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Iraq is trying to Import Gas from Turkmenistan: What will be the Role of Iran?

Vali Kaleji On 10 July 2023, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani convened an emergency meeting with energy officials to explore alternatives to Iranian gas, including supplies from Qatar and Turkmenistan. The meeting was held in response to the abrupt suspension of Iran’s gas exports to Iraq, which resulted in the reduction or shutdown of power plant operations in Al-Mansuriyah, Baghdad, Sadr, and some other regions of the country. Iraq’s electricity ministry declared that Iran’s restrictions on gas exports to its neighbor had caused the country to lose approximately five thousand megawatts (MW) of power. In order to attain stability in electricity supply, Iraq urgently needs 40,000-MW of power, of which 26,000 MW of electricity is generated from imported gas, primarily from Iran. Because of this, Al-Sudani directed the Iraqi government to come up with quick fixes and alternatives as well as to continue its initial efforts to import gas from Turkmenistan and Qatar. In this regard, Iraqi Parliamentary Committee on Electricity and Energy met the Minister of Electricity, Ziyad Ali, and his accompanying delegation on 15 July to look for alternative options for obtaining and purchasing gas, including gas supplies from Turkmenistan and Qatar. Regarding this, Iraqi Oil Minister Azzat Sabir announced on 24 August that “an initial agreement has been reached with Turkmenistan regarding the import of gas for the operation of their power plants. The agreement between the two countries was reached after negotiations in Ashgabat. Details will be reflected in the relevant agreement. The agreement, which will be signed closer to the end of the year, will determine the volumes of gas that Turkmenistan will supply to Iraq.” During this process, on 6 October, Turkmenistan’s Minister of State and Chairman of the State Concern “Turkmengaz” Maksat Babayev visited Baghdad. On the same day, Turkmenistan and Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the supply of natural gas to meet the needs of production stations and the electrical system. “The preliminary agreement is to import approximately 25 million cubic meters (883 million cubic feet) of gas per day” from Turkmenistan. In the continuation of this process, on November 8, 2023, a meeting between representatives of the State Concern “Türkmengaz” and the delegation of the Republic of Iraq led by the Minister of Electricity Ziad Ali Fadel took place in Ashgabat. According to the protocol that was signed in this meeting, 9 billion cubic meters of Turkmen natural gas will be transported annually through Iran to Iraq under the SWAP scheme during 5 years. However, this agreement, if implemented, will not completely solve the problem of Iraq and it can only help reduce the current problems of gas and electricity shortages in this country. The truth is that Iraq suffers from persistent power shortages despite its large oil and gas reserves. This is particularly noticeable in the summer, when temperatures rise above 50 degrees Celsius (122°F) and power consumption peaks. Although the current production volume of gas in southern Iraq is about 900 million cubic feet and 300 million cubic feet in northern Iraq, these amounts are insufficient to meet the demand, Iraq’s minister of electricity, Ziad Ali Fadel stressed. Indeed, on the one hand, the limitation of water resources — particularly in light of Turkey’s control of water flows from the upstream areas of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in recent years — has posed challenges in the development of dams and hydroelectric power plants for electricity generation in Iraq. On the other hand, Iraq’s thermal power plants, which use gas fuel, are heavily dependent on imported gas input from Iran. Despite the close political relations between Iran and Iraq, unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran and payment problems for imported gas by Iraq have caused several disruptions in Iran’s gas exports to the country in recent years, and the halt of gas in early July 2023 was the latest example of this. Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Sudani, in the emergency meeting, noted that “the U.S. sanctions and non-compliance with the gas dues payment mechanism agreed upon in 2018 caused a 50 percent reduction in gas supplies from Iran which negatively affected electricity production in Iraq”. Although in June, Iraqi officials received U.S. permission to pay about $2.76 billion to Iran after receiving clearance from U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and the Iraqi Minister of Electricity also announced that all of Iran’s gas payments have been deposited into the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI), it appears that the problem of receiving payments for Iran’s gas exports to Iraq, especially blocking Iranian gas money in the TBI, has not been fully resolved yet. To overcome these challenges, the Iraqi government is pursuing two options simultaneously in the domestic and international arenas. In the domestic area, Iraq is planning to build combined cycle power plants totaling 4,000 MW in the next two years, which use both a gas and a steam turbine together to produce electricity. This will be only a small portion of the 26,000 MW of electricity generated from imported Iranian gas. However, in the international arena, as was previously mentioned, Baghdad is looking for new sources of gas imports to reduce the negative impact of Iran’s sanctions and banking issues on the sustainable supply of Iraq’s electricity network. In this regard, Turkmenistan and Qatar are the two main options for the Iraqi government. However, with respect to Turkmenistan’s role — the primary focus of this article — it has the fourth-largest proven gas reserves in the world, after Qatar, Iran, and Russia, with around 50 trillion cubic meters (tcm). Indeed, Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality policy in foreign policy also enables the country to cooperate with various parties, including China, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Europe, in the field of energy. However, given the geographical distance between the two countries, the question is how to supply a portion of Iraq’s imported gas. The first and most likely option is the transit or swap of Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq via Iran. In transit, although it can be done utilizing the existing Iran-Turkmenistan-Turkey gas pipeline to transfer gas to northern Iraq and through the Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline to transfer gas to the eastern and central parts of Iraq, this is very difficult in practice. In this regard, Gholam Hossein Hasantash, a faculty member of the Institute for International Energy Studies (IIES) Tehran, in an interview with the author, said it is currently not possible to transport gas from Turkmenistan to Iraq through Iran unless a separate pipeline is built with the financial support of both Iraq and Turkmenistan, as well as Iran’s approval. However, due to the high level of investment required for such a pipeline, which would be more than 1000 kilometers long and pass through mountainous areas, it seems very difficult to conclude such a tripartite agreement. Another option will be the swap of Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq via Iran. Recent agreements between Turkmenistan and Iraq show that both sides have chosen this option. Before this, Iran has taken steps in the field of gas swap with Turkmenistan. In this regard, a trilateral gas cooperation between Turkmenistan, Iran, and Iraq may be formed as a result of the resolution of long-standing gas disputes between Iran and Turkmenistan and the trilateral gas swap agreement signed on November 27, 2021, by Turkmenistan, Iran, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Indeed, Iran repaid $1.6 billion in gas debts to Turkmenistan using its deposits withheld in Iraqi banks. This can facilitate the transfer of Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq via Iran, which can help Iraq reduce its dependence on Iranian gas imports and ensure a more sustainable supply of gas for its electricity network. It is important to remember that most of Iran’s oil and gas fields, including the “South Pars Gas Field,” are located in the country’s south and southwest. Although Iran has a wide network of gas transmission lines, during the winter season, the country’s northeastern and northern provinces, including Razavi Khorasan, North Khorasan, Mazandaran, and Golestan, with their high gas consumption, cause a sharp drop in gas pressure in pipelines and distribution stations. To overcome this challenge, Iran has pursued a trilateral gas swap agreement with Turkmenistan and the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as a bilateral gas import agreement with Turkmenistan to import 10 million cubic meters of gas per day. Therefore, the formation of a trilateral gas swap agreement between Turkmenistan, Iran, and Iraq is possible and can lead to more stable and sustainable supply of gas for Iran’s domestic needs, especially during the winter months. Gholam Hossein Hasantash in the interview with the author said that “logistically, swapping is completely possible. If the potential of such a swap exists, transit has no economic logic at all.” The important point is that 83 percent of Iran’s power plants use gas sources and less than 20 percent of them use other sources, including water. Consequently, during the winter months, when gas consumption peaks and pressure drops, not only households face problems, but also power plants face a serious challenge. In fact, the problem that Iraq is facing in the summer, Iran will deal with in the winter. As a result, trilateral gas cooperation between Iran, Iraq, and Turkmenistan can help address the issue of supplying sufficient gas to Iran’s power plants during the winter and high gas consumption during that time, while also providing assistance to Iraq’s power plants during the summer. Additionally, from a financial and banking perspective, the Iraqi government will be a party to Turkmenistan, and the level of sanctions and banking restrictions imposed by the U.S. on Iraq will also be reduced. The second option for exporting Turkmenistan’s gas to Iraq is Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), which can be transferred by tankers. The volume of gas transportation via tankers is much lower compared to pipelines, and LNG is usually twice as expensive as piped gas. Hasantash said that “at present, Turkmenistan is not among the countries that produce and export LNG and lacks liquefaction facilities. Moreover, because it does not have access to open waters, it cannot potentially be a major exporter of LNG. It does not have any LNG receiving terminals”. However, the main advantages of LNG will be Turkmenistan’s direct gas exports to power plants in different parts of Iraq and meeting some of the country’s gas needs, particularly during pressure drops in the Turkmenistan and Iranian gas transmission lines. Although Turkmenistan’s production and export capacity for LNG cannot be compared to a country like Qatar, Turkmenistan has taken steps in recent years to develop its LNG industry, and in May 2023, the country started exporting LNG to Pakistan through Afghanistan’s Kandahar for the first time, which included 50 gas tankers, each carrying 30 tons of gas. Overall, it seems that in both forms of gas exports or swaps from Turkmenistan to Iraq through pipelines or LNG exports, Iran will play the most important intermediary role between Ashgabat and Baghdad. While it appears that the Iraqi government is considering a mixed approach to importing gas from Turkmenistan through both pipelines and LNG exports, the reality is that the main form of gas imports from Turkmenistan to Iraq will be through pipelines, whereas LNG will be the main mode of gas imports from Qatar.

