and IS is one example of successful cooperation in the Middle East. Each side needs the other; the U.S. needs to exist in the area to protect its interests and stop the incursion of Russia, China, and Iran into the KRG. At the same time, the Kurds need the U.S. to protect themselves from extremist groups and threats from neighbouring countries. Furthermore, over the past 20 years, the U.S. has not had smooth relations with Shiite groups as they support Iran, while the Sunni groups have consistently clashed with American troops during the post-Saddam era. The Kurdish Peshmerga, in contrast, has consistently supported connections with the U.S. But in the last decade, the Kurdish leadership has taken advantage of the Peshmerga and continues to misuse their relationship with the U.S. This situation does not facilitate the U.S.’s regional interests and may force them to rethink other new partnerships and even to stop supporting the Peshmerga forces. But the U.S. should not cut off this relationship. In doing so, the U.S. may lose an epicentre of power in the region and cost the Kurdish authorities their long-standing security from militia attacks from neighbouring countries. If this happens, it will be the end of the Kurdish region of power, similar to the collapse of power in Afghanistan after the U.S.’s abrupt departure. Mahmoud’s most recent display with his private militia is only one link in a long chain of corrupt practices, personal brigades, and divisive tensions within the Peshmerga. To this day, Peshmerga forces remain loyal to their singular parties or party leaders, ignoring their stated purpose of protecting the Kurdish people as a whole and co-opting aid for themselves. By continuing with existing aid practices, U.S. officials fail to serve Kurdistan and its people. To change this reality, there are several steps the U.S. needs to take. First, they should push for abolishing the non-integrated PUK’s 70 units and the KDP’s 80 units—forces that only work for their parties. Second, the U.S. can curtail the KDP’s Zerevani forces and the PUK’s emergency forces, as well as the parties’ militia academies in Zakho and Qalasholan. Finally, the U.S. should investigate where the weapons and financial aid go and how they are used. Ideally, the Peshmerga must employ professionals in high positions who have no party affiliations. Without these steps and several more beyond, the U.S. support only helps parties and their corrupt politicians and commanders, not Kurdistan’s citizens. Diary Marif References: Van Wilgenburg, W. and M. Fumerton, “Kurdistan’s political armies: The challenge of unifying the Peshmerga forces” Carnegie Middle East Center, 2015. Arif, B. H. and T. M. Mokhtar, “The Kurdish civil war (1994–1998) and its consequences for the governing system in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”, Asian Affairs, 2022. culturico https://culturico.com/2023/03/29/why-the-united-states-should-stop-supporting-the-iraqi-kurdish-peshmerga/

'Iraq is not an Islamic country': Minorities protest Baghdad's alcohol ban as unconstitutional

The Iraqi government's renewed effort to prohibit alcohol is not only worrisome for Christian and Yazidi minorities, but also raises constitutionality questions. Draw Media, Al-Monitor Iraq officially banned the import, production and sale of alcoholic beverages of all kinds on March 4, in a repeat of a ban that was passed in 2016, but its implementation was paused due to strong objections from secularists and minorities at the time. The new law imposes fines for violations of between 10 million and 25 million dinars ($7,700-$19,000). Last month, the law instituting the ban was published in Iraq's official gazette, paving the way for implementation. The coalition of new Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who took office last October, is dominated by Shiite Islamist parties and militias in the so-called Coordination Framework who support the ban. Now, with the law going into effect, liquor stores are still open in Baghdad, Erbil and other parts of the country. But some Iraqis, especially those from the Yazidi and Christian communities, are raising concerns. 'Not an Islamic country' Iraq has great religious diversity. The majority of the population is Shiite and Sunni Muslims, but there are also sizable communities of Christians, Yazidis, Zorastrians, Mandaeans and others. Some analysts believe the law is a step toward turning Iraq into an Islamic country. "This is ethnic discrimination," Diya Butros, an activist in the predominantly Chaldean Catholic town of Ankawa, told Al-Monitor. "It's a violation of the rights of non-Muslim religions that do not forbid alcohol." Ali Saheb, an Iraqi political analyst, told Independent Arabia on March 6 that Iraq is not an Islamic country, and "Some religions allow drinking alcohol, and the government cannot impose a certain opinion or ideology on others." Unlike Islam, the Yazidi and Christian faiths do not forbid alcohol consumption. Some even use it in their religious rituals. Others argue the law violates the Iraqi constitution, which guarantees personal, religious and cultural freedom. Mirza Dinnayi is a Yazidi activist and chairman of Luftbrucke Irak, a non-governmental organization that helps victims of conflict in Iraq. He told Al-Monitor, "The law is contrary to the constitution because Iraq is a multi-ethnic, -religious and -cultural country, and drinking alcohol is not prohibited for many." Dinnayi also argued that if alcohol drinkers turn to other alternatives, the ban could provide an opportunity for the spread of drug use “The majority of Muslim countries do not ban alcohol, but rather regulate it. Why doesn’t the Iraqi government do something similar, instead of banning it totally?” The law is especially troublesome for Yazidis and Christians, who manage the overwhelming majority of alcohol shops in the country. Many Christians and Yazidis have been attacked in recent years for working in this sector, and some fear this law could lead to an increase in violence against them. It is therefore unsurprising that Iraqi civil society groups have come out strongly against the law. More than 1,000 prominent Iraqi researchers, academics, journalists and activists drafted an open letter to the secretary general of the United Nations earlier this month criticizing the ban. In addition to the objections on constitutional grounds, the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq may reject the law. The Kurdistan Region is home to much of Iraq's Christian and foreign population, particularly in Ankawa and the nearby regional capital Erbil. A KRG customs official told the Kurdish news outlet Rudaw earlier this month that they reserve the right to make their own decision on the ban. Religious authorities' views The law is religiously motivated by the Islamic prohibition on alcohol, but Shiite religious authorities did not play a role in it. The highest religious authority for Iraq's Shiite majority, in the holy city of Najaf, is headed by Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Throughout the 21st century, Sistani has vocally supported a civil state and rejected the imposition of religion. Sistani has not commented on the law, but a prominent cleric told Al-Monitor that the religious authority in Najaf is against this legislation or any similar action. “The religious authority in Najaf has been always calling for a ‘civil state’ in Iraq, rejecting any kind of imposition of religiosity in the state institution,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity. The source referred to stances taken by Sistani in the past, such as when he rejected the Personal Status Law in 2013 due to its imposition of Sharia, as well as the leader's rejection of displaying religious symbols in state offices. When asked about Sistani's current silence, the cleric said, “Sistani had made it very clear for a long time that he is against such a law, and there is no need to repeat the same thing.” With corruption and militia control rampant in Iraq, however, many worry that the ban will drive Iraqis to the black market to purchase alcohol. In this context, the ban may increase drug smuggling into the country, as well as encourage other forms of substance abuse.

Report Reveals Only One Million Iraqi Women Are Employed

According to this United Nations report, women’s participation rates in the global labour market between the ages of 25 and 54 increased in the 1990s to between 60 and 85 percent. Unfortunately, this has not been the case for Iraqi women, whereby women’s entry into the labour market is a huge challenge in Iraq. Increasing women’s participation in the labour force would improve the productive capacity of the country and support economic growth. In turn, this could help give women the ability to express their opinion in society and play a leading role in the family. To date, there is little research that explores the reason for the decline in women’s participation in the labour force in Iraq. Despite the importance of the subject, research that has been conducted is on a limited scale. The latest report in 2021 was conducted by the International Labor Organization, in cooperation with the Ministry of Planning, and the Central Statistical Organization. The report shockingly revealed that “there are 13 million women within the working age, of whom only one million are engaged in work.” Iraqi Women’s Participation in the Labour Force in Numbers Those aged 15 and older, who are of working age, account for 6.63% of the total population of Iraq. Men constitute 50.3% and women are 49.7% – almost half of the country’s population. Unfortunately, this percentage is not reflected in women’s participation in the labour force, nor in equal access to resources and opportunities. According to the 2021 Labor Force Survey in Iraq, the percentage of the labour force in Iraq reached 39.5% of the total population of working age. Men accounted for 86.6% while women were only 13.4%. The labour force participation rate for women was 10.6%, compared to 68% for males. These rates are among the lowest rates of female labour participation in the world. This significant decrease in women’s labour force participation is due to several reasons, including Iraq’s instability, a lack of culturally sensitive spaces, financial constraints, and a competitive job market with few jobs available. In addition to the unemployment rate, which reached 16.5% in Iraq, the above graphic shows that there is one unemployed person for every 5 people. On the other hand, the female unemployment rate reached 28%, which is double the male unemployment rate of 14%. According to the results of the Ministry of Planning / Central Statistical Organization, women tend to be more concentrated in the fields of services (73%) and agriculture (14%), compared to 62% and 7%, respectively, for men. The results also showed that the following sectors are male dominated: Construction and related professions Protection services Drivers of cars, trucks and motorcyclists Sales representatives While the professions dominated by women are: Primary education and kindergarten High school Garment industry and related professions As for the preferences of work sectors, 71% of women prefer to work in the government sector, while 29% of them prefer to work in the private sector. While for men, 34% of them prefer to work in the government sector and 65% of them prefer to work in the private sector. Steps to Expand the Scope of Women’s Work The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report indicated that Iraq ranked 154 out of 156 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index for the year 2021. These numbers show the seriousness and importance of the issue. Unless real and decisive steps are taken to support women, Iraqi women will continue to fall behind. Institutions must work together to reduce the gap by developing female talent for the industries of the future. Additionally, the government must develop legislation for early marriage and childbearing, as is the case in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has placed women as a priority in the labour market, in both its private and public sectors, and in all aspects of life. Removing these disparities would reduce the unemployment rate, raise the level of women’s participation, enhance competition among jobseekers, revitalise the efforts of many vital sectors and ultimately grow the country’s GDP. In The End Women have an important and active role in society, and they represent half of it! Despite the limited opportunities and obstacles faced, many Iraqi women have proven that they can be successful and contributing members of society. But the question is, where does the problem lie in these statistics? The percentage of women’s participation in the labour market in developing countries, including Iraq, is less than the global average, noting that the percentage of women’s participation in developed countries is more than 67%. What Iraqi women need today is not limited to increasing available job opportunities, but we must also realise the many complexities and challenges that women face in the labour market. And as the data has highlighted, we need to facilitate women’s participation in the workforce by addressing social norms, establishing sound policies, and real commitment to implement these frameworks across the country. Today, we live in a rapidly evolving digital world where the digital economy can provide more opportunities for women to be involved in the workforce, and create new job opportunities that women can easily adapt to. This work has been done by the support of MiCT organisation and Germany cooperation GIZ Iraq.

