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Draw Media publishes the KRG proposal and the response of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil regarding the oil and gas law

Draw Media According to a document obtained by (Draw Media), the Legal Office of the Iraqi Oil Ministry on 15/2/2023 have responded to the proposals of the Kurdistan Region regarding the oil and gas law and rejects 10 out of 15 suggestions. The proposals have not been directed to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) delegation, but instead the legal office has submitted to the Iraqi Oil Ministry. The Iraqi Oil Ministry is against the KRG (selling oil, having its own oil and gas pipelines, having an oil and gas council, and reviving the KRG's oil and gas law after being repealed by the Federal Court). These are the details of the recent discussions between the Kurdistan Regional Government delegation and the central government on how to write the draft of the oil and gas law. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has presented its proposal on the law in 15 points. The central government has rejected 10 points of the KRG's proposals, which is 67% of the proposals. • Article 111 of the Constitution One of the principles that the Kurdistan Regional Government delegation in the negotiations to prepare the draft law on oil and gas submitted to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, compliance with Article (111) of the Iraqi Constitution. Article 111 of the constitution states that "oil and gas in all regions and provinces belong to the entire Iraqi people." The Iraqi government agrees with the KRG, because it believes that this article of the constitution defines a good basis for the ownership of oil and gas and does not give any rights to either the central government or the KRG. Grant of permission The KRG has proposed that the issuance of oil licenses should be under the authority of the parties specified in the constitution, while the contracts for the fields in the Kurdistan region should be under the authority of the region, in accordance with Article 115 of the constitution. The federal government rejects the proposal, saying that the constitution does not give the authority to grant oil exploration and extraction licenses to any party, but in Article 112 writes that the federal government together with the Kurdistan Regional Government will manage the oil and gas extracted from existing fields. Transfer of ownership! The KRG has proposed that the oil and gas law allow for the “transfer of ownership of oil and gas to others at the point of delivery”. The central government disagrees with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on this proposal, saying that such a provision cannot be included in the oil and gas law, because it is contrary to Article 111 of the constitution. The Iraqi government proposes to leave the regulation of the transfer of oil and gas ownership to the sales contracts signed for this purpose. Oil and gas policy The KRG has proposed that the Federal Council and the Regional Council for Oil and Gas Affairs take over the preparation of the strategic oil and gas policy. The central government opposes the KRG's proposal, saying it is unconstitutional and could open the door to the creation of councils in oil-producing provinces. Oil and gas policy The KRG has proposed that the Federal Council and the Regional Council for Oil and Gas Affairs take over the preparation of the strategic oil and gas policy. The central government is against the KRG's proposal, saying that “This proposal is unconstitutional and could open the door to the creation of councils in oil-producing provinces,". In addition, it will lead to a plurality of stakeholders responsible for setting the overall oil and gas strategy. Who should sell oil? The KRG has proposed that the region have its own marketing company and deposit crude oil revenues into an international account under the control of the region and the revenues from the sale of oil from the federal government into another account. The central government has rejected the proposal, saying it is contrary to the law regulating the Ministry of Oil and the rules of the oil marketing company. "The proposal also contradicts the provisions of the Financial Administration Law and the Federal Budget Law, which state that all revenues from the sale of crude oil must be deposited in an account opened for this purpose.