Future Center: Iran’s Struggles Amid Regional Shifts

The collapse of the Assad regime marks a significant shift in Middle Eastern dynamics, hitting Iran where it matters most. For years, Syria served as Iran’s gateway to Lebanon, allowing it to bolster Hezbollah, challenge Israel, and expand its regional influence. With Assad gone, these critical links are severed, forcing Tehran to reassess its strategy. Iran now finds itself increasingly vulnerable, as other regional actors such as Turkey, Israel, and Gulf states are poised to exploit the Syrian vacuum. Potential Revival of the Maximum Pressure Campaign Meanwhile, Washington may see this moment as an opportunity to revive the Maximum Pressure Campaign—a strategy aimed at paralyzing Iran’s economy and undermining its ability to operate in the region.[1] The return of such a campaign would be devastating for Tehran, further isolating it economically and diplomatically at a time when its resources are overburdened. However, it can also threaten regional stability more than ever before. If sanctions are reimposed with full force, Iran’s economic troubles, already deepened by years of stagnation, would worsen dramatically. Inflation would surge, the currency would continue to collapse, and frustrations among the Iranian population could boil over. These pressures would likely empower hardliners, who would blame external aggression to justify more confrontational policies, including accelerating nuclear development. Iran’s response would likely play out on multiple fronts: doubling down on its influence in Iraq and Lebanon to compensate for the loss of Syria, and escalating proxy conflicts as a show of resilience. For the U.S. and its allies, while the Maximum Pressure Campaign might weaken Iran, it also risks significant blowback, including heightened instability across the region, more aggressive proxy actions, and closer cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China. In this post-Assad reality, both Iran and the U.S. face difficult choices that will shape the Middle East’s future trajectory. Potential Consequences of Renewed Sanctions Economic impact The economic consequences for Iran under renewed maximum pressure will be massive. Iran’s oil exports, essential for its economy, would face even harsher restrictions. During the first Trump administration’s initial pressure campaign, oil sales dropped from over 2.5 million barrels per day to as low as 200,000. If a similar pattern were to unfold again, Iran’s fiscal deficit would expand, exacerbating already dire economic conditions. Beyond depressing oil sales, international financial sanctions would further isolate Iran from the global banking system, cutting off access to funds needed for both domestic priorities and foreign operations. In such a scenario, the government’s ability to finance subsidies, pensions, and public services would further erode, widening the gap between the state and its increasingly frustrated population. Iran’s economic fragility has long been a point of contention within its borders.[2] Previous waves of sanctions have demonstrated their capacity to stir unrest, as seen during the protests of 2017-2018 and 2019, when rising fuel prices and inflation triggered demonstrations across the country. The return of maximum pressure could accelerate these conditions, putting the load on ordinary citizens’ shoulders. Inflation, already a persistent issue in Iran, would surge even higher as the rial depreciates under pressure. The currency’s collapse would erode the purchasing power of middle- and lower-income households, forcing many more Iranians into poverty. Social discontent, driven by economic desperation, could manifest in widespread protests, strikes, and labor unrest. The Iranian regime, accustomed to suppressing such movements, would likely respond with harsh crackdowns that further alienate segments of the population. Political ramifications The return of economic hardship would not occur in isolation. Tehran’s hardliners, who already dominate Iran’s political establishment, would see sanctions as both a threat and an opportunity.[3] Historically, external pressure has been framed as evidence of Western hostility, fueling nationalist sentiment that consolidates domestic support for more radical policies. Hardliners would likely champion economic self-sufficiency and resistance against perceived U.S. aggression. Such rhetoric, while aimed at boosting national morale, often coincides with more aggressive foreign and national security policies, which could include further advancements in Iran’s nuclear program, both as leverage in future negotiations and as a deterrent against military threats. Regional response At the regional level, Iran’s strategy would shift toward damage control and recalibration. Syria’s importance to Iran cannot be overstated; it has served as a critical land bridge for arms transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon and a forward operating base for Iranian proxies to pressure Israel. The collapse of the Assad regime disrupts these routes, forcing Tehran to look elsewhere to maintain its influence. Iraq, already a significant arena for Iranian activity, would become an even greater focus. While Iraq would seek to avoid being drawn into the crossfire between the U.S. and Iran,[4] its reliance on Iranian-backed militias for internal security might limit its ability to distance itself from Tehran. Deep economic linkage, Iran’s political and militia influence, and shared Shia identity constrain Iraq’s ability to fully sever ties with Tehran eveb as Iraq tries to strengthen its relations with Arab states to diversify its alliances. With the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen potentially avoiding broader confrontation with Israel and the United States, Iran might escalate proxy conflicts elsewhere. Tehran may encourage limited Houthi actions against Saudi Arabia or the UAE if desperate.[5] While avoiding direct confrontation with Israel, Iran could resort to cyberattacks or covert operations to disrupt Israeli security and maintain its deterrence. Simultaneously, Tehran would also likely expand alliances with Russia and China to counterbalance regional losses. The fall of Assad also opens new fault lines between Iran and other regional powers, most notably Turkey. Ankara, having played a significant role in Syria’s conflict, will seek to expand its influence in the post-Assad environment. This puts it on a potential collision course with Tehran. Turkey’s ambitions could undercut Iran’s efforts to retain any semblance of influence in Syria, further complicating Tehran’s regional strategy.[6] At the same time, Iran’s relationship with Russia, a former key ally in Syria, may be tested. While Moscow and Tehran have cooperated in supporting Assad, their long-term interests diverge, particularly in a post-conflict scenario where Russia seeks broader geopolitical influence at Iran’s expense. Challenges for the U.S. and Its Allies For Washington, reviving the Maximum Pressure Campaign presents a double-edged sword. Iran's weakened position post-Assad offers an opportunity to apply significant pressure, potentially forcing Tehran into concessions. By tightening sanctions and isolating Iran economically, the U.S. could aim to limit Iran's ability to fund proxies and expand its nuclear program. However, the geopolitical landscape has shifted since the original implementation of maximum pressure. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties with both China and Russia, who could offer Tehran critical lifelines to bypass sanctions. Beijing, in particular, remains a major buyer of Iranian oil, providing Tehran with vital revenue despite U.S. restrictions. Reviving maximum pressure would likely drive Iran closer to these powers, undermining Washington's efforts to isolate Tehran. Moreover, a unilateral approach to sanctions risks alienating European allies, who are wary of the destabilizing consequences of economic warfare. The domestic fallout in Iran could also carry unintended consequences for U.S. interests. While sanctions are designed to pressure governments, ordinary citizens often bear the brunt of economic hardship. Past instances have shown that this can fuel anti-American sentiment rather than opposition to the regime. Additionally, hardline factions within the Iranian government are adept at using external pressure to delegitimize reformist voices, consolidating their hold on power. In such a scenario, the likelihood of meaningful negotiations diminishes as Tehran adopts a more defiant posture both domestically and abroad. A Critical Juncture Ultimately, the collapse of the Assad regime and the potential return of the Maximum Pressure Campaign place Iran at a critical juncture. The loss of Syria represents not just a strategic setback but a broader challenge to Tehran’s regional ambitions. Faced with mounting economic pressures and an increasingly hostile regional environment, Iran will have limited options for recourse. Its response will likely involve a mix of economic adaptation, domestic repression, and proxy escalation, all of which carry significant risks for the region. For the U.S. and its allies, the decision to revive maximum pressure must account for these complexities, balancing the need to contain Iran with the broader goal of regional stability. In this evolving post-Assad reality, the stakes are higher than ever, and missteps could have far-reaching consequences for the future of the Middle East. [1] Financial Times, “Trump Team Aims to Bankrupt Iran with New 'Maximum Pressure’” [2] New York Post, “Energy crisis has Iran on the brink — and hands Trump a historic opportunity” [3] Modern Diplomacy, “Trump 2.0: A Return to “Maximum Pressure” against Iran?” [4] L’Orient Today, “In Iraq, Assad regime’s fall could limit Iranian militias' influence” [5] Associated Press, “Collapse of Syria’s Assad is a blow to Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’” [6] Reuters, “Turkey aiming for maritime agreement with Syria, transport minister says”

