Iraq and Turkiye's relationship spans a spectrum of challenges and collaborations, from addressing security concerns related to the PKK to fostering robust trade ties and navigating complexities in the oil and water sectors.

This report sets the stage for a closer examination of the multifaceted dynamics shaping their bilateral interactions.

Turkiye's Military Operations And Iraq's Evolving Response

The Turkish Armed Forces have been conducting cross-border military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) since the 1980s.

The PKK maintains bases in the mountainous areas of northern Iraq near the Turkish border. This proximity allows them to launch attacks into Turkiye.

In contrast, the Turkish army has established several military bases at strategic points in the Matin mountain range in Iraqi Kurdistan, citing the expulsion of Kurdistan Workers' Party militants as justification.

In July 2015, a two-and-a-half year-long ceasefire broke down, and the conflict between Ankara and militants of the PKK – recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkiye, the U.S., and the European Union – entered one of its deadliest chapters in nearly four decades.

Since that date, the conflict has progressed through several phases. Between roughly 2015 and 2017, the violence devastated communities in some urban centers of Turkiye's majority Kurdish southeast and – at times – struck into the heart of the country's largest metropolitan centers. From 2017 onward, the fighting moved into rural areas of Turkiye's southeast.

As the Turkish military pushed more militants out of Turkiye, by 2019, the conflict's concentration shifted to northern Iraq and northern Syria.

In 2020, the first mission triggered a series of subsequent operations with similar names and methods of execution, each justified differently.

Between June and September 2020, Ankara launched Operation Claw Eagle and Claw Tiger, characterized by airstrikes carried out by aircraft and drones targeting PKK positions in Mount Sinjar. Additionally, ground operations were conducted in Haftanin (Zakho District of Duhok) against Kurdish guerrilla forces.

In April 2021, the Turkish army launched Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt operations along the Iraq-Turkiye border near Metina, Zap, and Avashin-Basyan.

In April 2022, Ankara commenced Operation Claw-Lock in northern Iraq, establishing several bases in Duhok Governorate.

Iraq views Turkish airstrikes and bases as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. These operations commonly cause civilian casualties and damage infrastructure alongside the killing of PKK members.

The Iraqi government also worries that Turkish military presence in northern Iraq could destabilize the Region and empower Kurdish separatists within Iraq.

The PKK conflict, spanning about four decades, has been a persistent challenge, with Turkiye expressing disappointment in the Iraqi government's historical "reluctance" to acknowledge and ban the PKK as a terrorist organization.

However, recent developments have signaled a shift in Iraq's stance.

Last March, Turkiye proposed the establishment of a "joint operation center" with Iraq to combat the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a move that has received a positive response from Baghdad.

Previously, a high-level Turkish delegation, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and National Intelligence Organization (MIT) head Ibrahim Kalin, visited Baghdad for a top security meeting with Iraqi counterparts. This meeting marked the second round of discussions, with the first round held in Ankara in December.

During a press conference in Ankara, Brigadier General Zeki Akturk, the Turkish defense ministry's media, and public relations advisor stated that Iraq and Turkiye are ready to sign a strategic framework document. This document aims to establish a joint operations center as part of Ankara's efforts to combat terrorism.

"Both countries are positively inclined towards our proposals for the Joint Operations Center and other cooperation efforts in combating terrorism," said Akturk. He also noted that Iraq recognizes the PKK as a threat.

According to a Turkish defense ministry official, the proposal aims to enhance cooperation in addressing the PKK's activities along the Iraq-Turkiye border.

Following the high-level talks, Iraq announced the designation of the PKK as a "banned organization."

Moreover, the Kurdistan Region is always confirmed to turn the Region into a source of conflict with neighboring countries.

In a TV interview last February, the President of Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani, was asked if Turkiye coordinates with Erbil when launching strikes against PKK in the Region; Barzani explained, "The (Kurdistan) Workers' Party is a severe headache for the Kurdistan Region and Iraq as well. They do not value the legitimacy of the Kurdistan Region's institutions and threaten Turkiye from our territories. While we completely reject the principle of turning the lands of the Kurdistan Region into a source of threat to our neighbors, whether this neighbor is Turkiye or Iran."

He rejected that PKK, as opponents of Tehran and Ankara, "make the Kurdistan Region a safe area to create problems for these countries. It is regrettable that the PKK plays a very negative role in this context and uses the mountainous areas of the Kurdistan Region and tries to create problems for Turkiye. This is absolutely unacceptable from our side."

