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هه‌واڵ / جیهان

Türkiye’s Strikes Wreak Havoc on Northeast Syria

Critical Infrastructure Damaged, Millions Without Access to Essential Services Hiba Zayadin As the world's attention remains fixed on the devastating conflict unfolding in Gaza, another crisis is intensifying under the radar in northeast Syria. There, Türkiye’s airstrikes and drone attacks on critical civilian infrastructure are putting livelihoods at risk and severing communities from electricity, medical care, and other essential services. In late October 2023, Human Rights Watch reported that Turkish strikes on Kurdish-held areas of northeast Syria had resulted in water and electricity disruptions for millions of people. Back then, Turkish forces struck water and electrical power stations, oil installations, and the only operational gas plant for domestic use in all of northeast Syria. In December and January, Türkiye intensified its strikes to include medical facilities and crucial access roads used by humanitarian responders, according to the Northeast Syria (NES) NGO Forum, a coalition of international organizations operating in the area. Attacks which cause disproportionate damage to civilians and civilian objects are prohibited under international humanitarian law, and deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure is a war crime. The repeated strikes on civilian infrastructure have left many essential facilities in ruins, rendering hospitals, bakeries, and water facilities inoperable. Fuel, needed for cooking, heating, and farming, is running out. On January 29, the NES NGO forum said that 1 million people in cities and villages had been cut off from electricity, and over 2 million people had limited access to safe water. Damage to medical facilities targeted in December has disrupted the oxygen supply to more than a dozen private and public hospitals, and strikes on 28 health facilities have disrupted their services, increasing the risk of water-borne diseases. The forum warned that the “scale of damage far supersedes the humanitarian community’s capacity to sustain emergency life-saving service provision.” Türkiye has, for years, carried out military operations and airstrikes in northern Syria with the stated aim of targeting the Syrian Kurdish armed group, the People’s Protections Unit (YPG). Türkiye views the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an armed group based in Türkiye and Iraq, which it considers a terrorist organization. As the crisis in Northeast Syria escalates, action is needed to mitigate the humanitarian impacts on the civilian population. Türkiye should immediately stop targeting critical civilian infrastructure, respect international humanitarian law and hold to account those responsible for serious violations. All countries need to address the plight of the region's populace even if other conflicts are dominating the headlines.

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2023 prison census: Jailed journalist numbers near record high

Israel emerged as one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists following the October 7 start of the Israel-Gaza war, the Committee to Protect Journalists’ 2023 prison census has found. Israel ranked sixth – tied with Iran – behind China, Myanmar, Belarus, Russia, and Vietnam, respectively. Middle East and North Africa Egypt, routinely among the world’s worst jailers, tied with Turkey for the eighth-highest number of jailed journalists globally – 13 – in the 2023 census. Saudi Arabia was ninth, with 10 journalists behind bars. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Iraqi Kurdistan have all expanded the use of false news, terrorism, and anti-state charges against journalists in recent years. Egyptian authorities regularly work around legislation limiting prisoners’ pretrial detention to two years by filing additional charges to extend that period. Cases in point: freelancer Mohamed Said Fahmy, has spent more than four and a half years in pretrial detention after being arrested on false news and terrorism charges in 2018. He was scheduled for release in 2020 and 2021, but his detention was extended after prosecutors added further charges. Mostafa Mohamed Saad, a senior cameraman for Qatari broadcasting network Al-Jazeera, has been held in pretrial detention in Cairo on terrorism and false news charges since 2019.  No new jailings were reported from Bahrain and Syria, which still held five journalists each in 2023, or from Morocco and Algeria, which each held three. Iraq’s four jailed journalists included one new prisoner in Iraqi Kurdistan. In Tunisia, Khalifa Guesmi was taken into custody in September to serve a five-year prison sentence on charges of disclosing national security information. Earlier in the year, an appeals court had increased his sentence from one to five years... Continue.  

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Turkey says tanker seized by Iran carrying Turkish oil purchased from Iraq