Energy Geopolitics and Conflict between Energy Basins

Draw Media Bahrooz Jaafar Executive Summary Since early 2022, Russia and Iran have been enjoying rising oil and natural gas prices due to the smell of the war in Ukraine. Only one month before the Ukraine war broke out, the US secretary department sent a non-formal massage (non-paper) to each of the energy departments in Greece, Cyprus and Israel's s foreign affairs ministries, announcing that they suspend their support for Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline. This will kill Israel and Cyprus's dream to export natural gas to Europe via the Crete island in Greece! Are these conflicts more energy-related, or do they have historical and political depth? Will natural gas pipelines (the new energy geopolitics) lead to a new common regional cooperation system, or is it a source of conflict and increasing regional problems? This study, from the Mediterranean Institute for Regional Studies, attempts to understand the essence of problems by identifying three main energy basins and showing what the new regional and global energy system will look like. First: Energy security and the world's need for oil and natural gas Energy security means balancing national security with the availability of cheap natural resources to meet domestic needs. According to the US Energy Information Administration, in 1980, the world consumed 53 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, but in 2010, the world consumed 113 trillion cubic feet of natural gas{1}. In 2022, the world's demand for natural gas will reach 146.482 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, which means that the world's demand for natural gas will increase by 4.6% annually{2}. Similarly, in 2010, the world consumed 86.4 million barrels of oil per day, but in 2020, 91 million barrels of oil per day, and in 2022, the world consumed 100.80 million barrels per day{3}. The demand for natural gas and oil has increased: In the simplest terms, this means that oil and natural gas are still the world's top commodities, and millions, if not billions, of cars, planes, ships, factories, power grids, and large and medium-sized industries are still employed. Without natural gas and oil, the global economy would be largely paralyzed. It also means that although humanity has reached the last stage of great progress and innovation in its history, it has yet to find an alternative to oil and natural gas. Just as coal was hugely influential in previous centuries, and then the role became oil, today, natural gas is in the most influential days of its life. In 2022, natural gas has had the strongest impact on international relations: Second: The Caspian Basin: a new Silk Road, a new conflict, a new integration Caspian refers to the world's largest enclosed sea; Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are located in the Caspian basin. All of them have owned oil and natural gas reserves. Geographically, it lies between Europe and Asia; east of the Caucasus, West of the broad steppe of Central Asia, south of the fertile plains of Southern Russia in Eastern Europe, and north of the mountainous Iranian Plateau of Western Asia (this region is known as the heart of the world. Whoever controls it can control the world){4}. These regional factions have long sought to build an integration like the European Union. After the 2021 tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it became clear that Russia has a complete hegemony and ally in the region. 2. 1. Europe will no longer heat itself with Russian gas? However, it can be seen hydrocarbon as a common ground. However, the first third of the world's natural gas reserves are located in Asia: Russia (19.9%) of natural gas and Iran (17.1%) and Qatar (13.1%) in the Arabian Gulf. Although Qatar is a US ally and European natural gas supply, at the same time, Qatar is the Taliban and Iran's ally. By this word, (50.1%) of the world's natural gas reserves are owned by three alliance countries. Fourth is the United States (6.7%), which uses it more for domestic needs{5}. Europe consumes 540 billion cubic meters of gas annually, while Russia supplies 40 per cent of that. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline will transport Russian natural gas to Germany via Ukraine. Ukraine itself is a good beneficiary of taxes on gas pipelines{6}. On September 27, 2022, it was discovered that natural gas had leaked into the water from the North Stream 2 pipeline 70 meters underwater. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell called the incident deliberate and said the aim was to make natural gas more expensive for Europe; 2-2. Russian-Ukrainian War: Diplomacy failed to prevent war Indeed, this is not a conflict between the two ordinary countries; as we have seen, with the outbreak of the war on February 24 and February 24, 2022, the borders and sovereignty of countries, in general, have faded. This is the collision of at least two great continents, two different civilizations that have been in conflict for thousands of years. Therefore, it is still the beginning of the war, which Russia, Europe, the United States, Britain, China and Ukraine are part of; the spark has reached Taiwan and the Middle East. Is the gas pipeline alone responsible for the huge smoke that has engulfed the world, or where does the problem come from? In 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev declared the fall of the Soviet Union: 16 countries declared independence due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The world entered a different phase under the US and NATO presidencies, and Russia accepted the new system on the condition that its current hegemony and borders would be maintained. However, after 1999, the United States and Europe invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the European Club and made them members of NATO. The United States assured it would not deploy nuclear weapons in these countries, and Russia remained silent. In 2004, US President George W. Bush announced that Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia would become members of NATO. All these countries were formerly under the control of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin, therefore, understood that it should take the threat seriously. Then, in (2008) the US administration, under the direct supervision of Barack Obama and members of Bulgaria, Austria, Turkey and Romania, signed the Nabucco Pipeline project to transport natural gas from Central Asia (from the Caspian region) to Central Europe (They tried to transport gas from the region under Russia's ears without valuing Russia). In 2014, Ukrainian protesters, as media agencies showed that the United States and Europe backed them) forced President Viktor Yanukovych to flee to Moscow and turn his royal palace into a museum. They brought forward another team close to the West and have been trying to make Ukraine a member of NATO for a long time! This time, Russia considered regaining control of the Crimean peninsula. In 2014, they fought Crimea (Crimea: located north of the Black Sea and south of Ukraine, the island has a great military and material position, especially the port of Sevastopol, where most of the world's powers are clashed from here). With the occupation of Crimea, the Western power will no longer be able to receive any military assistance from the Black Sea. In addition, the threat of a NATO-Russian conflict in Crimea disrupted the Nabucco pipeline, especially when the world was busy with the war against terrorism (ISIS). The outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011 gave Russia an excuse to cross the Mediterranean Sea: This occurred from the Black Sea to the Marmara, and Russian warships reached the port of Tartus in Syria. Russia is still an important player in the Syrian conflict. The US administration has described China's economic and Russian military incursions as the biggest threat to national security. Therefore, the United States deployed long-range weapons and missiles in Romania (2016) and Poland (2020). Third: Conceptualization and theorizing: A call to securitization theory Theory in international relations helps us to understand phenomena. The securitization theory sparked in 1983 with Barry Buzan's book, "People, State, Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations". Later, Buzan and their colleague established "the Copenhagen School" as an important contribution to the science of international relations. According to this school, national security policy is not natural but carefully formulated by politicians and thinkers{7}. Here, securitization means that when an issue is labeled a "threat" and "danger", the social and political institutions must be provided for it. In other words, security issues do not come from the outside alone but must be addressed from the inside by security actors. For example, indicating "immigrants" as a threat to national security makes "immigrants" a less important issue to be directly addressed at all levels of "borders". This theory emphasizes that issues are not inherently dangerous but that when they are "securitized," they become security problems. This "security" was previously seen in a narrow context as a matter of military confrontation during the Soviet-American Cold War. Then the concept shifted to various levels such as regional security, energy security, environmental security, social security, food security, cyber security, etc. Hence, "issues" or "new phenomena" are considered security threats to culture, identity, economic status and national incomes. When US troops suddenly withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, in less than a week, the entire Afghanistan, worth (85) billion US$, weapons and military equipment fell into the hands of the Taliban{8}. This made serious questions about the US personality and gave Putin an incentive to impose an energy embargo on Europe and invade Ukraine in a cold winter. Ukraine has been under Russian rule for 200 years. For the Russians, Ukraine is an important part of Russian identity, language, geography and authenticity. From the beginning of the war, the price of oil rose from $ 60 to $ 94; the Wall Street Journal saw the price of oil reach $ 100-120, then reach the same price and more{9}. The European gas crisis and the sale of Russian gas and grain in the country's currency (Ruble) mean that Russia has done its duties successfully. Even the Biden administration has called on OPEC to increase oil production, but OPEC has ignored it from the beginning. Three allies, Russia, China, and Iran, have been prominent factors in global energy prices. On the other hand, another weakness of Europe is that they do not have a unified army; their entire military presence is considered to be NATO, which the United States dominates. Fourth: The gas pipeline in the eastern Mediterranean region Knowing the nature of the distribution of power relations about energy issues depends on recognizing the strategic energy basins and alliances in these regions. This is "energy geopolitics": In 2010, Cyprus and Israel announced that they had discovered underwater natural gas in their offshore borders. In August 2019, Cyprus, Israel and Greece signed a natural gas alliance agreement in Athens with the support of the United States. Even Frank Fannon, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Natural Resources, was present {10}. Egypt, Cyprus, Israel and Greece have established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), AS France, Italy, Spain, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Lebanon are also members of the EMGF, and former US Presidents and Secretaries of State Mike Pompeo have expressed strong support for the project. The discovery of the reserves in several major fields concerned Turkey in the southern Mediterranean. A strategic dream has been true in Southern Europe on the other side: Europe does not need Russian natural gas؛. From here on, another pipeline to Europe imports gas from Israel and Cyprus. In early 2021, the 1,900-km East-Med Pipeline has commissioned to transport Israeli and Cypriot natural gas through Greece to Italy, Macedonia, Serbia and other countries. However, this project is very controversial: - The Cyprus issue remains pending in the region. Turkey does not recognize the Greek Cypriot state and the Turkish part of Cyprus (TRNC) remains marginalized by the international community, which has exacerbated the natural gas problem. The main heads of gas production in the eastern Mediterranean are at odds with Turkey. So, it has been the main cause of regional tension. - Russia is stationed in Syria, and Turkey does not want the northeastern regions of Syria, which contain oil and natural gas reserves, to be under the control of Kurdish forces. - The Mediterranean Sea is the crossroads between three continents: Asia, Africa and Europe (Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey). - Environmental problems, migrants, human trafficking, etc., continue in this region. - The deployment of Italian and French warships in the Mediterranean Sea to oppose Turkey's maneuvers. - US and British warships stationed in the Mediterranean basin - The project has led Israel and motivated to become a producer and exporter of natural gas (Israel: imported natural gas from Azerbaijan through Turkish territory in the 1990s and from Egypt from 2008 to 2012). In March 2021, Israel's Delek Drilling sold a 22 per cent stake in the Tamar gas field to UAE's Mubadala Petroleum for more than $1 billion {11}. - the Mediterranean, led by France in Europe and Israel in the Middle East, Britain and the United States, look forward to the oil and gas reserves in Kirkuk and the Kurdistan Region into part of the eastern faction. Therefore, in response to these steps of the West, Russian and Turkish companies are participating in all fields of oil and gas services in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 4. 1. Why did the US administration withdraw support for the East-Med pipeline project? On January 9 January 9. 2022. the ministries of foreign affairs of Greece, Israel and Cyprus received a non-formal letter from the US secretary department. The letter states that the US administration will suspend its support for the East-Med gas pipeline project, which has sparked regional tensions. The additional gas reserves in the region can be utilized through electricity cables to produce and promote the joint regional project. The letter comes as the United States and Europe have been preparing for a dangerous confrontation with Russia (a month before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war). The Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Project is immensely important to the United States and the West, so it does not make any excuse for any researcher to believe that support for Europe and the United States will be suspended for this project. However, the following points should be considered: The project has been hurting Turkey for ten years. Therefore, the rumors of suspending US aid are directly related to the Ukraine crisis, a US compromise for Turkey not to get closer to Russia. If the US administration intended to end the project, it would have notified them through the embassies of the three countries in Washington. The US administration believes that the project will bring regional tension and conflict rather than peace and cooperation and has led to the neglect of Turkey in the region. Therefore, Turkey described the US announcement to suspend the EMGF as a great victory for itself. However, Turkey has received this message erroneously because they state that "every line to Europe must pass through Turkey. The United States desire the natural gas projects in the eastern Mediterranean to be in line with European environmental plans and policies. Therefore, they proposed to become an electricity and cable exchange network in the region. The European Union has decided to reduce its use of natural gas by 25 per cent by 2030 and not use it completely by 2050{12}. · The project is expensive and will not solve Europe's energy crisis entirely. Substantially, during the discovery of natural gas, energy giant companies have flocked to the eastern Mediterranean since 2010, such as Noble Energy and Exxon Mobile as the two major US companies, British Petroleum (BP), French Total, Italian Eni, Israeli Delek Drilling, German DEA. Recently, the UAE has devoted all its political, economic and diplomatic strength to the Mediterranean. The UAE has normalized relations with Israel and Turkey. In 2022, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited the UAE after 12 years of war and crisis in Syria. Are these signs a simple event and a normal regional step? Is it normal to spend $7 billion and start transporting Cypriot and Israeli natural gas to Greece and other countries in 2021? Fifth: The West and its environmental issues The European Energy Network has announced that it will reach a neutral level of environmental issues by 2050. According to this roadmap, Europe will no longer rely on oil and natural gas (neither exported nor imported). Europe and the Mediterranean countries have had stable agreements since the end of the Cold War; For example, the Barcelona Declaration of 1999: these three continents fall on the same sea; they called it the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In 2008, it was renamed the Union for the Mediterranean. According to these agreements, Europe will intervene in any country in the name of cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea, such as Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Libya, etc. Therefore, the US administration has called for the Eastern Mediterranean gas project to be conducted by European environmental policies. Establishment of a large joint power line to transport and use excess gas produced off the coast of Cyprus, Israel and Egypt with Greece, thus connecting three neighboring countries on different continents. However, it is not easy because it covers a large area of more than 1,300 miles, and again, this project will cause Turkey's objections. Legally, these waters have an UN-designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which mostly passes through Turkey. Experts believe that after the US decision in early 2022, the gas in the eastern Mediterranean will be only for the Mediterranean region, and a certain region will not be economically relevant to Europe. Investors are more likely to follow the statements of Israeli Energy Minister Karin Elharar, who said that in 2022, his office would focus on renewable energy for the production of energy, especially through wind and solar {13}. Sixth: Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Hydrocarbon potential, geographical location, political decisions The population of the Kurdistan Region has exceeded 6 million people, more than 5 million of whom live in cities. 1.4 million people receive salaries from the government, which requires 870 billion Iraqi dinars (about 750 million US dollars) monthly. The armed and security forces of the Kurdistan Region are 270,000 people{14}. However, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) claims to have between 3.7 and 5.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 45 to 60 billion barrels of oil reserves. Almost the Kurdistan Region ranks between the seventh and ninth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, with between 3% and 5% of the world's natural gas reserves{15}. The existence of hydrocarbon potential for the Kurdistan Region within the framework of the Iraqi state requires deep thinking in the regional chessboard and conflicts: How does the geopolitical aspect of the Kurdistan Region affect its natural reserves? The Kurdistan Region is directly involved in the war between Russia and NATO in the Caspian region. It is also more directly involved in the eastern Mediterranean's energy geopolitics, environment and political conflict. Russian companies are currently operating in Kurdistan Region. Iran is a Russian ally in all areas of the Kurdistan Region, while the Germans have been training the Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) since 2014. The French consider the Kurds their friends, and the US has the largest military base in the Kurdistan Region. In other words, the KRI and its natural gas are located between three different energy geopolitical basins: the Mediterranean Sea in the northwest the Qazvin (Caspian) basin in the east and northeast the Gulf region ( Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia) from the south For this reason, if the KRI does not maintain the balance, the Kurdistan energy line will bring chaos to the region. This geopolitical influence is reflected in decision-makers behavior in the Kurdistan Region; When the UAE normalized relations with Israel and Turkey in 2021, the KRG's Prime Minister Masrour Barzani will visit the UAE directly, and then the KRG's President Nechirvan Barzani will visit Turkey. In 2022, when the natural gas and fuel crisis in Europe and the United States due to the war in Ukraine, the Emir of Qatar visited the United States; following this, the Prime Minister of the KRG arrived in Doha on February 15, 2022, at the invitation of Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. As well as, during his participation in the 2022 global energy forum –Atlantic Council, the PM of the KRG pointed out that "We will also export natural gas to Baghdad, Turkey and Europe" he said Atlantic Council's Global Energy Forum in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), March 28, 2022{16}. Moreover, Our goal is to export Kurdistan's gas to Europe," said Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani at the Delphi Economic Forum in Athens in April 2022. The Islamic Republic targeted the residence of Sheikh Baz Karim Barzanji, the executive director of Kar group company, with 16 missiles. Further to remind, 60% of the Kurdistan oil pipeline is owned by Kar company, and Rosneft owns 40% of Kurdistan and its oil marketing. So, Russia and Iran will never want the Kurdistan Region's natural gas to replace Iranian gas for Iraq, nor become it facilitates for Europe. Subsequently, in June and July 2022, militia armed groups targeted the Kormor field three times (Kor Mor is the largest natural gas and LPG field in the Kurdistan Region, operated by UAE Pearl Petroleum since 2007). The Kurdistan Region can work to maintain its balance of power and neutrality; Perhaps the best scenario is for the Kurdistan Region to exercise its power and validities within the framework of the Iraqi Constitution, Articles 111, 112, 116 and 122, as well as Law No. 22 of 2005 on the Oil and Gas Law which is issued in the Kurdistan Parliament in (2007). Iraq is not a stable country. The Kurdistan Region should take every opportunity to work with the central government to pass an oil and gas law with the support of the US administration (because Iraq still needs an oil and gas law). This opportunity is also important for the Iraqi central government; instead of importing natural gas from Iran at higher market prices, or instead of demanding electricity from Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf, Kurdistan's gas should be used inside Iraq to generate electricity for central and southern provinces of Iraq: It is geographically closer, it is cheaper, it will be implemented within one country, it will lead to more political coexistence, and the Shiite militias close to Iran may not repeat the threats and shelling of the Kurdistan Region's fields. "Everywhere, the oil and gas is not only related to oil and gas in terms of chemical composition and geological dimensions, not only an economic issue but also an environmental, security, political and geopolitical issue. So, It is not an exaggeration to say, "Tell me where the pipeline is going, and I will tell you where your political destiny is going". Conclusion Finally, so-called "energy security" is generally related to the reasons for the world's high and low prices of oil and natural gas. All three main basins of the Caspian, the Gulf, and the eastern Mediterranean are direct threats to global economic and political security. The US administration's decision to withdraw their support for the EMG project in January 2022 was a tactic through an unofficial paper. This is further confirmed by signing a new deal between Israel, Egypt and the European Union in June 2022 to export gas from the eastern Mediterranean. As the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen said the EU would use Cypriot and Israeli natural gas as an alternative to Russian gas. However, the European Union and the United States will continue their environmental programs to reduce their dependence on oil and natural gas. Pressure on OPEC will continue to supply much more amount of oil. All this does not mean that by mid-2023, we will see oil prices below $70, But in 2024, we will see oil prices below $40. However, natural gas will be the main market and geopolitical conflict topic for many years. Therefore, it is better for developing oil-producing countries such as Iraq, which suffers from unnatural political conflict and violence, to take advantage of this temporary opportunity. Finally, one of the main characteristics that distinguish the Russia and Ukraine war from other world wars is that instead of only a great military, economic, financial and political impact on the two direct countries participating in the war, the war has also created great political, economic and security pressure on those indirectly involved in the war. Click here to PDF References {1} US. Energy Information Administration (2012) Global natural gas consumption doubled from 1980 to 2010. For more: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=5810 {2} Jazeera Net (2019) How much oil do we consume?.. Facts about black gold in the world. For more click here (Translated from Arabic to English language). https://www.aljazeera.net › 2019 › كم... {3} Statista (2021) Daily global crude oil demand 2006-2026 – Statista {4} Mammadyarov, E (2007) "A new way for the Caspian region: cooperation and integration". Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ). P 2-8. {5} Henderson, S (2022) "Reality Check for Israel’s Natural Gas Plans", The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. {6}Reuters (2021) Explainer: Why Russian exports hold sway over European and British gas prices. See here: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/why-russian-exports-hold-sway-over-european-british-gas-prices-2021-11-03/ {7} Stritzel. H (2014) Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School. Palgrave Macmillan, London. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137307576_2 {8} The hill (2022) McCaul says US withdrawal from Afghanistan has emboldened Russia on Ukraine {9} WSJ (2022) What’s Behind Wall Street’s $100 Oil Forecast? {10} Barkey, J (2022) US pipeline withdrawal marks new chapter in Eastern Mediterranean. Ekathimerini:https: //www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1176904/us-pipeline-withdrawal-marks-new-chapter-in-eastern-mediterranean/ {11} Bloomberg (2021) UAE-Israel Ties Deepen as Mubadala Buys Gas Stake for $1 Billion . see here: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-02/uae-israel-ties-deepen-as-mubadala-buys-gas-stake-for-1-billion {12} Henderson, S (2022). (OP. Cit). {13} I24 News (2021) Energy Minister: Israel wants to focus on renewable energy: https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/politics/1639586438-energy-minister-israel-wants-to-focus-on-renewable-energy {14} Rudaw (2021) Ministry of Planning: The population of the Kurdistan Region is 6.17 million (translated from Kurdish to English language) see here: https://www.rudaw.net/arabic/kurdistan/180120214 {15} Mediterranean Institute for Regional Studies (2020) Stubborn Kurdish Petroleum Resources: Surveying Actual data and investigating the declared Numbers. Research Paper {16} Daily Sabah (2022) KRG in Iraq to start energy exports to Turkey soon: PM Barzani. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/krg-in-iraq-to-start-energy-exports-to-turkey-soon-pm-barzani

