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The U.S.-Kurd alliance in Syria has a tangled history

Cora Engelbrecht The fighting around Sinaa prison in Hasaka, a city in northeastern Syria, has cast a spotlight on the predominantly Kurdish region, and also renewed questions of America’s role there. The Syrian conflict dates to 2011, when a popular rebellion began against the government of President Bashar al-Assad, the country’s longtime dictator. The revolt started with peaceful demonstrations but quickly descended into a bloody conflict between rebels and government forces. The Kurds, comprising about 10 percent of Syria’s population and concentrated in the northeast, largely stayed out of the fight. But that changed in 2014, when jihadists of the Islamic State swept across eastern Syria and northern Iraq, creating a so-called caliphate the size of Britain. The rise of ISIS brought the United States directly into the conflict, with President Barack Obama assembling an international coalition to fight the group, and ordering airstrikes and dispatching the U.S. military to support local forces on the ground. The coalition turned to a Kurdish militia that was already fighting the jihadists in Syria and formed a partnership that grew into the Syrian Democratic Forces, or S.D.F., and included fighters from other ethnic groups as well. In March 2019, the S.D.F., backed by the United States, recaptured the last piece of ISIS-held territory. “We have won against ISIS,” President Donald J. Trump declared, adding “now it’s time for our troops to come back home.” But the victory left a lot of unfinished business that set the stage for the events of the past week. The S.D.F. fighters seized the opportunity to establish a wide measure of autonomy for themselves over northeastern Syria. They called their enclave Rojava and rapidly set up their own administration. Diplomatically, the Kurdish-led administration has had only limited success, failing to win recognition from any country, including the United States. And the Kurdish-led push for political autonomy in Syria raised fears in Turkey, which sees the S.D.F. as deeply connected to the PKK, a Kurdish militant group considered a terrorist organization by Turkey and the United States that has fought a long, bloody insurgency against the Turkish state. But Turkey declined to intervene, largely because of the thousands of American troops then working with the S.D.F., until October 2019, when President Trump abruptly ordered the withdrawal of most U.S. forces. That was seen as a green light for Turkey to invade, and it did, seizing control of a slice of northeastern Syria, which it still occupies. More recently, the U.S. kept about 700 troops in northeastern Syria to help the S.D.F. battle the remnants of ISIS. But the withdrawal also provided the space that allowed the Islamic State to regroup, which helps explain why U.S. forces found themselves back in the fight in Syria this week. Cora Engelbrecht is a reporter and story editor on the International desk, based in London. She joined the Times in 2016.  @CoraEngelbrecht

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Jordanian intrigue points to outside meddling

DAVID GARDNER  Jordan is, relative to the turmoil of its region, a haven of stability, though the royal court of its Hashemite dynasty has at times been a jostle of intrigue. This is one of those times. The late King Hussein, in his time the west’s gold standard of gracious Arab despotism, survived plots, coups, uprisings, three Arab-Israeli wars, two Gulf wars, a civil war with the Palestinians and around a dozen assassination attempts in his 46-year rule. His son King Abdullah, on the throne since 1999, on Saturday placed Prince Hamzah, oldest son of Hussein’s fourth wife, the American-born Queen Noor, under house arrest. Amman says it has uncovered a plot threatening the “security and stability” of the country. Up to 18 people have been arrested, including palace aides of Hamzah, who in 2004 was stripped of the position of crown prince when Abdullah made his first son, Hussein, heir apparent. The two main detainees are Bassem Awadallah, once chief of King Abdullah’s court and a former finance minister, and Sharif Hassan bin Zaid, a minor royal. Awadallah was the king’s envoy to the Saudi court, where he became an adviser to Mohammed bin Salman, crown prince and de facto ruler. Bin Zaid was formerly Jordan’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Ayman Safadi, Jordan’s foreign minister, said on Sunday the authorities had long been monitoring the plot and intercepted “communications with foreign parties over the right timing to destabilise Jordan”. Some Jordanian officials are dismissing Hamzah’s role, saying plotters used his “illusions and aspirations” to further their own interests. This is not, on the face of it, a coup nipped in the bud. It was the army chief of staff who told Hamzah to cease his activity. The military and the Mukhabarat, the powerful intelligence service, are the bedrock of Hashemite rule, rooted in the East Bank or native Jordanian tribes, as opposed to the Palestinian majority driven across the Jordan river from the West Bank in the 1948 and 1967 Arab wars with Israel. Recommended Jordan Jordan’s former crown prince pledges loyalty to king, royal court says But Prince Hamzah is more than an illusionary figure. “He’s been swimming in murky waters for years,” says one confidant of the king. Tutored for kingship from birth, he looks, speaks and dresses like his late father, and cultivates conservative tribal leaders, disaffected with Jordan’s struggling economy and joblessness, its corruption and patronage, and its increasingly unbenign despotism — everything Prince Hamzah denounced in defiant videos after being told to desist. “I am not the person responsible for the breakdown in governance, the corruption and for the incompetence that has been prevalent in our governing structure for the last 15 to 20 years and has been getting worse,” Hamzah said. Outsiders tend to focus on Jordan’s Palestinian demography as a security challenge but the Jordanian elite is wary of unrest in the East Bank tribes, the regime’s natural constituency. Indeed, it was then Prince Abdullah, commander of elite special forces, who put down bread riots across the loyalist south in 1996. That, and a court jostle between factions that included Hamzah, won Abdullah the throne. “This is a family matter and they are dealing with it in a family way,” said foreign minister Safadi at the weekend. Prince Hamzah’s videos suggest otherwise but on Monday night he signed a public pledge of allegiance to the king. King Abdullah is supported by the west and, ostensibly, by his western-allied neighbours. But there are visible strains with Israel and Saudi Arabia, which intersect over Jerusalem. There is suspicion in Jordan that the House of Saud wants to take oversight of the city’s Islamic sites from the Hashemites — from whom crown prince Mohammed’s grandfather took the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1925 — as the price of Saudi detente with Israel. There is more intrigue to come.   FINANCIAL TIMES