Turkey’s main oil refiner Tupras said Thursday that a ship seized by Iran off the coast of Oman is laden with Turkish crude imported from Iraq.  Iran’s navy seized the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker St Nikolas, Iranian state media reported earlier Thursday. The move, according to the Iranian navy, came in retaliation for the confiscation of the same ship’s cargo by the United States in 2023. Under the name of Suez Rajan, the ship was laden with sanctioned Iranian oil and was bound for China before its owners were convinced by US officials to redirect to the United States.   Tupras said in a statement that radio communication with the Greek-owned and Tupras-chartered vessel was cut off at around 6:30 a.m. Istanbul time Thursday off the coast of Oman.  The tanker is carrying 140 metric tons of crude oil Tupras purchased from Iraqi state oil marketer SOMO and was en route to Turkey’s western port of Aliaga from Basra in Iraq, the statement added.  The ship’s Athens-based operator, Empire Navigation, told Reuters that the vessel’s 19-member crew consisted of 18 Filipino nationals and one Greek citizen.  Thursday's raid came after the US Navy reduced its presence in the Gulf region and diverted part of its Navy forces to the eastern Mediterranean as part of efforts to prevent the Israel-Hamas war from spreading to the broader region. Tensions between Washington and Tehran further escalated last week after the assassination of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in a Beirut neighborhood, which is under the influence of Iran-allied Hezbollah. Dozens of commercial shipping tankers in the region have been seized or harassed by Iran’s navy over the past few years. As Iranian attempts to seize commercial vessels increased following the confiscation of the Suez Rajan’s cargo, the United States beefed up allied patrols in Strait of Hormuz, increasing its military buildup in the region. Last year, the Biden administration also weighed a plan to deploy US Marines on commercial tankers but the plan was never approved.  

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Iran's Proxies In Iraq Target Israel’s Eilat, Jordan Intercepts

Iran-backed Iraqi militias launched a drone attack on the Israeli port city of Eilat, but the drone was intercepted by Jordan in its airspace. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella term for multiple Iran’s proxies, claimed responsibility on X for the failed attack on Friday morning. In the statement, they claimed the drone had hit the target. According to Hebrew-language daily newspaper Maariv, the Jordanian Defense Ministry announced that it had shot down the drone after it had crossed into Jordanian airspace Islamic Resistance in Iraq said the attack is in support of the people of Gaza, who have been under heavy Israeli fire since October 7, when Tehran-backed Islamist militant group Hamas declared war on Israel, killing 1,200 mostly civilians and taking 240 hostages. According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) is not a fixed group "but rather a generic name used to denote unity among Iran-backed armed groups. The "generic, no-logo brand" militia is part of Iran's "facade strategy" to avoid accountability for attacks on Americans, which have been intensified by the Gaza crisis. The institute suggests that Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is likely coordinating the attacks and "corralling" Iran's proxies which would normally argue over public leadership. The attack on Eilat is part of Iran's attempts to use proxy groups around the Middle East to put pressure on the US and Israel, as has been the case with increased Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Israel's Eilat Port has seen an 85% drop in activity since Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen stepped up attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, the port's chief executive said on Thursday. Also on Thursday, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that Assad Air Base in Iraq’s western province of Anbar, hosting American forces, was targeted by Iran-backed proxy forces in Iraq, who have launched around 100 such attacks since October 7.

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118 arbitrary detentions by Iranian government in November

Hengaw Organization According to data registered at the Statistics and Documentation Center of the Hengaw Organization, in November 2023, Iranian government security forces detained a minimum of 118 individuals. This reflects a 61% reduction when contrasted with the 303 individuals detained in the preceding month of October. The report reveals that in November 2023, the security forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran arbitrarily detained and forcibly disappeared a total of 44 Kurdish individuals, 7 Baloch people, 40 women, 5 children, and 18 Baha'i adherents.   More than 43% of those detainees are Kurdish or Baloch According to Hengaw's statistics, during November, at least 44 Kurdish individuals were detained by Iranian government entities, comprising 37% of the total detentions across Iran during the past month. During the same period, 7 Baloch individuals were also detained by government security forces, accounting for 6% of all detentions. Furthermore, during the past month, 9 Gilak activists, 5 Lor and Bakhtiari individuals, and 5 Turkish individuals were detained by security forces.   Detained Religious Minority Activists; The arbitrary detention of religious minority activists persisted in November, mirroring previous months, with government entities detaining a minimum of 26 individuals. Among those arrested, 18 were Baha'i adherents, comprising 12 women and 6 men. Furthermore, during the same period, Iranian government entities detained four Kurdish Yarsan adherents in Kermanshah province and four Sunni figures from Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchistan.   Detention of 40 females and 5 minors in November; According to the statistics at the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, at least 40 females were detained across Iran during the past month. This number accounts for 34% of all detentions. In the last month, at least 12 female Baha'i adherents, 7 Gilak women activists, and 2 Kurdish women activists were arrested. Additionally, during the same period, five minors under the age of 18 were detained or forcibly disappeared by security and government entities across Iran. These five detainee children are Kurdish from Piranshahr.   Detention of teachers, students, and media activists; During November 2023, based on Hengaw's statistics, at least 2 students in the cities of Tabriz and Karaj, as well as 9 teachers in the cities of Abdanan, Firuz Abad, Shiraz, Ahvaz, and Mashahd, were detained. It is also important to note that during the past month, at least six journalists and media activists, as well as nine artists and actors in various cities across Iran, were detained by government entities.