The quota seats…Point of Election Conflict

Draw Media Religious and ethnic minorities quota seats have become the main problem facing the parties for the sixth session of the Kurdistan Parliament. Some are in favor of distributing the quota seats among the provinces. Others believe that the minorities’ representation in Parliament do not express their opinions and are monopolized by the political parties. The total number of votes obtained by the minorities in the first round of the Kurdistan parliamentary elections was (11 thousand 971) votes. In the last parliamentary elections, their total votes increased to 23 thousand 165 votes. The share of the minorities in the Kurdistan Parliament is one of the points of contention between the political parties and some call it the "The Knotty Spot of the elections." Some parties believe that the quota seats are monopolized by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and in parliament, the representatives of the minorities decide in their interests. Therefore, some parties are in favor of dividing the quota seats among the constituencies, so that a Turkmen seat for Kfri district and a Christian seat for Sulaymaniyah province. In Iraq, 2.3% of the seats in the House of Representatives are reserved for some communities. But others have not been given any political opportunities. In the Kurdistan Region, 10% of the seats in parliament are allocated to the communities. These figures do not fully reflect the rights of minorities, since the voices of minorities are rising from time to time, they say that those appointed in parliament do not represent the communities. This is despite the fact that the Yazidis and Kakais, who are largely residents of the Kurdistan Region, have no representation in the Kurdistan Parliament. According to Article 36 of the Kurdistan Parliamentary Election Law No.1 of 1992, amended: First, five seats will be allocated to the Chaldeans, Syrians and Assyrians. Second, five seats will be allocated to the Turkmen. Third, one seat will be allocated to Armenians. Now the main point of disagreement between the political parties, especially the PUK, the opposition and the independents Now the main point of disagreement between the political parties, especially the PUK, the opposition and the independents against the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is the distribution of community seats and voter registration for communities.

The oil values in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region in 2022

Draw Media Based on Deloitte reports, compared to the data of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and the measures of SOMO, the value of oil in (Iraq and the Kurdistan Region) and the (KRG oil through SOMO) in 2022 is as follows; 🔹 The average cost of a barrel of oil in the Kurdistan Region was more than (45.93) dollars and in Iraq (13.38) dollars, in other words (54%) of the revenue of every barrel of oil went to the cost of the process and in Iraq only (14%) was the cost of the process. 🔹 If the Kurdistan Region had sold oil at the price and cost of SOMO, then instead of (39.06) dollars per barrel, (82.16) dollars would remain, that is, instead of returning 5 billion and 709 million dollars to the government treasury, (11 billion) dollars would return to the government treasury. First, compare the oil prices of the Kurdistan Region and Iraq in According to the analysis, the Iraqi government in 2022, through the Iraqi Oil Marketing Company (SOMO) sold an average of $ 95.54 per barrel, the total value of oil sold was (115 billion 466 million 245 thousand) dollars. According to Duraid Abdullah, researcher and expert; “Foreign Oil Companies have 20% share out of 70% of the exported Iraq’s oil. "Iraq spent $16.1 billion last year on oil production," he said. According to this analysis, the return rate of Iraqi oil revenue was 86% and 14% went to the cost of oil processing. In other words, an average of $82.16 per barrel of oil sold returned to the Iraqi treasury and $13.38 was spent per barrel. But that is not true for the Kurdistan Region! According to Deloitte, the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2022, through the Kurdistan oil pipeline, sold an average of $ 84.99 per barrel and the total value of oil sold and delivered to foreign buyers (through the pipeline except domestic) was (12 billion 331 million 417 thousand 848) dollars and (90 million 843 thousand 46) dollars from domestic oil sales, but only (5 billion 709 million 704 thousand 87) dollars were put on revenue and the KRG General Treasury (Ministries of Finance and Natural Resources). Accordingly, the return rate of oil revenue was 46% and 54% went to the expenditure of the oil process. In other words, only $39.06 per barrel of oil sold in the Kurdistan region returned to the general treasury and $45.93 was spent per barrel of oil for the production process.

Draw Media publishes the KRG proposal and the response of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil regarding the oil and gas law

Draw Media According to a document obtained by (Draw Media), the Legal Office of the Iraqi Oil Ministry on 15/2/2023 have responded to the proposals of the Kurdistan Region regarding the oil and gas law and rejects 10 out of 15 suggestions. The proposals have not been directed to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) delegation, but instead the legal office has submitted to the Iraqi Oil Ministry. The Iraqi Oil Ministry is against the KRG (selling oil, having its own oil and gas pipelines, having an oil and gas council, and reviving the KRG's oil and gas law after being repealed by the Federal Court). These are the details of the recent discussions between the Kurdistan Regional Government delegation and the central government on how to write the draft of the oil and gas law. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has presented its proposal on the law in 15 points. The central government has rejected 10 points of the KRG's proposals, which is 67% of the proposals. • Article 111 of the Constitution One of the principles that the Kurdistan Regional Government delegation in the negotiations to prepare the draft law on oil and gas submitted to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, compliance with Article (111) of the Iraqi Constitution. Article 111 of the constitution states that "oil and gas in all regions and provinces belong to the entire Iraqi people." The Iraqi government agrees with the KRG, because it believes that this article of the constitution defines a good basis for the ownership of oil and gas and does not give any rights to either the central government or the KRG. Grant of permission The KRG has proposed that the issuance of oil licenses should be under the authority of the parties specified in the constitution, while the contracts for the fields in the Kurdistan region should be under the authority of the region, in accordance with Article 115 of the constitution. The federal government rejects the proposal, saying that the constitution does not give the authority to grant oil exploration and extraction licenses to any party, but in Article 112 writes that the federal government together with the Kurdistan Regional Government will manage the oil and gas extracted from existing fields. Transfer of ownership! The KRG has proposed that the oil and gas law allow for the “transfer of ownership of oil and gas to others at the point of delivery”. The central government disagrees with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on this proposal, saying that such a provision cannot be included in the oil and gas law, because it is contrary to Article 111 of the constitution. The Iraqi government proposes to leave the regulation of the transfer of oil and gas ownership to the sales contracts signed for this purpose. Oil and gas policy The KRG has proposed that the Federal Council and the Regional Council for Oil and Gas Affairs take over the preparation of the strategic oil and gas policy. The central government opposes the KRG's proposal, saying it is unconstitutional and could open the door to the creation of councils in oil-producing provinces. Oil and gas policy The KRG has proposed that the Federal Council and the Regional Council for Oil and Gas Affairs take over the preparation of the strategic oil and gas policy. The central government is against the KRG's proposal, saying that “This proposal is unconstitutional and could open the door to the creation of councils in oil-producing provinces,". In addition, it will lead to a plurality of stakeholders responsible for setting the overall oil and gas strategy. Who should sell oil? The KRG has proposed that the region have its own marketing company and deposit crude oil revenues into an international account under the control of the region and the revenues from the sale of oil from the federal government into another account. The central government has rejected the proposal, saying it is contrary to the law regulating the Ministry of Oil and the rules of the oil marketing company. "The proposal also contradicts the provisions of the Financial Administration Law and the Federal Budget Law, which state that all revenues from the sale of crude oil must be deposited in an account opened for this purpose.