Assad’s fall spurs calls to revive Iraq-Syria oil pipeline

The overthrow of the former Syrian president, Bashar Al-Assad, has brought calls for the revival of the now-defunct pipeline that once carried crude oil from Iraq to a Syrian port on the Mediterranean. Several Iraqi experts have urged their government to consider rebuilding the facility as an outlet for the Opec member’s oil exports to Europe. An adviser to Iraq’s prime minister, Mohammed Al-Sudani, said there was a need for negotiations between the two Arab neighbours to set the groundwork for the pipeline’s resurrection. But other analysts disagreed with these calls, on the grounds that the situation in Syria is uncertain and Iraq’s oil exports to Europe have been falling in favour of Asian markets. In October 2023, Iraqi officials said rebuilding of the 850 km pipeline was discussed at two-day talks between the state-owned North Oil Company in Kirkuk and several local oil companies. The official news agency later quoted government spokesman Bassim Al-Awadi as saying Baghdad was thinking of reviving the pipeline to expand export outlets. Mudhar Saleh, a spokesperson for the Iraqi prime minister, said: “The Iraq-Syria pipeline is one of the vital projects that had shaped the oil industry in Iraq and the entire region. “Iraq remains in need to revive plans to expand its oil export outlets through the Mediterranean for its European clients... but this issue requires negotiations between the two countries because the pipeline’s part in Syria had been aggressively nationalised by Damascus,” Saleh told the official Iraqi news agency last week. The pipeline, dating back to the early 1950s, linked Iraq’s oil-rich Northern Kirkuk governorate with the western Syrian port of Baniyas on the Mediterranean. Iraq shut the pipeline between 1982 and 2000 because of political rifts with Syria, and it sustained heavy damage during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Abdul Hussein Al-Hanin, a member of Iraq’s Economists’ Association, says: “I believe it is time for Iraq to discuss with Syria the reconstruction of the pipeline after the recent changes in that country and the US willingness to ease its economic siege of Syria.” Al-Hanin says the US rejected Iraqi plans to revive the pipeline in 2003, and this prompted Baghdad to consider constructing a pipeline to Aqaba in South Jordan. Another Association member says he believes a revived pipeline to Syria could be an alternative to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which connects Iraq and Turkey. “I think there is a tendency now by Iraq to search for new oil export outlets to reduce reliance on the Ceyhan pipeline, which repeatedly faces political and security risks. I see the Syria pipeline as the best alternative in this respect.” Walid Khaddouri, another Iraqi energy analyst, rebuffs this view, saying the pipeline to Turkey is economically more feasible. Khaddouri, former information chief at the Kuwait-based Arab Energy Organisation, says: “The pipeline to Syria has not been maintained for decades. Iraq also considers that this pipeline is less economically feasible than the Kirkuk-Ceyhen pipeline when it comes to transporting crude to Europe. “Furthermore, the European markets have been declining due to a gradual fall in demand. Iraq and other Gulf oil producers are now more interested in Asian markets, to which nearly 65 to 70 percent of their crude is exported.” Nabil Al-Marsoumi, an economics professor at Basra University, has a similar view. He says, "I don’t believe it is a good idea to think now of reviving the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline, because the situation in Syria now is uncertain and unstable.” Source: AGBI

Turkish influence in Syria changes the West's mood towards the Kurds

The German Foreign Ministry calls for the disarmament of armed Kurdish groups in Syria and their inclusion in the security forces of the new government in the country. New Western approaches towards the Kurds American and German statements indicate a change in Western approaches towards the Kurds, and this change is linked to the influence that Turkey has in Syria after its Islamist allies took control of Damascus. US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf told reporters on the sidelines of an official US delegation's visit to Damascus, "Turkey has great influence in Syria and has national security interests and many other interests," noting that the circumstances that prompted the Kurds in northeastern Syria to organize and defend themselves have changed significantly. Although the US official's statement was general and did not include any details regarding a change in Washington's position towards its Kurdish allies, it suggests a change aimed at appeasing Ankara, in light of Kurdish fears that Leaf's statements could pave the way for a change in US policy. Barbara Leaf: The conditions that prompted the Kurds in northeastern Syria to organize and defend themselves have changed dramatically It is not known whether Leaf’s words are related to the Joe Biden administration, which is preparing to leave its place in a few weeks to President-elect Donald Trump, or whether he expresses an official position, especially since Trump himself supports the complete US withdrawal from Syria. In a more explicit position, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said on Friday, after talks between her and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara, “The armed Kurdish groups in Syria must be disarmed and integrated into the security forces of the new government in the country.” Baerbock added at a press conference that “the security of the Kurds is essential for a free Syria, but Turkish security concerns must also be addressed to ensure stability.” Turkey says the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, which has been fighting alongside U.S. forces for years, is an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been fighting Turkey, and It’s considered a terrorist organization by Ankara, Washington and the European Union. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan predicted on Friday that foreign countries would withdraw their support for Kurdish fighters in Syria, saying "there is no longer any reason for foreign powers to support the YPG fighters." Source: Al Arab Newspaper

The Complex Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict: Qatar’s Strategy in Syria