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As Turkey intensifies war on Kurdish militants in Iraq, civilians are suffering

Seventeen-year-old Samir Saado was finishing his cleaning shift at the village medical centre when an airstrike hit the building. "I didn't see anything other than dust and smoke," said Saado, a member of Iraq’s minority Yazidi community. "My leg was stuck under the rubble. I called for help and people were coming but the planes kept striking.” At least four civilians were killed that day, Aug. 17, 2021, local officials said. Among the dead was Saado’s father, who worked as a cook at the centre in Iraq’s northern Sinjar province, about 100 km (62 miles) from the Turkish border. Saado suffered a broken pelvis and a cracked skull. The strike was part of escalating attacks by Turkish aircraft and drones in mainly Kurdish areas of Iraq and Syria, which have since continued, a Reuters data analysis shows. Western firms have supplied critical components for the drones, which Kurdish and Iraqi officials say Turkey is deploying with increasing frequency. Airstrikes have surged since Turkey launched “Operation Claw-Lock” in April last year. The aim, the Turkish Defence Ministry says, is to protect Turkey’s borders and “neutralise terrorism and terrorists at source.” Earlier this month , Turkey unleashed air strikes on militant targets in northern Iraq and Syria after the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) said it was behind a bomb attack near government buildings in Ankara, in which two police officers were injured. Northern Iraq is the base of the PKK, which over decades has carried out many deadly attacks in Turkey and is labelled a terrorist organisation by the United States and European Union. Turkish operations in Syria target the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a militia that Ankara says is a PKK-affiliated terrorist group. The YPG is part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a U.S. ally against Islamic State. Turkey’s Defence Ministry said in a statement to Reuters that all of its operations fall “within the framework of international law, respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all our neighbours.” “In the planning and execution of the operations, only terrorists and their positions, warehouses and shelters are targeted, and the utmost care and sensitivity is shown to prevent harm to civilians and to prevent damage to infrastructure and cultural sites.” Any claims to the contrary “are unfounded, slanderous, and lies,” the statement said. Reuters could not reach the PKK. The Syrian Democratic Forces said Turkish strikes in Syria are unjustified. A YPG spokesperson said its forces “did not fire a single shot in the direction of the Turkish state.” Reuters analysed violent incidents recorded by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a global research organisation that collects reports from media outlets, government reports, non-governmental groups and other sources. This analysis shows that in 2022, Turkey carried out at least 2,044 airstrikes in mostly Kurdish areas of Iraq and Syria, a 53% increase on the previous year and the highest number since ACLED began documenting strikes across the two countries in 2017. The figure is likely a conservative estimate because Reuters’ analysis excluded airstrikes that may have been conducted in battle. ACLED draws information about airstrikes in northern Iraq and Syria from sources including the PKK’s military wing, the Turkish state-owned news agency Anadolu and conflict monitors the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Airwars and Liveuamap....continue reading.

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What Did Nasrallah Really Say, and Why?