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Professor Chomsky and the Kurds

  Kani Xulam   Famed American Professor Noam Chomsky missed a chance to put his incisive talents to better use when he addressed students at Zaningeha Rojava, a Kurdish university in Qamislo, northeastern Syria or western Kurdistan. The brilliant trailblazer in the field of linguistics—who has been ridiculed by Turkish President Recep T. Erdogan as “an ignoramus” and “lover of terrorists”—spoke to students of the Institute of Social Sciences on January 15, which was broadcast live on social media platforms.  I watched it on YouTube and was hoping that the critic of American imperialism would light some fireworks to the delight of anti-imperialist Kurds and their friends, but most of his lecture was largely “sound and fury,” in Shakespeare’s memorable words, and, alas, “signified nothing.” Still, it is worth watching—if for nothing else than to see that he doesn’t really know the Kurds, or their aspirations, very well. To be sure, Professor Chomsky praised the accomplishments of the Rojava Revolution in the fields of freedom and justice as an inspiration for the world. Given the spiteful darkness that Islamic State insidiously spread in the region, our splendid Kurds do magnificently gleam like bright stars in the aftermath! But you’ll be disappointed if you thought he was going to expand on the virtues of those stars and our collective responsibility, as the rest of the world, to aid them. He didn’t. Instead, he spent the rest of his address on the challenges facing our “sad world.” It’s indeed a sad world for Kurds, since we top the list of “terrorists” on our own land, in Turkish-misruled Kurdistan. On issues of social justice, Turkey is “deeply retarded,” Chomsky said, but being a critic of American foreign policy, he quickly equated Ataturk’s Turkey with Jefferson’s republic. I have never questioned Professor Chomsky’s encyclopedic knowledge of the United States—I have actually often envied it—but does he know his Turks or even our hapless Kurds? We are, as our bigoted neighbors are quick to remind us, still not officially a part this “sad world.” Was Professor Chomsky telling us, perhaps, the journey to self-determination, or self-rule if you will, is not really worth it? If the world is so sad and scary, why did we shed the blood of 11,000 of our daughters and sons, like water, to extirpate the Islamic State, with help from the United States, for the good of the region and the world? What should we tell the 300 or so foreign fighters or their parents who joined our ranks against the merciless cutthroats? Our planet is turning into a hothouse earth, Professor Chomsky continued. He had come prepared, quoting scientists of Oxford University. He declared fossil fuels the culprit and said the Middle East is at risk of becoming unlivable, so perhaps the good old Mediterranean that once cooled the likes of Caesar and Cleopatra will now have Jacuzzi-like temperatures year-around. There is some oil under our soil, but it has, unfortunately, been the source of enmity between us and our neighbors. People may think Saddam Hussein gassed Halapja and declared our women “halal” with the blessings of “his” holy book, Quran, but I say, if we had no oil in southern Kurdistan, some of our Halabjans might have still been alive today and thought of the chemicals as the toys of chemists in the labs. Yes, it is true, we don’t like fossil fuels—and not because of their continued use will hasten the end of life on earth, but because our adversaries have used them to send our loved ones on a one-way ticket to hell. The good professor also touched on nuclear weapons. They have taken the world hostage. Humanity is on the verge of extinction. Even Henry Kissinger, the enabler of Saddam Hussein, doesn’t want the world vaporized. Iran may have unkosher leaders, but it is resisting domination and deserves our … well, I really shouldn’t paraphrase anymore. You should just go watch the lecture yourself. Iran and Henry Kissinger are noxious words for Kurds who cherish freedom and are struggling for a place of their own under the sun. The first is an imperialist power dominating eight to ten million Kurds with the aid of public hangings. Its leaders rejoice in shedding Kurdish blood. Those who are imposing targeted sanctions on them—not ordinary Persians—deserve, I say, not our censure but gratitude. As to Henry Kissinger, mushrooms need darkness and manure to grow. The most charitable Kurds want him to stay in the dark and grow mushrooms for the rest of his stinking life. The question that brought a wry smile to my face came from a YouTube viewer. The anonymous person equated the Rojava Revolution with that of the Clerics in Iran and wanted to know how they could be preserved. Perhaps the person was carried away by Professor Chomsky’s matchless rhetoric on the “anti-imperialism” of Iran. I just hope he or she was not a fellow Kurd. The late playwright Harold Pinter acknowledges the influence of Professor Chomsky on his collected works. One of his plays is called “Mountain Language.” It was inspired by the author’s visit to Turkey in 1985 with American playwright Arthur Miller. The Kurdish language was still illegal then. In the play, a grandmother is unable to talk to her loved one in a prison, because her language is a “forbidden tongue.” By the time the play ends, the restrictions on her “Mountain Language” have been lifted and she is told to indulge in it. She refuses to do so. She will not be a “Kurdish” mouse to please the “Turkish” cat. I was hoping for déjà vu from the teacher of Mr. Pinter, Mr. Chomsky. Like let go of hatred that your leaders are instilling in you against your fellow Kurds who don’t subscribe to totalitarian views. Appeal not to the enmity, but humanity of your foes as Gandhi did in India and succeeded. Engage in fierce nonviolent resistance, which has a higher success rate than violence. Confound the misguided souls of the Middle East who can’t stand you with the unexpected, with love. Read, for example, Tolstoy’s Resurrection for inspiration. Change the face of the Middle East that has become the epicenter of intolerance and violence with a moral revolution—by practicing it first—worthy of Prince Nekhludoff, the protagonist of the inimitable Russian novel. One more thing. Kurds are thirsty for freedom. Perhaps the good folks at Zaningeha Rojava would consider having Jose Ramos Horta as their next guest lecturer. He helped free East Timor after all. He could have some telling lessons for us Kurds. But If I were selecting the person that should address our future leaders, Yuval Noah Harari, the distinguished Israeli public intellectual and history professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, would have been my choice. Invest in his book, Sapiens, by way of doing your homework.   Kani Xulam (@AKINinfo) is a Kurdish activist who loves experimenting with nonviolence to expand the boundaries of freedom in the Middle East.