Religious leader or politician: What does Muqtada al-Sadr really want?

Draw Media Dana Taib Menmy- Iraq Analysis: Muqtada al-Sadr has been an influential figure in Iraqi politics for years, vowing to withdraw from political life multiple times only to return once again. Iraq is now experiencing an ominous calm before the next expected escalation between supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Iranian-backed Shia rivals, who have been at the centre of the country's political stalemate for years. Iraq is now experiencing an ominous calm before the next expected escalation between supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Iranian-backed Shia rivals, who have been at the centre of the country's political stalemate for years. Sadr, in a tweet on 29 August, unexpectedly announced his "final" retirement from politics, causing his supporters to take to the streets in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone, as well as across central and southern Iraqi provinces. His announcement turned the Green Zone - home to government buildings and embassies - into a battlefield, as Sadr supporters used machine guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), and Katyusha rockets in pitched battles against their rivals, including former paramilitaries of the Iran-backed Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi network and the party of former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki, a longtime foe of Sadr. "The recent violence in Iraq really demonstrated Sadr's power and ability to incite a civil war in the short-term" More than 30 people were killed and hundreds were injured. The fighting ended the next day with a call from Sadr to his fighters to cease fighting and withdraw from the area. “The violence escalated, Sadr gave 24 hours to his supporters to act without his instructions and needed to end it as it looked like the Sadrists were the outlaws attacking the state," Sajad Jiyad, a fellow at the Century International for Research and Policy, told The New Arab. "It is possible this was a planned provocation and, in any case, he showed the power of his group and nothing more was to be gained.” During a press conference, Sadr went on to say that both those killed in the clashes and the killers "were in hell", with others speculating about whether the Shia cleric had ambitions of replacing Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Al-Sistani. RELATED The Iraq Report: Sadr at the heart of Iraq's political chaos Iraq Report The New Arab “Sadr was disappointed that his group resorted to such open violence and wanted to distance himself from it, which is why he blamed the killer and those killed for engaging in violence," Jiyad told TNA. "I think he cares very much about his image and religious legitimacy and does not want to be seen like any other political leader, which is natural as he is a cleric too.” Iraq’s political crisis is now in its 11th month after the country went to early elections on 10 October 2021 in which Muqtada al-Sadr's bloc won a majority with 73 seats. Sadr tried to form a 'national majority' government with several Sunni and Kurdish blocs, mobilising against pro-Iran Shia blocs organised under the Coordination Framework (CF). More than 30 people were killed and hundreds injured in clashes between Shia rivals last month. [Getty] Frustrated in his efforts to fulfil his promise to his supporters, however, Sadr ordered lawmakers from his bloc to resign, which all his MPs did on 12 June. The CF replaced Sadr's MPs with their own, becoming the biggest bloc in the Iraqi parliament. They vowed to form a consensus government that would include all the Sunni and Kurdish blocs. Iraqi analysts have told The New Arab that Sadr had made a mistake by withdrawing from the parliament and choosing to confront his rivals in the Iraqi streets and through his Saraya al-Salam and Al-Mahdi Army militias. Sadr, claiming to be a reformist, insists that the Iraqi parliament should be dissolved by the country’s Supreme Federal Court, and snap elections be held again. But the CF insists that the parliament should convene to elect a president, form a consensus government, amend the country’s election law, and then vote to dissolve itself. "Muqtada al-Sadr is interested in becoming the most powerful figure in Iraq, both politically and spiritually, and all of his moves are framed by his want to do so" Where is Iraq going? There are now several different scenarios for Iraq, including the possibility of snap elections, which even Iraq's President Barham Salih has voiced support for. "The trouble is that an election is actually unlikely to change anything on the ground, it could even make things worse, whilst only temporarily abating the different factions,” Shayan Talabany, an analyst at the Tony Blair Institute (TBI) focused on Iraq’s politics, told TNA. “Iraq’s last election had the lowest voter turnout in any election since 2003. With the recent violence, there are different dynamics that could play out in terms of voting. Some Iraqis could feel more encouraged to vote, which could be a source of optimism, as a large population of Iraqis would rather vote for those not currently in government,” Talabany said. RELATED The Iraq Report: Night of violence reveals grave instability Iraq Report The New Arab “Another very likely scenario is that Iraqis will be even more frustrated with the political process and not even vote, particularly if they feel that even when alternative parties do gain votes (such as in October 2021) these results are overridden by the traditional parties who are squabbling for power,” she added. “The real issue is that the political process of forming a government, the outbursts of violence, and the continuous back and forth between the different factions engaged in a power struggle have the ability to prolong the political process even further. This could quickly become very dangerous, given the ability of more regressive forces, such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers, to mobilise so quickly. The recent violence in Iraq really demonstrated Sadr’s power and ability to incite a civil war in the short-term.” She also cautioned that there is a high possibility that public anger and frustration could rise and potentially explode if the country’s needs and its people’s demands are further ignored. Sadr’s withdrawal from politics has also once again raised the question of whether he wants to be Iraq’s next Shia religious Marjaeya, replacing al-Sistani. Sadr's withdrawal from politics has once again raised the question of whether he wants to be Iraq’s next Shia religious Marjaeya. [Getty] “I think Muqtada al-Sadr is interested in becoming the most powerful figure in Iraq, both politically and spiritually, and all of his moves are framed by his want to do so. On the political front, the trouble is that Iraq’s system structurally prevents a single or central concentration of power, especially since former Prime Minister Noori al-Maliki was removed. We have seen this play out since the October 2021 elections,” Talabany said. “On the religious or spiritual front: Sadr does not have the qualifications nor calibre religiously to replace al-Sistani. The danger is however that Sadr thinks he can or should achieve both these pillars of authority. What Sadr wants and what is actually feasible, at least under the current circumstances, is therefore quite different.” Regarding the scenario that the US might fully withdraw from Iraq as it did in Afghanistan last year, Talabany ruled out such a possibility, given how different the situation in both countries is. "Sadr does not have the qualifications nor calibre religiously to replace al-Sistani. The danger is, however, that Sadr thinks he can or should achieve both these pillars of authority" “It is difficult to make the argument that Iraq is the centre of international interest. I think that apart from Iraq’s current important role as a major oil exporter during times of low energy supply, there is international fatigue with Iraq,” she said. “There is a lot of international interest in Iraq that is solely centred on Iran. It is worrying to hear the large number of voices that seem very willing to allow Iraq to regress, for the sake of countering Iran, which is itself a really impractical and narrow-sighted way of viewing the country and its relationship with its neighbours,” Talabany added. "At the same time, if Iraq wants to be taken seriously, it has to maintain its security so that it can move on and attract positive attention and not just negative attention by being a security threat – but right now that seems quite unlikely.”