Hanin Ghaddar The Washington Institute The Hezbollah leader’s first public remarks on Gaza were cautious in tone and vague on substance, but the group may not stay deterred indefinitely if its political or tactical situation changes. As expected, Hezbollah secretary-general leader Hassan Nasrallah did not declare war against Israel today—rather, his first public speech on the Gaza conflict served as a reminder that his calculations on the crisis are the same as Iran’s, and that preserving Tehran’s plausible deniability for the actions of its proxies is paramount. (For English excerpts and analysis of the speech, see this live update thread by L’Orient Today.) In addition to assuring the international community that Iran is not responsible for any of Hamas’s actions, he also told Hamas that it is on its own: “This is a purely Palestinian battle and is not related to any regional or international file.” In other words, the “united front” is not that united. Rather than joining the actual fight, Nasrallah asked his supporters to fight the war of public opinion, essentially arguing that the battlefield is online, not in Gaza. The speech’s understated tone was more surprising—Nasrallah showed far less anger and agitation compared to his past speeches on conflicts in Syria and Yemen. After one month of eerie silence and three pre-speech trailers full of suspense, most observers anticipated a little escalation, even if mostly rhetorical. Yet his tone was largely muted and his red lines were vague. Besides warning that any Lebanese civilian fatalities would force Hezbollah to kill Israeli civilians in return, he offered the standard ambiguous rhetoric about choosing “the right time and place” to retaliate for Israel’s actions in Gaza. His bottom line was clear: for now at least, Hezbollah will not participate in the war beyond the current border skirmishes. (For more on Hezbollah’s attacks so far, see The Washington Institute’s interactive tracking map.) His warnings to the United States were more specific and potentially escalatory—he noted that Yemen’s Houthis will continue firing missiles northward, and that Iraqi militias will keep targeting the U.S. presence in both their country and Syria. Yet he was careful not to implicate Tehran in these Iranian proxy actions, nor did he threaten to use Hezbollah’s own weapons against U.S. forces. Indeed, Washington’s timely military deployments so close to Lebanon have seemingly played a major deterrent role for the group. Nasrallah’s speech was no doubt deeply disappointing for his supporters in Lebanon and the wider region, many of whom expected a more aggressive response by the alleged leader of the “resistance.” It was also disappointing for Hamas, which will probably feel less secure and more isolated now—and perhaps more inclined to negotiate and compromise. Yet the speech’s most serious repercussions will be felt in the realm of Hezbollah’s legitimacy. Nasrallah essentially declared that he will not be involved in the battle to “free Palestine,” a goal that lies at the core of his resistance narrative. In doing so, he confirmed that Hezbollah’s mission has drastically shifted since the 2006 war—from “resisting” Israel to protecting its own (and, by extension, Iran’s) interests in the region. Without the legitimizing power of resistance rhetoric, the group’s regional (and, perhaps, domestic) support base may lose faith in both Hezbollah and Tehran. Indeed, this predicament has bedeviled Hezbollah since 2006. Despite engaging in a month’s worth of calculated attacks along the border, the group’s military strength is becoming a weakness of sorts, since flexing its muscles more than it already has would increase the risk of a major Israeli response. Hezbollah has long used the threat of its increasingly advanced arsenal as a deterrent against Israel. But Nasrallah also knows that these same weapons—particularly its precision-guided missiles—would lose their main value if the group began launching them, since Hezbollah forces and assets would quickly be exposed to a devastating war. Yet by dashing regional expectations for a grand, effective, and united military response against Israel, Nasrallah may incur other costs. In short, the group is damned if it escalates and damned if it doesn’t. Nasrallah also briefly addressed what might happen when the Gaza war is over and Israel turns its full attention back to Lebanon and Hezbollah’s dangerous missiles. The deterrence strategy that was upheld for seventeen years is likely no longer valid now that Israel suffered such horrific casualties at the hands of another neighboring enemy on October 7. Even before the Gaza war, Hezbollah’s border escalation was seemingly changing Israel’s calculus; today, many countries have concluded that groups like Hamas and Hezbollah need to be contained before another October 7 happens. In addition, the United States has reestablished a very strong military presence in the region, and even if some of these deployments prove temporary, the Biden administration’s recent diplomatic activity in the Middle East indicates a longer-term determination to prevent escalation after the war. Nasrallah seems aware of these shifts and has signaled Hezbollah’s unwillingness to change the deterrence policy along the border: “The resistance’s operations in the South tell the enemy that if it carries out an aggression or thinks of waging a preemptive operation, it will be committing the biggest foolishness in its history.” While vague and couched as a warning against Israeli action, this remark essentially communicated that Hezbollah will not escalate unless Israel launches some kind of unexpected, large-scale campaign across the northern border. Despite Nasrallah’s rhetorical caution, however, the fact remains that more and more military clashes are occurring on Lebanon’s border daily, so the risks of miscalculation are rising as well. Whether he likes it or not, he may eventually find himself having to make a very different speech in the midst of unintended escalation with Israel. Alternatively, Hezbollah may one day improve its financial situation and boost its military apparatus to the point where it is truly ready to face Israel in a full-scale conflict. Either way, the United States and its partners must continue signaling Hezbollah and Iran that they are willing to strike back if the group miscalculates its current level of attacks or changes its tactics. They should also start formulating a new Iran policy—one that addresses all of Iran’s militias and destabilizing activities in the region. Otherwise, they risk leaving themselves vulnerable to a repeat of October 7 on another frontier.

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Zhina Amini awarded top EU human rights prize

Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life and Freedom Movement in Iran were on Thursday awarded the European Parliament's Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. "The 16 September 2022 is a date that will live in infamy and the brutal murder of 22-year-old Jina Mahsa Amini marked a turning point. It has triggered a women-led movement that is making history," European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said after announcing the winner.  "The world has heard the chants of "women, life, liberty", three words that have become a rallying cry for all those standing up for equality, for dignity and for freedom in Iran.  "So let's today's prize serve as a tribute to the brave and defiant women, men and young people of Iran who despite coming under increasing pressure are leading the push for change. The European Parliament hears you, the world sees you and we are with you," she added.  The Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, given each year since 1988 by the European Parliament, is the European Union's highest tribute to human rights defenders and comes with a €50,000 endowment.  Last year it was awarded to the "brave people" of Ukraine defending their country against Russia's relentless invasion. Women rights' defenders and Nicaraguan activists Two other nominees made it on the finalist shortlist. Women fighting for free, safe and legal abortion were nominated by the Left group which highlighted three women in particular including Justyna Wydrzyńska. The Polish activist is a member of the Abortion Dream Team, a grassroots initiative that provides direct and immediate assistance to women who need abortions. She was sentenced to eight months community service for helping a woman obtain an abortion in Poland, whose government rolled out a near-total ban on pregnancy terminations in 2021. The two other women included were Morena Herrera, a feminist and social activist, advocating for safe and legal abortion access in El Salvador, and Colleen McNicholas, an American obstetrician-gynaecologist with a strong track record of high-quality patient care and impactful reproductive health advocacy. The nomination of Vilma Núñez de Escorcia and Monsignor Rolando José Álvarez Lagos from Nicaragua was meanwhile backed by 43 MEPs. Nuñez is a lawyer and human rights activist who has chosen to remain in the country despite being jailed and tortured. Álvarez, Bishop of Matagalpa, is a vocal critic of President Daniel Ortega's Sandinista regime. He was sentenced to 26 years in prison earlier this year and his nationality was suspended after he was charged with treason, undermining national integrity and spreading false news.  The prize will be given at a ceremony in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 13 December.  The Prize is named in honour of Soviet physicist and political dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov.  