Dr Rebwar Fatah Qatar's strategy in Syria is multifaceted, driven by its regional ambitions and ideological leanings. Here are the key components: Promoting Islamist Groups: Qatar has historically supported Islamist groups, including factions within the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), to promote a governance model aligned with its ideological preferences. This support includes financial aid, weapons, and other resources as part of its broader strategy to balance regional alliances and maintain its influence in the Middle East. The exact amount of financial support is not publicly disclosed, but it is well-documented that Qatar has been a significant supporter of various Islamist factions in Syria. Mediation and Diplomacy: Qatar has positioned itself as a mediator in the Syrian conflict, engaging with different Islamist factions and regional powers. This diplomatic role allows Qatar to influence the political landscape and promote its interests by: Building Alliances: Forging strategic alliances with influential groups and regional actors. Promoting Political Islam: Helping place Islamic factions in positions of power, aligning with its broader ideological goals. Enhancing Influence: Using mediation and diplomacy to bolster its influence and reputation as a key player in regional politics. This approach has allowed Qatar to exert considerable influence in the Syrian conflict and other regional issues, despite its relatively small size compared to other regional powers. Balancing Regional Influence: Qatar's involvement in Syria is also driven by its desire to counter the influence of other regional players, such as Iran and Russia, who support the Assad regime. By supporting opposition groups, Qatar aims to prevent these actors from consolidating power. Post-Assad Strategy: Qatar has been active in mediating conflicts and supporting transitions in various regions. The Foreign Ministry has called for the preservation of national institutions and unity in Syria, urging all parties to engage in dialogue. Qatar's foreign policy involves supporting various Islamist groups, particularly during the Arab Spring and in conflict zones like Syria and Libya. This support aligns with Qatar's broader strategy of promoting political Islam and increasing its influence. For example, Qatar has played a significant role in mediating conflicts and supporting peace processes, such as in Afghanistan with the Taliban. Qatar's Position on the Kurds and SDF: Qatar's strategy in Syria has primarily involved supporting various Islamist groups rather than the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or Kurdish people. This support has had significant implications for the SDF, which has been a key player in the fight against ISIS and in maintaining control over parts of northern and eastern Syria. Qatar's backing of Islamist factions aligns with its broader regional strategy and has contributed to the complex dynamics on the ground, impacting the balance of power and the ongoing conflict. Conclusion Qatar's strategy in Syria is complex, involving support for opposition groups, promotion of Islamist factions, and engagement in diplomatic efforts to shape the future political landscape. By balancing regional influences and promoting its ideological preferences, Qatar aims to maintain its influence and ensure a favorable outcome in the Syrian conflict.

The Complex Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict: Israel’s Strategic Goals in Syria

Dr Rebwar Fatah Israel's strategy in Syria is multifaceted, focusing on several key objectives to ensure its national security and regional stability. Here are the main components: Preventing the Transfer of Advanced Weapons Israel has conducted numerous airstrikes targeting Syrian military infrastructure, including airbases, weapons stockpiles, and naval assets. The goal is to prevent advanced weaponry, such as missiles and chemical weapons, from falling into the hands of hostile groups like Hezbollah, Turkey and Qatar-backed groups, and other extremist factions. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has conducted over 300 airstrikes on Syria. These strikes have targeted critical military infrastructure, including air defence systems, missile depots, and chemical weapons sites. The Israeli military estimates that it has destroyed around 70-80% of the former Assad regime's strategic military capabilities. Establishing a Buffer Zone Israel has moved to establish a "sterile defence zone" in southern Syria, particularly near the Golan Heights. This zone aims to prevent the establishment and organization of insurgent groups close to its borders. The buffer zone is intended to create a security barrier without a permanent Israeli presence, ensuring that threats are kept at a distance. Israel has recently seized control of a 155-square-mile (400-square-kilometer) demilitarized buffer zone in the Golan Heights, which was established by a 1974 ceasefire agreement with Syria. This move was described as temporary and aimed at securing its border amid the collapse of the Assad regime. Given Israel's historical expansion policies and recent actions, it seems unlikely that they will withdraw from the buffer zone anytime soon. Israel has been expanding settlements and increasing its control in the region, which suggests a long-term strategy rather than a temporary measure. Countering Iranian Influence Before the ousting of the Assad regime, Israel was very active in countering Iranian influence in Syria, conducting numerous airstrikes targeting Iranian military sites and proxies. This strategy aimed to limit Iran's operational capabilities and prevent it from establishing a permanent foothold near Israel's borders. However, the power vacuum left by the ousting of the Assad regime has led to increased instability. Fundamentalist groups, including remnants of ISIS, have been moving closer to the Israeli border, raising concerns about potential threats to Israel's security. Supporting Reliable Partners Israel's actions indirectly support groups like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are seen as more reliable and secular compared to Islamist factions supported by Turkey and Qatar. By weakening groups like the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Israel aims to bolster the SDF's position and ensure a more stable and secular governance structure in the region. This is not solely to support the Kurds, but to build a more reliable partner in future Syria. Israel's support for the Kurds has historically been driven by strategic interests rather than a genuine desire to establish a Kurdish-led state. Israel has maintained informal relations with the Kurdish people, recognizing their struggle for self-determination and using this relationship to counterbalance regional adversaries like Iran and Turkey. Maintaining Regional Stability Israel's overarching goal is to maintain regional stability and prevent the rise of extremist groups that could threaten its security. This involves a combination of military actions, diplomatic efforts, and strategic alliances to shape the future political landscape of Syria in a way that aligns with its security interests. Conclusion Israel's strategy in Syria is complex and involves balancing various regional dynamics to ensure its national security and promote stability in the region. By targeting advanced weaponry, establishing buffer zones, countering Iranian influence, supporting reliable partners, and maintaining regional stability, Israel aims to secure a safer and more stable future both for itself and the broader region.

American man found in Syria after being imprisoned for months

It was not widely known that the man, who identified himself as Travis Timmerman and went missing in Hungary in May, was in Syria. By Matt Bradley and Chantal Da Silva A Missouri man found in Syria told NBC News on Thursday he spent months in a Syrian prison after after crossing into the country on a "pilgrimage" to Damascus. It was not widely known that the man, who identified himself as Travis Timmerman and went missing in Hungary in May, was in Syria. His discovery came as a shock to locals and journalists as thousands of detainees emerged from jails after the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad over the weekend. Timmerman, who initially identified himself only as “Travis,” was first seen in a video that emerged overnight. Surrounded by reporters while leaning against walls with flaking paint, Timmerman, 29, said he was stopped by Syrian officials earlier this year after crossing into the country on foot. "I was on a pilgrimage to Damascus," he told NBC News in a building on the outskirts of the capital. Timmerman separately told CBS News that he'd been freed from a prison earlier in the week as Assad's regime was toppled. Travis Timmerman speaking to NBC News outside the Syrian capital Damascus on Thursday.Ted Turner / NBC News “My door was busted down, it woke me up,” Timmerman said. “I thought the guards were still there, so I thought the warfare could have been more active than it ended up being… Once we got out, there was no resistance, there was no real fighting.” The video that emerged after he was found sparked early speculation that the missing man could be American journalist Austin Tice, 43, who disappeared in 2012 just days after celebrating his 31st birthday in Syria. After being located by NBC News and other outlets in Dhiyabia, Timmerman said he had “been reading the scripture a lot” before deciding to cross the mountains from Lebanon into Syria. He appeared calm. When one man repeatedly offered to put him in touch with U.S. officials, he replied that he was "okay for right now." A U.S. official told NBC News that Washington was "aware of reports of an American found outside of Damascus and seeking to provide support. Out of respect for his privacy, we have no further information to provide at this time." Timmerman said he had been in Europe prior to embarking on his pilgrimage and eventually traveled from Lebanon into Syria in late May, but was spotted by a border guard and detained. Authorities in Missouri and Hungarian capital Budapest had earlier this year put out missing person reports for a man named Pete Timmerman, with Hungarian police identifying him as “Travis” Pete Timmerman. The Missouri State Highway Patrol said in a public awareness bulletin that Timmerman had gone missing from Budapest, Hungary, on May 28th, just under seven months ago. Timmerman had been identified by authorities in Budapest in a request for information as “Travis Pete Timmerman.” They said he was last seen at a church and had since “left for an unknown location, with no sign of life.” Matt Bradley reported from Damascus, and Chantal Da Silva from London.