Energy Geopolitics and Conflict between Energy Basins

Draw Media Bahrooz Jaafar Executive Summary Since early 2022, Russia and Iran have been enjoying rising oil and natural gas prices due to the smell of the war in Ukraine. Only one month before the Ukraine war broke out, the US secretary department sent a non-formal massage (non-paper) to each of the energy departments in Greece, Cyprus and Israel's s foreign affairs ministries, announcing that they suspend their support for Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline. This will kill Israel and Cyprus's dream to export natural gas to Europe via the Crete island in Greece! Are these conflicts more energy-related, or do they have historical and political depth? Will natural gas pipelines (the new energy geopolitics) lead to a new common regional cooperation system, or is it a source of conflict and increasing regional problems? This study, from the Mediterranean Institute for Regional Studies, attempts to understand the essence of problems by identifying three main energy basins and showing what the new regional and global energy system will look like. First: Energy security and the world's need for oil and natural gas Energy security means balancing national security with the availability of cheap natural resources to meet domestic needs. According to the US Energy Information Administration, in 1980, the world consumed 53 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, but in 2010, the world consumed 113 trillion cubic feet of natural gas{1}. In 2022, the world's demand for natural gas will reach 146.482 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, which means that the world's demand for natural gas will increase by 4.6% annually{2}. Similarly, in 2010, the world consumed 86.4 million barrels of oil per day, but in 2020, 91 million barrels of oil per day, and in 2022, the world consumed 100.80 million barrels per day{3}. The demand for natural gas and oil has increased: In the simplest terms, this means that oil and natural gas are still the world's top commodities, and millions, if not billions, of cars, planes, ships, factories, power grids, and large and medium-sized industries are still employed. Without natural gas and oil, the global economy would be largely paralyzed. It also means that although humanity has reached the last stage of great progress and innovation in its history, it has yet to find an alternative to oil and natural gas. Just as coal was hugely influential in previous centuries, and then the role became oil, today, natural gas is in the most influential days of its life. In 2022, natural gas has had the strongest impact on international relations: Second: The Caspian Basin: a new Silk Road, a new conflict, a new integration Caspian refers to the world's largest enclosed sea; Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are located in the Caspian basin. All of them have owned oil and natural gas reserves. Geographically, it lies between Europe and Asia; east of the Caucasus, West of the broad steppe of Central Asia, south of the fertile plains of Southern Russia in Eastern Europe, and north of the mountainous Iranian Plateau of Western Asia (this region is known as the heart of the world. Whoever controls it can control the world){4}. These regional factions have long sought to build an integration like the European Union. After the 2021 tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it became clear that Russia has a complete hegemony and ally in the region. 2. 1. Europe will no longer heat itself with Russian gas? However, it can be seen hydrocarbon as a common ground. However, the first third of the world's natural gas reserves are located in Asia: Russia (19.9%) of natural gas and Iran (17.1%) and Qatar (13.1%) in the Arabian Gulf. Although Qatar is a US ally and European natural gas supply, at the same time, Qatar is the Taliban and Iran's ally. By this word, (50.1%) of the world's natural gas reserves are owned by three alliance countries. Fourth is the United States (6.7%), which uses it more for domestic needs{5}. Europe consumes 540 billion cubic meters of gas annually, while Russia supplies 40 per cent of that. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline will transport Russian natural gas to Germany via Ukraine. Ukraine itself is a good beneficiary of taxes on gas pipelines{6}. On September 27, 2022, it was discovered that natural gas had leaked into the water from the North Stream 2 pipeline 70 meters underwater. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell called the incident deliberate and said the aim was to make natural gas more expensive for Europe; 2-2. Russian-Ukrainian War: Diplomacy failed to prevent war Indeed, this is not a conflict between the two ordinary countries; as we have seen, with the outbreak of the war on February 24 and February 24, 2022, the borders and sovereignty of countries, in general, have faded. This is the collision of at least two great continents, two different civilizations that have been in conflict for thousands of years. Therefore, it is still the beginning of the war, which Russia, Europe, the United States, Britain, China and Ukraine are part of; the spark has reached Taiwan and the Middle East. Is the gas pipeline alone responsible for the huge smoke that has engulfed the world, or where does the problem come from? In 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev declared the fall of the Soviet Union: 16 countries declared independence due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The world entered a different phase under the US and NATO presidencies, and Russia accepted the new system on the condition that its current hegemony and borders would be maintained. However, after 1999, the United States and Europe invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the European Club and made them members of NATO. The United States assured it would not deploy nuclear weapons in these countries, and Russia remained silent. In 2004, US President George W. Bush announced that Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia would become members of NATO. All these countries were formerly under the control of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin, therefore, understood that it should take the threat seriously. Then, in (2008) the US administration, under the direct supervision of Barack Obama and members of Bulgaria, Austria, Turkey and Romania, signed the Nabucco Pipeline project to transport natural gas from Central Asia (from the Caspian region) to Central Europe (They tried to transport gas from the region under Russia's ears without valuing Russia). In 2014, Ukrainian protesters, as media agencies showed that the United States and Europe backed them) forced President Viktor Yanukovych to flee to Moscow and turn his royal palace into a museum. They brought forward another team close to the West and have been trying to make Ukraine a member of NATO for a long time! This time, Russia considered regaining control of the Crimean peninsula. In 2014, they fought Crimea (Crimea: located north of the Black Sea and south of Ukraine, the island has a great military and material position, especially the port of Sevastopol, where most of the world's powers are clashed from here). With the occupation of Crimea, the Western power will no longer be able to receive any military assistance from the Black Sea. In addition, the threat of a NATO-Russian conflict in Crimea disrupted the Nabucco pipeline, especially when the world was busy with the war against terrorism (ISIS). The outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011 gave Russia an excuse to cross the Mediterranean Sea: This occurred from the Black Sea to the Marmara, and Russian warships reached the port of Tartus in Syria. Russia is still an important player in the Syrian conflict. The US administration has described China's economic and Russian military incursions as the biggest threat to national security. Therefore, the United States deployed long-range weapons and missiles in Romania (2016) and Poland (2020). Third: Conceptualization and theorizing: A call to securitization theory Theory in international relations helps us to understand phenomena. The securitization theory sparked in 1983 with Barry Buzan's book, "People, State, Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations". Later, Buzan and their colleague established "the Copenhagen School" as an important contribution to the science of international relations. According to this school, national security policy is not natural but carefully formulated by politicians and thinkers{7}. Here, securitization means that when an issue is labeled a "threat" and "danger", the social and political institutions must be provided for it. In other words, security issues do not come from the outside alone but must be addressed from the inside by security actors. For example, indicating "immigrants" as a threat to national security makes "immigrants" a less important issue to be directly addressed at all levels of "borders". This theory emphasizes that issues are not inherently dangerous but that when they are "securitized," they become security problems. This "security" was previously seen in a narrow context as a matter of military confrontation during the Soviet-American Cold War. Then the concept shifted to various levels such as regional security, energy security, environmental security, social security, food security, cyber security, etc. Hence, "issues" or "new phenomena" are considered security threats to culture, identity, economic status and national incomes. When US troops suddenly withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, in less than a week, the entire Afghanistan, worth (85) billion US$, weapons and military equipment fell into the hands of the Taliban{8}. This made serious questions about the US personality and gave Putin an incentive to impose an energy embargo on Europe and invade Ukraine in a cold winter. Ukraine has been under Russian rule for 200 years. For the Russians, Ukraine is an important part of Russian identity, language, geography and authenticity. From the beginning of the war, the price of oil rose from $ 60 to $ 94; the Wall Street Journal saw the price of oil reach $ 100-120, then reach the same price and more{9}. The European gas crisis and the sale of Russian gas and grain in the country's currency (Ruble) mean that Russia has done its duties successfully. Even the Biden administration has called on OPEC to increase oil production, but OPEC has ignored it from the beginning. Three allies, Russia, China, and Iran, have been prominent factors in global energy prices. On the other hand, another weakness of Europe is that they do not have a unified army; their entire military presence is considered to be NATO, which the United States dominates. Fourth: The gas pipeline in the eastern Mediterranean region Knowing the nature of the distribution of power relations about energy issues depends on recognizing the strategic energy basins and alliances in these regions. This is "energy geopolitics": In 2010, Cyprus and Israel announced that they had discovered underwater natural gas in their offshore borders. In August 2019, Cyprus, Israel and Greece signed a natural gas alliance agreement in Athens with the support of the United States. Even Frank Fannon, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Natural Resources, was present {10}. Egypt, Cyprus, Israel and Greece have established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), AS France, Italy, Spain, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Lebanon are also members of the EMGF, and former US Presidents and Secretaries of State Mike Pompeo have expressed strong support for the project. The discovery of the reserves in several major fields concerned Turkey in the southern Mediterranean. A strategic dream has been true in Southern Europe on the other side: Europe does not need Russian natural gas؛. From here on, another pipeline to Europe imports gas from Israel and Cyprus. In early 2021, the 1,900-km East-Med Pipeline has commissioned to transport Israeli and Cypriot natural gas through Greece to Italy, Macedonia, Serbia and other countries. However, this project is very controversial: - The Cyprus issue remains pending in the region. Turkey does not recognize the Greek Cypriot state and the Turkish part of Cyprus (TRNC) remains marginalized by the international community, which has exacerbated the natural gas problem. The main heads of gas production in the eastern Mediterranean are at odds with Turkey. So, it has been the main cause of regional tension. - Russia is stationed in Syria, and Turkey does not want the northeastern regions of Syria, which contain oil and natural gas reserves, to be under the control of Kurdish forces. - The Mediterranean Sea is the crossroads between three continents: Asia, Africa and Europe (Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey). - Environmental problems, migrants, human trafficking, etc., continue in this region. - The deployment of Italian and French warships in the Mediterranean Sea to oppose Turkey's maneuvers. - US and British warships stationed in the Mediterranean basin - The project has led Israel and motivated to become a producer and exporter of natural gas (Israel: imported natural gas from Azerbaijan through Turkish territory in the 1990s and from Egypt from 2008 to 2012). In March 2021, Israel's Delek Drilling sold a 22 per cent stake in the Tamar gas field to UAE's Mubadala Petroleum for more than $1 billion {11}. - the Mediterranean, led by France in Europe and Israel in the Middle East, Britain and the United States, look forward to the oil and gas reserves in Kirkuk and the Kurdistan Region into part of the eastern faction. Therefore, in response to these steps of the West, Russian and Turkish companies are participating in all fields of oil and gas services in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 4. 1. Why did the US administration withdraw support for the East-Med pipeline project? On January 9 January 9. 