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British lawmaker remembers ‘strength’ of Kurdish resistance to Saddam Hussein

James Cleverly March is a month of joy and sorrow for the Kurds. I celebrated with you from the UK as Kurds around the world ushered in the New Year two weeks ago – nawroz piroz! And I took a moment on 16 March to commemorate the 33rd anniversary of the dreadful atrocities committed in Halabja. I also know that March is the month the Kurdistan Region of Iraq first gained autonomy in 1970. But this year I remember 1991 in particular. I have always been moved by the strength of resistance the Kurds showed against Saddam Hussein and the Baath forces, but there is no doubt of the cost endured in this fight. The number of Kurds who died, were incarcerated or were forced to flee their homes rather than face indiscriminate violence, should never be forgotten. Brits and many others around the world watched with horror at what Saddam’s forces were doing in the Kurdistan Region. And the then British Prime Minister, Sir John Major, decided that this could not be allowed to continue. On the day of Kurdish New Year in 1991, the UK knew it had to lead the international community to deliver a unified response to the violence. By convincing European partners to come on board, Major was able to leverage NATO and convince the George Bush Snr Administration in the US that a coalition could be formed. These efforts, with further interventions from France, Iran and Turkey, ultimately led to the UN Security Council passing Resolution 688 – 30 years ago today. It was this UN Security Council Resolution that led to the start of Operation HAVEN/Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Friendship is at its most important in times of great struggle and need. The UK, US, France and seven other members chose to honour their friendship with the Kurds when it was needed most. On 6th April Op HAVEN commenced, as UK, US and French aircraft started to enforce a no-fly zone above Northern Iraq. Under an American lead, the UK deployed a ground force to support the Peshmerga and facilitate humanitarian assistance, made up mostly of Royal Marines from 3 Commando Brigade. In just under three months, these ground forces worked to clear the threat and provide space – and safe haven – for Kurds to return to their homes and start to rebuild their communities.  I know that the impact of these operations is still felt today in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In almost 20 years since the fall of Saddam you have built a prosperous and modern region. I saw this first-hand when I visited last December. I was struck, when speaking to the Kurds I met, by just how optimistic and hopeful you are as a community, in the face of ongoing challenges.  This hope and resilience will be a great asset as we build back better from COVID and as a new settlement is agreed between Erbil and Baghdad. We will be with you in both endeavours. When I met PM Masrour Barzani for the first time during my visit in December, I stressed how valued the KRI was to the UK and reiterated our offers of support on defence and security issues. The UK, as in 1991, remains an important friend to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The British Consulate in Erbil is larger than many British embassies around the world and our team works across all elements of Kurdish society and life. Our commitment and support to the Peshmerga, in particular, continues. There are currently Peshmerga officers being trained at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the UK’s world-leading officer academy. We also have a permanent team in Erbil providing technical advice to the KRG on modernising and reforming the Peshmerga, so that it can continue to keep the region safe, in the face of many adversaries and challenges. We can never forget that the Peshmerga were our collective front line, holding out against Daesh attacks, and finally helping to expel them from all territory in Iraq. Today, they remain a critical partner in containing the Daesh threat – and ensuring that the terrorists cannot resurge. As we set out in our recent comprehensive foreign policy review, we are taking an even more robust approach to security and deterrence, which will protect all of us, increasing our investment in defence to 2.2% of GDP. This support will continue, and I am incredibly grateful to have been able to see first-hand just how close the UK and KRI are. As the Minister in the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office responsible for the Middle East, I will ensure we do not lose sight of our very close and mutually-beneficial connection. The UK is currently indebted to a Kurd – as our COVID-19 vaccine minister and my good friend, Nadhim Zahawi, continues to deliver a world-beating vaccine rollout. Today is an important moment to reflect on how the UK and our allies united to provide the Kurds with the safe haven they deserved. But whilst it is important to reflect, I am also focused on the bright future of cooperation that exists ahead of us. The Rt Hon James Cleverly MP is the United Kingdom’s Minister of State for Middle East and North Africa at Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).

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One Less Hurdle Before Iraqi Elections