AP: America’s closest ally in Syria is losing ground as a new order takes shape

The jihadi rebels who toppled Syrian President Bashar Assad say they want to build a unified, inclusive country. But after nearly 14 years of civil war, putting that ideal into practice will not be easy. For Syria’s Kurdish minority, America’s closest ally in the country, the struggle for a new order is entering a potentially even more challenging phase. Over the course of Syria’s civil war, Kurdish fighters have fended off an array of armed factions, partnered with the U.S. to rout the Islamic State group and carved out a largely autonomous region in the country’s oil-rich east. But the gains of the non-Arab Kurds are now at risk. The ascendance of the Sunni Arab rebels who overthrew Assad — with vital help from Turkey, a longtime foe of the Kurds — will make it hard for the Kurds to find a place in the new Syria and could prolong the conflict. FILE – Kurdish-led fighters backed by the U.S. escort suspected Islamic State militants in Hassakeh, Syria, on Jan. 26, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad, File) The jihadi rebels who rode into Damascus over the weekend have made peaceful overtures to the Kurds. But the rebels violently drove Kurdish fighters out of the eastern city of Deir al-Zour days after government forces abandoned it. To the north, a separate opposition faction backed by Turkey that has been battling the Kurds for years seized the town of Manbij. And Turkey carried out airstrikes on a Kurdish convoy it said was carrying heavy weapons looted from government arsenals. The Kurds have long counted on U.S. aid in the face of such challenges. Around 900 American troops are in eastern Syria, where they partner with Kurdish forces to prevent an Islamic State resurgence. But the future of that mission will be thrown into doubt under president-elect Donald Trump, who has long been skeptical about U.S. involvement in Syria. Here’s a closer look at the predicament the Kurds find themselves in. FILE – Kurdish-led fighters backed by the U.S. man a checkpoint in Hassakeh, Syria, on Jan. 24, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad, File) Who are the U.S.-allied Kurdish fighters in Syria? The Kurds are among the largest stateless ethnic groups in the world, with some 30 million concentrated in a territory straddling Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. They are a minority in each country and have often suffered persecution, which has fueled armed Kurdish uprisings. In Syria, they carved out an autonomous enclave early in the civil war, never fully siding with the Assad government or the rebels seeking to topple him. When the Islamic State group seized a third of the country in 2014, Kurdish fighters — who are secular and include women in their ranks — proved their mettle in early battles against the extremists, earning support from the U.S.-led coalition. They formed a group known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, which also includes Arab fighters, and drove the Islamic State group out of large areas of Syria with help from U.S.-led airstrikes and American special forces. In 2017, these Kurdish-led forces captured Raqqa, the capital of the extremists’ self-styled caliphate. Why is Turkey fighting the Kurds? Turkey has long viewed the SDF as an extension of the decades-old Kurdish insurgency within its own borders. It considers the main Kurdish faction a terrorist group on par with the Islamic State and has said it should have no presence in the new Syria. In recent years, Turkey has trained and funded fighters known as the Syrian National Army, helping them wrest control of territory from the Kurds in northern Syria along the border with Turkey. These Turkish-backed fighters have portrayed themselves as part of the opposition against Assad, but analysts say they are largely driven by opportunism and hatred of the Kurds. The Kurds have focused on battling the SNA in recent years. But the new leadership in Damascus, which also has longstanding ties to Turkey, could open another, much longer front. How do the Syrian rebels view the Kurds? The main rebel faction is led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani, a former al-Qaida militant who cut ties with the group eight years ago and says he wants to build a new Syria free of dictatorship that will serve all its religious and ethnic communities. Nawaf Khalil, head of the Germany-based Center for Kurdish Studies, said the early signs were positive. He said the rebels steered clear of two SDF-controlled enclaves of Aleppo when they stormed the city two weeks ago at the start of their rapid advance across the country. FILE – Kurdish-led fighters backed by the U.S. stand guard in Raqqa, Syria, on Feb. 7, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad, File) “It is also positive that they did not speak negatively about the Syrian Democratic Forces,” he said. It remains to be seen if those sentiments will endure. After sweeping into Deir al-Zour this week, a fighter from al-Sharaa’s group posted a video saying they would soon advance toward Raqqa and other areas of eastern Syria, raising the possibility of further clashes with the Kurds. The rebels could still seek some kind of agreement with the Kurds to incorporate them into the post-Assad political order, but that would likely require accepting a degree of Kurdish autonomy in the east. It would also risk angering Turkey, which now appears to be the chief power broker in Syria. Will the Trump administration support the Kurds? The top U.S. military commander for the Middle East, Army Gen. Erik Kurilla, met with SDF forces in Syria on Tuesday, in a sign of the Biden administration’s commitment to the alliance post-Assad. But things could change on Jan. 20. Trump has provided few details about his Middle East policy, aside from saying he wants to end the region’s wars and keep the United States out of them. In a social media post shortly before Assad was overthrown, Trump wrote that “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT.” During his previous term, in 2019, Trump abandoned the Kurds ahead of a Turkish incursion, casting it as the fulfillment of a campaign promise to end U.S. involvement in the region’s “endless wars.” The move prompted heavy criticism, including from prominent Republicans who accused him of betraying an ally. Trump backtracked weeks later, approving a wider mission to secure oil fields in the east. The troops remained where they were and the alliance endured.

Syria: The Last Nail in the Coffin of Arab Nationalism

Dr Rebwar Fatah . The region is transitioning from ethnic nationalism—Persian, Turkish, and Arab—to Islamic nationalism. The initial ideology failed, and now failing states hope that an Islamic cover can sustain their nationalism, continuing to dissolve and deprive non-Arab, non-Persian, and non-Turkish ethno-religious groups of their cultural heritage. . During the early 1960s, the dream of a united Arab state was championed by leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Hafiz al-Assad of Syria, and Abdul-Karim Qasim of Iraq. These leaders, all with military backgrounds, were part of the Free Officers Movement, which sought to promote Arab unity and nationalism [1]. . However, this dream quickly faded. In Iraq and Syria, the Kurds became the primary victims of Arab nationalism. They were accused of establishing a "second Israel," implying that they were a threat to Arab land and identity, which gave pretext to oppressing Kurds. As a result, the Kurds faced severe hardships, including displacement, genocide, Arabization, and the destruction of their villages and towns. Their cultural identity was deeply shaken [2][3]. . The first wave of Arab nationalism aimed to build Arab unity by dissolving the rich cultures of non-Arab ethno-religious identities. The ideology of Arab unification died at the sunrise, but even at the sunset, the ideology of oppressing the Kurds stayed alive and kicking. After the failure of this ideology, states turned to Islamic nationalism, which sought to achieve the same goal but through religious means. This approach, similar to the previous one, only created failed states like Iraq. The last nail in the coffin of Arab nationalism was seen in Syria, where it transformed into an Arab Islamic identity. Islamic groups backed by Erdogan are now controlling Damascus, with the only exception being the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controlling the north and east of the country, representing the only hope to rescue Syria from falling into an Islamic nationalist state [4][5]. . This approach was not unique to the Arab world. In 1979, Iran became a Shia Islamic state, but at its core, it remained a Persian nationalist state, similar to that of the Shah regime. Turkey, under President Erdogan, also adopted an Islamic hijab, but its core remained an ultra-Turkish nationalist state, aiming to dissolve all non-Turkish identities, particularly the Kurds [6]. . Sources: Ismael, Tareq Y. "The Arab Left." Syracuse University Press, 1976. Human Rights Watch. "Iraq: Claims in Conflict – Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq." 2004. International Crisis Group. "Flight of Icarus? The PYD’s Precarious Rise in Syria." Middle East Report N°151, May 2014. Izady, Mehrdad R. "The Kurds: A Concise History and Fact Book." Mazda Publishers, 1992. Abrahamian, Ervand. "A History of Modern Iran." Cambridge University Press, 2008. Özkırımlı, Umut. "Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction." Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. . The flag of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a political union between Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1971, featured three horizontal bands of red, white, and black with two green stars in the white band

A documentary film produced by (Draw Media) was screened in The Hague

Today in The Hague, Netherlands, within the framework of the 29th Annual Conference of the States Parties (CSP), which oversees the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a documentary film produced by (Draw Media) was screened. The documentary film (Goptapa) talks about the chemical attack and Anfal of the village of (Goptapa) within the framework of the fourth phase of Anfal on May 3, 1988. Farhad Latif is the main character of this documentary film, whose 22 family members were martyred in this massacre. During the screening of the documentary, (OPCW) officials participated and called for more victims of chemical attacks in different parts of Kurdistan to be known to the world through films and documentaries.