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US sends radar system to its forces in Syria

The United States provided its forces in the Deir Ez-Zor province in eastern Syria with a radar system after oil fields in the area were attacked by “foreign terrorist groups backed by Iran,” local sources reported. The sources told the Anadolu Agency that US forces brought four radar systems from Iraq to their base in the Al-Shaddadah area, in Al-Hasakah province, northeastern Syria, through the Al-Walid border gate on Saturday. US forces deployed radar systems in Al-Omar oil and Konko gas fields in Deir Ez-Zor yesterday, according to the same sources. A radar-linked missile system was also deployed at the two sites, the model of which was not identified. The sources stated that the deployment of the radar system was to respond to any attacks by Iranian-backed terrorist groups west of the Euphrates River. On 17 July, Washington reinforced its forces in Syria with four Himars missile launchers, 15 artillery batteries, five armoured vehicles, five tanks, and 45 ammunition-loaded vehicles, which arrived at its base in Al-Shaddadah.

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This war will not stop only between Israel and Hamas but will spread to other countries

Draw Media Israeli citizens are still searching for the answer! what was it that happened? Was it the failure of the Israeli army and intelligence or is the war itself a scenario? Officials say they will postpone the response until after the War. This war will be long and will not stop only between Israel and Hamas but will spread to other countries. This is the war between Israel and the United States against Iran. In order not to be burned by the flames of the war, the Kurds must remain neutral and not get involved in the agenda of their neighbors. The war is much bigger and will change the map of the Middle East. Ilan Israel, a Kurdish journalist and political observer living in Israel, spoke to Draw Media from Tel Aviv..Here is the full interview in Kurdish

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Syrian Democratic Council calls for international action against Turkey’s strikes

The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), a part of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, has released a statement on the anniversary of the "Peace Spring" operation, where the Turkish Armed Forces captured the cities of Serêkaniyê (Ras al-Ain) and Girê Spî (Tal Abyad) in northern Syria. In the statement, the SDC noted that four years after the operation, Turkey's attacks on North and East Syria continue. They called on the international coalition led by the United States, as well as Russia, to take action. According to Hawar News Agency (ANHA), the statement criticized Turkey's airstrikes and drone attacks on the region's infrastructure and energy centers. It emphasized that Turkey's ongoing attacks on the region have tragically affected the lives of more than five million people. The SDC called on Russia and the international coalition, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, to fulfill their responsibilities and urgently take steps to stop the attacks and protect the region. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria previously declared three days of mourning following an airstrike on the Internal Security Forces Academy in Derik, affiliated with the Haseke governorate, on October 8, which resulted in the loss of 29 lives and injuries to 28 others. At least 45 fatalities At least 45 people have lost their lives in the airstrikes that began after Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's statement on October 4, indicating that infrastructure and superstructure in North and East Syria would be targeted, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights based in London. According to the Observatory's reports: - 30 Asayish members in the village of Gucerat in the rural area of Haseke - One person at a petrol station in El-Kahtaniye - Six members of the Internal Security Forces in Haseke city - Two individuals as a result of an attack on a moving vehicle in El-Müşerifa (Mişêrfa) in the north of Haseke - One civilian in the village of Tel Habeş (Til Hebeş) in Amude district - Five people in Kobanê; two workers in Celabiya, three soldiers in Sırrin lost their lives in the airstrikes.