2022. the ministries of foreign affairs of Greece, Israel and Cyprus received a non-formal letter from the US secretary department. The letter states that the US administration will suspend its support for the East-Med gas pipeline project, which has sparked regional tensions. The additional gas reserves in the region can be utilized through electricity cables to produce and promote the joint regional project. The letter comes as the United States and Europe have been preparing for a dangerous confrontation with Russia (a month before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war). The Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Project is immensely important to the United States and the West, so it does not make any excuse for any researcher to believe that support for Europe and the United States will be suspended for this project. However, the following points should be considered: The project has been hurting Turkey for ten years. Therefore, the rumors of suspending US aid are directly related to the Ukraine crisis, a US compromise for Turkey not to get closer to Russia. If the US administration intended to end the project, it would have notified them through the embassies of the three countries in Washington. The US administration believes that the project will bring regional tension and conflict rather than peace and cooperation and has led to the neglect of Turkey in the region. Therefore, Turkey described the US announcement to suspend the EMGF as a great victory for itself. However, Turkey has received this message erroneously because they state that "every line to Europe must pass through Turkey. The United States desire the natural gas projects in the eastern Mediterranean to be in line with European environmental plans and policies. Therefore, they proposed to become an electricity and cable exchange network in the region. The European Union has decided to reduce its use of natural gas by 25 per cent by 2030 and not use it completely by 2050{12}. · The project is expensive and will not solve Europe's energy crisis entirely. Substantially, during the discovery of natural gas, energy giant companies have flocked to the eastern Mediterranean since 2010, such as Noble Energy and Exxon Mobile as the two major US companies, British Petroleum (BP), French Total, Italian Eni, Israeli Delek Drilling, German DEA. Recently, the UAE has devoted all its political, economic and diplomatic strength to the Mediterranean. The UAE has normalized relations with Israel and Turkey. In 2022, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited the UAE after 12 years of war and crisis in Syria. Are these signs a simple event and a normal regional step? Is it normal to spend $7 billion and start transporting Cypriot and Israeli natural gas to Greece and other countries in 2021? Fifth: The West and its environmental issues The European Energy Network has announced that it will reach a neutral level of environmental issues by 2050. According to this roadmap, Europe will no longer rely on oil and natural gas (neither exported nor imported). Europe and the Mediterranean countries have had stable agreements since the end of the Cold War; For example, the Barcelona Declaration of 1999: these three continents fall on the same sea; they called it the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In 2008, it was renamed the Union for the Mediterranean. According to these agreements, Europe will intervene in any country in the name of cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea, such as Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Libya, etc. Therefore, the US administration has called for the Eastern Mediterranean gas project to be conducted by European environmental policies. Establishment of a large joint power line to transport and use excess gas produced off the coast of Cyprus, Israel and Egypt with Greece, thus connecting three neighboring countries on different continents. However, it is not easy because it covers a large area of more than 1,300 miles, and again, this project will cause Turkey's objections. Legally, these waters have an UN-designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which mostly passes through Turkey. Experts believe that after the US decision in early 2022, the gas in the eastern Mediterranean will be only for the Mediterranean region, and a certain region will not be economically relevant to Europe. Investors are more likely to follow the statements of Israeli Energy Minister Karin Elharar, who said that in 2022, his office would focus on renewable energy for the production of energy, especially through wind and solar {13}. Sixth: Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Hydrocarbon potential, geographical location, political decisions The population of the Kurdistan Region has exceeded 6 million people, more than 5 million of whom live in cities. 1.4 million people receive salaries from the government, which requires 870 billion Iraqi dinars (about 750 million US dollars) monthly. The armed and security forces of the Kurdistan Region are 270,000 people{14}. However, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) claims to have between 3.7 and 5.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 45 to 60 billion barrels of oil reserves. Almost the Kurdistan Region ranks between the seventh and ninth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, with between 3% and 5% of the world's natural gas reserves{15}. The existence of hydrocarbon potential for the Kurdistan Region within the framework of the Iraqi state requires deep thinking in the regional chessboard and conflicts: How does the geopolitical aspect of the Kurdistan Region affect its natural reserves? The Kurdistan Region is directly involved in the war between Russia and NATO in the Caspian region. It is also more directly involved in the eastern Mediterranean's energy geopolitics, environment and political conflict. Russian companies are currently operating in Kurdistan Region. Iran is a Russian ally in all areas of the Kurdistan Region, while the Germans have been training the Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) since 2014. The French consider the Kurds their friends, and the US has the largest military base in the Kurdistan Region. In other words, the KRI and its natural gas are located between three different energy geopolitical basins: the Mediterranean Sea in the northwest the Qazvin (Caspian) basin in the east and northeast the Gulf region ( Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia) from the south For this reason, if the KRI does not maintain the balance, the Kurdistan energy line will bring chaos to the region. This geopolitical influence is reflected in decision-makers behavior in the Kurdistan Region; When the UAE normalized relations with Israel and Turkey in 2021, the KRG's Prime Minister Masrour Barzani will visit the UAE directly, and then the KRG's President Nechirvan Barzani will visit Turkey. In 2022, when the natural gas and fuel crisis in Europe and the United States due to the war in Ukraine, the Emir of Qatar visited the United States; following this, the Prime Minister of the KRG arrived in Doha on February 15, 2022, at the invitation of Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. As well as, during his participation in the 2022 global energy forum –Atlantic Council, the PM of the KRG pointed out that "We will also export natural gas to Baghdad, Turkey and Europe" he said Atlantic Council's Global Energy Forum in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), March 28, 2022{16}. Moreover, Our goal is to export Kurdistan's gas to Europe," said Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani at the Delphi Economic Forum in Athens in April 2022. The Islamic Republic targeted the residence of Sheikh Baz Karim Barzanji, the executive director of Kar group company, with 16 missiles. Further to remind, 60% of the Kurdistan oil pipeline is owned by Kar company, and Rosneft owns 40% of Kurdistan and its oil marketing. So, Russia and Iran will never want the Kurdistan Region's natural gas to replace Iranian gas for Iraq, nor become it facilitates for Europe. Subsequently, in June and July 2022, militia armed groups targeted the Kormor field three times (Kor Mor is the largest natural gas and LPG field in the Kurdistan Region, operated by UAE Pearl Petroleum since 2007). The Kurdistan Region can work to maintain its balance of power and neutrality; Perhaps the best scenario is for the Kurdistan Region to exercise its power and validities within the framework of the Iraqi Constitution, Articles 111, 112, 116 and 122, as well as Law No. 22 of 2005 on the Oil and Gas Law which is issued in the Kurdistan Parliament in (2007). Iraq is not a stable country. The Kurdistan Region should take every opportunity to work with the central government to pass an oil and gas law with the support of the US administration (because Iraq still needs an oil and gas law). This opportunity is also important for the Iraqi central government; instead of importing natural gas from Iran at higher market prices, or instead of demanding electricity from Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf, Kurdistan's gas should be used inside Iraq to generate electricity for central and southern provinces of Iraq: It is geographically closer, it is cheaper, it will be implemented within one country, it will lead to more political coexistence, and the Shiite militias close to Iran may not repeat the threats and shelling of the Kurdistan Region's fields. "Everywhere, the oil and gas is not only related to oil and gas in terms of chemical composition and geological dimensions, not only an economic issue but also an environmental, security, political and geopolitical issue. So, It is not an exaggeration to say, "Tell me where the pipeline is going, and I will tell you where your political destiny is going". Conclusion Finally, so-called "energy security" is generally related to the reasons for the world's high and low prices of oil and natural gas. All three main basins of the Caspian, the Gulf, and the eastern Mediterranean are direct threats to global economic and political security. The US administration's decision to withdraw their support for the EMG project in January 2022 was a tactic through an unofficial paper. This is further confirmed by signing a new deal between Israel, Egypt and the European Union in June 2022 to export gas from the eastern Mediterranean. As the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen said the EU would use Cypriot and Israeli natural gas as an alternative to Russian gas. However, the European Union and the United States will continue their environmental programs to reduce their dependence on oil and natural gas. Pressure on OPEC will continue to supply much more amount of oil. All this does not mean that by mid-2023, we will see oil prices below $70, But in 2024, we will see oil prices below $40. However, natural gas will be the main market and geopolitical conflict topic for many years. Therefore, it is better for developing oil-producing countries such as Iraq, which suffers from unnatural political conflict and violence, to take advantage of this temporary opportunity. Finally, one of the main characteristics that distinguish the Russia and Ukraine war from other world wars is that instead of only a great military, economic, financial and political impact on the two direct countries participating in the war, the war has also created great political, economic and security pressure on those indirectly involved in the war. Click here to PDF References {1} US. Energy Information Administration (2012) Global natural gas consumption doubled from 1980 to 2010. For more: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=5810 {2} Jazeera Net (2019) How much oil do we consume?.. Facts about black gold in the world. For more click here (Translated from Arabic to English language). https://www.aljazeera.net › 2019 › كم... {3} Statista (2021) Daily global crude oil demand 2006-2026 – Statista {4} Mammadyarov, E (2007) "A new way for the Caspian region: cooperation and integration". Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ). P 2-8. {5} Henderson, S (2022) "Reality Check for Israel’s Natural Gas Plans", The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. {6}Reuters (2021) Explainer: Why Russian exports hold sway over European and British gas prices. See here: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/why-russian-exports-hold-sway-over-european-british-gas-prices-2021-11-03/ {7} Stritzel. H (2014) Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School. Palgrave Macmillan, London. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137307576_2 {8} The hill (2022) McCaul says US withdrawal from Afghanistan has emboldened Russia on Ukraine {9} WSJ (2022) What’s Behind Wall Street’s $100 Oil Forecast? {10} Barkey, J (2022) US pipeline withdrawal marks new chapter in Eastern Mediterranean. Ekathimerini:https: //www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1176904/us-pipeline-withdrawal-marks-new-chapter-in-eastern-mediterranean/ {11} Bloomberg (2021) UAE-Israel Ties Deepen as Mubadala Buys Gas Stake for $1 Billion . see here: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-02/uae-israel-ties-deepen-as-mubadala-buys-gas-stake-for-1-billion {12} Henderson, S (2022). (OP. Cit). {13} I24 News (2021) Energy Minister: Israel wants to focus on renewable energy: https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/politics/1639586438-energy-minister-israel-wants-to-focus-on-renewable-energy {14} Rudaw (2021) Ministry of Planning: The population of the Kurdistan Region is 6.17 million (translated from Kurdish to English language) see here: https://www.rudaw.net/arabic/kurdistan/180120214 {15} Mediterranean Institute for Regional Studies (2020) Stubborn Kurdish Petroleum Resources: Surveying Actual data and investigating the declared Numbers. Research Paper {16} Daily Sabah (2022) KRG in Iraq to start energy exports to Turkey soon: PM Barzani. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/krg-in-iraq-to-start-energy-exports-to-turkey-soon-pm-barzani