Labour MP’s aide paid £400,000 by oil firms linked to Kurdistan

The Telegraph, By Mason Boycott-Owen An MP’s aide has been paid £400,000 by oil companies linked to a regime accused of human rights abuses, amid concerns over foreign influence in Parliament, The Telegraph can reveal. Gary Kent has been paid by Kurdistani oil and construction companies as he and the MP he works for promoted the region’s interests in Parliament. The aide still works for Mary Glindon, the Labour MP and whip, and is also the secretary of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG). He has highlighted how the APPG has helped shape select committee reports and MPs’ speeches, as well as how it has secured a government trade mission to the country. Mr Kent has also described how the group has taken more than 50 UK parliamentarians to the region over the last decades, some "several times". Annual salary of £57,000 from Kar Group Transparency documents show that between 2015 and last year, Mr Kent had been paid by a number of different oil and construction companies with close links to the Kurdistan Regional Government. He had been paid an annual salary of £57,000 by Kar Group and other companies in the region, but it is understood he now runs the APPG in a voluntary capacity Kar Group, a Kurdistani oil and construction company, has reportedly close links to the region’s government. Local media has reported that Baz Karim, the company’s president and chief executive, is a trusted adviser of Masrur Barzani, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s prime minister. Last year, Amnesty International said Kurdistani authorities had "ruthlessly cracked down on journalists, activists and protesters exercising their right to freedom of expression, including by arbitrarily arresting and forcibly disappearing them". Alistair Graham, the former chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, questioned whether it had been appropriate for foreign companies to pay salaries to parliamentary staffers. 'Very odd affair' Mr Graham told The Telegraph: "It’s a very odd affair. Who is he accountable to, the MP or the Kurdistan government? "It’s a backdoor way of lobbying. I’m strongly opposed to such arrangements because there is a lack of accountability. "It is an unacceptable way of getting access to Parliament to pressure their own commercial interests." But Ms Glindon defended the work of the APPG, saying it had "done much to build bilateral relations with a vital ally" and that all of the donations were within Parliamentary rules. Sponsorship for APPG delegations since 2008 and funding of the secretariat from 2014 to 2021 were declared, in full, to the parliamentary authorities," she said. "Advisers advise but MPs decide. The APPG is run by MPs and is seen by many as having done much to build bilateral relations with a vital ally. "It has urged economic and political reform in the Kurdistan Region, of which it has been supportive where possible and critical where necessary, as an independent cross-party group, chaired by senior Labour and Conservative MPs." Mr Kent declined to comment. Spotlight on lobbying by overseas governments Lobbying and attempts to shape political decision-making by foreign governments has come under the spotlight in recent months. Barry Gardiner, a Labour MP, faced criticism after employing the son of an alleged Chinese spy in his office. Mr Gardiner rejected any suggestion of impropriety. Sir Lindsay Hoyle, the House of Commons Speaker, has indicated he will crack down on foreign lobbying in Parliament. All-party parliamentary groups are set up by MPs to pursue specific interest areas. Often they receive funding from outside groups, raising questions about their roles in parliamentary discussions. The Telegraph has found that dozens of parliamentary staff have had their salaries funded by outside bodies. Some are charities or philanthropic bodies, but others have been companies. Mr Kent described the work of the APPG in a post on its website and in interviews. "We helped put Kurdistan on the map by persuading Top Gear to film a programme in Kurdistan, which reached millions," Mr Kent said in 2018. Mr Kent is currently listed as director of policy at the University of Kurdistan Hewler in Parliamentary transparency documents. The university last year appointed Bill Rammell, a former Labour foreign office and education minister, as its new president. Since 2014, Ms Glindon has spoken eight times in Parliament, submitted eight questions and proposed nine motions to the Commons specifically regarding Kurdistan, including on topics such as the supply of machine guns and ammunition supplies from the UK. In 2018, Ms Glindon called on the House to welcome a deal between Baghdad and Kurdistan for an oil pipeline to export tens of thousands barrels of oil a day and "restore billions of dollars of lost revenue" to the region. Steve Goodrich, head of research and investigations at Transparency International UK, said: "It’s particularly worrying when foreign governments are closely linked to the day-to-day running of APPGs, as this can give rise to the perception – or reality – that the group has been captured by private interests. "In order to avoid the next big lobbying scandal, there should be much greater openness and accountability over how APPGs are run.

Turkey's Grip in the Oil Process Of the Kurdistan Region

Draw Media Turkish oil companies work in the Kurdistan region's 8 oil fields in a way that the Genel Energy company has a share in these oil blocks: Tawke (25%), Bir Bahr (40%), Duhok (40%), Bna Bawe (44%), Taqtaq (44%), Miran (75%), Chia Surkh (60%). While Petoil company has a 20% share in the fields of Chia Surkh and Palkana. This is despite 75 percent of Kurdistan's oil pipeline passing through Turkish territory and being owned by the Turkish energy company. Most of the money for selling Kurdistan's oil goes through filters from Turkish banks and then goes back to the KRG. The importance of the KRG's oil and energy to Turkey The Kurdistan Region has a unique position in turkey's current situation from many perspectives. Without Kurdistan's natural resources, Turkey cannot continue to thrive, without the Controlled Market of Kurdistan, turkey's economy will be in crisis. Without contact with the region, the unemployment problem in the Kurdish areas would increase and the PKK would be more active. Without relations with the Kurdistan region, Turkey will be deprived of Iraq's oil and its future would be more difficult when its hands off the region's oil and gas pipelines. Turkey's need for oil and gas Turkey has undergone major economic growth between 2002 and 2017, making it the 13th largest economy in the world. According to the OECD data, Turkey ranks first in terms of energy needs for the economy to continue to grow. It must be provided continuously and without interruption to the sectors that provide economic growth. Oil production in the Kurdistan region Since 2006, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has been rapidly conducting search and inspection activities due to contracts with oil companies, with a total of 10 oil wells, 8 of which have had positive results. Gulf Keystone Petroleum company, in the Shekhan fields near the Turkish border, has found a wide area of oil, which is estimated to be between 12 to 15 billion barrels of oil. 45 billion barrels of oil have been found in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, according to statistics from the KRG's Ministry of Natural Resources, and with the oil have founded in the Shekhan area is expected to be 60-65 billion barrels of oil. Turkey's grip in the region's oil process First: The region's oil pipeline in Turkey The KRG exports about 450,000 barrels of oil abroad daily, all through the Kurdistan Oil Pipeline, which passes through Turkish territory. The Kurdistan Region's oil pipeline is 896 kilometers long, starting at the Kurdistan Region's border at the Khurmalawa field and reaching 221 kilometers by Fishkhabur, according to which 24.6 percent of the oil pipeline is on the Kurdistan Region's border, owned by both Kar Group and Rosneft, a Russian company. The part of the Turkish border is owned by the Turkish energy company and operates by Turkish company Botas. Its 675 kilometers from Fishkhabur to the Turkish port of Jayhan, forms (74.6 percent) of the pipeline's length. Second: Turkish companies in the oil fields of the Kurdistan region Two major Turkish energy companies work in the Kurdistan Region, Both Genal Energy and Petoil currently have contracts and shares with the KRG in several oil fields in the Kurdistan Region. Third: Oil money and Halkbank The KRG's oil money will be transferred to the KRG's private account of Turkish banks. In 2015, the Kurdistan Regional Government's Council of Ministers decided in a letter no. 983: All oil exports and sales revenues must be transferred directly to the KRG's account at the Halkbank in Turkey without the mediation of the Third Bank. The KRG's decision shows the fact that the total amount of oil sales in the Kurdistan Region is being collected in Turkey, and the Central Iraqi Government has pressured turkey on this issue several times, but the process has remained the same.

Iran’s Attack Was Response to Secret Israeli Attack on Drone Site

Draw Media The New York Times Israel and Iran are pushing the boundaries of a long-running clandestine war that is increasingly spilling out of the shadows. By Farnaz Fassihi, Ronen Bergman and Eric Schmitt Iran fired a barrage of ballistic missiles into Iraq over the weekend, striking what it claimed was an Israeli target and leaving some analysts scratching their heads about what exactly precipitated the blitz and why Iraq. Now, officials say, the attack was retaliation for a previously secret Israeli airstrike on an Iranian drone factory last month. And, according to some officials, the Israeli intelligence operatives who launched the airstrike were based in Iraq. The tit-for-tat strikes represent an alarming escalation in the long-running shadow war between Israel and Iran, as both sides push the boundaries of a conflict that has also entangled the United States and now Iraq. For Israel, the attack on the Iranian drone facility is part of a new approach in countering Iran’s growing drone program, a tacit recognition that it is easier to pre-emptively destroy a drone than to intercept one en route. Iranian drones have been deployed in numerous attacks against Israel, as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and, last October, a U.S. base in Syria, according to intelligence officials. For Iran, the missile strike in Erbil, Iraq, on Sunday reflects both a more aggressive policy of responding to Israeli attacks and a more overt one: Unlike most previous attacks attributed to Iran, Iran, not one of its proxies, immediately claimed responsibility for this one, a sign of confidence that it can do so with impunity. Iran’s use of ballistic missiles instead of rockets or drones was also a serious escalation. For years, Israel and Iran have engaged in a largely covert war, keeping their actions brief, limited and, if not completely secret, at least deniable, in an effort to prevent a full-scale direct war that neither side wants. But as the recent strikes demonstrate, each side is willing to test those limits. And in a sign of the increasing reliance on drones, or remotely piloted aircraft, Israel’s attack on the Iranian drone facility last month was carried out by drones. A senior intelligence official briefed on the operation said that six suicide quadcopter drones exploded into the Iranian facility near Kermanshah, Iran, on Feb. 12. The official, who asked not be identified when discussing sensitive intelligence issues, said the facility was Iran’s main manufacturing and storage plant for military drones, and that the Israeli attack destroyed dozens of them. Iranian officials have not confirmed that the facility was used for drones, referring to it only as a base for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the paramilitary force that carries out much of Iran’s foreign military activities. Iran’s drone program has been the subject of increasing concern to Israeli and American officials, as well as to Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. A document compiled by Israeli intelligence lists 15 drone attacks carried out by Iran or its proxies in the region from February 2018 to September 2021. Israeli military officials say that Israel has been attacked by Iranian drones several times. Last year, an Israeli F35 fighter jet intercepted two drones that Israel claimed had taken off from Iran, on their way to the Gaza Strip to drop off a supply of pistols for Hamas, the Islamist militant group that controls Gaza, the Israeli military said. American officials say that Iran also provides drone technology to proxy forces in Iraq and Syria, who carry out strikes against American personnel in those countries with Tehran’s blessing or direction. Last October, five so-called suicide drones were launched at the American base at Al Tanf, Syria, in what the military’s Central Command called a “deliberate and coordinated” attack. The attack caused no casualties but the drones were loaded with ball bearings and shrapnel in a “clear intent to kill,” a senior U.S. military official said. U.S. officials said they believed that Iran directed and supplied the local proxy forces that carried out the attack in retaliation for Israeli airstrikes in Syria, the first time Iran directed a military strike against the United States in response to an attack by Israel. The real wake-up call on the threat of Iran’s drone program came in 2019, with a pair of dramatic pinpoint strikes on two Saudi oil facilities carried out by a combination of drones and cruise missiles. A Saudi Aramco plant was attacked in 2019 by a combination of drones and cruise missiles.CreditCredit...Hamad I Mohammed/Reuters The strikes were claimed by the Houthis, a Yemeni insurgent group, but American and Israeli officials said they were directed and possibly carried out by Iran. Iran denied responsibility. That strike and others led Israeli officials to conclude that the best defense against Iranian drones was to attack the production and storage sites, like the one attacked last month, according to the senior intelligence official. It was unclear what role, if any, the United States played in the February strike. The senior intelligence official said that Israeli officials briefed the United States in advance. Iranian officials have not publicly linked Israel’s attack in Iran with their attack in Iraq, but others — including an analyst close to the Revolutionary Guards, an adviser to the Iranian government, an Iranian proxy force in Iraq and a Lebanese television station affiliated with Iran — have said the Iranian attack was retaliation for the Israeli one. Iran fired more than a dozen missiles on Sunday at a site in Erbil, Iraq, that Iranian officials say the site is a base for Israeli intelligence operations against Iran. Erbil is the capital of the semiautonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq. While the Iraqi government does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, the Kurdish regional government has a long history of close ties with Israel. The Iraqi prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi inspecting the site of the missile strike in Erbil. Iraqi officials denied there was an Israeli operation there.Credit...Iraqi Prime Minister's Office “We believe this building in Erbil was a center for coordinating and planning operations against Iran’s national security and several malicious activities against Iran happened from there,” Hossein Dalirian, a prominent defense analyst affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, said in an interview. Saeed Khatibzadeh, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesman, said Monday that “Iran will not tolerate that a location near its border be used for destructive and terrorist operations inside Iran.” Iraqi and Kurdish officials have denied that Israel operates a base there. Israeli officials have declined to comment. A senior U.S. official who was briefed on the strikes said the building hit in Erbil served as an Israeli intelligence outpost and training facility. But a senior Biden administration official rebutted that assessment, saying the administration believes that the building that was hit was a civilian residence only and did not also serve as an Israeli training site. The senior U.S. official and another U.S. official confirmed that Israel has conducted intelligence operations against Iran from Kurdistan, but declined to cite specific details. The two officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss confidential intelligence assessments. In a statement on Sunday, the State Department spokesman Ned Price said the missiles struck a private residence near the new U.S. Consulate in Erbil, which is under construction. He said that no U.S. facilities were damaged and no American personnel were injured, adding that “we have no indications the attack was directed at the United States.” Iranian officials have claimed at least once before that they had attacked Israeli intelligence bases in Iraq and killed its field personnel. That claim could not be verified. Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Iraj Masjedi, said in a speech in Karbala, Iraq, on Monday that Iran respects Iraq and considers it a close ally and that neither Iraq nor the United States were the targets of the attack in Erbil. But the attack does represent a more aggressive posture against Israel adopted by Iran’s relatively new hard-line government, defense analysts said. Officials in the previous Iranian government had professed a strategy of “strategic patience,” at least until the end of the Trump presidency in an effort not to give President Donald J. Trump an excuse to launch a war he seemed eager to wage. “Iran’s strategic patience has ended and from now on it will be answering attacks with attacks,” said Gheis Ghoreishi, an analyst who is close to the government. Iran is more confident about its regional policies, he said, because it is convinced that the U.S.’s maximum pressure policy — the Trump administration’s strategy of piling punishing sanctions on Iran in an effort to coerce its agreement to a more restrictive nuclear agreement — had failed. And as the Biden administration struggles to resurrect the nuclear agreement with Iran, Mr. Ghoreishi said, Iran is convinced that Washington has no appetite for another war in the region. The Revolutionary Guards, he said, have concluded that the most effective way to defend against Israel was to “increase the costs” and adopt an “eye for an eye” policy of strikes and counterstrikes.