Bilal Wahab - washingtoninstitute A complicated parliamentary compromise has reactivated some of the machinery required for this year’s proposed ballot and a potential resolution to the KRG energy dispute, though the country’s hobbled legal institutions are still holding back reform. On March 19, the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) amended Law No. 30 of 2005 establishing the Federal Supreme Court (FSC), the country’s highest constitutional court. Although the decision stems from a thorny political compromise and fails to resolve Iraq’s deeper legal pathologies, it will nonetheless help overcome a serious barrier to holding early elections in October. The FSC has been paralyzed since 2019 by a self-inflicted constitutional crisis, but it can now fulfill its mandated duty of ratifying election results. It might also be able to dust off a case regarding national oil and natural gas management rights—a subject of bitter dispute between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Yet if Iraq keeps kicking the can down the road on constitutionally mandated reforms, the situation could lead to even worse political and legal complications. A Broken Third Pillar Since Iraq’s current constitution was adopted in 2005, the judicial branch has undergone a number of haphazard transitions and rapid changes whose net effect has been to blunt the rule of law. Among these negative consequences is a political process periodically marred by constitutional violations. Article 92 (2) of the constitution mandated the creation of a federal supreme court and tasked the legislature with achieving this end. Yet despite bearing that name, the current FSC was not established by the COR as required by the constitution—it was created by the interim government that oversaw Iraq’s transition before the constitution was ratified. This supposedly interim FSC ought to have been replaced very soon after the constitution was in place, but fifteen years later, the COR has yet to pass the necessary legislation—a failure that remains among Iraq’s foundational postwar sins. In addition to a long track record of highly questionable rulings (see below), the FSC was completely disabled in 2019 after one of its members retired. The court had previously struck down articles in Law No. 30 that allowed for naming judges to the FSC, so no replacement judge could be appointed. Unable to achieve the quorum needed for rulings, the court has essentially been deactivated ever since. Earlier this month, the COR finally embarked on the long-delayed effort to pass the constitutionally mandated legislation and create a new FSC. Yet the bill faced two tall obstacles. First, in today’s fractured politics it is nearly impossible to garner the two-thirds majority vote needed to pass such a law given its constitutional nature. Second, heated disagreements erupted over interpreting ambiguous constitutional language about the role of clergy at the FSC. After prolonged wrangling, the COR reverted to an easier but legally problematic option: continuing to postpone the creation of a new, constitutionally compliant FSC and instead amending Law No. 30 in ways that reactivate the existing FSC, since this required only a simple majority. Specifically, the amendment stipulates that all current FSC judges be removed and new ones be appointed. The court’s jurisdiction has been expanded as well. Ironically, the amendment is selectively copy-pasted from the constitution—the powers and jurisdictions contemplated for a constitutionally compliant FSC are repeated word for word, but the articles that set out the process and requirements for establishing such a court are entirely ignored. Another problem is that the amendment’s process for nominating judges is vague and unaccountable. It empowers only some judicial bodies to make a list of nominated judges and send it to the president for ratification and swearing-in, or to the COR should the president refuse. The amendment also tries to inject ethnosectarian “balance” into the FSC’s makeup, and establishes a new but ill-defined position of secretary-general for the court. Regardless of how these changes pan out, the FSC has already lost a great deal of credibility over the years by passing politically motivated and undemocratic judgments on various issues. For example, it reduced the COR’s powers and