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Campaigners raise alarm after former Kurdish oil minister sues journalists

ARAB NEWS Campaigners have expressed concern that UK courts are being used to silence critical reporting after a former Kurdish minister sued two journalists who accused him of misconduct, The Times reported. Ashti Hawrami, who served as oil minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government from 2006 to 2019, is taking legal action against journalists Will Jordan and Daniel Balint-Kurti, reporters for the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, over a 2021 article that alleged he had misused his power to grant oil concessions. Hawrami, who was a major player in the Kurdish oil industry, was linked to UK MP and former chancellor Nadhim Zahawi, who worked as a “fixer” for oil company Gulf Keystone. Campaigners say Hawrami’s claim is a “strategic lawsuit against public participation,” or SLAPP, a legal strategy designed to intimidate journalists and discourage public interest reporting. The practice has received increasing scrutiny in the UK, with lawsuits often filed by wealthy or powerful individuals against journalists and activists, who face having their financial resources drained amid costly litigation fees. In a letter to the UK justice secretary last month, editors from several major newspapers, including The Times, The Telegraph and The Guardian, warned that SLAPPs represent a growing threat to press freedom in the UK and Europe. “We are deeply concerned that human rights defenders are facing prison sentences and heavy fines for exercising their right to freedom of expression and opinion,” UN experts said in a statement last year. It is unclear if the case against Jordan and Balint-Kurti will come to court. Hawrami’s lawyers said that they decided to sue OCCRP only after contacting the outlet to dispute the accuracy of several claims. A spokesman for Hawrami’s lawyers, Carter Ruck, said: “There is no proper basis whatsoever to assert that this case is a SLAPP. The position is that our client only very reluctantly brought proceedings in May 2022, over an article published in May 2021, when extensive attempts to resolve his complaint, without recourse to litigation, broke down. “As well as making false claims, the article contains significant errors which to this day have never been corrected. Our client finds himself in the very regrettable position of having been defamed and is entitled to bring legal proceedings seeking to clear his name.” The case is being closely watched by press freedom groups and journalists, who fear that it could set a dangerous precedent for press freedom in the UK.

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Iraq-Turkey oil pipe restart not imminent

The restart of the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline continues to be "complicated" by financial compensation issues between the two countries and is not imminent, a senior Iraqi source told Argus, as expectations are mounting over a possible return of around 470,000 b/d of northern Iraqi crude following a six-month shut-in. "The issue is not about logistics, but financial commitments," the source said. Talks about how and when to restart pipeline flows have been underway between Turkey and Iraq since late June. And the Turkish official line often attributes the halt in exports to inspection and assessment of the pipeline for earthquake-damage. Iraq's prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and oil minister Hayan Abdulghani also used this justification. But the problem lies with financial compensation, according to the senior Iraqi source. "Turkey cannot pay Iraq the compensation it is required under the arbitration case ruling. The situation is complicated," he said. The Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in March ordered Ankara to pay Baghdad $1.9bn for breaching its contract with Iraq by directly trading oil with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) between 2014 and 2018. It awarded Turkey around $500mn for counterclaims, mainly predicated on low pipeline capacity and unpaid transportation fees dating back to the 1990s. Turkey is also seeking legal action against Iraq, and has filed at the ICC a motion to set aside the arbitration ruling. Another financial layer hinders the restart of 470,000 b/d flows — around 400,000 b/d sold by the KRG and 70,000 b/d of federal Iraqi crude — from Turkey's Ceyhan port, according to the source. "The Turks have loaned the Kurds a certain sum of money. It seems like payback used to happen through Turkey getting a certain share from Kurdish crude exports through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline," the source said. And Turkey wants the money, he said. Turkey's energy minister Alparslan Bayraktar earlier this month said that the pipeline is "more or less ready", but that its restart was down to Erbil and Baghdad. "They need to get together and decide how they're going to proceed," he said. Relations between Erbil and Baghdad have been strained over the past few months, with both sides accusing each other of not upholding their end of the 2023 budget agreement. But Iraq's federal government this month approved an increase in loans to the cash-strapped Kurdistan Region Government (KRG), which could temporarily turn down the heat between the two. And the KRG's finance ministry on 24 September announced that it will begin dispersing public servants' salaries, in a sign that Baghdad began transferring money. Erbil will initially receive 2.1 trillion Iraqi dinars ($1.6bn) for the current fiscal year, to be paid in three ID700bn instalments starting this month.

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Oil exports from northern Iraq to be resumed soon

The Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar, said that the inspection of the oil pipeline between Iraq and Turkey has been completed, and the pipeline will be technically ready for operation soon. Turkey had stopped oil flows through the pipeline in northern Iraq on March 25, after the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ordered Ankara to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion in compensation for damages caused by the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) export of oil without permission from the federal government in Baghdad between 2014 and 2018. Turkey began maintenance work on the pipeline, which, according to Turkish officials, passes through a seismically active area and was damaged by floods. “As of today, an independent survey company has completed its work, and they are now preparing the report,” Bayraktar said in a press briefing last Thursday. The Turkish minister did not mention a date for the resumption of oil flows through the pipeline. The Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) said at the end of August that the closure of the Iraqi oil export pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan has cost producers and the Iraqi government about $4 billion. According to the APIKUR, which includes a group of foreign and local companies working in oil production, losses are expected to continue despite initial talks between the Iraqi and Turkish governments to resolve the outstanding issue.