Iraq-Turkiye's Growing Economic Partnership

Iraq and Turkiye have a long history of trade relations; Turkiye's most important exports to Iraq include chemicals and products, the oilseed sector and its derivatives, grains and legumes, furniture, paper and forest products, the construction sector, and medicines.

On the other hand, Iraq's most important exports to Turkiye are mainly oil.

On Saturday, the Turkish Ministry of Trade revealed that Turkish exports to Iraq would soon increase to $15 billion and $20 billion by 2030.

Turkish Minister of Trade Omer Polat told Anadolu Agency that "Iraq has always been one of the most important countries for Turkiye in terms of trade and economic relations," noting that "Iraq's share of Turkish exports over the past ten years exceeded 5% of the country's total exports."

Polat clarified that "Turkish exports to Iraq encompassed most sectors, with the trade volume between the two countries reaching $24.2 billion in 2022 and $19.9 billion last year."

"Our exports to Iraq decreased by 7.2% compared to the previous year, reaching $12.8 billion, while our imports from Iraq decreased by 31.1% to approximately $7.2 billion during the same period. Our foreign trade surplus was $5.6 billion last year."

Polat emphasized that "exports increased by 24.5% during the first three months of 2024 compared to the same period last year, reaching $3.4 billion, while imports decreased by 46.2% to $835 million."

The Turkish Minister of Trade concluded by indicating that "Turkish exports to Iraq are poised to reach $15 billion soon and $20 billion by 2030, with the completion of the Development Road project."

Oil Diplomacy: Tensions And Renewed Efforts In Iraq-Turkiye Energy Relations

The energy dynamics between Iraq and Turkiye have played a pivotal role in their diplomatic ties, given Turkiye's energy consumption and reliance on imports, primarily from hydrocarbons, due to limited domestic resources.

Iraq, particularly the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), has emerged as a crucial partner for Turkiye, particularly in oil and gas reserves.

Over the years, Turkiye has become a key strategic ally for the KRI, facilitating the export of approximately 500 thousand barrels per day (mb/d) of oil through the Ceyhan port. However, tensions escalated in March 2022 when Turkiye halted oil exports amounting to 450,000 bpd from Kurdistan following a compensation order by the International Chamber of Commerce related to "unauthorized" oil exports by the KRG between 2014 and 2018.

The crux of the dispute revolves around accusations that Turkiye breached a 50-year-old pipeline transit agreement by allowing oil exports from KRG-controlled areas without Iraq's consent.

Baghdad contends that Ankara and the Turkish state energy company BOTAS violated the terms of a 1973 Iraq-Turkiye pipeline agreement by handling oil from Kurdistan without official approval.

Iraq asserts that only the state-owned marketer SOMO has the authority to manage crude exports via Ceyhan.

While most of Iraq's crude exports pass through southern ports, the northern route via Turkiye still contributes around 0.5% of the global oil supply.

The halt in exports contributed to the oil barrel to reach 80$ at that time.

During a visit to Erbil in November 2023, Iraqi oil minister Hayan Abdel-Ghani expressed optimism about reaching an agreement with the KRG and foreign oil companies to resume oil production from Kurdish oilfields.

Despite Turkiye's prior announcement that the pipeline was ready to operate, Iraq maintained that it had yet to receive official notification and highlighted unresolved financial and technical issues.

However, recent discussions between the Iraqi PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani and U.S. President Joe Biden emphasized the importance of ensuring Iraqi oil reaches international markets, signaling a renewed effort to reopen the pipeline between Iraq and Turkiye.

In response, the Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) expressed readiness to engage in discussions with Iraqi and KRG officials to resume oil exports, stressing the need for guarantees regarding financial obligations per existing agreements.

Water Crisis: Turkiye's Dams And Iraq's Droughts

The water problem between Iraq and Turkiye primarily revolves around the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which originate in Turkiye and flow through Syria and Iraq.

The construction of dams and large irrigation systems by Turkiye has led to a massive reduction in water flow into Iraq by 30-40%, causing droughts and water shortages.

In addition, Turkiye's Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and the Ilısu Dam project are particularly contentious. They have resulted in a 40% cut in water flows into Syria and Iraq, impacting agriculture, energy production, and the overall water supply in these countries.

This reduction in water flow has been a major source of tension between the two countries, with Turkiye's projects leading to droughts in Iraq and exacerbating the water shortage crisis in the Region.