How did Trump win and what is next for the Kurdistan Region?

Winthrop Rodgers After a year of primary and general election campaigning, voters in the US picked Republican Donald Trump over Democrat Kamala Harris. Trump, who was running to retake the office that he held between 2017 and 2021, won with 312 electoral votes. Harris managed just 226. The former president is also expected to win the popular vote, which he failed to do in the 2016 election. The final results will be confirmed in the next few weeks. Trump’s victory came as a result of sweeping all seven major swing states: Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Georgia, Arizona, and Nevada. While he went beyond the narrow margins that had been anticipated, the election was still decided by just a fraction of the more than 146 million votes cast. Across those seven states, Trump won fewer than 800,000 more votes than Harris based on the preliminary numbers. He won just 255,000 more votes in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, a combination that would have gotten her to 270 electoral votes. Overall, there was a broad shift to the right across the US. While Democrats continued to win women, Blacks, and university-educated voters. More conservative demographics like men, Whites, and working class voters continued to cast ballots for Republican candidates and did so at higher rates than in the past. The rightward shift was most pronounced among young men, Whites, Latino men, and voters aged 45-64 years old. In particular, voters seemed to be reacting against the high cost of living in the US. While the administration of President Joe Biden has been successful at bringing down inflation, spurring economic growth, and reinvigorating the industrial sector, the effects were not felt by ordinary people who are still grappling with the economic fall-out of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many economists have questioned Trump’s proposed plans, but voters’ anger was real. Moreover, Trump used racist and sexist grievances and stoked a narrative that Biden had mishandled immigration as a way to motivate his base. While these trends prevailed at the presidential level, Democrats had a better, but still disappointing night, in races for the Senate, the House of Representatives, and state-level races. They lost control of the Senate after Republicans flipped seats in West Virginia, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. As of writing, control of the House remains unclear, but Republicans look likely to retain control. Voters in the US also make choices about policy questions at the ballot box. In a number of cases, they rejected Democratic candidates for office, but embraced Democratic-backed initiatives. For example, there were ballot measures in ten states to protect abortion and reproductive rights, including several places where harsh abortion restrictions were put in place after the Supreme Court invalidated Roe v. Wade. These were approved in seven states, but failed to pass in three. In Florida, the pro-choice measure achieved a majority, but was unable to reach the 60% of the vote needed to become law. As a result of the election, the US continues to be one of the only major Western countries never to select a woman as its top political leader. The so-called “highest glass-ceiling in the nation” remains cracked, but unbroken. How will the result affect the Kurds? Observers in from around the world watched the US election closely, including in the Kurdistan Region. This is understandable given the stakes: what the next president decides to do will have significant bearing on its future. Now that the result is known and Trump will be returning to the White House, Kurds are wondering what that means. Given that he was previously the president, there is a precedent for what he might do. Kurds will of course remember his administration’s opposition to the 2017 independence referendum in the Kurdistan Region and his personal actions to enable Turkey’s invasion of northeastern Syria during Operation Peace Spring. But that is no guarantee that he will do the same thing. Trump is famously transactional and prone to changing his mind based on emotion. The leaders of the Kurdistan Region’s main political parties—who have much work to do themselves in terms of forming a government following their own election—were quick to congratulate Trump on his victory. They emphasized the bond between the US and the Kurdistan Region and a desire to strengthen it. However, the relationship between the US and the Kurdistan Region is changing, particularly on the security front. By mid-way through Trump’s term in 2026, the International Coalition will withdraw its forces from bases in the Kurdistan Region, including Erbil and Harir. Moreover, the four-year memorandum of understanding regarding Peshmerga reform will expire that same year. These will have to be dealt with in due time and Baghdad will have a significant say in the matter, particularly in terms of the bases. Much of Trump’s Middle East policy will depend on who he selects for key positions at the State Department and the Pentagon. His first term was characterized by confrontation with Iran and many of the names being floated for those jobs have hawkish views about Tehran. While politically this may prove popular among some Kurds, many others understand that it is often the Kurdistan Region that is caught in the crossfire when the US and Iran clash. This is all the more relevant in the context of regional tensions regarding Israel, which Trump is expected to support even more than Biden. However, Trump also ran on a platform of keeping the US out of foreign conflicts. “'I’m not going to start wars, I’m going to stop wars,” he said in his post-election victory speech. Obviously, this is more easily said than done and Trump thrives on aggression. Only time will tell whether this was merely a talking point to get elected. But this is all at the geopolitical level. There is little chance that the next administration increases its attention on the Kurdistan Region; in fact, its focus will probably continue to shift away from the problems of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Practically, this means that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) will appeal to Washington when they feel that it is in their interest, but ignore it when they want. That will likely have a destabilizing effect inside the Kurdistan Region and enable further democratic backsliding and freedom of expression violations.

Linking the Eastern Mediterranean and Gulf Energy Hubs: The Expanding US Strategic Role