Russia’s war in Ukraine: complete guide in maps, video and pictures

Draw Media: theguardian: by Andrew Roth, Dan Sabbagh, Paul Scruton, Harvey Symons, Finbarr Sheehy, Glenn Swann and Niels de Hoog What is the latest? Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Kyiv and carried out an amphibious assault from the Sea of Azov near Mariupol, a day after attacking Ukraine from three sides on a massive scale. In the capital air raid sirens wailed and heavy gunfire and explosions were heard in a number of districts, as Russian military vehicles approached from the north-west. The defence ministry in Moscow claimed its forces had taken control of the strategic Hostomel airfield to the north-west after a day of fighting. Pressure was also intensifying around Chernihiv, about 90 miles (145km) north-east of Kyiv, Ukraine’s military said, with Russian forces trying to bypass the city and head to the capital down the E95 road to Kozelec and ultimately Kyiv’s eastern suburbs. Further east, about 125 miles from the capital, the city of Konotop was lost to Russian forces. According to the Pentagon, 10 amphibious landing ships unloaded thousands of naval infantry to the west of Mariupol, potentially cutting off the port city on the Sea of Asov. Fighting was reported to be continuing around Kherson on the Dnieper River and in Melitopol. Elsewhere, Ukraine’s forces were believed to be holding firm in the eastern Donbas region, while the eastern city of Kharkiv, which has a population of more than 1 million, was gradually being surrounded. What happened on Thursday? Russia attacked Ukraine along multiple axes, bringing to a calamitous end weeks of fruitless diplomatic efforts by western leaders to avert war. Fighting and other military activity took place around and on the way to Kyiv, including an ambitious attack by helicopters on the Hostomel military airbase. Ukraine lost control of the Chernobyl nuclear site in the north, where fighting raged after Russian troops crossed the border from Belarus. One Russian line came through the Senkivka border crossing near Chernihiv. Tanks seen moving into Ukraine across the Senkivka border on 24 February. Photograph: Ukraine border guard A substantial attack was also aimed towards the eastern city of Kharkiv. Russian forces also headed north and east from Crimea. Social media footage showed them reaching Kherson on the Dnieper, 80 miles (130km) inside Ukraine. How did we get here? Over the past few months Russia has forward-deployed hundreds of tanks, self-propelled artillery and even short-range ballistic missiles from as far away as Siberia to within striking range of Ukraine. Moscow’s rhetoric also grew more belligerent. Vladimir Putin demanded legal guarantees that Ukraine would never join Nato or host its missile strike systems, concessions he was unlikely to receive. A flurry of diplomatic activity did little to ease tensions. The second half of February was long seen as the most likely period for a potential offensive. Russian soldiers stayed on in Belarus beyond the end of planned military exercises, and the Winter Olympics, hosted by ally China, concluded. The invasion was preceded on 22 February by Putin saying Russia would recognise the territorial claims of its two proxy states in east Ukraine. He had already ordered his forces into Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine. On 22 February a Reuters witness saw columns of military vehicles including tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) on the outskirts of Donetsk, the capital of one of the territories claimed by Russia. What do we know about Russia’s deployments? Scores of battalion tactical groups – the smallest operational unit in Moscow’s army, consisting of about 800-1,000 troops – were put in place near the borders of Ukraine in both Russia and latterly Belarus prior to the invasion. As of 18 February the US estimated that Russia had between 169,000 and 190,000 personnel in and around Ukraine. An estimated 32,000 separatist forces were already operating in the breakaway areas of Donetsk and Luhansk – some of whom were likely to be unacknowledged Russian forces – before the invasion. Many of the heavy weapons stationed near Ukraine arrived as far back as spring 2021. Over the new year Russia also began to move tanks, artillery, air defence systems and fighter jets to Belarus for joint exercises in February. That deployment has since grown. Deployments at Zyabrovka (AKA Pribytki) airfield in Gomel, Belarus, 15 miles (25km) from the border with Ukraine, on 10 February. Photograph: Maxar Technologies/Reuters Half of Russia’s air force is now deployed near Ukraine, according to western estimates. Russian warships conducted training exercises in the Black Sea in the run-up to the invasion. This footage released by the Russian defence ministry shows a Ka-27PS helicopter taking off and landing on the deck of a frigate during exercises on 22 February. These satellite image composites show the buildup of troops in Yelnya and Pogonovo over the new year. Satellite photographs also show increased deployments in Novoozernoye in western Crimea. The US estimates 10,000 troops moved into Crimea in late January and early February. This image from 18 February shows deployments including armour, helicopters and field hospitals in Novoozernoye: Photograph: EyePress News/Rex/Shutterstock Satellite images taken on 20 February showed troops and equipment being moved from holding areas to what the UK defence secretary described as potential launch locations. How do the militaries compare? Russia’s invasion pits the Kremlin’s large, recently modernised military against an adversary largely using older versions of the same or similar equipment, dating back to the Soviet era. Russia has significant numerical advantages on land and in particular in air and at sea, although the Ukrainians are defending their homeland. What is the historical context? In 2014 Putin sent troops to annex Crimea, a mainly Russian-speaking region of Ukraine. Russia also incited a separatist uprising in Ukraine’s south-east, clandestinely sending soldiers and weapons to provoke a conflict that grew into a full-blown war. A 2015 peace deal established a line of demarcation and called on both sides to make concessions. Since then low-level fighting has continued along the front, and both sides have accused the other of violating the agreement. Going back further, Russia has long opposed any attempts by Ukraine to move towards the EU and Nato. One of Putin’s often repeated demands is a guarantee that Ukraine never joins Nato, the alliance of 30 countries that has expanded eastwards since the end of the cold war. What is the role of Nord Stream 2? On 22 February, the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, stopped the certification process for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline in response to Russia’s recognition of the two self-proclaimed republics. First announced in 2015, the $11bn (£8.3bn) pipeline owned by Russia’s state-backed energy company Gazprom has been built to carry gas from western Siberia to Lubmin in Germany’s north-east, doubling the existing capacity of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline and keeping 26m German homes warm at an affordable price. Europe’s most divisive energy project, Nord Stream 2 bypasses the traditional gas transit nation of Ukraine by running along the bed of the Baltic Sea. It has faced resistance within the EU, and from the US as well as Ukraine, on the grounds that it increases Europe’s energy dependence on Russia, denies Ukraine transit fees and makes it more vulnerable to Russian invasion. … we have a small favour to ask. Millions are turning to the Guardian for open, independent, quality news every day, and readers in 180 countries around the world now support us financially. We believe everyone deserves access to information that’s grounded in science and truth, and analysis rooted in authority and integrity. That’s why we made a different choice: to keep our reporting open for all readers, regardless of where they live or what they can afford to pay. This means more people can be better informed, united, and inspired to take meaningful action. In these perilous times, a truth-seeking global news organisation like the Guardian is essential. We have no shareholders or billionaire owner, meaning our journalism is free from commercial and political influence – this makes us different. When it’s never been more important, our independence allows us to fearlessly investigate, challenge and expose those in power. Support the Guardian from as little as $1 – it only takes a minute. If you can, please consider supporting us with a regular amount each month. Thank you.

Will the 2018 Presidential Election Scenario Be Repeated?