Religious leader or politician: What does Muqtada al-Sadr really want?

Draw Media Dana Taib Menmy- Iraq Analysis: Muqtada al-Sadr has been an influential figure in Iraqi politics for years, vowing to withdraw from political life multiple times only to return once again. Iraq is now experiencing an ominous calm before the next expected escalation between supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Iranian-backed Shia rivals, who have been at the centre of the country's political stalemate for years. Iraq is now experiencing an ominous calm before the next expected escalation between supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Iranian-backed Shia rivals, who have been at the centre of the country's political stalemate for years. Sadr, in a tweet on 29 August, unexpectedly announced his "final" retirement from politics, causing his supporters to take to the streets in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone, as well as across central and southern Iraqi provinces. His announcement turned the Green Zone - home to government buildings and embassies - into a battlefield, as Sadr supporters used machine guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), and Katyusha rockets in pitched battles against their rivals, including former paramilitaries of the Iran-backed Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi network and the party of former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki, a longtime foe of Sadr. "The recent violence in Iraq really demonstrated Sadr's power and ability to incite a civil war in the short-term" More than 30 people were killed and hundreds were injured. The fighting ended the next day with a call from Sadr to his fighters to cease fighting and withdraw from the area. “The violence escalated, Sadr gave 24 hours to his supporters to act without his instructions and needed to end it as it looked like the Sadrists were the outlaws attacking the state," Sajad Jiyad, a fellow at the Century International for Research and Policy, told The New Arab. "It is possible this was a planned provocation and, in any case, he showed the power of his group and nothing more was to be gained.” During a press conference, Sadr went on to say that both those killed in the clashes and the killers "were in hell", with others speculating about whether the Shia cleric had ambitions of replacing Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Al-Sistani. RELATED The Iraq Report: Sadr at the heart of Iraq's political chaos Iraq Report The New Arab “Sadr was disappointed that his group resorted to such open violence and wanted to distance himself from it, which is why he blamed the killer and those killed for engaging in violence," Jiyad told TNA. "I think he cares very much about his image and religious legitimacy and does not want to be seen like any other political leader, which is natural as he is a cleric too.” Iraq’s political crisis is now in its 11th month after the country went to early elections on 10 October 2021 in which Muqtada al-Sadr's bloc won a majority with 73 seats. Sadr tried to form a 'national majority' government with several Sunni and Kurdish blocs, mobilising against pro-Iran Shia blocs organised under the Coordination Framework (CF). More than 30 people were killed and hundreds injured in clashes between Shia rivals last month. [Getty] Frustrated in his efforts to fulfil his promise to his supporters, however, Sadr ordered lawmakers from his bloc to resign, which all his MPs did on 12 June. The CF replaced Sadr's MPs with their own, becoming the biggest bloc in the Iraqi parliament. They vowed to form a consensus government that would include all the Sunni and Kurdish blocs. Iraqi analysts have told The New Arab that Sadr had made a mistake by withdrawing from the parliament and choosing to confront his rivals in the Iraqi streets and through his Saraya al-Salam and Al-Mahdi Army militias. Sadr, claiming to be a reformist, insists that the Iraqi parliament should be dissolved by the country’s Supreme Federal Court, and snap elections be held again. But the CF insists that the parliament should convene to elect a president, form a consensus government, amend the country’s election law, and then vote to dissolve itself. "Muqtada al-Sadr is interested in becoming the most powerful figure in Iraq, both politically and spiritually, and all of his moves are framed by his want to do so" Where is Iraq going? There are now several different scenarios for Iraq, including the possibility of snap elections, which even Iraq's President Barham Salih has voiced support for. "The trouble is that an election is actually unlikely to change anything on the ground, it could even make things worse, whilst only temporarily abating the different factions,” Shayan Talabany, an analyst at the Tony Blair Institute (TBI) focused on Iraq’s politics, told TNA. “Iraq’s last election had the lowest voter turnout in any election since 2003. With the recent violence, there are different dynamics that could play out in terms of voting. Some Iraqis could feel more encouraged to vote, which could be a source of optimism, as a large population of Iraqis would rather vote for those not currently in government,” Talabany said. RELATED The Iraq Report: Night of violence reveals grave instability Iraq Report The New Arab “Another very likely scenario is that Iraqis will be even more frustrated with the political process and not even vote, particularly if they feel that even when alternative parties do gain votes (such as in October 2021) these results are overridden by the traditional parties who are squabbling for power,” she added. “The real issue is that the political process of forming a government, the outbursts of violence, and the continuous back and forth between the different factions engaged in a power struggle have the ability to prolong the political process even further. This could quickly become very dangerous, given the ability of more regressive forces, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers, to mobilise so quickly. The recent violence in Iraq really demonstrated Sadr’s power and ability to incite a civil war in the short-term.” She also cautioned that there is a high possibility that public anger and frustration could rise and potentially explode if the country’s needs and its people’s demands are further ignored. Sadr’s withdrawal from politics has also once again raised the question of whether he wants to be Iraq’s next Shia religious Marjaeya, replacing al-Sistani. Sadr's withdrawal from politics has once again raised the question of whether he wants to be Iraq’s next Shia religious Marjaeya. [Getty] “I think Muqtada al-Sadr is interested in becoming the most powerful figure in Iraq, both politically and spiritually, and all of his moves are framed by his want to do so. On the political front, the trouble is that Iraq’s system structurally prevents a single or central concentration of power, especially since former Prime Minister Noori al-Maliki was removed. We have seen this play out since the October 2021 elections,” Talabany said. “On the religious or spiritual front: Sadr does not have the qualifications nor calibre religiously to replace al-Sistani. The danger is however that Sadr thinks he can or should achieve both these pillars of authority. What Sadr wants and what is actually feasible, at least under the current circumstances, is therefore quite different.” Regarding the scenario that the US might fully withdraw from Iraq as it did in Afghanistan last year, Talabany ruled out such a possibility, given how different the situation in both countries is. "Sadr does not have the qualifications nor calibre religiously to replace al-Sistani. The danger is, however, that Sadr thinks he can or should achieve both these pillars of authority" “It is difficult to make the argument that Iraq is the centre of international interest. I think that apart from Iraq’s current important role as a major oil exporter during times of low energy supply, there is international fatigue with Iraq,” she said. “There is a lot of international interest in Iraq that is solely centred on Iran. It is worrying to hear the large number of voices that seem very willing to allow Iraq to regress, for the sake of countering Iran, which is itself a really impractical and narrow-sighted way of viewing the country and its relationship with its neighbours,” Talabany added. "At the same time, if Iraq wants to be taken seriously, it has to maintain its security so that it can move on and attract positive attention and not just negative attention by being a security threat – but right now that seems quite unlikely.”