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Iran’s Pressure Campaign on Iranian Kurds Continues

The Washington Institute, Wladimir van Wilgenburg Iran has stepped up pressure on Baghdad and Erbil to disarm and relocate Iranian Kurdish opposition parties in the Kurdistan Region amidst ongoing disputes between Erbil and Baghdad over budget and oil revenues. Most of the Iranian Kurdish parties are located in areas controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), apart from fighters of the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), that are in Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) controlled territories in the Qandil mountains, who vowed not to disarm. The situation has become even more precarious for Iranian Kurdish parties, especially with the appointment of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's government in October 2022. Sudani’s government received support from the Iran-backed Coordination Framework and is perceived as granting Iran greater room to exert its influence. Tehran is hoping to remove the Iranian Kurdish parties from Iraq, as it did with the People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran that was moved from Baghdad to Albania in 2016. While it has proven more difficult to convince the KRG to comply compared to Shia parties in Baghdad, Iran is applying significant pressure on officials in Erbil and Suleimani. Furthermore, the position of the Kurdistan Region significantly weakened in March after Baghdad won the international arbitration case in Paris against Turkey, which stopped the export of 500,000 barrels per day through Turkey. The abrupt removal of its key form of revenue generation made Kurdistan more dependent on the budget coming out of Baghdad. The Iraqi government could also use this as a pretext to gain more control over the Kurdistan Region’s border areas and weaken the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy. Baghdad is already demanding oil and non-oil revenues in addition to the handover of 400,000 bpd from the KRG in exchange for sending the budget to Erbil. Therefore, the KRG is under more pressure to make concessions. This contentious relationship between Baghdad and Erbil is not a new development, however. Even before PM Sudani’s administration, Iran has carried out several ballistic missile and drone attacks on Iranian Kurdish forces in the Kurdistan Region since 2018. The PDKI in 2016 briefly broke a ceasefire with Iran and resumed attacks, but these hostilities ceased soon after. The KRG previously instructed the Iranian Kurdish parties to not use the Kurdistan Region’s territory as a staging ground for attacks on Iran, and for the most part they have abided by this request.   Targeting Iranian Kurdish Parties During Iranian Protests The Iranian attacks and pressure on Iranian Kurdish parties intensified after massive protests erupted in Iran, following the death of Jina (Mahsa) Amini, a young Kurdish woman on September 16 of last year while in the custody of Iran's morality police. While the resulting protests were pervasive and spanned across Iran’s ethnic communities, Iran has attempted to blame sectarianism and accused the Kurdish Iranian opposition parties of fomenting unrest in Iranian Kurdistan. Tehran claims that these Kurdish parties have worked with Israel to attack Iran. Between September and October 2022, Iran carried out several attacks using ballistic missiles and suicide drones on three Iranian Kurdish opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) in Koya and the Sidekan subdistrict (Erbil governorate), Komala in Zirgwez (Sulaimani governorate) and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) in Pirde (road between Erbil-Kirkuk). According to Hengaw, at least 21 members of these parties died, including two women, a one-day-old child, and also a civilian from Koya. Moreover, Iran threatened a military incursion that October, although the threat did not materialize. In order to assuage Iran’s concerns, Iraq deployed border guards to the border with Iran in December 2022, and in March signed a border security agreement with Iran. While the attacks decreased after the Iranian protests largely died down by January this year after a huge crackdown—with at least 537 killed—Iran has continued to carry out assassinations against Iranian Kurdish opposition figures in the Kurdistan Region, including one in July against two PDKI members. In addition, Iran and Iranian affiliated Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) have previously targeted Kurdistan’s oil and gas infrastructure and the U.S. military presence. Turkish military bases in Iraq have also been targeted by PMU groups. On August 30, rockets allegedly fired from Tuz Khurmato once again targeted the Khor Mor gas field. PMF groups are now also in close proximity to the Kurdistan Region, having benefited from the anti-ISIS war in 2014 and gaining control of disputed territories from the Peshmerga forces in October 2017, subsequent to the September 2017 referendum. Iran also played a major role in the events of October. Consequently, Kurdish provinces are within the range of PMF’s katyusha rockets. Renewed Threats and a Hard Deadline Iran has been increasing the pressure in the weeks leading up to the anniversary of Jina Amini’s death. Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nasser Kanaani on August 28 underlined that Iran’s deadline issued earlier this year to disarm Iranian Kurdish parties by September 19 “will not be extended” under any circumstances. He underlined that Iran expects Baghdad to evacuate and transfer the Iranian Kurdish parties from their military bases to camps designated by the Iraqi government. Kanaani warned that if the Iraqi government does not fulfill its commitment by the end of the set deadline, Iran will act in line “with its responsibility to guarantee its own security.” Moreover, Iran has reportedly also submitted a list of Iranian Kurdish leaders to Baghdad, seeking their extradition. Most recently, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi called Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani directly, emphasizing that any efforts from “separatist terrorist groups” to undermine regional security would not be tolerated. PAK spokesperson Khalil Nadri also added that there will be more attacks on Iranian Kurdish parties “if the US and its allies remain silent about Iran's threats.” stating that “Washington can stop Iran from taking a decisive stance" but that its current indifference was sending the wrong signals to Iran. It seems likely that Iran will continue its drone and missile strikes so long as the KRG does not disarm or relocate Iranian Kurdish groups, especially amidst the upcoming anniversary. In addition to artillery and drone attacks, Iran could also attempt to launch cross-border assaults, similar to Turkey’s offensive into KRG territory in the north. In 1996, Iran launched a cross-border offensive with 3,000 troops against the PDKI in Koya, killing at least 20 members. Following the offensive, the PDKI announced they would stop cross-border attacks. Moreover, it will be difficult for the KRG to fully disarm the groups, although it could try to remove Iranian Kurdish armed fighters from positions at the border with Iran. Indeed, reports over the last several days suggest that this process may be beginning, although the scope of these efforts is not yet clear. These include reports that PAK forces were removed from Pirde, located between Erbil and Kirkuk. Reportedly, Iraq has stationed an additional 6,000 troops along its borders and plans to construct new border posts, with aims to recruit 3,000 locals for border guards. Iraqi National Security Advisor Qassem al-Araji had meetings with both senior KRG and PUK officials in Iran and the Kurdistan Region to discuss the border agreement. This dialogue continues; on September 11, KRG interior minister Reber Ahmad arrived in Baghdad to discuss the situation, while PUK head Bafel Talabani travelled to Iran the preceding day for meetings likely linked to the crisis. On August 20, Araji also met with the UN envoy to Iraq, and KRG’s Interior Minister to discuss the situation of refugees in the Kurdistan Region. Also on September 11, PM Masrour Barzani met with Iran’s Ambassador. Kurdish President Nechirvan Barzani on Wednesday also said that both Baghdad and Erbil have taken steps, which leaves no more “room for any pretext for an Iranian military operation.” Iraqi FM Fuad Hussein also told reporters on September 13 during a visit to Iran that the groups will be disarmed in two days. However, Kamran Matin, a senior Lecturer in International Relations at University of Sussex thinks it is unlikely that the Kurdistan Region will disarm Iranian Kurdish groups. “These groups have a long and close relationship with [the] local population so any move by KRG to disarm them will be politically costly for its ruling parties.” He added that the “US might also not condone such a move which will boost Iran’s influence in Iraq and the wider region.” However, he said a “change in the existing pattern of these groups’ presence in KRI is possible, especially one involving UN oversight.” For their part, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are not staying silent. In a rare move among a series of parties that do not generally coordinate their movements, on September 6, most of the Iranian Kurdish parties called for a general strike on September 16—the anniversary of Amini’s death. “On the other hand, Rojhalat of Kurdistan (Iranian Kurdistan) is on the eve of the anniversary of the Jina (Mahsa Amini) Uprising. Iran wants to draw attention to the street threats of Iranian political parties,” PAK spokesperson Khalil Nadri stated in an interview with the author. He also accused Tehran of leading “a comprehensive process against all parts of Kurdistan. This is a process that began in 2017” in response to the Kurdish independence referendum. In August, the KRG reportedly summoned officials from Komala and PDKI parties to discuss mounting pressures from Tehran, reported The Citadel. The opposition groups were open to move to new camps, but they rejected calls to surrender their arms. The PDKI has since called on both Baghdad and the international community to prevent new attacks. When asked about the potential of relocating forces from near the Iranian border, a member of PDKI, on the condition of anonymity, said, “I don’t think that is an option for us. We might relocate but not move from the border.” Other officials echo the same sentiment. Arash Saleh, representative of PDKI to the United States, also told the author that “PDKI has never used Iraq’s soil to initiate any military activities against Iran. We respect the sovereignty of Iraq.” Reflecting on the broader geopolitical impact of these maneuvers, Saleh proposed that “Iran's end game here is ultimately to tighten its grip on Iraq. The regime in Tehran is trying to increase its influence and leverage in Iraq and to undermine KRG status and they use any baseless pretext to further their agenda. The silence in Washington, London, and Paris about this matter can be disastrous for the West's interests in Iraq and the broader region.”

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