Bahrooz Jaafar Exclusive Summary: The Eastern Mediterranean basin, encompassing Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey, has emerged since the late 2000s as a focal point of energy competition, ideological struggles, historical conflicts, and rising regional ambitions. This region forms part of a broader geopolitical landscape where the interests of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and China intersect. Increasingly, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf are merging into a single geopolitical sphere, becoming arenas for both regional competition and the influence of global powers, especially as the United States seeks to curtail the spread of Chinese dominance. Simultaneously, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have crucial consequences for the global and regional order. Security and Energy Dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean Since 2009, gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have sparked speculation about significant geopolitical shifts. These discoveries have transformed Israel from a gas importer to an exporter, elevated Cyprus as a regional energy player, and fostered a trilateral alliance between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus. To this effect, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) was formed in 2019, which includes seven countries bordering the Eastern Mediterranean, along with the European Union, the United States, and the UAE as observers. Despite Turkey's significant regional presence and location in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has been excluded from these regional gas activities, intensifying regional tensions. Notable gas fields such as Tamar (2009) and Leviathan (2010) in Israel's offshore borders, Aphrodite off the coast of Cyprus (2011), Zohr in Egypt (2015), and later discoveries like Calypso in Cyprus and Karish in Israel, raised hopes that these reserves would promote economic cooperation and ease political tensions. However, this optimism has not appropriately materialized. Geopolitical tensions persist due to overlapping maritime claims and border disputes, especially between Lebanon and Israel, the ongoing Israel- Palestine conflicts, as well as Turkey’s incursions into Greek waters, and the unsolved Cyprus problem. These issues, involving both sovereign rights and economic interests, continue to impede economic cooperation. Turkey’s refusal to recognize Cyprus’ sovereignty further exacerbates the geopolitical tensions. Since 2018, there have been plans to build a 1,900-kilometer underwater gas pipeline from the Cypriot and Israeli gas fields to the Greek island of Crete, with a projected completion date of 2025. However, this project has encountered a range of geopolitical, financial, and environmental challenges. The purpose of this pipeline is to reduce Europe's reliance on Russian gas by transporting 9-12 billion cubic meters annually, which would cover about 10% of Europe's energy needs. The Eastern Mediterranean is also expected to be a key region for Europe's security and energy strategy. It is essential to remember that the Mediterranean basin is not solely a hub for oil and gas extraction and export. Beyond its role in trade and economic activities, the region is intricately linked to Europe's security landscape. Millions of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe, contributing to a migration crisis that has fueled identity struggles across the continent. This issue has played a key role in the electoral success of right-wing and populist parties in several European countries. The Missing Link in the BRI: Connecting the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean The Gulf’s engagement in Eastern Mediterranean affairs has played a pivotal role in shaping recent developments, particularly through the participation of the Gulf's national oil companies. These companies have spearheaded the Gulf Arab states’ increasing presence in the region as part of their internationalization strategies. Among the three Gulf powers, the UAE has taken the lead in establishing a significant role in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its involvement in Libya and Egypt, alongside its deepening ties with Cyprus and Greece, highlights this strategic focus. The Abraham Accords, signed with Israel in 2020, further cemented the UAE's influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, blending both soft and hard power strategies during this period. The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and Mubadala Petroleum, both based in Abu Dhabi, have been at the forefront of the UAE's bid to secure a dominant position in the Eastern Mediterranean energy sector. In September 2021, Mubadala Petroleum acquired a 22% stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field for $1 billion. Additionally, Mubadala owns 10% of Egypt’s largest gas field, Zohr. In February 2023, ADNOC Distribution, the UAE’s largest fuel and service retailer, purchased a 50% stake in TotalEnergies Egypt, marking Abu Dhabi’s significant entry into Egypt as part of its broader regional expansion plans. Moreover, ADNOC is actively partnering with BP to develop new gas fields in the Mediterranean, and both companies have agreed to purchase New Med, the largest shareholder in Israel’s Leviathan gas field. Although the ongoing Gaza war complicates the deal, the UAE’s ambitions remain evident. Its policy starkly contrasts with that of Iran and its allied groups in the region, as well as with the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is a part. In February 2024, Egyptian officials signed a $35 billion agreement with the UAE to develop the Ras al-Hikma resort on Egypt's north coast. This deal provided a crucial boost to Egypt's struggling economy by injecting much-needed foreign currency, which led to a sharp decline in black-market activity amid Egypt’s currency and economic crisis. The project also promises to increase Gulf tourism and wealth flows to these coastal areas. In my latest book, Deciphering the Eastern Mediterranean's Hydrocarbon Dynamics: Unraveling Regional Shifts (published by Emerald Group Publishing in Europe and the United States), I explore these developments in detail. I argue that not all economic and security issues in the region are tied solely to oil and gas. Instead, these factors form part of a broader geopolitical shift in which both the Gulf states and Israel pursue their agendas. Natural gas has indeed become a central issue in international relations, especially in light of the Ukraine war. Although the majority of cars in Europe are battery-powered and the world as a whole has turned to clean energy, we are now in the energy transition phase, but oil and gas still dominate the global economic market. Before and after the Ukraine war, the European Union has clarified that it aims to replace Russian gas with Eastern Mediterranean gas (from the reserves of Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus) to reduce the West's dependence on Russian energy. As a result, the Eastern Mediterranean region needs to promote greater integration with the energy-rich Gulf states. While progress has been made, the ongoing Gaza war and the presence of Militia forces aligned with Iran in the region could complicate this effort. Moreover, as the war in Ukraine continues, Russia may increasingly align itself with Iran's interests in the region. Meanwhile, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known in China as One Belt, One Road, or the New Silk Road, is a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013. It aims to invest in more than 150 countries and international organizations. According to the 2024 report from the Center for Finance and Green Development, based on official Chinese media, by April 2023, a total of 149 countries (including China) had signed agreements to join China's Belt and Road Initiative. China has strengthened its strategic and economic relationships in the Gulf, with economic ties between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) increasing by 140 percent between 2015 and 2022. According to Commerce and Industry Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad Bin Qassim Al-Sani, who led a Qatari delegation to a conference in Xiamen, China, on May 23, 2024, titled "Embracing the Future: Promoting Industrial Cooperation and High-Quality Investment between China and the GCC," trade between China and the GCC reached approximately $23.7 billion in 2023, with an expected growth rate of 3.7% in 2024. China’s growing soft power in Asia, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf, poses a significant challenge to U.S. unipolar dominance. However, the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman remains a cornerstone of U.S. and British policy in the region. These nations still rely on the U.S. for security, particularly against threats from Iran and pro-Iranian groups in the surrounding region. Connecting the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean will be part of a broader U.S. strategy to curb the expansion of Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region, which is anchored by U.S. partnerships with India, Japan, and Australia. Additionally, the expressway from the Port of Duqm to Saudi Arabia is nearing completion, as is Saudi Arabia’s access to the Mediterranean coast with the support of Jordan. Conclusion Many of the world's most complex problems are concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean. These include the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Syrian crisis, the unresolved Cyprus dispute, which increases Turkey's involvement in the region, as well as issues like immigration, environmental degradation, the Lebanese conflict, and drug trafficking. In general, The war in Gaza is really matters for the Eastern- Mediterranean. Addressing these issues might require decisive action, though military solutions alone may not be sufficient. In the Middle East, Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are considered the major regional powers. Turkey's collapsing economy limits its ability to project power or engage in conflict, as its internal economic challenges take precedence. This doesn't allow Turkey to enter a war abroad because they will face collapse inside. Meanwhile, the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are focused on diversifying their economies and continue to view Iran as a significant threat. With strong support from the West, Israel is moving to keep the threats away posed by Hamas and Hezbollah, aiming to protect its key economic assets such as ports and gas fields. The Eastern Mediterranean holds immense strategic value for Western powers, and they seek a reliable and influential ally in the region -Israel fills this role. Therefore, ongoing conflict is inevitable, and it could be prolonged, given the resilience of groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. These groups have shown the ability to recover and renew their activities after being targeted, posing recurring threats to U.S. and Israeli interests. Bahrooz Jaafar holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Cyprus International University, Nicosia. He is the founder and head of the Mediterranean Institute for Regional Studies. His latest academic book, “Deciphering the Eastern Mediterranean's Hydrocarbon Dynamics: Unraveling Regional Shifts,” was published by Emerald Group Publishing. Dr. Jaafar is originally from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Email: [email protected]