Labour MP’s aide paid £400,000 by oil firms linked to Kurdistan

The Telegraph, By Mason Boycott-Owen An MP’s aide has been paid £400,000 by oil companies linked to a regime accused of human rights abuses, amid concerns over foreign influence in Parliament, The Telegraph can reveal. Gary Kent has been paid by Kurdistani oil and construction companies as he and the MP he works for promoted the region’s interests in Parliament. The aide still works for Mary Glindon, the Labour MP and whip, and is also the secretary of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG). He has highlighted how the APPG has helped shape select committee reports and MPs’ speeches, as well as how it has secured a government trade mission to the country. Mr Kent has also described how the group has taken more than 50 UK parliamentarians to the region over the last decades, some "several times". Annual salary of £57,000 from Kar Group Transparency documents show that between 2015 and last year, Mr Kent had been paid by a number of different oil and construction companies with close links to the Kurdistan Regional Government. He had been paid an annual salary of £57,000 by Kar Group and other companies in the region, but it is understood he now runs the APPG in a voluntary capacity Kar Group, a Kurdistani oil and construction company, has reportedly close links to the region’s government. Local media has reported that Baz Karim, the company’s president and chief executive, is a trusted adviser of Masrur Barzani, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s prime minister. Last year, Amnesty International said Kurdistani authorities had "ruthlessly cracked down on journalists, activists and protesters exercising their right to freedom of expression, including by arbitrarily arresting and forcibly disappearing them". Alistair Graham, the former chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, questioned whether it had been appropriate for foreign companies to pay salaries to parliamentary staffers. 'Very odd affair' Mr Graham told The Telegraph: "It’s a very odd affair. Who is he accountable to, the MP or the Kurdistan government? "It’s a backdoor way of lobbying. I’m strongly opposed to such arrangements because there is a lack of accountability. "It is an unacceptable way of getting access to Parliament to pressure their own commercial interests." But Ms Glindon defended the work of the APPG, saying it had "done much to build bilateral relations with a vital ally" and that all of the donations were within Parliamentary rules. Sponsorship for APPG delegations since 2008 and funding of the secretariat from 2014 to 2021 were declared, in full, to the parliamentary authorities," she said. "Advisers advise but MPs decide. The APPG is run by MPs and is seen by many as having done much to build bilateral relations with a vital ally. "It has urged economic and political reform in the Kurdistan Region, of which it has been supportive where possible and critical where necessary, as an independent cross-party group, chaired by senior Labour and Conservative MPs." Mr Kent declined to comment. Spotlight on lobbying by overseas governments Lobbying and attempts to shape political decision-making by foreign governments has come under the spotlight in recent months. Barry Gardiner, a Labour MP, faced criticism after employing the son of an alleged Chinese spy in his office. Mr Gardiner rejected any suggestion of impropriety. Sir Lindsay Hoyle, the House of Commons Speaker, has indicated he will crack down on foreign lobbying in Parliament. All-party parliamentary groups are set up by MPs to pursue specific interest areas. Often they receive funding from outside groups, raising questions about their roles in parliamentary discussions. The Telegraph has found that dozens of parliamentary staff have had their salaries funded by outside bodies. Some are charities or philanthropic bodies, but others have been companies. Mr Kent described the work of the APPG in a post on its website and in interviews. "We helped put Kurdistan on the map by persuading Top Gear to film a programme in Kurdistan, which reached millions," Mr Kent said in 2018. Mr Kent is currently listed as director of policy at the University of Kurdistan Hewler in Parliamentary transparency documents. The university last year appointed Bill Rammell, a former Labour foreign office and education minister, as its new president. Since 2014, Ms Glindon has spoken eight times in Parliament, submitted eight questions and proposed nine motions to the Commons specifically regarding Kurdistan, including on topics such as the supply of machine guns and ammunition supplies from the UK. In 2018, Ms Glindon called on the House to welcome a deal between Baghdad and Kurdistan for an oil pipeline to export tens of thousands barrels of oil a day and "restore billions of dollars of lost revenue" to the region. Steve Goodrich, head of research and investigations at Transparency International UK, said: "It’s particularly worrying when foreign governments are closely linked to the day-to-day running of APPGs, as this can give rise to the perception – or reality – that the group has been captured by private interests. "In order to avoid the next big lobbying scandal, there should be much greater openness and accountability over how APPGs are run.

Turkey's Grip in the Oil Process Of the Kurdistan Region

Draw Media Turkish oil companies work in the Kurdistan region's 8 oil fields in a way that the Genel Energy company has a share in these oil blocks: Tawke (25%), Bir Bahr (40%), Duhok (40%), Bna Bawe (44%), Taqtaq (44%), Miran (75%), Chia Surkh (60%). While Petoil company has a 20% share in the fields of Chia Surkh and Palkana. This is despite 75 percent of Kurdistan's oil pipeline passing through Turkish territory and being owned by the Turkish energy company. Most of the money for selling Kurdistan's oil goes through filters from Turkish banks and then goes back to the KRG. The importance of the KRG's oil and energy to Turkey The Kurdistan Region has a unique position in turkey's current situation from many perspectives. Without Kurdistan's natural resources, Turkey cannot continue to thrive, without the Controlled Market of Kurdistan, turkey's economy will be in crisis. Without contact with the region, the unemployment problem in the Kurdish areas would increase and the PKK would be more active. Without relations with the Kurdistan region, Turkey will be deprived of Iraq's oil and its future would be more difficult when its hands off the region's oil and gas pipelines. Turkey's need for oil and gas Turkey has undergone major economic growth between 2002 and 2017, making it the 13th largest economy in the world. According to the OECD data, Turkey ranks first in terms of energy needs for the economy to continue to grow. It must be provided continuously and without interruption to the sectors that provide economic growth. Oil production in the Kurdistan region Since 2006, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has been rapidly conducting search and inspection activities due to contracts with oil companies, with a total of 10 oil wells, 8 of which have had positive results. Gulf Keystone Petroleum company, in the Shekhan fields near the Turkish border, has found a wide area of oil, which is estimated to be between 12 to 15 billion barrels of oil. 45 billion barrels of oil have been found in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, according to statistics from the KRG's Ministry of Natural Resources, and with the oil have founded in the Shekhan area is expected to be 60-65 billion barrels of oil. Turkey's grip in the region's oil process First: The region's oil pipeline in Turkey The KRG exports about 450,000 barrels of oil abroad daily, all through the Kurdistan Oil Pipeline, which passes through Turkish territory. The Kurdistan Region's oil pipeline is 896 kilometers long, starting at the Kurdistan Region's border at the Khurmalawa field and reaching 221 kilometers by Fishkhabur, according to which 24.6 percent of the oil pipeline is on the Kurdistan Region's border, owned by both Kar Group and Rosneft, a Russian company. The part of the Turkish border is owned by the Turkish energy company and operates by Turkish company Botas. Its 675 kilometers from Fishkhabur to the Turkish port of Jayhan, forms (74.6 percent) of the pipeline's length. Second: Turkish companies in the oil fields of the Kurdistan region Two major Turkish energy companies work in the Kurdistan Region, Both Genal Energy and Petoil currently have contracts and shares with the KRG in several oil fields in the Kurdistan Region. Third: Oil money and Halkbank The KRG's oil money will be transferred to the KRG's private account of Turkish banks. In 2015, the Kurdistan Regional Government's Council of Ministers decided in a letter no. 983: All oil exports and sales revenues must be transferred directly to the KRG's account at the Halkbank in Turkey without the mediation of the Third Bank. The KRG's decision shows the fact that the total amount of oil sales in the Kurdistan Region is being collected in Turkey, and the Central Iraqi Government has pressured turkey on this issue several times, but the process has remained the same.