Neaz Mustafa, Draw Media The statistics show that the 2018 scenario cannot be repeated, and Masoud Barzani would be the winner over Bafel Talabani this time. If the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) loses the Presidency post, there would be a big question on the PUK’s participation in the new government cabinet in Iraq. Barzani and Talabani’s discussion on President’s Candidates was not fruitful. PUK insists on Barham Salih, and PDK on Hoshyar Zebari to be their candidates for the next Iraqi president. More Details are in this report by Draw Media. Barzani Wants the President in any Circumstances! PUK and PDK have not reached an agreement on a candidate for the next Iraqi president both sides have their candidates, which was noticed at today’s meeting between Talabani and Barzani. The three main leadership positions in the Iraqi government are divided among Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. Whereas Kurds get the presidency, Shiites get the premiership, and Sunnis get the parliamentary speaker. Among Kurds, the PUK has held on to the presidency position since 2005. The KDP and PUK for years abided by a strategic agreement, where the PUK would get the Iraqi president of their choice, and the KDP in return would get the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region. Until 2018, When Masoud Barzani stepped down as President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), he wanted to get back the Iraqi presidency position from PUK. The KDP and for the first time, put forth Fuad Hussein against Barham Salih for the position. Will the 2018 Scenario Be Repeated? Today the political situation in Bagdad is the same as four years ago. There is no official agreement between the KDP and the PUK over the Iraqi presidency. Both parties have their candidates for the position. But the election results show that this time Barzani would win the competition and he would be able to get revenge for the 2018 incidents. The MPs have to elect a new president by February 8. The president will later assign the candidate of the biggest parliamentary alliance to form a new government. In 2018, Bafel Talabani won the position from Barzani. When Barham Salih, Talabani’s Candidate, won by 219 votes over Fuad Hussain, Barzani’s Candidate, by 22 votes. But repeating the same scenario in 2022 is kind of impossible because the situation has been changed now. KDP and Barzani have returned to Bagdad with more power. Before the Oct 10 of 2021’s election, Barzani has signed an agreement with Muqtada Sadr. And now Sadr is the biggest winner of the election and he would form the new government. Above that, Barzani has established a strong relationship with the Suni blocks. How Barzani would win the presidency competition? On the 9th of January, in the first meeting of the fifth round of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, the KDP showed its power. In that meeting, a new political alliance in Iraq has been presented for the first time between (Sadr, Barzani, Al-Halbousi). This alliance has 180 seats out of 329 parliament seats. On the other side, the Coordination Framework alliance has 70 seats. The PUK is one of the political parties that got 18 seats in the October 2021 elections and is looking forward to getting the presidency position as its portion, depending on the previous political agreements between the Iraqi parties. But yet the party does not have a solid agreement Neither with Muqtada Sadr nor with the Coordination Framework alliance. In addition, the PUK did not vote for Muhamad Al-Halbousi for the parliament presidency which angered the Sunnis. But by being away from the Shiite conflict, PUK might achieve the satisfaction of Iran. If the situation continues as it is, in the second parliament meeting, the (Sadr + Halbousi) alliance would vote for (Hoshyar Zebari) the KDP Candidate for the Iraqi presidency.

Cowboy Drugstore... Traces of a kleptocrat from Iraq to Delaware to Miami

Draw BY ZACK KOPPLIN - THE AMERICAN PROSPECT A few blocks from the water, in the heart of Miami’s glitzy South Beach, is a drugstore not like the others. Tourists buying sunscreen and straw hats from the CVS on Washington Avenue are financing a Middle Eastern kleptocrat. The plexiglass building housing the roughly 12,000-square-foot pharmacy is worth $18.3 million and, because of favorable rent terms negotiated with CVS, should generate significant profit for its landlord. In 2019, based on Miami property records, local press credited a Virginia-based real estate company, KLNB, with purchasing the building. But the Virginia firm’s inclusion in the property registrar was a diversion. “KLNB is not the owner of this property and had no involvement in the transaction,” a company representative said. The actual purchase was made by an anonymous Delaware shell company. Buried in incorporation documents for this Delaware company’s Florida branch is the name of the building’s real owner: Masrour Barzani, the prime minister of Iraqi Kurdistan. More from Zack Kopplin A semi-independent region in Iraq’s north, Kurdistan is a hereditary monarchy in all but name and has been dominated by the Barzani family for decades. The Kurdish prime minister has abused his power to attack, torture, and kill his critics, including Saudi-style assassinations of journalists. While he previously served as the region’s intelligence chief, Barzani had a local university student, Zardasht Osman, tortured and killed for publishing a satirical poem about the social advancement that would come with marrying one of the prime minister’s sisters. The Kurdish prime minister is not a benign pharmacy operator. But because of America’s underappreciated role as an enabler of corporate secrecy, if not for a clerical error, South Beach residents would have no idea about the Washington Avenue CVS. No one knows the extent of the illicit wealth hidden inside the United States. Corporate secrecy laws, maintained by states like Delaware, keep it that way. But tracing the Barzani family’s investments, like this Miami pharmacy, explains why America has become an appealing destination for dirty money. THROUGH OIL AND CORRUPTION, the Barzanis, whose agents did not respond to requests for comment, have amassed enormous amounts of wealth. For example, a real estate investment in Kurdistan, owned by a company secretly connected to one of the prime minister’s brothers, has been valued at $1.27 billion. Like other despots, the Barzanis turned to secrecy havens, the kind of places exposed by the Panama and Pandora Papers, to conceal their money. Secrecy havens are jurisdictions that don’t require public disclosure of the names of the owners and shareholders of companies housed within their borders. This enables all sorts of financial crimes, from tax evasion to money laundering and facilitating bribery. But, unlike the king of Jordan and Argentina’s former president, whose secret companies got busted in previous offshore leaks, Barzani assets and business deals were not exposed in the Panama and Pandora Papers. They’ve only been caught in one major leak, a database of Dubai property records, obtained by the nonprofit Center for Advanced Defense Studies, which contains details about the Barzanis’ assets in the uber-expensive Burj Khalifa complex and one of the city’s artificial islands, Palm Jumeirah, along with the family’s connections to United Arab Emirates royalty. Keep this site free and open for all to read... SUPPORT THE PROSPECT This is because instead of Cayman Island beaches, the Barzanis opted for an office building in Delaware owned by the CT Corporation, an American branch of a Dutch company, Wolters Kluwer, that specializes in creating anonymous companies. Though less picturesque, America’s corporate secrecy regime is virtually equivalent to what is offered by any Caribbean island. In many states, rather than disclosing real ownership, wealthy individuals can hire agents and representatives to put their names and addresses on corporate paperwork instead, or aren’t required to supply ownership information at all. A network of accountants, law firms, and consultants, like Wolters Kluwer, will set up and manage these secret companies for anyone who can pay. The Barzanis have enough secret property, which also includes mansions in California and Virginia, that they’ve now been caught hiding money in America four times. Collectively, the family has paid over $75 million for these four properties alone. These investments likely represent only a small fraction of the family’s secret wealth in the United States. None of these properties were discovered through a Panama Papers–style leak. Instead, all four properties, which had proxy owners and expensive law firms to protect them, were only unmasked because their agents made small slipups. Tracing the Barzani family investments explains why America has become an appealing destination for dirty money. In the case of the CVS, it was a Pennsylvania-based law firm, Cozen O’Connor, that appears to have exposed their own secret client. Over two months, beginning in December 2018, the law firm opened three Florida companies and a Delaware company all named after the pharmacy’s Washington Avenue address. The paperwork for the Florida companies included the Kurdish prime minister’s name and signature, along with that of one of his other brothers, Muksi Barzani. Those names were not meant to become public and, shortly after the pharmacy’s purchase, the law firm removed them from the companies. The Barzanis were replaced with one of Cozen O’Connor’s own lawyers, Matthew Weinstein. It wasn’t a perfect solution, but this legal triage was highly effective. You won’t find their names in popular corporation research databases, and it was enough to fool local journalists. The CVS deal also highlights how far corporate lawyers will go to defend their wealthy dictator clients. When called for comment, Weinstein categorically denied that the Barzanis owned the building or were clients of Cozen O’Connor. Instead, he said the corporate documents held by the Florida secretary of state were incorrect. (Later, in response to follow-up questions, Weinstein denied saying any of the things that he had previously said. “If you choose to write an article about the Barzani family, your characterization of my response to you must be ‘Mr. Weinstein would not comment on these matters,’” he wrote in an email.) His statements were all over the place, but Weinstein’s core claim, that the Florida secretary of state’s records were wrong, is implausible. The names of the Kurdish prime minister and his relatives don’t just randomly end up all over incorporation documents for multiple Florida companies for no reason. “The name is a significant piece of the corporate registry,” said Robert Appleton, a former senior prosecutor for the Department of Justice. These documents were prepared by Cozen O’Connor and many were signed by Weinstein personally. Submitting falsified documents to the Florida corporate registrar is a felony, but that’s essentially what Weinstein claimed his law firm had done, in a last-ditch attempt to conceal the identity of his clients. Obviously, the Barzanis do not tolerate errors, but it was a similar mistake that exposed their Virginia mansion. It was purchased in 2010, by an anonymous Virginia company put together by a local law firm. For years, Kurdistan watchers had speculated the property belonged to Masrour Barzani, but documentary evidence didn’t emerge until someone accidentally allowed the registration for the Virginia company to lapse. Its reinstatement paperwork was signed by the chairman of Ster Group, a Kurdish conglomerate. According to State Department cables published by WikiLeaks, Ster Group is owned by members of the Barzani family. Expand NAM Y. HUH/AP PHOTO The Miami CVS deal would not have been traced to the Barzani family were it not for an error by a Pennsylvania law firm. The Barzanis don’t just use American corporate secrecy to hide their blood money. They’re even exploiting it to defraud the United States government. Both of their California mansions were connected to a conspiracy to defraud the Pentagon. Purchased in 2018, by anonymous Delaware and Virginia companies, through representatives of another small Virginia law firm, these mansions were one of the largest real estate purchases in Beverly Hills history. The scheme was only exposed when Variety’s real estate vertical discovered the name of a Barzani family employee, Haval Dosky, on paperwork associated with the properties. Dosky was a middleman in a scheme where fuel purchases to supply American bases in Kurdistan were steered to the Barzanis’ preferred military contractors, who charged the Pentagon significantly above market prices. It’s quite possible proceeds from those deals were what financed these mansions. All of this raises the question: How many hidden properties do the Barzanis, and other autocrats, have inside the United States? Corporate lawyers make mistakes, but not every time and probably not even often. Most journalistic investigations into anonymous shell companies and secret real estate purchases end in failure. Even in the process of reporting this piece, I was unable to obtain ownership records to validate another probable Barzani property in California. The lawyers behind that company made no errors and kept it fully anonymous. As long as states like Delaware maintain corporate secrecy laws, journalistic investigations into corruption will continue to dead-end. Delaware officials recently defended the status quo to the Prospect, with one former judge saying “there’s a reason it’s called the Panama papers and not the Delaware papers.” But the main distinction between Panama and Delaware is that there hasn’t been a Delaware whistleblower, yet. IN JANUARY, CONGRESS PASSED the Corporate Transparency Act, which requires companies to file the names of their real owners with the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), with some major exceptions. There’s already evidence this approach isn’t enough. Providing law enforcement access to ownership records is a step in the right direction, but still inadequate. This ties the ability to effectively investigate corporate malfeasance to the priorities, resources, and legal handicaps of the Department of Justice. Federal investigators will probably be far more effective at catching terrorist financiers and drug smugglers, but anyone who doesn’t threaten national security, like the Barzanis, who are close American military allies, will likely be far less of a priority. Another major leak of files from FinCEN showed that agency did little to stop financial crimes despite receiving evidence of hundreds of thousands of suspicious transactions from banks. There’s no evidence things will be different in corporate transparency investigations. A public beneficial ownership registry is the only adequate reform, but even that approach has vulnerabilities. One often illegal service provided by companies in the secrecy industry is nominee ownership. This means that the company provides a fake owner, not just a lawyer or agent, to sign corporate paperwork. The real owner is protected by legal documents, like undated letters of resignation signed by the fake owner and a power of attorney that lets them dictate corporate decisions, all while remaining hidden from the public and law enforcement. Corporate secrecy is going to remain a problem as long as people like the Barzanis have money to hide. The only real solution for it, in America, is a leak of the Delaware papers by a whistleblower. Employees of law firms, like Cozen O’Connor, and corporate service companies, like Wolters Kluwer, should take the internal databases of their kleptocrat clients and the names of their secret businesses and make them public. Corporate whistleblower laws are an imperfect patchwork of protections, and any whistleblower brave enough to expose America’s criminal financial secrecy regime will face serious risks and potential retaliation for their act of civil disobedience. But we need those employees to stand up. They’re the only ones with the power to really bring down this system.