From Beijing to Erbil: China's 75th Anniversary: Insights for the Kurdistan

China’s progress over the last 75 years has been remarkable. From a largely agrarian economy in the mid-20th century, China has become the second-largest economy in the world, largely due to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has fostered international trade and infrastructure development. The Kurdistan Region, a rapidly growing area within Iraq, can learn from China’s economic model—particularly in diversifying its economy beyond oil, enhancing its industrial base, and attracting foreign investment.The BRI offers the Kurdistan Region a gateway to new infrastructure investments, trade partnerships, and technology transfers. By aligning itself with China’s global economic vision, Kurdistan can improve its connectivity with international markets and bolster its role as a commercial hub within Iraq and the wider Middle East. Chinese companies are already active in the region, contributing to sectors like energy and construction. Kurdistan can deepen its ties with China to accelerate development in critical sectors such as technology, telecommunications, and manufacturing.China’s vast investments in infrastructure, both domestically and abroad, demonstrate its commitment to modernization. From high-speed rail networks to smart cities and green energy projects, China has transformed the landscape of its cities and can serve as a model for Kurdistan,Connection to Kurdistan: The Kurdistan Region is focused on rebuilding and expanding its infrastructure, particularly in transportation, energy, and housing. China’s experience in developing megaprojects could be crucial for enhancing Kurdistan’s infrastructure, improving the quality of life for its citizens, and attracting foreign investment. Additionally, by partnering with China, the region can access cutting-edge innovations in renewable energy, telecommunications, and digital economy infrastructure, supporting its ambitions to become a technological leader in Iraq.Over 75 years, China has preserved its rich cultural heritage while embracing modernization. The promotion of Confucian values, the arts, and cultural diplomacy has made China a global cultural powerhouse. Similarly, the Kurdistan Region should strive to promote its identity while engaging in cultural exchange,China and Kurdistan have established cultural ties through events like the China-Kurdistan Cultural Weeks, language programs, and student exchanges. Expanding these exchanges will foster mutual understanding and promote tourism and education in both regions. The expansion of Mandarin language programs in Kurdish universities could allow more Kurdish students to study in China, bringing back valuable knowledge that could benefit various sectors of the Kurdish economy. Cultural diplomacy through arts, heritage preservation, and joint exhibitions could further strengthen the bonds between the two regions.China’s journey has focused on achieving sovereignty, national unity, and stability while emerging as a major global player. The Kurdistan Region, facing its own challenges related to autonomy, security, and regional stability, can find inspiration in China’s path to success.Just as China prioritized national unity and stability to enable its rise, the Kurdistan Region can work on consolidating its governance structures, ensuring peace and stability as a foundation for economic development and international cooperation. China has played a significant role in regional security, offering political support and engaging in diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts in the Middle East. Continued diplomatic engagement between China and Kurdistan can help address local security concerns, promote regional stability, and facilitate reconstruction efforts in Iraq.China’s global rise has been characterized by fostering diplomatic partnerships and participating in international forums that support global peace and development. Its strategic alignment with regions around the world, including the Middle East, has grown. The Kurdistan Region, through its cooperation with China, can leverage this partnership for both regional stability and economic growth. Halo Hassan Saeed -Halo Hassan Saeed is a writer and journalist, a member of the International Union of Journalists, and the author of two books on the People's Republic of China. His work focuses on fostering cultural understanding and promoting awareness of Chinese influence in the region.

The US election will come down to the “swing states,” but Harris has an advantage over Trump

Draw Media, Winthrop Rodgers US voters will go to the polls on November 5 to elect a new president. The Republican Party selected former President Donald Trump, who is seeking to recapture the post that he lost in 2020. The man who beat him, President Joe Biden, dramatically declined to continue his reelection campaign earlier this summer in response to concerns about his age. Instead, the Democratic Party nominated Vice President Kamala Harris. She will become the first woman to be US president if she wins. With just a few weeks to go, the race is close. Observers from Kurdistan, Iraq, and around the world are wondering what will happen. For many people, the process of the US election can be confusing, but it helps to keep a few key aspects in mind. The US has a federal system of government and it uses what is known as the “Electoral College” to determine who becomes president. Each state is given a number of electoral votes, which are roughly proportional to the size of its population. For example, California is the largest state and has the most electoral votes with 54, while smaller states like Wyoming and Vermont only have three. To win the presidency a candidate must get at least 270 electoral votes. The total number of votes that a candidate receives from across the entire country — known as the “popular vote” — is irrelevant. In fact, in two of the last six cycles — George W. Bush 2000 and Trump in 2016 — the winner got fewer votes overall, but was still elected because they got more electoral votes. Most states give all of their electoral votes to whoever wins the state, although there are two exceptions. The parties want to come first in as many states as they can, especially if they have large populations like New York or Texas. However, there are many states with clear political leanings and the outcome can be predicted ahead of time. For example, Democrats are almost certain to win in places like Massachusetts, while Republicans will definitely win Tennessee. Each cycle there are a few “swing states” that could go either way. With the US pretty evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats, how these states vote becomes extremely important. They are where the contest will be decided. In 2024, there are seven swing states where either candidate has a good chance of winning: Pennsylvania (which has 19 electoral votes), North Carolina (16), Georgia (16), Michigan (15), Arizona (11), Wisconsin (10), and Nevada (6). Harris and Trump will hold many rallies in these states and spend lots of money on TV advertisements to convince voters to support them. Whoever can win in enough of the right states in this group will become president. At the moment, Harris has a slight edge in polling averages, which change as new surveys are added. As of writing, she is currently leading in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. These three states alone have enough electoral votes to get her to 270 and secure the White House. She is also leading in Nevada. Trump has a slight edge in Arizona, North Carolina, and Georgia, but these will not be enough to win. However, he still has a decent shot at winning if Harris stumbles. The race remains extremely close. Pennsylvania is particularly important for both campaigns. It has a lot of electoral votes — more than any of the other swing states — and a history of voting for both Republican and Democratic candidates for president, congress, and at the state level. It has two major cities, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. These are vote-rich areas because of their large populations. Many young people, Blacks, and members of labor unions live there and they vote overwhelmingly for Democrats. In between these two cities, there are vast rural areas, where voters tend to be strongly Republican. Many people here are White and are more conservative than the voters in the cities. There are also suburbs and smaller cities that have a mix of voters. Harris will need to win by very large margins in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh and do well in their suburbs in order to off-set Trump’s strength in rural parts of the state. If she can do this, she will win Pennsylvania — and most likely the White House. On September 10, Trump and Harris debated each other in Philadelphia. They clashed on a variety of topics, including the economy, immigration, abortion, and foreign policy. Polling afterwards showed that more voters thought Harris did a better job because she appeared calm, empathetic, and prepared. In contrast, Trump focused heavily on fears about the impact of immigrants and spouted racist lies. He was widely criticized, including by members of his own party. The debate exposed a stark contrast between the two candidates among voters, many of whom are just now starting to pay attention to the election. It will merely reinforce the preexisting preferences of Democrats and Republicans, but Trump seems to have hurt himself among undecided voters with his poor performance. He has, in fact, refused to debate Harris again, likely to avoid getting embarrassed a second time. There is still a month and a half to go before the election on November 5. This is a long time in politics and many things can change in the meantime. Moreover, polling does not necessarily provide the full picture, as was the case when Trump was first elected in 2016. For now, however, it looks like Harris has a slight advantage based on polling in key swing states like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. She also has greater momentum than Trump coming out of the debate. But keep a close eye on the swing states over the next several weeks. That is where the race will be won or lost.

Major oil companies' profits in the second quarter of 2024

🔹 In the second quarter of (2024) seven major oil and gas companies such as; (Exxon Mobil, Chevron, TotalEnergies, Shell, BP, Equinor and Eni) posted a profit of $26.325 billion, up 2 percent from $25.848 billion in the second quarter of 2023. 🔹 In the second quarter of this year, Exxon Mobil alone had revenue of more than (9 billion) dollars, while the company's profit in the second quarter of last year was (7 billion 880 million) dollars. 🔹 In the second quarter of this year, Chevron's profit decreased by (26%), compared to the same period last year, while the Italian company "Eni" profit increased by (125%), compared to the second quarter of (2023).

Oil & Gas Dossier

Opinion

Iraq is trying to Import Gas from Turkmenistan: What will be the Role of Iran?

Future Center: Iran’s Struggles Amid Regional Shifts

Assad’s fall spurs calls to revive Iraq-Syria oil pipeline

Turkish influence in Syria changes the West's mood towards the Kurds

The Complex Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict: Qatar’s Strategy in Syria

The Complex Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict: Israel’s Strategic Goals in Syria

American man found in Syria after being imprisoned for months

AP: America’s closest ally in Syria is losing ground as a new order takes shape

Syria: The Last Nail in the Coffin of Arab Nationalism

A documentary film produced by (Draw Media) was screened in The Hague

How did Trump win and what is next for the Kurdistan Region?

Linking the Eastern Mediterranean and Gulf Energy Hubs: The Expanding US Strategic Role

From Beijing to Erbil: China's 75th Anniversary: Insights for the Kurdistan

The US election will come down to the “swing states,” but Harris has an advantage over Trump

Major oil companies' profits in the second quarter of 2024

China's Path to 2035

Why the United States should stop supporting the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga

Kurdistan gas and diversification

Will Iraq Finally Revive This Mothballed Megaproject?

BP’s Return to Kirkuk

Iraq is trying to Import Gas from Turkmenistan: What will be the Role of Iran?

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