Iran’s Attack Was Response to Secret Israeli Attack on Drone Site

Draw Media The New York Times Israel and Iran are pushing the boundaries of a long-running clandestine war that is increasingly spilling out of the shadows. By Farnaz Fassihi, Ronen Bergman and Eric Schmitt Iran fired a barrage of ballistic missiles into Iraq over the weekend, striking what it claimed was an Israeli target and leaving some analysts scratching their heads about what exactly precipitated the blitz and why Iraq. Now, officials say, the attack was retaliation for a previously secret Israeli airstrike on an Iranian drone factory last month. And, according to some officials, the Israeli intelligence operatives who launched the airstrike were based in Iraq. The tit-for-tat strikes represent an alarming escalation in the long-running shadow war between Israel and Iran, as both sides push the boundaries of a conflict that has also entangled the United States and now Iraq. For Israel, the attack on the Iranian drone facility is part of a new approach in countering Iran’s growing drone program, a tacit recognition that it is easier to pre-emptively destroy a drone than to intercept one en route. Iranian drones have been deployed in numerous attacks against Israel, as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and, last October, a U.S. base in Syria, according to intelligence officials. For Iran, the missile strike in Erbil, Iraq, on Sunday reflects both a more aggressive policy of responding to Israeli attacks and a more overt one: Unlike most previous attacks attributed to Iran, Iran, not one of its proxies, immediately claimed responsibility for this one, a sign of confidence that it can do so with impunity. Iran’s use of ballistic missiles instead of rockets or drones was also a serious escalation. For years, Israel and Iran have engaged in a largely covert war, keeping their actions brief, limited and, if not completely secret, at least deniable, in an effort to prevent a full-scale direct war that neither side wants. But as the recent strikes demonstrate, each side is willing to test those limits. And in a sign of the increasing reliance on drones, or remotely piloted aircraft, Israel’s attack on the Iranian drone facility last month was carried out by drones. A senior intelligence official briefed on the operation said that six suicide quadcopter drones exploded into the Iranian facility near Kermanshah, Iran, on Feb. 12. The official, who asked not be identified when discussing sensitive intelligence issues, said the facility was Iran’s main manufacturing and storage plant for military drones, and that the Israeli attack destroyed dozens of them. Iranian officials have not confirmed that the facility was used for drones, referring to it only as a base for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the paramilitary force that carries out much of Iran’s foreign military activities. Iran’s drone program has been the subject of increasing concern to Israeli and American officials, as well as to Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. A document compiled by Israeli intelligence lists 15 drone attacks carried out by Iran or its proxies in the region from February 2018 to September 2021. Israeli military officials say that Israel has been attacked by Iranian drones several times. Last year, an Israeli F35 fighter jet intercepted two drones that Israel claimed had taken off from Iran, on their way to the Gaza Strip to drop off a supply of pistols for Hamas, the Islamist militant group that controls Gaza, the Israeli military said. American officials say that Iran also provides drone technology to proxy forces in Iraq and Syria, who carry out strikes against American personnel in those countries with Tehran’s blessing or direction. Last October, five so-called suicide drones were launched at the American base at Al Tanf, Syria, in what the military’s Central Command called a “deliberate and coordinated” attack. The attack caused no casualties but the drones were loaded with ball bearings and shrapnel in a “clear intent to kill,” a senior U.S. military official said. U.S. officials said they believed that Iran directed and supplied the local proxy forces that carried out the attack in retaliation for Israeli airstrikes in Syria, the first time Iran directed a military strike against the United States in response to an attack by Israel. The real wake-up call on the threat of Iran’s drone program came in 2019, with a pair of dramatic pinpoint strikes on two Saudi oil facilities carried out by a combination of drones and cruise missiles. A Saudi Aramco plant was attacked in 2019 by a combination of drones and cruise missiles.CreditCredit...Hamad I Mohammed/Reuters The strikes were claimed by the Houthis, a Yemeni insurgent group, but American and Israeli officials said they were directed and possibly carried out by Iran. Iran denied responsibility. That strike and others led Israeli officials to conclude that the best defense against Iranian drones was to attack the production and storage sites, like the one attacked last month, according to the senior intelligence official. It was unclear what role, if any, the United States played in the February strike. The senior intelligence official said that Israeli officials briefed the United States in advance. Iranian officials have not publicly linked Israel’s attack in Iran with their attack in Iraq, but others — including an analyst close to the Revolutionary Guards, an adviser to the Iranian government, an Iranian proxy force in Iraq and a Lebanese television station affiliated with Iran — have said the Iranian attack was retaliation for the Israeli one. Iran fired more than a dozen missiles on Sunday at a site in Erbil, Iraq, that Iranian officials say the site is a base for Israeli intelligence operations against Iran. Erbil is the capital of the semiautonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq. While the Iraqi government does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, the Kurdish regional government has a long history of close ties with Israel. The Iraqi prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi inspecting the site of the missile strike in Erbil. Iraqi officials denied there was an Israeli operation there.Credit...Iraqi Prime Minister's Office “We believe this building in Erbil was a center for coordinating and planning operations against Iran’s national security and several malicious activities against Iran happened from there,” Hossein Dalirian, a prominent defense analyst affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, said in an interview. Saeed Khatibzadeh, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesman, said Monday that “Iran will not tolerate that a location near its border be used for destructive and terrorist operations inside Iran.” Iraqi and Kurdish officials have denied that Israel operates a base there. Israeli officials have declined to comment. A senior U.S. official who was briefed on the strikes said the building hit in Erbil served as an Israeli intelligence outpost and training facility. But a senior Biden administration official rebutted that assessment, saying the administration believes that the building that was hit was a civilian residence only and did not also serve as an Israeli training site. The senior U.S. official and another U.S. official confirmed that Israel has conducted intelligence operations against Iran from Kurdistan, but declined to cite specific details. The two officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss confidential intelligence assessments. In a statement on Sunday, the State Department spokesman Ned Price said the missiles struck a private residence near the new U.S. Consulate in Erbil, which is under construction. He said that no U.S. facilities were damaged and no American personnel were injured, adding that “we have no indications the attack was directed at the United States.” Iranian officials have claimed at least once before that they had attacked Israeli intelligence bases in Iraq and killed its field personnel. That claim could not be verified. Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Iraj Masjedi, said in a speech in Karbala, Iraq, on Monday that Iran respects Iraq and considers it a close ally and that neither Iraq nor the United States were the targets of the attack in Erbil. But the attack does represent a more aggressive posture against Israel adopted by Iran’s relatively new hard-line government, defense analysts said. Officials in the previous Iranian government had professed a strategy of “strategic patience,” at least until the end of the Trump presidency in an effort not to give President Donald J. Trump an excuse to launch a war he seemed eager to wage. “Iran’s strategic patience has ended and from now on it will be answering attacks with attacks,” said Gheis Ghoreishi, an analyst who is close to the government. Iran is more confident about its regional policies, he said, because it is convinced that the U.S.’s maximum pressure policy — the Trump administration’s strategy of piling punishing sanctions on Iran in an effort to coerce its agreement to a more restrictive nuclear agreement — had failed. And as the Biden administration struggles to resurrect the nuclear agreement with Iran, Mr. Ghoreishi said, Iran is convinced that Washington has no appetite for another war in the region. The Revolutionary Guards, he said, have concluded that the most effective way to defend against Israel was to “increase the costs” and adopt an “eye for an eye” policy of strikes and counterstrikes.