Channel disaster: Kurdish woman is first victim identified

Draw: A 24-year-old Kurdish woman from northern Iraq has become the first victim of this week's mass drowning in the Channel to be identified. Maryam Nuri Mohamed Amin was one of 27 people who died while attempting to cross to Britain on Wednesday. Her fiancé, who lives in the UK, told the BBC she was messaging him as the group's dinghy started deflating. She tried to reassure him that they would be rescued. But help came too late, and she and 17 men, six other women - one of whom was pregnant - and three children died after their inflatable boat sank into the sea off the northern French coast. There were only two survivors - an Iraqi and a Somali. The disaster marked the biggest loss of life by drowning in the Channel in many years. Her fiancé said Maryam, nicknamed Baran, had been on the boat with a female relative. He had not known beforehand about the attempted Channel crossing and said Maryam's arrival in the UK was supposed to be a surprise. They were messaging each other on Snapchat just before the dinghy began to lose air, he said. Maryam told him that the boat was deflating and that they were trying to get the water out of it. He said she had been trying to reassure him in her last message, and give him hope that the authorities were on their way to rescue them. What's being done to stop Channel crossings? Why do migrants leave France for the UK? The migrant debate can't escape European politics Reports from Calais say the two survivors of Wednesday's sinking have been discharged from hospital and are due to be questioned about how many people were on the boat. Maryam's uncle confirmed to the BBC that she was one of the people who drowned in the English Channel. He said the family heard the news from two people who were with her, and the family were waiting for her body to be flown back to Iraq. On Friday night her father, family and friends gathered at their home in northern Iraq to share their grief and remember her. Maryam's best friend Imann Hassan said that her friend was "very humble" and had "a very big heart". "When she left Kurdistan she was very happy, she couldn't believe that she was going to meet her husband," Ms Hassan told the BBC on Friday night. "At her engagement party she was telling me: 'I will buy a house and live nearby you ... we are going to live together.'" Ms Hassan said that she wanted to send a message to the world "that no one deserves to die likes this". "She tried to live a better life, she chose the UK, but she died."

Why Iraqi Kurds Are Fleeing Their Peaceful Homeland

draw: By Bobby Ghosh - Bloomberg The situation on the Belarus-Poland border is terrible. But that hasn’t stopped migrants from one of the more stable parts of the Mideast from trying their luck. For many Americans and Europeans, news that thousands of Iraqi Kurds are among the refugees stranded on the border between Belarus and Poland might have come as a surprise. After all, the Kurdish region of Iraq was supposed to be the one part of that blighted country that had, with substantial Western assistance, escaped the wider tragedy that has played out since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. That many Iraqi Kurds are now seeking instead to escape from the region shows the extent to which hopes for economic and political opportunity in the post-Saddam Hussein era have evaporated. Things had seemed headed in a different direction. In the years after the U.S. invasion, while the central and southern portions of Iraq descended into sectarian bloodletting, the northern provinces under the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government experienced an economic boom. Blessed with oil wealth, boasting a predictable political environment that was largely free of violence, the region drew investors from around the world. Hotels, malls and residential towers went up in double-quick time, earning Kurdish cities comparisons with Dubai. More democratic progress seemed in the offing. The contrast with the rest of the country came into even sharper relief in 2014, when the Islamic State stormed into Iraq. As Iraqi military units in the heart of the country crumpled under the onslaught, Kurdish forces, backed by American air power, repelled the terrorists from the gates of Erbil, the Kurdish regional capital. Stable and secure, the Kurds has remained insulated from the calamities that turned millions of their neighbors elsewhere in Iraq and across the border in war-ravaged Syria and sanctions-stifled Iran into refugees. Indeed, the Iraqi Kurdistan became host to those fleeing violence next door. On the surface, not a great deal has changed. Iraqi Kurdistan remains relatively peaceful, by the admittedly low standards of its neighborhood. The economic outlook from Erbil isn’t nearly as bleak as from Baghdad, much less from Damascus or Tehran. As refugees en route to Europe exchange stories about the horrors they have escaped, the Iraqi Kurds aren’t likely to get much sympathy from, say, their Afghan and Syrian peers. But if they aren’t fleeing a Taliban-like oppressor or a genocidal dictator like Bashar al-Assad, the Iraqi Kurds are frustrated by the failure of their leaders to redeem the promise of 2003. The economy, overdependent on oil exports, never recovered from the fall of crude prices in 2014. It is too soon to tell if the recent rebound will last long enough to change the outlook. Unemployment has forced many Kurds to leave cities and turn to agriculture. The democratic dividend, meanwhile, has been paltry. In the absence of political reform, a duopoly of clans dominates political life. The government in Erbil has grown more authoritarian, jailing dissenters and muzzling the media. Anti-government protests late last year didn’t make a dent in endemic corruption.

Tory minister Nadhim Zahawi has been able to keep his total second job earnings hidden

Draw Media: mirror EXCLUSIVE: Zahawi banked £1.3million from an oil company, which included a final £285,000 “settlement payment” after he first became a Government minister in 2018 Tory minister Nadhim Zahawi has been able to keep his total second job earnings hidden Tory minister Nadhim Zahawi banked £1.3million from an oil company while working as an MP, but he has been able to keep his total second job earnings hidden due to a Parliamentary loophole. Mr Zahawi’s total earnings from Gulf Keystone Petroleum included a final £285,000 “settlement payment” after he first became a Government minister in 2018. Mr Zahawi was co-chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Kurdistan in 2015 when he landed the job with Gulf Keystone, which has an oil field in Kurdistan and which paid him more than £1,000 an hour. His Gulf Keystone income was declared in his register of interests, but his total second job earnings are not known thanks to Parliamentary rules allowing him to advise companies through Zahawi & Zahawi Ltd, a consultancy he set up with his wife. Mr Zahawi did not respond to a request for comment. But Sir Alistair Graham, a former Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, said: “This could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to get around the rules so that he doesn’t have to admit the scale of his earnings in a consultant capacity. Mr Zahawi made a mint from the oil firm ( Image: PA) “The important thing to stress is that MPs have their personal responsibility to ensure that they comply not only with the letter but the spirit of the code of conduct. “Constituents have a right to know how much time and money he is taking separate to his political work.” Alex Runswick, of Transparency International UK, said: “Any new controls on MPs’ second jobs need to focus on potential conflicts of interests, not just the hours worked or additional earnings. “Any company owned by an MP risks becoming a shell behind which the extent of the work and these conflicts remain hidden.” Our probe comes after the outcries over Owen Paterson’s lobbying, and Sir Geoffrey Cox’s taxpayer-funded rental home and £1million-a-year legal work. Masoud Barzani was President of Kurdistan from 2005 to 2017 ( Image: AFP via Getty Images) The Mirror’s investigation has revealed how Mr Zahawi made a fortune in the murky world of business and politics in Kurdistan. Within months of becoming an MP in 2010, Mr Zahawi became the vice-chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Kurdistan, taking five free trips to the region from 2011 to 2015. The secretariat to the group was funded by Gulf Keystone, the operator of the Shaikan oil field in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Mr Zahawi was a guest speaker at a conference sponsored by Gulf Keystone and a second oil firm, Afren, in the Kurdistan capital Erbil in November 2011. The two firms soon had Zahawi & Zahawi Ltd on the payroll. Under Boris Johnson, Mr Zahawi served as Business Secretary and then Vaccines Minister, before his appointment as Education Secretary ( Image: POOL/AFP via Getty Images) Mr Zahawi’s father Hareth Zahawi’s firm Iraqi Project and Building Development was already involved in construction projects in Kurdistan. One source told the Mirror IPBD also had a monthly contract with Afren. The Mirror has found an archived page from the IPBD website which stated it had a joint venture with Sirwan Barzani, the nephew of Masoud Barzani, who was President of Kurdistan from 2005 to 2017. Sirwan Barzani has been accused in US court documents of corruption at his Iraqi telecoms company, but denies the “baseless” claims. Nadhim Zahawi’s register of interests shows Zahawi & Zahawi Ltd advised IPBD from 2011 to 2019. It is not known how much the role paid and there is no suggestion Mr Zahawi or his father knew of any corruption. Zahawi & Zahawi Ltd was an adviser to Afren from 2012 to 2015, according to the register of members’ interests, but it is not known how much the role paid. Mr Zahawi quit Afren after the Serious Fraud Office began a bribery investigation, which led to two Afren executives being jailed for fraud and money laundering. Mr Zahawi went on to receive almost £300,000 in “bonus payments” from Gulf Keystone ( There is no suggestion Mr Zahawi was invloved in wrongdoing. When he stopped advising Afren in 2015 he became Chief Strategy Officer at Gulf Keystone, initially earning £20,126 and later £29,643 for eight to 21 hours a month, which he declared. Just weeks after taking the appointment, the Kurdish oil ministry agreed to begin huge payments to Gulf Keystone as part of an existing oil deal. High Court papers reported by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project allege that Gulf Keystone secured the oil field, prior to Mr Zahawi’s involvement, through a corrupt deal with Kurdish politicians. The claims are denied. Mr Zahawi went on to receive almost £300,000 in “bonus payments” from Gulf Keystone before he left in December 2017. He was then paid an additional £105,000 for “salary in lieu of notice” along with a £285,000 “settlement payment”. This last payment was made in May 2018, four months after he was appointed a junior minister at the Department for Education by then-Prime Minister Theresa May.