subverted independent commissions to the executive branch. It hastily issued a decision on the unconstitutionality of the Kurdistan independence referendum, yet remained silent when the Iraqi government missed the 2007 deadline for implementing Article 140 of the constitution, which covers disputed territories. Perhaps most damaging of all in reputational terms, the court has interpreted constitutional articles in ways that favored the ruling party at the time—a power it was never granted under Law No. 30. In 2010, for example, it interpreted the meaning of “winning bloc” from Article 76 (1) in a manner that favored Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, despite clear evidence that a different interpretation was intended during the constitutional drafting process. Elections, Energy Disputes Once the new FSC justices are in place, the most immediate and important issues requiring their attention will be the coming elections and the petroleum management disputes between the KRG and the federal government. The public has demanded early elections, and the government has committed to hold them this October. If the COR elected in that vote is to be legally valid, the FSC must ratify the results. Alternatively, the court could throw a wrench into the election gears by ruling that parts of the new electoral law are unconstitutional. Other political issues that the FSC might immediately look into are the 2021 budget law and the COR’s legally disputed January 2020 vote on expelling all foreign troops. Regarding energy disputes, Baghdad filed an FSC case against the KRG in 2012 over the region’s independent oil exports. The case stalled for technical and political reasons, but in 2014, the government filed a separate case against Turkey at the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration, accusing it of allowing KRG oil exports via the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline without Baghdad’s green light. The fate of the two cases may be related—Iraqi-Turkish tensions over the pipeline would decrease if the FSC issues an export ruling that the KRG and Baghdad both respect, though this is unlikely. Ankara wants Baghdad to drop the arbitral case and focus on putting Iraq’s legal house in order regarding petroleum management. The government attempted to do so in the past with the Iraqi National Oil Company Law, but the FSC ruled it unconstitutional. Policy Recommendations Although Iraq can take some pride in its constitution and competitive politics, a legal and political culture of constitutionalism and rule of law has yet to take root. The potential pitfalls in the COR’s amendment of Law No. 30 signal that the political system still faces serious challenges to its functionality and legitimacy. As it has done in the past, the reactivated FSC might overstep its role and set precedents that affect the country for years to come. Militias and corrupt politicians have been chipping away at Iraq’s sovereignty by flaunting rule of law in many sectors, and the judicial branch is no exception. The United States should watch this space. In general terms, Washington’s goal should be for Iraq and its judiciary to respect their own constitution. And as crucial elections near, the Biden administration (via the Justice Department’s office inside the Baghdad embassy) should work with international partners on engaging with the FSC. This includes offering technical and legal assistance as well as inviting the new judges to Washington in the near future (albeit after the coronavirus pandemic). U.S. officials should also stand ready to call out any bogus election results and the governments they produce. If the FSC rubber-stamps electoral procedures or results that are neither free nor credible, it risks being perceived as an extension of the political class and its patronage system. Alternatively, fostering trust in the electoral system and the high court could help boost voter turnout come October. Finally, a legitimate and respected FSC is crucial to Washington’s call for resolving federal-KRG disputes on energy and other matters according to rule of law rather than political facts on the ground. Safwan Al-Amin is an international attorney studying at Yale Law School. Bilal Wahab is the Wagner Fellow at The Washington Institute.

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