Russia’s war in Ukraine: complete guide in maps, video and pictures

Draw Media: theguardian: by Andrew Roth, Dan Sabbagh, Paul Scruton, Harvey Symons, Finbarr Sheehy, Glenn Swann and Niels de Hoog What is the latest? Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Kyiv and carried out an amphibious assault from the Sea of Azov near Mariupol, a day after attacking Ukraine from three sides on a massive scale. In the capital air raid sirens wailed and heavy gunfire and explosions were heard in a number of districts, as Russian military vehicles approached from the north-west. The defence ministry in Moscow claimed its forces had taken control of the strategic Hostomel airfield to the north-west after a day of fighting. Pressure was also intensifying around Chernihiv, about 90 miles (145km) north-east of Kyiv, Ukraine’s military said, with Russian forces trying to bypass the city and head to the capital down the E95 road to Kozelec and ultimately Kyiv’s eastern suburbs. Further east, about 125 miles from the capital, the city of Konotop was lost to Russian forces. According to the Pentagon, 10 amphibious landing ships unloaded thousands of naval infantry to the west of Mariupol, potentially cutting off the port city on the Sea of Asov. Fighting was reported to be continuing around Kherson on the Dnieper River and in Melitopol. Elsewhere, Ukraine’s forces were believed to be holding firm in the eastern Donbas region, while the eastern city of Kharkiv, which has a population of more than 1 million, was gradually being surrounded. What happened on Thursday? Russia attacked Ukraine along multiple axes, bringing to a calamitous end weeks of fruitless diplomatic efforts by western leaders to avert war. Fighting and other military activity took place around and on the way to Kyiv, including an ambitious attack by helicopters on the Hostomel military airbase. Ukraine lost control of the Chernobyl nuclear site in the north, where fighting raged after Russian troops crossed the border from Belarus. One Russian line came through the Senkivka border crossing near Chernihiv. Tanks seen moving into Ukraine across the Senkivka border on 24 February. Photograph: Ukraine border guard A substantial attack was also aimed towards the eastern city of Kharkiv. Russian forces also headed north and east from Crimea. Social media footage showed them reaching Kherson on the Dnieper, 80 miles (130km) inside Ukraine. How did we get here? Over the past few months Russia has forward-deployed hundreds of tanks, self-propelled artillery and even short-range ballistic missiles from as far away as Siberia to within striking range of Ukraine. Moscow’s rhetoric also grew more belligerent. Vladimir Putin demanded legal guarantees that Ukraine would never join Nato or host its missile strike systems, concessions he was unlikely to receive. A flurry of diplomatic activity did little to ease tensions. The second half of February was long seen as the most likely period for a potential offensive. Russian soldiers stayed on in Belarus beyond the end of planned military exercises, and the Winter Olympics, hosted by ally China, concluded. The invasion was preceded on 22 February by Putin saying Russia would recognise the territorial claims of its two proxy states in east Ukraine. He had already ordered his forces into Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine. On 22 February a Reuters witness saw columns of military vehicles including tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) on the outskirts of Donetsk, the capital of one of the territories claimed by Russia. What do we know about Russia’s deployments? Scores of battalion tactical groups – the smallest operational unit in Moscow’s army, consisting of about 800-1,000 troops – were put in place near the borders of Ukraine in both Russia and latterly Belarus prior to the invasion. As of 18 February the US estimated that Russia had between 169,000 and 190,000 personnel in and around Ukraine. An estimated 32,000 separatist forces were already operating in the breakaway areas of Donetsk and Luhansk – some of whom were likely to be unacknowledged Russian forces – before the invasion. Many of the heavy weapons stationed near Ukraine arrived as far back as spring 2021. Over the new year Russia also began to move tanks, artillery, air defence systems and fighter jets to Belarus for joint exercises in February. That deployment has since grown. Deployments at Zyabrovka (AKA Pribytki) airfield in Gomel, Belarus, 15 miles (25km) from the border with Ukraine, on 10 February. Photograph: Maxar Technologies/Reuters Half of Russia’s air force is now deployed near Ukraine, according to western estimates. Russian warships conducted training exercises in the Black Sea in the run-up to the invasion. This footage released by the Russian defence ministry shows a Ka-27PS helicopter taking off and landing on the deck of a frigate during exercises on 22 February. These satellite image composites show the buildup of troops in Yelnya and Pogonovo over the new year. Satellite photographs also show increased deployments in Novoozernoye in western Crimea. The US estimates 10,000 troops moved into Crimea in late January and early February. This image from 18 February shows deployments including armour, helicopters and field hospitals in Novoozernoye: Photograph: EyePress News/Rex/Shutterstock Satellite images taken on 20 February showed troops and equipment being moved from holding areas to what the UK defence secretary described as potential launch locations. How do the militaries compare? Russia’s invasion pits the Kremlin’s large, recently modernised military against an adversary largely using older versions of the same or similar equipment, dating back to the Soviet era. Russia has significant numerical advantages on land and in particular in air and at sea, although the Ukrainians are defending their homeland. What is the historical context? In 2014 Putin sent troops to annex Crimea, a mainly Russian-speaking region of Ukraine. Russia also incited a separatist uprising in Ukraine’s south-east, clandestinely sending soldiers and weapons to provoke a conflict that grew into a full-blown war. A 2015 peace deal established a line of demarcation and called on both sides to make concessions. Since then low-level fighting has continued along the front, and both sides have accused the other of violating the agreement. Going back further, Russia has long opposed any attempts by Ukraine to move towards the EU and Nato. One of Putin’s often repeated demands is a guarantee that Ukraine never joins Nato, the alliance of 30 countries that has expanded eastwards since the end of the cold war. What is the role of Nord Stream 2? On 22 February, the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, stopped the certification process for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline in response to Russia’s recognition of the two self-proclaimed republics. First announced in 2015, the $11bn (£8.3bn) pipeline owned by Russia’s state-backed energy company Gazprom has been built to carry gas from western Siberia to Lubmin in Germany’s north-east, doubling the existing capacity of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline and keeping 26m German homes warm at an affordable price. Europe’s most divisive energy project, Nord Stream 2 bypasses the traditional gas transit nation of Ukraine by running along the bed of the Baltic Sea. It has faced resistance within the EU, and from the US as well as Ukraine, on the grounds that it increases Europe’s energy dependence on Russia, denies Ukraine transit fees and makes it more vulnerable to Russian invasion. … we have a small favour to ask. Millions are turning to the Guardian for open, independent, quality news every day, and readers in 180 countries around the world now support us financially. We believe everyone deserves access to information that’s grounded in science and truth, and analysis rooted in authority and integrity. That’s why we made a different choice: to keep our reporting open for all readers, regardless of where they live or what they can afford to pay. This means more people can be better informed, united, and inspired to take meaningful action. In these perilous times, a truth-seeking global news organisation like the Guardian is essential. We have no shareholders or billionaire owner, meaning our journalism is free from commercial and political influence – this makes us different. When it’s never been more important, our independence allows us to fearlessly investigate, challenge and expose those in power. Support the Guardian from as little as $1 – it only takes a minute. If you can, please consider supporting us with a regular amount each month. Thank you.

Will the 2018 Presidential Election Scenario Be Repeated?

Neaz Mustafa, Draw Media The statistics show that the 2018 scenario cannot be repeated, and Masoud Barzani would be the winner over Bafel Talabani this time. If the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) loses the Presidency post, there would be a big question on the PUK’s participation in the new government cabinet in Iraq. Barzani and Talabani’s discussion on President’s Candidates was not fruitful. PUK insists on Barham Salih, and PDK on Hoshyar Zebari to be their candidates for the next Iraqi president. More Details are in this report by Draw Media. Barzani Wants the President in any Circumstances! PUK and PDK have not reached an agreement on a candidate for the next Iraqi president both sides have their candidates, which was noticed at today’s meeting between Talabani and Barzani. The three main leadership positions in the Iraqi government are divided among Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. Whereas Kurds get the presidency, Shiites get the premiership, and Sunnis get the parliamentary speaker. Among Kurds, the PUK has held on to the presidency position since 2005. The KDP and PUK for years abided by a strategic agreement, where the PUK would get the Iraqi president of their choice, and the KDP in return would get the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region. Until 2018, When Masoud Barzani stepped down as President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), he wanted to get back the Iraqi presidency position from PUK. The KDP and for the first time, put forth Fuad Hussein against Barham Salih for the position. Will the 2018 Scenario Be Repeated? Today the political situation in Bagdad is the same as four years ago. There is no official agreement between the KDP and the PUK over the Iraqi presidency. Both parties have their candidates for the position. But the election results show that this time Barzani would win the competition and he would be able to get revenge for the 2018 incidents. The MPs have to elect a new president by February 8. The president will later assign the candidate of the biggest parliamentary alliance to form a new government. In 2018, Bafel Talabani won the position from Barzani. When Barham Salih, Talabani’s Candidate, won by 219 votes over Fuad Hussain, Barzani’s Candidate, by 22 votes. But repeating the same scenario in 2022 is kind of impossible because the situation has been changed now. KDP and Barzani have returned to Bagdad with more power. Before the Oct 10 of 2021’s election, Barzani has signed an agreement with Muqtada Sadr. And now Sadr is the biggest winner of the election and he would form the new government. Above that, Barzani has established a strong relationship with the Suni blocks. How Barzani would win the presidency competition? On the 9th of January, in the first meeting of the fifth round of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, the KDP showed its power. In that meeting, a new political alliance in Iraq has been presented for the first time between (Sadr, Barzani, Al-Halbousi). This alliance has 180 seats out of 329 parliament seats. On the other side, the Coordination Framework alliance has 70 seats. The PUK is one of the political parties that got 18 seats in the October 2021 elections and is looking forward to getting the presidency position as its portion, depending on the previous political agreements between the Iraqi parties. But yet the party does not have a solid agreement Neither with Muqtada Sadr nor with the Coordination Framework alliance. In addition, the PUK did not vote for Muhamad Al-Halbousi for the parliament presidency which angered the Sunnis. But by being away from the Shiite conflict, PUK might achieve the satisfaction of Iran. If the situation continues as it is, in the second parliament meeting, the (Sadr + Halbousi) alliance would vote for (Hoshyar Zebari) the KDP Candidate for the Iraqi presidency.

Oil & Gas Dossier

Opinion

Understanding the Roots of the Younger Generations’ Despair in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

The Rise and Fall of Kurdish Power in Iraq

Why the United States should stop supporting the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga

'Iraq is not an Islamic country': Minorities protest Baghdad's alcohol ban as unconstitutional

Report Reveals Only One Million Iraqi Women Are Employed

The quota seats…Point of Election Conflict

The oil values in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region in 2022

Draw Media publishes the KRG proposal and the response of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil regarding the oil and gas law

Energy Geopolitics and Conflict between Energy Basins

Religious leader or politician: What does Muqtada al-Sadr really want?

Labour MP’s aide paid £400,000 by oil firms linked to Kurdistan

Turkey's Grip in the Oil Process Of the Kurdistan Region

Iran’s Attack Was Response to Secret Israeli Attack on Drone Site

Russia’s war in Ukraine: complete guide in maps, video and pictures

Will the 2018 Presidential Election Scenario Be Repeated?

China's Path to 2035

Why the United States should stop supporting the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga

Kurdistan gas and diversification

Will Iraq Finally Revive This Mothballed Megaproject?

APIKUR Objects to the Ministry of Oil's Actions

Iraqi Oil Minister: Kurdistan Region sells 286,000 barrels of oil per day without our knowledge

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