The Partie’s Valley… From Nawzang Tents to the Headquarters in Sulaymaniyah

DRAW: Nearly four decades ago, Khoury Nawzang was called "The Partie's Valley” each Kurdish party had a tent in the valley. Today, Sulaymaniyah is going to be like the “The Parties Valley.” Instead, the tents, this time they are constructing new buildings as their offices. Among the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Change movement, and other desperate people from the political situation, there are attempts of establishing several new parties. While the last election, only 27% of the city voted for the party's candidates. There is more information in this report regarding the new wave of political movements. The Partie’s Valley At the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, when Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian political and religious leader, announced “Jihad” against Kurds, the borders between south and east of Kurdistan became a shelter for gathering the Kurdish opposition parties from east, south, and even north of Kurdistan. The area was called the parties valley while they all had set up tents near each other. This valley belongs to the south of Kurdistan, which PUK had authority in that area. Mam Jalal Talabani, late Iraq, and PUK president had invited all his friends from Iraqi opposition to this valley. The parties which had tents in that valley were: + The Iraqi Communist Party + Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party + Sheik Izzadin Party + Revolutionary Group Of Kurdistan (Komala) + Democratic party of Kurdistan-Iran + Chrikay Fedaei, +Ranjbaran + Alay Rzgary (north of Kurdistan), and with some other Iraqis opposition parties. Will Sulaymaniyah become the partie’s valley? After separating Nawshirwan Mustafa from the PUK and establishing the Change Movement in 2009, Sulaymaniyah is going to be like the partie’s valley. The number of political parties in the province is increasing continuously. Following the establishment of the Change Movement in 2009, Some other parties have established since then. +Tavgari Azadi, a political movement that belongs to PKK. + New Generation: established by a businessman Shaswar Abdul Wahid in 2018. + Coalition for Democracy and Justice: established by Barham Salih after he left the PUK. The same year he abandoned his new party and went back to the PUK + National Coalition, the remaining from Barham Salih's party, established in 2018 by Aram Qadir, former leader from an Islamic party, which is now called Justice Group. +The National Reform Movement: it was established in 2019 by a group of leaders who isolated from the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party. These days Sulaymaniyah has the pain of delivering several new political parties. Perhaps none of the existing parties have been able to satisfy the people. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the authority in this district, has been in a deep internal conflict for four months. Lately, the political bureau approved the co-president Bafel Talabani's decision to expel Lahur Sheik Janji, the other co-president, from the party. This decision has left no other choices for Sheik Jngi other than to create a new political movement outside of PUK. Why Sulaymaniyah? What has attracted these trends for building new political parties in Sulaymaniyah is the broad opposition voices in the area. That means the other exciting parties were not able to bring people together under one umbrella. In the last Iraqi election, the voter turnout was 42% percent in Sulaymaniyah. Approximately 600 thousand people voted out of 1 million 425 thousand registered voters. From this number, only 390 thousand voters voted for the party's candidates, which means only 27% of voters voted for the parties.

Kurdistan Parliamentary Election, From One Electoral Circle to Multi-Circles

Neaz Mustafa, Draw Media Kurdistan Parliament discussing the upcoming election procedures, the Parliamentary Factions have to inform the Presidency of the Kurdistan Parliament about their opinion regarding the election system, by the 18th of this month. It has been for two years; the legal period came to an end. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is asking to replace the commission. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Change Movement, Kurdistan Islamic Union, and Justice Group are against the change. The voter's record has not been renewed. There are calls for changing the election mechanism from one electoral circle to multi-circles and, amending the election law. Get more information from this report by Draw Media. Parliament asking for the Parties Opinion The 2022 Kurdistan Parliament elections, 6th term, will be held on Friday, September 30, 2022. Last week, the presidency of the Kurdistan parliament held a meeting with the parliamentary fractions to discuss the election procedures because they have to reach the final decision regarding the election at least six months ahead of the process. According to the information that Draw has received, the Presidency of the Kurdistan Parliament asked the fraction presidents to submit their opinions regarding the election law, no later than November 18, 2021. The parties’ suggestions for the election Based on the Draw Media investigations, the parties have not made their final decisions, but they have presented some initial viewpoints. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) KDP is with conducting the election on time in considering the PUK local situation and the sharp downturn of the Change Movement in the last election. KDP is looking forward to securing approximately 50 seats in the next parliament election. Also, they are trying to reestablish the High Elections and Referendum Commission based on the current seat numbers in parliament. If this request would be executed, the KDP would control the vast majority of the commission in their favor. Based on that suggestion, KDP would secure 4 out of 9 seats of the High Elections and Referendum Commission, and they could make all the decisive decisions for their benefit. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Due to its internal conflicts, PUK would like to delay the election, but they have not announced this officially. Initially, they ought to change the election system from one electoral circle to multi circles, which means each province would have an independent electoral circle. Regarding the Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission, PUK is against the KDP suggestion for renewing the commission based on the current seat number in parliament. Currently, two out of nine commission members belong to PUK. Change Movement The movement already submitted their viewpoint to the parliament presidency and asked for a closed list and multi-circle election. About The Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission fate, Change Movement is agreed with PUK which they demand to keep the commission structure without making any changes. In the case of restructuring commission, as PUK asked for, the Change movement would lose one of its seats. Currently, the change movement has two seats in the commission. Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) KIU is demanding a semi-open election with multi electoral circles. KIU also demanded to renew the voter's record. Regarding The Commission destiny, KIU has the same opinion as the Change Movement and PUK, which they request to keep the commission structure as its current one. KIU has one commission seat out of nine members. New Generation Movement This movement has announced its perspective for the general public regarding the election, asking for "conducting the election on its legal time, September 30, 2022. Since they do not have any representatives in the commission, New Generation Movement demands an independent electoral commission away from the political fractions and work under the supervision of the United Nations. Kurdistan Justice Group Justice Group votes and seats have declined in the last Iraqi parliamentary election. Regarding the justice group attitude for the sixth term of the Kurdistan parliament election, Omar Gulpy a member of the Justice group parliament fraction told Draw Media, “Justice group demanding the election to be on time. Also, they want to amend the election law and change the electoral circles from one circle to multi circles. He added that "the amendment should let the ethnic and religious components reach parliament with their votes, not with the other party votes that they have authority in the region. The Justice group also does not support the ideas for changing the commission, but they want a clean voter's record out of the dead and fraud names. The group only has one seat in the high electoral commission. About The Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission The Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission in Kurdistan is one of the commissions that belong to the Kurdistan parliament, which was made by law NO. 4 which was passed on July 23, 2014, by parliament. The commission has started up 7 years ago. During this period, the commission has conducted only two missions: First: managing the Kurdistan Region independence referendum on September 25, 2017. Since it was a national referendum, there was not a lot of conflict or disagreement about the results. Second: Managing the Kurdistan parliament process on September 30, 2018. That was the first practical experience of conducting an election for the commission. The results brought a lot of disagreements. Particularly PUK, change Movement, KIU mentioned that the election was not clean and there was a big fraud going on in the election.

Sulaymaniyah Revenue Before and AFter, July 8

Draw: Compared to prior July 8 incidents, tensions between the Talabani brothers and Sheikh Jangi erupted into public view, the border crossing revenue in Sulaymaniyah reduced by 19%, and tax revenue reduced by 13%. It has been for a few days, reducing the border crossing revenue in Sulaymaniyah became a political matter once again. Kurdistan Region finance minister Awat Sheikh Janab says, "We have cash flow shortage in Sulaymaniyah Province. In Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, Garmyan, and Raparing administration, Tax revenue is not collected as needed, which is the consequence of running payroll late.” Before July 8, and rising tensions between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leaders (the ruling party in Sulaymaniyah), PDK leaders in Erbil had reiterated that PUK does not return the Sulaymaniyah revenue to the government treasury. That time their fight was with Lahur Sheikh Jangi, the Co-President of the PUK. They would say he is the one who is preventing the tax collection by the government. But now, things have been changed, Lahur Sheikh Jangi does not have power anymore among his party. The crossing border in the province is controlled by Qubad Talabani and Bafel Talabani, the sons of the late former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. Revenue, Before and after July 8 According to the General Directorate of Taxes and Real Estate, tax and Government incomes revenue without custom revenue was 657.14 billion IQD in 10 months of this year, which was collected as mentioned below: Erbil: 343.9 billion IQD, which is 52% of all taxes and real estate revenue. Sulaymaniyah: 164.9 billion IQD, which is 25% of all taxes and real estate revenue. Duhok: 148.16 billion IQD, that is 23% of all taxes and real estate revenue. In July, tensions between the Talabani brothers and Sheikh Jangi erupted. Co-President Lahur Sheikh Jangi stepped down from his position. The average government income in that month was 68.1 billion IQD and Sulaymaniyah's revenue was 18.2 billion IQD, which was 27% of all the government revenue in July. However, in October, three months after July 8 incidents, the overall tax revenue in the Kurdistan region was 63.84 billion IQD, only13.35 billion IQD of that was from Sulaymaniyah, which is 21% of all KRG tax revenue. That indicates, compared to before July 8 Sulaymaniyah's revenue reduced by 6%. Tax revenue list in Sulaymaniyah before and after July 8 June: 16.47 billion IQD July: 18.2 billion IQD August: 14.79 billion IQD September: 17.76 billion IQD October: 13.35 billion IQD Custom revenue in Sulaymaniyah before and after July 8 According to Draw Media investigations, Custom revenue of the border crossing points within the PUK authority areas has declined since July 8. Bashmax Border Crossing Revenue January: 22.8 billion IQD March: 22.47 billion IQD September: 17.1 billion IQD October: 18.7 billion IQD Compared to January, Bashmax Border Crossing Revenue declined by 19% in October. Parwez Xan Border Crossing Revenue January: 22.79 billion IQD March: 21.6 billion IQD September: 16 billion IQD October: 14 billion IQD Compared to January, Parwez Xan Border Crossing Revenue declined by 39% in October. Because of the Truck driver strikes, the commercial movement has been stopped at the Parwez Xan border crossing. .